The Imprint of Dumbarton Oaks' on Cyprus

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RÉSUMÉ

Les Etats-Unis ont dominé les structures de prise de décision des Nations unies depuis la conférence de Dumbarron Oak en 1944 pendant longtemps. L'insistance de la République de Chypre pour internationaliser la question chypriote via les Nations unies avait un sens, du point de vue des intérêts des Chypriotes grecs, mais seulement durant une très brève période de la Guerre froide. L'emphase mise par le côté grec sur le facteur de l'UE dans les années 1990 a été un mouvement intelligent, mais une analyse stratégique plus poussée est nécessaire pour appréhender les nouveaux rapports de force de la vaste région du Moyen Orient de nature à influencer toute tentative de solution du problème Chypriote.

ABSTRACT

The US has dominared UN decisionmaking structures throughout most of the period following the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944. The insistence of the Republic of Cyprus to internationalise the problem through the UN made sense, from the point of view of Greek Cypriot interests, only during a very small period of the Cold War. The focus of the Greek side on the EU factor in the 1990s has thus been sensible, but furrher straregic analysis is required to ascertain how new contingencies in the greater Middle East will impact upon any solution framework.

Introduction

Historically, the Cyprus issue has been the result of incomplete national revolutions in the former Ottoman space; i.e., the Balkans and greater Middle East. Politically, the issue stems from constant and continuous interplay between agents who are both endogenous (ethnic/religious) and exogenous (Britain, US, UN, EU, Turkey, Greece). In this political and structural interposition of endogenous/exogenous factors the determining force has always remained external to Cyprus.

This article offers an interpretation of the evolution of the Cyprus issue within the context of international politics and the United Nations. Its main

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focus is the post-Cold War period, although substantial background information will be given. Also considered are the Cold War settings in relation to the Eastern Mediterranean and the greater Middle East. The article seeks primarily to explain why UN policy, at least since 1990, has been shifting its solution framework from the concept of an independent bi-zonal/bi-communal federal republic to a 'constitutional engineering', politically equalising the two communities on the island.

I will begin my narrative by shedding some light on the evolution of the UN in post-war history and the role of the US in it. In this context, I will examine briefly some fundamental conceptions of US policy makers, basically that of Dean Acheson, Franklin Roosevelt and George Kennan. I will argue that the UN was and is as American in conception and construction as Dumbarton Oaks in Georgetown itself.[1] Then I will look at some specific political and strategic conjunctures that underpinned certain Security Council resolutions in favour of the Republic of Cyprus during the period of 1960-75. Following this, I focus mainly on the 1980s and 1990s and the impact of the end of the Cold War upon the divided Republic. The central argument is that the collapse of the Soviet Union and retreat of Arab nationalism took away any effective power from the UN, thus reducing it to a mere appendage of the US. The UN was keen to legitimise an American projection of power onto strategic geo-political zones in Eurasia and elsewhere. The subsequent impact has seriously affected the framework for a solution to the Cyprus issue in that it deprived the Greek Cypriot side from strong counter-balancing forces within the UN Security Council. Although such counter-balancing forces have been sought among EU powers, such as France and Germany, the fact remains that the EU has far less power *vis-à-vis* the US than the combined force of USSR/Arab nationalism used to have during the Cold War. All in all, however, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, as well as so many other states subject to US engineering and manipulation through the UN and NATO do not seem to be able to remove the imprint of Dumbarton Oaks.

From UN to NATO

During any of America's wars, its policy-makers have always been at pains as to what to do when it is all over. Although the generic strategic intent was the same; in other words, assuring hegemony over the enemy-states as well

as the friends, the means to achieve this intent have always differed. Before and after Yalta, there had been three main powerful conceptions put forward by prominent US strategists regarding how their country could rule over the Western capitalist world and defeated enemy-states. Having guaranteed the support of their business classes for an unprecedented expansion, thus abandoning the partial isolationism of the inter-war period, Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson had kicked off a unique debate inside the Administration: how to rule over the new world order.[2]

As we know, Roosevelt's ambitious plan for post-war US supremacy was centred on a new international organisation, the United Nations.[3] Contrary to the defunct League of Nations, the UN would have to be governed by an all-powerful Directorate, the Security Council, in which the US would dominate. US-led hegemonic policies could thus be enforced through robust 'peacekeeping' upon all recalcitrant UN members. The 'real peacekeeping', as envisaged by Roosevelt, was in fact an American projection of power through the UN in order to promote and establish US national interest wherever and whenever it was under threat. Let us remember that China had not yet become Mao's republic, and Roosevelt's grand design was to include in that Directorate the demoralised regime of Chiang Kai-Shek, alongside Britain and the USSR. In that way, it was thought, Stalin could be isolated and defeated.

