Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy*

George Kalpadakis and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos**

RÉSUMÉ

Le discours sur la politique étrangère adopté par les acteurs de la société civile en Grèce peut-être décrit par des termes d’un contraste idéologique entre l’“Europeanisme” et le “populisme nationaliste.” Ce discours a pénétré dans la politique grecque au moins depuis les premières années de la décennie 1980. En examinant les conséquences des quelques événements pour la politique grecque (p.e. la crise politique intérieure de 1989, les guerres de Yougoslavie), ainsi que l’européanisation de la Grèce, nous interprétons les façons par lesquelles la société civile a acquis un rôle important dans la politique étrangère grecque. En 1989-1996, les acteurs de la société civile inspirés par le discours nationaliste populiste ont prévalu sur les voix antinationalistes pro-européennes. Après 1996, la marche vers l’intégration européenne et la convergence croissante entre les deux grands partis (PASOK - Nouvelle Democratie) sur la politique étrangère a fait avancer les acteurs pro-européens de la société civile.

ABSTRACT

The foreign policy discourse adopted by civil society actors in Greece may be described in terms of an ideological contrast between “Europeanism” and “nationalist populism”. This discourse has pervaded Greek politics, particularly foreign policy, at least since the early 1980s. By examining the consequences of certain events for Greek politics, e.g. the domestic political crisis of 1989, the wars in Yugoslavia, as well as the Europeanization of Greece, we interpret the ways in which civil society has assumed a significant role in Greek foreign policy. In 1989-1996, civil society actors imbued by the nationalist populist discourse prevailed over pro-European, anti-nationalist voices. After 1996, the drive towards European integration and the growing bipartite (PASOK - New Democracy) convergence in foreign policy stimulated the rise of pro-European civil society actors.

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** Department of Political Science and Public Administration, the University of Athens.
Introduction

There is a broad consensus in Greece that civil society has won a recognizable place in the formulation and even more so in the implementation of Greek foreign policy. The consensus is shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the media, as well as the wider international relations (IR) academic community. There are two theses which we will advance here: 1. an ongoing dualism exists between what we shall call Europeanism and nationalist populism in Greek foreign policy, and state proponents and civil society supporters of these two discourses have played a role in forging the post-1989 Greek foreign policy; and 2. historically, the integration of Greece into the EU, the domestic political crisis of 1989 and the developments in Southeast European politics were conducive to the rise of Greek civil society, and had important consequences for the institutionalization of civil society into the policy framework.

Although the literature on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy has grown, the influence of civil society on this process has not been fully analyzed. “Civil society” is a normatively charged concept which suggests the possibility of an active public, equipped with institutionalized forms of participation (independent institutes, mass media, interest groups, NGOs, social movements), and of a “public sphere” based on rational constructive debate. We shall investigate the ways in which Europeanism and nationalist populism - in our opinion the two major discursive dimensions of Greek post-1989 foreign policy - have been employed by the actors of Greece’s nascent civil society.

We begin by describing the impact of the EU on the Greek state and society before treating Europeanization briefly. The historical roots of nationalist populism and Europeanism in Greek foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the emergence of the former, are then explored with some mention of the shaping of Modern Greek national identity and the implications of nationalist populism for foreign policy and civil society, particularly in the 1981-1996 period. We then proceed to examine the conjunctures which were conducive to the involvement of the Greek civil society in shaping foreign policy from 1989 to 1996. After an examination of Greece’s foreign policy after 1996 in the context of the bipartite convergence, we note the mobilization of pro-European civil society actors. Finally, we attempt to reach some wider conclusions about the role of civil society in Greek foreign policy in view of its shift from nationalist populism to Europeanism, acknowledging of course that our contrast between the two discourses is not a rigid analytical schema, but a way to interpret policy change.
This article draws upon various sources including anonymous personal interviews with officials and policy advisors, public statements and interviews by members of government and NGO activists, press reports, and Greek - and English - language international relations and political science literature on contemporary Greece. The theoretical framework is eclectic, drawing on discourse analysis (understood here to include not only the relevant rhetoric but also policy measures and political practices), the post-Weberian approach of Greek sociology and political science and the institutionalist approach to Europeanization.

Dualism of Greek Political Culture and EU’s Impact on Post-authoritarian Greek Society

The EU, Greek Civil Society and Europeanization

The EU has functioned as a modernizing force in terms of Greek foreign policy. Overall it has entailed the further consolidation of democracy, the creation of institutional preconditions for the development of civil society, and the creation of new rights for Greek citizens. The consolidation of post-1974 democracy achieved in Greece partly through its contact with the EU was largely connected with the socializing effect of its membership. After 1974, in post-authoritarian Greece, the EEC figured as an external safeguard, useful in restoring democracy to the post-Junta country.

