

American and British Policy towards Cyprus (1968-1974): New Conclusions in Light of New Evidence

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine les développements survenus à Chypre durant la période critique 1968-1974. Il se concentre sur le rôle joué par la Grande Bretagne et les États-Unis dans la formation des événements sur le plan politique, diplomatique et militaire. Une attention spéciale est attribuée à la crise de novembre 1967 et de juillet- août 1974. L'auteur avance que des considérations d'intérêts plus vastes que ceux des deux pays sur l'île et dans la région, plutôt que «la trahison et la conspiration» ont été les facteurs déterminants de leurs positions et actions. La présentation et l'analyse des politiques et événements se fait à la lumière de la documentation qui est devenue disponible récemment suivant la déclassification des documents officiels britanniques et américains.

ABSTRACT

This article deals with developments in Cyprus during the critical period of 1968 to 1974. It focuses on the role played by Britain and the United States in shaping events on the political, diplomatic and military fields. Special attention is paid to the crises of November 1967 and July-August 1974. The author argues that broader interest considerations of the two countries on the island and in the region, rather than 'betrayal and conspiracy' were the determining factors of their positions and actions. The presentation and analysis of policies and events is carried out in the light of evidence that became available only recently following the declassification of official British and American Documents.

Introduction

In 2003 the three 'dinosaurs' of Cypriot politics, Glafkos Clerides, his successor Tassos Papadopoulos and Rauf Denktash, failed to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. In spite of the urge to solve the Cyprus issue (the island's obligations if joining the EU) the old leaders failed to yield to international pressure. Even though the United Nations had taken the lead during the attempt of late 2002-early 2003, with Secretary-General Annan himself presenting the eponymous plan, it had again been Britain, and to an

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even larger extent, the US exerting pressure behind the front row of eager diplomats. However, Cypriots, Greeks and Turks have long ceased to yield to American pressure in pursuing their interests on the island, especially as the Americans and the British have a bad reputation for diplomacy among Cypriots. Bluntly, the US is being blamed for the *de facto* partition of the island since 1974. Embedded in Cypriot history for decades, this view is difficult to revise, even though several recent authors have discovered many inconsistencies as well as illogical arguments in the predominant theories of historians covering the British and American roles in Cyprus during the first half of the 1970s.¹ On the other hand, the recent declassification of many documents at the United States National Archives as well as at the Richard M. Nixon Library calls for more thorough discussion of the topic involving all those researchers with a genuine interest in discovering just how much America and Britain really were involved in Cyprus during that period. These documents will likely also reveal how some obvious diplomatic blunders occurred in 1974.

There may be diverging views within the historiography on the Cyprus conflict; however, most nuances disappear when it comes to the role of the United States in independent Cyprus. Regarding the general US policy towards Cyprus, most people maintain that America had endorsed the partition of the island ever since its independence in 1960, and that US diplomats share among themselves a profound dislike of President and Archbishop Makarios, regarded as a Communist priest who would sooner or later transform Cyprus into a “Cuba of the Mediterranean”. On British policy, not much had been known, as UK policy at the time had been perceived as generally passive and in the shadow of its mighty partner, the leader of NATO and big brother in the so-called British-American special relationship. Concerning the role of the two countries in the 1974 crisis, most people point to conspiracies mainly on the part of the Americans, with the British in tow to a lesser degree. The interesting pattern in this rationale is that the accusations include US conspiracies with Greece for the overthrow of Makarios, as well as US collusion with Turkey in its reaction to the coup.

While comprehensive documentary material is still not available on all issues, one basic contradiction to the accusations listed above appears to be confirmed with the gradual release of the files in American archives. This

contradiction is that all the alleged collusion with the unhappy events (partition plans, assassination attempts on Makarios, General Grivas' return to the island, the Greek coup and two Turkish invasions in 1974) would have implied a destabilization of the island, including the mother countries, Greece and Turkey, as well as the eastern Mediterranean region as a whole. Of course, this destabilization has long been the most profound American concern running like a thread through US diplomacy in Cyprus for the past five decades.

To start this analysis with a set of provocative statements in answer to the accusations evoked above; we argue here that, first, after the US had preferred *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) in return for some compensations to the Turks for years, it started to endorse the independence of the island as long as the Cypriots would not themselves agree to some form of partition. Second, by the end of the 1960s, US fear and hatred of Makarios had been replaced with basic annoyance at his stubbornness, coupled with sincere admiration by many politicians for his political skills and power. In general, after 1968, the US had come to regard Makarios as a nuisance. Nonetheless it also recognized him as powerful and indispensable for stabilization of the country. Third, and more significantly, neither the Americans nor the British regarded General Grivas as a viable alternative to Makarios any longer. Last, regarding both the Greek coup on July 15, 1974, and the two Turkish invasions in July and August, the Americans and the British endorsed none of these actions. Their actions during these events were marked by political failure, a lack of diplomatic means, but also a general lack of concern, rather than conspiracy or collusion. This was especially true for the American side, whose policy ultimately unwillingly encouraged both Greeks and Turks to act as they did. As for the British, the case speaks for basic political weakness at the time in the face of declining influence over the events in the region and diplomatic disagreement with the US.

This analysis will first look at the implications of the crisis of November 1967 on British and American policy, then it will trace these countries' roles during the bicomunal talks between Clerides and Denktash that started in June 1968 and ended with the crisis of 1974. The relations of the Americans with President Makarios and General Grivas will also be discussed. Finally, the events of 1974 will be analyzed, including the American and British roles

in the Greek coup and the Turkish invasions, as well as the crisis in the Anglo-American special relationship resulting from blunders in that crisis.

Early 1968 may be called a landmark in Cypriot history for several reasons. Most importantly, the most dangerous crisis in Cypriot history until then had just been resolved. It began on November 15, 1967, with a massacre near Agios Theodoros subsequent to a quarrel between Greek-Cypriot security forces and Turkish-Cypriot villagers who did not want them to patrol their area. After a credible threat by Turkey to invade Cyprus, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent his personal emissary, Cyrus Vance, on a mission that ended with an agreement which involved the withdrawal of General Grivas together with thousands of illegally infiltrated troops in return for the withdrawal of the Turkish threat. Equally important was the 365-degree turn in the Cypriot policy brought about by the crisis.

Implications of the November 1967 Crisis on British and American Policy towards Cyprus

The Americans managed the November 1967 crisis almost single-handedly, while British diplomacy remained in the background. On the one hand, British policy seemed paralyzed in the face of a massive economic crisis including the devaluation of the pound during the very same week. On the other hand, during those years, the British had rarely been quick to react with significant measures to crises in Cyprus because of a rather odd division of tasks and a lack of cooperation between the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office. Only when the most dangerous moments of the crisis had been over did the British attempt to offer the U.S. a role in the crisis management process. Regarding the follow-up diplomacy to the crisis, though, the British became as active as the Americans.

Although Britain had remained rather passive in its Cyprus diplomacy since 1964, at least it always advocated giving the Cypriots themselves a voice in discussions about the future of their country. This stemmed mostly from the island's membership in the Commonwealth. Yet the US had always brushed these suggestions aside, even during the November 1967 crisis. It was one of the severest mistakes of US policy towards Cyprus during the 1960s to have dealt only with Greece and Turkey, rather than with Cyprus.

