

The Origins of Greece's 'Socialization Strategy' vis-à-vis Turkey

Panayotis Tsakonas*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article fait état des diverses raisons d'ordre domestique, systémique et régional qui ont mené à une reformulation de la politique grecque envers la Turquie depuis les années 1995—2000 et jusqu'à l'adoption d'une stratégie dite de socialisation. Les facteurs qui conditionnent cette nouvelle stratégie, qu'on pourrait qualifier d'eupéanisation de la politique étrangère grecque 'd'en-haut' et 'd'en-bas', sont passés en revue. L'auteur offre des explications réalistes ou neo-réalistes de cette socialisation, présente des aspects de la théorie de la formation d'alliances (concepts tels le *balancing-bandwagoning* et le débat afférent) et s'en sert comme outils méthodologiques pour l'évaluation des données empiriques et historiques disponibles.

ABSTRACT

The article provides an account of the various domestic, regional and systemic reasons that have led to a reformulation of Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey since the mid-1990's and to the adoption of a 'socialization strategy' towards Turkey. The conditioning factors for the adopted new strategy, namely a 'top-down' and a 'bottom-up' Europeanization of Greece's foreign policy are also discussed. Realist/neo-realist explanations of socialization and certain aspects of the theory of alliance formation (*balancing-bandwagoning* debate) are used as methodological tools for assessing the empirical and historical data available.

Since the mid-1990s Greece has adopted a new strategy with the aim of transforming the three-decade dispute with Turkey (Greece's NATO-ally and 'arch-enemy') into a less confrontational and more stable relationship. At the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999, Greece's decision to lift its veto and grant candidate status to Turkey was the result of a paramount shift in Greece's foreign policy regarding its neighbour; a shift that most analysts consider as important as Greece's decision to join the European Union twenty years ago.

* University of the Aegean

This article explores how certain domestic, regional and systemic reasons led Greece to introduce a 'strategy of socialization' *vis-à-vis* Turkey. The central argument herein is that Greece's new strategic priorities, which focused mainly on its ability to integrate fully into the European Union, resulted in a realization of the limits of Greece's 'internal balancing' efforts *vis-à-vis* Turkey and a quest for the adoption of sophisticated 'external balancing' policies. Apart from providing a thorough account of the various reasons leading to a reformulation of Greece's foreign policy towards Turkey since the mid-1990's, the article discusses in detail the conditioning factors for Greece's 'socialization strategy' (i.e., 'top-down', and 'bottom-up', Europeanization of Greece's foreign policy). Realist/neo-realist explanations of socialization and certain aspects of the theory of alliance formation (balancing-bandwagoning debate) are used as methodological tools for assessing the empirical and historical data available.

Balancing the 'Threat from the East'

Analysts and policymakers in small countries are attempting to identify and predict trends as well as recommend policies of adjustment to emerging global patterns, which especially in the post-Cold War era are in a state of flux. The challenge for Greece, a small, strategically located, and *status quo* country, is to safeguard its territorial integrity and to protect its democratic system and values. Indeed, Greece can be described as democratic, Western, *status quo*, free-enterprise-oriented, and a sensitive strategic outpost of the European Union and NATO in the troubled regions of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean¹.

The dominant theory in the security studies literature that deals with the alignment policies of states - the 'balance of threat theory' - suggests that states, especially small and weak ones, have two ideal choices when confronted with an external threat: either to *balance against* the threat (in order to deter it from attacking or to defeat it if it does) or to *bandwagon with* the threat (in order either to appease it or to profit from it by sharing in the spoils of its victory)².

A number of scholars have also attempted to explain the alignment decisions of small and weak states by analyzing issues from a domestic

vantage point³. This domestic school of alliances highlights the notion that a small states' alignment decisions are but the product of the trade-off between internal mobilization of the state's resources and the formation of alliances, or to put it simply between *internal* and *external* balancing (or bandwagoning), as the classic 'balance of power' theory has, much earlier, suggested⁴. Thus, when confronted with serious external threats, a state may also decide to rely on a *combination* of internal and external balancing.

Traditionally, to balance threats to its security, Greece has relied on a combination of 'internal' (strong armed forces) and 'external balancing' (participation in all West European security and political organizations: NATO, WEU, EU) and signing and adherence to practically all multilateral arms control agreements and international export control regimes⁵. Indeed, since small states have fewer options and less room to manoeuvre than great powers, Greece has sought to promote its security interests more effectively by and aligning its policies, as well as adding its voice to those of its European Union partners and NATO allies⁶. For example, Greece has long endeavoured to deter the perceived threat emanating from its neighboring power by relying mainly on international law and agreements, as well as on the mediating role of the U.S., NATO, and the UN⁷. Indeed, both Greece and Turkey have been competing for US attention and have sought to enlist the USA in the role of peacemaker, arbiter, or balancer⁸. It is worth noting that, in Greek security thinking, if NATO abstained from involvement in the Greek-Turkish conflict, it would have been considered as impotent, indifferent, or implicitly supportive of the stronger party in the conflict, namely Turkey⁹.

Moreover, during the Cold War, Greece valued NATO more for its constraint of Turkey than for its contribution to collective security against the Warsaw Pact. One characteristic of Greek military is that it has always been more influenced by Turkish military spending than by any considerations of an external threat common to both countries, e.g., the former Soviet Union. In fact, almost since Greece became a member (along with Turkey) in 1952, Greece has viewed the NATO alliance as a means of balancing Turkey¹⁰.

However, the July 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus – an island considered by Greece as an integral part of 'Hellenism' – led to a major breakthrough in

Greek strategic thinking. For the majority of the Greek public, as well as Greek security analysts and decision-makers, the fact that “a NATO member, using NATO weapons, had taken 35,000 troops out of the NATO structure in order to occupy another democratic European country”¹¹ was ample proof of NATO inability to play the role of guarantor of Greek-Turkish borders in Cyprus¹².

