

Return to Europe: EU Accession as a Turning Point in Cypriot History

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RÉSUMÉ

L'occupation britannique a facilité le contact de Chypre avec les réalités européennes. En effet, même le mouvement de l'Enosis a reflété l'idée d'autodétermination à travers le continent européen et celle de modernisation occidentale comme complément des structures administratives, économiques et juridiques occidentales introduites par le " libéralisme britannique ". Cependant, l'extension dans l'île de la gouvernance coloniale après la Première Guerre Mondiale a détaché Chypre de la tradition européenne et l'a placée dans le contexte du mouvement anticolonialiste. L'adhésion à l'UE représente un retour à l'Europe, qui ouvre de nouvelles perspectives pour un avenir commun entre Chypriotes-Grecs et Chypriotes-Turcs.

ABSTRACT

British rule significantly facilitated Cyprus's contact with European trends. Indeed, even the rise of the *Enosis* movement reflected the advent of the idea of self-determination throughout the continent, and complemented the imposition of Western administrative, economic and judicial structures by 'liberal Britain'. However, the extension of colonial rule after the First World War partially detached Cyprus from the mainstream of European history and placed the island in the context of colonial liberation movements. The accession to the EU represents a long-awaited return to Europe, which opens new opportunities in the search for a common future for the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.

Introduction

International scholarship has repeatedly stressed that Cypriot history has been excessively influenced by international politics, the strategic interests of the great powers, and more recently by the cold war, decolonization or the Middle Eastern crises. This article attempts to determine whether there is a distinct European tendency in contemporary Cypriot history, from the arrival of the British in 1878 to the signing of the EU accession treaty in April 2003. It will be argued that until the end of the First World War, British rule facilitated Cyprus's increasing contact with European trends.

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However, the extension of colonial rule after 1918 partially detached Cyprus from the mainstream of European history. Even then, the Greek-Cypriots continued perceiving themselves as a European people. As a result, the accession to the EU may be regarded as a long-awaited return to Europe, which also opens up opportunities in the search for a common future of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots.

Tracing larger trends in contemporary history is an extremely difficult process which touches upon perceptions and political ideology, as well as events. Given that it tries to access ideology and identities, this short article can only sketch some points which might be useful for the interpretation of contemporary Cypriot history. But this is a broad subject, one which must wait for more detailed study in the future.

Historical Background

The British acquired Cyprus in 1878 because of the island's strategic value in the Eastern Mediterranean. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, the island was a key to Western Asia and a valuable stepping-stone on the route to India.¹ Yet, the arrival of the British brought Cyprus under the administration of a great European power and led to the imposition of a European administrative and judicial system, as well as a partially elected Legislative Council. In the relatively liberal political climate that British rule created, Cypriot political activity acquired the opportunity to develop. Thus, despite the fact that nominally sovereignty still belonged to the Sultan, from 1878 onwards it became significantly easier for Cyprus to follow European developments than during the previous period of Ottoman administration.

The development of the *Enosis* movement indicated this clearly. Throughout Europe, the second half of the nineteenth century was the age of the rise of liberal ideals, of the idea of the nation-state, even of nationalism; and Cyprus followed this lead.² After the arrival of the British, *Enosis* appeared much closer: in those years the *Enosis* movement put forward a rather moderate political program, hoping that liberal Britain would repeat in Cyprus its impressive offer of the Ionian islands to Greece (1864). This has been described as the Ionian pattern of the *Enosis* movement, placing its emphasis on the concept of a peaceful struggle.³ By the end of the nineteenth century two Greek Cypriot political parties had

emerged, the 'intransigents' and the 'moderates', representing a harder and a softer line respectively; yet neither was for an all-out clash with the colonial authorities. In fact, they both hoped that London would finally concede to *Enosis*.⁵ The development of trade in the Eastern Mediterranean helped increase Cyprus's contact with Europe and thus facilitated the intensification of the *Enosis* claim. It is noteworthy that the power of the so-called moderate party was based on inland Nicosia, while the intransigent group was dominant in the ports of Larnaca and Limassol, where contact with the outside world was much easier.

