

## Turkey, the Cyprus Issue and the European Union

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### RÉSUMÉ

L'adhésion de la Turquie à l'UE était une possibilité lointaine dans les années 1980 et 1990. Cependant, suite à la décision de décembre 2002 du Conseil européen de Copenhague cette adhésion est plus facile à atteindre aujourd'hui. Maintenant que la Turquie a obtenu le statut de pays candidat, des négociations d'adhésion pourront commencer si l'UE fixe une date à celui-ci au Conseil européen de décembre 2004. Même si une solution du problème de Chypre ne constitue pas une condition formelle pour l'adhésion de la Turquie, il existe néanmoins une opinion répandue selon laquelle ce pays doit faire des concessions essentielles afin de favoriser la réunification de l'île. Car, en effet, la question chypriote peut avoir un impact sur l'évolution de la candidature européenne de la Turquie.

### ABSTRACT

Turkey's EU membership was a distant possibility in the 1980s and 1990s. Following the decision of the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council, however, it has become a more realizable goal. Now Turkey is a candidate country and accession negotiations may commence without delay if the European Council so decides in December 2004. A Cyprus settlement is not a formal condition for Turkish accession. Yet, there is also a view spearheaded by the Greek side that Turkey must make substantial concessions in Cyprus to help reunify the island. This position may have an impact on both Turkey's European course and the search for a settlement on Cyprus.

### Introduction

Turkey's contentious relationship with the EU (and its predecessors, EC and EEC) spans four decades. In keeping with the Kemalist vision that Turkey's rightful place is within the Western family of nations, the Turkish secular establishment has pursued close European/Western ties for many years. Turkey has been a member of the Council of Europe since 1949, and joined NATO (along with Greece) in 1952. It is also a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and in 1992, became an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU), the EU's security arm.

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Turkey became an associate member of the EEC in 1963. As with the Greek associate membership that came into effect one year earlier, the agreement with the EEC envisaged full Turkish membership in due course. However, when the Turgut Ozal government submitted Turkey's application for accession in 1987, the EU (then known as EC) decided that Turkey did not satisfy the membership requirements. In spite of the disappointment arising from this and subsequent rebuffs from Brussels, the prospect of ultimate membership remained alive among pro-EU circles in Turkey. These hopes were boosted with the 1999 European Council decision in 1999 to formally grant candidate status to Turkey. Moreover, Turkish prospects were further improved by the offer of the Copenhagen EU summit of December 12-13, 2002, to begin accession negotiations in December 2004.

A Cyprus settlement is not a formal precondition of Turkey's EU accession. However, in view of Greek membership of the EU it has always been assumed in many circles that beyond satisfying the accession requirements demanded of other applicants, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would be required to make substantial concessions in Cyprus in order to help reunify the island. In broad terms, these concessions would comprise forsaking the claim of sovereignty of the self-declared "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"), substantial territorial adjustments in favour of Greek Cypriots, and the withdrawal of the bulk of the Turkish forces from the island; these have constituted key provisions in all the United Nations settlement proposals for Cyprus for more than two decades.

Turkish governments have balked at these provisions not least due to the anticipated domestic resistance. However, even if facing the risks of domestic political opposition for a Cyprus settlement appeared manageable to Turkish governments, they have been unwilling to bow to Greek and European pressures for Cyprus concessions unless the prospects of Turkey's EU accession looked reasonably secure. Moreover, unlike other candidates for EU membership who chose accession as a strategic goal for their societies, the Turkish political establishment has struggled to achieve a political consensus on EU membership, thus further complicating the prospects for a Cyprus settlement tied to Turkey's EU aspirations.