Greece’s participation in the process of European integration brought about the following changes vis-à-vis civil society: (1) The advocacy of greater transparency in existing institutions and the promotion of new ones (citizens’ initiatives, NGOs); through this process, acts and practices of traditional state institutions, such as central services of ministries, were periodically subjected to scrutiny by new institutions, such as the Greek Ombudsman and the Independent Personal Data Protection Authority. Recently, traditional social actors, namely trade unions, faced competition from new collective actors, for example, the anti-globalization movement. (2) The rise of local collective actors such as inter-municipal enterprises. The drive to secure funds and technical assistance from the EU incited local social groups to develop networks for communication at a national and European level. (3) The traditional “vertically” organized patron-client system was somewhat weakened because of the changing institutional relations between the state, the EU and the civil society. (4) The EU encouraged decentralization by providing political and economic incentives for autonomous activities, independent
from the state, at a regional level. New policy initiatives by regional and local government authorities related to environmental protection, gender equity, youth and employment issues sought to broaden the opportunities for actors from civil society to mobilize.

The EU also created a powerful legal framework with institutions for the protection of citizens’ rights: the European Ombudsman, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament constitute authorities which promote citizens’ rights. Greece’s entanglement in the “Balkan imbroglio”, however, mitigated the positive impact of the EU on civil society. Analysts of South-East European politics, such as Thanos Veremis, have noted the far-reaching effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Between 1989 and 1995, in addition to the ever-present Christian Orthodox Church, non-state actors like nationalist networks and ethnocentric citizens’ associations emerged, whose outlooks tended to correspond to the broadly nationalist populist foreign policy adopted by the governments of the time. The effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia on Greece, for instance the rise of xenophobia and nationalism, can help to illustrate the interplay between Greece’s then nascent civil society and foreign policy.

Europeanization involves the impact of the EU dynamics on national politics and policy-making, discourse, identities, political structures and public policies. As a process, it assumes many forms and operates at more than one level. The most common form is the Europeanization of the substance of policies. This involves the mainstreaming of the national economies of individual EU member-states and the transposition of legislation from the EU to the national level, for example, the agricultural policy. Another, less well-known form is the Europeanization of the mode of policy-making. The latter includes the EU’s impact on the discourse of national collective agents. This could be termed the cognitive level of Europeanization. In other words, adaptation to the EU involves other aspects beyond the legal order and economic performance of member-states. These aspects include acquiring a European mentality, i.e., thinking in terms of synchronization with other member-states of the Union, and also employing concepts and procedures, such as long-term planning, meeting deadlines, competing for available funds, and absorbing funds in time. Loukas Tsoukalis speaks of another aspect of the same phenomenon—benchmarking. In various policy areas, including foreign policy, this less visible but no less real cognitive type of Europeanization concerns the way decisionmaking structures, politicians and individual citizens describe and
understand the trends of domestic politics and foreign affairs.

Europeanization also involved administrative effects. After Greece's accession to the EEC in 1981, changes in government organization took place. A special post of deputy minister of European Affairs was created at the Greek ministry of foreign affairs. At various ministries, notably economy, labour and social security, and education, new units under the banner of Special Secretariats (which had existed since the 1980s but flourished in the 1990s), were founded and staffed with outside experts and political appointees. New public agencies were created to oversee the absorption and use of EU funds. Throughout the public sector, committees emerged, put together by ministers and heads of public enterprises in order to deal with Greece's adaptation to the requirements of European integration. All this revealed the tendency of Greek governments to circumvent the public administration, including the apparatus of the ministry of foreign affairs, judged as reluctant to adapt to policy change.

In Greece, both the cognitive adaptation and administrative reorganization took a long time to sink in, partly because of the change of government in October 1981, when the conservative party (ND) was replaced by the socialist party (PASOK) which did not bring to power a pro-European political élite. On the contrary, PASOK initially held a skeptical stance towards the EEC. While in opposition (1974-1981), PASOK had cultivated an anti-EEC profile, which it upheld until after the first term in power (1981-1985). The Nea Democratia (ND), in office from 1990 to 1993, contained an amalgam of nationalist and pro-European politicians but quickly succumbed to nationalist pressures and forged close links with Serbia. Upon its return to power (1993), PASOK also adopted an ethnocentric stance in foreign affairs. Only with the 1996 rise of an ex-minister of PASOK, Costas Simitis, did the socialist party and its government adopt an unambiguously pro-European position.

The Roots of “Nationalist Populism”

Nikiforos Diamandouros' study of modern Greek political culture yields a useful distinction between a “reformist” and an “underdog” strand in Greek foreign policy. Rooted in the middle classes of the late nineteenth-century Greek Diaspora, the “reformist” culture favours moderate and gradual changes which civil society may initiate. Foreign policy is also liberated from the state-centered, introverted and fearful discourses intrinsic to the worldview of the “nationalists”, and invested with ideas rooted in the Enlightenment such as rationality, democratization, and human rights. The term “underdog culture” is
a subcategory of cultures like Greece's, “which have experienced contact with more “developed” systems, have established asymmetrical, subordinate relations with them, and have internalized this asymmetry in negative and defensive terms that have translated in a commensurately diffident and xenophobic view of the international order”\textsuperscript{12}. In such a culture, “the state is perceived as the “natural” ally and protector of the weak and non-competitive layers and structures, whose interests it will safeguard from the ever-threatening and increasing pressures of the market mechanism and of the international system”\textsuperscript{13}.

