O Hubert Dreyfus για τον “εύρωστο ρεαλισμό” στον Heidegger, ή Heidegger εναντίον Davidson

Περίληψη

TWO ARE the major hermeneutic orientations, both ontological and cognitive, regarding Heidegger’s Being and Time. The first conceives of its First Division as the manifestation of an idealism – e.g. of a “temporal idealism” in William Blattner’s terms –, whereas the second one focuses on the unique features of its meta-metaphysical realism. Hubert Dreyfus’ main thesis stresses the irreductibility of practical understanding to cognitive elements in the early Heidegger; in this respect, he follows the positions of Quine, Davidson and Rorty as to the nature of convictions and beliefs. Nevertheless, according to Dreyfus, the early Heidegger, in close proximity to Merleau-Ponty and the late Wittgenstein, adopts the position that practical understanding, while involving beliefs and convictions, can only be conferred meaning against a background of common practices. In Being and Time’s hermeneutic realism Dreyfus traces down the basic assumption that micro-practices cannot be objectified in the form of beliefs, convictions, or norms. For Dreyfus, Heidegger’s “robust” realism is not reducible to any form of metaphysical realism, pragmatism or physicalism. In his more recent readings of Being and Time Dreyfus opposes Heidegger’s “robust” realism to Davidson’s “deflationary” realism criticising the interpretations of Being and Time by interpreters inspired by Davidson, such as Joseph Rouse and Jeff Malpas.