Psychological dependence and freedom in the Gambler of Dostoevsky: a philosophical analysis

Abstract

IN THE philosophical field of moral psychology and in the contemporary debate on the problem of free will, examples of psychological dependence play an important role. In the Gambler, Dostoevsky focuses on the phenomenon of psychological dependence which, given the philosophical significance of his overall work, makes this novel particularly suitable for philosophical analysis. In my paper, I draw on Plato’s tripartition of the soul in the Republic, on the one hand, and on contemporary philosophical theories regarding free will, on the other, and I attempt to investigate the conditions under which psychological dependence in Dostoevsky may be viewed as an expression of freedom. In particular, I employ Gary Watson’s compatibilist model of free will, which focuses on the relation between values and desires. The latter along with Dostoevsky’s own ‘theory’ of freedom in Notes from Underground provide me with the relevant background for determining the kind of freedom I ascribe to the Gambler. And, although in Watson’s model itself psychological dependence counts as a paradigmatic case of a lack of freedom, I maintain that its application in the Gambler leads –paradoxically– to the opposite conclusion.