Exchange Theory and Conflict Regulation: Cyprus through the British-Irish (Northern Ireland) Prism

Brendan O'Duffy *

RÉSUMÉ

En s'inspirant des modèles de la regulation comparative des conflits et plus particulièrement de l'approche intergouvernmentale anglo-irlandaise sur l'Irlande du Nord, cet article suggère des modes de régulation des demandes opposées d' auto-détermination nationale à Chypre. Après avoir discuté de la place centrale occupée par les "mères-patries", la Grèce et la Turquie, le rôle de l'UE et des Nations-Unies dans la régulation du conflit chypriote, l'article analyse le plan du secrétaire général de l'ONU Kofi Annan, comme base de solution de celui-ci. L'article suggère que les relations mutuelles et reciproques d'échange des parties chypriotes entre les "mères-patries" peuvent contribuer à compenser les ambitions maximalistes des ethno-nationalistes des deux côtés.

ABSTRACT

Considering insights from comparative conflict regulation—specifically from the British-Irish intergovernmental approach to Northern Ireland—this article suggests ways to regulare opposing claims to national self-determination in Cyprus. After a discussion of the centrality of the Greek and Turkish 'matron-states', and the roles of the EU and UN in conflict regulation, the author analyses the Annan Plan as a basis for a setrlement. The article suggests that mutual and reciprocal exchange relations between 'matron-states' can contribute to necessary trade-offs at subsidiary levels of dispute by offering side-paymenrs to compensate extreme ethno-nationalists for the denial of rheir maximal ambitions.

Conflict Regulation and Exchange Theory[1]

Analytical and prescriptive approaches to regulating or resolving ethno-national conflicts can be distinguished most broadly according to the degree of consent required for settlement negotiation and governance. At one extreme are approaches which assert the primacy and durability of ethnicity and propose remedial strategies based on providing relatively homogeneous territorial homelands for ethno-nations.[2] 'Consociationalists', most notably Arend Lijphart, propose less anarchic reconfigurations of government within existing states, prescribing formal and informal power-sharing between or

* Queen Mary, University of London

among the leaders of ethnic blocs.[3] Critics to the right of this consent-control spectrum (*see below*) reject the cleavage-freeing or cleavage-freezing proposals and instead propose to design democratic institutions to encourage inter-ethnic vote-pooling, along with other protections of minority rights.[4] Still further away from the consent principle are analyses which emphasize the durability, if not morality, of 'control' regimes[5] and/or the dangers of early democratisation (including unregulated media) on the creation and manipulation of populist nationalism by self-serving coalitions of oligarchs.[6]

In addition, we can distinguish conflict regulation approaches according to two other (usually related) criteria: first, the extent of regulation of the vertical dimension of authority (as it affects the inter-state, state, government or societal levels) and second, the extent of regulation of the horizontal (or territorial) dimension (distinguishing between unitary, devolved, federal and confederal forms). Table 1 (below) presents some examples of a range of different conflict regulation strategies, with the shaded areas representing the dominant focus of each broad strategy.

	Cleavage-freeing	Cleavage-freezing	Cleavage-dissolving	Cleavage-control
State-level	Maximal right of national self-determination	Confederalism / inter-governmental treaty relationship between one or more states	No change to external, constitutive sovereignty	No change to external constitutive sovereignty
Govt.-level	Majoritarian, centralized and unitary	Consociation with internal federal features. Elite-led party and electoral system	Centripetal power-sharing based on vote-pooling to achieve civic majoritarian result; centralised federalism or devolved unitary state	Majoritarian, centralized and unitary.
Societal-level	Minimal: dual nationality and individual rights protections	Elitist/ethnicist party system. Substantive group and individual rights protections	Demotic/non-ethnic party system. Procedural individual rights protections	Elitist/non-ethnic or mono-ethnic party system, minimal individual rights protections, maximal repressive capacity
Examples:	**Aspired to:** Tamil Eelam movement in Sri Lanka; Kashmir from India; Basque (ETA) from Spain etc. **Realized:** Irish Free State/ Republic from UK (1921.1937); Croatian, Slovenian, Bosnian secessions from Yugoslavia (1992/3); Czech and Slovak divorce from Czechoslovakia; post-soviet successor states; Pakistan and Bangladesh from India	**Aspired to:** Quebec 'sovereignty association' movement vis. Canada; Turkish Cypriot movement vis. Republic of Cyprus; Basque and Catalan constitutional nationalists; **Realized:** Northern Ireland (hybrid cleavage-dissolving) vis. UK and Irish Republic; Ethiopia	**Aspired to:** Rest of Canada (not Quebec); Spain vis. Historic nations; **Realized:** South Africa (1994-hybrid consociational); France ; US; Australia; Pakistan; India.	**Aspired to:** Sharon-faction of Likud (Israel) **Realized:** Israel (1977-87); Northern Ireland (1921-72) South Africa (1950-1992).
	Ethno-consensual			Ethno-coercive

⟍ Centrifugal ⟋ | ⟍ Centripetal ⟋

Analysing conflicts and the conceptions of elites and masses according to the consent-control equilibrium can enhance an understanding of conflict regulation because consent is the defining feature of the mutualist exchange relationships central to both internal redistributive political systems and external inter-governmental relations.[7] Coercion reflects assertions of power which, as we see below, degrade bi- or multi-part relationships by asserting power rather than seeking consent. Coercive relationships reflect what Max Weber defined as an 'ethic of conviction' on the part of the super-ordinate group, as opposed to an 'ethic of responsibility' inherent in a co-operative, reciprocal relationship between or among groups in society.

Yet at the other extreme, asserting the primacy of a right of ethno-national groups to achieve self-determination usually entails the coercion of other ethno-national groups with different ambitions.[8] The absolute right of self-determination therefore also represents a mirror-image ethic of conviction to that of the statist and should be dismissed for violating liberal conceptions of national justice. In the latter section on exchange theory, evidence is presented for the limited durability and degrading effect of control regimes in ethnically and nationally divided societies. This evidence lends empirical support to the liberal nationalist view by showing that coercive repression or suppression of territorially concentrated ethno-nations is counter-productive as well as unjust. The choices that lie between the maximally consensual and coercive strategies thus represent the most viable mechanisms for balancing ethno-national status-seeking with civic-national democratic consolidation. As argued below, the key to negotiating processes and institutional design in divided societies is to assess empirically the relative importance, for masses and elites, of ethno-national versus civic-national goals, including the possibility of territorial adjustment, and then to design institutions which maximise consent by compensating groups for limiting their maximal territorial and statal ambitions.

This article attempts first to assess some empirical evidence for conflict regulation strategies based on 'cleavage-dissolving', or centripetalism. The cleavage-freezing and cleavage-freeing approaches are then assessed with a brief analysis of the centrality of constitutional mechanisms for national self-determination in three contemporary conflicts: Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa. A deductive application of these findings to the case of Cyprus (and the Greek-Turkish relationship) is then presented,

concluding with some prescriptive policy options for constitutional design relevant to the current negotiating process.

The Limits of Control Strategies

The oft-compared cases of the Stormont government in Northern Ireland (1921-1972), Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza, South African apartheid all exemplified control strategies in which one super-ordinate group dominated others to an extent which made challenges unthinkable or unworkable for at least one generation.[9] Each succumbed, eventually, to demands for consensual democratic processes centred on constitutional renewals that recognise and protect collective and individual rights and maintain, and establish the principle of ethno-national status parity. Moreover, in all of these cases mutual recognition of the 'other's' national status was required to open the possibility of negotiated compromises.

As the examples of Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel/Palestine eloquently attest, control régimes tend to be medium-term 'solutions' to ethnic conflict. Their record of conflict management tends to be reactive and piece-meal, in patterns reminiscent of what social exchange theorists call 'nattering': unsystematic responses expressing displeasure and irritation, but without following through with any real costs and without risking more serious confrontation.[10]

For exchange theorists, 'nattering' is alleged to be the result of a lack of reward power by the stronger actor in the exchange relationship. The stronger actor relies on coercion rather than seeking consent for authority. According to one exchange theorist, Linda Molm, nattering is not just ineffective but also regressive over time: 'nattering decreases the partner's rewarding [and] ... the low level coercion actually extends the experience for both parties, of an unsatisfactory exchange relation'.[11] The confused or nattering response is primarily a result of the absence of reward power. If a super-ordinate power is unwilling or unable to offer side-payments the tendency is to respond in piecemeal fashion with sporadic flails of annoyance rather than systematic and mutualist exchanges.