George F. Kennan presented an alternative scheme to Roosevelt's UN-based conception. He was convinced that the Soviet system was basically weak and that America could weaken it further and thus defeat it. This defeat would come not through the UN but through strenghtened forces surrounding the Soviet Union; i.e., first and foremost, Europe and Japan. By off-shore balancing from each end of Eurasia, Kennan and his team thought that the USSR will eventually bend. In response to objections over the options the US would have once a strong federal Europe would choose to go with the Soviets sometime in the future, Kennan replied that 'off-shore balancing' meant also utilising Britain against the consolidation of a French-German-Soviet axis.[4]

However, Dean Acheson had also come up with a different and equally powerful set of ideas. For Acheson, neither the UN nor off-shore balancing alone could guarantee an enduring establishment of US primacy in the capitalist world. Although he did never exclude them from operating when

and where useful and successful as legitimising, or promoting US policy and interests, Acheson argued that American primacy can basically be consolidated and achieved through envisaging mechanisms of *direct* control of the polities of all of the states that interest America. The notion of consolidating US hegemonic presence within the capitalist state apparatuses themselves, as well as within the oil-rich Arab Republics wherever possible, has characterised US foreign, security and defence policy from at least the Truman Doctrine (1947) to the present day. In other words, Acheson's grand design had prevailed over, without abolishing or undoing Kennan's and Roosevelt's ones.

Admittedly, the victory of Mao in China, as well as the opposition of Churchill to Roosevelt's UN schemes, had given an additional boost to Acheson's ideas.[5] Particularly powerful was his ideational concept of 'the free world' against 'oppressive communist dictatorships'. This proved an operational and functional scheme that successfully defended US liberal interests in the West, lasting at least until the fall of the Berlin Wall. The paternity of this ideational scheme belongs to Nelson Rockefeller, co-ordinator of inter-American affairs in the Administration since 1940. His main assigned task was 'to lessen the dependence of Latin America upon Europe as a market for raw materials and a source of manufactured articles, not least by acquiring British assets in the region'.[6] But it was Acheson who thematised and sysrematised the cleavage in a 'friend-enemy' framework, a framework that was to come back after September 11, 2001, as a 'neo-conservative invention': the 'free world' against 'terrorism'. It should be noted that, as Secretary of State, Acheson lent overwhelming support to the foundation of NATO. He saw it as the best vehicle for the US not only for the defence of Europe against the Soviet threat, but also for the establishment of a permanent form of institutionalised dependency of Western Europe upon the US.

So was the case with Turkey and Greece when they both became NATO members in the wake of their joint participation in the Korean War. Whereas, on the one hand, the aim was to extend the belt of deterrence in the Southern Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, on the other, and at the same time, the US was establishing structures of overwhelming influence and power within those two states themselves. As elsewhere, the US established both in Turkey and Greece military bases and intelligence and spying structures, whereas making sure that US military

technology was to be purchased and, if need be, used against the perceived enemy. This was a framework of dependency upon US military technology and know-how.

The concept of Achesonian primacy proved very useful for the US, particularly during and after the Suez crisis (1956), when Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser re-asserted itself both regionally and in the UN. The Suez crisis, as Zbigniew Brzezinski did not fail to see, was not a 'simple affair', or a 'bad time' in transatlantic relations. In essence, it was since 1956 that European policy in the Middle East began to define itself *against* America.[7] In addition, it was since the late 1950s-early 1960s that US foreign policy began considering Israel as its most favourite client state in the region, with the Europeans and the Soviets leaning toward the Arabs. Makarios's foreign policy has to be seen in this qualified international and regional context.