Since reliance on NATO had proved unfounded and Greece realized that it had no institutional safeguards at its disposal and no commitment from the West ‘to bridle Turkish expansionism’¹³, it began to place more emphasis on ‘internal’ measures, namely strengthening its armed forces¹⁴ and less on NATO membership and the bilateral relationship with the United States (mainly as a result of Turkey’s membership in the former and “privileged” relationship with the latter). However, in accordance with its policy of relying on a combination of internal and external balancing, Greece soon returned to a policy of Turkish inclusion in NATO’s structure rather than exclusion. Indeed, NATO’s role as a means of minimizing Greek-Turkish confrontation¹⁵, owing to its interest in consolidating operational normality and cohesion on its southern flank, was precisely the reason for Greece’s reintegration into the Atlantic Alliance in October 1980, following its withdrawal in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus six years earlier. Still, NATO’s effectiveness with regard to its involvement in the Greek-Turkish conflict were viewed by Greek security analysts as inconsistent with Greece’s higher expectations to either turn NATO into a security providing bulwark or act as a mediator in resolving the Greek-Turkish dispute¹⁶.

Furthermore, NATO’s ‘failure’ to provide Greece with the expected security guarantees has intensified its search for an alternative. Since the 1970s the European Community (EC) had been seen as a possible candidate. In fact, Greece’s membership in the EC in the late 1970s, though largely economically motivated, was also meant to bolster the existing Greek government and, most importantly, to strengthen the country’s international position, especially its deterrent capability against Turkey¹⁷. Moreover, protection of territorial integrity was the reason for Greece’s application for admission to the Western European Union (WEU), the European Community’s defence arm. The WEU was thus viewed “as a system of political solidarity capable of activating diplomatic and political levers of pressure to deter Ankara from potential adventures in the Aegean”¹⁸. In sum,

Greece's participation in the EC was seen both as a Turkish deterrent and as a means of forestalling potential Greek-Turkish confrontation.

However, clear confirmation that Greece's expectations with respect to the WEU had been misguided came shortly thereafter in the form of the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. Article 5 of this document stated that the WEU would exempt itself from any involvement in a conflict between a WEU member (e.g., Greece) and a NATO member (e.g., Turkey)¹⁹. The WEU's position was described by Greek defense analysts and decision-makers as, at best, controversial and costly for Greece and, at worst, as completely offensive to a country that was a full member of the European Community.²⁰

For Greece's decision-makers in the post-Cold War era, the clinching confirmation of the EU's inability to provide security came in 1996 when the crisis over the islets of Imia in the Aegean brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. The Imia Crisis not only demonstrated the minimal role that NATO could play in crisis management between Greece and Turkey, it also highlighted the absolute inability of either the EU or the WEU to act as a mediator in a crisis or as a guarantor of borders. Indeed, both security organizations have played a peripheral role compared to the United States, a sovereign country (i.e., not an international body) viewed by both Greece and Turkey as the most important actor/mediator in the post-Cold War era²¹. It should be noted that as a result of the Imia Crisis, Greece again made a major effort for the inclusion of a 'clause of solidarity and guarantee of external borders' while at the EU's 1997 Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam²². The Greek request was again rejected by the WEU²³.

The Need for Reformulating Greece's Balancing Strategy

The rather serious crisis in January 1996 over the islets of Imia in eastern Aegean coincided with the rise of Costas Simitis and his self-defined 'modernizers' faction to the leadership of Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), after the seriously ill Andreas Papandreu was convinced to step down²⁴. By keeping the 'threat from the east' intact (and further reinforcing it through new territorial claims in the Aegean), the shocking crisis over the Imia islets had made apparent to the new administration the need to reorient


Greece's strategy *vis-à-vis* Turkey²⁵ and to adopt a more 'comprehensive strategy'. In the words of Greece's former Premier, Costas Simitis:

*"This 'comprehensive strategy' should challenge the bilateral-bipolar character of Greek-Turkish relations as well as the simplistic logic of the use of force (e.g. Turkey's threat of 'casus belli') as a means of resolving the Greek-Turkish differences... Greece was in need of a strategy which would go hand in hand with Greece's strategic priority for membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU); a strategy which would eventually lead Greek-Turkish relations into a peaceful and cooperative context based on international law and agreements"*²⁶.

In the mid 1990s, it was the EMU – contained in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty – which appeared as the biggest challenge for policymakers in Greece to either reform or marginalize²⁷. With a reputation at low ebb, the only way for Greece to join with the EU core was to achieve a major turnaround in its main macroeconomic indicators, as the position of the Greek economy diverged the most from the trends apparent in the EU's core²⁸. To that end, gradual adjustment and reform by consensus seemed the only feasible alternative for the 'modernizers' within PASOK in order for Greece to insure inclusion in EMU in January 2001, a year before the euro fully replaces national currencies in the European Union²⁹.

By placing Greece's quest for convergence with the EU economic prerequisites at the top of the agenda³⁰, the new administration had started putting the basic determinant of the Greek-Turkish competition, namely the existing and intensifying arms race into question. Indeed, Greek and Turkish defense expenditures – the highest among NATO countries – have been kept at extremely high levels, which have very much gone against the average NATO and European trend of falling defense spending³¹. Moreover, as a result of the Turkish announcement in April 1996 of a ten-year \$31 billion armament program, Greece responded that November with a \$14 billion (4 trillion drachmas) program for the next five years, 1996-2000³².

FIGURE 1: Trends in Defense Expenditures of Greece, Turkey, NATO and EU15 Member-States



* Stable prices and exchange rates 1995

Source: Data compiled from various editions of SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbooks.

Note: Figures on the right are total military expenditures of Greece and Turkey. Figures on the left are total military expenditures of NATO and the EU15. All figures in billions of dollars (stable prices and exchange rates 1995)

By implication, military expenditures constituted a heavy burden for the Greek economy, especially at the time when Greece was completing the implementation of an economic austerity program in order to enjoy the benefits of full membership in the EMU. As a matter of fact, defense expenditures were, to a certain extent, responsible for the country's budget deficit, as well as Greece's lower than desired level of social services. It was also believed that the arms race had resulted in an imbalance of power in favour of Turkey and the risk for Greece of distancing itself from EU economic convergence prerequisites³³.

Overall Greece thus found itself compelled to restore immediately the balance of power with Turkey; it also needed to escape from the interminable arms race in a way that would not undermine its deterrent ability or its

efforts for economic convergence with its other partners in the European Union. Two important goals needed to be achieved by Greece in the mid-1990s: 1) *short-term goal* referring to the need of reversing the existing imbalance of power and 2) *medium and/or long-term goal*, referring to Greece's ability to "escape" from the existing interminable arms race in a way that would not have it deviate from its strategic objective to fully integrate into the European Union³⁴.