Interestingly, this patterned behaviour is also reminiscent of the repression-reaction nexus observed by students of the dynamics of

comparative political violence. A number of studies have shown that low-levels of repression by the state (consistent with 'consensual' approaches) are associated with low levels of violence by dissidents. High-levels of repression (consistent with 'control' approaches) are also associated with low levels of violence as massive force *temporarily* diminishes capacity and willingness to confronr the government. Medium-levels of repression are associated with the highest levels of violence as challengers are alleged to be provoked without being stifled.[12]

For exchange theorists like Willer et al. the influence exerted by super-ordinates in laboratory experiments is mediated by emotion after previous negative interactions with a super-ordinate.[13] Negative affect resulting from perceptions of unjust status hierarchy offsets both power (control) and influence (consent).[14] In exchange experiments, influence, which is akin to consensual basis of authority, is largely a product of status. Enhanced and mutually perceived status in turn has a positive effect on acceptance of power differentials.

In the case of bi-national islands like Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine Sri Lanka, or bi-national cleavages like Israel/Palestine, each with territorially concentrated, potentially secessionist national movements, the need to address status-disputes is apparent in the variabiliry of success in negotiating and designing constitutional settlements. The underlying principles of federation and confederation, governmental power-sharing and segmental autonomy are consistent with consociational practices and ideas. In terms of exchange relations, consociational practices attempt to maximise reward power to compensate minorities by raising their status as partners in government and as guardians of the state.

Because state- and nation-building is centrally concerned with the success of reward power rather than naked coercion, or wealth, it follows that approaches to constitutionalism which treat sovereignty as tradable elements in a process of contractual exchange can distribute rewards sufficient to satisfy core needs and interests of component ethno-nations. 'In divided societies' as Tim Sisk notes, 'a central concern is that institutional choice outcomes must be perceived by actors to produce the equitable, efficient distribution of public goods'.[15] Indeed, for most modernist scholars of nationalism, individual and collective perceptions of upward mobility are the key variables in the consolidation of national state authority and

stability.[16] Though crucially, the pantheon of modernist scholars leave room for the effects and power of piqued ethnic and racial status, quite apart from materialist and class determinants of ethnic and national allegiance.[17] As a result, conflict regulation strategies should address both modernist (i.e., institutional and material factors) as well as non-modernist or essentialist aspects of identity.

Cleavage-dissolving through Centripetal Power-sharing

A more voluntarist and liberal approach to managing conflict in divided societies is based on the principle of encouraging non-ethnic federalism and cross-ethnic vote-pooling to dissolve cleavages. Interpreted as exchange relations, the goal of centripetal strategies is to increase reward potential by creating more levels of government and simultaneously diffuse conflict by managing exchanges (i.e. of votes) through institutional rules requiring distributed rather than (ethnically) concentrated support. But the empirical record of purposeful cleavage-dissolving through centripetal electoral engineering is limited, especially in societies where the territorial sovereignty of the state is in question. For example, Horowitz has shown that electoral vote-pooling in the case Sri Lanka[18] and the combination of electoral rules and territorial federation in Nigeria, have not succeeded in dissolving or de-politicising ethno-national cleavages.[19] The central cause of these failures is the centrality of the conflict over the state itself, with both cases experiencing extremely violent attempts at secession by territorially concentrated ethno-nations (Igbo secession in Nigeria during the Biafran war and the Tamil Eelam (independence) movement since the early 1980s.

Even where territorial integrity of the state is not questioned (or is secondary to contests over the form of government) the record of cleavage-dissolving is ambiguous at best. Post-apartheid South Africa holds out some evidence of the success of vote-pooling as the ANC has attracted votes from beyond its core constituency. But the South African case cannot be viewed as an adequate test of Horowitz' vote-pooling model for several reasons. First, the cabinet government and party-list form of proportional-representation electoral system are inherently centrifugal rather than centripetal institutions. There is no rule requiring a distribution of party support across territorial regions or states (as in Nigeria) and the President is

elected indirectly (from the party with the most support in Parliament) rather than directly and therefore does not require, by rule or by fact, distributed support from across main ethno-national cleavages.

In addition, the independent effects of centripetal power-sharing cannot be tested accurately because rhe South African constitution incorporates a centrifugal right of self-determination which might offset the influence of the internal form of power-sharing. In other words, territorially concentrated ethno-nations might accept minimal consociational practices because of the possibility of constitutional secession in the event of marginalization at the centre. Article 235 of the constitution states: 'The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the right to self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.' The existing legislation is restrictive but potentially realizable for Kwazulu Natal and part or parts of the Orange Free Stare. More importantly, the consociational mechanisms that have been developed to dissuade potential secessionists lend further evidence to the argument that the South African constitution is more centrifugal than centripetal. Informal power-sharing at the cabinet level has made Zulu chief Buthelezi the Home Secretary in the current ANC-led government, while the transitional constitution offered the Deputy Presidency to the leader of the second largest party, then the National Party led by De Klerk. Moreover, the consociarional features of ethnically-based group rights protections for language, schooling, and significant devolution to regional and less so, tribal levels all tip the balance towards a centrifugal settlement with centripetal aspects.

Reilly's comparative analyses of (centripetal) vote-pooling electoral systems led him to conclude that these systems have potential to moderate ethnic conflict in two kinds of societies: those which have either a high number of ethnic groups (e.g. Tanzania) or 'a low number of ethnic groups, but a high degree of ethnic group dispersion and geographical inter-mixing (e.g. Fiji, Malaysia and Guyana, Sri Lanka to some degree given large number of Tamils in Colombo).[20] By extension in societies with a small number of ethnic groups with little inter-mixing (such as Northern Ireland

and Cyprus) centrifugal (or consociational) options appear more appropriate. The implications for power-sharing as proposed in the Annan Plan for Cyprus will be elaborated below.[21]

National Self-determination and Inter-governmentalism

The key limiting factor for cleavage dissolving is that the approach assumes previous agreement on the status of population and territorial boundaries.[22] There is considerable evidence to show that unresolved or unregulated processes of national self-determination pre-empt agreement on subsidiary power-sharing institutions. The pre-eminence of constitutive sovereignty (territorial integrity and inter-state recognition as an independent body with residual sovereignty) over government or societal level aspects, supports the view that prior agreement on the regulation of constitutive sovereignty, including mechanisms of national self-determination.

A controlled comparison of this factor (agreement on the core regulative aspect of state sovereignty: national self-determination) is telling. Consider the treatment of national self-determination in the Oslo Process in Israel/Palestine and the recent negotiations over the Anan Peace Plan for Cyprus compared to the British-Irish (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998. The Declaration of Principles (DOP)[23] signed in 1993 did not include agreement on a mechanism for national self-determination but instead left this big item until last, as part of 'permanent status negotiations [including]: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis [settlers]'.[24] Moreover, the agreed criteria for final status was based on the intentionally vague wording of UN Security Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal 'from territories seized in 1967'. The absence of the qualifier 'the' has allowed for diametrically opposed interpretations in which Israeli's interpret their commitment to withdrawal from some territories, while Palestinians have interpreted the resolution as requiring complete withdrawal from *all* territories seized in 1967. The implications of these opposing interpretations has been a critical barrier to implementation of the DOP because the Israeli interpretation is used to justify continued settlement-building in the West Bank, which has in turn provoked Palestinian opposition and undermined faith in the Oslo process.[25] Instead of mutual and reciprocal exchanges

leading to confidence-building and progressive implementation, the Oslo process has been characterised by unilateral assertions of power and force.

In Cyprus, the question of national self-determination was the central blocking issue in the failed attempt to reach agreement before Cypriot accession to the European Union. In Anan's view, the 'Gordian knot' of the negotiations centred on the opposing Greek-Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot conceptions of national self-determination:

> *The dispute was clear - would a solution be one pre-existing state which would continue in existence and federalise itself under a new Constitution, or two pre-existing states which would found a new confederal or partnership structure?*[26]

Anan also concluded that' [p]erhaps the most contentious conceptual issue was sovereignty. The Turkish Cypriot side repeatedly raised this issue and often blocked discussion of others—particularly territory—pending satisfaction on it.[27]

While not suggesting that agreement on the core constitutive issues could somehow unlock Anan's Gordian knot, I suggest below a mechanism that could help regulate this matter, based on the integration of the Cyprus issue with the wider Greek-Turkish relationship. For now, I would like simply to contrast the way questions of national self-determination in Cyprus and Israel/Palestine have been obfuscated in comparison with the regulation of the territorial sovereignty dispute over Northern Ireland between the British and Irish states.