Despite friction with the colonial authorities over economic issues and mainly the Cyprus Tribute, authors have noted the "peculiar mildness" of Greek Cypriot nationalism of these years.⁵ The early *Enosis* movement made a distinction between English (European) liberalism, and 'Oriental despotism', namely, the Ottoman *ancien régime*. Even during the 1897 Greek-Ottoman war, at a moment of deep disillusionment with the policies of the European great powers, the attitude of the leaders of the *Enosis* movement and of the Press was illustrative: Greece, they claimed, had "undertook alone the task of driving the Asiatic tiger out of the grove of European civilization," but Europe had not done its "duty" to help in this; still, the Greek Cypriot Press finally concluded that "the three most liberal governments" (Britain, France and Italy) anyway had not taken an anti-Greek attitude.⁶ A tendency to look to Europe – not only for support but also as a liberal model – was more than clear. It must also be remembered that the *Enosis* claim aimed at the incorporation of Cyprus to the Greek kingdom, which also perceived itself as a European state. Taking into account that *the Enosis* movement expressed the demand for democratic rule during a period when a modern economic structure and a European administrative system emerged in the island, it may be argued that the *Enosis* ideal projected a claim for European-style modernization. It is also possible to suggest that by placing its hopes on "liberalism," the early *Enosis* movement was characterized by a profoundly idealistic tendency, which would follow Greek nationalism in Cyprus in the years to come.

Ironically, however, the British themselves, who had facilitated the political development of the Greek Cypriot community, refused to accept its claims. The British 'divide-and-rule' policy in Cyprus, and their attempt to play the Turkish-Cypriot minority community against the Greek Cypriot majority have been noted by numerous authors. London kept focusing on

the strategic value of Cyprus; the colonial officials consistently underestimated the strength of the Enosis vision and resisted its demands. The reluctance of the British to realize that they faced a European (indeed, Balkan) irredentism in Cyprus, and their insistence on viewing Cyprus solely in a colonial context stand out among the factors which gradually led to polarizing relations between the majority of the indigenous population and the colonial authorities.⁷

A break in Cypriot history occurred after the First World War. Greek Cypriot hopes run high in 1914-18; indeed, in 1915 Britain officially offered the island to Greece to lure it into the conflict, but the then neutralist government in Athens rejected the proposal. After Greece's defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 such hopes were dashed; British sovereignty was formalized by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, and Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown colony in 1925.⁸

In 1923, nominal Turkish sovereignty was ended and Cyprus came under the full ownership of Britain. Ironically, however, this caused a major detachment of Cypriot history from the mainstream of European history. By that time, in other countries of southeastern Europe, 'liberation' had already occurred, at least liberation of majorities. Most of these countries (Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey) slowly turned their attention to a different agenda, namely security, protection of the status quo, reconstruction, and domestic development. None of this took place in Cyprus, which was definitely put into a colonial/imperial rather than European sphere. Nonetheless, liberation remained at the top of Greek-Cypriot agenda; and, after 1925, this meant liberation from Britain, not from any "Asian despot".

The matter might not have been so grave, had Cyprus managed to start its course towards self-government; i.e. towards an *evolutionary* road to freedom. After 1922 a constitutionalist tendency, or party, emerged among the Greek-Cypriots, accepting the idea of a long period of liberal constitutional government under British sovereignty. In the 1920s, the rise of Kemalism and of secular nationalism was also recorded among the Turkish-Cypriots. This process had been completed by the late 1930s⁹. Yet, Kemalism aspired to bring Turkey closer to Europe, while Greece and Turkey solved their differences with their impressive rapprochement in 1930. Thus, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot cooperation in a liberal colonial regime was possible.

Yet this was not the option that the British colonial officials preferred. The 1925 revision of the Cypriot constitution again failed to set up proportional representation in the Legislative Council, which remained powerless. British reluctance to concede more power to the indigenous population destroyed the position of the constitutionalists and became one of the factors that led to the 1931 Cyprus revolt.¹⁰ This revolt was followed by the abolition of the Legislative Councils and led to government by decree. During the 1930s, there was a visible trend among Greek-Cypriots to hope for liberal self-government. Moreover, there were indications that there could even be some cooperation between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in return for a relaxation of the régime. However, the British strongly ruled out political concessions to the indigenous population, and blocked any move for joint Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot petitions regarding this demand.¹¹

The oppression of the 1930s dealt another severe blow to gradualist ideas for the establishment of self-government. The no-change policy that Britain adopted after 1945, culminating in Henry Hopkinson's famous "never" statement in 1954, completed this process. Greek-Cypriots had once more participated on Britain's side in a world war and had ended up with a colonial régime. In 1948, no longer believing in British good faith, Greek-Cypriots rejected a rather liberal British constitutional offer, the Winster plan. The rationale was that after another world war, a constitution was not enough. This was a major opportunity to set a pace for smooth political development that was lost by the Cypriots. Still, one should keep in mind that in 1947-8 the left-wing Greek Cypriots participated in the constitution-making process, despite accusations of giving in to British pressures. The Left asked for the establishment of a restricted form of self-government but was forced to reject the British proposal when Britain indicated that it would not concede Cypriot control of ministries. Thus, once again in 1948, the British pulled the carpet out from beneath the feet of the supporters of an evolutionary strategy.¹²