After the crisis in late 1967, several changes came about almost simultaneously.

First the government in Cyprus must have been sobered by the Turkish threat and the American difficulty in averting a crisis. It thus signaled attempts for a *détente vis-à-vis* the Turkish-Cypriots. At the same time, the Americans were so disappointed by the lack of a Greek-Turkish agreement at the Evros summit in the early autumn and received Greek signs of military as well as political withdrawal from Cyprus. Their disappointment was such that Washington's diplomats tended to look favourably on bicomunal negotiations, as long as Turkey could somehow still be a guarantor for safeguarding Western interests during the search for a solution. Several months went by before the top level of the Department of State agreed to this. It finally did agree because it was taken by surprise by the fact that not only the UN secretary-general, but also Greece and Turkey asked for bicomunal talks.²

The US was thus, for the first time, willing to engage in mediation for a long-term solution rather than crisis diplomacy. Moreover, again for the first time, the US broke the taboo of bicomunal talks, after having regarded Cyprus as a NATO issue for years. Finally, Washington explicitly endorsed independence as the desired and most realistic basis for a solution for Cyprus.

While an American 'Cyprus Study Group' had brought forward clear recommendations in this sense, the British and Canadians had carried out studies which were then compared in early January 1968. The British study on the "Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute" called for an approach to the problem in three tiers.³ The first tier proposed a general improvement of living conditions on the island, hopefully by March. The second tier would entail bicomunal constitutional talks that could last until the following year. Finally, the third tier would require the three Guarantor Powers: Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to approve the Constitution worked out by the two communities. The Canadian "Draft Working Paper on Possible Next Steps in Cyprus" had much in common with the British study, but was much more detailed and concentrated on bicomunal talks.⁴ The bone of contention between the Canadians, Britons and Americans was the timing of U.S. — or combined U.S., British and Canadian — involvement. The US preferred immediate, direct involvement; the British,

for involvement at the earliest during the bicomunal talks; the Canadians clearly called for the communities to work out their own problems without outside interference.⁵ A compromise was finally struck between the three countries when it was agreed that UN Secretary-General U-Thant should continue his good offices until reaching a deadend.

Roles of the US and UK in the Bicomunal Talks (1968–1974)

Although even the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had endorsed bicomunal talks by their start in June 1968, the US was not at all optimistic as to their success. From the offset, the US went about with supporting the official procedure, but considered planning for a four-sided conference between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The basic question would be when was the best moment for such a conference. In the end, it never happened.

Nevertheless, both the US and UK continued to support bicomunal talks without interfering as to their substance. They were in a dilemma, as best explained by Cyprus Country Director in the US State Department, Robert Folsom. While it was believed that in the face of deadlock American mediation could produce some new impetus, Folsom also recognized that US interference would harden the positions, since each party would believe America was on its side.⁶ For this reason, the Americans, British and Canadians decided through trilateral discussions on Cyprus in mid-November 1968 to not take action until the talks reached a clear dead-end. Furthermore, they determined not to take action until the UN secretary-general would have failed with an initiative on his own.

One of the main problems of the bicomunal talks was that the two interlocutors had the same approach that they would keep until early 2003: No concessions would be made and no intermediate accords signed until a whole package agreement would be reached on all issues. Throughout 1969, concern on behalf of the Americans and the British about a lack of progress increased. It was the crisis around the first assassination attempt on President Makarios that prompted a new push in US planning. In early March 1970, Washington discussed an initiative by their ambassador in Nicosia, called “constitutional compromise proposals.” They called for a compromise

between what the Turkish-Cypriots had gained through the 1960 constitution and what the Greek-Cypriots had gained through the events between 1963 and 1970.

At the time, the US always tried to make their views converge with those of the British in their Cypriot policy. However, the British told them that they would not want to interfere with the talks in any way, not even participate on an informal basis. London preferred to take a stance of so-called “positive non-involvement,” that had been regarded as successful in avoiding crises for the past three years,⁷ and wanted to reserve all potential outside interference to the UN secretary-general. This American initiative thus came to an end even before it had really started.

The Americans and British finally did agree to encourage that Greek-Turkish ideas be passed on to Clerides and Denktash respectively.⁸ With this in mind, it was agreed that from then on the Americans would start to prod Greece to come up with constructive proposals; whereas, the British would work likewise on Turkey. The basic reason for this division of tasks was that the US was the only Western country with fairly normal diplomatic relations with the Greek junta. It could thus apply pressure; whereas, the British would help out with Turkey whose relations to America were somewhat difficult owing to unresolved problems with the sixth fleet in the Turkish ports. These well-intended attempts failed quite soon, however, because the British did not cooperate in practice. In April 1971, the Americans heard that the British had engaged in a unilateral initiative in Turkey without prior consultation. The exact purpose of this initiative remained obscure but consisted of a clear British suggestion to Ankara that the Turkish-Cypriots should be induced to show more flexibility in talks on the island. What was especially odd about the initiative was that in rejecting the US compromise proposals in March, British diplomats had claimed that they would have to retain their clear impartiality with the two Cypriot communities by all means possible. Now they clearly did the opposite. *Perfide Albion?*

That the Americans for once were much more cautious in their approach was demonstrated by their repeated warnings that Greece and Turkey should not only be pressured in providing ideas to the interlocutors, but also that they should by no means attempt to impose an agreed solution on the Cypriots. Any such solution would clearly fail. Revelations from the American archives clearly speak against those who have claimed that the

Americans had applied power politics and had attempted to impose solutions throughout the history of their engagement in Cyprus until 1974. The US had become much more reasonable and more sensitive to Cypriot realities by the 1970s than during the 1960s. In one of the rare Country Policy Statements for Cyprus, produced in June 1971, the US stated "...no Cyprus solution will be viable unless it is acceptable to the Cypriots." It went on to point out: "Failure of all previous efforts to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus problem appears to have stemmed from the fact that the proposals either did not include the Greek and Turkish Cypriots or involved them only in the final stages."⁹ This insight was a big step from the insensitive approaches of the previous decade.

The decision in September 1971 to expand the talks with the inclusion of an advisor from Greece, Turkey and the United Nations was neither an American nor a British initiative. It originated in a bilateral Greek-Turkish agreement. At first the US remained non-committal. It then not only agreed, but also volunteered to apply pressure on the Greek Cypriots to accept, especially because the negotiators of both communities would still have the main say in the talks. The support was in effect an indication of growing US concern about lack of progress in the talks.

