The Emergence of a Greek-Turkish Cooperation System as the Result of a "Butterfly Effect"

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RÉSUMÉ

En utilisant la théorie des systèmes modernes de Niklas Luhmann, on analyse, dans cet article, la façon avec laquelle un événement accidentel ou un désastre naturel, tel que le dévastateur tremblement de terre qui a eu lieu en Turquie en 1999, peut avoir un effet boule de neige, c'est-à-dire déclencher une série de changements ayant contribué à l'émergence d'un système de collaboration entre les Grecs et les Turcs. À cette fin, non seulement on étudie le rôle que les différents systèmes sociaux (tels que les médias, la diplomatie, les organisations de la société civile et la politique) jouent à propos des transformations de conflits, mais on essaie aussi d'illustrer le rôle que la contingence et la chance peuvent jouer. L'argument principal de cet essai est que le nouvel ordre qui a vu le jour, c'est-à-dire le système de collaboration entre la Grèce et la Turquie, s'est constitué à partir d'une réaction de cause à effet et n'est pas le résultat d'une décision rationnelle. La recherche révèle *les points cachés* des systèmes sociaux qui ont contribué à la constitution de ce nouvel ordre, mais qui n'ont pas pu voir ni contrôler leur contribution. Cet article s'appuie sur une recherche sur le terrain en Turquie et en Grèce; il s'est fait à partir de 20 entrevues avec des politiciens, diplomates, journalistes et représentants de la société civile aussi bien Grecs que Turcs.

ABSTRACT

By employing Niklas Luhmann's modern systems theory, this article discusses how an accidental event, a natural disaster such as the devastating earthquake that occurred in Turkey in 1999, could have a "butterfly effect", namely trigger a chain of changes, which led to the emergence of a system of Greek-Turkish co-operation. To this end, it explores not only the role different social systems, such as the media, diplomacy, civil society organizations and politics can play in conflict transformation, but it also sheds light to the role contingency and chance can play. The article's main argument is that the new emerging order, the system of Greek-Turkish cooperation, was constituted through a causal process and it was not the result of a rational decision making process. The research conducted reveals *the blind spots* of social systems which contributed to the constitution of this emerging order and yet they could not see and control their contribution into it. The article is based on fieldwork conducted in Turkey and Greece and involves primary

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source material gathered through more than 20 interviews with Greek and Turkish politicians, diplomats, academics, journalists and civil society representatives.

Introduction

On 17 August 1999, Turkey's Marmara region was ravaged by one of the century's most devastating earthquakes. This accidental event had an unprecedented impact on Greek-Turkish relations. It seems that it has brought Greeks and Turks closer to cooperation than ever. Initially, Greeks were mobilized to gather aid for the victims of the earthquake. During the months after the earthquake, however, this expression of solidarity was transformed to cooperation in a number of fields such as politics, business, trade, arts, education and sports.

There are not many analyses in the literature of Greek-Turkish relations that attempt to explain and evaluate the impact of the earthquake and the emergence of the cooperation that followed it. Practitioners, like politicians, journalists and diplomats, are puzzled by this phenomenon that followed the earthquake. Yet, they usually do not consider the earthquake as the central factor in the emergence of these positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations. Isolating inter-governmental relations, they argue that this rapprochement was the result of actions and decisions undertaken by the two governments before and after the earthquake. They seek to establish continuity in the aims each country held before and after the earthquake and they base their analyses on an assumed rational calculation made by the Greek and Turkish decision-makers or by emphasizing the EU parameter¹.

Other approaches suggest that peace initiatives, both governmental and non-governmental, that developed between 1996 – in the aftermath of the crisis over the Imia/Kardak islets – and 1999 prepared the ground for and built up this phenomenon². Analytical tools from conflict resolution theory have also been employed to describe this phenomenon. This approach attempts to consider and evaluate developments on different levels of society, such as politics, media and civil society organizations. Nevertheless, it fails to establish links among them and cannot explain the timing of the developments and the dynamics that emerged after the earthquake. In the end, this approach too, returns to governmental politics, frustrated by its inability to provide an explanation for the complexity involved.

This article examines the phenomenon that emerged after the earthquake as a dynamic process of morphogenetic social change in Greece and Turkey. Based on Niklas Luhmann's theory of social autopoiesis³, it argues that the earthquake was the decisive point for a shift from the existing self-description of the Greek-Turkish conflict in Greece and Turkey, to a new self-description, which developed around themes of cooperation. The earthquake was the "irritation", the "stimulus" that triggered fast-moving communication processes in a multitude of social and psychic systems in Greece and Turkey. Social systems structurally – that is a causally – coupled with each other increased the complexity which then enforced the emergence of a new emerging order, a new "attractor", i.e. a social system of Greek-Turkish cooperation.

The article is divided into four main parts. The first part presents the phenomenon that followed the earthquake as a "butterfly effect", thereby describing the autocatalytic chain reactions the earthquake triggered in Greece and Turkey. The second part argues that this "butterfly effect" was due to the self-referential and thus paradoxical nature of the operation of social and psychic systems. The third part describes the transition from the stage of bifurcation – that is a stage of increased complexity – to the emergence of the new attractor of cooperation. Here, the article examines the mechanics of communication in order to demonstrate that the new order emerged after the establishment of new differences through a process of generalization and respecification of communication. The last part argues that this new system is autonomous from the other social systems.

The Earthquake of 1999 as a "Butterfly"

The devastating earthquake that occurred in Turkey on 17 August 1999, registered 7.4 on the Richter scale, caused the death of more than 30,000 people. The argument here is that the earthquake was the "butterfly" that triggered a chain of spontaneous reactions within a multitude of social systems and their subsystems in Greece and Turkey.⁴ The media, municipalities, professional associations and individuals in Greece were mobilized in order to help the victims of the earthquake. As the Greek mobilization was projected on the news media, it provoked positive reactions within Turkey which in turn were reported back in Greece further amplifying communication about cooperation. This section seeks to describe the autopoiesis or self-constitution of communication about cooperation and its autocatalytic nature through concrete examples of social systems' operations.

The earthquake became a front-page headline in the Greek news media for the first days afterwards. On 17 and 18 August, Greek newspapers devoted tens of pages to the situation in the area struck by the earthquake. Greek TV channels adapted their everyday programming to the earthquake showing live coverage of scenes from the rescue operations and extensive coverage of the consequences of the earthquake.

