

The Long and Winding Road of EU-Turkish Relations after Copenhagen

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RÉSUMÉ

L'Europe et l'Union européenne sont arrivées à un point tournant lors du dernier élargissement de celle-ci. L'Union, issue d'un projet pour établir la paix après la seconde guerre mondiale, fait face à des défis énormes dans un environnement en mutation rapide. Cet article présente un aperçu historique et une analyse du parcours européen de la Turquie. L'auteur met l'accent sur les événements récents y compris le dernier rapport de l'UE relatif aux progrès de la Turquie sur le vote de l'adhésion (octobre 2002) et conclut en traitant les résultats du sommet de Copenhague (décembre 2002) avec leurs conséquences au niveau des relations euro-turques.

ABSTRACT

Europe and the European Union have reached a multiple turning point with the latest enlargement round. The Union, which started as a peace project after World War II, faces its greatest challenges within a rapidly changing environment. There is no other country that has struggled for so many years to become 'part of the party' like Turkey. This article provides a historical overview and analyzes Turkey's European course. It places some emphasis on recent developments, including the latest Regular Report which was issued by the EU on Turkey's progress toward accession (October 2002). Finally, the results of the Copenhagen Summit (December 2002) and their possible consequences for Euro-Turkish relations are discussed.

Introduction

Europe and the European Union have reached a multiple turning point with the latest enlargement round. The Union, which started as a peace project after World War II, faces its greatest challenges within

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a rapidly changing environment. Obviously the 'Europe of 15' cannot be compared to the 'Europe of 27'. The latest enlargement will require the Union to straighten up its bureaucracy and decision-making processes — everything for the sake of pure survival. The deepening process has not materialized yet — despite a path-breaking widening step at the end of 2002.

The latest enlargement round left Turkey with a bitter taste in its mouth. No country has struggled for so many years to become 'part of the party'. No country has fought so much for its 'Western vocation' as Turkey has. However, no country has caused as many rifts within Europe and between Europe and its partners as Turkey has. Numerous hopes, created in Euro-Turkish relations over the past decade turned out to be weary and dim. On the one hand, Turkey has emerged as an increasingly important regional player, as could be seen in Turkey's unfolding engagement in Middle Eastern affairs, which has risen remarkably in contrast to the far more passive approach of the period before 1989/90. In the Iraq crisis, Turkey proved to be a linking pin and a diplomatic clearing house to avoid the war. Additionally, it had to fall in line with the United States because of multiple dependences.

On the other hand, relationships with Europe have become more complicated in the past decade. Many Europeans are anxious about Turkey's membership in the EU. They worry not only for political, economic and cultural reasons, but also because of the possible drag of Europe into the complex Middle Eastern situation. The reasons are multifold and rooted in EU-internal developments and security environment developments. Taken together, all these issues present a complex blend.

More than ever Turkey has been confronted with a multiple dilemma, e.g., internal tensions, economic roller-coaster, increased involvement of the army in operative politics, and a permanent questioning of Turkey's historical entitlement to be part of Europe and of Turkey's Western orientation as part of its identity.

Turkey has enormous 'coherence and dividing capacities'. Some consider it as a pivotal state.¹ A pivotal state is one whose future development may affect the stability of a region and eventually even international stability; which is geopolitically important; which has uncertain futures, where we find different levels of intensity in uncertainty; which has a potential to benefit and/or harm the development of a whole region. By definition it also has the combination of a large, fast-growing population with a rapidly rising middle class, considerable investments in education and infrastructure plus so-called 'emerging markets'; which influences by 'nature', a high number of interactions on the political, economic and social level as a model role for neighbouring countries; which has the potential to play a crucial part in global negotiations on crosscutting issues like human rights, population and environment.

Nevertheless, others see Turkey at the opposite end of the spectrum, calling it 'the sick man of Europe'. Turkey is perceived as an internally corrupt and sick state, with an overloaded bureaucracy, a remarkable societal dividing line, permanent unrest and an army that intervenes domestically more than any European state would accept.

Between those two diametrically opposed perceptions and a rather different self-perception, lies a reality.

The article is divided as follows:

The first part analyzes Turkey's road to Europe and provides a historical review of the very mixed relations over the years. The second part analyses and assesses the latest *Regular Report of the European Union* (October 2002) including the results of the Copenhagen Summit (December 2002) and possible consequences for Euro-Turkish relations and beyond. The final section (*A Concluding Outlook*) covers prospective developments.