## Ankara's Approach to Resolving the Cyprus Issue after 1974

In the aftermath of the war of 1974, when Turkey sent its military to avert the Greek junta's bid to unite the island with Greece, Ankara has supported the Turkish-Cypriot bid to create a new settlement based on the separation of the two communities. As a consequence of the war of 1974, 160,000 Greek-Cypriots (a third of the Greek community) became refugees, as did 45,000 Turkish-Cypriots (representing nearly 40 percent of the Turkish community). The forced movement of people resulted in the creation of two homogeneous ethnic entities on the island. This, and the presence of thousands of Turkish troops on the island, ensured that Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots would have a strong hand in negotiating a new settlement that would safeguard both Turkey's strategic interests and Turkish Cypriot security. Officially, Ankara supported the creation of a bi-zonal federation in Cyprus until the early 1990s. As Nancy Crawshaw, a long-time observer of Cypriot developments explained:

*The difference between 'federation' and 'confederation' may be blurred, but it has been clear for some years that the Turkish Cypriots have been moving away from the original agreement in favour of two sovereign states with equal rights to self-determination. This was confirmed in March 1990 by Rauf Denktaş in discussion with the then UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar.<sup>1</sup>*

Although a separate Turkish Cypriot state, the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") was established in 1983, the international community has continued to recognize the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate government of the island. The Greek-Cypriot leadership (acting with Athens) has used this position to its diplomatic advantage by internationalizing the dispute to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops.

Ankara and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership have rejected the internationalization of the Cyprus issue since 1974. However, they have accepted—albeit with deep misgivings—the continued involvement of the United Nations Security Council in the dispute, as well as the presence of the United Nations Peace Force that has been stationed on the island since 1964.<sup>2</sup> Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot governments have insisted that a new

settlement be negotiated by the Cypriot communities themselves. They have only reluctantly accepted United Nations and periodic United States mediation efforts, while insisting on the Turkish-Cypriot right to negotiate the terms of a settlement with Greek-Cypriots. They have also reacted with suspicion or opposition to any mediation initiatives that would propose terms for a settlement.

Since the late 1970s, Turkish and Greek-Cypriot leaders pledged to seek a settlement for the island based on a bi-zonal and bicomunal federation. A bi-zonal federation was, in fact, a Turkish-Cypriot idea that Greek-Cypriots reluctantly embraced in order to avoid the partition of the island. However, after many years of negotiating, the two communities could not reconcile their visions of what a federal Cyprus ought to be. While Turkish-Cypriots envisaged self-government in a loose federation, Greek-Cypriots preferred a centralized federation with a single sovereignty. The Turkish-Cypriot position, supported by Ankara, hardened in the 1990s, partly in response to unilateral Greek and Greek-Cypriot initiatives to secure EU membership for the island. Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş called for a two-state confederation in Cyprus on August 31, 1998, and received Ankara's backing. He proposed that negotiations aim at creating a "confederal structure of two peoples and two sovereign states"<sup>3</sup> while entrenching the special relationships between Greek-Cypriots and Greece, and Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey.

### **Resisting EU Involvement in Cyprus**

Even though they have been unenthusiastic about any third-party involvement, Ankara and Turkish-Cypriot officials could be consoled by the fact that the UN Secretariat treats the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot leaders as equals in the context of the UN-sponsored talks. Turks objected to EU involvement on the island principally because they anticipated that Greece's membership in the EU prevented Brussels from being an objective party in dealing with the Cypriot communities. Even before Greece succeeded in placing Cypriot accession on the EU's agenda in the early 1990s,<sup>4</sup> Turkish leaders were frustrated that Athens impeded progress in EU-Turkish relations. Until the warming of Greek-Turkish relations in the second half of 1999, Athens repeatedly vetoed the release of aid that the EU agreed to

provide to Turkey as part of the association and customs union agreements. Furthermore, Greece's success in getting the EU to begin accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus in 1998 caused dismay and anger in Ankara. In Turkish eyes, the EU had sided with Greece in a dispute involving Turkish- and -Greek Cypriots as well as Athens and Ankara.

