Immigration and Its Impact on Greek Foreign Policy*

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**ABSTRACT**

International immigration has long been considered part of the “low politics” agenda and thus peripheral to international relations scholarship. In Greece, migration emerged during the 1990s as an important national security issue. The paper examines the real and perceived impact of migration (especially illegal migration) on Greek foreign policy. A closer look at how migration shapes the contemporary foreign policy and security agendas may help argue that the migration “wave” recently experienced in Greece has led to the construction of new perceptions of threat as well as the development of a new discourse on Greece’s international role and identity. Migration also has influenced decisively Greek foreign policy agenda. Migration has also significantly altered its external priorities and objectives.

**Introduction**

After the collapse of the Communist régimes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the 1990s, increasing flows of legal and mainly illegal migrants from these countries entered Greece. In fact Greece is now a labour-
importing country with legal and illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries, such as Albania and Bulgaria, as well as from countries situated as far away as Pakistan and the Philippines. During the last five years in particular, illegal immigrants fleeing war and poverty mostly in the East, entered the country by sea with a view towards settling in Greece and via Greece to Italy and other European countries. Today the total estimated number of foreigners, including regularized labour migrants (about 600,000 in 2001), irregular migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union exceeds one million. Greece now has more immigrants than any Southern European country in proportion to its population. The great majority of immigrants to Greece come from countries with which it shares borders. In fact the exceptional domination of one source country, Albania, remains distinct in the Greek experience.

This article deals with the impact of international immigration, especially irregular immigration, on Greek foreign policy. For Greece, international immigration is by now considered as a major factor in the security and foreign policy problematic because the country has been overwhelmed with massive influxes of immigrants coming from the south and east of the Mediterranean, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. The first part of this article examines migration within the context of foreign policy. The second part deals with the impact of immigration on Greek national security concept, and the third analyzes the consequences of immigration on Greek foreign policy.

Foreign Policy and Migration

In recent years international migration has no longer been confined to the realms of humanitarian, labour market and social integration concerns. On the contrary, it has gained prominence on the agenda of heads of governments and of various inter-governmental organisations becoming a salient issue of “high politics”. However, migration has received little attention in major general approaches of contemporary international relations theory, whether that of neorealists, liberals or constructivists. Neomarxists and world systems theorists have discussed migration but they have focused primarily on explaining the phenomenon of migration under modern capitalism in terms of unequal exchange and dependency. Migration has also long been considered peripheral to foreign policy analysis. As Mark Miller and Demetrios Papademetriou have observed “underlying assumptions concerning the fundamental nature of foreign policy and international politics have left migration matters outside the traditional focus of foreign policy analysis in much the same way that the foreign
policy significance of energy, finance, and political terrorism issues long were underestimated. It belonged, after all, in the domain of ‘low politics’\textsuperscript{5}. Bimal Ghosh has advocated more extensive coordination of immigration policy with foreign policy. “The contention is that, despite the important consequences, there is too little thought given to international migration in policy-making”\textsuperscript{6}.

Even among International Political Economy (IPE) scholars who gradually found a voice in the security discourse, questions of the politics of capital and trade received the bulk of academic attention, while questions of migration (from an international perspective) were addressed by a largely marginalized interdisciplinary group of scholars\textsuperscript{7}. Only in the mid-to late 1990s did the discipline of international relations begin to recognize that international population movements can have a dramatic effect on security and foreign policy\textsuperscript{8}. Therefore, as Myron Weiner had observed correctly twelve years ago, the literature on international relations “says relatively little about population movements, except insofar as the refugee phenomenon is described as an outcome of conflicts”\textsuperscript{9}.

However, in developing countries as well as in developed ones, governments, public opinion, media and scholars increasingly perceive international migration as a threat to national, regional and international stability. As Sarah Collinson has noticed “migration has the propensity to feature prominently in connection with a variety of broader security issues because it dovetails closely with a number of deepening concerns about the wider regional and global economic, political and strategic environment in which European governments will have to operate in coming decades”\textsuperscript{10}. International migration therefore is emerging as one of the most prominent aspects of foreign policy and international security. Indeed, this shift in emphasis on security can be explained by the emergence of four factors.

First of all, governments are worried about what they perceive as a global migration crisis. Over the last two decades, migration has truly become a worldwide phenomenon in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In many countries, civil wars, gross human rights violations, poverty, unemployment, demographic growth and environmental degradation push millions of people to migrate. Large influxes of immigrants may represent an unbearable burden not only for developing, but also for developed countries. As a consequence, mass migration may create tensions which are likely to disrupt national and regional stability.

Second, the economic causes of migration are often inextricably linked with political ones, thus blurring the traditional dichotomy between voluntary and
non-voluntary migration. In light of the restrictions imposed since the 1980s by industrialized countries on the legal channels of migration, many economic migrants seek to enter the developed world through the asylum procedure or by circumventing legal procedures. As Allan Findlay notes, “policies to close off one channel of migration only added to pressure for immigration via other channels”\(^\text{11}\). This situation, notably the increase in irregular migration, has provoked a shift in the perception of international migration among industrialized countries. The fear of losing control over who and how many should be granted access to their territory has led governments in Western Europe and North America to underline the destabilizing effect of immigration on their internal stability and national security.