A Brief Historical Assessment²

Questions of the so-called 'Europeanness of the Ottoman Empire' and today's Turkey have been crucial throughout the past centuries. Europeanness was not only a question of culture but also one of respecting rules, norms, and laws. It also implied power dynamics and political aspects. Europeanness now is the crucial issue in Euro-Turkish relationships and Turkey's possible full membership in the European Union. The Copenhagen criteria might be called the rules and norms with which a state must comply should it wish to join the 'European Club' in the twenty-first century.³

Euro-Ottoman relationships were traditionally rather ambiguous. For a long period the Ottoman Empire served as the 'Other' for European powers notably in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire had contributed considerably to the development and shaping of the European International System, as such. It may be assumed that both, the European International Society and the Ottoman Empire have been interlocked on different levels and in different qualities for centuries. The Ottoman heritage and, at the same time, the 'Western orientation' have been crucial to the foundation of the Turkish state in terms of identity, self-perception and societal development. The Ottoman Empire began 'Westernizing' its economic, political and social structures in the second half of the nineteenth century, partly under pressure from European powers, partly because the Empire had no alternative if it wanted to survive.

World War I meant the end for the Ottoman Empire and a new start for Turkey. From 1919 to 1922, the emerging state faced resistance from outside (Asia Minor adventure by Greece) and inside (restoration of the Ottoman court, *ancien régime* was intended). For the first time, a new idea gained ground: a territorial nation-state based on the Turkish nation within Turkish borders slowly appeared. The driving force behind was Mustafa Kemal, called *Ataturk*. His target was the creation of Turkey. Turkishness — an identity and loyalty based on the Turkish nation — was the primary goal. It was

less a well thought out political concept than a cultural nationalism. He turned the 'umma' (Islamic community of brothers in faith) into the 'millet' (Ataturk translated it as 'nation'). Ataturk's *Kemalism* laid the framework for Turkey and is still valid. It consists of Swiss law, French centralism, German military order and Soviet-rooted projects. The creation of Turkey is linked inseparably to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) which replaced the highly unfavourable Sèvres Treaty. From 1923 onwards, Ataturk established Turkey as a regional power. He revolutionized the societal system and erased all Ottoman elements. Ataturk's key foreign political targets were non-interventionism, a Western orientation and an emphasis on national sovereignty. He based his ideology, *Kemalism* or *Ataturkism*, on six pillars (*alti ok*):

1. *Laicism (laiklik)*: separation of state and religion so that religion is a private matter. Islam was reformed and adapted to Ataturk's targets and became a state religion. The separation of state and religion was seen as the basis of a modern Turkey. This separation was perceived as a clear indication of Turkey's strong Western orientation.
2. *Republicanism (cumhuriyetcilik)*: Turkey became a republic according to Western examples.
3. *Populism (halkcilik)*: A classless society and a policy which takes the people into account.
4. *Nationalism (milliyetcilik)*: There is only one inseparable Turkish nation. No other nationalities (except the ones named in the Treaty of Lausanne) are accepted on Turkish territory.
5. *Etatism (devletcilik)*: The state controls economy, without having sole property. Turkey is an example of a strong state; i.e., the state stands at the center of public policymaking and the state has primacy over the rest of the society. The strong state molds public, political, social and economic life.⁴
6. *Reformism (inkilapcilik)*: Progress has to be achieved on a permanent basis. This is to be understood as a strong criticism of Ottoman inertia.

Turkey and its Western orientation after World War II

After World War II, Turkey closely aligned itself with the West. The country's ambitions were politically founded and less culturally or economically backed. Turkey became an important link in the American containment policy.⁵ Moreover, the protection of the strategically and economically relevant Turkish Straits became an issue again. The Black Sea, regarded as the 'soft underbelly' of Russia, became a strategic area for the Western Allies. Control over the Black Sea meant control over the Red Army in Central and East European areas. The Straits became a bottleneck; their protection, a vital issue. Deterrence of Russia became deterrence of the Soviet Union. In 1952, Turkey became a member of NATO (together with Greece). During the Cold War, Turkey acted as a buffer towards the Soviet Union in the Western alliance. Having thus entered into very close co-operation with Western Europe in the political field, it was therefore only natural for Turkey to do likewise in the economic arena. In 1959, Turkey chose to begin close cooperation with the fledgling EEC.

