ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

CRISE ET DE-EUROPÉANISATION
CRISIS AND DE-EUROPEANIZATION

Edited by / Sous la direction de
Stelios Stavridis, Charalampos Tsardanidis, George Christou

Contributors / Contributions de
**George Christou
Anna Bojinović Fenco
George Kyris
Marko Lovec
Carla Monteleone
Ali Şevket Ovali
Rodrick Pace
Stelios Stavridis
Charalampos Tsardanidis**

Zenonas Tziarras, George Koukoudakis

1

The Global Financial Crisis and the De-Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy[1]

Ali Şevket Ovalı

RÉSUMÉ

La crise financière mondiale de 2008, que la Turquie a réussi à traverser sans trop de dommages, a équipé Ankara avec un sens de l'excès de confiance qui a conduit à des décisions et des erreurs de jugement dans la mesure où la dé-européanisation est récemment devenue un phénomène plus important dans le domaine de la politique étrangère de ce pays. Nonobstant le rôle des facteurs individuels et autres au niveau de l'Etat, il est soutenu dans cet article que la crise, comme un facteur systémique, a déclenché l'éloignement de la Turquie de l'Europe. À cet égard, cet article est divisé en trois parties. Dans la première partie l'européanisation comme solution est examinée sous trois rubriques: les changements dans la structure institutionnelle et bureaucratique de la politique étrangère, les changements de l'approche de la Turquie dans le traitement des questions de l'ordre du jour de la politique étrangère, et les changements dans les politiques de la politique étrangère. Dans la deuxième partie, cet article évalue la relation causale entre la crise financière mondiale de 2008 et la dérive de la Turquie loin de l'européanisation. Dans la troisième partie, la dé-européanisation comme une sortie de la politique étrangère turque est examinée à travers des études de cas pertinents.

ABSTRACT

The 2008 global financial crisis, which Turkey has managed to sail through with atonable damages, has equipped Ankara with a sense of overconfidence which led to faulty decisions and misjudgments to the extent that de-Europeanization has recently become a more prominent phenomenon in the foreign policy domain. Notwithstanding the role of individual and state-level factors, it is argued in this article that the crisis, as a systemic factor, has triggered Turkey's drift away from Europe. In this regard, this article is divided into three sections. In the first section Europeanization as an output will be examined under three subheadings including the changes in the institutional and bureaucratic structure of foreign policy, the changes in Turkey's approach in handling foreign policy agenda issues, and the changes in the politics of foreign policy. In the second section, the causal relationship between the 2008 global financial crisis and Turkey's drift away from Europeanisation will be evaluated. In the

* University of Malta

third section, de-Europeanisation as an output in Turkish foreign policy will be discussed through relevant case studies.

Introduction

The 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU, when Turkey was granted its candidacy status, was one of the most remarkable points of Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of the Republic. After the Helsinki decision, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem and the subsequent Turkish governments initiated comprehensive structural reforms in almost every policy domain, from agricultural policies to foreign policy. Consequently, rapid transformations in the policy, politics and polity of Turkey began to be witnessed within a couple of years and the outcomes have created a tantalizing atmosphere for a sustainable and lasting reform process.

Despite its Islamic background and reactionary posture, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk nma Partisi, AKP) had also adopted a pro-European stance in the foreign policy domain during the very first years of their government. To comply with the demands of the EU, civilianization of foreign policy making processes, a shift in Turkey's uncompromising stance on problematic issues such as Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations and the government's efforts to initiate a dialogue process between Turkey and Armenia were all the early outcomes of Ankara's attempts to implement EU norms and values in the foreign policy area.

However, the reform process has slowed down since 2005 due to a number of individual, state-level and systemic/sub-systemic factors, and thereby the implementation of the reforms had remained uneven. In terms of foreign policy, Erdoğan's U-turn to a more nationalist position on Cyprus, the collapse of Turkish-Armenian dialogue process, and the failure of Turkish-Greek rapprochement to produce lasting solutions on the current problems, demonstrated Turkey's hesitancy to align itself with the EU positions on certain foreign policy issues. Moreover, disagreement between the EU and Turkey on arming the Syrian rebels

and Turkey's slamming of the EU for its stance on the military coup in Egypt had intensified tensions. The anti-EU sentiment among government circles reached its peak when Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that he did not recognize the decisions made by the European Parliament after the Parliament's non-binding decision urging 'consultation' between the government and environmental activists on the Gezi Park protests in May and June 2013.

In this regard, the Europeanisation/ De-Europeanisation dichotomy offers a valuable conceptual framework for explaining the above-mentioned shifts in Turkish foreign policy. However, using Europeanisation as a framework to examine the foreign policy shifts of a candidate country brings out some pertinent questions. The very first questions in stake are what is meant by Europeanisation and how does it take place? In the literature, there is no agreed single and precise definition of the concept, but it is generally used to refer various structural, institutional and policy changes taking place because of European integration both at the domestic and EU level.[2] How and through which processes Europeanisation takes place has also been a controversial issue.[3] Whereas a group of researchers define Europeanisation as a top down[4] or bottom up process[5], it also refers to a "circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one-off".[6] Considering Turkey's candidacy status, this paper consciously restricts itself to a top-down approach, or downloading, as referred to in the Introduction of this Special Issue. The main logic behind this assumption is that, within the course of European integration of candidate countries, "the EU becomes the only norm maker, generating a stimuli and imposing considerable pressure on the candidates, to adopt certain types of institutional and policy changes".[7] Since each candidate country gradually became a simple EU policy downloader or a 'passive recipient'[8] during the accession talks, this process may even take the form of EUization[9] in particular policy areas. As Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe argue, "in contrast to the foreign policy changes of member states brought about by the EU dynamics, the transformation of candidates is imposed vertically by the EU through a hierarchical process".[10]

If the dynamics of Europeanisation for a candidate country is formulated as such, the Europeanization/De-Europeanisation dichotomy addresses the consequences of European integration in candidate countries. A uni-dimensional top-down European integration may display a response spectrum ranging from 'absorption' 'transformation' and 'inertia' to "retrenchment".[11] In case of retrenchment, such a reactionary state behavior may either be named as "negative Europeanization"[12] "De-Europeanization" or "re-nationalization".[13] Understood as such, de-Europeanisation refers to partial or complete re-nationalization of domestic politics, policies and polity as the result of a member/candidate country's reaction to adaptation pressures generated by the EU.