Makarios' Gamble

The cumbersome constitutional arrangements of 1959-60 were an extreme case of institutional engineering, the most excessive being the overwhelming powers of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President and the establishment of three 'guaranteeing powers' watching after Cyprus's sovereignty: Britain, Turkey and Greece. Thus, as well as having Britain maintaining her military bases and other facilities on the island, both *enosis* (union with Greece) and *taksim* (partition — the Turkish Cypriot claim) were enshrined, not literally but in a refined and sophisticated way, in the arrangements of 1959-60 with the blessing of all three.[8]

For Britain, maintaining her military bases and intelligence gathering facilities on the island was becoming a priority, especially after the inter-communal strife of 1963-64.[9] Two new actors began entering the Eastern Mediterranean theatre since. On the 'front stage', it is noticeable the meddling of the UN in Cypriot affairs. It happened after Makarios' refusal to accept a NATO-led presence in Cyprus, allegedly in order 'to appease the Greek and Turkish Cypriot combatants'. The UN, enforcing Security Council resolution 186 in the wake of the 1963-64 crisis, established a rotating peacekeeping force on Cyprus.[10] On the back stage, which means behind the back of Makarios, the US began replacing Britain as a key

'meddler' in Cyprus, with Acheson's secret mission in Geneva. The architect of post-war US foreign policy was assigned with the difficult task of achieving a *rapprochement* between the Greek and the Turkish governments. His aim was to find an enduring solution to the problem, which could satisfy both Greece and Turkey, thus preventing hostilities between two NATO allies over Cyprus that could have been exploited by the USSR.

Makarios damned the Americans and, to a considerable extent, the Greeks and Turks alike. He found out about the secret Greco-Turkish meetings in Geneva in 1964 under the auspices of Acheson, and castigated George Papandreou, who was keen to compromise, by offering a large military base to Turkey on Cypriot soil in return for the union of the rest of the island with Greece.[11] By that time, Makarios had become adamant in mounting support, both at home and abroad, for an independent and non-aligned Cyprus, not least because any scheme of *enosis* coming to him from NATO quarters, including Greece, in practice would have meant *taksim*.[12]

It can be argued that Makarios was far more successful on account of what we have called 'front stage' issues than on account of 'back stage' themes. Even the methodical and careful landing of a Greek division on Cyprus in 1964 was intended more to back a *coup* against him. As a result, *taksim* and *enosis* could later be negotiated with Turkey, thus there would be no need to defend the island from possible Turkish military action.[13] Overall the most successful was Makarios in his strategy in internationalising the Cyprus issue through the UN and the Arab and Soviet support he could register there. Almost instantly after the Christmas crisis of 1963-64, on 7 February 1964, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sent a remarkable letter to US President Lyndon Johnson, in which he supported the non-aligned and independent physiognomy of the Republic of Cyprus. It also directly recognised Makarios' rule and policies and gave a warning for non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic from any NATO power whatsoever. In addition, the aforementioned Resolution 186 boosted Makarios popularity in that it explicitly asked "the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus".[14] Markarios' great success came the following year. In March 1965, UN mediator, Galo Plaza, produced a text which virtually supported most of Makarios' positions. In his 66-page report, Plaza outlined majority rule for the Greek Cypriots and minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots and a new UN

guarantee for Cyprus in replacement of the illegal - from the point of view of international law and UN Charter - Treaty of Guarantee. Yet a far more powerful game was being played in the background.

For instance, in response to President Johnson's letter, which stopped a Turkish landing on Cyprus at the eleventh hour, and the American decision to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Turkey, began to warm up its relations with the USSR.[15] This alarmed the US and Israel, as a strategic *rapprochement* between Turkey and the USSR would have damaged NATO's cohesion and undermined the US strategy of primacy in the Middle East.[16] The Turkish opening to the Soviets, coupled with the international (and Soviet) disgust for the Greek dictatorship (1967-1974), undermined Makarios's non-aligned stance. By then the USSR had exchanged its pro-Greek Cypriot rhetoric for a discourse of two equal communities on the island. Makarios, however, continued to play the Arab and non-aligned card until the very end, that is, until Turkey's two advances on Cyprus (July 20 and August 14, 1974), when Turkey occupied 37 per cent of the territory of the Republic. At the same time, Makarios had to deter the implementation of conspiracies of the Greek junta seeking to overthrow him and implement *enosis*, that is, a form of partition, bilaterally negotiated with Turkey.

Perhaps most costly of all was the political stance Makarios took, along with Britain, Greece and Turkey not to assist Israel during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. The first Turkish invasion came nine months later. From 1960 to July 15, 1974, the date when the Greek junta under Ioannides attempted to achieve 'régime change' by killing him, Makarios had been gambling all along. He won again in the UN, as the Turkish-installed régime in Northern Cyprus was not recognised by the Security Council. On the other hand and in real terms, he lost nearly half of Cyprus.