The first telegram of support from Greece to Turkey was sent in the afternoon of the first day after the earthquake, 17 August, by the President of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Panayiotis Koutsikos.⁵ The Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, expressed their sympathy to the Turkish government on 18 August. The first official Greek mission of people and humanitarian aid arrived in Istanbul in three C-130 airplanes, in the early afternoon of 18 August.⁶

From 18 August, initiatives were undertaken by Greek civil society organizations in order to gather money as well as primary necessities for the victims of the earthquake. On 19 August a group of Greek Red Cross doctors, professional and volunteer nurses and members of the Samaritans left for Istanbul. The Municipality of Athens set up centres where the Athenians could bring food, clothes and other basic necessities for the victims of the earthquake.

On the same day this mobilization reached the Turkish news media through Stelios Berberakis's articles in the Turkish newspaper *Sabah*. Berberakis referred to the humanitarian aid sent by the Greek government to Turkey, described the mobilization of the municipality of Athens, media and other civil society organizations for the gathering of aid.⁷

By 20 August, the mobilization of Greek civil society had already received the name *Operation Solidarity* from the Greek news media. The newspaper *Ta Nea* itself started a campaign for Turkish homeless and orphaned children. Stelios Berberakis presented all these initiatives on 20 August in the newspaper *Sabah* in a more detailed article. Yet, it was on 21 August that the mobilization in Greece appeared on the front page of the Turkish newspaper *Sabah* with the title "Neighbour, We Could Not Have Known You Are Like That".

The Greek and Turkish news media started observing themselves and the change in their own attitudes which led to a spontaneous public dialogue. The initiatives undertaken by the Greek newspaper *Ta Nea* were news for the Turkish *Hürriyet*. On 22 August, *Hürriyet* was writing about an "Earthquake in the Media...Aid Account from Ta Nea". "Thank You Very Much, Neighbour" was the leading article of *Hürriyet* on 23 August and it was also written in Greek. The Greek press expressed its surprise and replied in the same spirit.

On 24 August, the City Council of Thessaloniki, the second largest city of Greece, gathered and sent to Turkey more than 20 tons of food, pharmaceutical

supplies, tents and clothes. The Greek Orthodox Church entered the campaign on 24 August. The Bishop of the island of Rhodes, the head of the Prefecture and other local authorities also started a campaign gathering humanitarian aid for the victims of the earthquake. The Prefecture of Kefallinia and Ithaki, two Greek islands, opened bank accounts for the victims.

Hundreds of Greeks visited or called the Turkish embassy in order to express their sympathy and learn how they could help the victims of the earthquake. The Turkish embassy in Athens and the consulate in Thessaloniki issued statements expressing their gratitude for Greek support in light of the great disaster. The Prefecture of Xanthi and the Greek State Radio and the GSEE (General Confederation of Workers of Greece), in agreement with Turkish labour unions, organized large concerts in Xanthi, Athens and Istanbul for the victims of Izmit with famous Greek and Turkish artists such as Mikis Theodorakis, Zulfu Livaneli, George Dalaras, Maria Farantouri. Organisations such as the Red Cross, the Médecins sans frontières, the National Kapodistrian University of Athens, the Greek left-wing political party *Synaspismos* in Thessaloniki, the Athens Bar and the Pharmacists' Association of Attica Province and many others, all gathered and sent medical and other aid to the victims of the earthquake.

The attitudes of the Greek people triggered further reactions of ordinary people from Turkey and Turks from all over the world, who started expressing their gratitude to Greeks in various ways. The Greek news media published dozens of electronic messages and letters of thanks that had been sent to them by Turks. Greeks who happened to be in Turkey those days experienced this sudden change of attitudes in their interactions with Turks which, in turn, reached the Greek news media as "news". On 23 August, the newspaper *Ta Nea* wrote about the way its crew in Turkey was being treated by Turks in the streets or in cafeterias and other public places. "The owner of the small shop outside Agia Sophia did not accept money and the owner of the café, whose grandfather was a Turk from Crete, burst into tears".

Foreign news media also observed these changes of attitudes between Greeks and Turks and wrote about it. *Corriere della Sera*, the *New York Times* and the *Boston News*, all published articles on this new situation, reproducing parts of articles from Greek and Turkish newspapers and also publishing letters sent to them by their Greek and Turkish readers. This was fed back to the Greek and Turkish news media, which started reflecting on how foreign news media were examining this phenomenon in Greek-Turkish relations.

Official state authorities from other countries noticed and supported this change. The American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the German

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder praised the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and the Foreign Minister George Papandreou for the Greek help to Turkey.¹¹

The Blind Spots of Social Systems

The previous section has described the chain reactions that occurred in a multitude of social and psychic systems in Greece and Turkey after the earthquake. Nevertheless, this description cannot explain how these reactions came about nor can it explain their effects. This section, therefore, demonstrates that the actions and events described above were simplifications of complex processes of meaning determination carried out within various social systems, such as the media, civil society organizations and politics. It is argued that every action, after its occurrence, becomes autonomous from the conditions that brought it about and acquires informational and connective value for other systems which will in turn select it, i.e. interpret it for their own selfreproduction. This also means that the same element is used by more than one social system and that it has different meaning - different selectivity and connectivity – for each of them. Furthermore, the earthquake was an event that was employed by various social and psychic systems for their further autopoiesis. It was "news" for the Greek and Turkish news media, the stimulus for expressing philanthropic sentiments which drove Greek civil society organizations to action, a profit opportunity for certain humanitarian aid organizations, a publicity opportunity for Greek politicians, an unexpected opening for a long-sought change of policy for a part of the Greek government and so on.

Modern systems theory helps us to understand how each social and psychic system operated during that time. The element emphasized here is simultaneity. Each system remained opaque and incalculable to the others, accessing complexity only selectively and only through reference to itself that is through its pre-established schemes of interpretation. By acting, it introduced its distinctions back to the emerging order. Nevertheless, it could not observe this re-entry and its consequences. It could not see that it could not see what it could not see. Systems cannot "see" their own blind spots. In what follows, this section highlights this mode of operation of social systems and presents examples of structural couplings that occurred after the earthquake among various social and psychic systems in Greece and Turkey.

The System of News Media

The news media is a system, which makes distinctions according to the binary code news/not news¹². The selection of the issues, that is, the

construction of news, after the earthquake in the Greek and Turkish news media, followed the rules and the rationale of news production. The aim of the Greek and Turkish news media was not the propagation of friendship and cooperation. They only implemented their normal functions guided by their previously institutionalized practices and patterns of behaviour.¹³

The earthquake in Turkey had all the characteristics of news for the Greek and Turkish news media, it was surprising and unusual and it referred to the life and death of thousands of people¹⁴. Similarly, the spontaneous reaction of Greek civil society organizations and the emergence of dialogue of friendship and cooperation among Greek and Turkish media were also surprising and unusual developments.