It was during the next year, 1972, that London and Washington began to disagree more often about action on Cyprus. In short, a general increase of American concern stood opposite an obvious lack of British concern. In November 1972, the difference in views culminated with silent suspicion on behalf of the US that the British were in effect well-served by the growing tension on the island. A solution to the problems would likely result in a change of the status of their Sovereign Base Areas.¹⁰ This suspicion was repeated well into 1973. It seemed, therefore, that the well-meant Anglo-American cooperation on Cyprus policy existed only for short periods and primarily in theory. However, the increase of rather disturbing events on the island, more in relation to tension within the Greek Cypriot society than between the two communities, was primarily responsible for a general lull in US policy after the spring of 1973. The bicomunal talks remained interrupted for many months until they were resumed in June 1974, shortly before the big crisis that ended the talks altogether. Before looking at that crisis, however, it is necessary to briefly discuss the US and British roles during significant events in Cyprus other than the bicomunal talks.

America, Britain, and their Views of Makarios and Grivas

In an assassination attempt in March 1970, President Makarios's helicopter was shot while taking off from Nicosia. The wounded pilot died shortly after having succeeded in landing the damaged helicopter, but Makarios remained unharmed.¹¹ Regarding the culprits, Clerides in his memoirs came to the conclusion that officers around the influential Greek General, Dimitrios Ioannides, together with supporters of General Grivas and former Interior Minister Georgadjis, were responsible for the attempt. This broadly corresponded with the court rulings in the aftermath of the attempt on Makarios' life.¹²

Nevertheless, the Soviets, though not accusing the Americans directly, seemed to suspect American complicity with the Greek junta in the assassination plan.¹³ Recently declassified documents reveal that the Americans had expected to be accused, as they had known about all the rumours concerning their role in Cyprus. These rumours escalated when one of the main suspects, Georgadjis, was himself assassinated only few days later. However, conspiracy theories by those authors who saw the CIA behind almost everything evil happening on the island have only been supported by the weak evidence that extremist circles in Greece had some good relations with CIA officials.¹⁴ U.S. Ambassador David H. Popper in late March reported from Nicosia:

In the present situation of accusation and counter accusation, there is an almost irresistible temptation for those who wish to absolve the mainland Greeks from any involvement (...), to shift the blame either to the U.K. or to the U.S. While most informed Cypriots do not believe the 'American CIA' attempted to assassinate Makarios and did assassinate Georkadjis, there is a sizeable constituency that either accepts the U.S. devil theory or prefers to have Americans (or British) blamed instead of mainland Greeks.¹⁵

The Americans had changed their attitude towards the archbishop substantially during the previous six years. In their view, Makarios was not the "Castro of the Mediterranean" any-more, as he had been during the early and mid-1960s. The formation of political parties in 1969 confirmed that the Communists, although strong, did not have the clear support of the

Archbishop. Now Makarios was seen as the obstacle to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. However, because of his authority in Cyprus, there seemed to be no way around him in reaching a settlement. Moreover, as a stable and quiet southeastern flank of NATO was the primary American goal in the region, any attempt to remove the Archbishop would clearly have been contrary to U.S. interests. In fact it was believed that it would likely have been followed by civil war including Greek and Turkish involvement. Not surprisingly, documents reveal that American diplomats were rather shocked and concerned by the attempt on Makarios' life.

Evidence that the US was actually trying to protect Makarios was produced by Laurence Stern as early as 1975.¹⁶ In his well-known article "Bitter Lessons" Stern explained how American officials had cautioned Makarios about an assassination attempt twice, at the end of January and in late February 1970. Makarios did not take the threat seriously, but Ambassador David Popper's warning and timing of the attempt proved astonishingly prophetic. Moreover, when a US contingencies and options paper in the wake of the turmoil was being finalized, mid-April 1970, the State Department explicitly included a revealing clause about the continuing danger of a coup: "Should the US government become aware of an assassination plot against Makarios we would want to make every attempt to warn him of the threat."¹⁷

The British were also of the view that President Makarios constituted the best guarantee of stabilization on the island and in the wider area. The only diplomat who seemed to diverge from this view was High Commissioner Edmonds, who was promptly told to get in line with the opinion in London. Charles Wiggin of the Foreign Office's Southern European Department wrote:

In particular I do not share what appears to be his [Edmond's] view that we might be better off if the Archbishop were to disappear from the scene. I do not see how... we could hope for a successor who was both well disposed towards us and capable of maintaining stability in the island.¹⁸

Another rather unfounded as well as illogical accusation is that the US conspired to bring exiled General George Grivas back to Cyprus in autumn 1971 and helped him fund the organization EOKA-B.¹⁹ Instead it turns out that the Americans were concerned about his return for the same reason that

they were concerned about the assassination attempt on Makarios: regional stability was of the necessity and was likely to suffer with this development. The British agreed and were similarly concerned about a possible *coup d'état*. The US Ambassador was thus authorized by the State Department to convey to Makarios that Washington saw Grivas' return as

*potentially disruptive and in that sense unwelcome. Should Grivas move to challenge the authority of the GOC [Government of Cyprus], which we support, we hope he will be promptly contained and removed from Cyprus. In the event of such a challenge, we would be prepared to make this view known to other governments sharing responsibility for the maintenance of stability on the island.*²⁰

Makarios responded that he welcomed this assurance and might be calling Washington on its promise. He did so only few months later upon realizing that he was to be overthrown by the Greek Government in a *coup d'état*, in March 1972. At his request, Ambassador Tasca in Athens warned the Greeks about doing anything of the kind. In not uncertain terms he told them that the US was strongly against any such attempts. Documents on the occasion are still partly classified, but for Clerides the conclusion, as described in his memoirs, was clear: “[...] pressure from the US first, and then from other Governments prevented the coup planned by the military government of Greece for the 15th March 1972.”²¹

While the Americans were not as convinced as the British that the Greek Government was behind the secret return of Grivas, they nevertheless pressured the Greek junta to come out publicly against Grivas' attempt in order to thwart any negotiated settlements. In this context, the US made it clear once more that it remained “opposed to any effort to impose partition and double enosis on Cyprus because it would not solve the Cyprus problem but, rather, place it in a more tragic and chaotic context.”²² The assessment would prove correct in the summer 1974.

The US and the Samson Coup in Cyprus

The change of thinking in U.S. policy towards Cyprus between the 1960s and the early 1970s demonstrates that the question of an American role in

the coup of July 15 1974 is one of whether the US had done all in its power to dissuade the Greek junta from overthrowing Makarios, rather than of whether the US conspired with the colonels.