The second question is if foreign policy is considered as one of the most problematic areas to observe national adaptation, how may the researchers measure the impacts and limits of such a process? This question deals not only with the ontological problem of studying foreign policy within the context of European integration but also evokes a methodological problem as how to measure its impacts and limits.

Ontologically, studying the impacts of European integration on the foreign policy of a member or candidate country posits the nature of the state as a problem. Even though globalization continues to undermine the Westphalian model of state, foreign policy and national security are still considered as policy areas that should remain within the domestic/national realm of politics. The EU itself through the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty has highlighted similar concerns as well and whereas the principle of unanimity remains as the most essential system for security and defense cooperation, qualified majority voting was excluded from strategic decisions, which involve military and defense implications.[14] Regarding the significance of the Westphalian legacy particularly in the foreign policy domain of a state, it is argued here that, it is for this reason that examining the consequences of European integration in the foreign policy domain can best display the Europeanization/de-Europeanisation dichotomy.

Methodologically, measuring the impact(s) of European integration on the foreign policy of a candidate country is assumed to necessitate the examination of outputs that is mostly based on Hix and Goetz's

identification of European integration as an independent variable and the changes appearing at the domestic level or Europeanisation as the dependent variable.[15] Concordantly, the existing literature on Turkey's bid for EU membership had assumed greater significance to Europeanisation to explain domestic changes due to adaptation pressures.[16] Considering the Turkish case, if Europeanisation is understood as visible changes in the polity, policies and the politics of a candidate country, Turkish foreign policy cannot be immune from the transformative impacts of European integration.

Moreover, the EU's relative weakness on the generation of adaptation procedures in the foreign policy domain does not nullify its transformative impact on the foreign policies of candidate countries but instead forces the researchers to go beyond European integration as the only independent variable for exploring change/Europeanisation at the domestic level. In other words, measuring the scope and limits of change/Europeanisation with reference to 'adaptation pressures' as the only presumed cause ignores the context dependent nature of foreign policy. Thus, together with the adaptation pressures generated by the EU, contextual parameters at the individual, state and sub-systemic/systemic levels may provide new insights to observe shifts in Turkish foreign policy.

Notwithstanding the significance of adaptation pressures generated by the EU as well as individual, state and sub-systemic/systemic level parameters enforcing a certain type of foreign policy behavior, it is argued that a systemic factor, namely the 2008 global financial crisis, is one of the most significant factors that caused Turkey's drift away from Europeanisation to De-Europeanisation in the foreign policy domain. In this regard, this article is divided into three sections. In the first section Europeanisation as an output will be examined under three subheadings including the changes in the institutional and bureaucratic structure of foreign policy,[17] the changes in Turkey's approach in handling the issues on the foreign policy agenda, and the changes in the politics of foreign policy. In the second section, the causal relationship between the 2008 global financial crisis and Turkey's foreign policy preferences will be evaluated. In the third

section, de-Europeanization as an output in Turkish foreign policy will be discussed through relevant case studies.

Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy

Borrowing Tanja Börzel's conventional categorization between politics, polity and policy, [18] three substantive areas can be identified to examine the scope and limits of Europeanisation in Turkish foreign policy. Accordingly, the change in the institutional structures (polity),[19] the change in problem solving approaches and instruments (policy) and the change in interest formation/representation and public discourse (politics) are the areas that are to be dealt with within the framework of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy.

Democratization of decision making through the civilianization of the National Security Council (NCS)[20] and the emergence of new institutional mechanisms were the very first prominent outcomes of european integration in the foreign policy domain. EU conditionality has undoubtedly necessitated such a structural transformation since the EU in the 2001 Accession Partnership Document urged Turkey to take the necessary steps for reviving such reform.[21] Yet, the AKP's perception about the role of the EU in domestic politics can also be identified as a factor in the transformation of decision-making mechanisms. After declaring its victory in the 3 November 2002 elections the AKP has engaged in a power struggle with the secular ranks of the civilian and military bureaucracies. In the very first years of this struggle, the EU was seen as an anchor for the consolidation of civilian authority.[22]

In conjunction with EU regulations, the Secretariat General for EU Affairs was established on 4 June 2000. The duties and competences of the Secretariat were described as "providing internal coordination and harmonization between public institutions, with a purpose to prepare Turkey to EU membership".[23] In June 2011, the Secretariat was transformed into the Ministry for EU Affairs and Egemen Bağış, Turkey's chief EU negotiator since January 2009, was appointed as the first EU minister.

Turkey's efforts to align itself with EU governance also necessitated

structural changes within already existing institutions. NSC, a military dominated advisory body, has attracted severe criticisms from the EU for its interference in politics that had become a daily routine between 1980 and 2001.[24] After Turkey was given candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the coalition government had initiated an extensive reform program. Within the context of foreign policy, the government's proposal aimed to diminish the significance of military elites in the decision making processes. The parliamentary bill on article 118 of the 1982 constitution changed "the structure and the functions of the NSC by increasing the number of civilian members and declaring that the decisions of the council thereafter to be considered as recommendations".[25] The first NSC meeting with a civilian majority was held on 30 October 2001.[26]

As Turkey undertook comprehensive reforms, the AKP government took further steps to diminish the role of the military in politics. Concordantly, the government sent a seventh reform package to the National Assembly which included structural changes concerning the legal status of the NSC. On 23 July 2003, the National Assembly passed the package with a majority vote and "the consultative nature of NSC was more greatly emphasized" in the new law.[27] On 18 August 2004, for the first time in Turkish political history since 1980, a civilian, senior diplomat, Yiğit Alpogan, was appointed as the Secretary General of the new National Security Council.

Structural changes inevitably entailed the incorporation of civil society into foreign policy making process and elevated strategic foreign policy issues to the level of public debates.[28] The pressure created by public opinion first surfaced during the US intervention to Iraq in 2003. The US demand to deploy troops on Turkish territory undoubtedly sparked a debate among the Turkish people on the risk of an armed clash between Turkish and Iraqi forces. As a result of public pressure, the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected a draft authorizing the deployment of US troops in Turkish territory.[29] For Philip Robbins, this event demonstrated that "even in a super elite-oriented country like Turkey, public opinion can count for something, even in the arena of foreign policy making".[30]

The incorporation of civil society to foreign policy making[31] was not only limited to business circles such as the TOBB (Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) but also included think thanks such as SETA (The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) and USAK (International Strategic Research Organization).[32] Moreover, thanks to its conservative structure and unconditional political support to the AKP, MUSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) became an influential actor of foreign policy making under Erdoğan governments.[33]

Europeanisation in terms of structural reforms in foreign policy decision making had coincided with the changes in the politics of foreign policy, which means changes in interest articulation, representation and public discourse. In this regard, Turkey transformed itself from 'security state' to 'trading state'[34] and economic interests replaced hard security concerns as the main motivations behind Turkey's activism.