The third factor relates to the reassessment of security which took place after the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, discussions about international security mainly centered on military issues such as the balance of power, the risk of nuclear and conventional war and the need for arms reduction; however, the end of the bipolar world saw increasing concern in the international community for non-military global matters such as environment, population growth, transnational terrorism, human rights and migration. Governments, inter- and non-governmental organizations and scholars began to recognize that security cannot be considered in strictly military terms anymore. Instead, it must also cover various non-military aspects\(^\text{12}\). In fact security has to be considered as well at the individual and societal levels.

In its 1994 *Human Development Report*, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) examined the concept of “human security” at the individual level (United Nations Development Report, 1994:2)\(^\text{13}\). According to the UNDP Report, until recently the concept of security “ha[d] been related more to nation-states than to people”. Therefore, a “profound transition in thinking” is needed, in order to take into account the threats which could disrupt the life of ordinary people. In this respect, human security “ means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in home, in jobs or in communities”\(^\text{14}\).

In addition to human security, society becomes one of the main objects of the late twentieth century's threats\(^\text{15}\). In fact, as pointed out by Barry Buzan, concerns about “threats and vulnerabilities that affect patterns of communal identity and culture” are gaining prominence in the governments’ security agenda. In this respect, international migration can be perceived as threatening
“both nationally and internationally on the security agenda of governments the ability of the existing society to reproduce itself in the old way”16. According to some scholars, the issues of migration and identity now appear at the top of the security agenda17. The concept of “societal security” has been developed in order to identify “situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms”, such as influxes of immigrants or refugees. More specifically, in Ole Waever’s mind, societal security “is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional partners of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and customs”18. Paul Roe concurs, stating that a society feels insecure when its “ability to reproduce its traditions and way of life” is threatened19. In this framework by introducing large numbers of people of diverse ethno-cultural and ideological backgrounds to a host-society is a potentially significant threat20.

Fourth, immigration may influence and serve the goals of national foreign policy21. Both sending and receiving countries have found that migration may acquire marked importance in their bilateral dealings, serving varied roles as stakes or instruments in state-to-state interaction22. Foreign military or political interventions and internal or external responses to intervention, often result in mass migrations23. Of course, such active foreign policy interventions also produce refugees. The absence of policies may also trigger migration so foreign intervention (direct or indirect) might actually serve to restrain mass out-migration. Such conditions may arise when domestic economic or political conditions deteriorate into economic desperation, large-scale internal repression, or the rise of totalitarian governments24.

Further Relationships

Immigration and foreign policy are related in three other important ways:

First, even when immigration policy responds strictly to domestic political demands, the effects of policy decisions are felt abroad hence immigration policy-making often has foreign policy consequences and may cause international political responses.

A second, general type of interaction between immigration and foreign policy occurs when foreign policy implications are so important that foreign policy concerns cause immigration policy decisions. Flows and stocks of immigrants do not have an impact on host countries’ national security only. They also have important implications for any host country’s foreign policy. As a result, considerations of immigration policy as foreign policy point to a strategy that takes into account foreign policy concerns25.
Third, as immigration becomes an issue of foreign policy as well as a matter for bilateral or regional negotiations, then a shift in power will take place from ministries and departments concerned with labour and home affairs to those concerned with external affairs and defense. The result will be change in the intra-bureaucratic relationships. In turn, this will introduce new and often conflicting interests in the consideration of policies which affect immigration in the whole decisionmaking apparatus.

This article deals primarily with irregular immigration. The most likely type of population flows to have real or perceived implications for national security and foreign policy is irregular immigration. Any illegal, undocumented or uncontrolled mass movement of people, be it in response to conflict, disaster or economic difficulty, can represent a major potential threat to national well-being. Because this threat originates abroad, it can also menace security. Nonetheless, we should not forget that even other types of migration (permanent migration, labour migration, refugees and asylum seekers) may have an impact on national security and foreign policy. For example, the political activities of Kurdish and Croatian guestworkers in Germany have created tensions within the receiving country, as well as between the latter and their countries of origin.

Three Key Concepts

Before we go any further, some key terms should be defined according to contemporary foreign policy usage.

First of all, the definition of security depends upon the geographical and temporal context in which it is used. What is seen as threatening by one society may not necessarily represent a threat for another. For instance, countries with a multicultural tradition may feel less threatened by an influx of immigrants than countries which have been built on the basis of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Security should be understood therefore within a social context; i.e., as the product of “social practices in a particular spatial and temporal context.”

Secondly, a distinction should be made between real and perceived threats. Fears about immigration may be exaggerated with respect to existing realities. Nonetheless, as perception actually shapes the foreign policy adopted by countries in order to deal with immigration issues, these so-called threats must be considered in the analysis of the impact of international migration on national and international security. “In this respect, it is important to distinguish between ‘threat’ (as probable) and ‘risk’ (as possible danger)”.
Thirdly, the idea of immigration as threat does not mean forgetting the positive side. People leaving their countries of origin actually do find safety or better living conditions elsewhere. There they may be joined by their families. Migration contributes significantly to the development of the countries of origin through remittances and the reduction of pressures on their local labour market. Countries of destination benefit from the economic performance of immigrants and from their contribution to intercultural exchange. Moreover, migration brings concerned countries together through international discussions and co-operation, either bilaterally or multilaterally.

The Impact of Immigration on the Greek National Security Concept

Among the many trends influencing international migration in recent decades, perhaps the most notable has been the securitization of migration policies. Clearly the latest waves of migration have led to political crises in many countries in both the developed and the developing world. Not surprisingly, at the heart of the political science literature on international immigration one finds concerns about the institutions of sovereignty and national security. In looking at the politics of sovereignty and national security, as James Hollifield points out “we are concerned not just with domestic politics, the play of organized interests, and issues of state autonomy, but also with foreign policy and the nature and structure of the international system.” Immigrants can be perceived as a threat to the major societal values of the receiving country and more particularly to national identity, to economic well-being and to political stability.

