

Remaining Engaged: Turkish-US Relations in the Post-Iraq Era

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine la rupture dans les relations entre les États-Unis et la Turquie durant l'année 2003. Plus précisément, il explique pourquoi l'Administration Bush était prête à tolérer le comportement de la Turquie concernant l'Iraq. Essentiellement, les États-Unis avaient pardonné la Turquie, afin de limiter le danger que cette dernière ne se tourne vers de nouveaux partenaires stratégiques, par exemple la Russie et l'Iran. Cependant, la décision avait été prise par un besoin pressant de garder la Turquie impliquée dans le cadre des efforts de stabilisation de la situation en Iraq. Cependant, malgré le fait que la Turquie s'est avérée un allié non fiable aux yeux de beaucoup des décideurs de la politique américaine, elle ne pourrait pas être laissée de côté, ignorée et abandonnée.

ABSTRACT

This article explores the American intention to maintain overwhelming global political and military superiority, and take whatever action is needed to preserve the 'new world order' and prevent the emergence of a rival power. Superpower status is by no means confined to the military dimension, as the US still has the largest and most vibrant single national economy. In the near future, no other country or combination of countries can hope to challenge American prominence. At the same time, however, as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated, the US is structurally vulnerable and the cost of its global engagement greater than many Americans thought.

Introduction

For fifty years, Turkey's strategic importance as the linchpin of security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean went unquestioned. Throughout the Cold War, it was a vital element in the defence of Western Europe against the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold War, the country's position as a key player in regional affairs appeared secure as its proximity to both the Caucasus and the Middle East made it a valuable strategic property in the quest to ensure

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new transit routes for energy supplies. More recently, Turkey's place at the high table of geopolitics was reconfirmed when it was seemingly drafted as a vital Muslim ally in the war on terrorism.

However, Turkey's failure to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 severely strained Ankara's relations with Washington. At the same time, Ankara's relations with the European Union appeared to be in trouble following the collapse of peace talks over the divided island of Cyprus in March 2003. As a result of the simultaneous difficulties with Europe and the United States, serious questions arose regarding Turkey's future strategic orientation. One idea that received considerable attention when raised by a senior general was that Turkey could look to establish new alliances with Russia and Iran. Although it is a surprising suggestion, and one that has received considerable attention, it is unlikely to be accepted by mainstream decisionmakers in the future. However, the fact that the options were even being suggested certainly served a useful purpose for Turkish decisionmakers. The United States, fearful of the implications of such a move and determined that Turkey should not look to new horizons, remained firmly engaged with Ankara despite the low points of 2003, which may be called a post-Cold War nadir in Turkish-US relations.

Turkey's Traditional Geostrategic Role

For half a century, Turkey has been a key strategic partner of the West, and throughout the Cold War, its value was never questioned. Quite apart from being a bulwark against Russia's long-held dream of direct access to the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey offered NATO the only direct non-Arctic entry point into the Soviet Union. Likewise, in the post-Cold War era Turkey's continuing value was quickly recognised. When in August 1990 Saddam Hussein marched into Kuwait, the Turkish Government, led by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, quickly sided with the United States and played an important role in isolating the Iraqi regime economically. Following the defeat of Iraq, Incirlik airbase in Turkey served as a vital component in the effort to protect Iraq's Kurds as part of Operation Safe Haven — a move that confirmed Turkey's strategic military value despite the fact that it did not contribute forces to the liberation campaign.

Ankara also sought to confirm its continued pre-eminence at a grander strategic level following the collapse of communism. In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Turkey was widely expected to take a lead role in Central Asia and exert hegemony over the region's Turkic-speaking republics. While this did not materialise due to the continuing relationship these countries enjoyed with Moscow, Turkey soon found itself centre stage once more. This time, however, its value was defined in terms of access to the oil rich Middle East and Caucasus regions. The discussions concerning the construction of an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan, through Georgia and then down to a southern Turkish port, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, represented a major affirmation of Turkey's vital role meeting the future energy supply needs of the United States. This was confirmed by President Clinton when he visited Turkey for a meeting of the OSCE in November 1999 and declared a new strategic partnership between the US and Turkey. Thus throughout the 1990s, "Turks and Americans found they had become more, not less important to one another than during the Cold War".¹