Furthermore, Europeanisation of the politics of foreign policy became more prevalent through the government's discursive shift from its predecessor Refah's (Welfare Party) reactionary anti-western discourse. In the very first year of its governance, AKP certainly avoided the use of anti-western discourse that could hamper Turkey's EU membership process. In its struggle with the secular elites for power, AKP saw the EU anchor as an essential factor for the consolidation of Turkish democracy and an outside source of its legitimacy. Under these circumstances, Tayyip Erdoğan took off the 'national outlook shirt' previously tailored by Turkey's well-known Islamist leader, Necmettin Erbakan, and adopted a liberal discourse towards Turkey's EU membership in its early years.[35]

Finally yet importantly, Europeanisation became more prominent in the foreign policy domain through the adaptation of new problem solving approaches and instruments such as diplomacy, dialogue and the use of economic instruments, towards the problematic issues on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. In the aftermath of 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was compelled to reformulate its instruments and

problem solving approaches on certain issues.[36] The very first outcomes of Turkey's efforts to comply with the EU norms and values were the Turkish-Greek rapprochement and Ankara's retreat from its traditional position towards the long-standing Cyprus problem.

Turkish-Greek rapprochement manifested itself through a dialogue process first initiated by the foreign ministers Ismail Cem and Yorgos Papandreou in the aftermath of 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey. Since then, as Bahar Rumelili argues, "The Greek-Turkish conflicts have de-escalated to issue conflicts, with the as yet unresolved Aegean disputes being to some extent desecuritized, and have begun to be articulated as differences that can be managed, rather than as existential threats".[37] In 2000, an agreement on confidence building measures including prior notification of military exercises was signed and both countries decided to organize seminars, workshops and working groups for further cooperation.[38] In February 2002, exploratory contacts between Ankara and Athens began with an aim to find a sustainable and long lasting solution to Aegean disputes.[39] Moreover, economic relations between the two countries have rapidly expanded between 2002 and 2008.[40]

Europeanisation as a change in problem solving approaches also became visible in Turkey's changing attitude towards the re-unification of Cyprus. In November 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a comprehensive re-unification plan for the island. Annan plan was intended to create a federal state structure with two constituent parts and rotating presidency. Shortly after Annan's declaration of the plan, the EU in December 2002 Copenhagen Summit manifested its position on the issue which can be considered as an early announcement of EU conditionality for Turkey's membership. While the EU openly declared its support to the efforts for the settlement of the dispute under the auspices of the UN, the Copenhagen decision also underlined that in case of a possible failure only the Greek Cypriot part of the island would become a full member of the EU in 2004. The decision of the EU undoubtedly urged Ankara to reconsider its policies towards the re-unification of the island and the Erdoğan government pledged its support for the proposed plan.

For Meltem Müftüler Bac and Aylin Güney, EU conditionality was the main factor behind this policy shift and the AKP's handling of issue was indeed a breakthrough compared with the previous governments' arguments and policy preferences.[41]

As a matter of course, Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy cannot be limited to the aforementioned policy shifts and structural changes. The improvement of relations with neighbors such as Syria and Armenia, erstwhile considered as enemies and the use of economic tools instead of military power as the main instruments of foreign policy are the outputs that can be evaluated within the context of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy. Yet, this article consciously restricted itself with concrete institutional adaptations as outcomes and case studies where EU conditionality can be observed through a causal link.

Even though the implementation of reforms remained problematic particularly in the area of human rights and freedoms, between 1999 and 2005 Turkey undertook extensive reforms to adjust itself to European norms, values and expectations. However, Ankara's enthusiasm for EU membership remarkably decreased after 2005 and the reform process lost its momentum. More recently, Turkey's changing stance on certain foreign policy issues and Tayyip Erdoğan's rejection of the EU Parliament's resolution during the Gezi Park protests raised concerns among pro-European circles. In this regard, the government's retreat from its pro-European posture on almost every single policy domain brings up a crucial question: which factors seem to explain Turkey's drift away from Europeanisation to de-Europeanization?

The 2008 Financial Crisis and Turkey's Drift away from Europe

A comprehensive analysis of Turkey's policy shift towards the EU requires the examination of individual, state-level and systemic factors.[42] Whereas the AKP's third electoral victory in the 2011 elections, steady economic growth rates and the government's increasing over-confidence after consolidating their power in domestic politics can be accounted for by state level factors, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's personal

preferences, ambitions, perceptions and foreign policy formulations based on their Islamic identity can be indicated as individual factors that seem to shape Turkey's drift away from Europeanization. On the other hand, the EU's mismanagement of the Cyprus problem and uncertainties embedded in Turkey's accession talks together with the opportunities that appeared in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, can all be considered as sub-systemic factors that culminated in Turkey's drift away from Europe.

Admitting that all of these factors more or less shaped Turkey's policy preferences towards the EU, this article aims to discuss the influence of a systemic factor; the 2008 global financial crisis. The rationale behind this approach is the assumption that the 2008 global financial crisis has directly hit the parties of the turbulent Turkey-EU relationship in a significant way.

For Turkey, the financial crisis had two inevitable repercussions for Turkish foreign policy. First, the crisis impelled the decision makers to seek alternative routes in foreign policy at the time where Europe was experiencing a decline. Second, despite its economy's structural weaknesses and fragility, Turkey's capability to sail through the crisis resulted in Ankara distancing itself from Brussels.

For the EU, the shattering impact of the financial crisis inflamed the already existing arguments stressing that enlargement should take a back seat. In other words, member states' concerns on the costs of enlargement in general, and worries on Turkey's full membership in particular, have been doubled by the outbreak of financial crisis.