Beyond challenging the EU's credentials as an impartial third party, Ankara has marshaled legal objections to EU accession for Cyprus. Ankara has objected to Cypriot accession without Turkish-Cypriot consent on the grounds that Article I (2) of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee provides that "Cyprus cannot participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever."<sup>5</sup> According to Ankara and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities, Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee equally applies to more than one state as much as a single state.<sup>6</sup>

However, EU officials have not accepted that legal obstacles prohibit Cypriot accession. In any case, the EU decision to move forward on the Greek-Cypriot accession process without the agreement of Turkish-Cypriots, has had less to do with the merit of the island's membership than with Greece's ability to sway its EU partners. In spite of the potential headaches that Brussels would face by admitting a divided island, Greece extracted concessions to advance Cypriot accession each time its EU partners wished to promote Turkey's membership prospects. When the EU presidency affirmed Turkey's eligibility to become an EU member at the Helsinki summit on December 10, 1999, fellow EU members were obliged to make a balancing concession to Greece by stating that a political settlement would not be a precondition to Cyprus's accession.<sup>7</sup> Subsequently, Greece's threat to veto the accession of eastern European states was instrumental in winning support for the Greek-Cypriot bid for accession at the EU's Copenhagen summit on December 12-13, 2002.

For several years, successive Turkish governments warned Brussels that EU accession prior to a settlement would close the doors to future possibilities of reuniting the island. Former Turkish prime minister Bulent Ecevit even threatened that Turkey might annex north Cyprus.<sup>8</sup> However, when the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power in Turkey on November 3, 2002 with a comfortable parliamentary majority, it signaled a serious intention to achieve EU membership and that it would pursue a different Cyprus policy than its predecessors. Thus Ankara responded mildly

when the EU Copenhagen summit in December 2002 ignored Turkish entreaties and endorsed Cyprus's membership.

### **The Denktash Factor**

Indeed, in a bid to improve prospects of securing an early date for Turkey's accession talks with the EU, Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the JDP, unsuccessfully tried to persuade Denktash to accept the plan that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented to the parties on November 11, 2002. Soon after his party formed the government in Ankara, the JDP leader announced that he did not favour the continuation of Ankara's longstanding Cyprus policy and made numerous other statements criticizing Denktash's policy.<sup>9</sup> In the months leading up to the December 2002 EU Copenhagen summit, but especially since the submission of the UN proposals (better known as the Annan plan), numerous Turkish newspaper columnists have argued that Denktash's hard line has jeopardized Turkish Cypriot chances of EU accession, as well as Turkey's own membership prospects.

These criticisms of Denktash have coincided with massive demonstrations in the "TRNC" demanding negotiations based on the Annan plan to ensure that Turkish Cypriots do not forsake the opportunity to enter the EU at the same time as Greek Cypriots.<sup>10</sup> The opposition left-centre parties in the "TRNC", the Republican Turkish Party and the Communal Liberation Party, have been emboldened by the stance of Erdogan's government in Ankara and have campaigned for a resumption of negotiations with the Greek-Cypriot leadership based on the Annan plan. They have pledged to remove Denktash as the Turkish Cypriot negotiator if they win the parliamentary elections in the "TRNC" scheduled for December 14, 2003.

Turkish critics of Denktash are clearly anxious too: should Greek Cyprus become an EU member alone, Greek Cypriots would agitate against Turkey in the EU and complicate Turkey's future accession. Turkish officials fear that what has hitherto been an issue between the Cypriot communities and between Greece and Turkey will become an EU-Turkish issue. Turkish observers and officials believe that upon accession, Greek Cyprus will renew its efforts to secure the withdrawal of Turkish troops on the grounds that the latter are occupying the territory of an EU member.<sup>11</sup>

The Erdogan-Denktaş disagreement is reminiscent of the policy differences between the Turkish Cypriot president and former Turkish prime ministers Turgut Özal and Tansu Çiller. These differences surfaced when Özal and Çiller pressed Denktaş to adopt more flexible positions in intercommunal negotiations in order to smooth Turkey's EU membership path. Özal was a keen advocate of Turkey's EU membership and believed that a Cyprus settlement was essential for Turkish accession. He did not fully trust Denktaş, and sought to ensure that the Turkish Cypriot leader did not evade negotiations that could yield a settlement. Çiller had a similar outlook on the 'TRNC' leader; hence, she preferred to handle Cyprus policy primarily through the prime minister's office rather than through the foreign ministry, where Denktaş enjoyed greater support. Çiller and Denktaş had major policy differences concerning the acceptance of confidence-building measures promoted by the UN, and when Çiller appeared receptive to calls from Washington and EU states for the adoption of the confidence-building measures in late 1993 and early 1994, the opposition supported Denktaş in resisting the measures. By the time Erdogan's party assumed power in 2002, prospects for Turkey's EU accession looked considerably better. Thus, with Turkey facing higher stakes than before, averting a veto by Denktaş on Ankara's Cyprus policy became more urgent for Erdogan than was the case with his predecessors.