The international setting and Cyprus (1974-1989)

For Greece and Cyprus, the Cold War could have ended in the summer-autumn of 1974. By letting Turkey step into Cyprus, the Soviet Union virtually resigned from earlier claims to Eastern Mediterranean influence through Makarios and his strong communist constituency. At the same time, Constantine Karamanlis' Greece was revising its defence doctrine by re-

militarising the Eastern Aegean islands in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). From 1974 onwards, Greece's main enemy was seen to be not the communist neighbours to the north, but NATO Turkey to the east. In this qualified context, there was no supportive framework for a non-aligned policy, similar to that promoted by Andreas Papandreou and Makarios in the 1960s and early 1970s. Such policies were becoming increasingly redundant, especially after the Camp David peace accords of 1979 between Israel and Egypt. At the same time, both Turkey and Israel continued to be seen by the US as its more valuable strategic allies in the Middle East. More to the point, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah in Tehran in 1979, the US began courting Turkey so as to build an extensive military infrastructure in south-eastern Turkey and thus be able to meet contingencies in the Gulf area and in Central Asia. Two consecutive defeats of the Arabs (1967 and 1973), economic recovery in the West under the neo-conservative cabinets of Thatcher and Reagan plus the peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, weakened the international regulatory powers of the UN even further.[17]

Yet, both Karamanlis's and Andreas Papandreou's cabinets in the 1970s and 1990s continued to uphold their warm relations with the Arabs and the Palestinians. Karamanlis withdrew Greece from NATO's military structure, a tactical move to appease popular discontent over Cyprus, while convincing France and other European countries to support Greece to open accession negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC). True, Greece had somewhat to find new friends and she found them in Europe and in Giscard d'Estain's France. However, all European actors, including Greece and the divided Republic of Cyprus, continued to view the UN as the sole legitimate agency that could provide a just and viable solution to the Cyprus issue. There is not a single EEC decision from this period that differs in the slightest from the rhetoric of the UN. The UN and, more pertinently, the institution of the Secretary General, could be manipulated by the US at will, particularly as far as matters of secondary international importance were concerned. One such case was the UN-sponsored high level meeting in New York in January 1985 between Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash.[18]

America's chief Middle-Eastern worries after 1979 were Iran (the establishment of Homeini's anti-American regime) and Afghanistan (the occupation of the country by the Soviets) contingencies. Keeping a watchful

eye on the Gulf region and Central Asia was a demanding task that the precarious and discreet support of Saddam's Iraq in a war against the new anti-American regime in Tehran (1980-88) could not guarantee. South-eastern Turkey held the key. The Reagan administration entrusted Richard Perle with the task of convincing the Turks to accept the establishment of a large military infrastructure in Turkish Kurdistan. The economic *quid pro quo* for the Turks was guarantees for receiving large American funding, which had to be approved by the Congress. The political *quid* was Cyprus.

The American Congress had at times given severe headaches to the Administration and Turkey, as in 1975-78, when it imposed a partial arms embargo on Turkey due to invading Cyprus by using American military equipment. The Administration had to lobby Congress annually to obtain the consensus needed to implement the delivery of economic and military aid assigned to Turkey. The years 1983-84 were particularly difficult for the Administration for, on the top of everything,[19] it had to deal with the negative implications of the unilateral declaration by Denktash of a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC) and the Left-wing Kurdish uprising in South-eastern Turkey. In the spring of 1984 the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate adopted the Pressler/Bidden amendment, according to which Turkey should be deprived of '215 million of the 715 million dollars in military grants proposed, unless she relinquished control of Varosha'.[20] However, the amendment, after huge lobbying efforts by the Administration, was defeated in October of the same year. At the same time, Perle was working to obtain UN backing to set up a meeting between the two Cypriot leaders in order to force them to work on a solution framework which was blatantly against the Greek Cypriot side. Everything would have happened under the auspices of the UN and no blame could be attributed to the US.

From 1974 onward, US diplomacy considered Cyprus as being of a secondary importance on its international priority list. But for US daunting realists, such as Henry Kissinger, the problem was solved. Whatever the case, Cyprus has proved to be a good bargaining tool for both Turkey and the US, an instrument that could be used to achieve other strategic aims for the two states. However, because no other state had officially recognised 'TRNC', all interested parties had to show good faith in finding a legal solution satisfactory to both sides. Thus, following the High Level agreements between Makarios and Denktash in 1977 American and British diplomats