The landmark treaties which preceded the British-Irish (or Good Friday) Agreement addressed, but did not conclusively resolve, the mechanism for self-determination.[28] The Sunningdale Agreement (1973) committed the Irish government (of the day) to recognise that Northern Ireland's status would be determined by a majority of its citizens in a referendum. The Anglo-Irish (Hillsborough) Agreement of 1985 re-iterated this 'consent' principle, but intentionally avoided specifying Irish recognition of Northern Ireland's place as a part of the United Kingdom, to avoid the conflicting sovereignty claim in the Irish constitution. The Downing St. Declaration of 1993 was a breakthrough in committing the Irish government to a process leading to Irish recognition of Northern Ireland's place as part of the United

Kingdom and, simultaneously, in exchange for the UK's re-iteration of its commitment to abide by the same consent principle (granting a united Ireland if that becomes the majority wish), granted the people of the Irish Republic a veto over any change to the current status of Northern Ireland.

The inter-governmental relationship which drove this process was able to sequentially affect process, then shape the structure of the settlement and to date, ensure its relatively successful implementation. The constitutional changes required to affect this process were both the centre-piece of the British-Irish Agreement and central to shaping the preference of the main antagonists in Northern Ireland.[29] The Ulster Unionist party leader David Trimble could sell the agreement to (a bare majority of) his community as providing recognition of a separate right of self-determination for Northern Ireland while the nationalist community (both moderate and extreme) were assured that a constitutional mechanism existed to enable Irish re-unification or to prevent any unilateral Northern Irish declaration of independence. In turn, all of the ancillary institutions were shaped by the bi-national criteria of mutual consent: the power-sharing government for Northern Ireland (devolved within the United Kingdom) operates primarily according to double-majority consent rules requiring majorities of both nationalist and unionist representatives. The North-South Ministerial Council is a confederal body operating by unanimity and comprised of representatives from the Northern Ireland executive and the Irish government, with executive power providing functional co-operation in 'low politics' such as trade, business development, inland waterways; aquaculture and marine matters, special EU programmes; food safety, language (Gaelic and Ulster Scots), agriculture, tourism, transport, education, environment and health.

Unlike the Israeli-Palestinian or Cypriot processes, the British-Irish agreement on a mechanism for national self-determination has reflected and reinforced a mutualist exchange relationship which has been instrumental in co-managing the implementation process. The British-Irish Agreement represents a novel approach to conflict regulation because of its hybrid nature - between centrifugal and centripetal governing institutions —and holistic nature—institutionalising protections for individual and group rights at the societal, governmental, state and inter-state levels.

Whether and to what extent the bi-national, inter-governmental-led process is applicable to similarly divided and contested societies will be

examined below in the analysis of Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus conflict. I will focus on two main themes stemming from the discussion above: first, that pluralising internal and external conceptions of sovereignty creates reward power which can diffuse maximalist ethno-nation-state ambitions for self-determination or majoritarian domination (or worse); secondly, that inter-governmental foundations should reflect and respond to the societal, governmental and statist preferences, particularly as they coalesce in preferences for national self-determination. The implicit argument is that only when a mechanism for national self-determination is agreed can subsidiary aspects of conflict regulation (power-sharing government, including bi-national legislative, judicial processes, bi-communal administration etc.) be negotiated. In the case of Cyprus, this necessitates Greek, Turkish and British agreement on a re-negotiation of the Treaty of Guarantee.

Background to the Cyprus Conflict: the Primacy of Greek and Turkish Ethno-nationalisms

Cyprus has been a source of rivalry between Greek and Turkish nation- and state-building projects since the end of the First World War. The island in the eastern was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, leased to Britain in 1878 and annexed by Britain in 1914, the status of the island and its 850,000 inhabitants (of which roughly 24% are Turkish Cypriots and 75% Greek Cypriots),[30] reflects its strategic importance as a steppingstone to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and its role as an important source of Greek-Turkish rivalry for regional influence. Despite (or because) of its attracting the interests of the great powers (UK and US) and supra-national bodies (UN and EC/EU), the conflict between the two communities on the island and their respective matrons (Turkey and Greece) has defied resolution since the imposition of a UN peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) in 1964. UN intervention followed the breakdown of the consociational arrangements established by the UK, Greece and Turkey in 1960, under the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. The treaties recognised Turkey, Greece and the UK as responsible for the maintenance of the constitutional order of the new Republic, established a constitution based on an elaborate bi-communal power-sharing system that gave Turkish Cypriots a disproportionate amount of political power relative to their population.[31] Some Greek-Cypriots

interpreted the disproportionality as a reflection of the negotiating advantage of Turkey over Greece, given Turkey's proximity to Cyprus, military strength and strategic importance for Nato's eastern Mediterranean. Turkish-Cypriots tended to view the disproportionality as a necessary means of off-setting their physical vulnerability as a minority on the island.[32]

As an exercise in conflict regulation or more specifically as an exercise of national self-determination, the treaties were non-consensual. Neither Greek-Cypriot nor Turkish-Cypriot leaders participated in the negotiations, leading Joseph S. Joseph to argue that 'the problem was, in effect, settled on a bilateral basis between Greece and Turkey under British directorship'.[33] The constitution establishing the bi-communal, bi-national power-sharing system was never submitted to the people (or peoples) in a referendum. At least partly as a result of the external imposition of the agreement and the absence of a mechanism for its alteration, the implementation of the agreement was characterised by re-negotiation from below. Joseph has demonstrated how central, unresolved issues became nested, zero-sum contests. For example, Turkish Cypriots used their minority veto provision in parliament to block the government's income tax bill and justified it by citing the failure of the government to implement the 70:30 ratios (Greek-Cypriot to Turkish-Cypriot) in the public service and the failure to establish separate municipalities, as per the agreement. Greek-Cypriots on the other hand, cited the inconsistencies and perceived unfairness of disproportionate ratios as the basis for power-sharing and public policy outcomes.[34] The absence of consent to the agreement precluded any popular political mandate to restrain the respective leaderships from maximalist, counter-poised positions on the core articles of the constitution.

Above all, the prospects for consociationalism in the early 1960s was undermined by the unresolved issue of national self-determination. For example, Joseph has argued that

> *the most destructive element in biethnic relations was the fact that the two communities failed to abandon their old conflicting ethnopolitical goals of enosis and partition [taksim]... In effect, the creation of an independent state was viewed by the two sides as an interim phase for materialisation of enosis or partition.*[35]

The lack of agreement on a mechanism for subsequent national self-determination allowed maximalist positions on *taksim* and *enosis* to dominate the discourses of leaders from both ethno-nations.

When this unstable system collapsed in 1963 the tri-lateral protectorate failed to uphold the power-sharing system or intervene to re-negotiate the constitutional settlement. Violence escalated, severe ethnic cleansing took place on both sides and the UK established a buffer-zone in the capital Nicosia, between the increasingly homogeneous northern and southern parts. The matron-states became more directly involved in 1974 when the (mainland) Greek military junta toppled the Greek-Cypriot government of Makarios and attempted to achieve *enosis* or unification between Greece and Cyprus. The Turkish government responded by intervening militarily and eventually seizing 37% of the northern part of the island. This part was recognized by Turkey in 1983 as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"' ("TRNC") though it is not recognised by the international community.