There was no central planning about the way the earthquake or the other issues that emerged in the course of the first days after the earthquake should be presented. Greek and Turkish journalists and editors emphatically insist on the day-to-day development of the media agenda. This chapter presents examples of news construction, exploring the emergence of news items, as complex nexuses of meaning and of structural couplings between various social and psychic systems. These examples are taken from the Turkish television channel NTV, the Turkish newspaper *Sabah*, the Greek newspapers *Eleftherotypia* and *Ta Nea* and the Greek state radio station.

The Turkish news channel NTV was one of the most important and reliable sources of information about the situation in the earthquake area in Turkey. Many news programs had references to the Greek relief workers in the area of the earthquakes as well as the developments within Greece. According to the foreign news editor, Mustafa Asçioğlu, three main reasons explain why the Turkish news media made news out of the Greek aid story.

First the Greek aid was news because it was unusual and surprising. Second, we saw that CNN-Turk [the other important news channel in Turkey] had a story about a Greek rescue team and so we asked our own reporter to work on a similar story... Third, it was a good opportunity, a way to make up for past mistakes. We had all understood the bad role the news media had played in the Imia/Kardak crisis and the mistakes we had made and there was an opportunity to make up for that as well. Stelios Berberakis's articles from Athens for *Sabah* and his reports on the Turkish TV channel ATV provided the Turkish public with the first descriptions of the developments within Greece. Berberakis described his own rationale as follows:

There were two important things for me at the time; one was the Greek television and the second an article in Eleftherotypia noticing a sudden radical change. After

that I realized this is something different, this is important and I immediately took a camera and went to the hospitals to take pictures of the people who were giving blood. $^{\text{\tiny IV}}$

The article in *Eleftherotypia* that motivated Berberakis was written by Anna Stergiou. The title of this article was "Weapons Have Not Brought Happiness' and the author pointed to the sudden change of Greek attitudes. Stergiou at that time was not a columnist at the newspaper but a young reporter. Nevertheless, that day she felt like writing this article to which nobody paid attention when she turned it in. In subsequent days, however, everybody started talking about it. It was reproduced by Berberakis in the Turkish newspaper *Sabah* and by the American newspaper *The Boston News*, too.

Institutionalized processes of cooperation among Greek and Turkish journalists established from 1996-1999 not only offered a scheme of interpretation for what was happening in the form of themes for journalists like Mustafa Asçioğlu but in some cases they provided the structures for further cooperation. The concert for the victims of the earthquake organized by the Greek State Radio Station in Xanthi was an initiative undertaken by the Director of the Hellenic Radio Station, Ioannis Tzanetakos and his close associates. The implementation of this project was supervised by Damon Damianos, the director of the local State Radio Station of Komotini. Tzanetakos and Damianos were both active members of the "Movement of Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace" at that time. After the former became General Director of the State Radio Station in 1998 and the latter Director of the local radio station in 1999, they undertook several initiatives to promote cooperation between Greece and Turkey, "taking advantage of the inertia of the structures of state mechanisms", rather than by cooperating with the state authorities.¹⁹

The journalists and columnists who first described the changes in Greek-Turkish relations that followed the earthquake in their writings had participated in the workshops that took place from 1996 until the earthquake. Stelios Berberakis, Sami Kohen, Mehmet Ali Birand, Damon Damianos, Ioannis Tzanetakos, Zeynep Göğus and Alkis Kourkoulas were only some of them.

To sum up this section, the news media, by means of their normal functions, provided irritations and increased the communication possibilities and constrained complexity towards the direction of cooperation. The transmission of information to an undetermined number of potential receivers who could continue communication created an open field of experimentation in Greece and Turkey. That enabled unexpected structural couplings to occur in Greece and Turkey.

Civil Society Organizations

Greek non-governmental organizations specialized in humanitarian aid, ordinary people, intellectuals, authors and journalists made a major contribution to the emerging order, the system of cooperation²⁰. Yet, each system, operated by drawing on different distinctions and following different aims.

The Greek non-governmental organizations that specialized in humanitarian aid missions – like *Kessa Dimitra* and *European Perspective* – reacted not as Greek organizations but rather as humanitarian aid organizations. Their first mission to Turkey after the earthquakes was completely independent of the Greek government. They were financed by the European Union (European Community Humanitarian Office).²¹ Offering aid to the victims of the earthquake was their job and they had to accomplish it according to certain international standards. However, their Greek and not their European identity and source of funding was accentuated by the Turkish people they worked with, as well as by the Turkish news media. It was precisely this element that was selected and interpreted and served for further structural couplings that enabled the autopoiesis of Greek-Turkish cooperation.

Labour union leaders from various associations in Greece with a strong leftist ideological tone participated in the campaigns for the victims of the earthquake in order to express their solidarity with their colleagues from Turkey with whom they had established some contact before the earthquake. There we find international solidarity to be consciously opposed to the Greek and Turkish nationalisms.

Leftists used the rhetoric of international solidarity and peace among people when they wrote about the earthquake in Turkey and the stance of the Greek people. A characteristic example is the article that provoked the dialogue between one of the best selling Greek newspapers, *Ta Nea*, and the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet*. That article was written by Mihalis Mitsos, with the title "We Are All Turks". When Mitsos wrote this article he "projected the idea of international solidarity rather than something else". The paradox here was that this article was reproduced by the right-wing Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet*. Hürriyet was not concerned with the ideological message that the article conveyed. It selected this article for its striking title and also because it was written by a Greek journalist in one of the two best-selling Greek newspapers. In addition, when Mitsos wrote this article, he did not think of its possible effects, nor had he been following the developments in Turkey after he wrote it, since he is not a specialist in Greek-Turkish relations. Three years later, he was surprised to hear that the

Turkish newspaper Hürriyet had reproduced a part of his own article.24

It is important to note here that no communication with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other official authorities had preceded initiatives such as the message of support by the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the organization of the campaign for the gathering of humanitarian aid and the blood donation by the Municipality of Sappes.²⁵

The hundreds of Greek citizens who rushed to offer money, blood or other necessities and expressed their sympathy and solidarity with the Turkish victims of the earthquake, on one hand, and the Turks who expressed their gratitude, on the other, played an important role in the emergence of this phenomenon. They explained their attitudes in their letters, electronic messages and face-to-face interactions which reflect four main motivations. Firstly, Greeks felt they share a common fate with Turks because of the vicinity of the two countries. Secondly, the vivid images of destruction and pain that the earthquake had caused, projected through electronic media, stimulated feelings of compassion for the families of the victims. Thirdly, again, some Greeks and Turks employed a leftist ideology, which put the emphasis on solidarity among peoples and opposed Greek and Turkish nationalism in favour of internationalism. Finally, personal memories that Turks and Greeks had from the years they were living side by side in Istanbul or even positive impressions from visiting the other's country emerged now to contradict the system of conflict and provide the background for their personal initiatives.

