

Greek-Turkish Relations: Problems and Prospects for Europe

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RÉSUMÉ

La longue campagne électorale en Grèce qui s'est terminée par les élections du 7 mars 2004, a ramené la politique étrangère au premier plan. Le voisinage de la Grèce est semé d'un nombre de différents de politique étrangère qui méritent d'être examinées de près. Il est important dès que la future direction des relations greco-turques va dominer l'agenda de la politique étrangère dans les mois et les années à venir. Les relations greco-turques peuvent avoir un impact sur la recherche d'une solution du problème de Chypre et sur l'avenir de l'île qui va se joindre à l'Union Européenne en mai 2004. Les relations de la Turquie avec l'Union européenne arriveront à un point critique en décembre 2004 quand l'UE prendra une décision concernant un possible commencement des négociations d'adhésion.

ABSTRACT

The protracted electoral campaign in Greece which ended with the elections of March 7, 2004, brought foreign policy back into the limelight. Greece's neighbourhood is saddled with a number of foreign policy issues which deserve close attention. More importantly, the future direction of Greek-Turkish relations will dominate the foreign policy agenda in the months and years to come. Greek-Turkish relations may also have an impact on the search for a settlement on Cyprus and the future of the island which will join the European Union in May 2004. Turkey's relations with the European Union are also coming to a head in December 2004 when the EU is expected to make a decision about the possible commencement of accession negotiations.

The European Dimension

The story of Turkey and the European Union (EU) is akin to the myths of Sisyphus and Tantalus. Like Sisyphus, the EU is unable to carry the weight of its own ambitions because, as a concert of 15/25 states, it has lost sight of these ambitions. The same applies to Turkey, which constantly stalls its European prospects due to the burden of its domestic political and

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institutional soul-searching. Like Tantalus, the EU, as a model of peace, security and prosperity, tempts Turkey, while Turkey, with its huge market and economic potential, tempts the EU. At the same time however, questions about Turkey's identity and the free movement of its citizens within the EU keep both sides apart.

While Turkey's EU candidacy status is more clearly defined than that of its Western Balkan neighbours, there are major difficulties for political, economic and security reasons. While it goes without saying that the pre-accession process has led to a number of important legislative and constitutional changes in Turkey, e.g., civilian majority in the National Security Council (9 civilians and 5 military members), lifting of the death penalty in peacetime, possibility of radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish, enhanced freedom of expression and greater freedom for non-Muslim religious minorities, its candidacy remains a headache for itself and the EU.¹

The signatory of an Association Agreement (the "Ankara Agreement") with the EC/EU since September 1963, Turkey formally presented its application for membership to the EC in 1987. After a Customs Union Agreement in 1995, Turkey's candidacy suffered a rebuff at the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, because it failed to make the list of candidates for accession. There were various reasons including its human rights record, position on Cyprus and tenuous relationship with Greece. Despite the Turkish official attitude which "combined bitterness for the rebuff with an attitude that dismissed the importance of EU membership for Turkey,"² the EU confirmed "Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union" and decided to draw up a strategy "to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field."³

The Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 was a great leap forward in EU-Turkish relations as it welcomed "recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reform towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria." The Council, therefore, concluded that "Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria

as applied to the other candidate States.”⁴ Apart from paragraph 12 of the Helsinki Council Conclusions, which laid down the criteria for membership, Turkey is bound to paragraphs 4 and 9 (a). Paragraph 4 refers to the “principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter,” while urging candidate states “to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this, they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.”⁵

The reference here obviously points to Turkey’s disputes with Greece. Paragraph 9 (a) also expressed the EU’s “strong support for the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring the process [a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem] to a successful conclusion.” The Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 December 2002 went a step further to advance Turkey’s cause by defining the parameters of the EU’s future relations with Turkey. More specifically, the Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council stated that:

The European Council recalls its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the subsequent implementation measures which cover a large number of key priorities specified in the Accession Partnership

The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.⁶

With the adoption of a revised Accession Partnership by the Council of the EU in May 2003 that establishes the priorities Turkey should pursue in its legislative reforms and supported by increased pre-accession financial assistance, the Thessaloniki European Council of 19-20 June 2003, reaffirmed the EU's intention to take a decision on Turkey's candidacy at the December 2004 European Council.⁷

