Kant on our duties regarding animals

Abstract

Kant claims that we do not have duties ‘towards’ animals; what we have are, at best, indirect duties ‘regarding’ animals, which are nonetheless duties towards ourselves. This view is rather unpopular both amongst animal ethicists and in the Kantian literature, and there are many attempts to reconstruct the Kantian argument in a way that it can be shown to accommodate direct duties towards animals. However, it is my view that this cannot be done without violating basic principles of Kant’s moral theory. Thus, far from agreeing with these attempts, in my paper, firstly, I explain Kant’s ‘indirect duty’ approach and, secondly, I support it (my aim being purely exegetical as concerns Kant’s ethical views) in the light of what Kant calls “amphiboly in moral concepts of reflection” in the famous “Episodic Section” of the Doctrine of Virtue. Of particular importance in my reading is pointing out some degree of relevance between this concept of amphiboly in the Metaphysics of Morals and the concept of analogy, which Kant uses in his Lectures on Ethics as the basis for supporting his indirect duty approach. I argue that, although at first sight ‘analogy’ seems to be something positive, as it reveals resemblances with moral importance between humans and animals, a more careful examination shows it to be something negative that lies on the basis of amphiboly. At the same time, I point to a possible contradiction between Kant’s indirect duty approach regarding animals and his non-revisionist views on our ordinary moral thinking, and I interpret his solution as resulting from his commitment to critical thinking.