Though addressing the vulnerabilities and fragility of the Turkish economy is beyond the scope of this study, it is noteworthy to mention that the empirical data addressing an intriguing economic performance is still debated among the academic and economic circles.[43] The alarming current account deficit that reached unmanageable levels, a pseudo growth based on credit expansion and foreign capital flows, a low labor force participation rate (roughly around 50 percent), unequal distribution of wealth and large-scale privatizations that increased Turkey's import dependency, all represent negative aspects of the

Turkish government's approach. In addition the context dependent nature of the global economy, conjunctural developments that may hamper Turkey's foreign trade, like a new recession in EU, the country's dependency on energy sources and the AKP's mismanagement of the regional political crises in the Middle East, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, raise doubts about the sustainability of Ankara's economic performance.

After the outbreak of the crisis, Ankara invested in diversifying its trading partners to cope with its devastating impacts.[44] Such a strategy was adopted and implemented from 2002, even before the outbreak of the crisis, and it produced the expected outcomes for Turkey particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region until the Arab Spring.

Accordingly, whereas the EU's share in Turkey's foreign trade was 53.63 percent in 2003, it decreased to a level of 41.6 percent in 2010.[45] On the contrary, Asia-Near and Middle Eastern Regions' share in Turkey's foreign trade continued to increase throughout the same time periods. The latest data revealed by the Turkish Ministry of Economy demonstrate that the share of Asia, including the Near and Middle East regions in Turkey's foreign trade, reached the levels of 38 percent in exports and 29.1 percent in imports, by June 2012. However, export market diversification strategy should not be interpreted as Turkey's search for an alternative to the EU but indeed an attempt to minimize the negative effects of the crisis. Despite a major setback in 2008, the EU27 still ranks first in Turkey's trade relations. In 2012, Turkey's imports from the EU exceeded 75 billion Euros and exports reached 47.8 billion Euros (27.2 billion Euros in favor of the EU).[46]

Addressing the causal link between the global financial crisis and Turkey's gradual drift away from Europeanisation would be a reductionist approach and previously mentioned individual, state and system level factors should also be taken into account. Yet, it is still plausible to argue that, at the time when the spectre of financial crisis haunted Europe, economic parameters had significant affects over the parties of the volatile Turkey-EU relationship. In this regard, Ziya Öni

explains the affects of the 2008 global financial crisis over Turkish foreign policy as follows:

> "The global economic and financial crisis of 2008-2009 was ultimately a 'crisis of the center', in contrast to the frequent crises which had occurred in the semi-periphery of the global system during the course of the 1990s. From this point of view, the global financial crisis presented a major political economic challenge to the American or Western-dominated globalization. The crisis, moreover, accelerated the shift which had already started, namely a shift of the economic axis of the global system from the 'west' to the 'east' or from the 'north' to the 'south'. BRIC countries in general and China in particular, emerged even stronger from the global financial crisis. In contrast, the EU appeared to be a major loser of the global economic crisis, at least from a short-term perspective. Many countries in the European periphery, notably Central and Eastern European countries and Greece, encountered drastic economic turmoil and downturns in economic performance. The West, especially the EU, turned out to be a less attractive destination in terms of purely economic benefits while the rising 'East' or 'South' appeared to be increasingly more attractive in terms of future trade and investment".[47]

Understood as such, the 2008 financial crisis becomes a crucial factor in explaining Turkey's increasing activism in the East and ongoing estrangement between Ankara and Brussels. Turkey's move from its cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue, the atmosphere of the Turkish-Greek dialogue process that failed to produce any concrete solutions to primary problems and growing Euroskepticism in Turkey inflamed by Erdoğan, are the outputs within which de-Europeanisation can be observed.

De-Europeanisation in Turkish Foreign Policy

De-Europeanisation as an output in Turkish foreign policy became prominent first in Turkey's stance towards the Cyprus issue, particularly after Cyprus' joined the EU in 2004. The EU's response to Turkey's positive stance towards the Annan Plan created disappointment among Turkish political circles. While 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the plan, the plan was rejected by 76 percent of Greek Cypriots. Accordingly, Cyprus' accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, as the sole legitimate representative of the island, without any final settlement of the dispute, was a turning point in the recent history of Turkey-EU relations.

Despite Brussels' unfair approach to the problem, Turkey's immediate response was not reactionary at all since the EU also decided to open accession talks with Turkey in December 2004. This time, Turkey was required to sign the Additional Protocol that would adapt the 1963 Ankara Agreement to the new members of the EU, including Cyprus. This meant Turkey's recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, since Turkey was required to open its ports and harbors to the Greek Cypriots. To start negotiations Turkey signed the Additional Protocol in July 2005, but declared simultaneously that it did not mean an official recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.

In October 2005, the EU decided to start accession talks with Turkey and the peaceful settlement of the border disputes with the neighbors and normalization of relations with Cyprus were declared as the principles that would govern the negotiations.[48] However EU conditionality on Turkey's recognition of the Republic of Cyprus continued to hamper the accession talks. In 2006, the crisis between the EU and Turkey escalated when the EU ministers decided to suspend the accession talks on eight chapters because of Turkey's refusal to implement the requirements of the Protocol.

Between 2006 and 2008, no significant progress was observed with the Cyprus problem. In 2008, the political landscape of the negotiations between Mehmet Ali Talat and Dimitris Christofias were promising since both leaders were assumed to have similar political

backgrounds. Yet, not only this initiative, but also Christofias-Eroğlu negotiations that took place between 2008 and 2010 failed to produce a solution to the existing problems and the island remained divided until now. By early 2011, when a solution looked unlikely to appear, Turkey's approach towards the settlement of the dispute began to change towards adopting a more nationalistic discourse and praxis.

The first significant crisis between Cyprus and Turkey in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis surfaced in the summer of 2011. As Cyprus' presidency for the EU approached, the tone of criticism on the Turkish side was hardened. The following precept from Erdoğan displays Turkey's move towards a nationalistic posture regarding the Cyprus problem:

"This is our final approach... How can we sit at the negotiating table with a Greek Cypriot administration that we do not recognize? We don't care what the EU would think about it. The EU should have thought about it while accepting them [Greek Cypriots] into the EU. The EU has done us wrong. They weren't honest with us... During its [Greek Cypriot] presidency, we will never meet them. Relations with the EU will freeze...There will not be any relation between Turkey and the EU for six months. We will only watch the process from Turkey... It is out of the question for us to meet Greek Cypriots. We don't meet a country that we don't recognize. We consider it degrading to even sit at the same table with the Greek Cypriot administration in the United Nations."[49]

The crisis peaked when a Greek Cypriot licensed international company, Noble Energy, began natural gas and oil explorations on the waters that were unilaterally claimed by Cyprus as its own exclusive economic zone. Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, declared such a move as a "one-sided provocation" and added, "If this fait accompli continues, we have steps of our own we can take".[50] In response, Turkey also signed an energy exploration and exploitation agreement with Turkish Cypriots[51] and sent its warships to the Mediterranean to escort Turkish drilling ship Koca Piri Reis.[52] The recent hydrocarbons crisis between Cyprus and Turkey have inflamed the already existing tension between Ankara and Nicosia and Turkey's changing stance

towards the settlement of the problem manifested itself during Cyprus' EU term presidency, as relations between the EU and Turkey froze.