viewed the framework of such a legal solution as a trade-off between territorial concessions from the Turkish side versus constitutional ones from the Greek side.[21] In 1984-85 Perle had to work within those vague constraints, and indeed he convinced Turkey to accept that the territory under Turkish control following an agreement with the Greeks could be no less than 29.9 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. The Greeks, on the other hand, had to accept a 'rotating presidency', make further concessions on the issue of refugees and also to move into a co-federal, rather than federal framework as outlined by Denktash and Makarios in 1977. As a result when Kyprianou turned down the 'Draft Framework Agreement' and blame was assigned to the Greek side. A jubilant Denktash sent a message to Ankara of how useful his 'TRNC' is in paving the way for guaranteeing American support for Turkey: the Americans began building their bases in Incirlik and Diyarbakir, the Turks received the aid they needed, whereas keeping Northern Cyprus under control. The Greeks were to take the blame for the failure of the talks.

After the Cold War: Into the Abyss

I have argued that the United Nations was founded and destined to work as an appendage of US global interests. Indeed, it has been so for most of the Cold War period, the sole partial exception being the years of the rise of Arab nationalism under the influence of Nasser. Yet, as we have seen, Achesonian doctrine did not allow the UN to become the main vehicle of projection for US hegemonic influence. NATO and other US-led intelligence, economic and spying means were envisaged and expanded US power at the core of other states in Western Europe, South-eastern Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. The collapse of the Soviet Union delivered another serious blow to the credibility of the UN as a truly and just representative body regulating international relations.

At a time when Greece and the divided Republic of Cyprus considered knocking at the door of European Communities, the UN, under the primacy of the US, was in a position to shift the boundaries of a solution framework further. As the first post-Cold War contingencies in the Gulf and the Western Balkans were making headlines all over the world, the March 1990 Security Council resolution 649 was asking the Greek Cypriot leadership to accept further concessions and go beyond the bi-zonal/bi-

communal federal concept of 1977. It defined the Cyprus problem as an 'inter-communal affair' that had to be solved between the two communities on an 'equal basis'. Moreover, 'it defined the parameters of the settlement, but remained silent on the issues of the implementation of UN resolutions, the withdrawal of Turkish forces and the Turkish settlers, the return of the refugees, the three freedoms etc.'.[22] This resolution was followed by resolution 716 (1991), which was similar in tone and spirit. These initiatives culminated in the April 1992 'Set of Ideas' of Boutros Boutros Ghali. It is interesting here to note that the report by the Secretary General, which was devastating for the Greek Cypriot side, was even including a clause which 'expanded the Turkish Cypriot veto to include the question of membership in the European Community'. However, because of France's objections who argued that such a clause interferes with the powers of the Community, the Security Council resolution 750 (1992) did not endorse that specific clause of Ghali's 'Set of Ideas'.[23]

As the global and regional balance of power was drastically changing in favour of US, Turkish and Israeli interests, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus decided to go down the European road. Four months after the adoption of resolution 649 (March 1990), the Republic of Cyprus submitted its formal application to join the Communities as a full member. At the European Council meeting in Corfu (June 1993), when Greece was holding the EU's rotating presidency, the EU took a further step, putting on an equal footing the membership of the Republic of Cyprus with that of East-Central European states. This alarmed the US (and Turkey), but they were both somewhat mollified soon after that, as a customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU began to loom large. In a masterly deal crafted between the EU, Greece and Turkey under the auspices of the US (February-March 1995), the EU went further and declared that entry negotiations with Cyprus could commence six months after the Amsterdam inter-governmental conference of 1996. At the same time Turkey signed a customs union agreement with the EU.

The EU was prepared to go this far in its relations with Turkey. Had it been left to its own devices, that is to say, without hefty lobbying on the part of the US in favour of Turkey, the EU might not have advanced its relations with Turkey beyond a customs union so quickly.[24] A clear indication we have for this is the Luxembourg summit of 1997. Commenting on that EU summit, a number of observers failed to see that the country that blocked

progress on Turkey's application was Germany, rather than Greece. As I have argued elsewhere,[25] it was basically Germany's weight that backed Cyprus's inclusion in the fast track group of candidate countries and Turkey's exclusion from any candidate group.[26]