In 1959, Turkey's ambitious endeavors to become Western reached a zenith. It applied for associate membership of the then European Community (EC). The reasons behind its application can be summarized as follows: 1) Turkey saw in an association with the EC a confirmation of its Western orientation and vocation; 2) the EC offered a tremendous market potential for the Turkish economy then still undergoing a reshaping procedure plus the EC provided the necessary *pouvoir* for direct foreign investments to fuel the economic restructuring process; 3) the final and probably most important reason for the application was the fact that Greece applied at almost the same time. Greece was a positive driving force for Turkey. Here was a competition fired by historical burdens, mutual misperceptions and jealousies. A 'winner-loser syndrome', which is still predominant, cannot be denied and appears at the bi-and multilateral level.

The EEC reply to Turkey's application in 1959 suggested the establishment of an association until Turkey's circumstances

permitted accession. Despite Western support, domestically Turkey could not get out of the spiral of repeating economic crises and government change. On the external level, tensions with Greece rose, despite NATO-membership. The main issue was the Cyprus question. Domestic and external developments fueled each other reaching a climax in the coup d'état of May 27, 1960.

Nevertheless, negotiations between the EEC and Turkey continued and resulted in the signature of the *Agreement Creating an Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community* ('Ankara Agreement') on September 12, 1963.⁶ This agreement, which entered into effect on December 1, 1964, sought to secure Turkey's full membership in the EEC through the establishment in three phases of a customs union which would serve as an instrument to bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey.

The Ankara Agreement envisaged the establishment of a customs union, which would bring the parties closer together in economic and trade matters. In the meantime, the EEC would offer financial assistance to Turkey. Under the *First Financial Protocol* which covered the period 1963-1970, the Community provided Turkey with loans worth 175 million ECU. The Additional Protocol of November 13, 1970, set out in detailed how the customs union would be established. It provided that the EEC would abolish tariff and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey (with some exceptions including fabrics) upon the entry into effect of the *Protocol*; whereas Turkey would do the same in accordance with a timetable containing two calendars set for 12 and 22 years, and called for the harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the EU in economic matters. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol envisaged the free circulation of natural persons between the Parties in the next 12 to 22 years. The Additional Protocol brought significant advantages for Turkey's agricultural exports to the EEC. In the end, the *Additional Protocol* was abandoned and Turkey lost its preferred position.

On March 12, 1971, the second coup d'état occurred, paving the way for a very volatile period on the domestic and foreign levels. Of course domestically the times were overlaid with a deep economic crisis and serious social upheaval. In July 1974, the *putsch* in Cyprus and subsequent Turkish annexation of the northern part of the island in August 1974 led to heavy and sustainable political consequences for Turkey. In 1975, Greece applied for full-membership. Turkey felt left out and stopped relations with the EEC in 1978. In 1979, Greece became full member and Turkey reacted with the preparation of its application for full membership in 1980. The third *putsch* on September 12, 1980, prevented Turkey's submission of its application. The domestic situation blocked all efforts to come closer to Europe for roughly fifteen years. In 1982, the Ankara Agreement was suspended. This step was a harsh set-back for Turkey because it fell in the phase of the EEC's Southern enlargement when Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) became new members of the Community. This enlargement round was characterized by political consideration. The three new members were making their own way out of years of military dictatorship and accession would contribute to stabilize these young democracies.

Turgut Özal, the leading political personality in this post-*putsch* era, stressed the European vocation of Turkey. EC-Turkish Relations were thus resumed in 1986 and the *Agreement* became active again in 1988. On April 14, 1987, Turkey submitted its application for full EC membership. Instead of emphasizing the political dimension as Greece, Spain and Portugal had in their membership bids, Turkey continued to emphasize the economic dimension. If Turkey applied a 'double strategy', it would have had far better chances to join the Union already at the end of the 1980s.⁷

The Commission's Opinion was completed on December 18, 1989, and endorsed by the Council on February 5, 1990. It underscored Turkey's eligibility for membership yet deferred the in-depth analysis of Turkey's application until the emergence of a more

favorable environment. The Commission required in its statement the enlargement of political pluralism and a considerable improvement of the human rights record. Secondly, the conflict with Greece has to be settled and thirdly, the Cyprus question has to be solved.