Anxieties among Turks concerning the link between a Cyprus settlement and Turkey's EU accession have become more manifest as Turkish accession prospects have improved since late 1999. Some Turkish commentators have complained that the future of 69 million Turks is being jeopardized because of a policy geared for the benefit of 200,000 Turkish Cypriots.<sup>12</sup> In fact, Turkey has borne considerable costs for many decades because of its Cyprus policy. Successive U.S. administrations have routinely petitioned Ankara to help settle the Cyprus issue and to pressure Denktaş to show more flexibility in intercommunal negotiations. Greek/Greek Cypriot lobbying in Washington has regularly caused problems for Ankara by generating critical congressional resolutions, cuts in US aid, and circumspection over American arms to Turkey. In Europe, too, governments have also called upon Turkey to exercise its influence with Turkish Cypriots to help achieve a settlement on the island. European Parliament resolutions criticizing Turkey's Cyprus policy have been commonplace.

In a major blow to Ankara, the July 28 1996 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHO) held Turkey (rather than the Turkish Cypriot government) responsible for barring a Greek Cypriot refugee's access to her property in northern Cyprus and ordered the Turkish government to pay her compensation. Ankara has rejected the rulings and has refused to pay any compensation, arguing that the "TRNC", not Turkey, represents the legitimate authority in northern Cyprus. Nevertheless, since the 1996 ruling the ECHR has issued several other similar judgments for Greek-Cypriot refugees, and dozens more such appeals to the court have been lodged against Turkey.<sup>13</sup> Some Turkish commentators have argued that the Turkish government might be held liable for hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation to settle these judgments and future claims, unless a political agreement is reached that mandates the settlement of property claims between the two island communities (as provided by the 2002 UN plan).<sup>14</sup>

Denktash has typically sought allies within the Turkish political establishment in order to strengthen his hand in dealing with politicians or high-level bureaucrats who might apply pressure on him. In Turkey, he has enjoyed enormous prestige as a vigorous defender of Turkish Cypriot rights and of Turkish interests. He has cultivated political ties with influential Turks in many walks of life, including the military, the foreign policy establishment, political parties, and the media. His success in cultivating such ties, his political longevity, and his decades-long experience in dealing with the Cyprus issue has given him a significant advantage in dealing with Turkish leaders. Premiers, foreign ministers, and military chiefs have come and gone, but Denktash remains Turkish Cypriots' voice on the island and abroad.

In the latest contest of wills with the JDP leader, Denktash has received the backing of the powerful Turkish military and the senior ranks of the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy, as well as that of the opposition parties.<sup>15</sup> He has also been supported by political groups which either oppose Turkey's EU accession or doubt that EU states would allow Turkey to become a member. These groups argue that concessions in Cyprus would yield no commensurate benefit for Turkey.

### **Turkey's EU Membership: Uncertain Prospects?**

A 2002 survey conducted by two academics at Bogazici University in

Istanbul indicated that 74 percent of the respondents would vote in favour of Turkey's membership should a vote be conducted on the issue.<sup>16</sup> Domestic support for Turkey's EU membership has been strong and, in the aftermath of the economic crisis that has gripped the country since late 2000, this sentiment grew even stronger.