Realizing the Limits of 'Internal Balancing'

With a view to satisfying its short-term goal, Greece proceeded with the adoption of a series of internal balancing measures in order to deter the perceived Turkish threat. Based on the fundamental strategic principle that "Intentions may change very quickly but [military] capabilities remain", Greece should have been prepared to maintain a relative military balance with Turkey. Therefore, to deter the Turkish threat, at least until Turkish policy towards Greece changed in a fundamental way, Greece's emphasis had to be on the strengthening of its Armed Forces through the adoption of a modern strategic and operational doctrine with emphasis on combined/joint operations, improved personnel training and acquisition of modern weapon systems, including smart weapons and force multipliers. It is worth mentioning that these measures focused on shifting the country's arms procurement policy *from quantity to quality* to an even greater degree than before³⁵. Therefore, the internal balancing of the Turkish threat and the strengthening of Greece's deterrent ability were connected with a series of specific proposals concerning the qualitative upgrading and modernization of the Greek Armed Forces in the context of the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs", the cost-effective use of the available economic resources ("more bang for the buck"), the change in the structure of the Greek armed forces, the optimum use of the human resources available, and the like³⁶.

On the level of internal balancing, the qualitative strengthening of the country's deterrent ability – especially for as long as Turkey showed no limiting of its claims – constituted *a sine qua non* for Greece to restore the balance of power, mainly in the Aegean, and attain a favourable balance of power that would convince Turkey that the cost incurred from an eventual attack would be far greater than the expected gains.

Nevertheless, even if the efforts of internally balancing the Turkish threat were crowned with total success and Greece managed to attain its short-term goal of achieving a balance of power with Turkey, the *medium/long-term goal* for Greece was *still to 'escape' from the existing interminable arms race* in a way that would not deviate it from its strategic objective of economic development and full integration into the European Union. Thus, Greece was facing the difficult 'guns or butter dilemma'. The dilemma came down to Greece's ability to match the need for immediate and considerable defense expenditures with its medium or long-term objective to fulfil the commitments imposed by the terms of the euro-zone's stability and growth pact. There was, in other words, a quest for the achievement of both deterrence and economic development³⁷.

The Quest for Sophisticated 'External Balancing': The 'Socialization Strategy'

To achieve both goals, Greece had to undertake a series of initiatives that would convey to the Turkish cost/benefit strategic calculus that cooperation would be far more beneficial for Turkey than the expansionist policy thus far followed. As a result, Greece eventually started distancing itself from past assessments indicating either that diplomacy alone could moderate Turkish behavior (which coupled with Turkey's intransigence had eroded the credibility of Greek deterrence) and/or that Greece's 'internal balancing' efforts alone could provide the answer to the 'guns or butter dilemma' Greece was facing.

In turn, Greece's efforts to balance the Turkish threat effectively without undermining its strategic priorities had to move towards a new position where credible deterrence, mainly achieved by the strengthening of the Greek Armed Forces, would be *coupled* with *sophisticated diplomatic manoeuvring* and *initiatives*. With the election of the Simitis' government it was made evident that unless successful external balancing – through diplomatic means and manoeuvring – could offset the Turkish prospective military superiority, the only option for Greece would be to follow Turkey in a costly and destabilizing arms race. To that end, Greek security policy started relying on a *mixture* of 'internal' and 'external balancing' policies that involved: (a) the strengthening of Greece's Armed Forces to offset the current military imbalance with Turkey and, most importantly, (b) the engagement of Turkey in a context where

Greece has a comparative advantage, namely the European Union.

In the minds of Greek decision-makers at least, the European Union was the best available forum for setting conditions and placing prerequisites in accordance with certain “European” principles and standards on those countries that wish to become members. It was thus believed that the strengthening of Turkey’s European orientation would engage Turkey in a medium and long-term process that would eventually lead to the adoption by this candidate country of a less aggressive behavior *vis-à-vis* an EU member-state, i.e., Greece. This was in fact the rationale behind Greece’s concession to grant the status of candidate country to Turkey. Indeed, the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999 was seen by Greek decision-makers as a ‘window of opportunity’ to play the card of Greece’s external balancing in a more sophisticated manner.

Greece, by insisting on a real – instead of a virtual or *sui generis* – candidacy for Turkey, aimed, in fact, at the *engagement* of Turkey in an “accession partnership” with the EU. This partnership would put Turkey under the constant screening and monitoring process of certain EU mechanisms and procedures allowing for certain structural changes (i.e., democratization) to take place in Turkey in order for the European *acquis* to be fully endorsed. This ‘Europeanization’ of Turkish politics and society is expected, by Greek decision-makers, to eventually lead to the abandonment by the Turkish élite of the aggressive behavior and to the adoption of policies based less on geopolitical instruments of statecraft and more on international law and agreements.

By placing increased importance on its ‘European card’, Greece did not rely solely, as it has been wrongly assumed in the past, on the EU’s ability to become a ‘security-providing’ hegemon³⁸ nor did it see the European Union “as a system of political solidarity capable of activating diplomatic and political levers of pressure to deter Ankara from potential adventures in the Aegean”³⁹. Instead, by playing the EU card in a more sophisticated manner than in the past, Greece’s medium and long-term policy endeavoured to enmesh Turkey in the European integration system, where the European norms of behavior and certain European-style ‘rules of the game’ had to be followed by Turkey. By pushing Turkey deeper into the European integration process, Greece aimed at successfully linking Turkey’s state (élite’s) interests to certain international (European) ways of behavior⁴⁰. ‘Socialization’ from

this perspective is the process of reconciling states' individual aspirations with generally accepted standards⁴¹.

The engagement of Turkey in the 'European project' is thus expected to transform Turkey's behavior *vis-à-vis* Greece from a policy based on the 'logic of coercive deterrence' to one based on European norms and practices. From this perspective, the notorious *casus belli* issue, namely Turkey's threat to wage war against Greece in case the latter extends its territorial waters in the Aegean, will sooner or later be viewed – especially by the 'Europeanists' in the Turkish civil-military establishment – less as the 'success story' of Turkey's 'coercive diplomacy' to make Greece refrain from such a move and more as a burden in Turkey's future relations with the European Union. Instead, Turkey's enmeshment in the European integration system will encourage the country to start reconsidering whether it is worthwhile to keep putting a policy of 'myopic optimization' before its medium and/or long-term goal of becoming a member of the European Union.