Developments in 1922-48 were crucial. The evolutionary concept lost its appeal for Greek-Cypriots, and, after WW II, it was gradually replaced by a *revolutionary* mood. After successive bitter disappointments, the inherent idealism of the Enosis movement led to more violent paths, and to a 'Cretan' pattern for its struggle. The emphasis now lay on the need to *fight* for freedom, if freedom was denied. In other words, the radicalization of Greek

Cypriot nationalism took place in those years, culminating in Archbishop Makarios' *Enosis* campaign in 1950-54 and to the armed struggle in 1955-59. It was mainly now that the rhetoric of Greek-Cypriot nationalism acquired its combatant, often excessive, style.

Certainly Greek Cypriot rhetoric of that time argued that the British were denying freedom to a European people, at a time when colonies around the globe were gaining independence. Makarios himself stated at a press conference in London, in February 1953, that "Cyprus belongs to the West",¹³ and in 1954 the first Greek appeal to the UN noted that Cyprus was "one of the most ancient cradles of Western civilization".¹⁴ The strong insistence on principles also reappeared, with Makarios appealing to the liberalism of the US and of the British people, but also denouncing the 'illiberal' attitude of the British governments.¹⁵ Yet liberalism now equaled 'Western' (in general), or 'anti-colonial', rather than 'European'. Makarios made few direct references to Europe. This is not surprising as many European states, such as Britain, France and Belgium, were colonial powers and used to vote in the UN against Greek appeals for the self-determination of Cyprus. If, in the 1950s, there were two images of Europe: a 'reactionary'/colonialist one and a progressive Europe of integration—the Greek Cypriots had an experience only of the former. In any event, the *Enosis* movement had now placed its hopes on the UN, and therefore had to broaden its scope to include wider geographical areas.

After 1956-7, Greece and the Greek-Cypriots resisted the Turkish claim for partition, arguing that it was unacceptable to effect compulsory population transfers and upset the economy and the society of a European land in this way.¹⁶ The Greek-Cypriots kept stressing that they were Europeans; but they connected their European identity with their liberation claim, not with the search for a common future within a wider European framework. This was another natural consequence of prolonged colonial rule. Supranationalism, integration or even traditional European cooperation can be the options of free societies only.

In those years Britain itself did not view Cyprus as a European land, but as a part of its invaluable Middle Eastern imperial/strategic position. Thus Britain's strategic and international needs in the Middle East largely determined its policy on Cyprus throughout the 1950s.¹⁷ The detachment of Cyprus from the mainstream of European history had reached a new peak: Cyprus was now part of a very violent pattern of the decolonization process.

The Modern Era

After independence was gained in 1960, Cyprus entered a new phase in its history, but new difficulties occurred.¹⁸ This was both a post-colonial and a post-revolutionary period, while independence did not particularly appeal either to Greek-or Turkish-Cypriots. Yet, free political life presented opportunities both for internal political development, as well as for the international position of the new state.

According to the Greek Prime Minister, Constantinos Karamanlis, after independence Athens strongly advised Makarios to pursue a pro-Western policy with the aim of "ending today's prevailing psychosis in Turkey on the Cyprus question;" alignment with, and integration in the West was the only way of solving Cyprus's problems. Karamanlis claimed that in that case, one might hope that at some point in the future Turkey could even agree to consider Enosis itself.¹⁹

Indeed, it must be remembered that even during its revolutionary phase, the Enosis movement aspired to keep Cyprus in the West: Enosis would result in the union of Cyprus with a NATO country. Makarios' participation at the 1955 Bandung Conference aimed at securing support for Cyprus at the UN, not at detaching it from the West. During the final meeting of the Greek policy-makers prior to the 1959 Zurich Conference, Makarios strongly stated to Karamanlis that the Cyprus Republic should become a NATO member.²⁰ This did not transpire, mainly because of British reservations for Cypriot entry in the Western alliance.