The same survey reported that Turks expect a higher living standard to result from EU membership. As for what needs to be done in Turkey to facilitate EU membership, the respondents stated that Turkey needed to remove restrictions on religious practices, improve freedom of expression, and find diplomatic solutions to problems with Greece and Cyprus.<sup>17</sup>

In as much as this and similar surveys demonstrate the EU's popularity among ordinary Turks, some Turks—including influential groups within the Turkish establishment—have displayed considerable ambivalence and opposition to the EU. According to the veteran Turkish journalist Sami Kohen:

*... excepting a few marginal groups, there is no party in Turkey which opposes our EU membership... However, the degree of this desire and support varies among the parties. Some of them take the necessary criteria for EU membership into consideration and fully support them. Others always start their sentences, yes, but and then lay down conditions.<sup>18</sup>*

In 2001, Ersel Aydinli and Dov Waxman argued that “two opposing camps have emerged” in the debate on the EU's accession Partnership Document, “the ‘integralists and the ‘gradualists’”.<sup>19</sup> According to these writers, “traditional gradualists include the armed forces and the right-wing Nationalist Action Party, while integralists are generally associated with more centrist political parties, the media, the foreign ministry, and the business world ...”<sup>20</sup> Beyond these broad observations, however, Aydinli and Waxman noted significant divisions among influential groups, including the powerful military. Indeed, several high-ranking members of the military have voiced some of the strongest criticisms of the EU, particularly over the alleged support that European governments have provided to Kurdish groups, and the reticence of European authorities to designate the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party) and its successor KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) as terrorist organizations.

However, notwithstanding periodic criticisms of the EU by high-ranking members of the armed forces, the Turkish military has apparently supported Ankara's implementation of reforms required by the EU. Thus the military has endorsed an end to 15 years of semi-military rule in the predominantly Kurdish area in the south-east of the country, and its replacement with civilian rule as required by the EU. Moreover, the Turkish military appeared flexible on such sensitive issues as the abolition of the death penalty and Kurdish language broadcasting and education. Since coming to power in November 2002, the Justice and Development Party has ushered even bolder reforms to satisfy EU political requirements: the most notable among these has been the curbing of the influence of the military in Turkish politics through the reduction of the powers of the highly-influential National Security Council (NSC) in August 2003.

Whereas domestic support for Turkey's EU course gathered momentum in 2002, largely owing to deteriorating economic conditions, many Turks have long doubted the willingness of EU states to proceed with Turkey's accession. At 67 million in 2002, Turkey's population is expected to overtake that of Germany—the most populous EU country—by 2014.<sup>21</sup> Many Turks wonder whether Europe is ready to admit a Muslim country with such a large population into its club.

Occasional statements made by European leaders questioning Turkey's European credentials and its suitability to join the EU has added to Turkish suspicions. Former French President Giscard d'Estaing warned in an interview in late 2002, that Turkey's admission would mean the "end of Europe".<sup>22</sup> He declared that Turkey "... has a different culture, a different approach, and a different way of life. It is not a European country".<sup>23</sup> Other European politicians have expressed similar misgivings. It is well known in Turkey that German administrations under former Chancellor Helmut Kohl have had strong misgivings regarding Turkish membership, and that these are not merely related to the human rights problems in Turkey. Edmund Stoiber, leader of the Christian Democrat Party in Germany, has expressed similar reservations regarding the Turkish membership of the EU.<sup>24</sup>

The German authorities' reservations regarding Turkey's membership are rooted in Germany's experience of Turkish immigration since the 1960s, and anxieties that EU membership would prompt huge numbers of poor Turks to move to German cities in search of jobs and social benefits, thereby

creating major economic and social problems. Teitelbaum and Martin have explained the background of German sensitivities regarding Turkish immigration in these terms:

*Numerically, Turks have never represented more than a third of all the foreigners in Germany, but in many respects they have been the most visible and least integrated. Turks were the last guest workers to arrive in large numbers, the poorest, the least educated, and the most different in cultural and historical terms.<sup>27</sup>*

While Germany may bear the economic and social brunt of Turkey's future membership, other EU members too will seriously consider the anticipated economic costs of admitting a poor country with a huge population. *Osteuropa-Institut*, a research organization in Munich, estimated in late 2003 that "Turkey's membership of the EU could cost up to 14 billion Euro a year."<sup>28</sup>