Overall the Commission was very reluctant to accept Turkey. The timeframe had a very broad and long-ranging dimension. The EC did not wish to bind itself more than was necessary. Any integration of Turkey was seen as a very challenging task so the Commission decided to assess Turkey's status from time to time. Reluctance in the answer reflected EU-policy towards Turkey for years to come.

Although it did not attain its basic objective, Turkey's application revived relations and efforts to develop relations intensified on both sides. The Association's political and technical mechanisms started meeting again and measures to complete the customs union in time were resumed. Meanwhile, the Commission's promised co-operation package, known as the 'Matutes Package', was unveiled in 1990, but could not be adopted by the Council due to Greece's objection.

Since 1989 the EU-Turkish relationship has been influenced very much by global changes. Since the Soviet Union broke up, a new Europe has emerged and led to a search for new policies in a community of states. This searching process has been influenced by the highly uncertain global environment. "This ambiguity about Turkey's place in Europe – its "Europeanness" – has become more acute since the end of the Cold War. As long as the Soviet Union was perceived as a major threat, strategic considerations tended to dominate Turkey's relationship to Europe. Although many Europeans had doubts about whether Turkey could ever become a member of the European Community – ... - these doubts took a backseat to the overriding strategic need to bind Turkey close to the West. The end of the Cold War, however, has raised new doubts about Turkey's place in Europe and created new difficulties in Ankara's relations with Europe.⁸" The demise of the Soviet Union brought a shift in Europe's military and strategic considerations. Cultural, economic and political factors

increased in importance. This shift in importance and priorities highlighted the particular position of Turkey and its distinctiveness and raised new concerns about whether Turkey fits into the 'new Europe'.

We can take for granted that an increased integration of Turkey at the beginning of the 1990s would have been beneficial for Turkey. Its buffer role of the Cold War was gone, thereby leaving the country hanging in the air. Domestically, it was in a phase of consolidation. Moreover, the Gulf War (1990/91) made the new realities clear. After the Gulf War, the new situation in the Balkans affected Turkey considerably. The dissolving bi-polar system, the emergence of a new perception of Europe and the Eastern Enlargement (the facilitation of the return to Europe) placed Turkey in a far larger line-up with fewer perspectives to become a full member soon.

Obviously this broad reshaping of identity and search process has affected the EU-Turkish relationship. Due to a number of insecurities in the societal environment and some unsolved issues between Turkey and EU-members, the 1990s were characterized by increased tensions and difficulties in that delicate relationship.

The following key obstacles deserve mention. First, on the *international level*, the dispute between Greece and Turkey became increasingly volatile, thus endangering the security in an already troubled area. This turned out to be an important obstacle. The second obstacle has been the pending Cyprus issue. After years gathering dust on diplomatic tables, Cyprus turned into an official blocking factor after the Dublin summit in 1990. Since then the EU has started a 'linkage policy'. The situation became even more complicated when the Republic of Cyprus submitted its application for full membership and the EU gave its approval. The EU hoped that with the approval and start of negotiations (after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996), it would contribute to solving the pending question concerning Turkish involvement in Cyprus. On the contrary, the EU did not have anything to contribute

to a reasonable and sustainable solution. Within a short time, the EU had imported a number of conflicts between a member-state (Greece) and one of its most difficult non-member partners. The issues covered above are tightly interlocked. Moreover, both countries differ in the perception of which are the bilateral problems. On the domestic level, the unsolved Kurdish question, strong influence of the Turkish army on domestic questions, lack of democracy and Turkey's poor human rights record have been the main obstacles so far. Even these problems and the negative opinion of the Commission on the application for membership did not completely close the door to Turkey. The Commission stated that in its opinion that co-operation with Turkey should be resumed because the country shows a general openness towards Europe. For this reason, it has been in the interest of the Commission to support the country's efforts to complete the process of political and economic modernization.

Although there have been internal EU problems and open issues between Turkey and Greece, the EU went into a customs union agreement with Turkey. The agreement became effective in 1996.⁹ In more than six years, it led really to a 'one-way-development', favouring the EU while keeping the pro-European mood in Turkey suppressed. Several times, an opting-out from the agreement was debated by Turkish politicians, but was never seriously pushed forward.