Immigration should thus be regarded as a factor capable of creating tension with other countries. Although, fears about immigration are often exaggerated, these elements must be taken into account in any analysis of the impacts of immigration on national and international security. In this respect, it is important to distinguish clearly between “threat” (as probable) and “risk” (as possible) danger.

Immigration as a Threat to Greek National Identity

According to some scholars, issues of immigration and identity now appear at the top of the European security agenda. If determining or changing the composition of a people, questions of membership will obviously go straight to the heart of basic character or identity. Moreover, one might expect that a large influx or stock of immigrants will wish to maintain their cultural, linguistic and religious traditions. As it is unrealistic to think that the people of the host
country will exhibit a cavalier disregard for the preservation of the culture they share, understandably they will seek immigration policies which nurture and protect their culture. Immigration triggers these deep reactions because it forces a people to address the questions, who are we and who do we want to be?35

In Western Europe, the fear of being swamped by a large influx of immigrants of different cultural backgrounds remains rooted in the centuries-old process of creation and evolution of the nation-state which emphasized cultural homogeneity. Moreover, this perception has been highlighted in recent years by the European integration process. An ethnically homogeneous society may place a higher value on preserving its ethnic character than does a heterogenous society. In this case, it sees a population influx as a threat to security36. Although in most cases these fears appear to be exaggerated, they nevertheless do exert an important influence on the formulation of government policies regarding immigration. Moreover, one might expect that the perception of immigration as a threat to national identity in Western Europe would grow stronger in the future simply because migration pressures in European countries show no sign of abating. Actually, one of the ideas shaping European governmental perception of immigration is that immigrants usually settle permanently, thus initiating the longer term problem of cohabitation and religious identity37.

Also among the “new” immigrant communities in Europe, as in Greece, a lot of immigrants maintain strong links with the culture of their countries of origin. Furthermore they do not wish to abandon their linguistic, religious and cultural practices. The issue of a clash with local populations, who may feel threatened in terms of culture and identity, lies at the core of the perception of international migration as a security problem. In this respect, Barry Buzan remarks that “migration threatens communal identity and culture by directly altering the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of the population”38.

Myron Weiner and Michael Teitelbaum have noted that if one segment of a given population – in terms of a socially defined category such as race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation – grows more rapidly than another, such changes may shift domestic political power balances39. This may also fundamentally challenge a polity’s conception of national identity and long-held beliefs. Consequently, mass immigration is the most viable means of initiating rapid demographic and social change that can in turn create perceptions of threat and bring identity issues to the forefront of the political agenda in receiving states40.
In Greece, fears that foreigners of other races and religious creeds, especially Muslims, would not be easily integrated into “traditional” Greek society have also arisen. In the minds of many Greeks, Islam remains associated historically with Ottoman rule and thus today is connected with the so-called Turkish threat. Moreover, an indigenous Muslim (mainly Turkish) population already exists in the northern part of the country. In fact, some Islamic non-governmental organisations and Middle Eastern countries have paid attention to the welfare of Muslims in Greece. These issues have gained prominence in recent years because Greek society has undergone modernization and consequently has abandoned some of its traditional characteristics. Some believe that immigrants to Greece are transforming the ethnic and cultural milieu of a country traditionally proud of its perceived homogeneity. The immigrants are presenting the Greek state and society with difficult, unfamiliar problems. Indeed, the issue of identity loss is particularly high on the agenda of Greece’s powerful Orthodox Church and other conservative elements. The Church believes that the country’s most salient security issue is loss of identity, a problem severe enough to threaten the nation’s very survival. The root of the problem, as they see it, is the de-Christianization of the society in the face of the avalanche of foreign and mainly non-Christian elements. The Head of the Church, Archbishop Christodoulos, holds politicians responsible for the country’s social ills. Not surprisingly for years, thanks to efforts led by the Archbishop, the Greek Orthodox Church has successfully blocked plans to build a mosque and a Muslim cultural centre in Athens. Another characteristic example of this attitude came from a former Minister, who argued that there should be a quid pro quo from Turkey, “There should be reciprocity. To open a mosque, they should give us the keys of Aghia Sophia” (the famous Byzantine church in Istanbul, which was first turned into a mosque and then into a museum).

Furthermore, in the early 1990s a geopolitical view appeared in the Greek media and in foreign policy-making circles about the existence of a “Muslim crescent or arc” in the Balkans that threatened the stability of the entire region and posed a serious threat to Greek national security. The story was quite simple: Muslim populations in the Balkans formed an axis, an “arc” or a crescent from Turkey to Albania, that was crossing Bulgaria, FYROM, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Greeks thought that Turkey tried to manipulate this arc in order to create conditions suitable for Muslim secessionist movements (involving also Western Thrace - a Greek territory with approx. 100,000 Muslim inhabitants). Note that many in Greece preferred to use the term “Turkish” instead of “Muslim” or “Islamic” arc or crescent. Behind this
concept was the fear that the Turkish “threat” to Greek territorial integrity would spread from the eastern to the northern borders of the country. The constant repetition of the “Muslim threat” theme in innumerable articles in Greek newspapers until 1994 proved extremely effective. Many Greek intellectuals supported and strengthened this view. Proponents of the arc idea thought that Greece should develop a counter-strategy aiming at the creation of an alliance of “Orthodox forces”, of an “Orthodox arc”.