As things stand today, therefore, EU-Turkish relations will fundamentally and qualitatively change after December 2004. In this regard, both the international and the domestic contexts are equally important for Turkey. It should be remembered that the Helsinki European Council was also groundbreaking in that it formally launched the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a necessary component of the EU's embryonic crisis management capability. ESDP became a key concern for EU-NATO relations and the subject of intensive negotiations with Turkey regarding the country's participation in decisions on EU-led operations using NATO assets.⁸ Also, the Copenhagen summit confirmed Cyprus's accession to the EU by May 2004, no matter whether or not there will be a settlement on the island by that time. Since Copenhagen, the Iraq crisis has also shaken US-Turkish relations to the core, thereby simultaneously challenging Turkey's strategic dependence on the United States, and vice versa, as well as fundamentally bringing to the fore the necessity for greater strategic thinking on the part of the EU as it widens both its frontiers and its neighborhood.

The Domestic Turkish Scene vis-à-vis the EU

A series of events since 1996 (the post-modern coup of February 1997, the Izmit earthquake of August 1999 and the twin economic catastrophes of November 2000 and February 2001) have contributed to surging pro-EU sentiment. These developments led to a broad-based demand for further democratic reform and fury directed at any and all institutions – no matter how previously sacrosanct – deemed responsible for the calamities of recent years. Popular support for EU membership is new and suggests that this great goal of republican Turkey is no longer the special preserve of elites and

their “ideological obsession” with the EC/EU which was interpreted as “Turkey having made a political choice between East and West.”⁹ Ultimately, the push for change, the claims of a rising counter-elite to a place in the power structure, and the popularity of EU membership all point to a fundamental fact: Turkey is now ready to shake off the shackles of the 1982 military-drafted constitution as well as the mentality that framed it.¹⁰ Yet whether the establishment that drafted or supported this constitution is willing to accept the changing domestic political balance of power and allow the “Muslim Democrats” to rule effectively remains to be seen.¹¹

In other words, Turkey’s European aspirations do not conform to its Kemalist political and institutional edifice: “while it remains the state ideology in Turkey it will be impossible to assess the extent to which — as its adherents maintain — Kemalism is the reason for Turkey’s being [more] democratic than other Muslim countries or whether it is irrelevant, or even, as its opponents argue, an obstacle to complete democratisation.”¹² Who knows what this augurs for the future. As long as Turkey does not come to terms with its domestic political and economic heritage and the necessity to undergo the necessary political and economic changes to meet the “Copenhagen criteria” and basic preconditions for truly liberal democratic societies, its relations with the EU will remain in stalemate.

It is in the context of foreign policy and in particular with regard to relations with the EU that Turkey is judged. To date the results have been mitigated by the perceived inability of the Erdogan government to promote its foreign policy initiatives, beginning with early resolution of the Cyprus issue. Here the struggle between the AKP’s (Justice and Development Party) new thinking and the status quo will be paramount, as will the debate over the strategic value of the country. In Turkey’s case, unlike any other candidate for accession, the geostrategic dimension shares centre stage with the Copenhagen criteria. Reconciling these factors presents a paradox and remains to be seen how that could happen, given the fact “[that] the record shows that when Turkey collects high strategic rents, its democracy is liable to suffer.”¹³

This is to say that the domestic tug-of-war in Turkey between democratization and the army-dominated secular establishment could

paradoxically lead to a (last-ditch?) coup attempt in Turkey as the country's strategic importance has been reduced, given the successful conclusion of the war against Saddam Hussein.¹⁴ According to Gareth Jenkins, "privately, the military continues to insist that, if necessary, it will not hesitate to intervene to protect secularism. This would initially be in the form of a warning but, if this was not heeded, would eventually include forcing the government from office."¹⁵

Nevertheless, the Erdogan government's commitment to the goal of EU membership has been impressive. Since coming to power the government has approved 4 harmonization packages (the last coming into effect August 7, 2003). A reform monitoring group, composed of the ministers of foreign affairs, justice and interior with high-level bureaucrats, was established in September 2003 with a view to ensuring effective implementation of the reforms.