Supranational Conflict Regulation and Centripetal Bias

Three supra-national bodies have played important roles in conflict regulation since the early 1970s: The United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Community/European Union (EC/EU). None has been successful in coaxing a settlement, though all have been instrumental in establishing and maintaining broad parameters for a settlement.[36] The UN peace-keeping force UNFICYP has maintained a militarised buffer-zone between north and south and has prevented serious escalations of violence since 1974. Creative and balanced proposals were put forward by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in 1992 as the basis for talks, but were rejected by Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash who has then and since stuck to his maximalist position of a two-state solution, with prior recognition of "TRNC" sovereignty.[37] On this basis, Denktash subsequently pulled out of talks in 1997 (New York and Glion, Switzerland), rejected UN Security Council Resolution for a resumption of talks in 1998 and participated in proximity talks in New York (Dec. 1999) and Geneva until November 2000. Substantive, direct talks between the Greek-Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash began in January 2002 chaired by UN Special Adviser Alvaro de Soto. Progress was made between the

leaders on the federal architecture, power-sharing rules, broad distribution of competencies and some aspects of security and citizenship and residency rights. The UN proposals for property retribution and territorial adjustment are creative and consistent with the promotion of bi-national exchange relationships at the individual and collective level. However, despite significant progress, core constitutive sovereignty issues blocked agreement and delayed the work of technical committees working on the legal and technical foundations of the constitution and institutions of government. While the UN process has maintained broad parameters based on the principle of a singular, independent, bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, it has not been able to exert sufficient leverage to overcome the core dispute between the Turkish-Cypriot insistence on prior constitutive recognition (confederalist) versus the Greek-Cypriot insistence on a singular (federalist) form of sovereignty.

A second level of mediation has developed between Greece and Turkey as regional partners within NATO. NATO membership has moderated tensions between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean disputes in 1987 and 1996 and has contributed to symmetrical Greek-Turkish relations whereby the US alliance with Turkey has to some extent off-set the Greek-influenced posture of the EC/EU. More prosaically, the NATO regional command structure has also been instrumental in developing inter-governmental bodies within regional subcommands at Izmir in Turkey and Larissa in Greece since 1999. Each of these subcommands has a local commander, and American deputy. The Greek command has a Turkish chief of staff and the Turkish command has a Greek chief of staff. Nevertheless, NATO membership has not prevented a serious arms race between Greece and Turkey for superiority in the Aegean. This arms race extended to Cyprus in 1999 when GC leader Clerides threatened to install medium-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets in southern Turkey. Only strong pressure from Greek President Simitis (and US pressure) prevented the conflict escalating.

In addition to NATO and UN involvement, the EC and EU have been directly involved because of Greek membership since 1979 and Turkish and now Cypriot (Republic) aspirations to accede to full membership. Michael Keating has demonstrated how the European Union (Commonwealth, in his view) has gradually constituted a stable meta-constitutional framework

based on broadly shared values and norms as applied to ethno-nationally divided societies. European constitutionalism based on pluralist conceptions of sovereignty (what Keating calls 'plurinationalism') and multi-level governance has in turn facilitated the management of deep-seated ethno-nationalist conflict in Belgium, Spain and the UK, including Northern Ireland.[38] Similar forms of confederalism have been instrumental in managing ethno-national conflict in Canada vis. Quebec and indigenous 'first' nations.[39]

To what extent can the EU facilitate conflict regulation in Cyprus? At the broadest level, the generally pro-European opinions of the Turkish and Greek-Cypriots about joining the EU is likely to encourage moderation and reconciliation. Opinion surveys show that Greek Cypriots and Turkish people share similarly pro-European attitudes about accession and that these shared attitudes are near or above (for Turkey) the average among the current accession candidates.[40] The current government led by Prime Minister Recep Erdogan's Justice and Development Party[41] appears to be committed to promoting the European accession project and has explicitly recognized the potential linkage between a resolution on Cyprus and EU membership.

While little data exist for Turkish-Cypriot opinion, the prospects for EU accession are likely to have an ameliorative affect by reducing economic dependence on Turkey (through structural funds and other regional aid), offering avenues for political representation currently denied to the "TRNC" and providing a legal framework for the protection of human rights.

Diplomatically, the EC/EU role has generally sought to encourage agreement on Cyprus as a condition for Turkish accession. However, the effects of this approach have been, on balance, a form of mediation that has led to asymmetrical incentives following Greek accession in 1979, based on the acceptance of the Greek and Greek Cypriot interpretation of the primacy of the bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal model, with significant minority rights protections. While the EU position is consistent with the international legal position as pronounced through UN Security Council Resolutions[42] and may also reflect the demographic supremacy of the Greek Cypriot community, it does not recognise sufficiently the Turkish political interest as the mandated protectorate of the Turkish-Cypriot community (derived from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee). The EU decision taken at Helsinki in 1999 to consider accession of the Republic of Cyprus,

irrespective of a settlement of the conflict, has been interpreted by Turkey and the "TRNC" as a violation of the Treaty of Guarantee which stipulated that Cyprus' status could not be altered without agreement of both Turkey and Greece. Nor does it take sufficient account of the pro-Turkish-Cypriot/anti-European alignment in Turkish politics, which has been strengthened in response to the confrontational stance promoted by Greece within the EC/EU.

As a result, when the Cypriot Republic began accession negotiations with the EU in 1997, against the wishes of both Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, the latter immediately declared that accession of the Cypriot Republic would be matched by Turkish-"TRNC" integration. According to McDonald, '[a]cceptance of the application of the government of the [Cyprus] republic thus had the opposite effect of that which had been sought'.[43] When Turkey was excluded from the European Commission's *Agenda 2000* programme for accession in July 1997, TC leader Denktash walked out of talks with his GC counterpart (at Glion) and Turkey and TC announced the formation of a 'partnership council' intended to harmonise legal and regulatory frameworks. Greece adjusted its position in 1999 but only subtly, announcing that it would remove its threat of veto of Turkish accession, but on the condition that the EU apply pressure against Turkey to achieve internal political and economic reforms and to unilaterally shift its position on the recognition of "TRNC" as a separate state. Following the breakdown of the UN sponsored talks, the Secretary General made it clear that a significant obstacle to a settlement was the Turkish-Cypriot perception that the Greek-Cypriot side had no incentive to be flexible following the accession agreement with the European Union.[44]

The Greek threat of veto over accession was countered by Turkey's use of Cyprus as a leverage for EU integration. Following the breakdown of talks in March 2003, Anan asserted that '[f]or its part, Turkey had come to the summit with a policy which sought to link a settlement of the Cyprus issue with Turkey's European Union perspective.'

In sum, despite the undoubted facilitation of conflict regulation provided by the EU, the asymmetrical status of Greece as an EU member with Turkey as a candidate member has not created the basis for a mutual exchange relationship and has arguably polarised the relationship as Greece and Turkey have both used the EU to exert power rather than seek consent for a

settlement of the conflict.[45] In the next section I argue that developing a mutual exchange relationship requires an appreciation of the bi-national nature of the conflict and the development of commensurate Greek-Turkish inter-governmental relations to achieve leverage over the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities.

The Bi-national Nature of the Cyprus Conflict

The historical experiences of both populations have reinforced feelings of antagonism and insecurity. For Turkish Cypriots, the experience of coercive domination by both the colonial (British) and post-colonial Greek-Cypriot state has re-enforced their view of Turkey as protectorate. These attachments were strengthened by the coercive denial of citizenship following the British annexation (recognised in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923) which forced Turkish Cypriots to give up their Turkish citizenship. More recently, coercive undermining of the consociational system established with the Treaties of London and Zurich, followed by the denial of human rights during the breakdown of power-sharing from 1963 to 1974 has reinforced Turkish-Cypriot distrust of the Greek-Cypriot majority. As a result, the Turkish military presence, as well as political and economic support is strongly supported by the Turkish-Cypriot population, up to half of which according to some estimates, are immigrants (primarily from Anatolia) who have arrived since 1974 and are naturally more prone to preserve links with the mainland.[46] Elections in 1998 in the "TRNC" demonstrate the dominance of pro-Turkish sentiment as (Turkish) nationalist and right-wing parties secured a plurality of the popular vote (44%) and a clear majority of seats in the "TRNC" assembly. The centre-left parties which are more critical of Turkish involvement and more amenable to a Cypriotist and federal settlement secured only 26.6% of the popular vote and 13 seats.[47]

Secondly, 'mainland' Turkish public and elite opinion strongly supports the rights of Turkish-Cypriots to self-government, primarily through international recognition of a separate state (supported by 49% of Turks in a recent poll) or in the form of a bi-communal (or bi-national) federation (supported by 29%). While only 8% supported Turkish annexation of the "TRNC", 62% supported the view that the protection of Turkish interests in Cyprus should be maintained, even at the expense of Turkey's prospects for accession to the EU.[48]