As far as Turkish-Greek relations are concerned, the general course of the relations is unlikely to renew the antagonistic atmosphere of the 1990s, even at the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. The mutual visits of Karamanlis to Turkey on 23 January 2008 and Erdoğan to Greece on 22 October 2010 contributed to the improvement of relations and twenty two cooperation agreements were concluded. During Samaras' visit to Turkey on 4 March 2013 a broad range of cooperation agreements from agriculture to disaster relief were signed by both parties.[53] However, despite the intensity of these efforts, it is worth mentioning that Turkish foreign policy towards Greece in the post 2008 period has transformed from a policy approach to be formulated within the context of EU membership to a technical process that could last for decades.

Despite the bilateral endeavors to improve relations, the ongoing dialogue process has failed to provide long lasting solutions on certain disputed issues such as the Aegean problems and the unification of Cyprus. Moreover, mutual allegations of air space violations became a daily routine, particularly between 2012 and 2013.[54]

Besides the EU and system generated factors, state level contextual shifts and sub-systemic imperatives were also influential in the course of the relations particularly after 2008. The sub-systemic imperatives were a crisis led environment in Europe in which Athens was wrecked by economic and political turmoil and the outbreak of Arab Spring that Ankara was trying to adjust itself to. These factors inevitably led Turkish-Greek rapprochement to take a back seat on the foreign policy agendas of both states. On the other hand, state level contextual shifts were the political instability in Greece and the rising Euro-skepticism within Turkish political circles. Taking all of these factors into account, one may easily argue that Turkish foreign policy towards Greece entered the inertia of a standstill period if not precisely De-Europeanization.

If De-Europeanisation of the politics of foreign policy is understood as re-nationalization of interest articulation, interest representation

and public discourse, AKP's recent presentation of the Western world through a reactionary nationalist discourse during the Gezi Park Protests during 2013 should also be examined as a case study. During the protests, the AKP government did not refrain from using the Islamic reactionary discourse of its Islamist predecessor Refah Party against the West in general and the EU in particular. Such an anti-western discourse can be seen as a precise move away from Europeanisation if the liberal discourse adapted by the AKP during their early years of governance is considered.

De-Europeanisation of the politics of Turkish foreign policy has become prevalent during the Taksim Gezi Park protests, which started as a peaceful demonstration of environmental activists against the local government's plan to construct a shopping mall in one of the most well known destinations in Istanbul, Taksim Square. The riot police's excessive use of violence against the peaceful demonstrations resulted in the spread of protests to other cities. The tear gas capsules and water cannons injured thousands of protestors and four protestors were killed. From the very early days of these protests, the Western world has been and still is securitized by Tayyip Erdoğan and by other AKP leaders via reactionary and nationalistic speech acts.[55]

During these protests, the western world, in which the EU is a constitutive part, was continuously accused of organizing such a conspiracy to undermine Turkey's political and economic power by the AKP's leading figures. An imaginary 'interest lobby' together with 'foreign powers' and their 'domestic collaborators' such as non-governmental organizations, political parties, trade associations, student unions and trade unions were presented as the actors behind the nationwide protests. In Erdoğan's words;

"Do you know who emerged as the winner in these incidents? The interest lobby and rivals of Turkey. Yes, our economy suffered from these protests to a little extent. They went out saying they were the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal and they became the interest rate lobby's unpaid soldiers"[56]

Similarly, Egemen Bağış accused the western world of supporting the

Gezi Park protests arguing that "there is no state violence in Turkey... We know the national and international players in this plot".[57]

Understood as such, the government's discursive transformation from the 'EU as the guarantor of democracy' to 'EU as a plotter', which signals a shift towards De-Europeanisation increased the tension between Ankara and Brussels. After the European Parliament's (EP) non-binding resolution expressing the concerns of the government's excessive use of violence against peaceful protests and urging consultation among the parties of the conflict, Erdoğan reacted harshly stating "I do not recognize any decision that the EP will make on Turkey".[58] The crisis between Ankara and Brussels is likely to deepen, as the parties' disagreement on certain policy preferences towards Syria and Egypt continues.

Conclusions

The Europeanization-De-Europeanisation dichotomy offers an analytical framework for explaining the shifts in certain policy domains. For the purpose of this article Europeanisation is taken as an output/change that can be observed in the domestic policy, polity and politics of a state as a result of the adaptation pressures generating from the EU. The rationale behind this preference is the belief that candidate countries simply become policy downloaders during the accession talks.

Such a formulation of the concept entails the examination of state responses to the pressures that are assumed to take place throughout the integration process. However a comparative analysis of Turkish foreign policy before and after 2005, demonstrated that these changes have appeared both on the negative and positive response spectrums. Thus, in this research De-Europeanisation is used to refer to the states' reaction to the pressures generated by the EU and an inclination towards a reformulation of certain policy domains on the basis of national priorities, interests and principles.

Considering the foreign policy of a candidate state, the Europeanization-De-Europeanisation dichotomy becomes more meaningful.

Foreign policy is the most significant policy domain in which a state's manifestation of sovereignty and Westphalian heritage becomes more apparent compared to other areas of European integration requiring mainly technical cooperation. For this very reason the nature of the state enables researchers to observe foreign policy shifts of candidate/member countries through the lens of the Europeanization-De-Europeanisation dichotomy. Yet focusing on European integration as the only independent variable would be a reductionist approach if the context dependent nature of foreign policy is considered.

The context dependent nature of foreign policy requires the examination of a broad range of factors, stemming from individual decision makers, state-level factors and systemic/sub-systemic imperatives, to understand and analyze shifts in a state's foreign policy preferences and orientations. Notwithstanding the significance of these factors, this research restricted itself to revealing the causal relationship between the 2008 global financial crisis and De-Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy. Within this context, it is assumed that the crisis, as a systemic factor, did not only alter the course of Turkey-EU relations but also impelled Turkey to solidify its position in the East and rearrange its national priorities in order to survive the devastating impact of the crisis.