The dispute between Makarios and the junta peaked in early July when the Archbishop demanded in a letter to the Greek President that all Greek officers serving on the island be withdrawn. By leaking this letter to the media without awaiting a Greek answer, Makarios deliberately let the proud Greek military dictatorship lose face. Nevertheless, as it seems, neither the Archbishop nor the American diplomats in the upper echelons of the State Department believed that the Greek junta would be as unwise as to stage a coup. This misjudgment seems much more probable than either US complicity or even Kissinger's later claim that "the information [regarding an impending coup] was not exactly lying on the street."²³

There had been numerous forewarnings of a coup, of which the US had taken notice. As early as February 1974, the country directors for Cyprus, Greece and Turkey at the State Department pressured for Ambassador Tasca in Athens to issue a warning to the junta that the US would be against any effort to overthrow Makarios. However, Kissinger did not grasp the urgency and strictly instructed the Ambassador that he "make no waves."²⁴ In March, both the Soviets and Cypriots warned the US about an impending coup. Instead of heeding the warning, Kissinger instructed not to follow it, as it would be embarrassing to "go running into the Greeks and the Turks on the basis of a Soviet *démarche*," especially as it could have been that the Soviets had been "put up to it by the Cypriots."²⁵ A third warning came by way of a Greek journalist through Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee J. William Fulbright, in May. However, Kissinger reportedly answered that he could not intervene in Greek internal affairs.²⁶ The fourth warning was the most obvious, arrived at the same time and was handled most inappropriately. On June 20, Greek junta leader Ioannides informed a CIA officer in Athens that he was planning a coup against President Makarios and asked how the United States would react.²⁷ As a consequence, by late June the country directors for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus were finally able to convince their superiors on the seriousness of the situation in Cyprus. Instructions were eventually sent to Ambassador Tasca on June 29.²⁸ However, it was now Tasca who stalled, fiercely arguing that the warnings would alienate the Greek government.²⁹ In the defense of Tasca it must be

said that he had allegedly been kept in the dark about the CIA report of 20 June.³⁰ Also, he had the support of Deputy Chief of Mission Lindsay Grant in Nicosia, who similarly believed that making demarches to the Colonels while the officially declared Greek policy continued to be non-violent would be extremely harmful to U.S.-Greek relations, as it would accuse the Greek regime of duplicitous behavior.³¹ Finally, Tasca and Grant clung to the assessment of the U.S. mission in Nicosia that the earliest logical date for a coup would be upon the rotation of the Greek officers in Cyprus, in September, as an excuse not to act upon the instruction.³² By the time a reworded, eighth version of the instructions reached Athens, Tasca was on leave. In the absence of the ambassador, the political counselor paid visits to the powerless Prime Minister and a Greek Orthodox bishop close to the junta instead of to Ioannides himself.³³

This proves that Kissinger's claims that there was no information about an impending coup and that if there had been any it was not brought to his personal attention are wrong. The question begs to be answered: Why did the Americans not take action? Kissinger's strongest argument against the accusation that he had failed to prevent the coup is that Archbishop Makarios himself had neither asked for American help nor expressed any specific concern during Kissinger's short stopover in Cyprus in May.³⁴ Thus the assurance that Makarios was not concerned, together with trust in the junta's common sense and reluctance to further antagonize the colonels, made every indication contrary to the coup rumors welcome. This maybe explain why the US chose to trust one crucial misleading message by the CIA dated July 12, or three days before the coup, according to which junta leader Ioannides assured a CIA intelligence officer that the Greek government did not intend to overthrow Makarios. The State Department decisionmakers chose to ignore the mountain of evidence in favour of this one message. Not surprisingly, this has given rise to conspiracy theories among Greeks and Greek-Cypriots.³⁵

The problem with most allegations that the CIA had been involved in planning the coup is that they are supported by weak evidence. It does seem odd that Ioannides' confirmation to a CIA officer of planning a coup was not conveyed to the embassy in Athens, contrary to the claim of July 12 that there would be no coup. Nevertheless, if some of the suspicious episodes will be proven correct with the further declassification of archival material, it is

likely that there will be evidence for wrongful, even conspiratorial behavior of some individual US agents, rather than of the CIA as a whole, or even the US Government.

The most obvious evidence against a CIA conspiracy is the record of the intelligence collection effort, which demonstrates that the bulk of the clandestine reports were warning about an impending coup, while only the reporting from the Athens embassy was termed as “weak.”³⁶ Also, Stern provided information about the CIA’s Athens station chief, Stacy B. Hulse, Jr., who was virtually thrown out of Ioannides’ office shortly before July 15, because he had reportedly tried to discourage any thoughts of a coup in Cyprus.³⁷

If it were true that the US had conspired with the junta to overthrow Makarios, Nixon and Kissinger would have needed a good reason for upsetting the fragile balance in the eastern Mediterranean. It would have to be a very good reason to let the Nixon administration embark on a dangerous adventure at the same time as the American presidency was in a deep crisis which threatened to paralyze much of the day-to-day business. In fact, the only substantial reason brought forward by those who have tried to prove an American conspiracy is the dislike of Makarios and an alleged fear of communism in Cyprus.³⁸ As has been demonstrated above, however, the often-heard American portrayal of Makarios as the “Castro of the Mediterranean” belonged to the Johnson rather than the Nixon era.

The most obvious, overall conclusion is that the matter was handled inadequately at the State Department. One explanation for this is that the State Department section concerned with Cyprus was not fully functioning at the time, as the Cyprus, Greece and Turkey desks were transferred on July 1 from the Near East Affairs Bureau (NEA) to the European Affairs Bureau (EUR). The result was that many mid-level officials were confronted with the new topic of Cyprus about which Assistant Secretary Wells Stabler later admitted, “very few of us at that time in EUR had a great deal of knowledge [...]”³⁹

However, answers must be sought about American action during the coup itself. Assistant Secretary Hartman advised Kissinger to attempt a reversal of the coup but without sanctions. Hartman pointed out that “this is our best chance to prevent the Cyprus situation from complicating our evolving

relations with the Soviets and from becoming a cause of strife between Greece and Turkey,”⁴⁰ Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wanted a much harsher reaction, including cutting off all military aid to Greece and withdrawing American nuclear weapons.⁴¹ Secretary Kissinger, however, did not agree with either option. Neither did he want to jeopardize the U.S. air and sea bases in Greece, nor did he want to give up a maximum flexibility until the other countries would be committed.⁴²

What Kissinger did not understand is that such an approach could not work with the allies in the eastern Mediterranean. Both Greece and Turkey had usually looked to their primary arms deliverer and NATO leader America as soon as they had themselves become uncertain as to the path to choose. The maximum flexibility that Kissinger was promoting could be but a non-committal policy that was likely to be exploited by all sides, and sent wrong signals to the parties that were desperately looking for some U.S. guidance. In general, the Kissinger approach signified a policy of procrastination in a fast-moving situation that contained all the dangers of the very escalation that the U.S. had sought to prevent for years.

With this approach Kissinger also fanned the conspiracy theories because included in the flexibility approach was the question of whether the new government in Cyprus should be recognized or whether Makarios was still regarded as the president. It is worth pointing out that allegations about US officials dealing diplomatically with coupists, which would have been just about proof for recognition of the new government, do not seem to be true. Only in one case did a US official in Nicosia meet with the new “Foreign Minister”, but he pointed out very clearly in his talk with him that they were meeting on a private basis, as the Washington still regarded the Makarios government as the legitimate one. Moreover, allegations that the US only welcomed Makarios to the White House after the coup as Archbishop rather than President are clearly wrong. Kissinger announced shortly before the visit that he was receiving Makarios in his presidential and not his episcopal capacity.⁴³ Therefore, despite all the attempts by critics to accuse the US of preferring the new strongman Nikos Sampson rather than Makarios, the evidence points to the fact that the US did neither more nor less, than stay non-committal. Evidence for this non-committal stance can be found in a joint US State Department strategy paper of July 18 that Kissinger signed himself:

We view as unlikely the restoration of Makarios and we do not accept a Sampson regime. Consequently, the situation in favor of either one or the other should not be allowed to freeze, thus creating the conditions for the development of a compromise and negotiated settlement which would permit the maintenance of constitutional arrangements in Cyprus [...].⁴⁴

At least, albeit vaguely defined and evasive, Kissinger's policy was consistent in its overall aims. From the day of the coup the U.S. policy aimed to avoid internationalization of the conflict. However, this internationalization of the crisis could not be prevented.