The System of Politics

The argument put forth here is that the Greek and the Turkish governments were not in a position to control, let alone to design these developments.²⁶ Rather, the changes occurred in the wake of the earthquake transformed their environment and imposed cooperative attitudes on the systems of Greek and Turkish politics. These changes reinforced within both systems of politics structures favourable to cooperation and rapprochement and provided connecting points for their further development contributing to the overall dynamics of communication about cooperation.

The humanitarian aid gathered by Greek non-governmental organizations and the massive mobilization of Greek civil society brought about a new situation, which changed the environment of the system of Greek politics. The media noticed, recognized and reinforced this change by making "news' about it. Questions posed by journalists to politicians invited comments on people's

reactions. The new emerging issues of communication provided a field of experimentation not only for the news media but for politicians too.

The first statements of sympathy and the humanitarian aid sent by Greece to Turkey and the reply received were within the framework of the international official code of conduct. Nevertheless, the change in the official communication between the two governments was important. The provocative statements usually hurled every now and then towards the other side were now replaced by expressions of sympathy and words of friendship. These statements, however formal or however technical they might have been, were oriented towards the direction of cooperation and thus they were coupled with other communications from other social systems that had chosen the same direction.

The mobilization of the Greek authorities was spontaneous. Fotis Xydas, Consul-General of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul, a junction point for the humanitarian help coming from Greece, argued that there was not a well-organized plan driving the action of the various governmental agencies. He said that:

[t]he TV set played a major role.... The mobilization of the Greek authorities did not follow a specific programme. It was just for appearances' sake because the Greek TV channels were showing images from the earthquake for a long time... It was more the result of a kind of competition among the different agencies and organizations regarding who would appear more on the Greek TV.²⁷

The mobilization itself, however, created its own self-referential dynamics. It required continuous contacts on a daily basis among officials on both sides of the Aegean in order to cope with their tasks. The lack of understanding and the absence of common ground for cooperation that had been characteristics of the contact between the two sides of the Aegean over the years were now replaced by this specific and practical task to be implemented.

The stance of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, was important for these developments. Papandreou encouraged the Greek initiatives within civil society and he was personally engaged in certain efforts in that direction. The statements he made and his personal initiative for generous funding of Turkey by the European Union was in accordance with his previous policy of rapprochement with Turkey. Nevertheless, the Greek government was not in control of these developments for two reasons. Firstly, the statements which encouraged people to make a contribution to the aid campaign were made on 24 August, which was seven days after the earthquake. By that time, tons of humanitarian aid supplies had already been

gathered. Secondly, these statements cannot be considered as active coordination or engineering of the mobilization. Rather, the cooperative perspective of the Greek Foreign Minister vis-à-vis Greek-Turkish relations was structurally, that is, a causally coupled, synchronized, with the other spontaneous processes of communication emerging in and between various social and psychic systems in Greece and Turkey.

To explain the Greek government's stance we have to take also into account the change of dynamics which the earthquake set in motion within the European Union regarding EU-Turkish relations. The pro-Turkish camp within the EU raised its voice urging solidarity with Ankara and asked the Union to reconsider Turkey's candidate status.²⁸

Facing these new pressures within the EU, the Greek government perceived the emergence of a stream of sympathy for the Turkish victims of the earthquake within Greece, as an opportune moment to change its policy with regard to the veto on the Turkish candidacy for membership in the EU. High-ranking officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceived that this shift of attitudes would decrease reactions against both the release of the funds by the EU towards Turkey with Greek consent and also the potential lift of the Greek veto at the Helsinki Summit. The Greek veto had been considered by Greeks to be a stronghold in the undeclared Greek-Turkish diplomatic war within the various EU bodies. The resistance built around it within the Greek society made this issue seem like a minefield for any Greek government until the time of the earthquake.

Ambassador Xydas's observation with regard to the impact of the earthquake on the perceptions of the Greek officials is illuminating: "[I]t was only afterwards [after the first weeks that followed the earthquake] that we saw its beneficial results". 29 Xydas's empirical observation underlines the spontaneity of the changes occurred within Greece and challenges the assumption of engineering from above.

Neither were the Turkish attitudes determined by a rationale of cooperation or peaceful resolution of the conflict. The unexpected phenomenon that followed the first days of the earthquake, with the Greek aid flowing towards Turkey from different sources within Greece, was a major surprise for Turkish authorities. Again, the Greek Consul in Istanbul describes the situation as follows: "At the beginning they [Turkish authorities] were completely dazed at what was happening. What does this attack [of friendship] mean now? What is its purpose? They thought that we [Greeks] were influencing public opinion... But the dynamic of the whole situation made them more flexible".³⁰

From Bifurcation to Attractor

The previous section described the emergence of the unexpected dynamics of cooperation as uncoordinated selectivity, oriented to the same direction, namely the direction of cooperation and solidarity. Social systems and psychic systems, each "acting" under their own rationale, increased the complexity of the situation and contributed to the emergence of a stage of bifurcation, a stage of undecidability where alternatives to the well-established explanations about the Greek-Turkish conflict emerged and eventually prevailed.

This section explores the process of transition from the stage of bifurcation created by the dispersion of communication about the earthquake to the emergence of a new "attractor", a new order of cooperation. As discussed above an "attractor" is a self-description that has prevailed in society and has become stable condition through networks of recursive observations of observations. Here, it is demonstrated that observing systems carry on their operations of self and other observation based on existing differences or by establishing new differences. The old well-established differences supportive of the Greek-Turkish conflict that were taken for granted before the earthquake were Greek vs. Turkish interests, Greek state vs. Turkish state. The earthquake and the developments it brought about broke down and eventually replaced these differences by new differences such as civil society vs. state, Greeks/Turks vs. politicians, enmity vs. friendship. These new differences found connections in existing referential substrata of both countries.

It is argued that cooperation emerged as a new identity, a new attractor to order the new differences, interpret the new phenomenon and attribute meaning to aspects of Greek-Turkish relations from the past. It was introduced to rationalize the new situation and to help social and psychic systems handling infinite complexity. The linking device for the structural couplings, which led to the emergence of the new order, was the language already formed through similar processes of morphogenetic evolution from 1996 to 1999 or even before.

The Emergence of New Differences

The mobilization of Greek civil society in order to gather humanitarian aid, offer money and express sympathy for and solidarity with the victims of the earthquake broke down the long-held image of Greeks as enemies who seek to inflict harm upon Turks. On the other hand, in Greece, the image of Turks as the worst and most dangerous enemy of Greeks collapsed in front of the image of Turkish people mourning myriad victims of the earthquake.