In this regard, the changes in the politics, polity and problem solving approaches within the context of Turkish foreign policy were discussed in the first section. The empirical parts of this section are based on structural/institutional changes, shifts in problem solving approaches and the politics of foreign policy encompassing changes in interest articulation, representation and public discourse.

In the second section the impacts of the global financial crisis on Turkish foreign policy as a factor behind De-Europeanisation has been examined. The empirical findings in this section are addressing the fact that, the recent economic indicators about Turkish economy and opportunities in the MENA region in which Turkey was politically over-engaged resulted with an increasing over-confidence which can be interpreted as one of the main factors behind Turkey's drift away from Europeanization.

In the third section, De-Europeanisation is discussed through a closer examination of Turkey's changing stance on certain foreign policy issues. Accordingly, Turkey's move from its cooperative stance on Cyprus, the inertia of standstill in Turkish-Greek relations and the government's recent securitization of the Western financial circles and the EU in particular, were evaluated as the signs of De-Europeanization.

Finally, yet importantly, Erdoğan's slamming of the EU for remaining idle to the massacres in Egypt and Syria is likely to find resonance among Turkish people. If the societal perceptions on the EU continue to change in such a negative direction, the government may take further steps towards De-Europeanisation in almost all policy domains. In terms of foreign policy, Turkey's drift away from Europeanisation is likely to continue as the contextual shifts take place. Together with the financial crisis and the EU's reluctance on Turkey's membership, rising Euro-skepticism in Turkey may also trigger this process. Under these circumstances, no precise steps from Ankara can be expected towards the settlement of disputes with Greece and Cyprus, the cases in which Europeanisation was previously observed.

NOTES

1. An earlier draft of this study was published in *Studia Europea*, Vol. 3, 2012, pp. 17-38 with the title "From Europeanization to Renationalization: Contextual Parameters of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy". A revised and updated version of the study was presented in the 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations organized by EISA in Warsaw Poland, April 2013.

2. Johan P. Olsen, "The Many Faces of Europeanization", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002, pp. 923-924.

3. For a comprehensive analysis on the conceptualizations and dynamics of Europeanisation, see Kerry Howell, "Developing Conceptualizations of Europeani-sation and European Integration: Mixing Methodologies", ESRC Seminar Series / UACES Study Group on the Europeanisation of British Politics, 29.11.2002, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1720/1/Howell.pdf (accessed in April 2015).

4. For Robert Ladrech, Europeanisation is an "an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic

dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making". Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1994, p. 69. Similarly Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble define the concept as "a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics". See, Jim Buller and Andrew Gamble, "Conceptualizing Europeanization" *Public Policy and Administration, Understanding the Europeanization of Public Policy,* Vol. 17, No. 2, 2002, Special Issue, p. 17.

5. According to Kenneth Dyson, Europeanisation refers to the emergence of 'genuine structures' at the EU level. Kenneth Dyson, "Introduction: EMU as Integration, Europeanization and Convergence" in Kenneth Dyson, (ed.), *European States and the Euro*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 3. Similarly Claudia Major defines Europeanisation as a bottom-up process "where states seek to export particular policy models, ideas, and ways of doing things to the EU level". See Claudia Major, *Europe is what Member States Make of it, an Assessment of the Influence of Nation States on the European Security and Defense Policy*, A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, European Research Institute, School of Social Sciences, The University of Birmingham, September 2008, p. 32. Maria Green Cowles, James Caporosso and Thomas Risse Kappen formulate Europeanisation as "the emergence and development at the European level of distinctive structures of governance, that is, of political legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules". See, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporasso and Thomas Risse Kappen, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", in Maria Green Cowles and James Caporasso and Thomas Risse Kappen (ed), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, New York, Cornell University Press,, 2001, p.3.

6. Klaus Goetz, "Four Worlds of Europeanization", Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshop, Turin, Italy, 22-27 March 2002, p.4. Similarly, Claudio Radaelli defines Europeanisation as "processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub national) discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies". See, Claudio M. Radaelli, "The Europeanization of Public Policy", in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.30. Also see Kevin Featherstone, and George Kazamias, "Introduction" in Kevin Featherstone, and George Kazamias (eds.), *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery,* London, Frank Caas, 2001, p. 6.

7. Olivera Djordjevic, "The Limits of Europeanization 'From Without': Is there an EU Driven Democratization Process in Serbia?", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 18, October 2008, p. 83.

8. Scott James, "Europeanization as Projection: Understanding the Changing Face of EU Policy Making within the Core Executive", *Political Perspectives*, Vol.2, No. 3, 2007, p. 8.

9. Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power, Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p.4.

10. Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe, "Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 9, No. 3 2007, p. 267.

11. In the literature, European integration is assumed to bring about changes in domestic politics, namely inertia, transformation, absorption, accommodation and transformation. Tanja Börzel claims that 'inertia' refers to the lack of change that occurs because of member states' resistance to adaptations which are necessary to meet European requirements and 'retrenchment' refers to the "resistance to change may have the paradoxical effect of increasing rather than decreasing misfits between the European and the domestic level". See Tanja Börzel, "How the European Union interacts with its Member States", *Political Science Series,* 93, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, November 2003, p. 15. For Claudio Radaelli, inertia "may take the forms of lags, delays in the transposition of directives, implementation as transformation, and sheer resistance to EU-induced change". Similarly for Claudio Radaelli, inertia "may take the forms of lags, delays in the transposition of directives, implementation as transformation, and sheer resistance to EU-induced change" and "retrenchment" refers to a very paradoxical effect of European integration "in which national policy becomes less European than it was". See Claudio M. Radaelli, "Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 4, No. 8, 2000, p. 14. Also see Tanjia Börzel and Thomas Risse "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 4, No. 15, 2000, p. 11.

12. C. M. Radaelli, "Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change", *op.cit,* p. 14.

13. Şevket Ovalı, "From Europeanization to Re-nationalization: The Contextual Parameters of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Studia UBB Europea*, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2012, pp. 17-38.

14. Christian Mölling, "ESDP After Lisbon: More Coherent and Capable?", *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 28, February 2008, p.1.

15. Simon Hix, and Klaus Goetz, "Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems". *West European Politics,* Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, p.27.