A crucial point about the “underdog culture” is that it “exhibits a distinct preference for small and familiar structures compatible with clientelistic practices”\textsuperscript{14}. The nation's rights “are invested with a permanent, incessant, and morally superior content that raises them above the moral relativism, “dirty” political struggles and world of compromises they invariably come with”\textsuperscript{15}. These rights are evoked in foreign policy to highlight the threats against “just” Greek policies or Greek sovereign rights. The guiding ideology of the Greek state throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s was “nationalist populism”. Populism, based on the inclusion of the masses into active politics through their direct rapport with a charismatic leader, reduced the space for the creation of a strong civil society. Not necessarily identical to nationalism but belonging to the underdog culture, nationalist populism led many citizens into believing that the Greek nation is “perpetually betrayed, nationally superior but historically unfortunate, always right but always disaffected by Western “foreigners” who detest it and machinate towards its exclusion”\textsuperscript{16}.

As Panayiotis Ioakimides has noted, the tension between Greece's self-perception as a “Balkan state” in the EU and an “EU state” in the Balkans also stems from this dualism and is linked with the issue of the Greek national identity and the nature of Greek citizens' relations to the state\textsuperscript{17}. In late-developing societies, the process of unprecedented social change generated by capitalism and the emergence of the nation-state uprooted segmental localism from all levels of social life, inducing individuals to shift their allegiance from their traditional community to the “national centre”. The process of inclusion into the centralized mechanisms of the state, the national market and national education system meant getting people involved discursively in the “imagined community” of the nascent nation-states, ensuring the transformation of “subjects” into “citizens”.

Nevertheless, the form civil society would take depended on the structure of pre-industrial/modern central administrative power. Historically, in most of the social formations which were later to become advanced industrial Western
societies, a delicate balance had been achieved between the monarch and the élites, creating the space for the *corps intermédiaire*\(^\text{18}\). Under these conditions a strong civil society was created in the West, one which could check state power and represent collective interests autonomously. By contrast, in the early nineteenth century, Greece had no room for autonomous interest groups. The country simply lacked the organizational, cultural, and political basis on which civil society relies in the West. After the country’s national independence (1830), the establishment of parliamentary institutions preceded the expansion of industrial capitalism, while the state had to respond to growing pressures from below which stemmed from rapid urbanization. Political parties employed two mechanisms to absorb these pressures and also ensure a minimum of intra-élite political competition. Nicos Mouzelis has called these modes of political domination *clientelism* and *populism*\(^\text{19}\).

Clientelism, or the formation of client-patron networks based on transaction of political and/or economic capital, was successfully connected to the political strategy of using the public sector as a safety valve for rising unemployment and social/political unrest. This form of bringing citizens into the modern state atomized their interests, thus diminishing the potential for forging forms of loyalty based on civic bonds. In Greece clientelism endured as a mode of political domination throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. Clientelism also set the scene for the development of an hypertrophic and particularistic state unable to facilitate the pluralist interest representation observed in Western European countries\(^\text{20}\). Nationalism thus served to unite these modes of domination, defining the nature of citizen participation in Greek political life. In the case of Greece, nationalism was born when the modern Greek social formation was still part of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, the shifting of alliances from the local to national level did not go hand in hand with industrialization and the administrative consolidation of the nation-state. Untempered by the socio-economic and political realities of modernization, the nationalist discourse was allowed to take more utopian, volatile, and ultimately uncontrollable forms. The political conjuncture of 1981-1995, to which we now turn, offers an illustration of the effects of nationalist populism.

**PASOK’s Nationalist Populism**

From 1981 to 1989, PASOK evoked a volatile discourse\(^\text{21}\) for the purposes of legitimating its foreign policy strategy. In juxtaposition to the conservative nationalism associated with the pre-1974 *status quo*, a leftwing nationalist
ideology was constructed, grounded on a combination of “anti-imperialism”, clientelism, and populism giving impetus to the charismatic personality of PASOK’s leader, Andreas Papandreou. Through clientelist practices, PASOK ushered in (particularly through employment in the public sector) large parts of the working class, the rural population and the lower middle class. These segments of Greek society had been excluded from the centres of power owing to the ideologically discriminatory clientelism which followed the defeat of the communists in the Greek Civil War (1946-49). The new clientelism was organized by the socialist party’s bureaucracy rather than individual members of the political elite. It was not restricted to the entry level of the civil service but extended to the élite level, composed of party cadres and new businessmen who engaged in business with the state.

PASOK also utilized the anti-American sentiments, which had grown because of the widespread perception of American involvement in the earlier breakdown of Greek democracy (1967) and the debacle in Cyprus (1974). PASOK’s hegemony thus helped replace anti-communist nationalism with nationalist populism. Its foreign policy did not make openings for a strong civil society, something which would have been supported by the discourse of Europeanism. It drew upon popular support as a legitimizing element, employing a discourse which evoked the notion of brotherhood among “peoples”, rather than the idea of rights, voluntary associations and deliberation among partners of equal standing. The major domestic crisis of 1989 highlighted the dead-ends of the nationalist populism of PASOK as an impediment to the rise of a robust civil society.