Negative images of immigrants have been reinforced by the following factors, social and political-ideological:

First, until recently, the prevailing collective image of Greece was of an ethnically homogeneous society. This image, combined with the lack of any debate about multiculturalism, rendered it difficult to entertain any notion of acceptance of the other. Similarly, political developments in the Balkans during the 1990s revived nationalism in the region. As a result, Albanian immigrants have been the most heavily stereotyped and stigmatized. This occurred not so much because of their essential “difference” from Greeks but because, as neighbours, they represent the “near Other” who becomes, through immigration, the “Other within”.

Second, foreign policy considerations that lead to differential treatment for similar immigrants from different countries can stimulate divisive political protest. For example the criteria for Greekness replicate and reinforce the ethnic-cultural-religious definition of the Greek “nation”. The boundary between insiders and outsiders is defined by a combination of ethnic and religious features. This issue is particularly relevant for Albania, the major immigrant-sending country, where people who are Christian Orthodox and have Greek origins are given preference over Muslim Albanians. Furthermore, regarding matters of the foreign policy of the Greek state - or, as it was so eloquently stated by both NGO representatives and public administrative employees, “for matters of national interest” Greek immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union (Pontioi) - were given full rights and Greek passports, while Greek Albanians were treated as guestworkers. In other words, Greek Albanians were “also a bit like Greeks”, but their Greekness remained unrecognized because it was in the interest of Greek foreign policy that they remain in Albania to keep the Greek minority alive there. Consequently a hierarchy of Greekness has been constructed in the political discourse whereby priority was given to real Greek; i.e., citizens of the Greek state, of Greek ethnicity and Orthodox religion. Only recently has it been announced that Greek-origin immigrants from Albania could apply for Greek citizenship.
Third, should the law also facilitate naturalization, those ethnic or religious communities which have a higher fertility rate than the Greeks may challenge the long-established, albeit entirely unrealistic, model of national identity. Some estimate that by 2015 about 25 percent of the population of Greece will be first- and second generation “foreigners”. This means that out of an estimated population of 14.2 million, 3.5 million will be first- and second generation immigrants. In a homogeneous and largely Christian Orthodox country like Greece, these developments raise serious concerns.

**Immigration as a Tension-Creating Factor with Other Countries**

It now appears, however, that sending countries may have more control over outmigration than was previously thought. Indeed, out migration may be visualised as a kind of “national resource”, to be managed like any other. Inevitably, therefore, measures to restrain illegal immigration taken by the receiving countries can be expected to incur some foreign policy costs.

During the past fifteen years, irregular immigration from the Eastern Europe and the South Mediterranean countries has often resulted in bilateral tensions between countries of destination, countries of origin and transit countries. Additional instability in already strained bilateral relations arose for the following seven reasons:

First, destination countries blamed countries of origin or transit countries for not taking concrete actions against clandestine departures and human trafficking. A country’s concern that an immigration influx is the result of population “dumping” (clearly a matter of perception of intentions) is likely to be greatest when there is a history of enmity between sending and receiving countries. Already tense relations between Greece and Turkey have been further burdened by a series of incidents involving irregular immigrants transiting from Turkey into Western Europe via Greece. Therefore, irregular migration and migrant trafficking appear likely to burden bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey, already strained by the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea and minority rights in Western Thrace and Istanbul.

Irregular migration and refugee flows may have been used by the country of origin to trump cards in interstate negotiations, in order to force destination counties to make political, commercial, economic or strategic concessions. Gil Loescher has argued that by expressing an inability to control the population outflow or by demonstrating a willingness to manipulate it a home country is in a position to extract foreign policy and strategic concessions from the receiving state. For example, the Albanian government has linked its...
cooperation in the control of irregular migration and human trafficking to
requests for financial aid and increasing legal emigration opportunities. Naturally these requests are addressed to the Greek and Italian governments, and via Italy and Greece, to the European Union54.

Forced emigration can be also an instrument in a home-country foreign policy. It can press a neighbouring state to provide aid or credit in return for stopping the flow of immigrants. An examination of both historical and contemporary population movements demonstrates that countries of emigration have more control over international population flows than is usually mentioned by political analysts. Moreover, what often appears to be spontaneous emigration and refugee movements may represent deliberate emigration policies on the part of sending countries55.

Second, countries favouring outmigration, for whatever reason, may be expected to oppose efforts by the countries of destination to regulate the entry of their nationals. Such opposition may be expressed through diplomatic channels, through criticism in the domestic and international media, through retaliatory measures, or even through support for certain political groups in the receiving country56.

Third, immigrants and refugees may attempt to convince the host country to support their cause against the régime they fled through diplomatic pressure, thus raising the possibility of bilateral tensions, particularly when the receiving country may actively support the refugees in their quest to change the régime of their country of origin57. Although the receiving country may have no such intention, where its motives are humanitarian, the mere granting of asylum based on a finding that fear of persecution exists may be treated by the home country as interference in its affairs. In the end, this may be sufficient to create an antagonistic relationship with the sending country. Yet, whether the national security of the host state is threatened depends on the abilities of the home country to respond against the host. For example, although the Cuban government may object to the opposition activities of Cuban-Americans, Cuba lacks the ability to pose a credible threat to US national security. Nevertheless, the activities of migrants still can create foreign policy problems for host countries, even if those problems do not pose a threat to national security58.