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Turkey's key strategic value was yet again confirmed, if not wholly strengthened, with the Bush administration's war on terror. In an era of growing instability in the Middle East, Turkey soon came to be seen as a secure base from which the United States could operate. However, Turkey's importance surpassed the traditional geopolitical significance of territory. For the Neo-conservative establishment, which has proved to wield so much influence in Washington in the aftermath of September 11, Turkey was seen as the type of Muslim state that the US would like to see worldwide. Quite apart from the support that Ankara would provide in efforts to combat Islamic terrorism, Turkey presented the United States with a model for a country built upon an Islamic cultural tradition but nonetheless firmly allied to the West. Moreover, the fact that Turkey maintained strong relations with Israel only served to confirm the Turkish Republic's position as the embodiment of the Bush Administration's realistically attainable 'virtuous ideal' for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and a host of other Muslim states. As one observer put it, 'Turkey has, since September 2001, been transformed in practice from a strategic regional ally into a tactical facilitator of the deterritorialized 'war against terrorism'.²

Turkey's Relations with the US Are Strained over Iraq

Suddenly, however, Turkey looks more isolated than it has at almost any time since the end of the Second World War. Its role as an ally has never been questioned so much in US policy circles as it is now. On March 1, 2003, as the United States made its final preparations for the invasion of Iraq, the Turkish Grand National Assembly failed to permit US forces to be stationed in the country, despite the fact that the United States had promised \$15 billion in aid.³ This was a major blow to Washington's war planning. Prior to hostilities, US Central Command had expected to be able to place up to 62,000 American troops in Turkey. Indeed, Pentagon planners had been so confident that Turkey would accept American soldiers that it had gone ahead and authorised the transportation of the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division to Turkey. This led to the unfortunate situation whereby many thousands of US forces spent weeks on ships stationed off Turkey's southern coast.⁴

Although the decision was poor, there appeared to be at least some sort of willingness to concede to Turkey's discomfort. There was less forgiveness when the Turkish Government, at the very last minute, delayed giving US aircraft access to Turkish airspace, despite a parliamentary resolution, passed on March 20, permitting US warplanes to fly over the country on combat missions.⁵ The final blow, however, came when the Turkish Government decided to authorise the deployment of large numbers of Turkish forces in Northern Iraq as a means of preventing any attempts by the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence. Had this decision been acted upon, it would almost certainly have been a catalyst for longterm instability in a post-conflict Iraq.

The combined result of these moves was a severe setback to Turkish-US relations worsened by the fact that the Bush administration holds a binary conceptualisation of allegiance and alliance. The world view prevailing in Washington is built upon the notion that countries either stand with the US or against it. Turkey had certainly not stood shoulder-to-shoulder with America at the crucial moment. As the US saw it, Turkey's behaviour was unpardonable, especially when there were so many countries that had lined up to support US efforts in one way or another. The disappointment of the Bush administration was further exacerbated by the fact that several months earlier it had taken a lead in lobbying the EU for a firm date for the start of Turkish negotiations for EU membership.

Then, just as relations appeared to be stabilizing, a massive row broke out following the arrest of eleven Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq. In the weeks that followed all levels of Turkish society expressed their outrage at the manner in which the United States had treated such an important, long-standing ally. On the street, in the media, from the Presidential Palace, on the floor of the parliament, and especially by the Turkish General Staff, there were demands for an apology from the United States for treating such an important ally in such a demeaning way.⁶ General Hilmi Ozkok, the Chief of the General Staff, even described the incident as being the greatest crisis of confidence between Turkey and the United States.⁷ Very few people in Turkey stopped to consider that the United States may have seen Turkey's delays and prevarications, eventually resulting in obstructionism, in the run up to the conflict in Iraq as the actions of an ungrateful ally, who, after fifty years of support, had abandoned the United States at a crucial moment.

Uncertain Turkish-EU Relationship

If Turkey's relationship with the European Union were more secure, the tense relationship with the United States, while undoubtedly serious, would not have been a cause for serious concern in Washington. However, as relations with the United States have come under increasing strain, Turkey is facing a growing crisis with the European Union. Of course this crisis is of a far slower and far less obvious kind. Unlike the relationship with the United States, a relatively straightforward insofar as it is built upon a defence and security partnership, Turkey's relationship with the European Union is obviously far more complex. Unlike the relationship between the United States and Turkey, which is a standard bilateral relationship between two sovereign states, the relationship between Turkey and the European Union is in part based on bilateral relationship issues. It is also structured around a formal recognition by Europe, taken at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, that Turkey is a candidate for full EU membership.