Turks appeared as human beings suffering, in agony for their families who were still under the ruins. Furthermore, the Turkish reactions that followed the dispatch of material aid and relief workers were a surprise, which further broke down the expectation of the enemy according to the image built up over the years.

The emergence of the new differences can be traced in the articles, writings and the public speech of these days. Mihalis Mitsos wrote on 20 August in his article "We are all Turks!" that, "if pain and joy really bring peoples together, then *Greeks* and *Turks* should be brothers.... we might believe in a different God, we might not believe in a God at all, but we pray for you, because whatever our *governments* say, whatever propaganda our channels transmit, we love you, we stand by you, we are close to you".³¹

Panayiotis Ioakeimidis, an academic and a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote in the same newspaper on the same day about the common elements that the two people share and pointed to the vanity of the conflict:

"Looking at those maps and reading about the disaster of biblical proportions, a disaster that the experts say can strike our country at any time, one can reflect on really how pointless it is for the two countries to come to the brink of war for some arid rocks, for some arid islets, whether they are called Imia or Kardak. The fate of the two *peoples* is indeed somehow common in many important things".³²

"From now on, nobody will be able to follow the "*politics* of tension" just because the "*public* wants it this way". Nobody will be able to write provocative words by taking refuge in the same superficial argument. The public's wish was determined by this disaster", Sami Kohen stated categorically.³³

As noted above the motive for Stelios Berberakis to write his report in the Turkish newspaper *Sabah* where he described Greek reactions was an article written by Anna Stergiou. He quoted a part of this article in his own report:

Family, school, armywith all these institutions and a series of historical and political examples we, the Greeks, fed feelings of hatred and antagonism and we believed that the Turks are our enemies. But how did it happen that these feelings, full of hatred and antagonism, that have lasted for years, are deleted and gone within a day? The enemy is becoming a friend overnight.³⁴

On 22 August, the columnist Zeynep Gögus wrote in *Sabah* about the collapse of Greek stereotypes. The next day, she emphasized the fact that those who were considered to be Turkey's enemies, such as the Greeks, Russians and

Israelis, had been the first ones who had arrived quickly to help the Turks. Bekir Coskun wrote in *Hürriyet* on 28 of August about "the flower of friendship of the two *peoples* that grew in the ruins of the earthquake" stating that he "will never again believe those *politicians* who instigate crises between the two states".⁵⁵

A group of 21 nuclear physicists from Turkey sent their best wishes to Greece "which proved that humanism is more powerful than everything else". Another "friend from Turkey" thanked the newspaper *Ta Nea* for publishing his electronic mail message to the Greek people. "Our Brothers the Greeks", wrote the columnist of *Cumhuriyet* Ahmet Kislali, who used to employ a strong language in his criticism of the Greek policy vis-à-vis Turkey.³⁶

On 27 August, the newspaper *Ta Nea* published a number of electronic messages sent to it from Turkey. A characteristic example is the following, written by Cengiz Sarri: "We have always loved you in spite of *politics*. You know it and we know it. ...I am sending you my best wishes and I hope for your friendship. I am sending you the best wishes of the Turkish *people* too!"³⁷ Adnan Caglayan, correspondent of the Anatolian News Agency and Stelios Berberakis correspondent of *Sabah*, when asked by *Eleftherotypia* about the possibility of a non-aggression agreement between the two countries and cuts to both countries' military budgets, answered positively, arguing that "*peoples*' and *journalists*' initiatives can be more effective than those of *politicians* and *governments*".³⁸

During the days after the earthquake, ordinary Greek and Turkish citizens instead of politicians became the focus of the observation of various social systems. Greek rescue teams and humanitarian non-governmental organizations at the location of the natural disaster working together with Turks, side by side in the rescue operations and other activities broke down the difference Greeks vs. Turks. Initiatives undertaken by ordinary people landed on the front pages of the newspapers. Turks and Greeks, became symbols of the friendship of the two peoples. Little Güven, the boy that the Greek rescue team found in the ruins of his house, a Greek woman fire-fighter who went to Turkey as the head of the mission that would help in putting out a big fire³⁹, the pilot of a military aeroplane, who now flew a cargo plane with humanitarian aid are only some examples.

Another focus of observation became the way the Turkish state dealt with the crisis the earthquake created. The expectation that the Turkish state would be strong and could protect its people against external enemies and any disaster was shattered.⁴⁰ The Turkish government found itself subject to intense criticism about delays and its inability to deal with the problems that the earthquake had created. In addition, the new situation challenged and eventually broke down the well-established theory in Turkey "of Turkey being isolated and surrounded by enemies". This theory was built upon the differences Turkey vs. world and Turkey vs. Greece. Now the enemies, including Greece, were running to help.

The extracts from the Turkish press below reveal that these observations gave rise to the emergence of new differences such as the Turkish people vs. the Turkish state, people/civil society/world society vs. state, cooperation vs. conflict.

On 20 August an article was reporting on "the fourth day of the earthquake and the rescue operations of the state!" with the title "Political Ruins". Bekir Coskun wrote an article in *Hürriyet* with the title "Where Are You?" to state that "the most frequently asked question is "Where are you?" This word of the question "where?"..... Where is the aid?.... Where are the rescue teams?.. Where is the state?.. There is no answer to those questions.....".

The next day Cüneyt Ülsever wrote in *Hürriyet*. "The bureaucracy with the army in this state since a long time ago justify those who say that 'this state structure is useless'". In *Milliyet* on the same day Duygu Asena wrote an article with the title "Yes, they came into terms with that!" He argued:

"...But the state isn't there....They work voluntarily with their hearts and minds. They work simply to succeed at what the state has not done. We were in Yalova and Cinarcik. We did not see either intensive work or anyone in charge from the *state*... Indeed, there was complete harmonic cooperation...that was among the *citizens*....".

On 24 August *Milliyet* criticising the authorities for the serious delays to rescue operation, wrote "The People are Unprotected". The Islamic newspaper *Zaman* reported on the same deficiencies. Its main headline was "Disaster at Night, Scandal in the Day".

The revelation of the inability of the state to meet the needs of the people operated as a reinforcing factor for the emerging system of Greek-Turkish cooperation for two reasons. Firstly, it contributed to the breaking down of the difference our nation/your nation. It was not the Turkish state, but the world that came to help the thousands of victims of the earthquake. Now, worldwide civil society emerged in contrast to the political system. In addition, although those that had officially sent help were governments, Turkish correspondents could see and thus project the image of individuals

in the field. Secondly, this contingency enabled further structural couplings within Greece. This critical reporting vis-à-vis the Turkish authorities was important news for the Greek news media. It particularly found good ground among leftists who still held vivid memories of the years of the Greek junta and perceived the criticisms against the Turkish state as a reaction of the Turkish people against an autocratic regime.