Yet there were other options, for example, the European Economic Community. It is important to note that immediately after the Cyprus settlement, in 1959, negotiations for the association of Greece with the EEC started and the Greek Treaty of Association was signed in July 1961. The Turkish agreement followed in 1963. Athens regarded association with the EEC as a strategic option for Greece that would provide for its political, economic and social integration into the country's 'natural space'.²¹ The Karamanlis government encouraged Cyprus to follow the same course; thus, according to the British Embassy in Athens, during Makarios' 1962 official visit to the Greek capital, discussions focussed mainly on Cyprus's possible association with the EEC.²²

Yet, Nicosia followed London's not Athens's lead with regard the EEC. Cyprus considered reaching an Association Agreement with the Community in 1962, at a time when London also sought full membership. When de Gaulle vetoed British entry, Cypriot interest in association evaporated. Cyprus concluded an Association Agreement in 1972, shortly before Britain's entry in the Community. In the 1960s Nicosia viewed the EEC merely as a trade mechanism rather than a strategic option for the country, and its main aim was to protect Cypriot trade with Britain and the Commonwealth, as well as the position and residence rights of the large Cypriot diaspora in Britain.²³

The main reason why Cyprus failed to make a European option in the 1960s lay in the gradual breakdown of its recent constitutional settlement. After 1963 Cypriot affairs were dominated by internal armed confrontation and ethnic conflict, a situation hardly compatible with a European perspective. During this period Nicosia saw the EEC as a supplementary rather than as a main theme of its policy: the primacy of the question of its international status was not disputed. Yet on that level, the Commonwealth, the non-aligned countries and the UN were regarded as more appropriate forums to attain Nicosia's aims. This is a further reason why the eruption of the second Cyprus crisis prejudiced the island's future. Crises kept detaching Cyprus from the search for a Western and a European perspective. Makarios' decision to approach the non-aligned countries has been severely criticized. Similarly, his Thirteen Points proposal for constitutional revision has been described as a fatal mistake.²⁴ From this point of view, the failure of Nicosia to steer its course toward Europe in the early 1960 may be regarded as a major lost opportunity.

It should be noted that the post-1963 crisis dramatically destabilized Cypriot domestic as well as foreign policy. Hence, in his letter of 1 March 1964 to the Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, Makarios stated that "Cyprus historically and culturally belongs to the West, although it will continue pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy."²⁵ This was at best a contradictory policy. Furthermore, it tended to increase US and Western suspicions about Makarios. In 1964, repeatedly threatened by a Turkish invasion, Makarios felt the need to appeal to the Soviet Union for support, which also severely alienated the US and the Western powers, even Athens.²⁶ This in turn created anti-Western reflexes among the Greek Cypriot policy-makers, which made them turn even more toward the non-aligned. In the

vortex of successive crises after 1963, Cyprus kept regarding itself as a European country on the verge, but not as a country of the European mainstream.

Thus, ethnic conflict as well as Cyprus's uncertain international position tended to become self-fulfilling prophecies. As has been suggested, after 1964 Makarios proved skillful in becoming an "international power broker,"²⁷ but this was a dangerous course in a very troubled region of the world, and it was doubtful whether the Archbishop's intelligence and personal abilities were enough to overcome all possible difficulties. Most of all, these marked Cyprus's failure to pursue a *long-term* policy, either domestic or foreign.

The 1974 Turkish invasion, the US and NATO's immobility during the crisis, and the destruction of the Cypriot economy after the occupation of almost 40% of the country's territory, should enhance anti-Western views in Cyprus and further remove it from Europe. Significantly, this did not take place: in 1963-74 the Greek Cypriots had not disputed that their country was European; they simply searched for support in the Third World for tactical reasons. Even in the post-1974 years, their European identity was not brought into question.

Indeed, trying to survive in the post-invasion period, the Greek Cypriots were forced to turn their attention primarily to such goals as reconstruction, development, and the strengthening of their democratic institutions. All these form part of the European agenda. And the stunning economic success of the Greek Cypriots, the so called "Cypriot economic miracle," further confirmed the Western/European orientation of the Cyprus Republic. At the same time the Cypriot political system evolved after the loss of the father figure of Makarios in 1977. This weaning of the Cypriot political system from Makarios' dominant personality would inevitably take place sooner or later; it occurred at a very difficult moment, shortly after the trauma of 1974, but was carried out smoothly and successfully.