Pushed by the US, the UN re-appeared on the Eastern Mediterranean front stage in the late 1990s, putting pressure on the two communities on the island to resume negotiations.[27] US-UN efforts for a solution to the Cyprus issue intensified after the commitment of the US to new war theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq, following the terrorist attacks on America on 11 September 2001. The 'proximity talks' led to direct negotiations between the Greek Cypriot president Glafkos Clerides and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash under the auspices of the Secretary General, Kofi Anan. The climate was improved, especially after the 'earthquake diplomacy' of late 1999, leading to a *rapprochement* between Greece and Turkey. In November 2002, Anan, taking into account all the points raised by each side in the discussions, presented a new plan to the parties. The 'solution principle of equality between the two communities' which was enshrined in resolution 649 (1990) and all crucial resolutions thereafter, did not change. The Republic of Cyprus was, once again, confronted with an Anglo-American inspired plan, presented along the lines of a 'Swiss-style' solution, proposing two 'component states' and a 'common state' under a presidency that would rotate every ten months.[28] Interestingly, it was proposed that the Treaty of Guarantee remain in force. Back in 1962, Makarios' team of lawyers had proved that this Treaty was illegal and against the very charter of the UN, an affair which, among others, led to the 1963-64 crisis.[29] In 2002, the UN Secretary General still upheld it and, apparently, any solution to the problem would have to have that Treaty annexed to it. One might argue that the Secretary General, by his actions, undermined the very legitimacy and credibility of his own institution. But the Secretary General has no independent voice and is an instrument manipulated at will by the US.

The UN is not an organisation in which equality of membership and adherence to international law come before issues of power, dominance and prevailing national interests. Quite the opposite is the truth. The collapse of communism and the retreat of Arab nationalism, the re-colonisation of Iraq and Afghanistan by Anglo-American forces were bound to produce a 'new world order' in which the US, the uncontested victor of the Cold War, could alone set the rules of the game. The others cannot but bandwagon. Yet, a

range of Eurasian powers, including France, Germany, Russia and China, opposed the second Gulf War and, contrary to what they did in the case of Kosovo (1999), refused to provide after-sales service to the US by endorsing a UN 'reconstruction' resolution. As in 1990-1992 with the Ghali 'Set of ideas', it is interesting to note that the recent Anan plan comes amidst a second crisis in he Gulf area. The setting was the same, as well as the substance of the plans, although one might argue that the second Gulf War represents a far greater gamble for the US. This time round, the agenda of Bush Jr. goes beyond stabilising US occupation of Iraq. The over-ambitious aim is the transformation of the entire Middle East according to US interests. The differences, however, had to do with Turkey's stance during the first and the second crises, as well as with Europe's embracing of Cyprus.

Turgut Ozal's Turkey was keen to assist the Americans during the first Gulf crisis, but Tayip Erdogan faced enormous opposition to do so in 2003, both from Turkish public opinion and his generals. The key issue here to understand the situation is the Kurdish question. Having enjoyed a relative autonomy since 1991 as the Americans enforced non-fly zones over the Northern and Southern Iraq, the Kurds wished to establish an independent 'micro-state' in Northern Iraq. To make it viable, they claimed control over the oil-rich regions of Mosul and Kirkuk. The Turks had fiercely opposed this throughout. They were to receive the appropriate gesture from the Americans by negotiating over the Anan plan, as well as pledges to a 6 billion dollar grant, convertible to 24 billion in long-term, low interest loan that could have helped re-finance Turkey's 145 billion state debt. But they did not receive enough concessions as far as the Kurdish question was concerned. Hence the generals' and Denktash's outright refusal of the Anan plan and the UN's decision to blame Denktash for refusing to accept it as a basis for further negotiations.

In January-February 2004, Denktash was once again cornered to negotiate on the basis of the UN blueprint and before the Republic's official entry to the EU on 1 May 2004. But at the same time, Turkey has accepted to facilitate through the US bases of Incirlik and Diyarbakir the rotation of more than 100,000 American troops stationed in Iraq. A new deal between Turkey and the US regarding the Kurdish issue may have been drafted and whose contents remain, as yet, unknown to us. The more lasting the Iraqi quagmire proves to be for the Americans, the more likely it is that they will start courting the Turks again. Cyprus will be there to be used and abused as

a bargaining chip at all times, even if a 'solution' of the type envisaged by Anan is endorsed by the ruling groups of the parties concerned.

Concluding Remarks

The UN, set up at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco some fifty years ago, was designed to be a two-tiered institution, with its general assembly a powerless body and its Security Council a powerful instrument for the application of US-led directives. Yet, even the best of designs fail to match exactly complex historical realities and social dynamics. Neither the international organisation has been that way all the time, nor has it been the only, and the main, instrument for the exercise of US power. There were periods of exception during the Cold War, which had coincided with the rise of Arab nationalism, the euphoria of anti-colonial movements in the Third World and Latin America and the USSR's strong posture in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. But then the Achesonian strategy of primacy, established and well-embedded in US departments by 1950, could sort out issues of hegemony within West European, Latin American, Middle Eastern and Asian states in perpetuity.