The Institutionalization of Cooperation

The new system can be identified through the institutions, programmes and roles that have been established in various fields after the earthquake. From early September, expectations for cooperation began to assume an institutionalized form in a number of fields, creating the conditions and setting the goals for further promotion of cooperation. The structures of cooperation established in politics, business, arts and the media consolidated a broader change of attitudes at the grassroots level, which can be described as a new system of cooperation.

Cooperation on the governmental level was consolidated with the signature of nine agreements on economic cooperation, environment, tourism, security and other issues.⁴¹ The discussions about these agreements started after the Kosovo crisis in April 1999. The Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Ali Tuygan uses a metaphor to describe the impact of the earthquake upon this process saying, "the earthquake helped to place in an avenue what had begun in a narrow road".⁴²

Greece and Turkey co-authored a resolution to the UN, creating a unit for emergency situations. Furthermore, Greek seismological institutes established closer cooperation with their Turkish colleagues on issues of scientific interest. The universities of Athens and Istanbul signed an agreement, which established the creation of new Departments of Turkish and Greek Studies in both universities. Indeed, many projects have been implemented in the years from 1999 to 2002, among the schools and faculties of various universities of the two countries.

The municipalities of Istanbul and Athens have established a permanent channel of communication and cooperation, which has enabled close contact and the development of projects in the framework of EU-funded programmes. The European Union's funds have encouraged cooperation among municipalities, allocating a considerable amount of money for the promotion of the institution of sister-cities, as well as for developmental programmes.⁴³

The Municipality of Sapes initiated and completed the creation of a network of municipalities, which includes municipalities in Western Thrace in Greece and municipalities in Eastern Thrace in Turkey. As the Mayor of Sapes, Dinos Haritopoulos, emphasized, it was only after the earthquake that the mayors of the other cities took the courage to visit Turkey and start some sort of cooperation, overcoming the impediment of the previous prejudices that they or their constituents held.⁴⁴ The municipality of Kavala also established an office in Istanbul with the task of providing information for tourists and those interested in trade with this part of Greece. Thessaloniki, the second largest Greek city, has also developed close bonds with the municipality of Istanbul.

Several Greek banks have expressed their interest in investing in Turkey and have opened offices, which actively search for local partners in Turkey. Various associations, artists and organizations have found a way to develop cooperation in their neighbouring country. Films of Greek-Turkish production have been produced in the latest years and have been very successful.⁴⁵ Several exhibitions of different kinds of art have been organized in both countries. Furthermore, the number of Greeks who have visited Turkey and the number of Turks who have visited Greece since the earthquakes has increased impressively.⁴⁶

Nikitas Lionarakis, chairman of the Greek Foreign Ministry's liaison committee for non-governmental organizations and Ali Tuygan, the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, both admit that today it is impossible for the official authorities of both countries to catch up with the majority of these initiatives. After the two earthquakes, these initiatives have multiplied on a scale that cannot be followed, as most of them do not involve the Greek or Turkish state in any way.⁴⁷ These processes of cooperative interactions culminated in the lifting of the Greek veto at the Helsinki Summit of the leaders of the 15 members of the EU, in December 1999.

The Emergence of New Self-descriptions

The structural changes that emerged after the earthquake were self-changes. More precisely, they were changes of social systems' self-descriptions. The main operations of social and psychic systems, which are observing systems, are the operations of self-observation and other-observation as well as self-description. The previous section explored how social systems observed their environment and themselves within it, with what semantics they made their selections of observations. The present section examines the way these observations affected the self-descriptions of social systems. The analysis below emphasizes again that

a social system is constituted as the unity of the system/environment difference.

Initiatives that had been suspended after the Ocalan crisis of February 1999 were activated after the earthquake. The initiatives of business-people for peace got back on track after the earthquake. The Greek part of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce was the first Greek civil society organization that sent messages of support and offered material support to its Turkish counterpart. Mayors of Greek and Turkish cities were encouraged to pursue some kind of cooperation with municipalities from the "other side". Furthermore, the Greek-Turkish Forum managed to come up with a concrete proposal about the resolution of the dispute over the continental shelf in May 2000, which was welcomed by the Greek and Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs as an important contribution to the peaceful resolution of the dispute.

These changes were self-changes, which emerged through self-referential processes of communication. The systems themselves played a part in the alteration of their own structures. The information employed was selected from a domain of potentialities that each system devised and held to be relevant. It was social systems themselves in both Greece and Turkey that perceived the developments after the earthquake as an important change to their environment. They picked up the irritation their environments provided them with and they attributed to it meaning, which in turn had a further effect on their own self-description.

To give an example, members of the Greek-Turkish Forum admit that they felt endowed with a different responsibility after the earthquake. They felt that the two people wanted peace and this justified their effort.⁵⁰ For that reason, they decided to be "more ambitious" and discuss the core of the conflict in the Aegean.⁵¹ This new perspective as well as the previous transformations of the Greek-Turkish Forum reveals the paradoxical nature of social change. Members of the Forum like Ambassador Costas Zeppos and Ambassador Ilter Türkmen had participated in many discussions on Greek-Turkish problems in the past from their official positions. Ambassador Zeppos was the Head of the Department of Greek-Turkish Relations in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Türkmen had served in important posts within the Turkish Ministry, as Turkey's representative at the United Nations and also as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, they had never come so close to the production of a formula for the resolution of the dispute over the continental shelf, a long-lasting thorny issue between the two countries. Both of them attest to the importance of the environment of trust and cooperation established within the Forum. Furthermore, the impact of the earthquake upon their interaction comes to show that their perception of the environment outside of the Forum is equally important.

This sudden transformation draws our attention to one more feature of these processes. Thus, the differences that emerged after the earthquake existed before the earthquake. Yet, the developments brought about by the earthquake made social and psychic systems aware of them leading them to new self-descriptions. Once again, here it becomes apparent that the operation of self-description does not amount to some kind of accurate or objective description of reality. This is an evolutionary achievement rather than the result of a rational calculation.