Moreover governments of the host country are quite often concerned that refugees to whom they give protection may turn against them if they are unwilling to assist refugees in their opposition to the government of their country of origin59.
Fourth, refugees have been used as tools of what might be termed “private foreign policies”. Immigrant groups also may pose a security threat to host countries forming alliances with domestic opposition groups. This use of immigrants or refugees arises when nongovernmental groups of the host country opposed to particular foreign régimes see mass exodus from those countries as a weapon to dramatize the reasons for their opposition and thus exert pressure on their government to change its foreign policy. In the end, some of the most active advocates of Kurdish immigrants and refugees to Greece appeared primarily concerned with discrediting and ultimately changing the régime in Turkey; in other words, less than with the plight of the Kurdish refugees themselves. The use of refugee admissions, however, as a tool of foreign policy has become an increasingly dangerous game, as the Ocalan case proved. It can backfire badly in both domestic and foreign policy.

Fifth, the immigrants themselves may become a focal point of controversy between the home and host countries, among contending groups within the immigrants/diaspora, or between sections of the immigrants and the home government. Immigrants and refugees usually maintain personal links with their homelands. They can support political parties, factions or ethnic groups in their country of origin through representation, political lobbying or, more directly, through recruitment and the sending of funds and of arms. Although lacking the right to vote and hold office, resident aliens can have an effect upon the conduct of foreign policy. But more unorthodox and potentially violent examples should also be noted. The recent past has seen conflicts between Greek and Slavomacedonian nationalist immigrants in Canada and Australia. However, there have also been clashes and even violent actions between right and left Albanian immigrants in Greece over the past few years.

Sixth, the presence of substantial numbers of immigrants and diaspora members could be mobilized by the sending country in support of its own positions in dealings with the receiving country. Domestic pressures by the Greek-American community played an important role in the 1970s on American foreign policy regarding the Cyprus problem, Greek-Turkish disputes, and in the 1990s the so-called Macedonian question. Two factors do, however, limit the political power of immigrant groups and diasporas in the national policy-making of their host country. One is the immigrant group’s cohesion which relies on organizational and material capabilities. The other is the group’s access to political power, determined largely by the political institutions of each host society. In countries that facilitate the acquisition of citizenship and grant other participatory rights, if immigrant groups are large,
homogeneous, and well organized, they will have greater influence over the host country’s foreign policy. Conversely, in countries where immigrants are less organized and less able to participate in the political process, they will have less influence. Ultimately though, immigrant influence only matters if immigrant preferences are distinctive from those of the host society.

Seventh, the home country may exert diplomatic pressure on the host country complaining about the treatment which immigrants are receiving in the host country. Greece has felt similar diplomatic pressures from sending countries to facilitate outmigration, often from the foreign ministries of the home countries. The Albanian government, for example, had opposed Greek proposals to restrain illegal immigration or to take measures to limit illegal entry across the Greek border. However, Greece’s prime concern in relations to Albania was to avoid conflict, since tensions between Greeks and Albanians in Greece have quite often led to a nationalist mobilisation in Albania in support of the Albanian immigrants in Greece. This could consequently affect the Albanian immigrant community in Greece and damage bilateral relations between Greece and Albania. For instance the improving situation of Albanian immigrants has periodically experienced several aberrations, stemming neither from labour market insufficiency to absorb foreign workers nor from a limited societal capacity to accept newcomers. Deportations of undocumented Albanian immigrants have actually been inspired by electoral motivations or concerns from the Greek community in Albania regarding infringement of ethnic, human, educational or cultural rights. Albanian reaction has been immediate: parliamentary statements, media pressure, coercion of Greek minority, and delays in opening schools in Greek-populated areas of Albania. However, Greek Foreign Ministry officials rejected the suggestion that immigration policy depended on considerations of bilateral relations with host countries, like Albania, although they recognized that it had impact on these relations.

In Greece, the diplomatic representatives of Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait and Indonesia, have also shown an interest in the welfare of the emerging Muslim communities in Greece. The diplomats’ efforts have mainly focused on the establishment of a central Mosque and an Islamic cultural centre in the suburbs of Athens. On the other hand, the Islamic organization active in Greece, the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at Islam Lahore (the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement), is more interested in translating several books on Islam into the Greek and Albanian languages as well as converting the Albanian immigrants in Greece into devout Muslims.
Immigration as a Tool of Greek Foreign Policy

As Kenneth J. Franzblau points out the effect of immigration on the foreign policy of a receiving country is determined by a number of considerations. First, if the numbers of immigrants are small or they are easily assimilated into society, the impact on the foreign policy of the host country will likely be small. However, if the receiving country perceives that the level of immigration is too high or that substantial numbers of immigrants are entering the country outside the legal framework, as is the case of Greece, foreign policy may be used as an instrument to prevent the emergence of displacement and mass migration or, if movement cannot be stopped, as an instrument to regulate migration and keep migration away from the country. On the other hand, at the level of official policy, states can also mobilize first- and second-generation immigrants to assist in achieving particular foreign policy projects, like the American government did by mobilizing highly skilled Afghan immigrants for nation-building in Afghanistan, and relying on Palestinian Americans as negotiators in various rounds of Middle East peace talks.

According to Jorge Dominguez “the deterrence of illegal immigration is more complex than normal deterrence in foreign policy, which is ordinarily aimed as a particular government to ensure that it will not engage in undesirable behavior. To deter illegal migration, however, it is also necessary to deter individuals who are acting on their own.”