The problem, however, is that this relationship, whether recognised by Turkey or not, is fundamentally dependent upon the Cyprus issue. While there are certainly a number of other factors (economic, political and social) shaping the relationship, that will determine whether Turkey does become a member, the most significant obstacle to Turkish accession is the continuing

division of Cyprus. While talks were continuing, things looked promising for Turkey. Indeed, in December 2002, at the Copenhagen European Council, Ankara even managed to get a commitment from the EU that a full appraisal of Turkey's application would be conducted in December 2004 with a view to opening formal membership negotiations the following year. However, the breakdown of UN-sponsored talks to reunite the divided island of Cyprus, on March 10, 2003, cast doubt on this decision. Several EU officials, including Gunter Verheugen, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, made it clear that without a solution to the Cyprus issue Turkey would almost certainly be unable to join the Union. The spokesman of the European Commission went even further and warned Turkey that when Cyprus becomes a member of the EU in May 2004, Turkey would be left in the unenviable position of being in occupation of the territory of an EU member state.⁸

Some in Ankara understood the significance of the Cyprus issue and deep division the island could create between Turkey and the EU, and therefore seemed willing to reach a settlement along the lines of the UN peace plan. However, others in the more traditional establishment, including much of the hierarchy of the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff, appeared to remain steadfastly opposed to a solution on these terms. This situation opened the way for some of the more sceptical members of the Turkish foreign policy establishment to step in and call for a full re-assessment of Turkish strategic priorities, including a re-appraisal of ties to both the United States and the European Union.

Turkey's alternative strategic options

In a speech that received wide attention when it was made in March 2002, General Tuncer Kilinc, the Secretary General of the National Security Council,⁹ stated in an address delivered at the Istanbul War Academy that Turkey should seriously give some thought to the fact that it would never get European Union membership and that steps should be taken to consider other options. Specifically, the general cited the development of alliances with Russia and Iran.

Somewhat unsurprisingly, the statement caused an outcry. It was quickly dismissed by some as being little more than an expression of frustration at the way in which the European Union was perceived to be behaving towards Turkey.¹⁰ The call also drew strong rebuttals from President Sezer, who stated that EU membership was the ultimate goal of Turkey. A similar response came from other senior political leaders, including Bulent Ecevit, the prime minister, and Mesut Yilmaz, the deputy prime minister and leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), the most pro-EU party in the coalition government. At the same time, the other senior military officials of the General Staff appeared to distance themselves from the statement. They stressed that General Kilinc had made it clear at the outset of his speech that he was simply expressing a personal view.

Despite all of the rebuttals, it is unlikely that such a senior officer would have made the comment had it not been at least considered within the military hierarchy.¹¹ It was also noticeable that the general's comments were not dismissed by all of the country's politicians. For example, Sukru Sina Gurel, the extremely Euro-sceptic government spokesman and minister for Cyprus, made it clear that he also felt that other options should be explored. Similarly, Osman Durmus, the Health Minister who had come to attention by supposedly wanting to reject Greek blood donations in the aftermath of the August 1999 Izmit earthquake, and was a prominent member of the ruling MHP, greeted General Kilinc's statement with his full support and also expressed his belief that the EU had no intention of ever seeing Turkey join.¹²

Of the two choices, Russia is a much more viable choice for Turkey, should Ankara did decide to redirect its strategic relationships. Although Russia has traditionally been the main threat to Turkey, and many believe that the two countries are always likely to be strategic threats to each other, relations between Moscow and Ankara are not as bad as they might appear on the surface. Indeed, there seems to be a growing group of what have been called 'Eurasianists' in both countries who view Turkish-Russian co-operation as a natural extension of both countries failure to advance their European Union relations.¹³ Now that Turkey has accepted its limited role in the Central Asian Republics, Russia has ceased to view it with quite the same degree of concern as it did in the 1990s. Turkey's limited impact in the Caucasus has also helped to reduce Russian fears.