The Rise of Greek Civil Society as a Player in the Foreign Policy Area

The Domestic Political Crisis of 1989

After the mid-1980s, political cynicism and alienation in Greece appeared and peaked in the late 1980s. By 1989, PASOK may have been extolling the benefits that would accrue from conforming to the Single European Market but it suffered a deep identity crisis. A divide emerged between supporters of technocratic reform favouring a more dynamic agenda of liberalization and European integration, and opponents of this reform who emphasized “the national interest” and adhered to large public spending. The ensuing political crisis was reflected in two political affairs. The “corn affair” of the late 1980s stemmed from the revelation that officials of the Ministry of Finance were implicated in falsifying official documents related to the shipping of goods.
The documents falsely confirmed that a cargo of Yugoslavian corn was Greek, so as to benefit from relevant EEC legislation for products of EEC member-states. In his defense at the court, the accused former Deputy Minister of Finance did not deny the charges but chose to evoke the “national interest” to legitimize his actions. Thirteen former ministers, who were called in to testify as defense witnesses, also evoked the national interest.

The most representative instance of the political crisis was the Koskotas affair, a case of extensive money-laundering operations implicating high-ranking state officials. The Koskotas story reflected deeper issues surrounding the relations between state and civil society. Disillusionment with public services and political parties functioned as a catalyst for the emergence of civil society as an arena open to non-partisan mobilization. At the same time, there was an upsurge of nationalist elements whose agendas seemed consonant with the foreign policy followed by Greek governments in the early 1990s.

The effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia on Greek foreign policy provide a fine illustration of this point as seen below.

**The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Greek Civil Society**

As late as in 1992, Greece had no coherent foreign policy towards the new Balkan states. It was therefore a shock for politicians submerged in the webs of Greece’s political crisis to witness the resurgence of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as an independent state, which both adopted the symbol of the ancient Macedonian royal house and, more alarmingly, inserted in its constitution terms that could have been taken to imply claims on Greek territory. At the same time, Turkey was renewing its interest in the Muslims of Thrace. Meanwhile, the Cyprus problem remained unresolved. These developments were exacerbated by the corresponding inability of the Greek state to use both its EC/EU and NATO memberships and its economic superiority in the Balkans as a springboard for the pursuit of a leading regional role.

In the face of changes following the collapse of Yugoslavia, two successive Greek governments (ND in 1990-1993 and PASOK, 1993-1996) tended to adopt a “simplistic explanatory framework” (often taking the form of “encirclement theories” and “imaginary alliances”) grounded on a “maximalist thesis”: any bilateral negotiation with FYROM would rest on the assumption that its official name does not contain any references to “Macedonia.” As no such reassurances could be made, Greece was silently castigated for its stance by the rest of the EC/EU members, who were
making efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement. In August 1992, the Greek government imposed an oil embargo on FYROM, while two years later PASOK generalized the embargo by closing down the Greek General Consulate in Skopje and prohibiting the circulation of goods to and from FYROM (excluding food and pharmaceutical products). A million-strong demonstration that took place in February 1992 in Thessaloniki appeared to legitimize the maximalist foreign policy line.

Serbian nationalism also became an emotional subject for Greeks, as Milosevic initially figured as another Tito struggling to reunite Yugoslavia. During the war in Bosnia, Greece opposed any military operation against Serbia. On grounds of national interest, the Greek Foreign Minister rejected the UN decision to create a no-fly zone over Bosnian airspace because this would have made it permissible for Turkish aircrafts to fly in Greek airspace. Furthermore, when it became known that a number of Greek businessmen violated the economic embargo imposed on Serbia, the Greek government demonstrated reluctance to punish the perpetrators. With its stance, Greece gradually managed to alienate the EU and international community at large, and even a section of the business community in Northern Greece (which operated on the profit-seeking approach). During this period, nationalist politicians on all sides exploited the patriotic ferment in Greece with regard to the “Macedonian” issue and relations with Serbia.

By the mid-1990s, pro-maximalist sentiments in Greek society began to subside. A temporary settlement (Interim Accord) was signed by Greece and FYROM in 1995. Yet, as long as two years later, Athens-based media, influential political analysts, and powerful economic and commercial interests seemed to advocate an increasingly confrontational policy towards Skopje. These groups were reinforced by segments of civil society in northern Greece and “a highly sensitive diaspora entrenched in maximalist positions”. The Greek privately-owned media are a case in point. Following the divorce of mass media from the state in the early 1990s, a media culture based on sensationalism grew. The absence of state regulation on new television channels led to the development of a so-called Darwinian environment for media competition, further exacerbating its ethnocentric core through the negative portrayal of incoming immigrants from Southeastern Europe.

Between 1989 and 1995, all the elements prevalent in Greek nationalist populism at large, became conjoined and condensed into a nationalist foreign policy. NGOs and citizens’ groups which disagreed with this policy were confronted with the paradoxical situation of having to articulate a
rights-based discourse without the benefits of a more developed civil society, as all three composite characteristics of civil society (material base, organizational expression, ideology and values) were present in Greece, but were imbued with the element of state-centrism. Indeed, although weakened by the crisis at the end of the 1980s, the paternalistic state demonstrated resilience by forging a complementary relationship with the nationalist segments of civil society. Despite PASOK’s desire to appear forward-looking in 1993, foreign policy with respect to FYROM and Serbia remained within the framework set out by the previous conservative government. Promises were made for “an even tougher stance on FYROM”, and Greece’s ties with Milosevic’s Serbia were strengthened. The unusual degree to which the aspirations of Greek civil society actors corresponded to the orientation of the state’s foreign policy at the time, becomes explicable if one acknowledges that their ideological core degenerated into an ethnocentric discourse similar to the age-long, traditional nationalist discourse of the Greek state.