Furthermore, Greek decision-makers estimate that Turkey's further European integration will entail certain costs for Turkey, especially at the domestic level. By strengthening the democratization process in Turkey, pressure is expected to be put on the civil-military establishment to make a more rational allocation of the country's economic resources. Additionally, the 'democratization process' would entail that the military be put under civilian control and the process of élite circulation will be also accelerated and a new state élite will be eventually forced to start searching for the new 'reason of the state' and for new definitions of 'national interest'. Furthermore, the deepening of the democratization process and the ability of a broader political participation of the electorate, currently more or less indifferent and/or incapable of reacting to the commands of the military bureaucracy, would intensify the pressure exerted on the Turkish foreign policy élite and redefine the strategic priorities of the country towards a more rational distribution of the country's assets.

Conditioning Factors for Greece's 'Socialization Strategy'

It is evident from the above that Greek security and foreign policy *vis-à-vis* Turkey started being reformulated in the mid-1990's when Greece's new

strategic priorities – which focused mainly on its ability to fully integrate into the European Union – resulted in a realization of the limits of Greece’s ‘internal balancing’ efforts *vis-à-vis* Turkey and a quest for the adoption of sophisticated ‘external balancing’ policies. To this end, the European Union appeared as the most appropriate forum for the adoption of Greece’s ‘socialization strategy’, which was depicted as a U-turn in Greece’s foreign policy towards Turkey.

However, this major shift in Greek foreign policy and the adoption of the new ‘socialization strategy’ – first visible in the mid 1990s and culminating in the 1999 Helsinki European Council decisions – was not due only to an instrumental thinking on the part of the Greek decision makers, instigating by the realization of the limits of the country’s ‘internal balancing’ efforts and the subsequent need for the adoption of a more sophisticated ‘external balancing’ policy. Greece’s new strategy was primarily the result, and an example, of an intended ‘top-down’, and ‘bottom-up’, *Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy*.

Most foreign policy analysts agree that since the mid-1990s, the ‘defensive’, ‘static’, ‘reactionary’ ‘inward-looking’ nature of Greece’s foreign policy arguing for the isolation of Turkey by all means and at all costs was followed by a ‘post-nationalist’, ‘outward-looking’, ‘pro-active’, ‘flexible’, and much more confident foreign policy based on long-term planning, a willingness to take calculated risks and the faith that Greece’s national interests are better served via multilateral efforts⁴².

To the extent that the former has been the product of the Greek political system and culture from early 1970s to mid 1990s one should give credit to the supporters of reformist demands —arguing for Greece’s full integration into the international distribution of labour and European structures and the redefinition of Greek identity within the framework of an open, multicultural European society—for managing to successfully linking political choices at home with choices abroad. Indeed, the election of Costas Simitis was followed by a modernization program, which has a complementary policy externally. For the Greek administration in the mid 1990s, the modernization of the Greek political system and membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU) were the means to put an end to the ‘Greek exceptionality’ and move Greece from the periphery to the epicentre of the European developments.

Thus, there was a strong intention and a purposefully action by the new administration to transfer into the Greek political system a model of governance reflecting the values, norms and principles upon which the EU system and those of its member states are constructed⁴³. In other words, there was a political as well as an ideological program for intended change and reform towards a parallel process of ‘Europeanizing’ Greek foreign policy while pursuing a modernizing domestic reform process⁴⁴ or “towards ‘modernization’, and therefore, Europeanization”⁴⁵. Most importantly, the rise of Simitis in power did not only promote the modernization of the Greek political system but it succeeded fairly well in adjusting to the post-Cold War realities.

More specifically, following the end of the Cold War, the epicentre of political developments moved to the European periphery. This new geopolitical environment could potentially bring Athens – whether willingly or not – at the forefront of developments of immense interest to Brussels and Washington alike, such as the EU and NATO expansions to the East. From a major Western security outpost on the Iron curtain, Greece had suddenly become a beacon of liberty and economic progress for its Balkan neighbours. At the same time, Athens had the opportunity to exert substantial influence in the rapidly globalizing international environment of the 1990’s, not so much due to its successful integration in the international economic and commercial networks, but rather thanks to its mobilized diaspora and its dynamic mercantile marine. Unfortunately, instead of seizing these unique opportunities, Greece had chosen to develop its foreign policy through the adoption of traditional/nationalist approaches. The mishandling of the Macedonian issue is a strong case in point. Trapped by a progressively nationalist public opinion and a lack of a coherent and long-term Balkan policy the Greek administration in early 1990s handled the Macedonian issue in a way that had seriously damaged Greece’s international and European standing⁴⁶. Most importantly, it made Greece look “as an immature Balkan parvenu in the Western European milieu while its very membership of the EU was [put] in question”⁴⁷.

Having faced the burden of counterproductive foreign policy from the early 1990s, the Simitis’ ‘modernizers’ were called upon to overcome nationalist rigidities, adapt to the new post-Cold War environment, recover from the traumas of its Balkan policy of the 1989-1995 period and manage

to elevate Greece's role in the Balkans, thus raising the country's credibility in the eyes of the international, especially European, community⁴⁸.

Moreover, the new era brought along a broader definition of the notion of security. New sorts of power emerged in the political sphere beyond the traditional military might ('hard power'), such as diplomatic, economic, cultural and moral influence ('soft power'). Their placement at the epicenter of interstate relations, and especially the need to use these types of power for the most effective promotion of Greece's national interests, necessitated the rapid adaptation of its diplomacy in order to meet the new demands. The development of foreign policy in a globalized environment also demonstrated the connection and interdependence of the various means of exercise of foreign policy, such as the economy and defense. Several non-state actors (NGOs, corporations) entered the stage not only as agents of exercise (and eventually of formation) of Greece's foreign policy, but also as partners in the management of major foreign policy issues⁴⁹. The gradual, yet steady, 'metamorphosis' of Greek foreign policy was due to the way in which the systemic changes and the new circumstances were perceived by foreign policy decision-makers and were integrated in Greece's foreign policy agenda. Indeed, Greek decision makers did not only make the aforementioned observations in a timely manner, but they were also effective in integrating them into Greece's foreign policy agenda by putting Greek politics back to European normalcy, by cementing peace with economic rationality and the Euro-Atlantic structures, and, most importantly, by making the Greek public to start showing concern for the broader long term questions of Greece's future in the context of a highly competitive post-Cold War world⁵⁰.