The European Union

For the EU, it is primarily economic and political criteria rather than strategic prerogatives that direct its policy towards Turkey. The major obstacle seems to be Turkey's "unproductive and unstable economy, and the related threat that with accession to the EU, millions of Turks in search of jobs and higher wages would emigrate to Germany and elsewhere in Europe."¹⁶ Turkey's sizeable population of nearly 70 million growing at a rate of 1.6 per cent annually, coupled with a low per capita income (per capita GDP is about 5,200, i.e., 22 per cent of the EU average); a large agricultural workforce (about 40 per cent of the population); large regional disparities; high inflation (the average annual consumer price inflation was 69.9 per cent during the period 1997-2001, with large fluctuations between 101 per cent year-on-year in January 1998 and 33 per cent in February 2001); low foreign investment (0.8 per cent of GDP on average during 1997-2001); a high public sector debt (35-40 per cent of GNP); and a slow rate of privatization, suggest that Turkey's structural adjustments are monumental.¹⁷

The EU's reluctance to admit Turkey is understandable, given the aforementioned slow progress in fulfilling the political criteria for membership and troubled relations with Greece and Cyprus. Part of the problem is the slow realization on the part of the Turkish elite that the southern enlargement of the 1980s which resulted in the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal "reflected an important shift in the EC's approach to enlargement" as it "gave priority to political considerations particularly the — desire to stabilize democracy in these countries — over economic concerns."¹⁸

This also led to the slow "Europeanization" of Greek-Turkish differences over the Aegean and Cyprus, which the EC/EU had to take into account. These differences slowed Turkey's European march, as Brussels has been reluctant to import into the Union bilateral differences between two NATO members and close US allies. Turkey's relations with Greece and its use of both military and diplomatic tactics in its disputes over the Aegean and Cyprus have complicated its pursuit of EU membership. For Greece, there has been a change in its foreign policy towards Turkey since 1996, moving away from confrontational and towards cooperative politics as the efficacy of confrontation has come under scrutiny.¹⁹ In the case of Turkey, "the 'success' of confrontational politics has prevented the development of a new consensus on the consequences and costs of such policies."²⁰ Cyprus, for example, is joining the EU irrespective of a resolution of the island's division. The continuing violations of Greek airspace and daily dogfights with armed aircraft and Greece's decision to protest in May 2003 to the European Commission for the first time are indicative of the distinctive approaches taken by the two countries in their foreign affairs.

Finally, the issue of identity is relevant to the Turkish case. The Turks tend to insist that the EU's reluctance to begin accession negotiations with Turkey stems from a feeling among many in the Union that a predominantly Muslim state has no place in a predominantly Christian Union. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's famous interview in *Le Monde* a month before the Copenhagen European Council re-ignited the debate about what constitutes a "European" country.²¹ It goes without saying that Turkey's complaints are not without a certain validity.

Hence the ‘yes-but’ attitude of the EU, which raises the question of whether Turkey should *ever* be admitted to the EU. By being left out of the “wider Europe” document and having its accession undefined, Turkey is left in limbo in spite of the fact that it has shared a common land and sea border with the EU since Greece’s accession in 1981. With the accession of Cyprus and Bulgaria (in May 2004 and possibly 2007, respectively), Turkey will share new sea and land borders with other EU member states. We should keep in mind that

- the EU’s neighbourhood is growing
- there is an ever-growing role for the EU as powerbroker in the Balkans
- the ongoing discussions for an EU special envoy for the Caucasus
- the increasing EU involvement in the Middle East peace process via the Quartet and possibly NATO
- the ongoing discussions for the formulation of an EU strategic doctrine,

EU-Turkish relations might need to be reassessed. Paradoxically this may have to be done through the strategic prism, which fundamentally will mean suggesting new approaches and addressing issues other than EU accession, while taking into account the consequences for Turkey’s democratic evolution.

On the EU side, serious thinking on the development of ties with Turkey is needed. Though accession negotiations are bound to start at some stage, their eventual conclusion in a radically different post-enlargement, post-Convention, and post-IGC Union allow for optimism that Turkish membership (if that happens) need not necessarily be destabilizing for the balance of power inside the Union and its project on political union or its greater global role. What is important now is to evaluate carefully the implications of the decisions taken or not taken at Copenhagen, allow time for and give assistance to Turkey’s continued transformation and assure a smoother road ahead for EU-Turkey relations.