Greece’s New Foreign Policy

Pro-Europeanists in Power: Foreign Policy and Civil Society

By the mid-1990s, a different bipartite convergence began to take place between ND and PASOK, which has been seen as a drive to achieve the political and economic standards set by Western European countries. This drive was facilitated by the spread of pro-European ideas (Europeanism). In fact, Costas Simitis won both general elections in 1996 and 2000, remaining in power until March 2004. Since 1996 the bipartite convergence in foreign policy goals has centered around an agenda based on the common assumption that the nationalist populism of Greece’s foreign policy in the previous years was counterproductive with respect to the national interest. This was attributed to the inordinate extent to which factors of personality and charismatic leadership had impacted on the formulation of foreign policy. Clientelism, which functions in the absence of institutional structures and leads to the electoral game of ethno-political outbidding, was also conducive to making non-rational policy choices, for example, the very friendly policy vis-à-vis Serbia.

At this point we would like to suggest a rough, but not too rigid, conceptual division between followers of Europeanism who adhere to economic, political and administrative changes in line with EU requirements, on the one hand;
and its opponents, usually associated with xenophobic social strata, nationalist actors and generally those who feel like “outsiders” vis-à-vis the process of Europeanization, on the other. While after 1974 opponents to Greece’s entry into the then EEC focused on the economic inequalities that might emerge from Greece’s integration into the Common Market, in the 1990s opponents were concerned about the threat it may pose to the Greek cultural identity. On the other hand, Europeanism has also been portrayed as a force that has exploited the nascent civil society while preserving intact clientelism, owing to the fact that the management and allocation of EU funds usually goes through the “party-controlled state”\(^41\).

In the mid-1990s, the first Simitis government emphasized meeting the Maastricht economic convergence criteria. An acute awareness prevailed within his Cabinet regarding “the tarnished image of past statism”\(^42\). For politicians like George Papandreou, civil society and non-state actors were not merely a secondary question to the restructuring of the economy and polity but figured as pillars of Europeanism. This is clearly a pluralist approach, advocating that civil society actors be represented in the social dialogue between state and society\(^43\). Democratization became associated with peace and human rights, in opposition to nationalist populism which linked democratization to “anti-imperialism” and national sovereignty. In its struggle to break with this rhetoric, Europeanism seemed to repudiate the notion of “anti-imperialism” altogether. In Greece, concerns with this lack of criticism towards great power politics were voiced by trade unions, the parliamentary and non-parliamentary left, and sectors of the media throughout the wars in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike nationalist populism, Europeanism was associated with the new discourse of humanitarian intervention or the “war on terrorism”. Europeanism has tended to downplay the importance of “sovereignty” and national-popular struggles (Kurds), while emphasizing the struggles of minority groups for recognition (Muslims in former Yugoslavia) or the struggles of social movements for basic human rights (the women’s movement in Afghanistan). International solidarity is thus linked more with civic bonds and human rights, rather than with historical-ideological or religious bonds tying together national struggles of different peoples around the world.

In this context, the fact that significant sectors of the Greek population have been hostile towards the United States and the Western powers has not affected the rise of a new bipartite (ND-PASOK) convergence in Greek politics. As a foreign policy analyst noted in 2003, post-1996 PASOK became “a champion” in the “two-level games-approach” required for
managing the discrepancy between its pro-western orientation in foreign policy and the sensibilities of Greek public opinion. Thanks to its mastery of this technique, “PASOK is emerging as a reliable partner to its Western allies since it is the only [party] that can manipulate the unruly Greek public opinion and absorb its reactions”\textsuperscript{44}. This became apparent during the NATO bombings of Serbia in 1999. While the overwhelming majority of citizens expressed its opposition to them, a tacit approval existed regarding the government’s obligation to align itself with the rest of the NATO members in supporting military action\textsuperscript{45}.

Following the rise of Europeanists under Simitis and George Papandreou, the MFA started to build up its undeveloped sector of “developmental diplomacy.” In the past, Greece had been on the receiving end of funding programs (Integrated Mediterranean Programs in the 1980s) but by the mid-1990s it was assuming the new role and responsibilities of an OECD donor-state. This also affected the character of civil society, whose nationalist elements seemed to be dissipating while a new framework was being created for their incorporation into a coherent policy framework. Greek NGOs such as European Perspective, Humanitarian Defense, and Doctors Without Borders could begin to work on an international level within both the development policy outlined at Maastricht in 1992 and the EU’s Liaison Committee on NGOs. At the same time, NGOs drew ideological legitimacy from the Stability Pact and the multilateral cooperative model it propagated\textsuperscript{46}. By leaving non-state actors outside its operational framework, the MFA leadership realized that it would be failing to address an emerging situation: as the head of the MFA’s Committee on NGOs has noted, “while a few years ago about 90 percent of decisions on foreign affairs had to go through the MFA, today it is only about 50-60 percent”\textsuperscript{47}. The new approach to civil society became especially clear in 1999, which was marked by the appointment of George Papandreou as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the wake of the Ocalan case.