In other words, the Cypriot decision to seek a new course within a united Europe was a process which touched upon Cypriot politics, ideology, as well as on the economy. By the late 1980s things were ripe for a new European opening, and Cyprus applied for full membership to the EEC in July 1990, during Giorgos Vassiliou's presidency (1988-93). This was also strongly encouraged by the Greek governments, mostly by the Constantinos

Mitsotakis administration; in June 1993 the Commission's Opinion opened the road for accession. The new Greek governments under Andreas Papandreou (1993-96) and Constantinos Simitis (1996-) also strongly supported this option during the presidencies of Glafkos Clerides (1993-2003) and Tassos Papadopoulos (2003-) in Cyprus.²⁸

Thus the new convergence of the Greek Cypriots with Europe started not only on the economic, but also on the political and the ideological levels in the 1980s; it also naturally derived from the fact that throughout the modern era the Greek Cypriots strongly held that they are a European people. Consequently, accession is not merely a technical/economic event, but the culmination of a long process. This is why Cyprus is well-prepared, politically, mentally and ideologically (not only economically) for EU accession.

Forward-Looking Perspectives

There has been a notable European trend in Cypriot history in general: the island was a part of the Byzantine Empire, then a Frankish and a Venetian possession up until the Ottoman conquest. In modern times, the arrival of the British in 1878 gave to Cypriot political life the opportunity to develop and to seek integration into a “liberal” (European) rather than the so-called despotic (Asiatic or Oriental) world.

However, the definite placing of Cyprus into a colonial/imperial sphere, following the First World War, caused a major break in Cypriot history. At a time when other European countries, including the Balkans, were in search for security and development and were making a transition to a more contemporary political agenda, liberation remained at the top of Greek Cypriot priorities. After 1945 the radicalization of the Enosis movement was combined with an excessive British interest in the Middle East. Cyprus became the field of a war of decolonization in an Eastern Mediterranean which went through a succession of crises. Thus, the Cyprus question became a part of a wider Middle Eastern upheaval, which also involved cold war antagonisms and the rise of other regional forces, such as Turkey or Arab nationalism. All these factors contributed to a detachment of Cypriot affairs from the mainstream of European history. Yet, British strategic priorities or post-independence mistakes of the Cypriots (both Greeks and Turks) could confuse the fundamental European trend in Cypriot history, but could not

arrest or cancel it. Today the return of Cyprus to Europe is being completed; the problem is that this may not involve the whole of the divided island.

It goes without saying that the European perspective of Cyprus is directly connected to settlement of the Cyprus question. EU membership makes available new procedures and guarantees for political and economic development, which would be unattainable outside the EU context. EU accession will also ensure that Cyprus's fate not be decided primarily by the severe international rivalries of this troubled region. This should ensure that its progress will be irreversible in the future.

NOTES

1. G. S. Georghallides, *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918-1926. With a Survey of the Foundations of British rule*, (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1979), 3-7.

2. See this point also in Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, 80.

3. Giorgos Georgis, "O Antiktypos tis Enosis tis Eptanisou me tin Hellada stin Kypro" (The Echo in Cyprus of the Union of the Seven [Ionian] Islands with Greece), in Ioannis Theocharides (ed.), *Praktika tou Tritou Diethnous Kyprologikou Synedriou* (Proceedings of the Third International Cyprological Conference) volume III, (Nicosia: Society for Cypriot Studies, 2001).

4. On Greek Cypriot politics see among others Michael A. Attalides, "Ta Kommata stin Kypro (1878-1955)" (The political parties in Cyprus), in *Kypriaka, 1878-1955* (Cypriot Issues, 1878-1955) (Nicosia: Municipality of Nicosia, 1986); Hubert Faustmann, "Divide and Quit? The History of British Colonial Rule in Cyprus, 1878-1960. Including a Special Survey of the Transitional Period, February 1959-August 1960," Diss. (Manheim: University of Manheim, 1999), 21-22.

5. Rolandos Katsiaounis, *He Diaskeptiki, 1946-1948: me Anaskopisi tis Periodou 1878-1945* (The Consultative Conference, 1946-1948: with a Survey of the Period 1878-1945) (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000), 19-20. See also idem, *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century* (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1996); Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, 81-87; Michael A.

Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979), 29. On the essentially moderate character of Greek Cypriot tactics even during the Balkan Wars, see Petros Papapolyviou, *He Kypros kai oi Valkanikoi Polemoi: Symvoli stin Historia tou Kypriakou Ethelontismou* (Cyprus and the Balkan Wars: a Contribution to the History of Cypriot Voluntarism) (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1997).

6. Petros Papapolyviou, *Faionon Simeion Atychous Polemou: he Symmetochi tis Kyprou ston Hellenotourkiko Polemo tou 1897* (A Bright Sign of an Unfortunate War: Cyprus's the Participation in the 1897 Greek-Turkish War) (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2002), 204-212.