This 'top-down Europeanization' of Greece's foreign policy meant that the latter had started successfully 'absorbing' the logic of European unification. By consequence, any international issue would be immediately seen through the lenses of the EU, bearing in mind the views of all the other member states. Greece's active participation in policing and peace-keeping missions in the Balkans in the 1997-98 period reflects a more equidistant, multilateral and constructive policy in the region⁵¹. The issue of Kosovo provides yet another case in point. As it has been correctly stressed, the Kosovo crisis would not have been dealt with in the same manner if Greece had not accepted the aforementioned logic of 'Europeanization', thus avoiding a

nationalistic and opportunistic policy⁵². The Kosovo crisis has made evident to both Turkey and Greece that moving towards a détente would provide some sort of stability in the Balkans, which were about to experience serious problems due to the NATO-led bombing of Yugoslavia⁵³. The Kosovo crisis has thus dictated a normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey, and this normalization could help the two countries to play a stabilizing role in the Mediterranean and Southeast European region⁵⁴.

The intended consequences of the ‘top-down Europeanization’ on Greek foreign policy since the mid-1990s had affected both the style and substance of Greece’s foreign policy and referred to the normalization of Greece’s relations with the EU and to the adaptation of the Greek foreign policy interests to the EU norms of behavior. Most important, this ‘post-nationalist’, ‘outward-looking’, ‘flexible’, and much more confident Greek foreign policy could now be projected onto the EU foreign policy agenda, allowing for an additional, ‘bottom up’, form of Europeanization to take place.

It is worth noting that the ‘bottom-up Europeanization’ process, referring mainly to the externalization of national foreign policy positions into the EU level, not only entails the acceptance of national foreign policy positions into those of the EU but also enhances the international action of the EU as a whole⁵⁵. Moreover, through this process a state uses the vehicle of the EU and the union’s weight in the international arena to promote national foreign policy objectives⁵⁶. The realization that the EU can be used as the best and most privileged means to promote national interests does not mean that a member-state can ‘sell its national interests as European interests’⁵⁷. It does mean that, due to the successful embedding of Europeanization and the adaptation of a member’s national system to the EU system, the state is in the position to actively engage its foreign policy objectives and goals in influencing the emergence, if not realization, of a more efficient and effective EU policy.

In the late 1990’s, enlargement was the most demanding project for an EU, which was itself changing. Indeed, the Kosovo War in the spring of 1999 made evident to EU member-states that a holistic approach to the region of East, Central and Southeast Europe was needed. Otherwise, countries left out of the EU accession process may see nationalist voices in their respective political arenas strengthened. As a consequence, the first

wave of applicants (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) would be joined in negotiations by the second wave of applicants (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia). After such a major decision by the EU to put forward the enlargement process by upgrading the status of the aforementioned countries and given the inclusive nature of the accession process, it would appear increasingly inconsistent and politically untenable to keep Turkey in its twilight status⁵⁸.

The prospect of EU enlargement to the east has made Greece realize that it could now become the 'globalization partner' of the new aspirants from southeast Europe on behalf of the EU. Such a policy would in turn require Greece to move from the politics of veto to the politics of interest; a move that would undoubtedly be most welcome by Greece's EU partners. To this end, the strengthening of EU enlargement on the part of Greece could not lead to the continuation of Turkey's exclusion from the full benefits of international (i.e. European) society⁵⁹.

In addition, the election of Schroeder as German chancellor in 1998 brought about an ideological shift in the traditional stance of the European conservatives of having an extensive cooperation with Turkey, while limiting the European project into a civilizational project, thus making the Turkish candidature for full membership unacceptable⁶⁰. Schroeder's major shift took place primarily because of the cosmopolitan inclusiveness and multicultural tolerance that the left wing (namely the Green allies) brought to the newly elected government. Coupled with Germany's particular interest in smoothing the forthcoming enlargement process of the EU for Eastern and Central European countries, the new government of Gerhard Schroeder was not hesitant in announcing its support for formal Turkish EU candidacy in the name of improved relations between Germany and Turkey.

Last, but not least, it was in the late 1990s that the old theme of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) became a tangible project. At Saint Malo in 1998, Tony Blair agreed with French President Jacques Chirac on a common platform that was to lead to the adoption by the EU of a plan aiming at the eventual integration of the WEU into the EU as well as at the expansion of the existing European foreign policy into the military realm. To alleviate Turkish fears that it will lose its hard-won gains as an associate member of WEU if such a plan materializes, Turkey should be provided with a prominent role in the development of a functional and

effective relationship between the European Union and NATO. Indeed, Turkey's collaboration was considered necessary for the promotion and strengthening of the European Security and Defense Identity, and, by consequence, both the EU and the United States should start treating Turkey as an essential component of the future European security system⁶¹.

Apparently, it was Europeanization through the 'top-down' approach that led to the Greek adaptation and socialization of the Greek national system, politics and policies to the European ones. It was also Europeanization through the 'bottom-up' approach that allowed Greek decision makers to actively engage Greek foreign policy objectives and goals in facilitating the realization of EU's major project in the late 1990s, namely enlargement. To this end, a 'socialized' and 'Europeanized' Greek foreign policy was embarking upon the more ambitious project to 'socialize' —by using the vehicle of the EU and its weight in the international arena—the state which has remained Greece's main security concern and the driving force behind most of its security and foreign policy initiatives. Needless to say, that on the epicentre of this 'socialization strategy' lies the assumption that the EU is not something 'out there' and that it can only be affecting national (i.e. Turkey's) policy making after its membership. On the contrary, it is in the pre-accession process that Europeanization can be effective⁶².

On the road to the EU summit in Helsinki, the EU looked receptive to Greek foreign policy interests and goals to the extent they could make its crucial enlargement project —along with the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)—more efficient and effective. The time was ripe for a major shift in Greece's traditional stance to use the Cyprus issue for blocking EU-Turkey relations⁶³, for the abandonment of its long-followed strategy of 'conditional sanctions' towards Turkey and for the adoption of a more flexible strategy of 'conditional rewards'⁶⁴. According to the latter, Greece should be willing to lift the veto for Turkey's candidacy and grant Turkey the status of EU candidate country if certain conditions are first met⁶⁵.