\textit{From the Ocalan Case to the Institutionalization of Civil Society}

Despite the fact that by 1999 the nationalist, “underdog culture”-influences on Greek foreign policy had declined, their sudden resurgence in the so-called Ocalan case signified the end of an era in which foreign policy had alternated between nationalist populism and the then-emerging bipartite (ND-PASOK) consensus. Nationalist forces had also played a role in the Imia crisis in 1996, largely due to the media and their sensationalist
coverage of the near-military confrontation between Greece and Turkey.\(^48\)

In 1999, however, the state experienced the implosion of an “abscess” (as one foreign policy analyst has described it) “of para-state nationalists, amateurish agents, responsibility-fearing members of the administration, and a political leadership that seemed to be in complete disarray.”\(^49\) In the Ocalan crisis the specter of its own nationalist elements came back to haunt Greece, as the country was isolated internationally in a manner not dissimilar to the period preceding the Interim Accord with FYROM in 1995. The crisis helped state officials overcome the zero-sum game logic, according to which what was harmful for Turkish interests was good for Greek interests. With the appointment of George Papandreou as Minister of Foreign Affairs, a number of major changes took place. Subsequent to the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis and the articulation of the anti-nationalist policy of the new MFA administration, organizations of the Greek civil society found it easier than in the past to engage in humanitarian efforts.\(^50\) From 1999 to 2000, development funding increased by 300 percent.\(^51\) In the meantime, Greece entered the EMU (2001). In 2002, the Greek MFA’s Committee on NGOs registered many Greek NGOs that fulfilled its two criteria: they both participated in an international advocacy network and had significant international experience of at least two years. “Humanitarian Defense” (HD), established in 1999, sought to provide the victims of Kosovo with aid, irrespective of their nationality, religion, or political beliefs. Thus with the cooperation of the ministries of foreign affairs and defense (General Staff), HD established contacts with local authorities in the rural areas of FYROM and sent over aid packages with food, clothing, and medical supplies.\(^52\) “European Perspective” (EP) was also among the Greek NGOs that mobilized during the Kosovo crisis and assumed the role of a “lead agency” of the European Agency for Reconstruction.\(^53\)

Other factors were also vital in creating a climate favorable to the development of the Greek civil society: namely, the devolution of power attempted by the government through administrative decentralization and the empowerment of municipalities, the establishment of independent administrative authorities that could ensure greater transparency such as the Greek Ombudsman, the growing independence of trade unions and interest groups and their inclusion in policy formulation through the establishment of the Economic and Social Committee,\(^54\) the proliferation of think-tanks, voluntary organizations, and institutes, and the encouragement of voluntary activism by the government.\(^55\) What foreign affairs achieved was the partial institutionalization of civil society, by providing the more internationally-
oriented social actors with an operational framework in which to promote their goals. The ministry succeeded in this endeavor by broadening its own policy framework, in order to include a novel dimension of diplomacy relating to international development as well as to enhance the sector of economic diplomacy. The institutionalization of civil society stirred up reactions from traditionalist diplomats, who were obligated to interact with multiple structures of diplomacy, which moreover seemed to supersede their own, neorealist agenda.

In 1996, the MFA had already begun negotiating the First Five-Year Programme for Bilateral Development Cooperation with the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), of which it belatedly became a member in 1999. In 1999, the ministry established the General Directorate for International Development and Cooperation (YDAS) that is responsible for financing and monitoring development assistance, emergency- and post-humanitarian aid programmes initiated by NGOs and directed towards developing countries. YDAS also aimed to encourage the development of Greek civil society. Such encouragement included sensitizing public opinion to humanitarian issues, providing a framework for selecting the most reliable actors of civil society, and promoting the development of Greek civil society and its coordination with the MFA based on “transparency, mutual trust, the rational use of public funds and an exchange of information” through programs for the promotion of voluntarism and development education.

A final aspect of the institutionalization of the relations between Greek NGOs and the MFA concerns the establishment of the Committee on NGOs, which provides information to Greek NGOs about the ways in which they could acquire a consultative status in international institutions such as the EU, NATO, the UN, and the OSCE. This committee attempted to create a network for effective communication and collaboration among NGOs and all the directorates of the MFA. In 2003, when it assumed the EU Presidency, the Greek government put forth a number of innovations designed to upgrade the role of NGOs. Over the course of every European presidency, about 1,000 NGOs engaged in a dialogue with officials from the presiding country in a parallel forum. The Greek government promoted the development of mechanisms for technical and experience-transfer between Northern and Southern non-state actors, the further institutionalization of the “Euromed Civil Forum”, the enhancement of the “Euroregions Initiative” (which aims to stimulate cross-border collaboration among local societies), and the strengthening of civil society through the creation of a
viable multilateral framework. Greece’s “Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans”, initiated in 2002, was a five-year scheme designed to allocate 550 million euros for the development of the Balkans. Although the Plan was never really implemented, it is noteworthy that about 20 percent of its budget was earmarked for co-financing “private productive investments”.