Makarios' calculation to internationalise the Cyprus issue in the 1960s was clever. However, he misread Arab and Soviet intentions and thought that they could run to his support in case Turkey attacked Cyprus. The end of the Cold War has turned the UN and their Secretary General into puppets manipulated by the US, particularly in cases in which the other members of the Security Council do not have especially strong vested interests. From this perspective, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have correctly adopted a strategy aiming at achieving EU membership for the Republic. This, it was thought, would please France, who wanted to extend its influence in the Mediterranean as a whole. At the same time, however, we are witnessing a linkage strategy on behalf of the EU, relating Turkey's EU membership to a prompt Cyprus solution.

The US has been on the side of Turkey throughout. As a state, which alongside Israel valued most in the greater Middle East, the US lobbied hard the EU to remove political and economic obstacles to Turkey's membership. But an interpretation of the Cyprus issue and of the UN involvement in it from 1990 to the present day on this basis alone would be certainly

insufficient. In fact, Cyprus straddles not only Turkey's EU prospects, but also Turkey's Middle Eastern and Kurdish imbroglio. The two systematic UN plans for a solution ro the problem of Cyprus from 1990 to date have been coincidentally presented just after or just before the two Gulf wars. Arguably, Cyprus has been used all along and by all sides in order for them to advance their respective national 'mega' or 'micro' interests. The UN will therefore not give the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots a 'just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem'. But they will give them a solution according to the interests of the power that dominates them, that is the US. That is Dumbarton Oak's indelible imprint on Cyprus.

NOTES

1. Formally the UN was founded in San Francisco in April 1945, but all the big decisions were taken at Dumbarton Oaks, Georgetown, under the leadership and decisive influence of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

2. For this section of the article, I am mostly indebted to the discussions I have had with Peter Gowan. On how US business classes induced US political leaders to abandon America's partial isolationism; see also his 'US:UN', *New Left Review*, November-December 2003.

3. During the War, the term United Nations was used to denote those states which were allied against the axis powers. On the crucial international conjuncture 1943-45, see the seminal work by Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and the USA, 1943-45* (New York: Random House, 1968).

4. See also, John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Roosevelt, Kennan, Acheson* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

5. Churchill wanted the UN to have a 'regionalised structure with a Council of the Americas, a Council of Europe and a Council of East Asia – leaving South Asia, the Middle East and Africa (that is the bulk of the British Empire) splendidly unregulated', see Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), vol.2, p.1640, quoted in Peter Gowan, op. cit.

6. Peter Gowan, *ibid.*

7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Hegemonic quicksand', *The National Interest*, no.74, Winter 2003-04, p.12.

8. The first claim was the desire of the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots (80 per cent of the total population). The second came as a result of the British policy of *divide et impera*, rather than as an innate co-sovereign tendency of the Turkish Cypriot minority (18 per cent).

9. Makarios's rule was severely constrained by the right to veto of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President. Deciding to move on and extend his powers, Makarios masterminded thirteen amendments to the constitution, the first in a series of other moves towards *enosis* (the so-called 'Akritas plan'). Interestingly, Makarios went ahead with publicising his 'thirteen points', only after having received the 'green light' by the British.

10. Among others, Suha Bolukbasi, 'The Cyprus Issue and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement between 1945-1996', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.30, 1998.

11. Makarios's biggest ally in Greece at the time was cabinet Minister Andreas Papandreou, the son of Prime Minister, George Papandreou; see in particular, State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, 1964-68*, vol XVI, Washington DC, 2002; see also Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*: The Greek Front (New York: Doubleday 1970).

12. Makarios had already thought of this possibility in 1957-58, when he saw signs from Greece that she might accept the Macmillan plan - after the name of the British PM -- which led to the Zurich-London constitutional arrangements. This is a fundamental reason, which led Makarios to adopt, already during the EOKA struggle, a non-aligned, pro-Arab and anti-Israeli policy. Yet Israel worked discreetly and persistently in order not to be excluded from Cyprus. Basically, it supported the Turkish Cypriots in their struggle against the Greek Cypriots in return for their use of veto in case Makarios refused to agree to the opening of the Israeli Embassy in Nicosia. Indeed, by February 1961 Israel, as all its Arab competitors, had its own Embassy in Cyprus. On this issue, see the perceptive article by Zach Levey, 'Israel's entry into Cyprus, 1959-1963: Diplomacy and strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol.7, September 2003.