On balance then, there is a dominant, largely reciprocal alignment between Turkish-Cypriots and the Turkish population which should inform approaches to conflict regulation. Public opinion in Turkey appears to be supportive of the rights of Turkish-Cypriots to self-government, but flexible as to the form such a government would take. This faithful but pluralistic regard for Turkish Cypriots should enhance the prospects for a Greek-Turkish inter-governmental relationship if, as Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash suggests, '...a Turco-Greek balance is set up and the realities on the island are acknowledged'.[49]

The dominance of Greek-Cypriot nationalism vis-à-vis Cypriot identity among Greek-speaking Cypriots mirrors the dominance of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism in the "TRNC". Indeed, the two are symbiotically linked as mobilisations for *enosis* (union) with Greece have spurred counter-mobilisations for *taksim* (division) and attachment to Turkey. Like Northern Ireland, the island of Cyprus has been dominated by a bi-national cleavage structure with each of the main communal blocs seeking to achieve or preserve significant connections with their 'external' matron. Historically, Greek-Cypriot nationalists have emphasised the organic links to the wider Hellenic civilisation based on common language, myths of descent, and religious orthodoxy.[50] Widely supported movements for *enosis* (union) with the Greek state have been cyclical features of Greek-Cypriot politics since at least 1878 when Cyprus was leased by the Ottoman Empire to the UK.[51] Most proximately to the current phase of conflict, the mobilisation of EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) fought against British colonial rule from 1955 to 1959 to achieve unification with Greece. Archbishop Makarios, as Cypriot President from 1960 to 1974 promoted enosis and only reverted to a Cypriot independence position to avoid succumbing to Greek military rule under the junta. Following the catastrophe of the junta's forceful attempt at enosis it is true that a Cypriotist movement emerged, promoted by the leftist AKEL (Reform Party of the Working People) and including many intellectuals (as organised in the New Cyprus Association) to challenge the domination of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, but this has been unsuccessful in achieving the type of cross-class, populist basis of the still dominant Greek-Cypriot nationalism.[52] Essentially, Cypriotist communal identity is an anti-nationalist, specifically anti-Greek chauvinist identity rather than a separate identity which could form the basis of a shared nationalism with Cypriotist Turks on the island.

On the Greek side, a greater degree of 'benevolent detachment' is apparent compared to the more strategically-based interests of Turkey. Greece's non-intervention in 1974 to protect Greek-Cypriots during the Turkish 'invasion' reflected the ambivalence among Greek masses and counter-veiling calculations of Turkish military power among Greek elites. The PASOK years of socialist government were characterised by rhetorical commitments which belied ambivalent commitment to uphold the rights of Greek Cypriots. The post-1974 'Karamanlis doctrine' combined a commitment in principle to support Greek-Cypriot interests, countered by the realist consideration that Cyprus was too far from Greece to guarantee defensive protection.[53] Nevertheless, support for the Greek-Cypriot position remains strong among elites and masses in Greece, both as a counter-weight to Turkish regional dominance and for non-rational nationalist reasons. The most tangible sign of this support is the development of the joint defence doctrine (JDD)[54] which emerged in the 1990s echoing the ideal of Greek 'Megali Idea' based on a Hellenistic revivalism.[55]

In sum, the attempts ro deny the dominance of opposing Turkish and Greek nationalisms represents the type of wishful thinking consistent with the liberal, civic-nationalist discourses of advocates of centripetalist institutional architecture. Quite simply, they assume the primacy of the Cypriot dimensions over the Greek-Turkish dimensions. Even though the dominant strand of this discourse has evolved towards acceptance of a bi-communal, bi-zonal form of federation, they tend to dismiss the potential for hybrid solutions which can complement the centripetal forms more closely reflecting the bi-national nature of the conflict (proposed below).

The comparative evidence from the British-Irish inter-governmental relationship, combined with the limited success in/over Cyprus of supra-nationalist mediation and the evidence for the existence of a similar bi-national conflict in Cyprus, all suggest that a Greek-Turkish inter-governmental relationship could be necessary, if not sufficient, to structure incentives for a stable, bi-national settlement. The next section assesses the prospects for such a relationship to develop in light of the recently stalled Anan Plan and concludes with an outline of a Greek-Turkish-led settlement process.

A History of Greek-Turkish Elite Accommodation? Prospects for Inter-governmentalism

So far, the discussion of the Cyprus conflict has focused on the island and the nationalist ties with the matron states. But the prospects for Greek-Turkish inter-governmentalism are complicated by the fact that Cyprus represents one component of several territorial and political contests between Greece and Turkey, a nested game based on remnants of territorial and political exchanges negotiated following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The contemporary nest of conflict can be summarised along four dimensions: Aegean Sea (territorial disputes over small islands and land and sea frontiers); minority rights (of Greeks in Turkey and Turks in Greece), European enlargement and Cyprus. These complex issues cannot be treated here, beyond noting several implications for development of Greek-Turkish inter-governmentalism. While most scholars agree that the disputes over the Aegean are primarily legal disputes which are justiceable through the International Court of Justice, they also recognise that the Aegean and Cyprus issues are related and further, that settlement of the Cyprus issue can unlock the other issues. Asmus et al., for example, argue that progress on the Cyprus issue 'is a key to a broader settlement of Greek-Turkish differences over the Aegean. The two problems are, in fact, closely linked: without progress on Cyprus there is likely to be little movement on the Aegean. At the same time, movement on Cyprus could create a better psychological climate for the resolution of outstanding bilateral differences over the Aegean'.[56]

Creating such a climate will necessitate overcoming significant political and emotional obstacles to mutual recognition as partners in conflict regulation. There remain significant margins of resistance against loosening entrenched positions. For example, the perpetuation of the Greek 'Megali Idea' reflects aspirations for an expansionist re-conquest of a quasi-mythical *Hellas*. While clearly a marginal opinion among Greek masses or elites, the typically exaggerated fear of the potential growth of such views among Turkish elites is clear. Moreover, these views represent the extreme manifestation of a more generally pervasive sense of distrust. A Turkish official, Aslan Gündüz quotes Ilter Turan, a distinguished professor of international relations:

> *[m]y observation of Greek political behaviour leads me to think that the word "binding" has different meanings for Greece and Turkey... When Greece was negotiating to enter the European Community there came a moment when Greece said "yes" to everything the Community representative asked for. But as soon as they acceded they reneged on every concession made. We might also turn to their behaviour in Cyprus; there was a Constitution in 1960 and in two years it was the Greek party which started reneging on the commitments they have [undertaken] ...I am under a constant fear that what we feel a binding situation is in fact perceived to be rather fluid by our rivals or if you so wish our allies.*[57]

Turkish distrust of Greek bona fides is compounded by Greece's poor record of implementation of European legislation.[58]

Conversely, Greek suspicions of Turkey's strategic interest in maintaining its military presence in the "TRNC" (and US, via NATO, acquiescence to Turkish strategic interests) are significant sources of distrust. The Turkish nationalist right is both anti-European and irredentist towards at least the "TRNC". These views are expressed, for example, by Mehmet Soysel, former Foreign Minister in the Ciller government and currently an advisor to the "TRNC" leader Denktash. Yet while these pro-Turkish sovereignty views are nested in opposition to diminution of either external sovereignty with the EU or 'internal' with regard to strategic control of northern Cyprus, they are not currently dominant in Turkey, at least among mainland Turks. As the European polling evidence suggests, the Turkish public is broadly pro-European and in favour of recognising Cypriot independence (at least as a confederal or federal state). Moreover, the important sections of the Turkish military appear committed to EU integration to entrench the secular nationalism of the Kemalist era against Islamic revival.