Over the past eighteen years, Greece has faced foreign policy choices about immigration that were complex, emotional, and deeply intertwined with domestic concerns. Other countries may have faced challenges, but it is clear that the immigration experience of Greece differs from that of other European countries on several points.

The first is the shift in the 1990s from the status of emigration to one of immigration. Greece suddenly realized that new issues had appeared on its foreign policy agenda. This shift also affected debates about the impact of immigration on the priorities of Greek foreign policy.

Second, there was the prevalence of a single source country. Just over 65 percent of the immigrants participating in the Greek regularization program originated from Albania while the second most important country, Bulgaria, accounted for only 7 percent. Albanians migrate to Greece primarily for economic reasons. No similar degree of dominance is to be found in any other countries of Southern Europe.

Third, immigration pressures are being further exacerbated by political instability and economic failure of the neighbourhood sending countries.
Political instability in countries of origin can spill over into Greece, thus giving an impact on the latter's public order and foreign policy towards the country of origin.

**Policy Instruments Employed in Greece**

Greek migration policies were exclusively designed with a view to combating illegal immigration through the following set of policy instruments, all of which had effects on Greek foreign policy:

Initially better instruments of control were sought to establish and enforce stricter border régimes. The first instrument involved, besides patrolling the extended Greek borders, using internal policy controls to prevent overstaying, tightening up visa procedures and launching media campaigns and for police operations to discourage illegal immigrants from coming.

A second instrument was to develop prevention and intervention strategies to restrain existing immigrants outflows through instruments of foreign policy. Such strategies were based on diplomatic negotiations, pressures, economic sanctions, expulsions of irregular immigrants and withdrawal of financial and development assistance. Where generosity did not work or was not financially feasible, receiving countries were getting a variety of threats to halt emigration. Therefore diplomatic pressures, including coercive diplomacy, was exerted. All in all, the leverage exercised by destination countries should not be underestimated because emigration is considered by many countries of origin as an essential economic resource. Labour migration can greatly contribute to the country of origin's development and economic well-being through worker's remittances and lessened pressure on the local labour market. The home countries have long been aware of their dependence upon migration and have recognized that any sudden influx of returning migrants would create a major problem for domestic security.

The situation of Albanian irregular migrants in Greece illustrates this point. Clandestine migration between Albania and Greece became one of the most salient aspects of their bilateral relations. Since the beginning of the 1990s, many Albanians have emigrated illegally to Greece. In the mid-1990s, Albanian migrants working abroad were sending home remittances estimated by various sources to be worth between $300 million and $1 billion per annum. This represented the country's major source of external income after aid and corresponded to a third of the GDP. Remittances were also several times the value of Albania's exports. The Greek government chose to deal with the influx of illegal migrants by using sporadic waves of administrative
deportations and mass expulsions. It linked the regularization of Albanian clandestine immigrants to the respect paid by the Tirana authorities to the rights of the Greek minority living in southern Albania. The Greek authorities have thus deported about 2.3 million immigrants since 1990. It is estimated, however, that only 764,000 irregular migrants had been deported from Greece between January 1991 and August 1994. Out of those 96 percent were Albanians sent back when incidents involving the Greek minority in Albania occurred, thus putting important economic and social pressure on the Albanian government. Nevertheless, many of those deported during that period had illegally crossed the border several times since then. As a result, discussions started in Spring 1995 between Greece and Albania and culminated in the signing of an agreement in March 1996. Under the provisions of this agreement, Albania accepted the creation of a Greek consulate in Korytsa, the opening of two new border posts and the establishment of more school classes for the Greek minority. On the other hand, Greece agreed to receive seasonal Albanian workers and to study the regularization of Albanian clandestine immigrants already living on its soil. Nevertheless, through extended and costly police operations, the Greek government continued to expel illegal immigrants, largely to appease domestic residents.

The policies of expulsion, however, appear to have had limited success because other immigrants were entering the country as (false) tourists, students or legal short-term workers, and then were overstaying. Also, despite the creation of a special police force to protect the borders, the illegal entry of foreigners into the country was not restrained in the least; instead, it continued without diminution. One reason was that the decrees for the punishment of offenders – both illegal foreign workers and their Greek employers – were scarcely ever applied.

A third instrument was to address the social, economic, and political consequences that actually or potentially generate mass emigration in the home countries. It has been shown that trade liberalization, foreign investment, and development assistance can reduce the pressures of emigration by creating income-generating opportunities, reducing unemployment, and improving wages in countries of origin. Four foreign policy tools were used in this context.

The first tool is trade liberalization, the key concept in international economic relations nowadays. With regard to forced migration, it is assumed that free trade will promote economic growth and social development, thus eventually diminishing migration pressures. In the short run, however, a rise in the unemployment of the country of origin should be expected thus increasing
the supply- push emigration pressures. Under these circumstances, there can be a migration hump, meaning that the same policies that decrease emigration pressures in the long term can increase them in the short term78.

Foreign direct investment is the second tool. In a global economy, the volume and importance of foreign investments is increasing substantially. Investments and subsequent economic development may play a role in reducing immigration or changing the direction of migratory movements79.

The third tool is foreign aid. The importance of private and public aid for socio-economic development remains significant. In recent years, this aid has come under strain as a result of alleged donor fatigue and the expressed need to use development funds for emergency relief. The presence of large immigrant and ethnic minority populations from developing countries within the European countries, however, could help to revive interest in development programs. In addition, there are good examples of the active involvement of immigrants in supporting development projects in their countries of origin.