As the only NATO member that faced real and immediate threats from a war with Iraq and its aftermath, Turkey will have to come around slowly to

a closer relationship with its European neighbors (and *vice versa*). The discordant debates at the North Atlantic Council and the National Assembly, as well as the bad press it received in the United States over its tough negotiating stance (and its rejection of the economic package the United States offered in exchange for the use of their territory), must have the Turks thinking twice about placing all their eggs in one basket. It should also awaken Europeans to the realization that a clearer strategic vision which does not write off Turkey is necessary for the EU. The Iraqi crisis demonstrated that Turkey has much more in common with the vast majority of the current 15 EU member states and their public opinion than most candidate nations. In fact a Pew Global Attitudes Project poll shows that majorities in five out of seven NATO countries surveyed support a more independent relationship with the United States on diplomatic and security affairs. Fully three-quarters in France (76 per cent) and solid majorities in Turkey (62 per cent), Spain (62 per cent), Italy (61 per cent) and Germany (57 per cent) believe that Western Europe should take a more independent approach than it has in the past. Only in the United Kingdom and the United States, narrow majorities in both countries want the partnership between the United States and Western Europe to remain as close as ever. On the other hand, the percentage of Americans favoring continued close ties with Western Europe has fallen from 62 per cent before the war to 53 per cent in the current survey.²²

As the dust from the transatlantic disagreement over Iraq begins to settle, the EU might find itself much more willing to engage with a much more receptive Turkey on the notion of an enhanced or strategic partnership. This would not foreclose the possibility of EU membership, as shifting strategic perceptions across the Atlantic could diverge. In this regard the following questions arise:

1. Is Turkey ready for the EU?
2. Does Turkey really want to join the EU?
3. Does the EU really want Turkey to join?
4. What role should the strategic dimension have in EU-Turkish relations?

For the EU, the following options are open in addressing the above questions:

- Start a serious debate in terms of the strategic pros and cons of Turkish membership.
- Proceed steadfast with EU accession strategy.
- Reconsider strategy and find common ground based on strategic partnership.
- Consider the implications of the permanent non-membership of Turkey.
- Consider the possibility of early membership with long derogations.

The timeframe for a positive decision regarding the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey is rapidly becoming tighter. The December 2004 “deadline” implies achieving the various benchmarks established by the revised Accession Partnership, but also a resolution of the Cyprus problem before Cyprus’s formal accession on 1 May 2004. Other helpful developments would be the resolution of bilateral disputes with member states or the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice on disputes before the end of 2004.

Yet there are some fundamental questions to be addressed. First, are the EU, its members and citizens willing to accept Turkey as a full member? It is not just the issue of Turkey’s size (physical and demographic) and its economic and institutional weight that need to be addressed, but also the question of its European “identity.” If “identity” comes up as a concern with regard to Ukraine’s intentions to join the EU, how can it not come up in Turkey’s case? While Germany’s Chancellor, G. Schröder has said that “if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, which means democracy and rule of law are ensured, human rights are kept and minorities are appropriately protected, then accession negotiations can start, “Germany’s opposition leader, A. Merkel, has ruled out membership in favor of a “special partnership”.²³

Second, there is an interesting geostrategic dimension (given Turkey's neighborhood) which paradoxically is more dangerous and problematic than the enlarged Europe's new borders, as addressed in the Wider Europe initiative.²⁴ If the intention is to have "a ring of well governed countries" around the EU and to extend "the zone of security around Europe," is this a feasible objective with Turkey's eastern and southern neighbors where weapons of massive destruction (WMD) and terrorism concerns proliferate? This issue raises a number of questions regarding the scope and longevity of the conceptualization of the security strategy in its present form as well as the issue of the limits of the EU.

Related to the above, two further factors merit special mention: The first has to do with the impact that the EU's new members will have on the development of a security culture. Furthermore is the issue of the EU's external actions and relations with its neighboring states. The tell-tale signs show that the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe would be more willing to expand the EU's frontiers given the strategic rationale on their part for joining the EU. Poland's activism vis-à-vis EU-Ukrainian relations is a case in point.