The US and Britain in the Face of the Turkish Invasions

The newly established Cyprus Task Force in Washington estimated on July 17 that Turkey was likely to intervene unilaterally in Cyprus within the next two days.⁴⁵ In addition, the Task Force did not believe that Turkey would consult with the United States before undertaking military action.⁴⁶ The damage of U.S. pressure on Turkey during the crisis of June 1964 had been too severe and the Vance mission of 1967 had been too harshly criticized by the political opposition in Turkey that was now in power.

The Cyprus Task Force suggested that superiors at the State Department proceed with a "constitutional strategy," a middle course that would involve pressing Greece to accept restoration of a legitimate government in Cyprus without unnecessarily alienating her and to convince Turkey that enough was being done to make military intervention unnecessary.⁴⁷ In spite of the vagueness of this proposed course, Kissinger once again chose to proceed on his undefined path of inaction. The Secretary later presented two major justifications for this. First, "nothing could have stopped a Turkish intervention," he later told his staff. After all, they had been prevented from intervening in 1964 and 1967. In 1974 they "were given, through stupidity of the Greek Junta, a godsend," especially because they did not attack a legitimate government in Cyprus, but "a man who was internationally considered a professional thug"⁴⁸ and who was known for his brutal action against Turkish Cypriots in December 1963. As Rauf Denktaş was reported to have pointedly remarked to the press, Sampson was as unacceptable to the

Turkish Cypriots as Adolf Hitler would have been to Israel.⁴⁹ Second, Kissinger wrote, in 1974, “on the verge of either impeachment or resignation, Nixon was in a very weak position either to threaten or to cajole” with a personal intervention, contrary to Johnson’s strong positions in 1964 and 1967.⁵⁰ Both attempts at justification demonstrate that the US was not even seriously willing to try to stop a Turkish invasion. The fear prevailed that the risks of failure were greater than the chances of success, and that in the case of failure the damage to U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey would be too big. This was the primary reason why the U.S. action to prevent a Turkish invasion and an internationalization of the conflict remained rather low-key from the first day of the coup.

Meanwhile, the status of Guarantor Power re-involved the British Government into the Cyprus problem for the first time since the 1960s. Ever since the Government of Prime Minister Douglas-Home had conveyed to the Americans the message that the British could no longer cover their political duties in Cyprus, in late January 1964, the United States had taken the lead in guarding the Western interests in the region, and in reminding Greece and Turkey from time to time that their bilateral problems over Cyprus were negligible, contrary to the larger picture of the Cold War.

Kissinger leaves no doubt in his memoirs that the British-American cooperation in the Cyprus crisis, although it would have been more important than ever before, did have drawbacks right from the beginning.⁵¹ First of all, Prime Minister James Callaghan, by definition of the British status, took over the leading role in what was his first exposure to foreign crisis diplomacy. In general, Kissinger rather arrogantly belittles Callaghan’s stature in foreign policy, owing to the latter’s preoccupation with predominantly domestic affairs prior to 1974.⁵² Secondly, the Labour policy’s strong anti-Greek junta stance clashed with Kissinger’s wavering policy. Not only did Britain evacuate Makarios from the island shortly after his surprising survival of the coup, but it also told Greece to recall her officers attached to the Cyprus National Guard.⁵³ Finally, the U.S. regarded the crisis within the NATO context, whereas the UK was primarily concerned about the invasion of a Commonwealth member. The US approach thus made it less willing to antagonize either the Greek Colonels or the Turks. Callaghan himself, as he remembered in his memoirs, felt fewer inhibitions.⁵⁴

Prime Minister Ecevit arrived in London for consultations with the British on July 17. There he confronted Britain with a request to allow Turkey to use the British bases for a military intervention to restore constitutional government. Moreover, Turkish access to the sea and the return of Makarios were repeated as further objectives. The British refused a Turkish use of their bases, however, because, as Callaghan later stated, the island needed fewer Greek troops, not more Turkish troops, and the British had already called on the Greek Government to withdraw their officers.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, to be fair, it was not Britain's refusal to cooperate with Turkey that led to the failure of the consultation, but rather the Greek Colonels' continuing refusal to comply with the British urgings, as they still regarded a Turkish invasion as unlikely.

Secretary Kissinger, meanwhile, sent his Under Secretary Joseph Sisco to London, Athens and Ankara. He was instructed to try to work out a compromise proposal that would elevate Clerides to acting president for a period of six months. After this time, an election would be held in which Makarios would be free to run. In the interval, a new communal arrangement would be negotiated between the Greek and Turkish sides. One of the basic advantages of this compromise, Kissinger believed, was that the Turkish side would not have to deal with the stubborn archbishop in the communal talks.⁵⁶ Sisco's team was convinced that Kissinger's plan would not work, as one of the members, Dillon, later recalled. However, they were unable to convince the Secretary and eventually left for Ankara rather unenthusiastically.⁵⁷

Also, it was soon obvious that Turkey was increasingly enjoying a stronger position that would let them demand a much better deal than the one proposed by the Americans. "Up to now we have tried this your way," Ecevit told Sisco, "so please let us for once try it our way."⁵⁸ In response, the Secretary sent a strong, though somehow belated, last-minute telegram to Sisco to urge him to impress on Ecevit that "the US would take the gravest view of Turkish military moves before all diplomatic processes are exhausted."⁵⁹ However, Sisco was not able to dissuade Ecevit from a decision already taken, to initiate military operations in Cyprus.⁶⁰

The Greek junta had not even attempted to intervene from Greece, because of military difficulties.⁶¹ Owing to the Greek absence and the fast Turkish advance, the conquest of northern Cyprus was only halted,

therefore, when the US issued what even Kissinger called an ultimatum: if a cease-fire was not agreed to within twelve hours, the United States would remove all of its nuclear weapons from both sides of the Greek-Turkish border in Thrace.⁶² Moreover, together with Britain and France the U.S. demanded that a cease-fite be followed immediately by a meeting under British auspices between the Foreign Ministers of the three Guarantor Powers.⁶³ Both Athens and Ankara agreed only reluctantly.