Relations with Turkey were also affected by the MFA’s new approach, even though they had traditionally been considered as a “special” issue requiring a firmer, neorealist approach. What came to be known as the earthquake diplomacy of 1999, however, helped reverse previous nationalist trends in Greek public opinion and the media, facilitating public support for the new framework for Greek-Turkish relations adopted by the new leadership of the MFA (and manifested in the Confidence Building Measures signed with Turkey in 2000). As noted by Panagiotis Tsakonas, the new bilateral framework was consonant with institutionalist principles. In 2000, the EU resolved to support a five-year program aimed at strengthening civil society in Turkey which included a sub-program called “Civic Dialogue” between Greece and Turkey. This has involved support for “demonstration dialogue” activities by three experienced NGO networks (Women’s Initiative for Peace, European student organization AEGEE, and European Center for Common Ground on Cooperation with the Media). The program also provided for NGO networking and dialogue promotion through workshops and manuals, as well as the offer of micro-grants to stimulate exchanges and joint projects between private actors from Greece and Turkey’s civil societies.

New Democracy in Power

On March 7, 2004, PASOK’s eleven-year rule ended. In September 2005, “Citizens’ Project’ (Ergo Politon) was established, an executive body overlooked by the Prime Minister. The project regulates the funds flowing from the Ministries of foreign affairs, health, culture, the interior, as well as from Public Utilities and Organizations (DEKO) towards civil society organizations. One of the areas where the new ND government was especially critical of its predecessors relates to the allocation of state funds to NGOs. Already in early 2005 Euripides Stylianides, ND’s Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for YDAS, was preparing an inventory of the NGOs affiliated to the MFA. It was clear that the MFA’s leadership was alarmed by the fact that the number of certified NGOs were, according to Stylianides, close to 360; i.e., six times that of European “NGO-superpower” Holland, and about four
times more than those of the USA. In fact, the bad press received by NGOs in Greece can be partly traced to the reputed mismanagement of their funds and associated absence of transparency frameworks. The further development of the NGOs was also hampered by other factors, such as the low interpersonal trust traceable to the country’s weak civic bonds. In order to end what was perceived to be a huge drain on public resources, the ND government terminated the funding of many NGOs. Still, members of both parties were accused either for acting as mediators for NGOs (in order for them to receive funding) or for using specific NGOs as a means for self-promotion.

Otherwise, in terms of the role of civil society in foreign policy, the ND government appeared to be moving along the same lines as its predecessors. In 2004, Greece sent 250,000 Euros-worth of humanitarian aid to Sudan (one of the 18 target-countries) during the Darfour crisis. In December 2004, Greece was the first country to help in the recovery of tsunami-stricken Sri Lanka, sending aid aboard several C-130 aircrafts. The Greek government also raised 35 million Euros for relief purposes by appealing to citizens through the media. In Southeastern Europe, regarding the implementation of the “Plan for Economic Reconstruction”, Stylianides claimed that the rates of fund absorption rose to 10.4 percent in 2006 (two years earlier it remained no higher than 2.4 percent). Several alternative diplomatic avenues were pursued with mixed success, such as cross-border cooperation projects notably in the cases of Bulgaria, Romania and FYROM. As regards Turkey, the MFA reaffirmed its intentions to promote links between Greek and Turkish civil society actors, for example on the economic level through the Council of Greek-Turkish Business Cooperation and the cultural level with academic and think-tank symposia.

Concluding Remarks and Theoretical Implications

In this article we have argued that nationalist populism advocated a specific nationalist foreign policy based on anti-Americanism and a state-centric notion of national solidarity. Rooted in the underdog culture, nationalist populism had the effect of forestalling the cultivation of an autonomous space for civic interaction. The domestic political crisis of 1989 was conducive to the gradual decline of nationalist populism and also signaled the rise of non-state actors in Greece. The sway of nationalist populism over society was such, however, that it dominated public debate vis-à-vis the disintegration of Yugoslavia. This discourse was coupled by ND’s (1990-1993) and PASOK’s (1993-1996) favourable stance towards the
Milosevic régime and maximalist policy towards FYROM. The main protagonists of Greek civil society’s mobilization in 1989-1996 were imbued with the nationalist populist discourse.

Another conjuncture that stimulated the rise of civil society in Greece, albeit one that dampened the influence of domestic nationalist populist forces, was the drive towards European integration. As an agent of reform, the EU has had a multifarious impact on civil society by facilitating the establishment of domestic institutional preconditions for the development of civil society, the creation of new rights for Greek citizens accruing from a viable legal framework that protects them, and the setting up of new regional cooperative structures based on regional development policy.

All this points to the tendency to adopt policy tools and to resort to conceptual aspects of foreign-policy decision-making which were hardly present before Greece’s integration in the EU, namely the interaction between the MFA and various NGOs at the stage of policy-making and the occasional “use” of NGOs at the stage of policy implementation. The conceptual frameworks and modes of thinking with which MFA policy advisors and even some diplomats formulated policy began to converge with points of view emanating from Brussels (cognitive Europeanization). The prevalence of Europeanism after 1996, owing not least to the growing new bipartite (ND-PASOK) convergence in foreign policy, ushered in an era of networking between MFA services and NGOs and facilitated the above noted “cognitive” Europeanization.