The Luxembourg summit of December 1997 has been regarded as a negative hallmark in EU-Turkish relationships. Instead of offering a perspective of full membership, the Council suggested 'a European strategy for Turkey'. This summit led to a deadlock in the relationship and also influenced European-American relationships considerably. Luxembourg led to a thorough discussion among the European partners and within Turkey. The 'European vocation of Turkey' became the core issue in the discussion. In parallel with the Luxembourg decision, the EU made it clear that it would start negotiations for accession with Cyprus on March 31, 1998.

A crucial year in Euro-Turkish relations was 1999. Since the summer of 1999, which saw a gradual improvement of Greco-Turkish relationship, it became clear that the Helsinki Summit in December would be of the utmost importance. The new government was very precise in its program and positioned Turkey as a very self-conscious partner as the following quotation shows:

“Turkey’s full membership in the European Union is its right emanating from history, geography and international treaties. We shall endeavor to realize Turkey’s aim of full membership in the European Union with equal rights and status as other members. Turkey will assume its rightful place in the integration process in Europe and while doing this, will go on protecting its national rights and interests meticulously. In this regard, we shall carefully monitor and exploit all opportunities and developments which may accelerate our relations with the European Union. Turkey will adopt a determined approach aimed at enjoying full and equal footing in political and economic European and Transatlantic institutions and formations as well as those related to security and defense. We shall be engaged in effective initiatives to eliminate the flaws inherent in the implementations of the Customs Union.”¹⁰

The reasons for this rapprochement were:

1. Dialogue between Greece and Turkey after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan.
2. Earthquakes in both countries, which led to a new mutual perception.
3. EU position to bring the enlargement through without any further delays and disturbances.
4. New Social Democrat-Green government in Germany, which had a more open and pro-Turkish position.
5. Pressure from the United States, who always saw Turkey as a strategic ally.

The European Union stressed that a closer rapprochement would depend on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria, a solution of the disputes with Greece over the Aegean, and a solution to the Cyprus problem.

At the Nice Summit (December 2000), the EU approved the Accession Partnership Document for Turkey. During the subsequent summits, Turkey remained at the top of the agenda, while also in a holding position.

The domestic situation was characterized by a number of economic crises (fall 2000 and spring 2001) and volatile governments. In summer 2002, it became clear that only early elections might lead to a breakthrough in a comprehensive deadlock situation. Since November 2002, Turkey has been ruled by a conservative Islamic party under Tayyip Erdogan. The Union's reaction was reluctant but positive.

The Latest Regular Report of the European Union and Some Results

On October 9, 2002, the European Commission announced Turkey's *Annual Progress Report* (2002). This report is a continuation of the *Regular Reports* for 2000 and 2001 and is structured according to the Copenhagen Criteria.¹¹ Moreover, the latest Report takes into consideration progress made since the 2001 edition. It covers the period until September 15, 2002. Lastly, the *Report* provides a basis for further recommendations.

Political Criteria

The decision on the candidate status of Turkey in Helsinki (1999) has encouraged Turkey to introduce a series of fundamental and remarkable reforms. Adoption of these reforms is an important signal of the country's determination to move closer to the values and standards of the European Union. The following list indicates Turkey's efforts.

- A major constitutional reform was introduced in October 2001 aimed at strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and restricting the grounds for capital punishment.
- A new Civil Code was adopted in November 2001 (it particularly improves gender equality and strengthened guarantees regarding the protection and rights of the child).
- Three reform packages were adopted in February, March and August 2002.
- The death penalty has been lifted in peacetime.
- The state of emergency has now been lifted in two provinces in the South East and the decision has been taken to lift it in the two provinces.
- Reform of the judicial system has continued. The competence of the State Security Courts has been narrowed and the period of pre-trial detention reduced. The functioning of these Courts, though, is still not in line with international standards. There are continued reports that the judiciary does not always act in an independent and consistent manner.
- Particularly the reform, which were adopted in August 2002, were brought through under difficult political and economic circumstances and cover a number of sensitive issues, such as the reform of the prison system, the broadening of the expression of opinion, the freedom of association, broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish.
- Corruption still remains a serious problem in Turkey (despite a number of efforts to amend the situation). The relevant Conventions of the Council of Europe have not yet been ratified.