At the same time, energy issues have grown in importance. Russia increasingly sees the value of using Turkey as a means to supply oil and gas directly to South East Europe, bypassing Ukraine and the more pro-Western Central European countries. Plentiful supplies of Russian energy also help Turkey, which suffers from chronic energy shortages. Finally, Turkey's stand on Iraq has also helped to strengthen its standing in Russian circles. It was very noticeable that in the aftermath of the failed vote in the Turkish parliament to place American troops in Turkey, Russian officials praised the 'courageous decision' taken by Turkish lawmakers.

However, one must ask why would Turkey do this? Russia may have energy, but it has precious little else that Turkey needs. It is difficult to see how Moscow could offer meaningful and valuable economic assistance to Turkey. Militarily Russia is a lesser option for Ankara as it cannot supply the hardware currently made available to Turkey by the United States. It may provide a link with Turkey's European outlook, all the more so given increasing acceptance in parts of the EU of the role that Russia could play in Europe in the future. However, a break with the EU and the US towards the building of relations with Moscow presents nowhere near as firm a validation of Turkey's European identity as Turkey gets from its direct links to the European Union. On the surface it may appear to some as an appealing proposition. Strip away the gloss, however, and the attraction is less easy to explain.

While it is possible to see a certain sort of utility in a relationship with Russia, the call for the formation of stronger relations with Iran is even harder to explain satisfactorily. Although Iran certainly offers enormous temptation in terms of helping Turkey to meet its significant energy needs, the costs of such an alliance would be extremely high politically. For a start, it is a member of the much vaunted 'Axis of Evil'. Any strategic shift along the lines presented by General Kilinc would therefore seem to mark a final, perhaps irreversible, alienation of Turkey politically from the United States. It could also mark a sea change in relations with the EU. By shifting focus towards Tehran, Ankara would simply be encouraging those within the EU who regard Turkey's European identity as suspect to claim that, in reality, Turkey should be considered a part of the Middle East. But perhaps most important, the formation of strong ties with Iran would bring into question the very foundations of the Turkish Republic. Iran is the very antithesis of

Turkey; a theocratic Shiite régime built on a strong sense of independence as opposed to Turkey's staunch secularism that was based on a strong and unwavering belief in Turkey's European orientation. A sincere strategic alliance with Iran, incorporating both political and military co-operation, would be hard to envisage.

In the minds of most observers, Turkey's only real option, therefore, is to remain closely linked to Europe or to the United States. This option is quite clearly favoured at this stage by the ruling Justice and Development Party. It is also a strategic direction supported by General Ozkok, who is widely held to be, "more supportive of democratic reform and strong ties with the United States and Europe than many of his colleagues".¹⁴ However, ranged against General Ozkok are a number of colleagues who take a far more cautious, if not wholly sceptical, approach. In particular, Ozkok appears to be under significant pressure from various influential quarters which seem more predisposed to the statement made by General Kilinc last year. In particular, Ozkok is seen to be sandwiched between his predecessor, General Huseyin Kivrikoglu, and the land forces commander, General Aytac Yalman.¹⁵ This lends still greater credence to the argument that the statement made by General Kilinc had in fact represented a far greater reflection of the thinking within the general staff than had been accepted at the time the speech was made.¹⁶

Thus, while General Kilinc may have been serious about Iran, it seems as though his thinking is still marginal within the General Staff as a whole. Rather than a statement of intent, it is perhaps better seen as a statement of alternatives. Many concluded at the time that the general's real intentions were simply to express the profound sense of frustration in Turkey about the European Union. Others took the statement as being a scare tactic designed to keep Washington firmly engaged with Turkey. However, things are changing in the world. What once may have been a move designed to generate panic and fear now looks like an alternative Turkey might want to pursue in seriousness.

The US Remained Engaged with Turkey

It is precisely the thought of a Turkey alienated from both Europe and the United States and thus attracted by other alliances that worried Washington

policymakers. Even though it is unlikely, if Turkey did move in this direction the results could be catastrophic for the United States. As one writer put it,

Just hypothetically: what kind of influence might a Turko-Russo-Iranian alliance have on the world? It could upset the status quo, with the potential to become a counterbalance to the US. Warm water ports, vast resources, nuclear weapons, probably the support of the Arab world as well.