These ambivalent views of faith in the other as a negotiating partner are similar to the characterisation of Irish and British elites' mutual distrust from the 1920s to the late 1970s. But that relationship evolved to become more reciprocal and mutually beneficial, shaped by common interests in stemming violent conflict in Northern Ireland and facilitated by the ethos and practice of inter-governmentalism within the EC/EU.[59] There are signs that the Greek-Turkish relationship is lately developing in a similarly

progressive way, especially following the 1999 earthquakes in each country which led to mutual aid and popular sympathy for each nation's plight. Additional contingencies such as the common experience of Greek and Turkish foreign ministers' positive interactions during the Kosovo crisis and the mutually moderating effects of the Oçalan affair[60] have ultimately contributed to warmer bi-lateral relations. Reciprocal visits by current Turkish and Greek leaders have broken new ground and formal inter-governmental committees were established over six 'regulative sovereignty' areas: economic co-operation; multi-lateral co-operation in the Balkans, Black Sea and Mediterranean; home affairs, or 'citizens' security (including crime, immigration, terrorism); the environment; culture; and tourism.[61]

Yet crucially, no such institutionalised inter-governmental foundation has been established over the Cyprus issue. Instead, during the negotiations over the Anan Plan, the Greek and Turkish governments failed to make progress on the security aspects of a re-negotiated Treaty of Guarantee.[62] While the lack of such inter-governmentalism might be explained by the absence of formal sovereignty claims over the island (in contrast to the opposing British and Irish claims leading up to the Good Friday Agreement), and Turkey's opportunistic EU accession strategy, nevertheless, the establishment of a form of regulative sovereignty over the island for each state (and the UK) in the Treaty of Guarantee, the longer-term political and strategic interests of both Greece and Turkey and the causal primacy of the Cyprus question to the other sources of Greek-Turkish conflict all point to the necessity and appropriateness of such a relationship.

Annan Plan: 'Virgin Birth' or 'Virgin Brides'?

The following discussion of the negotiation and design of the Anan Plan, assesses it in terms of the symmetry of status at the level of state and nation and according to the balance between centripetal and consociational forms of power-sharing.

Constitutive sovereignty. The Anan Plan envisages the continuation of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain as external guarantor powers, based on a revision of the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) to apply '*mutatis mutandis* to the new state of affairs established in the Foundation Agreement and the

Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic, it would cover, in addition to the independence, territorial integriry, security and constitutional order of the United Cyprus Republic, the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of its constituent states.[63] Additionally, the Anan Plan proposes that the UN maintain a peacekeeping operation with a mandate to monitor the implementation of the agreement and provide physical security 'as long as the federal government, with the concurrence of both constituent states, did not decide otherwise.'[64]

These proposals reflect the residual nature of the sovereignty of the Greek and Turkish motherlands, compared for example, to the more direct, integral conceptions of British and Irish states vis-à-vis Northern Ireland. As such, it is understandable that the Anan Plan proposes a primary role for the UN in implementation and provision of security. Nevertheless, the continuation of the Treaty of Alliance ensures that both Greece and Turkey will have the right and obligation to station an agreed number of troops in Cyprus (approximately 6,000 in the Anan Plan). In light of their guarantor status and especially in light of the inter-governmental relationship developing over the constellation of mutual interests mentioned above, it follows that a formal inter-governmental conference (perhaps modelled on the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference) could be established to bring together the Greek and Turkish governments to co-operate on issues specified in the revised Treaty of Guarantee. Following the British-Irish model, and building on the existing Greek-Turkish inter-governmental links, this conference could be served by a standing secretariat composed of Greek and Turkish officials, servicing regular meetings between appropriate ministers, including the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers.

If this level of inter-governmental co-operation is unrealistic at present, it remains a vital goal to achieve a mutual Greek-Turkish agreement on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus because of the cascading effect to subsidiary levels and aspects of sovereignty. Therefore, a revised Treaty of Guarantee could assert, mutually, that national self-determination for Cyprus should be determined by the people of Cyprus alone, voting separately in the two constituent units and that neither Greece nor Turkey will annex Cyprus or any part thereof.

Core regulative sovereignty. The Annan Plan attempts to bisect the Greek-Cypriot insistence on a singular conception of sovereignty with the Turkish-

Cypriot insistence on a compact between two sovereign states.[65] Anan proposes a Foundation Agreement in which each constituent unit simultaneously agrees to 'renew' the partnership formed originally with the Treaties of London and Zurich. The analogy of the 'virgin birth' has been invoked to describe the birth of a new entity (the bi-communal, bi-zonal federation) without antecedent sovereign 'parents'. This approach is designed to allay Greek Cypriots fear that if the Foundation Agreement is derived from agreement between two sovereign entities (i.e. a confederation) that any rupture of the constitutional agreement would lead to external sovereign recognition of the Turkish Cypriot founding entity. To eliminate Greek Cypriot fears of such secession, Anan proposed that partition or secession would be prohibited in an agreed Cyprus.

An alternative proposal would allow for future changes to the constitutive basis of the state but only on the condition of bi-national consent. In my view, Anan's plan attempts to solve the opposed sovereignty goals by eliminating them altogether. Anan noted that he originally envisaged a settlement which avoided 'mentioning sovereignty at all'.[66] He (through de Soto) soon realised the centrality of this core aspect of sovereignty to the political and security issues for the respective leaders.[67] It follows that eliminating the possibility of any future change in the status of the island or its constituent parts, while more explicit, does not resolve the issue. If, we accept that these opposing rights of self-determination are a. sincerely held b. mutually and diametrically opposed, then surely it is better to design mechanisms which allow for change while creating mutualist mechanisms that encourage modifications of maximal statist goals.

A mechanism for national self-determination could be agreed requiring simultaneous majority consent in referenda in the two constituent parts of Cyprus for any change in the status of the island, or any constituent units of the federation. This means that any future change in the territorial status of the island would have to have agreement in separate referenda in the two constituent states. Theoretically, this mechanism allows for the possibility of secession for either constituent unit, which could extend to either taksim or enosis. But practically, the requirement of mutual consent to any change is a purposefully high hurdle, meant to stabilise commitment to federal institutions.

In the present configuration of state-seeking, the bi-communal consent mechanism could be interpreted as Greek Cypriot recognition of Turkish Cyprus sovereignty in exchange for Turkish Cypriot acceptance of a Greek Cypriot veto on subsequent self-determination. Rather than the immaculate conception of the virgin birth, my alternative proposal could be thought of (however non-misogynist my intentions) as that of virgin marriage: the two partner states vow to base their union on a bond which can only be broken by both. With the additional safety net provided by the 'mothers-in-law' (described above) these pre-nuptials could assist a secure and happy, marriage.

Would the hurdle to secession take away the incentive to accommodate Turkish Cypriots in terms of power-sharing and rights protections? Given the alleged effects of EU accession on Greek-Cypriot negotiating stance we might expect that a similar disincentive would occur if Greek Cypriots wielded a veto over any attempt at Turkish Cypriot self-determination. However, the evidence to date suggests that there is stable bi-partisan commitment to the power-sharing model proposed in the Anan Report. Anan noted, for example, that the principle of a collective executive on the Swiss model was among the least contentious issues, even though it represented a considerable consociational concession from the Greek Cypriot perspective. Moreover, the new Greek President Tassos Papadopoulos gave Anan conditional agreement to accept the plan as the basis of future negotiations,[68] although with a revealing qualification: Papadopoulos insisted on agreement among the guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey, UK) on recognition of the constitutive elements of sovereignty before it would be submitted to simultaneous referenda. This approach, which may have been made on the tactical grounds that Turkey will not give such a guarantee in the absence of commitments to EU accession, is nevertheless consistent with my view of the hierarchy of sovereignties which necessitates prior agreement at the level of constitutive sovereignty.

Regulative sovereignty (non-core). The Anan Plan proposes a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, with significant devolved authority for each constituent state. The proposed executive is based on a Swiss-style collective Presidential Council of six equal members, with a rotating Presidency to ensure a Greek Cypriot President two-thirds of the time and a Turkish-Cypriot President one-third of the time. Here again, the Anan proposals represent a hybrid

between consociational and centripetal ethos. On one hand the collective executive is clearly consociational in that executive authority is divided proportionately between the two main communities and decisions require the support of at least one member of each constituent state. On the other hand, the election process has centripetal features in that the candidates are to be selected according to a single list of candidates. While the exact electoral system is not specified, on my reading Anan's proposal gives voters the right to express support for candidates across the communal divide. This centripetal feature allows and encourages candidates to appeal on non-nationalistic grounds for electoral support. This centripetal feature is then balanced by the consociational device of Senate approval for members of the Presidential Council, requiring support of at least two-fifths of Senators from each constituent state.