Due to the decisions taken at the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999, certain Greek key foreign policy issues (Greece's relations with Turkey and the Cyprus case) would be externalized into the EU. Indeed, the EU summit in Helsinki will acknowledge the linkage between Turkey's EU orientation, the resolution of Greek-Turkish conflict over the Aegean issues, and the end of Turkey's occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. Greece

will thus manage to enmesh both the Cyprus and the Aegean issues within the context of the European Union where Greece enjoys a comparative advantage *vis-à-vis* an aspiring EU member state and make both issues closely linked with Turkey's European accession path⁶⁶. Moreover, through the Helsinki decisions two important goals of Greece's 'socialization strategy', namely 'democratization' and the compliance with the so-called 'Copenhagen criteria' will also be illustrated as integral parts of Turkey's accession path to the EU⁶⁷.

NOTES

1. Although significant on a regional level, Greece's economic capabilities and political-military posture constitute no major (present or future) components of the European or global security system. See Dimitri Conostas, "Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters," in Dimitri Conostas and Nikolaos Stavrou, eds., *Greece Prepares for the 21st Century* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 72.

2. Thus, balancing is alignment *against* the threatening state or alliance of states (not the most powerful state or alliance of states, as balance of power theory claims) while bandwagoning is alignment *with* the most threatening state or alliance of states. According to Stephen Walt, the concept of threat incorporates both states' *power capabilities* (i.e. the elements of power, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities) and, in particular, the *perceived intentions* of others. Thus, "states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone." See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5. As it is widely known, 'balance of threat theory' has managed to refine the "too one-dimensional" classic 'balance of power theory' by adding into the equation the element of *threat*, the latter defined as a state's aggressive and dangerous intentions and, most importantly, by explicitly separating *powerful capabilities* and *expansionist intentions* as independent sources of threat.

3. From the point of view of the "domestic sources challengers" these scholars argued that a state's alignment policy is actually a choice (or a trade-off) between alliances and internal mobilization and thus weak states' alignment policies must be addressed with reference to certain domestic social and political variables. See Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments," *International Organization* (Vol. 45, No 3, Summer 1991), pp. 369–395. See also Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and Israel* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992) and Jack S. Levy & Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political

Economy, and Third World Security,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* (Vol. 14, No 4, December 1992), pp. 19–40.

4. For the notions of internal and external balancing see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 168.

5. Greece has signed all major international agreements including, *inter alia*, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Ottawa Treaty for the Prohibition of Landmines, etc. Greece has also been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group, MTCR, the Wassenaar Arrangement, etc.

6. Theodore Couloumbis and Prodromos Yannas, “Greek Security in a Post–Cold War Setting”, *The Southeast European Yearbook 1992* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1993), p. 52.

7. Such a reliance of Greece’s foreign and security policy on diplomacy has been criticized by some certain strategic analysts as counterproductive. According to one analyst, “the mistaken belief, shared by the Greek and Greek-Cypriot leadership, that diplomacy alone can moderate Turkish behaviour and minimise as much as possible Turkey’s political and military gains from the 1974 invasion, coupled with Turkey’s intransigence, has eroded the credibility of Greek deterrence”, see Constantine Arvanitopoulos, «Greek Defence Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence, op. cit, p. 157.

8. See Theodore Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle* (New York, Praeger, 1983), p. 133.

9. Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, “Greek Security Policy after the Cold War”, *Contemporary Security Policy* (Vol. 2, No. 3, 2000), p. 99.

10. Kenneth Mackenzie, “Greece and Turkey: Disarray on NATO’s Southern Flank”, *Conflict Studies*, (No. 154, 1983), p. 117.

11. Moustakis and Sheehan, *Greek Security Policy after the Cold War*, op. cit., p. 96.

12. Moreover, the Turkish invasion in Cyprus was interpreted as a situation where Greece found itself both *dependent* and *insecure*. See A. Platias, *Greece’s Strategic Doctrine*, op. cit., pp. 91–108.

13. Andrew Borowiec, *The Mediterranean Feud* (New York, Praeger), p. 29–81.

14. A. Platias, *Greece’s Strategic Doctrine*, op. cit., pp. 97–105.

15. A recent study on NATO and the Greek-Turkish conflict gives credit to NATO for the fact that the Greek-Turkish dispute has never erupted into a full-scale war. See Ronald R. Krebs, 'Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict', *International Organization* (Vol. 53, No. 2, Spring 1999), pp. 343-377.

16. As Monteagle Stearns has noted: "instead of enabling them to reconcile their differences by direct negotiation, their [Greece and Turkey] common alliance with the United States and Western Europe often appears to act as an impediment. Bilateral disputes acquired multilateral dimension". See Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy Towards Greece, Turkey and Cyprus* (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), p. 5.

17. In the words of one senior Greek official: 'Turkey would thus think twice to attack an EU member state', see *The Economist*, 26 July 1975 and *The Guardian*, 19 May 1976 as quoted in Yannis Valinakis, *With Vision and Program: Foreign Policy for a Greece with Self-Confidence* (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1997) [in Greek] p. 279, fn 14. See also the speeches of the Premier Constantine Karamanlis, *Kathimerini* (Greek daily), 11 April 1978 and 1 January 1981 as quoted in Y. Valinakis, op. cit., p. 283, fn 29).

18. See Yannis Valinakis, *The Security of Europe and Greece* (Athens: Foundation of Political Studies and Training, 1988) [in Greek], p. 55.

19. See Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union (WEU), Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992.

20. Yannis Valinakis, *With Vision and Program*, op. cit., p. 312. Moustakis and Sheehan, *Greek Security Policy after the Cold War*, op. cit., p. 101.

21. See Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations", *Mediterranean Politics* (Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 1997), pp. 76-101.

22. Premier Simitis described as particularly positive the agreement reached in Amsterdam that foreign policy decisions of strategic importance to the EU would be made unanimously. This meant that any member state could veto a common action if it felt its vital interests would be harmed. According to the *Athens News Agency*, Simitis told reporters that, on common foreign and security policies 'the references concerning respect of the EU's integrity and external borders and on the development of a mutual policy of solidarity among the member states were also satisfactory'. See *Athens News Agency*, 18 June 1997.

23. For Greece's misguided expectations that both the Atlantic Alliance and the European security and defence projects could turn into security providers, see Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tournikiotis, "Greece's Elusive Quest for 'Security

Providers': The 'Expectations-Reality Gap'", *Security Dialogue* (Vol. 34, No 3, September 2003), pp. 301-314.

24. The Imia crisis reached its peak on January 28, ten days after Simitis' election as Prime Minister after PASOK held internal party elections (January 18) and six days into his Premiership (January 22, 1996).

