Thucydides on Grand Strategy: Spartan Grand Strategy during the Peloponnesian War

Abstract

It is customary to view the Peloponnesian War as a contest between land and sea power. This is a quite distorting position, however, since the Spartans quickly understood the need to match Athenian naval strength, and they eventually did so. It is far more accurate to view the war as a contest between two opposing grand strategic designs. In contrast to the Periclean grand strategy of exhaustion, Sparta followed a grand strategy of annihilation centered around the Spartan military might. Sparta aimed at a decisive land battle, while consistently trying to make the war costlier for the Athenians by devastating Attica, encouraging Athens’ allies to revolt, and trying to exploit every secondary front the Athenians had opened. However, at the initial phase of the war the balance of power was so adverse to Sparta that her strategy could simply not work. Only after the Athenian disaster at Sicily were the Spartans able to secure the necessary support (chiefly from Persia) to match Athenian naval strength and pursue their grand strategy of annihilation with success.