A hybrid between confederal/consociational and federal/centripetal ideas also describes Anan's proposed bicameral federal parliament and the territorial distribution of competencies. The bicameral federal parliament would consist of a Senate (upper house) with an equal number of senators from each constituent state. The Chamber of Deputies (lower house) would reflect the population balance on the island as a whole, with a slight weighting to ensure at least 25% of seats for the Turkish Cypriot constituency. Cross-community voting rules provide consociational safeguards to offset the possibility of majority-domination at the federal level. Moreover, the maximal allocation of ordinary powers to the constituent-state level reflects a confederal balance to the federal structure. Finally, the provision of a supreme court with an equal number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members, plus three foreign judges approved by the constituent states, provides ultimate legal authority to break dead-locks at the federal and constituent-state levels.

Space limits prevent a discussion of important subsidiary aspects of agreement, including controversial issues such as residency rights, territorial adjustments and property rights. Without wishing to downplay the significance of these issues, my impression after extensive interviews with people, politicians and officials from both communities, is that none of these issues in themselves represent obstacles to a settlement based on the Anan Plan. On balance, I believe that the bi-communal and bi-zonal proposals represent an adequate balance between centripetal and consociational

features. With the addition of greater clarity and stability provided by the proposed Greek-Turkish intergovernmentalism and a more explicit pre-nuptial agreement on subsequent national self-determination, the Anan Plan therefore represents the foundations of the type of mutualist exchange relations required for bi-national conflicts.

These proposals can be interpreted as satisfying all but the maximalist Turkish-Cypriot interests by:

- Strengthening the links with Turkey through a Greek-Turkish intergovernmental conference.

- Achieving a mechanism for self-determination which prevents a: either non-consensual enosis with Greece or Turkey; a unitary state and offers the possibility for subsequent secession or even union with Turkey, conditional upon the consent of the Greek Cypriot side.

- Gaining self-government within the European Union does not satisfy the maximalist goal of independence but is still an enhancement of the active non-recognition afforded the TRNC. The participation of Turkish-Cypriot ministers in the European Council of Ministers would be a considerable enhancement of their current levels of status and authority. Additionally, the development of the regionalist 'para-diplomacy' within the EU, and the possible evolution of some participation in Council of Ministers (as afforded, for example, to German *länder* and other devolved representatives) as well as the increase in regionalism as a proportion of the EU budget, all represent tempting side-payments for the Turkish-Cypriots compared to their current dependent position vis-à-vis Turkey.

Greek-Cypriot incentives for a bi-national federation nested in Greek-Turkish inter-governmental structures include the following:

- The enhanced guarantor (or protectorate) role for Greece would be a vital counter-weight to existing Turkish influence. With less reliance on the unwieldy, variable influence of the EU, Greek-Cypriots could view Greece's role as a more effective restraint on Turkish power.

- The bi-national federation does not reward or entrench partition and creates a unified state, albeit more of a union than unity. The bi-national

mechanism for self-determination would give southern Cyprus an effective veto over unilateral action by the north, either to achieve independence or unity with Turkey.

Of course, it could be said that these types of institutional balance and protection were offered, based on the London/Zurich agreements etc. and ended in ethnic cleansing. But in fact, the previous power-sharing attempt in Cyprus did not create a bi-national federation comparable to the one proposed in the Anan Plan. It did not offer sufficient segmental autonomy (either territorial or functional) and did not address the opposing aspirations for self-determination. As noted above, the absence of the consent of the representatives of either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot communities made the Treaty non-consensual. In comparative terms, the evolution of the power-sharing system in Northern Ireland (from 1973 to 1982 to 1998) supports the idea that the failure of power-sharing does not preclude subsequent acceptance as the principle of government in a divided society. In fact, the British-Irish (Good Friday) Agreement is arguably a re-negotiation and enhancement of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. The primary difference between earlier failures and subsequent success was the creation of a more symmetrical exchange relationship between the British and Irish governments which was able to address the difficult question of national self-determination in a creative and balanced way. In my view, the facilitative conditions for British-Irish co-operation brought by EU integration are emerging in the Greek-Turkish relationship, albeit with significant doubts about the timing or eventuality of Turkish accession.

Finally, the combination of federal and confederal forms of multi-level governance provide greater reward power for aspiring elites, while reciprocal rights protections protect ethno-national minorities.

Conclusion

To the extent that comparable ethno-national cleavages exist in Cyprus and implicate both Greece and Turkey, the British-Irish lessons derived from their Northern Ireland experience have direct relevance to contemporary attempts at conflict regulation in/over Cyprus. More generally, this article attempts to contribute to a liberal nationalist theory of conflict regulation by

examining the empirical evidence for different configurations of authority and power in ethno-nationally divided societies. Considering evidence derived from social exchange experiments and the British-Irish approach to Northern Ireland, several ways were suggested which can regulate opposing claims to national self-determination. In a dyadic conflict like Northern Ireland and Cyprus, where each ethno-nation aspires to eirher join or seek protection from a national 'matron', the best way to regulate conflict is through bi-national inter-governmentalism involving the two matron-states. This type of exchange relationship reflects and promotes mutual recognition of national legitimacy and increases confidence in reciprocal exchanges, enabling trade-offs to be made concerning ancillary levels of conflict. Additionally, multi-level governance through internal forms of federalism and external supra-national association increase the availability of rewards which can be offered as side-payments to compensate extreme ethno-nationalists for the denial of their maximalist ambitions. In the case of Cyprus, the development of mutualist exchange relations will be analysed in light of the negotiations based on the UN Security Council's 'Anan Plan'.

NOTES

1. Research for this article was supported by a Study Abroad Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust and a grant from the British Academy.

2. Chaim Kaufmann, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,' in Michael Brown *et al.* (eds.) *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (MIT, 1996/97); 'When all else fails', *International Security* vol. 23 (1998). See also John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, 'When Peace Means War' in *New Republic* (December 1995). For an empirical test and critique of 'partition theory' (including secession), see Nicholas Sambanis, 'Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature' in *World Politics* 52 (2000): 437-83.

3. The classic statement is Arend Lijphart *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977). For a critique and overview of the development of consociational theory see Ian S. Lustick 'Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism' in *World Politics* 50 (1997): 88-117.

4. Most notably, Donald Horowitz *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

5. Ian S. Lustick 'Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control' in *World Politics*, 31 (1979): 325-44.

6. See, for example, Jack Snyder *From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist Conflict* (London: Norton, 2000). For an overview of the Consociational versus Institutional cleavage dissolving and an application to South Africa, see Timothy Sisk, *Democratisation in South Africa* (Princeton, 1995); see also Rupert Taylor 'The New South Africa: Consociational or Consensual Power-Sharing' *ASEN Bulletin* no 8 (1994): 14-18.

7. David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); see also Margaret Moore 'Normative justifications for liberal nationalism,' *Nations and Nationalism* 7:1 (2001), pp. 1-20.

8. See, for example, A. Buchanan 'Democracy and secession' in Margaret Moore (ed.), *National Self-determination and Secession* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

9. On control strategies as conflict regulation, see John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, 'Introduction: the macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict' in McGarry and O'Leary (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 24-26; see also Ian Lustick 'Stability in deeply divided societies: consociationalism versus control', *World Politics*, 31 (1979): 325-44.

10. See Linda Molm *Coercive Power in Social Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 268. cf. Gerald R. Patterson, *Coercive Family Process* (Eugene, OR: Castalia). For applications of exchange theory to political processes see, for example, Edward J. Lawler, 'Power Processes in Bargain,' *Sociological Quarterly* 33: 17-34. Edward J. Lawler and Jeongkoo Yoon . 1993 'Power and the Emergence of Commitment Behavior in Negotiared Exchange.' *Sociological Theory* 11: 268-290; Lawler and Yoon. 1996 'Commitment in Exchange Relations: Test of a Theory of Relational Cohesion.' *American Sociological Review.* 61:89-108.

11. Linda Molm, *Coercive Power in Social Exchange* p. 269.

12. A series of studies on different aspects of repression-reaction patterns have supported the existence of an "inverted U" relationship (i.e., 'normally' distributed) between repression and political violence. See Gupta *et al.* 'Government coercion of dissidents: deterrence or provocation?' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (1993): 301-39; Dudley and Miller 'Group Rebellion in the 1980s,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42, 1 (1998): 77-96; Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp 'Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action' *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 471-87.

13. David Willer, Michael J. Lovaglia and Barry Markovsky 'Power and Influence: A Theoretical bridge' Ch. 9 in Willer, David (ed.) *Network Exchange Theory* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p. 239.

14. *Ibid.* pp. 239-40.