Given the uncertainties of Turkish-EU relations, US policymakers quickly balked at the thought of punishing Turkey too heavily, or in any prolonged manner. Although Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy US Secretary of Defence, in an interview on Turkish television in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, made it abundantly clear that Turkey would have to pay a price for its failure to provide the United States with the support that Washington had wanted,¹⁸ it was always unlikely to be the case that the price to be paid would be unduly onerous. There are two reasons. First, quite apart from the longer-term geopolitical reasons for which the United States would not wish to risk alienating Turkey, there was also a more second, immediate need to keep relations with Ankara on a fairly even keel.

As the post-conflict combat death toll rose, the Bush administration became ever more concerned at the possibility that it may be left alone to manage what is certainly a harder task than many of the Pentagon planners had originally foreseen. Thus the decision by Turkey to send up to 10,000 troops to Iraq helped atone for previous diplomatic sins.¹⁹ It did not seem to matter that such a decision is contrary to the wishes of the Iraqis. At that stage, the possibility of having Muslim troops bolster their efforts to restore order in Iraq certainly appears to many to outweigh the objections of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which voted by 24-0 to reject the stationing of Turkish troops anywhere in Iraq, let alone in the north of the country where traditional Kurdish hostility to a Turkish force was well known and understood. The United States having promised Ankara \$8.5 billion in loan guarantees in return for support in Iraq,²⁰ despite the fact that the Turkish Government has rejected any link, seemed initially reluctant to step back and reconsider its decision. However, the extreme opposition in Iraq to the presence of Turkish forces finally led the US-led administration in Iraq to rethink matters. Quite apart from the fierce statement made by Iraqis against a Turkish presence, a bomb attack against the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad,

October 14, 2003, a few days after Turkey's decision to consider sending troops seems to have tipped the balance. Just a few days later, Prime Minister Erdogan stressed that his government's decision would be based on the wishes of the Iraqi people. At this point, the US decided to drop the idea of asking Turkish troops to participate in Iraq.²¹

Even though Turkish troops did not go to Iraq, the offer to participate in the international force was important. As Emin Sirin, a Turkish politician, neatly stated it: "We will have made our gesture to the Americans and come away without paying the price."²² As the initial invitation to Turkey showed, those who assumed that the United States would no longer need Turkey were too hasty in their judgement. The lack of international support for US efforts to rebuild Iraq has meant that Turkey remains a lot more important than many observers had predicted at the end of the Iraq conflict. For example, Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent Turkish journalist, wrote in the days following the end of hostilities that, "The Americans don't need Turkey anymore. Turkey lost its chance to become the strong point of the United States in the region".²³ Although this may be true at some point in the future, it was not true at that time. Turkey remained important and both Washington and Ankara understood it. For as long as Iraq remains unstable and Israel remains under threat, the US needs an ally separate from the Arab world. Indeed, within months, there were already signs that the United States and Turkey were trying to rebuild their ties and that Washington was prepared to forgive Ankara for the letdown of a few months earlier, aided by some significant Turkish lobbying.²⁴

At the start of 2004, Prime Minister Erdogan went to the United States and held a number of meetings with senior US officials, culminating in a direct face-to-face discussion with President Bush on January, 28. The visit came at a vital moment. Just days earlier, Erdogan had asked UN Secretary General Kofi Anan to resume his efforts to reach a settlement in Cyprus. Suddenly, Turkey's relations with Europe were looking brighter than they had done for many months. Sitting there in the Oval Office, the two leaders seemed at ease with each another. It was difficult to believe that the meeting was designed to draw a line under the most difficult periods in post-Cold War US-Turkish relations. There certainly appeared to be no animosity or acrimony. That was something that Washington could not afford. There are precious few countries in the world that Washington cannot permit to be

cast adrift, no matter how serious the sin. Turkey, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, is one of those countries.²⁵

Conclusion

As a result of its vital location, and, more recently, its secular democratic heritage, it has often seemed to observers that over the last five decades Turkey's value as a plank of Western policy has been a rare *sine qua non* of international relations. As one observer succinctly put it, 'For over fifty years since the Truman Doctrine and Turkish entry into NATO, successive US administrations had unfailingly perceived Turkey as a strategically vital ally.'²⁶ However, despite its previously unassailable position in Eastern Mediterranean affairs, the war in Iraq raised serious questions about Turkey's relationship with Washington. At the same time as there has been a period of reflection in Washington about Turkey's role, the tense relations that Turkey maintains with the European Union, not least because of the failure of efforts to reach a solution to the Cyprus issue, led to serious questions being asked about the future relationship Turkey will enjoy with its Western partners.