### **Conclusion: A Window of Opportunity?**

Notwithstanding European unease regarding Turkey's membership, pro-EU groups in Turkey believe that EU membership for Turkey is achievable. Although Turkish leaders have long resisted Greek and other external pressures for Turkish/Turkish Cypriot concessions on the island, they have also been long aware that Turkey's EU membership cannot be achieved without a settlement in Cyprus. But if the prospects of Turkey's EU membership were uncertain, Turkish government were unlikely to take great domestic political risks by endorsing important concessions (such as abandoning the claim of Turkish-Cypriot sovereign statehood) to achieve a Cypriot settlement.

The convergence of several developments during the past year has enhanced Turkish receptivity toward a Cyprus settlement. The first was the victory in Turkish elections on November 3, 2002, of the Justice and Development Party with a comfortable parliamentary majority, marking an end to eleven years of short-lived coalition governments in Ankara; the party's commitment to a reformist agenda in order to achieve EU membership set it apart from its predecessors. Secondly, and more

importantly, by offering Ankara a date (December 2004) for the start of accession negotiations, the EU summit of December 12-13, 2002, marked a crucial step in advancing Turkey's EU prospects. Thirdly, the Turkish government viewed the Annan plan as providing a solution that it could "live with". While it fell short of Turkish Cypriot and Turkish call for a confederation of two states, it provided a wide measure of autonomy for Turkish Cypriots in a loose bi-zonal federation and political equality between Turkish and Greek Cypriots..

While Turkey's EU membership was merely a distant possibility during the Ozal era in the 1980s, it has become a more realizable goal for Ankara since the EU's Copenhagen summit of December 2002. This represents the strongest incentive for the Turkish government to reach a compromise settlement in Cyprus. However, much can go wrong in the future with a Cyprus settlement and Turkey's EU accession course, in spite of the JDP's evident commitment to achieve greater democratization in order to satisfy the EU membership requirements and desire to find a political solution for Cyprus. Hence, other parties with a direct stake in the Cyprus issue and Turkey's EU membership might consider what they could do to in order to exploit the opportunity for a Cyprus settlement before the island's accession to the EU takes effect in May 2004. In an article published in September 2003, two veteran United States officials, Morton Abramowitz and James Wilkinson, argued for proactive EU diplomacy to ensure that the unresolved Cyprus issue does not derail Turkey's accession process.<sup>27</sup> They argued for a step-by-step application of the Annan plan, and the integration of the Turkish Cypriot state into the EU to be linked to the start of accession talks between the EU and Turkey.<sup>28</sup> Having made a Cyprus settlement a precondition for its EU accession Turkey, with all the attendant domestic difficulties for the Turkish government, it is particularly apt that Brussels undertake imaginative diplomacy to salvage both a Cyprus settlement and Turkey's democratization in pursuit of EU membership.

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## NOTES

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3. "Denktash proposes loose Cyprus confederation of two states," *Agence France Press*, 31 August 1998.
4. The Greek Cypriot government submitted Cyprus' application for EU accession in 1990.
5. For the text of the Treaty of Guarantee, see Appendix B in *Cyprus* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964).
6. Ergun Olgun, Undersecretary to Rauf Denktash, President of the "TRNC", reiterated this view in a statement issued by TAK, the official Turkish Cypriot news agency, on 31 July 2002.
7. In the words of the Helsinki communiqué: "*The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors*". Helsinki European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, December 10 and 11, 1999, <[http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99/\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99/_en.pdf)>.
8. Reported in *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), 5 November 2001.
9. Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared 'I am not in favour of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained in Cyprus over the past 30-40 years... We will do whatever falls on us. This is not Denktash's private matter.' *The New York Times*, 2 January 2003.
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22. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

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24. See the Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, *Cyprus*, 3 July 2002.

25. Teitelbaum and Martin, p. 105.

26. *EU Observer.com*, 22 September 2003.

27. Abramowitz, Morton and Wilkinson, James “A Cypriot Threat to Turkey’s Revolution”, *Financial Times*, 2 September 2003.

28. Ibid.