15. Timothy Sisk *Democratization in South Africa* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 48.

16. Ernest Gellner *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983) ch. 4; John Breuilly *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd edition, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.

17. For an application to post-Soviet Moldovan-Russian relations which emphasises the interaction between emotive mass and elite nationalism see Stuart Kaufman 'Spiralling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War' in Michael Brown et al (eds.) *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An International Security Reader* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 169-99.

18. Donald Horowitz *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 379-86.

19. Ibid. pp. 602-13. For a recent assessment of the trajectory from power-sharing to secession see E. Osaghae 'From Accommodation to Self-Determination: Minority Nationalism and the Restructuring of the Nigerian State.' *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 7, no. 1 (2001): 1-20.

20. B. Reilly *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 188.

21. The 'Annan Plan' is the draft agreement, designed primarily by Anan's Special Adviser to Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, which was the basis of substantive negotiations between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders from January 2002 until 11 March 2003. The Secretary General then published a 'Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus' S/2003/398, hereafter referred to as the 'Anan Report'.

22. See Margaret Moore's criticisms in 'Normative justifications for liberal nationalism: justice, democracy and national identity', *Nations and Nationalism,* 7,1 (2001) 1-20.

23. *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements* Sept. 13, 1993, Washington, D.C.

24. Ibid. 'Agreed minutes to the declaration of principles on Interim Self-government Arrangements', Article IV.

25. See Joseph Alpher 'The Oslo Process: Failures, Lessons, Alternatives,' *Pugwash Newsletter,* vol. 38, 2 (2000); Deborah Sontag 'Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why it Failed', *New York Times* 26 July, 2001.

26. Anan Report, p. 5.

27. Ibid. p. 16. Anan also emphasized that 'neither side would accept the starting point of the other regarding how a new state of affairs would come into being. P. 15.

28. The internationally recognised, constitutive status of Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom was contested by the Irish state's claim, in articles 2 and 3 of its constitution to sovereignty over the entire island and its territorial seas.

29. B. O'Duffy 'British and Irish conflict regulation from Sunningdale to Belfast Part II: Playing for a draw 1985-1999', *Nations and Nationalism* 6,3 (2000) 399-437.

30. There are also small Armenian, Maronite Christian and Catholic communities.

31. Turkish Cypriots were given 30% of cabinet seats despite their being (then) 18% of the population. See McDonald, 'Greek-Turkish Relations

and the Cyprus Conflict' in Keridis and Triantaphyllou *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 117-18.

32. Joseph S. Joseph *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (London: Macmillan, 1997) p. 25-28.

33. Ibid. p. 20.

34. Ibid. pp. 25-28.

35. Ibid. p. 30.

36. Oliver Richmond 'Ethnonationalist Debates and International Peacemaking: The Case of Cyprus.' *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, 5, no. 2 (1999): 36-61.

37. For example see H. Hendawi ' Tough Talk in Cyprus' 18-24 March 1999 Al-Ahram (Cairo), no. 421.

38. M. Keating *Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); see also Charles A. Kupchan, 'Conclusion' in his edited *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995.

39. Ibid., 103-112, 123-24; see also J. Tully *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a critique of the statist 'Westphalian' discourse on secession and self-determination and an application to Serb-Kosovan relations see Andrew March and Rudra Sil 'The Republic of Kosova' (1989-98) and the Resolution of Ethno-Separatist Conflict: Rethinking "Sovereignty" in the Post-Cold War Era' Working Paper no. 99-01, Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, University of Pennsylvania, 1999.

40. In a Eurobarometer survey from October 2001, 62% of Cypriots (Republic) declared support for joining the EU, compared to 68% of Turks (mainland). Turkish-Cypriots were not included in these surveys. See 'Applicant Countries Eurobarometer', 1 Oct. 2001.

41. In Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi.

42. In June 1998 the UN Security Council passed a resolution reaffirming that a settlement must be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal state comprised of 'two politically equal communities' ... based on a single sovereignty and international personality with a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded' quoted in R. McDonald 'Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Conflict' in Keridis and Triantaphyllou *Greek-Turkish Relations*, 126.

43. Ibid. 130.

44. The Annan Report p. 30. This view was supported by Greek-Cypriot academics and officials of the EU delegation in Cyprus. Interviews conducted Nicosia, Cyprus 16 July, 2003.

45. Annan Report, p. 11.

46. T. Bahcheli 'Turkey's Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974' in D. Kerides and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 212-15.

47. *Ibid.*, 215

48. ANAR public opinion poll (reported in Balkans Weekly 2001-12-03). Furthermore, Bahcheli, in 'Turkey's Cyprus Challenge' cites a 1998 poll which showed an (unspecified) plurality of Turkish citizens supporting *Taksim* or "TRNC" integration with Turkey as the preferred solution to the conflict.

49. Agence France-Presse, 11 January 2000, quoted in T. Bahcheli 'Turkey's Cyprus Challenge', 209.

50. P. Kitromilides 'Imagined Communities and the origins of the national question in the Balkans', European *History Quarterly*, 19,2 (1989): 178; cf. C.V. Mavratsas 'Greek Cypriot Identity and Conflicting Interpretations of the Cyprus Problem' in D. Kerides and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 166.; Joseph S. Joseph *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (London: Macmillan, 1997) ch. 3.

51. C.V. Mavratsas 'Greek Cypriot Identity and Conflicting Interpretations of the Cyprus Problem', 151-2.

52. C.V. Mavratsas, 'The ideological contest between Greek Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1995' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 20,4 (1997): 717-37.

53. A. Theophanous 'The Cyprus Problem and its Implications for Stability and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean' in D. Kerides and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*,

54. Under the joint defence doctrine Cyprus was incorporated into the Greek sphere of defensive interests. Joint exercises have been conducted and Greek naval and air forces are committed to supporting the Cyprus national guard. See Robert McDonald 'Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Conflict' in D. Kerides and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 139-40.

55. E.g. N. Mouzelis 'Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society' in J. Hall (ed.) *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).

56. R. D. Asmus, F. S. Larrabee and I.O. Lesser 'Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks', *NATO Review*, no. 3 (May, 1996): 30, quoted in A. Theophanous 'The Cyprus Problem and its Implications for Stability and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean' in Keridis and Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 185.

57. Aslan Gündüz 'Greek-Turkish Disputes: How to Resolve Them', in D. Keridis and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2001) 85-86.

58. N. Nugent *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, 4th edition (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1999), table 13.2, pp. 378-79.

59. For a comparison of recent developments in the role of the matron-states see Sean Byrne's article 'Power Politics as Usual in Cyprus and Northern Ireland: Divided Islands and the Roles of External Ethno-Guarantors." *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* 6, no. 1 (2000): 1-23.

60. The Greek embassy in Nairobi gave sanctuary to the Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Oçalan in early 1999. Turkey protested vehemently and special forces subsequently seized Oçalan, returning him to Turkey. The fallout produced mutually moderating effects in that the hard-line Greek Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos was forced to resign, replaced by the more moderate George Papandreou (son of former President and PASOK founder) while Turkey was inclined by considerations of the prospects for EU accession to stay the death sentence imposed against Oçalan.

61. R. McDonald 'Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Conflict' in D. Kerides and D. Triantaphyllou (eds.) *Greek Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, 141-43.

62. *Annan Report*, p. 27.

63. *Ibid.* p. 26.

64. *Ibid.* p. 27

65. As noted by Anan, the Turkish-Cypriot negotiators invoked article 3 of the Constitution of Switzerland, 'which stipulates that the Cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution.' Anan Report, p. 16.

66. *Annan Report*, p. 17.

67. The centrality of the opposing constitutive sovereignty claims was also apparent in my interviews with Greek Cypriot government representatives and officials as well as in discussions with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot academics from Cyprus and the self-proclaimed "TRNC". Interviews conducted in Nicosia and Famagusta, 6-17 July, 2003.

68. *Annan Report* pp. 30-31. Off the record interview with a current Greek Cypriot government official who participated in all the major negotiations between 1999 and 2003, Nicosia, Cyprus, 18 July, 2003. This interview reinforced the view that bi-partisan agreement exists within the Greek-Cypriot political establishment on the broad parameters of the Anan Plan as the basis for a settlement. One significant area of disagreement between Clerides government and his successor, Papadopoulos, concerns the issue of citizenship rights and the remit of the proposed alien board to grant permanent residency to Turkish citizens migrating to a future Cypriot state.