With the junta in Athens and its puppet regime in Nicosia crumbling in quick succession on July 23, Washington could finally leave behind its ambiguous policy of “maximum flexibility” and quickly recognize the new government of Constantinos Karamanlis and the interim government of Glafkos Clerides.⁶⁴

A crisis in the British-American “special relationship”

Callaghan and Kissinger sought to save the Geneva conference that had quickly been organized after the Greek coup and to prevent a second Turkish military move, the former by chairing the conference and the latter from the sidelines and through his emissary Arthur Hartman. The Secretary later recalled that Nixon’s resignation prevented a significant US role in Callaghan’s efforts.⁶⁵ However, this is an insufficient excuse. Once again The US had badly underestimated the seriousness of the crisis and danger of further strife. As the Secretary later had to admit, the State Department’s Cyprus Task Force was already dissolved after the first ceasefire, because the U.S. again thought that the crisis was on its way to being defused.⁶⁶ The U.S. was rather alone in this belief, as all other parties to the conflict prepared for the final showdown. This difference in assessment led to a serious dispute between Britain and the U.S., over the policy towards the island in its most challenging time, and evoked fears of a situation reminiscent of the Suez imbroglio of 1956.

When the Turkish forces broke the ceasefire at the end of July and UN forces were in danger of being attacked, the British sent some reinforcements to be placed under UN command. This, in Callaghan’s view, halted the Turkish moves.⁶⁷ Furthermore, he informed the British press that some Phantom aircraft would be sent to the island, and dropped a heavy hint that British troops would be authorized to fire on Turks to stop any breach of the ceasefire.⁶⁸

The Americans, however, had a different opinion about the situation in Cyprus. Hartman argued that there was no longer an odious regime in Athens, no illegal regime in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots were protected, and there was a strong UN resolution. These were rational arguments that should appeal to Turkish intelligence and restrain them from action, Hartman argued.⁶⁹ Kissinger states in his memoirs — wrongly it seems — that Callaghan agreed with him that a second Turkish move was not likely.⁷⁰ This is all the more surprising, as a CIA assessment of 27 July had clearly indicated that the original Turkish invasion plan had provided for a five-day assault. The ceasefire of 22 July had stopped the Turkish advance after three days of fighting, and had prevented the Turkish forces from extending their bridgehead to the city of Famagusta. Also, later reports confirmed that the ceasefire had left Turkish military leaders restive and eager to complete the operation.⁷¹ Nevertheless, Hartman was instructed to tell Callaghan that the United States was not happy with the British approach. To President Ford, Kissinger complained that the British were “threatening military action against the Turks which is one of the stupidest things I have heard.”⁷² The Secretary preferred to trust his former Harvard student, Prime Minister Ecevit. He had spoken to him on the telephone, urging him to refrain from military action and making it clear that Turkey would get no support from the U.S., if they made any further advance. As a result, the Secretary claimed he had received assurances from the Turkish premier on this score with which he was content.

The fate of Cyprus was sealed. The UN forces were ready to withdraw if the Turks advanced, while the United States was not prepared to put military pressure on the Turks.⁷³ Clerides later recalled that Callaghan pointed out to him that the United Kingdom was no longer a superpower, that it could not afford another Suez, and that any strong-arm action could not be contemplated by the United Kingdom, except if in the context of the UN or of an American initiative.⁷⁴ Kissinger later tried to take the sting out of Callaghan’s criticism by pointing at the U.S. domestic weakness, thus trying to conceal his misjudgment of Turkish intentions. “The presidential transition constrained our options [...],” he later wrote.⁷⁵ Hartman was therefore instructed to tell Callaghan that “it is out of the question to be asking a president in the first 48 hours of his administration to consider supporting military action.”⁷⁶ If the U.S. domestic situation had indeed been the main constraint on military support, as Kissinger tried to point out, it

would not have explained his remark to President Ford that threatening military action against the Turks was “one of the stupidest things I have heard.”⁷⁷

Finally, Turkey issued an ultimatum that could in no way be accepted by Greeks or Greek Cypriots, and on August 14 Turkey cut the Gordian knot by seizing the territory it had been demanding. The disappointed Callaghan allegedly wrote Kissinger an angry letter accusing the Americans of “disgraceful and duplicitous behavior,” as the author John Dickie claims to know.⁷⁸

The Turkish action lasted two further days. The CIA report that Turkey’s plan called for a five-day offensive to reach her goal had been accurate after all. By August 16, Turkey occupied the approximately 37 percent of the territory that it occupies to this day. It was the execution of a plan that had existed at least since 1964, as documents of the time prove.⁷⁹ Once again Greece did not even attempt to intervene, as its army was hopelessly outnumbered by the Turkish military.⁸⁰

Conclusion: Conspiracy or Failure?

It can be concluded that the United States could not have stopped Turkey, as long as it was not prepared to alienate her even more than in 1964 and 1967. This was all the more so, since relations had already been burdened with the issue of poppy plantations in Turkey and the threat of Congress to suspend all aid because of it. Finally, as the Soviet Union had obviously signaled to Ankara non-opposition to a Turkish intervention, Kissinger had no more leverage to convince Ecevit of a potential Soviet war on Turkey, as Johnson did in June 1964. This was apart from the fact that in 1974 such a threat would have been too risky, given the strategic situation in the region. Nevertheless, Kissinger’s reported remark that “Callaghan’s handling of the peace talks showed the dangers of letting ‘boy scouts handle negotiations’” is not appropriate.⁸¹ If anything could have stopped the Turks, it would have been the threat, or even limited implementation, of joint British-American military action.

The events of 1974 were really more a consequence of the complicated situations and opportunities in the area, rather than of United States betrayal

or conspiracy. It is probable that once the events had been triggered with the Greek coup, all the U.S. could do was to contain the conflict and keep the overall U.S. interests in mind. This meant that while the U.S. had to ultimately satisfy Greece and Turkey, the consequences for the Cypriots themselves were not relevant to the United States. Nevertheless, accusations that Washington “did nothing to prevent either the coup or the invasion” seem unfair.⁸² The U.S. simply did too little, too late. What can be criticized, therefore, is foremost Kissinger’s way of making politics according to the realist school that Professor Theodore Coulombis described as “a synthesis of considerations of power, prudence, pragmatism, amorality, and a great concern with the minimization of misfortune rather than the maximization of happiness.”⁸³ This accurate description of the Secretary’s approach to foreign policy was most vividly felt by the Cypriots, who fully had to bear the misfortune. They were simply left out of the American equation.

Kissinger’s policy of *realpolitik* and maintenance or establishment of power balances indeed made it impossible to influence Greek or Turkish policy, because the US above all wanted to prevent a Greek-Turkish war. Both countries are NATO allies and a war between them would have disrupted NATO’s southeastern flank. However, Kissinger’s assessment that American policy was successful because it prevented the Greek-Turkish war and Soviet intrusion is a misleading attempt to gloss over the US failure in Cyprus. After all, contrary to the long-term results, the flank was seriously disrupted in the short and mid-term, even though both countries remained NATO allies. Greece temporarily withdrew from the military structure of NATO and Turkey closed all American military installations except one air base, thus imperiling US security interests, after the American Congress had imposed an arms embargo to punish Ankara for its Cyprus adventure. Thus the disruption of NATO’s southeastern flank that the US had always vowed to prevent came close to reality.