- The role and composition of the National Security Council has been reshaped. The relevant constitutional amendments have been put into practice. Nonetheless, these changes do not appear to have modified the way in which the National Security Council operates in practice.

Overall, Turkey has made remarkable steps towards the Copenhagen political criteria. The reforms adopted in August 2002 are particularly far-reaching. Taken altogether, these reforms lay much of the groundwork for strengthening democracy and protecting human rights in Turkey. They pave the way for additional changes which should enable Turkish citizens to enjoy rights and freedoms commensurate with those prevailing in the European Union. Nonetheless, Turkey does not fully comply with the political criteria.

First, the reforms cover a number of significant limitations, which are delineated in the report. Important restrictions remain in the areas of freedom of expression, including in particular the written press and broadcasting, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion and the right to legal redress.

Second, many of the reforms require the adoption of regulations or other administrative measures, which should be in accordance with European standards. Some of these measures have already been introduced and others are being drawn up. To be effective, the reforms must be implemented in practice by executive and judicial bodies at different levels throughout the country.

Third, a number of important issues emerging from the political criteria have yet to be adequately addressed. These include the fight against torture and ill-treatment, civilian control of the military, the situation of persons imprisoned for expressing non-violent opinions, and compliance with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. In the light of these remarkable steps, the EU has encouraged Turkey to pursue the reform process to strengthen democracy and the protection of human rights, in both law and practice.

Economic Criteria

A functioning market economy requires that prices and trade are liberalized and that an enforceable legal system be fully implemented. Macroeconomic stability, consensus about economic policy, a well-developed financial sector and the absence of any significant barriers to market entry are additional conditions for a working market economy.

Turkey has achieved some progress on the functioning of its market economy, which should improve its ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, but is still suffering the consequences of two deeply destabilizing financial crises (fall 2000 and spring 2001). Note that Turkey was massively affected by the Russian crisis of 1998, too. Comprehensive IMF-support saved the Turkish economy and entire state from collapse.

After several attempts to stabilize the economy (based on the stringent and rigid IMF-conditions), the current reform program has revealed positive results. Fiscal discipline has improved and the transparency of public sector accounts has increased remarkably, while inflationary pressures are declining. Political interference has been reduced and structural weaknesses, such as a fragile and distorted banking sector, have been tackled. Financial market regulation and supervision have been strengthened. Important steps have been taken to liberalize key markets, such as agriculture and energy. Turkey has to continue the present reform process in order to achieve macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability. Additionally, the new Turkish government must undertake serious efforts to reduce chronically high inflation and to maintain fiscal discipline.

In sum, Turkey's ability to comply with EU-economic standards will require that Turkey go through a long and sometimes painful process of restructuring. This process will be successful if the domestic climate is stabilized. Financial support from the EU is not enough to amend structural weaknesses. The first, important steps were taken and

several more will have to follow, notably the ability to assume the obligations of membership.

Ability to Assume the Obligations of Membership

This section refers to the question of Turkey's ability to assume the obligations of membership. It refers to the legal and institutional framework, known as the *acquis*, by means of which the European Union implements its objectives.

The section covered a list of 29 negotiating chapters, and incorporated an assessment of Turkey's administrative capacity to implement the *acquis* in its various aspects.

Overall, Turkey has reached an encouraging level of legislative alignment in the areas covered by the Customs Union, while in other areas this alignment is less advanced. Major gaps between the *acquis* and Turkish legislation remain. Administrative capacity needs to be strengthened. Regarding the internal market, in the area of *free movement of goods*, the framework law on the free circulation of products adopted in 2001 has entered into force. Various pieces of implementing legislation have been adopted throughout a wide range of sectors. Substantial *technical barriers to trade* remain. Substantial work also remains to be done to establish and improve the functioning of various bodies (standardization, accreditation, and conformity assessment). An appropriate market surveillance system should be established. No progress can be reported in the field of *free movement of persons*. In the field of *free movement of capital*, important restrictions on foreign investment in various sectors have remained. As regards *Customs Union*, there is a large degree of alignment on paper, but little effective alignment of practices.