The change of self-description is reflected in the statements and writings of politicians, journalists, intellectuals and ordinary people. The expression of surprise that followed these developments illustrates further the autonomy of the operation of self-description. We read on the front page of the newspaper Hürriyet "The People Run Ahead of Us". The director of the newspaper Ta Nea, Leon Karapanayiotis, stated that "the solidarity that the Greek people express is not a surprise only for you [the Turks], but for us as well".52 Politicians too recognized the change and the emergence of new arrangements. The Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem and the Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, have talked about the expectations this phenomenon has created. Ismael Cem, in an interview he gave to a Turkish channel, openly confessed that these developments have gone far beyond what politicians had thought and he expressed his fears as to the risks of disappointment but also the responsibility politicians bear after this.53 "The earthquake has changed everything" in Greek-Turkish relations, wrote Mehmet Ali Birand.⁵⁴

These statements recognized the emergence of the new system. This very recognition reinforced the emerging order and ultimately contributed to its construction too. Causal analysis, based on narrowly defined interactions, cannot cope with these paradoxes of communication. Morphogenesis describes the complex processes of social change, going well beyond the general and abstract remarks of the sociality of peace processes. This autonomy of the new system of cooperation will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

The Autonomy of the System of Cooperation

The previous sections explored the increase of complexity after the occurrence of the earthquake and described the emergence of the new order as enforced selectivity towards the direction of cooperation. The new system of

cooperation employed previous determinations of meaning for its autopoiesis. This is possible due to the self-referential nature of communications and the specific strategies of generalization and re-specification.

Communications after the earthquake were generalized on all the three dimensions of meaning, i.e. the issue, the temporal and the social dimensions. Past events were recalled and connected to present occurrences and future expectations were formed through extrapolations from the past and the present. References to the Greek help for the victims of the earthquake detached themselves from the specific events of the earthquake and sought connections to references to a history of cooperation and peaceful Greek-Turkish coexistence. Turks who had memories from the years they lived together with Greeks in Istanbul,55 Greeks who had travelled to Turkey on holiday and had enjoyed Turkish hospitality,56 the common elements in the cultures of the two people, all were recalled to support and provide points for further connections in building up the new system.

Paradoxically enough, the system of cooperation emerged as something that had always been there. In the interpretations of these developments, the adverb "always" (alternating with "never") underlines the process of generalization on the temporal dimension, indicating duration and existence in time. Cengiz Sarri wrote in his electronic message "we have always loved you in spite of politics". Bekir Coskun argued "we will never again believe those politicians who instigate crises between the two states". "It has always been there" maintained the columnist Hadi Uluengin.

Generalization in the social dimension means that there is no constraint as to who is going to make what contribution and when that will happen. Different social partners can make a contribution to the new order. As was shown above, not only and not mainly politicians, but journalists and ordinary people contributed to the emergence of the system of cooperation. The Greek pensioner, Turkish intellectuals who had contacts with Greek writers and poets on the other side of the Aegean Sea,⁵⁷ they all made contributions to the emerging order.

This analysis of the emergence of Greek-Turkish cooperation in the aftermath of the earthquake demonstrates that the new system was independent of the will and planning of the various social and psychic systems that contributed to its constitution. It cannot be identified with the rationale of the system of politics and neither with the rationale of mass media or civil society organizations. Ultimately, it was independent from what brought it about, that is, cooperation for relief of the victims of the

earthquake. It acquired its own identity, its own existence as a complex system of Greek-Turkish cooperation.

Conclusion

The emergence and sudden diversification and multiplication of cooperative interactions between Greeks and Turks have often been described as a paradox, as "lacking reason". Indeed, the analysis in this article demonstrates that the system of cooperation lacked reason. It was neither instigated nor developed by a super-system, which was acting under a specific rationale of cooperation and peace in the broader region of the Aegean Sea.

The new system of cooperation was the product of the transformational dynamics of communications. Recursive operations of meaning production and processing triggered by the earthquake, were set in motion in the news media (Greek, Turkish and foreign), civil society organizations, politics and amongst ordinary citizens. Cascades of communication flows, which happened to get caught up in meaning networks that intersected one another, enabled the increase of complexity and created the need for its reduction. Ultimately, the new system of cooperation was itself a reduction of complexity. In that sense there is not a cause, a reason for its emergence and constitution. The new system itself has enforced selectivity towards the direction of cooperation.

The initial condition that gave rise to this system was a natural disaster, an accidental and thus contingent event. This analysis points to the role of contingency and chance but it underlines at the same time that chance does not mean randomness. Chance means lack of coordination among social systems. The absence of coordination can nevertheless produce effects and trigger causal processes. Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter demonstrates that it was the evolution of society that enabled the amplification and intensification of communication processes that constituted the new system. The unexpected appearance of the earthquake and the events and actions that followed it were incorporated and endowed with meaning and causality by social systems. Previous determinations of meaning and social structures like themes, institutions, persons and organizations provided adequate grounds for the functional specification and institutionalization of a Greek-Turkish system of cooperation. The new order emerged in the course of the autopoiesis, the ongoing self-renewal of modern functionally differentiated society. It was not imposed from outside, it emerged from within Greece and Turkey.

The systems theory perspective sheds light on the transformation process of

the Greek-Turkish conflict as a dynamic process which involves the whole of society in both countries. Furthermore, it breaks the illusion of Greek-Turkish relations as being in a state of stability, to describe their development as a constant process of becoming, restless change and movement - which is a state of dynamic stability. Thus, the analysis on the basis of Luhmann's theory departs decisively from deterministic approaches, which seek to uncover cause-effect relationships according to a machine-like Newtonian logic. The dynamics that unfolded after the earthquake were the dynamics of selectivity and connectivity of communication processes.

Finally, the aim of this article was to provide an insight into the complexity of this phenomenon. It does not claim that this is a representation of the reality. The judgement of the usefulness of the theory rests with the readers and whether it offers a better understanding of the complexities of modern society for them. This will be answered through the observations of the author's observations by other second order observers. The success of this viewpoint depends on its connectability and the way in which it is integrated into further communication.

NOTES

- For an overview see Rumelili, Bahar, "The Talkers and the Silent Ones, The EU and Change in Greek-Turkish Relations", Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No 10. Oct. 2004; Muftuler-Bac, Meltem, The Impact of the EU on Turkish Politics, East European Quarterly, 34(2), pp. 159-179, 2000;
- Heraclides, Alexis, "Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Détente: A Preliminary Evaluation", *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol.1, No.3, Spring 2002, pp.17-32. Also many participants in civil society peace initiatives argue in favour of this interpretation. Interview with Paulina Lampsa, Athens, 01.09.2001.
- 3. Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems, Stanford University Press, 1995.
- 4. The empirical data presented in this paper were mainly gathered from the Greek newspapers *Eleftherotypia* and *Ta Nea* and the Turkish newspapers *Sabah* and *Hürriyet*.
- 5. Interview with the Managing Director and Official Spokesman of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Harry Caloudis, Athens, 20.07.2001.
- 6. Many countries from all around the world sent humanitarian aid and trained teams equipped for the rescue works. For information regarding the humanitarian aid offered, see the articles "Rain of Aid", *Hürriyet*, 18.08.1999, "The World Runs to Help", *Hürriyet* 19.08.1999.