13. Initially, Makarios agreed to the secret landing of the Greek division, although he later regretted it. Basically, one of the themes Acheson's mission discussed with Greek and Turkish officials was the toppling of Makarios by Greek mainland troops, followed by an opening of negotiations with Turkey over the portion of Cypriot land to be conceded to her for military and civilian purposes; see, State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, 1964-68*, pp.214 passim.

14. For the text of this Security Council Resolution and Khrushchev's letter to Johnson, see Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, from Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp.148-49 and 155-57.

15. For an analysis of the consequences of this Turkish leaning towards the USSR, see Vassilis Fouskas, *Zones of Conflict: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp.74-5. For the letter of President Johnson to Turkish Premier Inonu, see Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, pp.158-60.

16. It is worth noting here that the Israeli-Turkish understanding, officially and publicly endorsed in 1996, goes as back as the mid-1950s; cf. in particular, Suha Bolukbasi, 'Behind the Turkish-Israeli alliance: a Turkish view', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol.XXIX, Autumn 1999, Marios Evriviades, ' The Turkish-Israeli axis: Alliances and alignments in the Middle East', *Orient*, vol.39, Autumn 1998.

17. See David Armstrong et al., *From Versailles to Maastricht; International Organisation in the 20ʰ Century* (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.88.

18. I follow here Marios L. Evriviades, *The US and Cyprus: The Politics of Manipulation in the 1985 UN Cyprus High Level Meeting*, Occasional Research Paper no.3, Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, Athens, October 1992.

19. Tensions had increased in Poland with *Solidarnosk*; there was also the issue of deployment of SS 20 Soviet missiles in Central Europe and the American response with Pershing and Cruise; in 1983 the US invades Grenada. But most crucial of all, it was the launching of the 'star wars' project by Ronald Reagan, which finally led to the defeat of the USSR and Gorbachev's openings with the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*.

20. Marios Evriviades, *The US and Cyprus: The Politics of Manipulation in the 1985 UN Cyprus High Level Meeting*, p.8.

21. See in particular, Van Coufoudakis, 'Cyprus, the United States and the United Nations since 1960', *Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies,* vol.3, no.2, Autumn 1994, pp.37-57.

22. *Ibid.*, p.47.

23. *Ibid.*, p.48.

24. At the Helsinki meeting of the European Council (December 1999), Turkey was offered a candidate status. At Copenhagen (December 2002), the European Council was determined to open accession negotiations with Turkey - the date for reviewing Turkey's progress was set for December 2004, on condition that she deepens the process of its political and economic reforms ('Copenhagen criteria' of 1993) and makes progress on its bilateral disputes with Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus. Technically, the Cyprus problem is not a pre-condition for Turkey's membership. Politically, however, it is.

25. See Vassilis Fouskas, *Zones of Conflict: US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East*, chapter 6: 'Eurasian gambles over Cyprus' EU prospects'.

26. Even acute analysts, such as Mehmet Ugur, fail to see the crucial role of Germany in Turkey's exclusion; see his otherwise perceptive analysis in 'Testing times in EU-Turkey relations: the road to Copenhagen and beyond', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, vol.5, August 2003, pp.165-184. To my knowledge, the sole exception I managed to pinpoint is the work by Harun Arikan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for Membership?*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp.167-77.

27. Throughout the 1990s, negotiations were on an 'on-and-off' basis. In 1996-98, tension between Greece and Turkey (the 'Imia crisis' in the Aegean, the case of transferring to Cyprus an S-300 Russian missile system, the killings of Greek Cypriots by Turkish security forces and the mob) thwarted any meaningful dialogue between the parties. All these cases of tension, however, have shown that the Cyprus issue was far from solved and that a serious and uncontrolled crisis could erupt at any moment.

28. For an analysis of the plan, see Vassilis K. Fouskas, 'Concluding remarks: the long way back', in Vassilis K. Fouskas and Heinz A. Richter (eds.), *Cyprus and Europe: the Long Way Back* (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2003), pp.205-210.

29. In short, the Treaty of Guarantee was assigning to Greece, Turkey and Britain guarantor power rights on Cyprus, which is against the very concept of state sovereignty and UN membership. For further comments on this issue, see William Mallinson, 'Reality versus morality', *Defensor Pacis*, no.7, January 2001.