Previously in the realm of the fringe nationalists, the debate about a re-orientation of Turkey's foreign policy priorities towards the Russian and Iranian East — rather than the Turkic republics of Central — seems to have entered the mainstream. While many may have previously scorned any talk of an alliance with Russia or Iran, the fact that this idea was even suggested by a senior general has certainly given the discussion an air of legitimacy, if not respectability. However, upon closer inspection, it rapidly becomes clear that the option of building stronger military and political ties with either Moscow or Tehran has little to offer Ankara. While both countries can certainly offer Turkey a lot in terms of its ongoing energy needs, neither supplies much else of value as compared with the benefits that are available by a continued adherence to the 'West'.

This debate, which was seemingly being encouraged by Turkey's weakened relationship with Europe, appears to have prompted US policymakers to the conclusion that it will be Turkey's relationship with the United States that is likely to keep Turkey on the right course, or at least prevent it from getting

too close to undesirable forces. Moreover, the imperative of retaining good ties with Ankara in order to try to stabilise the situation in Iraq further reinforced the willingness of the Bush Administration to maintain the alliance with Turkey, despite the fact that the alliance had proved to be significantly less valuable than the United States had previously believed. In a piece written in June 2003, one analyst wrote: 'what those in Ankara ought to realize is that geostrategic location is like foreign cash: an asset if converted, a worthless burden if it is not. If Turkey wants to mend ties with America now, it ought to cash in its strategic value.'²⁷ In fact, there was no need to cash in at all. Ankara did not need to authorise the US to use Incirlik. It did not need to make its South East provinces a staging point for US forces to enter Iraq. It did not need to send troops into Iraq. Prime Minister Erdogan's trip to Washington in January 2004 showed that the US Administration understood that despite its bad behaviour the previous year, Turkey remains too important to cast adrift, even if it does not deliver on its strategic location. The US would simply have to tolerate an independence of thought and action that it would accept from few other countries. Geopolitical issues were more important than Turkey's geostrategic location in determining Washington's decision to remain engaged with Ankara.

NOTES

1. Mark Parris, 'Starting Over: Turkish-US Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era,' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, April 2003.
2. Robert M. Cutler, 'Turks, Kurds and the US-Turkish relationship,' *Asia Times*, 29 July 2003.
3. The fact that the Turkish Government had requested greater financial assistance led many in the US to accuse Turkey of holding the United States to ransom. Much to the fury of the Turks, several US newspapers published cartoons depicting Turkey as being solely concerned with gaining as much money as possible out of the United States. In fact, the Turkish Government went as far as to warn the US Administration about the cartoons. *Anadolu Agency*, 7 March 2003. See also the justifications for barring the presence of US troops in Iraq that were provided by the Turkish Foreign Ministry: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/irak/06.htm>

4. Other units reported to have been preparing to use Turkey included the 1st Cavalry Division, in the process of leaving Fort Hood, the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Armoured Division in Germany. Col. Jack Jacobs (Ret.), 'Trying to Save the Northern Front,' *MSNBC*, 6 March 2003.
5. The resolution, which passed 332-208 with 1 abstention, did not permit US aircraft to refuel in Turkish airspace or land in Turkey. *Associated Press*, 20 March 2003.
6. K. Gajendra Singh, 'Turkish-US tensions cast dark clouds,' *Asia Times*, 23 July 2003.
7. *Anadolu Agency*, 7 July 2003.
8. 'Asked whether the EU would consider part of its territory under occupation by Turkey after Cyprus' accession, Jean-Christophe Filori said: "Yes we can look at things in that way. The occupation has always been considered illegal by the international community, including the EU. Nothing changes there." ' *Cyprus Mail*, 12 March 2003.
9. General Kilinc retired from the military in August 2003. Despite speculation at the time of his speech, he was not moved from his post as Secretary-General of the National Security Council in August 2002. This has led to further speculation that his views echoed the thinking of at least some of the senior members of the General Staff.
10. 'Turkey: Frustration Mounting Over EU Demands For Reform', RFE/RL, 15 March 2002. Later in the year, the general came to attention again when he dismissed EU concerns about the level of military involvement in Turkish politics. See, 'Turkish General Brushes off EU Criticism,' *Reuters*, 11 October 2002.
11. 'A general speaks his mind,' *The Economist*, 14 March 2002.
12. 'Strong Criticism of Top Turkish General Towards EU Stirs Criticism', Selected News on Turkey, TUSIAD, 4-10 March 2002.
13. For an analysis see, Igor Torbakov, 'Eurasian Idea could bring together Erstwhile Enemies Turkey and Russia,' *Eurasia Insight*, Eurasianet.org, 18 March 2002.
14. 'Turk General Faces Tough Choice in Iraq,' *Washington Post*, 9 April 2003.
15. 'Turk General Faces Tough Choice in Iraq,' *Washington Post*, 9 April 2003. See also, 'Turkey, Spared a War, Still Pays a Heavy Price,' *New York Times*, 19 April 2003.