The second factor has to do with the evolution of Turkish-American relations and their impact on EU-Turkish relations. In this regard, it should be noticed that in spite of the recent turbulence between Washington and Ankara, both sides are making significant efforts to strengthen their ties.

Greek-Turkish Relations

The year 2004 is important in reaching closure on certain key issues in Greece's foreign relations. It is a year of deadlines which marks the end of the so-called "Helsinki paradigm or cycle;" a set of criteria laid down at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 defining the conditions for Cyprus's accession and Turkish candidacy of the EU with immense implications for Greece. In this context, it is imperative that Greece has a clear strategy to meet the challenges and opportunities presented by the 2004 deadlines.

At Helsinki, Turkey was considered a candidate for accession. As stated above, this decision was bound to contribute to the search for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The EU also called for a resolution of any outstanding territorial disputes and other related issues with Greece or a resort to the International Court of Justice at the latest by the end of 2004. The December 2002 Copenhagen European Council also advanced Turkey's cause by stating that the EU will decide about opening accession negotiations in December 2004 provided Turkey meets these conditions.

Since 1999, Greece has pursued a "peace offensive" with Turkey, aimed at reducing tensions over the Aegean. This offensive was predicated on actively supporting Turkey's European future as a basis for advancing the cause of rapprochement between the two countries. This was a risky undertaking if considering that the two countries almost went to war as recently as 1996 when Turkey challenged Greek sovereignty over the Imia islet. But as the 2004 deadlines near what is the Greek strategy for the future? What if there is no short-term resolution of the impasse in Cyprus? How does Greece meet the challenge of rapprochement with Turkey if there is a deadlock in EU-Turkish relations? European support for Greece will be forthcoming, but only on the basis of a clear and proactive strategy emanating from Athens. This strategy must ultimately ensure the safeguarding of Greek interests. Cyprus and Turkey may have become EU concerns which can only be favorable to Greek interests, but Athens must resist all attempts to circumvent the decisions made in Helsinki and Copenhagen and should demand European backing for the resolution of all tensions on this basis. As it stands, however, Athens cannot currently provide answers to these questions or propose solutions to these issues.

Other European considerations further cloud these issues. For instance, 'big bang' enlargement has complex implications for the future of the EU, but as yet they are rather unclear. One thing is clear: the stalled EU constitutional debate, in conjunction with the current enlargement of the EU, will make potential accession negotiations with Turkey all that more contentious. In turn, will the Erdogan government in Turkey be able to maintain public support in favor of EU membership should the EU decide

in December 2004 that it is unwilling or unable to enter into negotiations? All these facts point to a degree of uncertainty which Greece must be ready to meet through a new strategy as yet unforthcoming.

In other words, Greece needs to advance in 2004 a strategy for post-2004.²⁵ The only viable option would be to upgrade its “peace offensive” toward Turkey with concrete proposals and commitments to address the territorial and other substantive differences in the Aegean and elsewhere. The purpose would be to assure Ankara that come what may, Athens is committed to the continued improvement of relations between the two sides.

The problem for Greece is compounded by the Cyprus conundrum. On the one hand, steadfastly supporting Cyprus’s accession to the EU “liberates” Greek foreign policy and allows it to focus on the key bilateral concerns with Turkey in the knowledge that Cyprus as an EU member will be in a better position to defend its interests. On the other hand, a Greek-Cypriot “blockage” of the Annan plan would destabilize, rather than strengthen, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a development would strengthen the hands of the Eurosceptics in Turkey and could lead to a possible veto by Athens and Nicosia with regard to Turkey’s future EU prospects given that Turkey’s armed forces would continue to occupy the sovereign territory of an EU member state.²⁶ Under these circumstances, a continued Greek-Turkish rapprochement will become extremely difficult to maintain.

Conclusion

For the future of Greek-Turkish relations, the EU-Turkish and the Greek-Turkish agendas need not necessarily be compatible in the sense that the future *rapprochement* between the two sides of the Aegean need not be dependent on Turkey’s EU prospects, provided that the Greek side does block a solution to the Cyprus question on the basis of the Annan plan. The stakes for Greece are certainly high. The swearing-in of a steady new government in Greece in March 2004 marks the beginning of a new era in

foreign policy where challenges and opportunities come hand in hand, and where a clear, coherent and practicable agenda is a vital necessity. The country and its foreign policy establishment need to refocus on the key issues and wider geographic region including the Balkans included to find once again the leadership Greece has shown before in working to assure that the European perspective for all its neighbours, especially Turkey, becomes a reality.