As for the British, the House of Commons Select Committee in 1975 concluded: “Britain had a legal right, a moral obligation and the military capacity to intervene in Cyprus during July and August 1974.”⁸⁴ The report was accepted with a four to one majority, the dissenter being the former Deputy Governor of Cyprus, Sir George Sinclair, who questioned whether British forces would have succeeded to overthrow the Sampson regime. He feared that “an armed intervention by Britain, which revived memories of

the conflict with EOKA in the 1950s might well have had the effect of swinging Greek Cypriot opinion behind rather than against Sampson.”⁸⁵ Keith Kyle in his recent article in the *Cyprus Review* concludes that the British would have had to gamble, had they wanted to intervene on their own or together with the Turkish.⁸⁶ They would have had to take into account – on the one hand – the rather doubtful Turkish request to reinstall the Makarios government, shortly after the coup, which in reality seemed an attempt to prepare the legal ground for an armed intervention. On the other hand they would have had to consider the risks of more civil strife. They finally decided that they were in the first place responsible towards the British citizens living on the island in addition to the large amount of British tourists, who were surprised about the unfolding events as much as the British and American diplomats later claimed they were.

NOTES

1. See e.g. Slengesol, I. (2000) ‘A Bad Show? The United States and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis’, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.2, pp.96–129.
2. Belcher, T.G. Embassy telegram (Embtel) Nicosia 1294, 9 February 1968: State Department Subject-Numeric File (SDSNF), 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2026, National Archives, College Park, MD (NARA). Hart, P.T. Embtel Ankara 3742, 9 February 1968: *ibid.*; Talbot, P. Embtel Athens 3507, 9 February 1968: *ibid.* For a more thorough assessment of the episode consult: Nicolet, C. (2001) *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954–1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*. Mannheim and Möhnese, Bibliopolis, pp.385–387.
3. The following is based on the British ‘Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute’, version of 19 January 1968, attached to: Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) between delegations of the U.S. and the U.K.: ‘Notes on Cyprus Discussions with the British’, 17 January 1968: SDSNF, 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2026, NARA.
4. See the Canadian ‘Draft Working Paper on Possible Next Steps in Cyprus’, 18 January 1968, attached to: Memcon between delegations of U.S., the U.K. and Canada: ‘Notes on Cyprus Discussions with British and Canadians’, 18 January 1968: SDSNF, 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2026, NARA.

5. Memcon between delegations of U.S., the U.K. and Canada: 'Notes on Cyprus Discussions with British and Canadians', 18 January 1968: SDSNF, 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2026, NARA, p.1.
6. Folsom, R.S. to Battle, L.D. Memorandum: 'Assuring a Cyprus Settlement', 15 April 1968: SDSNF, 1967–69, POL 27 CYP, box 2027, NARA, p.1.
7. See Discussion between Folsom, R.S. and Rogers, W.P. Department of State telegram (Deptel) 54592 to Nicosia, 14 April 1970: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 15-5 CYP, box 2225, NARA.
8. Irwin, Deptel 192102 to Athens, 24 November 1970: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2226, NARA.
9. Memorandum: Country Policy Statement: Cyprus, 10 June 1971: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA.
10. Evidence for this suspicion can be found in: Deptel 200422 to London and Nicosia, 3 November 1972: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2229, NARA; Popper, D.H. Embtel Nicosia 2040, 4 November 1972: *ibid.*; Sohm, Embtel London 10700, 7 November 1972: *ibid.*
11. See Clerides, G. (1989) *Cyprus: My Deposition*. Vol.II. Nicosia, Alithia, pp.361–369.
12. *Ibid.*, 366–369. Coufoudakis came to a similar conclusion: Coufoudakis, V. (1976) 'U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* Vol.5, No.3, p.257. On the domestic turmoil in Cyprus during 1970, see also: Crawshaw, N. (1971) 'Subversion in Cyprus', *The World Today* Vol.27, No.1, pp.25–32.
13. See the report on Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin's call on U.S. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson on 18 March: Memorandum for the President: 'Evening Report', 18 March 1970: Lot 74D164, Entry 5049, President's Evening Reading Reports, 1964–1974, box 3, NARA, p.1.
14. See e.g. Kadritzke, N. and Wagner, W. (1976) *Im Fadenkreuz der NATO: Ermittlungen am Beispiel Cypern*. Berlin, Rotbuch Verlag, pp.66–68.
15. Popper, Embtel Nicosia 488, 31 March 1970: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2226, NARA.

16. The following is based on Stern, L. (1975) 'Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus', *Foreign Policy* No.19, pp.44–45.
17. Rogers, Deptel 56130 to Nicosia, 15 April 1970: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 1–1 CYPRUS, box 2231, NARA.
18. As quoted by: Zahariades, T. 'Secret Foreign Office Papers Release Under 30-Year Rule', *The Cyprus Weekly*, 4 January 2002.
19. Among others, Van Coufoudakis (1977) implies this in 'U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A case Study in Cold War Diplomacy' in Attalides, M.A. (ed.) *Cyprus Reviewed*. Nicosia, Tryfonos, p.126. See also: Kadritzke and Wagner. *Im Fadenkreuz der NATO*, p.72.
20. Crawford, W.R. Embtel Nicosia 1837, 9 October 1971: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA, p.2–3.
21. Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, III, p.140.
22. Irwin, Deptel 214164 to Athens and Nicosia, 25 November 1971: SDSNF, 1970–73, POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA, p.3.
23. Kissinger in an informal news conference at the Department of State, 22 July 1974: *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 August 1974, p.261.
24. Stern, 'Bitter Lessons', p.48.
25. Kissinger, quoted in: 'Secretary's Staff Meeting', 22 March 1974: Lot 78D443, Entry 5177, Office of the Secretary of State: Transcripts of Secretary of State H. Kissinger's Staff Meetings 1973–1977, box 3, NARA, pp.34–35.
26. The journalist Demetracopoulos in an interview with Slengesol, in *id.*, 'A Bad Show?', p.102. See also: Hitchens, C. (1997) *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*. London, Verso, pp.88–89.
27. Attalides, M.A. (1979) *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*. Edinburgh and New York, Q Press and St. Martin's Press, p.163.
28. Hartman, A. to Kissinger, Action Memorandum: 'Greek Army Coup on Cyprus', 15 July 1974: Lot 75D146, Entry 5037, Records of the Executive Secretariat – Briefing Books, 1958–76: Cyprus, 17 July, 1974, box 206, NARA, p.2; Boyatt, T.D. (2000) 'Advocacy and Dissent within the System', Speech held at the

- Foreign Service Institute, 30 September 1992, in Bentley, M. and Warner, M. (eds.), *Frontline Diplomacy: The U.S. Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection*. CD-Rom. Arlington, VA, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. The instruction to Tasca is: Sisco, J.J. Deptel 141500 to Athens, 29 June 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, Richard M. Nixon (RMN) Presidential Materials Staff.
29. See Tasca, Embtel Athens 3936, 24 June 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, RMN Presidential Materials Staff, pp.3-4.
30. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.167.
31. Tasca, Embtel Athens 3936, 24 June 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, RMN Presidential Materials Staff, pp.3-4; Grant, J.P. Embtel Nicosia 1224, 27 June 1974: NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, box 592, RMN Presidential Materials Staff.
32. Tasca, Embtel Athens 4179, 1 July 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, RMN Presidential Materials Staff.
33. Boyatt, 'Advocacy and Dissent within the System'. See also: Oral History interview, Dillon, R.S. interview by Kennedy, C.S. 17 May 1990, in Bentley and Warner (eds.), *Frontline Diplomacy*.
34. Kissinger, H.A. (1999) *Years of Renewal*. New York, Simon & Schuster, p.203.
35. See e.g. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, pp.167-174.
36. Intelligence Community Staff to the Director of CIA, Memorandum: 'Post Mortem Report: An examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance before and during the Cyprus Crisis of 1974', January 1975, in *The Declassified Documents Reference System: including the declassified documents retrospective collection and the annual collection 1975*. Arlington, VA, Carrollton Press, 1977, Microform, doc.1978 8B, p.4.
37. Stern, 'Bitter Lessons', pp.50-51.
38. See e.g., Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, p.168.
39. Oral History interview, Stabler, W., interview by Kennedy, C.S. 1991, in Bentley and Warner (eds.), *Frontline Diplomacy*.