A Concluding Outlook

International reactions to the decision from Copenhagen 2002 were mixed. Turkey was at very first moment understandably disappointed;

finally, it reacted rather rationally as the following statement indicates. “The decisions taken at the Copenhagen European Council regarding Turkey fell short of our expectations. Nevertheless, they are perceived as a basis of a new stage in Turkey-EU relations.”¹²

Obviously Turkey still has a long way to go. Yet the work already accomplished is very encouraging, pragmatic and, most important, open. The new government gives hope for a new way, which might enable Turkey to meet the requirements for a full-membership. A ‘European touch’ has to come from inside and cannot be suppressed from outside. This is most likely the biggest challenge in a country, which embodies a blend of different identities, cultures, and self-perceptions.

The EU will have to clarify its position on Turkey’s full-membership by the end of 2004. Helsinki (1999) and Copenhagen (2002) were far-reaching steps and also commitments. Provided Turkey meets the requirements, the EU cannot find any more excuses. Otherwise, Europe would lose its credibility and project ‘Europe’ would suffer considerable and sustainable damage.

If neither party meets the conditions, Turkey will have the following options:

1. Surrender the full-membership in favour of a special partnership that would include strategic elements. Accept the customs union as maximum. This would indicate a suspension of the Ankara Agreement. This option would cause both parties massive losses in credibility, but it still represents an option.
2. A closer relationship with the United States. The USA would have to increase its financial support and thereby help Turkey to pull out of the chronic economic crisis and achieve regional player status. This will also depend on the stand-off with Iraq. Difficulties within NATO on an agreement to protect Turkey (Art. 4 request) clearly demonstrated the tensions within the

different parts of NATO and the delicate position in which Turkey finds itself.

3. A stronger alignment with the Islamic world. This has been an option promoted for several years whenever EU-Turkish relations were strained. Turkey is an Islamic but secular state. This paradox could hamper Turkey's position. The stand-off with Iraq and the concrete position also have considerable impact on this option. Nevertheless this orientation is a possible option.

In the next few years, Turkey will certainly remain a key matter for the EU on the European agenda and the Euro-Atlantic agenda, which has become rather strained since 2002. Turkey will likely pursue its ambitions to align with the EU, and given historical connections and strategic considerations, the easternmost candidate will remain essential for Europe. The vital nature of Turkey's relations became crystal clear during the war with Iraq in spring 2003.

In short, the answer to the question about the 'Europeanness of Turkey' will shape the perception of 'what is Europe all about?' and will light the way to another EU-enlargement round. Challenging times certainly await us.

NOTES

1. See Robert S. Chace, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, *Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy*, Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, No. 1, January/February 1996, pp. 33-51.

Robert Chase, Emily Hill, Paul Kennedy, Introduction, in: Robert Chase, Emily Hill, Paul Kennedy (eds): *The Pivotal States. A new framework for U.S. Policy in the developing world*, (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), pp. 1-11.

F. Stephen Larrabee und Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, Rand Publication, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, S. 2-3.

2. For basics see Ayse Kadioglu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity”, in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey. Identity, Democracy, Politics* (London, Portland: Frank Cass 1998), pp.177-193. David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism* (London, Totowa 1977). Andrea K. Riemer, “Die Türkei und die Europäische Union: Eine endlose Geschichte ohne Happyend?”, in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 3/2003. Andrea K. Riemer, *The Arrival of the European International Society in the Ottoman Empire*, paper presented at the 43rd ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, March 2002 and with www.ukc.ac.uk/politics/englishschool/.
3. The Copenhagen criteria (based on the 1993 Copenhagen Summit) may be summarized as: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 2) the rule of law, 3) human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, 4) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as 5) the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
4. See F. Stephen Larrabee und Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, Rand Publication, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. 21.
5. Due to its weak domestic situation, Turkey was rather open to Soviet efforts of gaining influence in the post-war order.
6. *Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey* (Signed at Ankara, 1 September 1963), www.mfa.gov.tr, esp. article 2-5.
7. See Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community [SEC (89) 2290, fin./2.], Brussels, December 20, 1989.
8. F. Stephen Larrabee und Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, Rand Publication, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. 47.
9. Commission of the European Communities, *Proposal for a Council Regulation Regarding the Implementation of a special Financial Cooperation Measure for Turkey*, Brussels, July 26th, 1995.

10. Programme of the 57th Government presented to the Turkish Grand National Assembly by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, June 4, 1999, p. 22.

11. Democracy, rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities; a functioning market economy the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union and the capacity to assume the obligations of membership.

12. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/latest.htm>, inquiry, 4.1.2003.