16. Ziya Öniş, "Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate", *Insight Turkey,* Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, pp. 35-50, Ziya Öniş, "Turkey's Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple Transformations, Inherent Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2006, pp. 279-298, Ziya Öniş, and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009, pp. 7-24, Ziya Öniş, "The New Wave of Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey, Drifting Away from Europeanization?", *DIIS Report*, No. 5, 2009, pp. 4-39, Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces Of The "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics And A Critique", *GLODEM Working Paper Series*, April 2010, pp. 1-23, Nathalie Tocci, "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 73-83, Ilker Ataç and Andreas Grünewald, "Stabilization through Europeanization? Discussing the Transformation Dynamics in Turkey", *Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2008, pp. 31-54, Kivanç Ulusoy, "The Changing Challenge of Europeanization to Politics and Governance in Turkey", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 30, No. 363, 2009, pp. 363-384, Ozan Örmeci, "The Impact of Europeanization on Turkish Political Party System: Justice and Development Party (2002-2007)", *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, Vol. 3, No. 18, September 2012, pp. 205-212, Faidon Zaras, "Europeanization or Endogenous Institutional Change? The Case of Turkey", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2013, pp. 1-23, Umut Aydin and Kemal Kirişci, "With or Without the EU: Europeanisation of Asylum and Competition Policies in Turkey", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2013, pp. 1-21. Kemal Kirişci, "The Limits of Conditionality and Europeanization: Turkey's Dilemmas in Adopting the EU Acquis on Asylum", *European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference*, 17-19 May 2007, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/7936/ (Accessed in April 2015), Isik Ozel, "Differential Europe within a Nation: Europeanization of Regulation Across Policy Areas", *Journal of European Public Policy,* Vol. 20, No. 5, 2013, pp. 741-759, H. Tarik Oğuzlu, "Turkey and the European Union: Europeanization Without Membership", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2012, pp. 229-243, Meltem Müftüler Baç, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics", *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 159-179, Bahar Rumelili, "The European Union's Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict", *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflict Studies*, No. 6, January 2004, pp. 1-31, Bahar Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek–Turkish Cooperation", *South European Society and Politics,* Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 45-56, Meltem Müftüler Baç, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union", *South*

European Society and Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 2005, pp. 17-31, Meltem Müftüler Baç and Yaprak Gürsoy, "Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2010, pp. 405-427, Meltem Müftüler Baç, "Turkish Foreign Policy, its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European Union", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2011, pp. 279-291, Metin Heper, "The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy", *South European Society & Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 33–44, Alper Kaliber, "Contextual and Contested: Reassessing Europeanization in the Case of Turkey", *International Relations*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2012, pp. 52–73, Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun, "Europe as Seen from Turkey: From a Strategic Goal to an Instrumental Partnership?", *Perspectives Review of International Affairs*, No. 2, 2012, pp. 83-101, Atila Eralp, "The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU relationship", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, pp. 149-170, Pınar Bilgin, "Clash of Cultures? Differences between Turkey and the European Union on Security", in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (eds), *The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls*, Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004, pp. 25-52, Fuat Keyman, "Modernization, Globalization and Democratization in Turkey: The AKP Experience and its Limits", *Constellations,* Vol. 17, No. 2, 2010, pp. 312-327. Bahar Rumelili and Fuat Keyman, "Enacting European Citizenship Beyond the EU: Turkish Citizens and their European political practices", in Michael Saward (ed.), *Enacting European Citizenship,* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013, pp. 66-83. Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun, "Europeanization of Turkish Politics and Policies: Past Present and Future", in Belgin Akçay and Bahri Yılmaz (eds), *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Political and Economic Challenges*, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2013, pp. 25-45.

17. For a comprehensive analysis on the impacts of Europeanisation in terms of foreign policy institutions and bureaucracy, see Michael E. Smith, "Conforming to Europe: Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Cooperation", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2000, pp. 619-624.

18. Tanja Börzel, "How the European Union interacts with its Member States", *Political Science Series 93*, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, November 2003, p. 4.

19. For a comprehensive analysis on the impacts of Europeanisation in terms of foreign policy institutions and bureaucracy, see Michael E. Smith, "Conforming to Europe: Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-operation, *op.cit.,* pp. 619-624.

20. NSC was first established by the 1961 constitution as an advisory body with a civilian majority. However particularly after the 12 September 1980 military coup d'état, this body has turned into an instrument that has been used by the military for intervening in politics. NSC with a majority of generals was not only a powerful actor of domestic politics but it was also influential in the foreign policy making

process. For a comprehensive analysis on the role of military in foreign policy making process, see Gencer Özcan, "The Changing Role of Turkey's Military in Foreign Policy Making", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 23, May 2010.

21. Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Açıkmeşe, "Europeanization Through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", *op.cit.,* p. 269.

22. For an assessment on the instrumental role of the EU within the context of civil-military relations under AKP see, Şule Toktaş and Ümit Kurt, "The Turkish Military's Autonomy, JDP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF)", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No.3, 2010, pp. 387-403.

23. Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EU Affairs, available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=44&l=2 (Accessed in April 2015).

24. Ziya Öniş, "Domestic Politics, International Norms nad Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era", in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds), *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*, London, Frank Cass, 2003, p.13.

25. Zühtü Arslan, "Government" in Ümit Cizre (ed.), *Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in Turkey*, Berlin, LIT Verlag 2007, p. 28.

26. *Yeni Şafak* (Turkish Daily), "İlk Sivil MGK Toplantısı yapıldı". 31.10. 2011.

27. Ali Resul Usul, *Democracy in Turkey, the Impact of EU Political Conditionality*, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 132. These amendments reduced the number of regular NSC meetings from once a month to once every two months changed the appointment procedures of NSC Secretary General through increasing the government's role in this process and redefined NSC roles, duties and areas of competence. Details on the Law of NSC and Secretariat General are available at http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/kanun.html, Available only in Turkish, (accessed in April 2015).

28. Ziya Öniş, "Recent Foreign Policy Attitudes in Turkey: How to Reverse the Gradual Shift Away from Europeanization?" *Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Brief*, November 2008, p.2, available at www.diis.dk, (accessed in April 2015).

29. For a comprehensive analysis on Turkish people's opinion on US intervention to Iraq see Nasuh Uslu *et al*. "Turkish Public Opinion Towards the United States in the Context of the Iraq Question", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2005, pp. 75-107.