25. The dominant impression in successive Greek governments since 1975 was that Turkey should be exclusively handled through military deterrence and the application of international law to the two states' differences.

26. See Costas Simitis, *Politiki gia mia Dimiourgiki Elllada: 1996-2004 (Policy for an Inventive Greece: 1996-2004)*, (Athens, Polis, 2005), [in Greek], pp. 75-76.

27. See Kevin Featherstone, "Greece and EMU: Between External Empowerment and Domestic Vulnerability", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 41, No. 5, 2003), p. 928-929.

28. See –among others—the detailed contributions of certain key-economic figures of the Greek administration in Achilleas Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000); especially Nicos Christodoulakis', "The Greek Economy Converging Towards EMU", pp. 93-114 and Nicolas C. Garganas', "Greece and EMU: Prospects and Challenges", pp. 115-129.

29. Because it failed to achieve the nominal convergence criteria that were stipulated in the Maastricht treaty, Greece was not included in the group of eleven European countries that proceeded to adopt the new currency, the euro, in January 1999. According to Greece's former Premier "The Madrid EU Summit in 1995 had made clear that in order to fully participate in the European Monetary Union in January 1st 1999, five particular criteria should be met by the end of 1997 by the interested EU members. This would, in turn, mean that in order Greece can become a member of EMU in January 1st 2001 those five criteria should be met by the end of 1999. By consequence, the time available for Greece's core objective of achieving nominal convergence was three years (e.g., 1997, 1998 and 1999), at the maximum". See *Ibid*, p. 182.

30. See Costas Simitis, *Policy for an Inventive Greece*, op. cit., pp. 168-172 [especially Chapter A: *The Strategic Importance of EMU*].

31. It is noted that the average defense expenditure, as a percentage of GNP, for the period 1985–1998 of the other NATO member-states was 3.1% and of the EU 15 member-states 2.6%. It is characteristic that in the period of 1989–99 there has been a 30% increase in Greece's defense spending (from \$5.001 million to \$6.543 million) and a 110% increase in Turkey's defense spending (from \$4.552 million to

\$9.588 million), see also *FIGURE 1*.

32. See the *White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces: 1996-7*, Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, p.107. According to this document, “1.95 trillion drachmas is expected to be disbursed until 2000, immediately after the placing of orders, and the remaining according to deliveries.”

33. As Kerin Hope has stressed while reporting from Athens about Greece’s decision to spend \$4.9 billion on buying 60–90 Eurofighters for its Air Force “...the decision is controversial because of fears that *high defense outlays would undermine Greece’s chances of achieving a budget surplus by 2003 in line with future commitments to the terms of the euro-zone’s stability and growth pact*” (my emphasis). See Kerin Hope, “Greece to purchase \$5bn European fighters,” *Financial Times*, March 9, 2000.

34. The most acute reference of Greece’s Prime Minister on the need for the achievement of these short-term and medium-term goals was made in his address to the Organizational Congress of PASOK in December 2000, where he stressed, that “Greece is neither Ireland nor Portugal. It is the current government, which implements the most extensive armaments program in Greece’s modern history in order for its national interests to be secured.” See Costas Simitis, *Address to PASOK Organizational Committee* (Athens, December 1, 2000).

35. Christos Kollias, *The Political Economy of Defense* (Thessaloniki and Athens: Paratiritis, 1998) [in Greek].

36. See Thanos Dokos, “The Balancing of the Turkish Threat: The Military Aspect,” in Christodoulos C. Yallourides and Panayotis J. Tsakonias (eds.), *Greece and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era* (Athens, Sideris, 1999), [in Greek] pp. 201–224.

37. The 1998–99 White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces has aptly demonstrated the defense-economy linkage by stressing that “...defense and economy constitute the basis, the two main pillars on which the national strategy of the nation stands ...their interweaving plays a determining role in the achievement of the goals of national strategy. *The harmonious linking of the two ensures Greece’s ability to successfully face the long-term antagonism with Turkey*” (emphasis added). “Without a powerful, dynamically developing and prosperous economy, *sooner or later the allocation of resources for the defense shall become very difficult with all that it means to the security of this country.*” (emphasis added). *White Paper of the Hellenic Armed Forces: 1998–99*, op. cit., p. 150.

38. See P. Tsakonias and A. Tournikiotis, *Greece’s Elusive Quest for ‘Security Providers’*, op. cit., pp. 302-14.

39. See Yannis Valinakis, *The Security of Europe and Greece* (Athens: Foundation of

Political Studies and Training, 1988) [in Greek], p. 55.

40. For a discussion of the pros and cons of Greece's 'engagement strategy' see Kostas Ifantis, "Engagement or Containment? For a Greek Strategy towards Turkey in the 2000s" (University of Athens, Athens, 2000 mimeo).

41. It is interesting that classical realists, such as Henry Kissinger, argue that the construction of stable international orders is dependent upon the successful linkage of state interests to international legitimizing principles. See Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). In international relations literature, 'socialization' has been studied by realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist scholars. Early writings on the concept include: Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 74–77, 127–128; John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 141–148; Henrik Spruyt, "Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order," *International Organization* (Vol. 48, No. 4, 1994), pp. 527–557; and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* (Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992), pp. 391–426. A more detailed and up-to-date survey of the various theories of 'socialization' from a realist/neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist, and constructivist perspective is offered in the introductory chapter.

42. See –among others– Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal", *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 27, No. 2, June 2005), pp. 217-239; Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment" in Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery* (London Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 73-94; and Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems" in Achilleas Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), pp. 359-372.

43. See P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, op. cit., pp. 74-75

44. See Spyros Economides, "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy", *West European Politics* (Vol. 28, No. 2, March 2005), p. 481.

45. P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, op. cit., p. 74

46. See –among others– Kalypso Nicolaides, "Greece and the Macedonian Question: Lessons for a Better Future" in Robert Pfaltzgraff and Dimitris Keridis

(eds.), *Security in Southeastern Europe and the US-Greek Relationship* (London, Brassey's, 1997), pp. 73-78; and Thanos Veremis and Theodore Couloumbis, *Greek Foreign Policy. Problems and Prospects* (Athens, Sideris, 1994) [in Greek]. For an analysis of the weaknesses the Greek grand strategy has experienced in the post-Cold War Balkan sub-system with regard to the "Macedonian issue", see Panayotis J. Tsakonas "The Hellenic Diaspora and the Macedonian Issue", *Journal of Modern Hellenism* (No.14, 1997), pp. 139-58.