The growing influence of Europeanism also signaled the partial abandonment of nationalist populism and the underdog culture in which it was grounded. Pro-European politicians and diplomats adopted the EU development policy framework and new responsibilities of an OECD donor-state. The ministerial turnover at the MFA in 1999 was a catalyst in the process of institutionalizing civil society. Moreover, the Ocallan case in early 1999, which preceded the turnover, helped state officials overcome their traditional zero-sum game logic vis-à-vis Turkey and seemed to mark the decline of nationalist elements in the Greek civil society. The new MFA leadership pushed towards the delegitimization of these elements, instead providing domestic, pro-European non-state actors with a framework in which to mobilize and promote their organizational goals. It broadened its own policy framework to include a novel dimension of diplomacy relating to development, manifested during the crisis in Kosovo. During that crisis, actors from Greek civil society engaged in emergency and post-humanitarian...
aid programmes under the finance schemes and monitoring of YDAS, and enhanced economic diplomacy.

In theoretical terms, the dualism in Greek foreign policy should not be seen as a rigid bipolar pattern. Politicians, officials, journalists and the wider public, as well as collective actors, such as trade unions and NGOs, while rallying around either Europeanism or nationalist populism, may shift positions, depending on the historical conjuncture. Thus Europeanism and national populism may be treated as an analytical set of two concepts, a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Another theoretical implication related to these developments refers to the limits of autonomous growth of Greek civil society. Traditionally weak and hampered by clientelism and populism, the two prevalent modes of political domination in Greece, the Greek civil society has started growing since the late 1980s. Yet it seems that at least in foreign policy-making civil society’s steps were closely monitored by the MFA, which after 1999, in particular, provided NGOs with funds, technical aid and legitimization. This poses obvious limits to the autonomy of Greek civil society which need further research.

To sum up, we examined key events in Greek politics; i.e. the domestic political crisis of 1989, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the war in Kosovo, as well as the wider context of Greece’s road to Europe. We discussed the fundamental ways in which Greek foreign policy was first under the sway of nationalist populism, roughly until 1996, and of Europeanism thereafter. There are indications, then, that Greek foreign policy no longer remains confined to the corridors of the ministry of foreign affairs, but is likely to be shaped by struggles, cross-cutting both high politics and a progressively maturing civil society.

NOTES

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2. An exception is Pantelis Sklias and Asteris Huliaras (eds), The Diplomacy of Civil Society: NGOs and International Development Cooperation (Athens, Papazisis, 2002). [In Greek].


7. See for example, Thanos Veremis, Action Without Foresight – Western Involvement in Yugoslavia (Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2002).

8. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, op. cit.


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13. ibid., p. 22.

14. ibid., p. 21.

15. ibid., p.88


18. N. Mouzelis, “Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society,” op. cit., p. 44.


26. Most of the major 1990s documents surrounding the controversy can be found in Giannis Valinakis and Sotiris Dalis (eds), The Skopje Problem: Official Documents, 1990-1996 (Athens, Sideris, 1996) [in Greek].
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31. ibid., p.473.


35. ibid., pp. 390-392.


37. Vasilis Sakellariou, “Greek Civil Society,” *To Vima*, 27/11/2000. Sakellariou was then a Member of the Secretariats of the “Anti-Nationalist Front” and the “Citizen Movement Against Racism”.


43. Interview with official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2003.


45. ibid., p. 324.


47. Quoted in Christos Frangonikolopoulos, “Non-Governmental Organizations and Greek Foreign Policy,” op. cit., p. 458.


50. Anonymous personal interview with the then special counselor for Hellenic Aid at the MFA, July 2003.


55. Ibid., pp. 283, 292. In the year 2000 alone, the government allocated $165 million for the equipment and training of a nationwide network for preventing and fighting forest fires.

56. Interview with the then special counselor for Hellenic Aid at the MFA, July 2003.

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59. *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia*, 23/6/03.


63. In March 2005, Stylianides informed a reporter that when NGOs “amount to fortune-seeking efforts aimed at profit, and are not monitored for the effectiveness of their activities and the transparency in the management of the funds they receive from the state, then it is clearly a bad thing and detrimental to civil society”. “Greece is a ‘champion’ in NGOs,” *To Paron*, 20/3/05.

64. *Greece – Europe European: Society – Politics – Values*, Social Survey Results, National Center for Social Research (Greece), November 2003, pp. 7-9. Compared to Portuguese, Spaniards, British and Dutch, Greeks show the highest rates of generalized social distrust.

65. Marina Mani, “An inventory on NGOs,” *Eleftherotypia*, 28/11/04. There are newspaper reports claiming that the management of funds dedicated to NGOs has been inefficient and not transparent. See the newspapers *Eleftherotypia* 9/6/05, *Ta Nea* 12/7/05 and *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia* 4/6/06. See also “Ministry of Foreign Affairs invites NGOs,” *Eleftherotypia*, 13/2/05.


67. Interview of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Stylianides on *Sky Radio*, 27/12/05.

68. Interview of Deputy Foreign Minister E. Stylianidis, *Adesmeftos Typos*, 13.11.05.

69. As of 2007, Greece is obligated to increase the percentage of its GDP apportioned to donor aid from 0.21 percent (about 300 million euros for 2005) to 0.33 percent, and eventually to 0.75 percent. Data published by Marina Mani, “An inventory on NGOs”, *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia* 28/11/04, p. 10.