The fourth tool, is the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance, which could have a positive effect on the general climate in a country, resulting in improved socio-economic development, increased opportunities and hence, the elimination of at least some of the key causes of forced migration. Governments from donor countries are increasingly attaching conditions on aid to progress in these areas. NGOs are increasingly monitoring the practices of trans-national companies and demand their respect for fundamental human rights in the countries in which they operate.

From the above instruments Greek foreign policy has used all of them particularly towards the Balkan countries except free trade, which however has been implemented for Bulgaria and Romania through the European Association Agreements and the admission negotiations and for the Western Balkan countries through the Process of Association and Stabilization.

Since the mid 1990s, it gradually became clear that Greece had major economic and political interests in the Balkans and that a new political approach reflecting them – including immigration – had become necessary. Therefore, Greek foreign policy priorities and the interests of Greek business have started to come together as never before.

As far as Foreign Direct Investment is concerned, thousands of Greek companies (mostly joined ventures with local partners) have set up operations across the Balkans. Most of the Greek investment in the post-1996 period was not private – it came from Greek para-statal companies like the state-owned telecommunications company and the state petroleum company. The
establishment of the Greek banks in the region has been promoted, to a large extent, by the presence of immigrants and has facilitated remittances and their channeling into productive investment at home. A much more ambitious objective for the Greek foreign policy is an aid project towards the Balkan countries called Hellenic Plan for the Reconstruction of the Balkans. Although it announced in 1999 for various reasons its implementation started only in 2002. The total aid according to the Plan could reach the sum of 550 million euros. Twenty five percent of this aid would be given exclusively to Greek companies to invest in the region and the rest to projects for improving the substruction and for promoting democracy and good governance.

However, despite the fact that Greece has been emerged as a substantial donor and big investor in the Balkans, so far there are not signs that immigration from these countries has been reduced. For example there is doubt that the enough labour forces of Albania or Bulgaria and other northern neighbour(s) countries have become somewhat dependent on employment opportunities from the Greek investments and by this way people are discouraged to immigrate. Hence, it is far from certain that the instruments of investment or aid could curtail illegal immigration and thereby serve Greek foreign policy interests regarding immigration. Meritorious as these tools are, there is no evidence that they can reduce emigration in the short run.

A fourth instrument to deter Greece immigration flows was to put emphasis on negotiating bilateral agreements with the sending countries. Negotiation is a relatively new and promising mechanism for policy development in the area of immigration control. Bilateral agreements between sending and receiving states lay out in more detail how these states intend to regulate migration and protect the rights of the parties involved. Such agreements may foster links between states and could have a positive impact on other domains of co-operation.

Greece’s relatively wide latitude in foreign policy offered some justification for using this approach to limit flows. In fact, negotiations had been central to Greece’s dealing with Albania and Turkey over the last ten years. For example, in 1999, Turkey and Greece started to negotiate a total of ten agreements, including one on illegal immigration. Half of these agreements were signed in Ankara when the Greek Foreign Minister Andreas Papandreou paid a historic visit to Turkey on January 19-22, 2000, the first in three decades. The other half were signed in Athens during Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem’s visit on February 1-2, 2002. A Protocol on Combating Crime, Especially Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Illegal Immigration was signed between Greece and Turkey in November 2001. The Protocol
provided detailed co-operation procedures for the readmission of citizens of either country or of a third country, who enter either country unlawfully.

Christopher Mitchell observes there are four factors among others which could maintain that negotiation for bilateral agreements is not an effective instrument: sending nations may prefer the \textit{status quo} and see little reason to bargain; sending governments may lack the administrative capacity to restrain emigration; receiving countries negotiators have limited and political leeway to promise certain levels of legal migration access; the host government hesitates to provide “side-payments” in return for restraint by sending states$^{83}$.

By 2006, it became clear that although Turkey was accepting some readmissions, there were considerable delays and problems. According to the Greek authorities, between April 2002 and November 2006, they had submitted 1,892 cases (covering 23,689 aliens) out of which Turkey accepted to take back 2,841 persons, but in reality took only 1,463$^{84}$.

A fifth instrument has been regional cooperation. Immigration can not only influence bilateral relations between the receiving country and the country of origin but also have implications for the former’s regional foreign policy. From the beginning of the 1980’s, the United Nations General Assembly has acknowledged that “massive flows of refugees may not only affect the domestic order and stability of receiving states but also jeopardize the political and social stability and the economic development of entire regions and thus endanger international peace and security. Consequently, governments in various regions of the world now recognize that the implementation of innovative approaches to the problems of international population movement and human displacement necessitate the establishment of regional frameworks to replace ineffective unilateral activities”$^{85}$.

Greece’s national interests (particularly in the Balkans) as far as immigration is concerned were seen as better served since 1999 via multilateral efforts rather than unilateral or bilateral ones. Not only the nationalistic and opportunistic policy of the early 1990s was abandoned but the bilateral framework was considered as secondary to the multilateral. Fearing that political and economic instability in the Balkans and the South Mediterranean countries could trigger major migration influxes, Greece and other South member states of the EU tried to involve the European Union in more active and consistent policies towards migration. This attitude could be explained also by the fact that Greek institutions lack of expertise on migration issues and on the other because the Greek government quite often used the EU as a scapegoat to justify measures regarding the immigrants. These were often measures Greece would have implemented anyway$^{86}$. 