NOTES

1. European Commission, *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, SEC (2002) 1412, Brussels, 9 October 2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/tuen.pdf>. According to the *Report*, "The decision on the candidate status of Turkey in Helsinki in 1999 has encouraged Turkey to introduce a series of fundamental reforms. A major constitutional reform was introduced in October 2001 aimed at strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and restricting the grounds for capital punishment. A new Civil Code was adopted in November 2001. Three sets of reform packages were adopted in February, March and August 2002. The death penalty has been lifted in peacetime. The state of emergency has now been lifted in two provinces in the South East and the decision has been taken to lift it in the two provinces where it still applies by the end of this year."
2. Thanos Veremis, "The Protracted Crisis," in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization* (Dulles, Va.: Brassey's, 2001), p.46.
3. *Presidency Conclusions*, Luxembourg European Council, 12 December 1997, <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LANG=1>.
4. *Presidency Conclusions*, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LANG=1>.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002, <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LANG=1>.

7. See Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey (2003/398/EC). See also *Presidency Conclusions*, Thessaloniki European Council, 12-13 December 2003, par.38, which states that the “Accession Partnership constitutes the cornerstone of EU-Turkish relations, in particular in view of the decision to be taken by the European Council in December 2004.”

8. For a substantive analysis of ESDP in connection with Turkey, see Antonio Missiroli, “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP,” *Security Dialogue*, vol.33, no.1, March 2002, p.9-26.

9. Philip Robbins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (London: Hurst and Company, 2003), p.140.

10. See Soli Ozel, “After the Tsunami,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol.14, no.2, April 2003, p.91.

11. See, for example, Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “The Electoral Victory of Reformist Islamists in Secular Turkey,” *The International Spectator*, vol.37, no.4, October-December 2002, p.7-19.

12. Gareth Jenkins, “Muslim Democrats in Turkey?” *Survival*, vol.45, no.1, Spring 2003, p.61.

13. Ozel, op. cit. in note 10, p 93.

14. “Turkey and the United States: Drifting apart?” *Strategic Comments*, vol.9, no.3, May 2003.

15. Jenkins, op. cit. in note 12, p.61.

16. Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip L. Martin, “Is Turkey Ready for Europe?” *Foreign Affairs*, vol.82, no.3, May-June 2003, p.102.

17. For economic data on Turkey, see European Commission, *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. See also F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2003), p.54-56.

18. Larrabee and Lesser, *ibid.*, p.48-49.

19. See Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, “Further Turmoil Ahead?” in Keridis and Triantaphyllou (eds.), op. cit., in note 2, p.56-79.

20. See, for example, Neophytos G. Loizidis, "Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process," *Security Dialogue*, vol.33, no.4, December 2002, p. 438.
21. Arnaud Leparmentier and Laurent Zecchini, "Pour ou contre l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union," *Le Monde*, 9 November 2002.
22. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Views of a Changing World 2003: War with Iraq Further Divides Global Publics," 3 June 2003, <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf>.
23. See Honor Mahoney, "Germany supports Turkey's EU membership," 23 February 2004, eu.observer.com, <http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=14574>.
24. As the EU begins to consider its post-enlargement frontiers through its intention to establish a neighbourhood policy with Russia, the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) and the southern Mediterranean, it is still struggling to define its relations with the countries of the Western Balkans. The European Commission's "Wider Europe" Communication of 11 March 2003 focuses on Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the countries of the southern Mediterranean. See European Commission, "Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours," COM(2003)104 final, 11 March 2003.
25. See, for example, Theodore Couloumbis, "The Cyprus Issue and Greek-Turkish Relations: The Opportunity for 2004," (in Greek), *H Kathimerini*, 1 February 2004.
26. See, for example, Theodore Couloumbis, "Diplomatic Weariness Test for the Kostas Karamanlis Government," (in Greek), *H Kathimerini*, 14 March 2004.