40. Hartman to Kissinger, Action Memorandum: 'Greek Army Coup on Cyprus', 15 July 1974: Lot 75D146, Entry 5037, Records of the Executive Secretariat – Briefing Books, 1958–76: Cyprus, 17 July, 1974, box 206, NARA.
41. Slengesol, 'A Bad Show?' pp.114–115.
42. Kissinger, 'Cyprus Critique', Secretary's Conference Room, 5 August 1974: Lot 78D443, Entry 5177, Office of the Secretary of State: Transcripts of Secretary of State H. Kissinger's Staff Meetings 1973–1977: Cyprus Critique 8/5/74, box 4, NARA, pp.6–8.
43. Hitchens, C. Extract of *The Trial of Henry Kissinger in: Guardian*, 26 February 2001.
44. Ingersoll, Deptel 156312 to Nicosia Niact, 18 July 1974: NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, box 592, RMN Presidential Materials Staff, p.3.
45. Kissinger had told the French Ambassador in Washington, on 15 July, that "Turkey would not move in the present circumstances unless enosis should be proclaimed:" Kissinger, Deptel 152972 to Ankara, 16 July 1974: Lot 75D146, Entry 5037, Records of the Executive Secretariat – Briefing Books, 1958–76: Cyprus, 17 July 1974, box 206, NARA; Cyprus Task Force to Sisco, Memorandum: 'Cyprus Analysis and Alternative Strategies', 17 July 1974: *ibid.*, p.4.
46. Cyprus Task Force to Sisco, Memorandum: 'Cyprus Analysis and Alternative Strategies', 17 July 1974: *ibid.*, p.4.
47. *Ibid.*, p.6.
48. Kissinger, 'Cyprus Critique', Secretary's Conference Room, 5 August 1974: Lot 78D443, Entry 5177, Office of the Secretary of State: Transcripts of Secretary of State H. Kissinger's Staff Meetings 1973–1977: Cyprus Critique 8/5/74, box 4, NARA, p.19.
49. According to Piller, U. (1997) *Zypern, die ungelöste Krise*. Politische Studien 5. Pfaffenweiler, Centaurus, p.61.
50. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.208.
51. *Ibid.*, p.209.
52. *Ibid.*

53. Kyla, K. (2002) 'British Policy on Cyprus 1974-2002', *The Cyprus Review* Vol.14, No.1, p.103.
54. Callaghan, J. (1987) *Time and Chance*. London, Collins, p.339.
55. *Ibid.*
56. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.216.
57. Oral History interview, Dillon, R.S.
58. Sisco, Embtel Athens 4742, 21 July 1974: NSC Files, Countries, Middle East, Greece, box 595, RMN Presidential Materials Staff, part V, 1.
59. *Ibid.*
60. According to Martin Lagasse, Soviet satellites had in the meantime monitored the Turkish military preparations. Obviously the Soviet Union did not mind a Turkish invasion, as they did not react to their intelligence information: Martin Lagasse, referred to in Richter, H.A. (1997) 'Historische Hintergründe des Zypernkonflikts', *Thetis: Mannheimer Beiträge zur Klassischen Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns* No.4 p.315.
61. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.222. The episode has also been told by Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, pp.345–346; Stoessinger, J.G. (1976) *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power*. New York, W. W. Norton, p.142.
62. Kissinger claims in his memoirs that this ultimatum was issued together with the British and French Foreign Ministers: Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.222; Callaghan in his autobiography contradicts him and recalls having been told by Kissinger over the telephone that he had issued this message to Ecevit by himself: Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p.345.
63. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.222.
64. Anderson, R. Statement to the press, 24 July 1974: *Department of State Bulletin*, 12 August 1974, p.267; Note, 24 July 1974: White House Press Releases, RMN Presidential Materials Staff. On the end of the Greek junta, see: Woodhouse, C.M. (1985) *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*. New York, Franklin Watts, pp.156–163.
65. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.227.

66. *Ibid.*, p.226.

67. Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p.347.

68. *Ibid.*, p.351; Dickie, J. (1994) '*Special*' *No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p.156.

69. As told in Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p.347.

70. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.227.

71. Research Project No. 1099: 'United States Diplomacy in the Cyprus Crisis of July 15 August 22, 1974: A Narrative Account', February 1975: Lot Files, Entry 5007, Executive Secretariat, Historical Office Research Projects, 1969–74, box 8, NARA, p.9.

72. Kissinger to Ford, Telcon, 10 August 1974: *Declassified Documents*, doc.1998 1975, p.2.

73. Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p.354.

74. Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, IV, pp.48–49.

75 Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.228.

76 *Ibid.*

77. Kissinger to President Gerald R. Ford, Telcon, 10 August 1974: *Declassified Documents*, doc.1998 1975, p.2, (see above).

78. Dickie, '*Special*' *No More*, p.158.

79. Turkish Prime Minister İnönü was reported to have proposed the cession of roughly 38 percent of the island to the Turkish Cypriots during the London Conference of January 1964: Hart, P.T. (1990) *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War; Cyprus: A Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965–1968*. Duke Press Policy Studies. Durham, NC, and London, Duke University Press, 1990, pp.19–20. In the autumn of 1964, the Turkish Government told UN mediator Galo Plaza that the Turkish community needed to receive 38 percent of the land to correspond to their percentage of land ownership. This demand was later significantly reduced: Memcon between a delegation of the U.S. Department of State and Galo Plaza: 'Cyprus', 9 November 1964: SDSNF, 1964–66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2089, NARA, p.4.

80. Some extracts from the minutes of Prime Minister Karamanlis' meetings with the Chiefs of the Armed Forces are printed in: Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, IV, pp.81–83.
81. Quoted, unfortunately without reference to the source, in Panteli, S. (1984) *A New History of Cyprus: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*. London and Den Haag, East-West Publications, p.391.
82. Quotation by Joseph, J.S. (1985) *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern*. American University Studies, Series X; Political Science 6. New York, Peter Lang, p.148.
83. Couloumbis, T.A. (1983) *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*. New York, Praeger, p.83.
84. Quoted in: Kyle, 'British Policy on Cyprus 1974–2002', p.102.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Ibid.*, p.103.