7. See Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *The Cyprus question, 1878-1960: the Constitutional Aspect* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 2002), chapter I.

8. On the 1914-25 developments, see among others, Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*.

9. James A. McHenry, *The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939: the Political and Diplomatic Interaction Between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community*, (New York and London: Garland, 1987).

10. See mostly G. S. Georghallides, *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis*, (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985).

11. Diana Weston Markides and G. S. Georghallides, "British Attitudes to Constitution-Making in Post-1931 Cyprus," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 13 (1995): 63-81; Katsiaounis, *Diaskeptiki*, 55-57.

12. On the important 1948 British constitutional offer, see Katsiaounis, *Diaskeptiki*; Yiorghos Leventis, *Cyprus: the Struggle for Self-determination in the 1940s. Prelude to Deeper Crisis* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 2002); Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem* (London: Hurst, 1999), 108-113; Faustmann, 79; Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), 39.

13. Makarios' press conference, 20 February 1953, in *Apanta Archiepiskopou Kyprou Makariou III* (Collected Texts of Archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III), volume I (Nicosia: Archbishop Makarios III Foundation, 1992), 335.

14. The text of the Greek appeal in *Apanta Makariou*, volume I, 435.

15. Out of numerous references to liberalism see Makarios' memorandum to Adlai Stevenson on 17 June 1953, his speech at Phaneromeni Church on 28 June 1953, his press conference in London on 20 February 1953, his interview with the Greek-American paper *Ethnikos Kyrix* on 10 August 1954, in *Apanta Makariou*, volume I.

16. See the Greek government's arguments in successive conversations of Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza in Stephen G. Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1967).

17. It is impossible to discuss British policy in the 1950s here. See, among others, Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord*; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59*, (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 1997); idem, *The Cyprus question: the Constitutional Aspect*, chapter IV; Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

18. On the transition to independence and the first post-colonial years see Faustmann, op. cit.; Diana Weston Markides, *Cyprus, 1957-1963: from Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis. The Key Role of the Municipal Issue* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 2001).

19. Karamanlis's notes (probably 1968), in Constantinos Svolopoulos (gen. ed.), *Constantinos Karamanlis: Archeio, Gegonota kai Keimena* (Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Events and Texts) volume 4 (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon and Constantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation, 1994), 15-17; Karamanlis to Kanellopoulos, 2 March 1964, *Karamanlis*, volume 6 (Athens, 1994), 125-127.

20. Record, 29 January 1959, Spyros Papageorgiou (ed.), *Ta Krisima Documenta tou Kypriakou (1959-1967)* (The crucial documents of the Cyprus question, 1959-1967) volume I (Athens: Ladias, 1983), 45-50.

21. On this decision see Constantinos Svolopoulos, *He Helleniki Exoteriki Poliiki* (Greek Foreign Policy), volume II (1945-1981) (Athens: Hestia, 2001), 114-132; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-1962," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30 (1995): 187-202.
22. Murray to Home, 8 October 1962, PRO FO 371/163455/8.
23. Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 116-117.
24. See mostly Theodore A. Couloumbis, *Kypriako: Lathi, Didagmata, Prooptikes* (The Cyprus Question: Mistakes, Lessons, Perspectives) (Athens: Sideris, 1996), 81-82.
25. Makarios to George Papandreou, 1 March 1964, in Papageorgiou, *Ta Krisima Documenta*, volume 1, 306.
26. On the post-1963 crisis see also Sotiris Rizas, *Enosi, Dichotomisi, Anexartisia: oi Enomenes Politeies kai he Vretania stin Anazitisi Lysis gia to Kypriako, 1963-1967* (Enosis, Partition, Independence: United States and Great Britain in Search for a Solution of the Cyprus Question) (Athens: Vivliorama, 2000); Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Manheim and Möhnese: Bibliopolis, 2001).
27. Joseph S. Joseph, "The International Power Broker: A Critical View of the Foreign Policy of Archbishop Makarios," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 3 (1992): 17-33.
28. On post-1974 developments see mostly Joseph S. Joseph "Esoterikes Politikes Exelixeis kai he Europaiki Poreia tis Kyprou, 1974-1998" (Internal political developments and Cyprus's European Course) in *Historia tou Hellenikou Ethnous* (History of the Greek Nation), volume 16, 484-492. On the Cypriot economy see Demetrios Christodoulou, *Inside the Cyprus Miracle: the Labours of an Embattled Mini-economy*, (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 1992).