47. S. Economides, *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 481; see also Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000).

48. On an article about the future of the turbulent Balkan region, *The Economist* observed in January 1998 that "Greece is more interested in joining Europe's monetary union than in pursuing nationalist dreams", see *The Economist*, January 24, 1998 as quoted in P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 371: (fn) 6.

49. Such as the role played by the NGO's in the process of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1999 and in Greek-Turkish relations in general. On the bureaucratic and institutional adaptation of Greece's foreign policy making structures, see P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, op. cit., pp. 87-89. See also Dimitrios Kavakas, "Greece" in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000), pp. 145-148.

50. For these remarks, see Dimitris Keridis, "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek Policy towards Turkey Today" in Christodoulos Yallourides and Panayotis Tsakonas (eds.), *Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War* (New York, Melissa/Caratzas Publications, 2001), pp. 57-58.

51 See Theodore Couloumbis, "Greece in a Post-Cold War Environment" in A. Mitsos and E. Mossialos, *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, op. cit., p. 382.

52. Despite the widespread opposition among the Greek public to NATO involvement in Kosovo, the Greek government supported the campaign against Milosevic. See D. Kavakas, *Greece*, op. cit., pp. 157-158.

53. See Alexis Heraclides, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation" in Mustafa Aydin and Kosta Ifantis (eds.), *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean* (London, Routledge, 2004), p. 75.

54. This was part of the argumentation used by the former Greek Premier Costas Simitis during the official talks he had with the US President Clinton in the White

House in April 9th, 1996. It was during this meeting that Greece has proposed a 'step-by-step' approach to be followed in Greek-Turkish relations. See C. Simitis, *Policy for an Innovative Greece*, op. cit., p. 82.

55. For the 'bottom-up' process as the second dimension of Europeanization, see C. Tsardanidis and S. Stavridis, *The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy*, op. cit., pp. 221-223.

56 See S. Economides, *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 472.

57. See Dieter Mahncke, "Reform of the CFSP: From Maastricht to Amsterdam" in J. Monar and W. Wessels (eds.), *The European Union After the Treaty of Amsterdam* (London and New York, Continuum, 2001), p. 229.

58. For these remarks see Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Europe's Tainted Mirror. Reflections on Turkey's Candidacy Status After Helsinki" in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization* (London, Brassey's, 2001), pp. 248-249.

59. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, George Papandreou had stressed: "the heart of the European ethos lies in building the institutions and practices of inclusiveness". See George Papandreou, "Greece wants Turkey to make the grade", *International Herald Tribune*, 10 December 1999.

60. For these views on the part of the European conservatives (including the Christian Democratic Party in Germany) see Andrew Mango, "Turkey and the Enlargement of the European Mind", *Middle Eastern Times* (No. 2, April, 1998), pp. 171-192.

61. Erik Siegl, "Greek-Turkish Relations: Continuity or Change?", *Perspectives* (No. 18, 2002), p. 51 (fn. 16). See also Kalypso Nicolaidis, *Europe's Tainted Mirror*, op. cit., pp. 257-260 and Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies", *Security Dialogue* (Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2000), pp. 489-502.

62. For a theoretical treatment of this view see B. Irondelle, "Europeanization without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991-96", *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003), p.223. For the opposite argument see C. Radaelli, "The Domestic Impact of European Union Public Policy: Notes on the Concepts, Methods, and the Challenges of Empirical Research", *Politique Européenne* (Vol. 5, No. 2, 2001), pp. 107-142.

63. Successive Greek governments have shown remarkable continuity in using the Cyprus issue for blocking EU-Turkey relations since the 1980s. See —among others—Heinz Kramer, "Turkish Application for Accession to the European

Community and the Greek Factor”, *Europa Archiv* (Vol. 42, No. 10, November 1987), pp. 605-614; Tozun Bahceli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1990); Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Chardanides, “The EC Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle” in Dimitri Conostas, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s*, op. cit., 207-230. On March 6, 1995 Greece decided to lift its veto towards the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement. In exchange for the removal of the Greek veto on the Customs Union accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus would begin in March 1998. Cyprus will thus be included in the next round of enlargement accession negotiations. With regard to Turkey’s European orientation, decisions made in Luxembourg and Cardiff, in January and June 1998 respectively, further burdened the already tense and fragile Greek-Turkish security agenda, as the postponement of Turkey’s accession negotiations remained linked to Greece’s deliberate policy of keeping the doors of the European Union (EU) closed.

64. The use of these terms is attributed to Professor Theodore Couloumbis, see Theodore Couloumbis, “Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy since 1974”, *Thesis: A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues* (Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1997-98), (EU) 11-17.

65. At the EU summit In Helsinki, Athens accepted the granting of EU candidate status for Turkey, attaching only two conditions (in addition, of course, to the Copenhagen criteria that apply to all candidate countries). Firstly, Turkish claims concerning ‘grey zones’ in the Aegean and the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf had to be submitted to the International Court of Justice in the Hague by 2004, if all other efforts failed, and secondly, that the accession of Cyprus to the EU would not be conditional on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. A detailed account of the institutional reflections of Greece’s strategy as shaped in the European Union summits in Helsinki (1999), Copenhagen (2003) and Brussels (2004) follows in Chapter 4.

66. See Panayotis Tsakonas and Thanos Dokos, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century: A View from Athens” in Lenore Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds.), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (BCSIA Studies in International Security, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2004), pp. 113.

67. It is worth noting that Helsinki has made evident that *democratization is a prerequisite for membership*. Thus clashed with the dominant perception in Turkish politics in the 1990s, namely that the EU should first incorporate Turkey as a full member and it will then help foster democratization. See Panayotis Tsakonas, “Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence. Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue, *Turkish Studies* (Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 2001), p. 31.

The EU Council, held in Copenhagen in 1993 adopted the following criteria for the evaluation of candidate countries for membership in the EU: (a) political conditions, i.e., the state of democracy and the respect for human rights, (b) economic conditions, i.e., macroeconomic stability, ability to deal with competitive pressure; and (c) the ability to adopt the European acquis. The Copenhagen EU Council stated that “membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities”. See *Presidency Conclusions*, The Council of the European Union (Copenhagen, 1993).