16. It is worth noting that in August 2003 the annual meeting of the Higher Military Council, which decides on promotions, retired off a number of the senior generals who were considered to be more hard-line, including General Kilinc. The prevailing analysis is that the ideology of the General Staff as a whole is more in line with the more politically liberal and pro-Western views of General Ozkok than before the reshuffle.

17. Simon Allison, 'The EU and the Turkey time bomb,' *Asian Times*, 16 October 2002.

18. K. Gajendra Singh, 'Turkish-US tensions cast dark clouds,' *Asia Times*, 23 July 2002.

19. The Turkish Grand National Assembly passed the vote with 358 in favour and 183 against.

20. Many also believed that by participating in the international force, Turkish companies will be given lucrative reconstruction contracts. Even as early as April 2003, when US anger with Turkey was at its maximum, one prominent Turkish figure engaged in the construction business said that Turkey was aiming to take up to 20% of the reconstruction projects, a figure that he calculated could well be in the order of \$100 billion. This effort was also supported by Mark Parris, the former US ambassador to Turkey, who is now working as a lobbyist for a prominent US law firm, and who stated that 'the world is Turkey's oyster as far as reconstruction in Iraq are concerned.... Turkish companies are right next door, they have the experience, and they built a lot of the things that now need rebuilding.' 'Turkey prepares to push hard for reconstruction contracts,' *Financial Times*, 17 April 2003. In October, when the issue of sending Turkish troops to Iraq was brought up, the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Faruk Lagoglu, stated that Turkish military participation in Iraq would bring major economic benefits. 'Turkey Expects To Reach Compromise With US Within Few Months', *Anadolu Agency*, 19 October 2003.

21. However, this thinking seems not to have had quite the same impact on the Defence Department where many senior officials, including Paul Wolfowitz, remained determined to see a Turkish presence in the country. 'Iraqis Force Rethink on Turkish Help,' *Guardian*, 19 October 2003.

22. 'Aftermath,' *The Economist*, 18 October 2003.

23. 'Turkey, Spared a War, Still Pays a Heavy Price,' *New York Times*, 19 April 2003.

24. 'Friends Till the End,' *Washington Post*, 3 April 2003. The article alleges that the Turkish Government pays approximately \$1.8 million to a number of lobbyists.

25. The example of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist who sold nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya, but who only received a mild rebuke from President Musharraf, was another example of a case where the US was prepared to accept behaviour from a vital strategic ally that would have otherwise caused a major incident. As one analyst put it, 'The United States -- and the rest of the world -- should be glad that Pakistanis have such a progressive leader in charge of their country. Moral diplomacy, unfortunately, will not find a home there. Any involvement by Musharraf in previous exchanges of nuclear know-how is worth examining, but a continued Western alliance with Musharraf -- and his continued luck in escaping death -- may be the best that the world reasonably can hope for in the near future. Better the enemy you know than the enemy you have yet to meet.' Patrick R. Gavin, 'US alliance with Musharraf still the best course,' *Miami Herald*, 5 February 2004.

26. Bulent Aliriza, 'Seeking Redefinition: US Turkish Relations after Iraq,' Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 5 June 2003.

27. Soner Cagaptay, 'Turkey Time,' *National Review Online*, 20 June 2003.