- 7. Sabah, 19.08.1999.
- 8. Hürriyet, 22.08.1999.
- 9. Hürriyet, 23.08.1999.
- 10. Mikis Theodorakis and Zulfu Livaneli have been in the forefront of efforts for cooperation before the earthquake and even in the most difficult times for Greek-Turkish relations.
- 11. See Eleftherotypia 28.08.1999 and Hürriyet 29.08.1999.
- 12. Luhmann, Niklas, The Reality of Mass Media, Polity Press, 2000.
- 13. Luhmann's framework allows research to explore the complexity involved in news production and the interaction of the system of media with the other social systems avoiding the general assumptions for manipulation or independence of the media. For analysis of the media product through conventional theoretical perspectives see Giallourides, C.K, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict From Cyprus to Imia to S-300 and the Helsinki, 1955-2000, The Press Perspective,* [in Greek], Sideris, Athens, 2001 and Tilic, Dogan, *Journalism in Greece and Turkey "I am ashamed, but I am a journalist"* (in Greek), Papazisis, 2000.
- 14. See MacQuail, Denis, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, 1987: p. 204.
- 15. Interview with Mustafa Asçioglu, editor of foreign news at the News Channel *NTV*, Istanbul, 20.08.2001.
- 16. See ZAMAN, 25.09.1999.
- 17. Interview with Stelios Berberakis, Athens, 11.03.2001.
- 18. Interview with Anna Stergiou, Athens, 07.03.2002.
- 19. Interviews with General Director of the Hellenic State Radio Station, Ioannis Tzanetakos, Athens, 07.03.2002 and the director of the Radio Station in Komotini, Damon Damianos, Komotini, 01.04.2002.
- 20. See also Kubicek 2002 and Gundogdu 2001
- 21. Interview with Pantelis Sklias, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Greek NGO European Perspective Development and Education Center, Athens, 11.06.2002.
- 22. Interview with journalist Mihalis Mitsos, Athens, 05.03.2002.
- 23. Hürriyet, 25.08.1999, "The Greek Ta Nea: 'We Are All Turks'".
- 24. Interview with Mihalis Mitsos, journalist, Athens, 05.03.2002.
- 25. Interview with Harry A. Caloudis, Managing Director and Official Spokesman of the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Athens, 20.07.2001, Interview with the Mayor of Sappes, Dinos Haritopoulos, Istanbul, 08.12.2001.
- 26. The mainstream literature focuses on the system of politics based on the assumption of the rational acting of states without doing research and questioning the role of

- civil society. See for example Giallourides, C. K. & Tsakonas, P. I. (eds), *Greece and Turkey After the end of the Cold War*, [in Greek], Sideris, Athens, 1999. A great part of the literature examines the role of the EU from this perspective. For example Kazakos and Ioakeimides, P.C., "Contradictions between Policy and Performance" in Kevin Featherstone and Ifantis (eds) *Greece in a Changing Europe, Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994; Gunduz, Aslan, "Greek Turkish Disputes: How to Resolve them?" In Keridis, Dimitris and Triandafyllou, Dimitris (eds), *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalisation*, Everett, MA: Brassey's, 2001.
- 27. Interview with the Consul General of the Greek Consulate in Istanbul, Fotis Xydas, Istanbul, 22.04.2001.
- 28. See French President Jacques Chirac and the European Commission's official responsible for Turkey Günther Verheugen's statements, *Turkish Daily News*, 12.09.1999.
- 29. Interview with Ambassador Fotis Xydas, Istanbul, 22.04.2001.
- 30. Ibid.
- 31. Ta Nea, 20.08.1999.
- 32. Ta Nea, 20.08.1999.
- 33. Sami Kohen, "The Public's Wish", Milliyet, 25.08.1999.
- 34. Sabah, 21.08.1999.
- 35. Bekir Coskun, Hürriyet, 28.08.1999.
- 36. Cumhuriyet, 24.08.1999.
- 37. Ta Nea, 27.08.1999.
- 38. Hristina Corae, *Eleftherotypia*, 17.09.1999.
- 39. That was the answer from interviews with people from this area two years after the earthquake on the question "Who put out the fire in the refineries?"
- 40. For the Turkish political culture and the role of the state see Dodd 1990 and Erguder 1987.
- 41. Interview with Ambassador Ali Tuygan, Athens, 18.07.2001
- 42. Ibid.
- 43. Some of them are the MERP, MEDA and INTERREG programmes. For further information see http://www.europa.int.
- 44. Interview with the Mayor of Sappes, Dinos Haritopoulos, Istanbul, 08.12.2001.
- 45. See for example the cinema movie *Buyuk Baba Kucuk Ask* as well as the Turkish TV series programme *Yilan Hikayesi* which made known to the Turkish public Katerina Moutsatsou, a young Greek actress. Interview with Katerina Mutsatsou, Istanbul, 20.12.2001. The Greek actress Karyofilia Karabeti played also a role in a

- film of Greek-Turkish production and the songs of the Greek singer Angela Dimitriou have been at the top spots of the charts in Turkish radio and TV stations.
- 46. Interview with Socrates Tragotsis, Consul General in Istanbul, 10.03.2000.
- 47. Interviews with Nikitas Lionarakis, President of Foreign Ministry's Liaison Committee for NGOs, Athens, 07.08.2001 and Ambassador Ali Tuygan, Athens, 18.07.2001.
- 48. For statistics about trade between Greece and Turkey over the last eight years see the website of the Turkish organization DEIK, www.deik.org.tr.
- 49. For the proposal see the Greek-Turkish Forum's website <u>www.greekturkishforum.</u> org.
- 50. Interviews with Ambassador Costas Zeppos, Paulina Lampsa, Ambassador Ilter Türkmen
- 51. Interview with Ambassador Ilter Türkmen, Istanbul, 13.11.2001.
- 52. *Hürriyet*, 29.08.1999, Ferai Tinc, p. 1 and p. 18. See also the article written by Sami Kohen in *Milliyet*, 25.08.1999, "...The attitude of various levels of society from the ordinary man to the businessman, from intellectuals to civilian organizations, surprised not only us, but also government officials in Athens...".
- 53. "The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, said that he has lost the capacity to control developments because as he emphasized "immediately after the earthquakes new expectations have been established in both countries", *Eleftherotypia*, 15.09.1999
- 54. Mehmet Ali Birand, "Efharisto Poli, File", http://www.greekturkishforum.org/arti_6.htm
- 55. Hadi Uluengin in *Hürriyet*, 26.08.1999 and Turgul Savkay writing about the Greek national poet Giannis Ritsos, in *Hürriyet* 29.08.1999.
- 56. See article about the letter Giannis T. Kouris sent to the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Ali Tuygan, *Hürriyet*, 25.08.1999.
- 57. Hürriyet, 26.08.1999.