30. Philip Robins, "Between the EU and the Middle East: Turkish Foreign Policy under the JDP Government, 2002-2007", *ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale)* Working Paper -11, 2007, available at www.ispionline.it (Accessed in April 2015).

31. For the roles of civil society and the EU on Turkish-Greek rapprochement see Bahar Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, pp. 45-56.

32. For the roles of the civil society organizations in Turkish Foreign Policy see Özlem Terzi, "Is a Europeanized Turkish Foreign Policy Possible? The Role of the Contested EU Perspective in Bringing About A Transformation in Turkish Foreign Policy", *IES Conference on The European Union in International Affairs*, pp. 16-18, available at http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_V_2_Terzi.pdf, (accessed in April 2015). Also see, Paula Sandrin, "The European Union as a Vincolo Esterno and the Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Paper presented at ECPR Graduate Conference Dublin 2010*, p. 12, available at http://www.ecprnet.eu/databases/conferences/papers/924.pdf, (Accessed in April 2015).

33. Şevket Ovalı, "From Europeanization to Re-nationalization: The Contextual Parameters of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy", *op.cit*, p.27.

34. Kemal Kirişçi, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State", *New Perspectives On Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, p. 42.

35. The term 'National Outlook Shirt' refers to Welfare Party's anti-western economic, social and political program based on Islamist values and principles. Tayyip Erdoğan's statement on the 'national Outlook shirt' inflamed a debate between traditional Islamist political circles and reformists around Erdoğan in the early years of AKP governance. See, "Gömlek Kavgası", *Milliyet* (Turkish Daily), 22.5 2003, available at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/05/22/siyaset/asiy.html, (Accessed in April 2015).

36. In this regard, 1999 Helsinki Presidency Conclusions can be evaluated as the manifestation of EU conditionality in the foreign policy domain and such an approach enforced Ankara to reconsider its foreign policy formulations towards Greece and Cyprus. In the document, the EU explicitly stated that Turkey should comply with the EU norms and values and should adapt a new approach towards the peaceful settlement of the disputes both with Greece and Cyprus. *Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions*, 10-11 December 1999, Press Release, Brussels, Nr: 00300/99.

37. Bahar Rumelili, "Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: the Case of Greek-Turkish Relations", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2007, p. 107.

38. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-greece.en.mfa (Accessed in April 2015).

39. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-issues—-aegean-sea—-background-note-on-aegean-disputes.en.mfa (Accessed in April 2015).

40. Mustafa Kutlay, "A Political Economy Approach to the Expansion of Turkish-Greek Relations: Interdependence or Not?" *Perceptions*,Vol. 14, No.1-2, 2009, p.101.

41. Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Aylin Güney, "The European Union and the Cyprus Problem", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 2,2005, p.290.

42. For an analysis on the factors that are assumed to shape Turkey-EU relations since 2004, see Atilla Eralp, "The Role of Temporality and Interaction on Turkey-EU Relationship", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 40, 2009, pp. 163-166.

43. For such critiques see 'Turkey's Economy: Istanbuls and Bears', *The Economist*, 7.4.2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21552216. (Accessed in April 2015), David P. Goldman, "Ankara's Economic Miracle Collapses", *The Middle East Quarterly*, Vol.19, No.1,2012, p. 25.

44. Ziya Öniş, "The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2012, p. 144.

45. Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey,* Vol.13, No.1, 2011, p. 56.

46. European Commission Trade Policy, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/, 3 May 2013 (Accessed in April 2015)

47. Ziya Öniş," Multiple Faces of Turkish Foreign Policy", *op.cit.,* p. 55.

48. Council of the European Union, 12823/1/05 REV I, LIMITE, ELARG 64, p.8. 12.10.2005.

49. Turkish PM Slams EU, Threatens to Freeze Ties, *Hürriyet* (Turkish Daily), 19.7.2011, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkish-pm-slams-eu-threatens-to-freeze-ties-2011-07-19 (Accessed in April 2015).

50. "Turkey warns Cyprus over oil and gas plans", *Euronews*, 18.9.2011, available at http://www.euronews.com/2011/09/18/turkey-warns-cyprus-over-oil-and-gas-plans/ (Accessed in August 2013).

51. "Turkey and Northern Cyprus Clear Gas Drill Hurdle", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 21.9.2011, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-and-n-cyprus-clear-gas-drill-hurdle-2011-09-21 (Accessed in August 2013).

52. "Turkey-Cyprus Drilling Dispute: Turkish Ship Koca Piri Reis begins Oil, Gas Exploration off Cyprus", *Huffington Post*, 27.9.2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/27/turkey-cyprus-drilling_n_983716.html (Accessed in August 2013).

53. Ayla Jean Jackley, "Greece, in trouble elsewhere, boosts cooperation with Turkey",

Reuters, 4.3.2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/us-turkey-greece-idUSBRE9230V120130304 (Accessed in August 2013).

54. See Turkish General Staff Website, Airspace Violations in 2012 (in Turkish), available at http://www.tsk.tr/11_haberler_olaylar/11_2_hava_ihlalleri/hava_sahasi_ihlalleri_2012.htm (Accessed in August 2013). Also see "Greek Fighters Chase Off Turkish Jets Violating Greek Airspace", *Ekathimerini*, 23 May 2013, available at http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_23/05/2013_500507 (Accessed in August 2013). "Turkish Jets Chased Off after Violating Greek Airspace", *Ekathimerini*, 20 August 2013, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_20/08/2013_514765 (Accessed in August 2013).

55. Securitization simply refers to "presenting an issue as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object". Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p.21. In the Turkish case, especially during the Gezi Park Protests, Europe in particular and the Western world in general, have been portrayed as threats targeting the stability of Turkey, by Tayyip Erdoğan and the leading echelons of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

56. "Erdoğan says interest rate lobby only winner in Turkey protests", *Today's Zaman (Turkish Daily)*, 22.6. 2013,available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-318984-erdogan-says-interest-rate-lobby-only-winner-in-turkey-protests.html (Accessed in August 2013).

57. Ministry for EU Affairs, Press Release, Statement on the Recent Developments by Egemen Bağış, 17 June 2013, available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=49004&l=2 (Accessed in August 2013).

58. "I do not recognize any decision that EU parliament will make on Turkey", *Anadolu Agency,* 13.6.2013, available at http://www.aa.com.tr/en/headline/192705—l-dont-recognize-any-decision-that-eu-parliament-will-make-on-turkey (Accessed in August 2013).