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In this context, Athens has remained strongly in favour of making EU migration a horizontal, “cross-pillar” issue in EU external relations. The Government also wants to incorporate standard readmission clauses in all association and cooperation agreements concluded by the EU with third countries. Therefore, use of the conditionality approach should continue to dominate relations with the new member states and the Eastern and Southern neighbours of the Union, which have traditionally been countries of emigration or countries of transit for migrants. “This purposeful and institutionalized form of policy transfer has become a central element in the EU approach towards immigration, and is a means by which to extend the reach of common policies to tackle problems further away from the common territory”87. For example, the Association Agreement with Turkey and the Co-operation Agreement with three Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) include provisions on migration. In fact, these bilateral Agreements could not ignore the high proportion of migrant workers of Maghrebian or Turkish origin who reside in member states, and Mediterranean countries insisted that this matter should be an integral part of the policy of co-operation. The provisions offer Turkish and Maghreb workers residing in the Union protection against discrimination as regards working conditions, remuneration and social security88.

Greece also has moved up on the agenda the issue of immigration within the framework of other regional cooperation schemes like the South East European Cooperation Process, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation and the Mediterranean Forum.

Conclusions

This article highlighted the implications of immigration for the national security as well as the foreign policy of Greece. We conclude that international migration, particularly irregular migration, has become a basic concern in Greece’s national security because it is increasingly perceived as a threat to national identity and political stability. Moreover, immigration does influence the formulation of Greece’s foreign policy towards both individual countries of origin, mainly those from Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan region as a whole. It creates tensions with them or aggravates already strained bilateral relations with others, thus impacting regional stability. On the other hand, Greek governments have used immigrants not only as an instrument of statecraft in order to impose restraints upon the actions of the home governments or to deter the population influx but also as a tool to achieve its own foreign policy objectives.
The reluctance of the Greek government to accept immigration as a long-term feature of modern Greek society was initially related to the novelty and unexpected character of the phenomenon. The dominant impression in the public and policy discourse was that the immigrants considered Greece as the “waiting room”, a place to stay for a couple of years in order to pay off the debt to the smugglers and then finance the second trip to other European countries. Despite successive legalisation programs, Greece continues to face an immigration problem as flows of illegal immigrants and the cost of integration continues to rise. Therefore, the net costs associated with their smooth integration into the host labour market and into Greek society have raised concern over the scop and effectiveness of immigration policies. For this reason Greece has become aware of the necessity to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives in order to mitigate the real or perceived destabilizing impact of international migration on its national security. Greek foreign policy-makers claim that only the EU framework could provide the means for cementing a consistent immigration policy. Overall, the EU could make available the means of planning and implementing a successful adaptation policy of its own immigrants and could, through the development of EU common policies and measures, deter the inflow of other immigrants.

NOTES


15. The introduction of the concept of “society” into the analysis of international security can be seen as a transitional phase in a shift within the mainstream tradition from material to cognitve structural resources, and from state to human subjects of security. See R. Furuseth, *Creating Security Through Immigration Control* (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Report 274, 2003), p. 16.


20. C. Rudolf, “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration”, *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 97, No. 4, 2003), p. 605. Also, according to Rudolf, four qualitative changes have increased the societal threat perception.
These are: (1) changing patterns of international migration; (2) the increasing diversity of migration flows; (3) changing migrant preferences regarding assimilation and integration; and (4) a cycle of threat that is created when government policies are seen as ineffectual in stopping unwanted migration. See C. Rudolf "Globalization and Security: Migration and Evolving Conceptions of Security in Statecraft and Scholarship", *op. cit.*, p. 22.


27. Irregular migration is taken here as migrant influxes circumventing the regulations of destination countries on entry, residence and employment. It includes both people legally entering with a passport, a visa or a student permit but then overstaying the legal period of stay, and people entering in an unauthorized way of illegal points of entry.


44. The “muslim arc” idea disappeared from Greek public discourse only in the second half of the 1990s on the one hand because of its complete failure in helping to understand Balkan developments and on the other hand, and more importantly, because the Greek political and economic elite thought was not anymore useful as a guide for policy. See A. Huliaras and Ch. Tsardanidis, “(Mis)understanding the Balkans: Greek Geopolitical Codes of the Post-communist Era”, *Geopolitics* (Vol. 11, No. 3, 2006), pp. 468-483.


51. By accelerating and amplifying the phenomenon of irregular migration, traffickers of migrants undermine governmental rules of entry, asylum and immigration procedures. In the 1990's Southern Europe became a major 'pole of attraction' for migrant traffickers, both as transit area and as a destination region. Immigrants are smuggled into Greece, mainly from Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria and FYROM (Former Republic of Macedonia). Turkey is becoming a major transit country for Iranians, Iraqis, Pakistanis, South-Asians and African irregular migrants desperately wanting to enter Western Europe. In recent years Greece has increased coast-guard patrols and have mobilised their armies in order to restore effective control at their borders against the inflows of clandestine immigrants trasported by human smugglers.

52. Ch. Tsardanidis, “Immigration and Foreign Policy of Greece”, Agora Without Frontiers (Vol. 6, No. 4, 2001)[in Greek], p. 366.


57. Democratic governments generally allow their refugees to speak out against the régime of their country of origin, allow them access to the media and permit them to send information and money back home in support of the opposition.


59. Refugees have in other occasions launched terrorist attacks within their host country, illegally smuggled arms, allied with the domestic opposition against host-government policies, participated in drug traffic, and in other ways eroded governments’ willingness to admit refugees. See M. Weiner, “Introduction: Security, Stability and International Migration”, op. cit., p. 13.


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