The Role of Experts in Greek Foreign Policy

Stella Ladi*

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine le rôle de l'expertise en matière de politique étrangère grecque en faisant un lien entre l'européanisation et le cadre d'une communauté scientifique. La connaissance, le pouvoir et la politique extérieure sont analysés au niveau des méchanismes «mous» d'européanisation et celui de la mise en évidence du rôle des experts. Les questions théoriques soulevées dans cet article sont illustrées à travers la discussion sur les changements de stratégie grecque des années 1990 à propos de la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union Européenne. La nature et l'action de la communauté scientifique qui a poussé pour l'adoption et l'application de cette réforme est également discutée.

ABSTRACT

This article explores the role of expertise in Greek foreign policy by linking the literature on Europeanization and the epistemic community framework. Knowledge, power and foreign policy reform are considered in an analysis of the "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization and of the way in which the expert's role is being enhanced. The theoretical claims made herein are illustrated in a discussion of the strategy shift of the 1990s as regards Greece's stand on Turkey's EU candidacy. The nature and action of the epistemic community that pushed for the adoption and implementation of this reform is also discussed.

Introduction

The Europeanization of the public policies of European Union (EU) member-states has become undisputable in the last decade. The discussion has now moved to specific mechanisms of Europeanization and to a comparison of its impact upon different policy areas[1]. Some argue that Europeanization is affecting policy areas even where "soft" mechanisms are in place and low levels of EU regulation exist[2]. An interesting example is foreign policy where the EU level of co-operation may well be loose but a number of changes in ministries of foreign affairs, policy-styles and the constitutions of EU member-states may

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* Advisor on European Issues, Ministry of the Aegean and of Island Policy, Greece.

nonetheless be observed[3]. The "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization include the imitation, diffusion and framing of domestic beliefs and expectations[4]. This article focuses on the way these "soft" mechanisms function through the diffusion of knowledge and change the policy styles of member-states. The creation and impact of *epistemic communities*, especially in the field of foreign policy, is explored as part of Europeanization.

The empirical focus of the article is on the role of experts in Greek foreign policy. The following key questions should be asked: *Can we observe an increased role for experts in Greek foreign policy? What has been the impact of Europeanization on the participation of experts in Greek foreign policy-making?* Greece yields interesting examples because variation in foreign policy choices may be observed as of 1981, date of Greece's entry into the EU and right up to today[5]. At the same time, an expectation (often a belief) exists that Greece as a small state is a country whose foreign policy would be easily Europeanized. Yet in practice, the opposite has often proved true. The changing role of experts in foreign policy is explored through an analysis of their impact during the policy shift in Greek-Turkish relations begun in 1996[6]. This example proves fruitful as an increased participation of experts can be observed. The "epistemic communities" framework proves useful for the description and analysis of the knowledge resources which were in place during this policy shift[7].

The article is divided into two parts. The first offers theoretical background on the "soft" mechanism of Europeanization and links them to the epistemic communities discussion. Specific hypotheses are developed in order to direct the empirical exploration but also to contribute to the Europeanization literature. The second part applies the theoretical framework to the Greek case. First, the main characteristics of EU foreign policy are treated. An introduction to the discussion of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy follows to set the scene for the exploration of the experts' role. The policy shift of the Greek government towards Turkey serves as the main example. The agents of knowledge are outlined, and the hypotheses on "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization and epistemic communities are then discussed.

Europeanization and Epistemic Communities

The impact of the EU on a state is often described as Europeanization. The term first appeared in the 1990s to describe a process different from both European integration and harmonization, both concepts which focus on the domestic adjustment of states to EU obligations[8]. Europeanization

thus acknowledges the two-way process of policy change between the EU and domestic environments in contrast to terms such as European integration which describe the one-way impact of the EU on member-states[9]. Europeanization may be defined as "a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making"[10] or as "the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance"[11].

For Radaelli, Europeanization refers to[12] processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things", and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.

The operationalization of definitions of Europeanization in the study of its impact upon member-states has largely followed a historical institutionalist approach. Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso adopt a three-step top-down approach, whereby they first look at changes at the European level, continue with adaptational pressures for change and finally, confront domestic mediating factors[13]. In an attempt to be more analytical about what happens at the European level, Schmidt[14] and Knill[15] begin by analysing the mechanisms of Europeanization. In my work, a different three-step approach was followed, namely one which distinguishes between "soft" and "hard" mechanisms of Europeanization, continues with analysis of the mediating factors of change and concludes with some possible outcomes of Europeanization[16]. This article focuses upon "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization because EU foreign policy is an intergovernmental EU policy where only "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization are in place.

"Soft" mechanisms of Europeanization are difficult to observe and to demonstrate but remain especially important for the understanding of policy areas where even though EU regulation is low, convergence of policy styles and policy decisions may be seen. Knill describes this "soft" mechanism as *framing domestic beliefs and expectations*[17]. The EU goal in this respect would be to prepare the ground for institutional change by altering the "cognitive input" of domestic actors also in areas where no institutional requirements exist. Page describes *polydiffusion* as a soft mechanism similar to Knill's *framing domestic beliefs and expectations*[18]. The difference resides in the fact that for Page this is an unimportant mechanism because if policy change is to occur, choice and deliberation as well as generation and maintenance of

public support are needed. Radaelli also outlines the cognitive and normative dimensions of Europeanization that can impact formal political structures but also affect prevalent domestic discourses, norms and values[19].

"Soft" mechanisms of Europeanization are put into practice through the activation of networks such as *epistemic communities*, advocacy coalitions and policy transfer networks[20]. The common characteristic of these formations is that possessors of knowledge participate in networks which seek to influence policy learning and to provoke policy change. *Knowledge* is the main resource of the actors involved. The discussion of the relationship between knowledge, power and public policy change seems old and diverse. Gagnon, for example, distinguishes three different pathways within the literature. The first pathway discusses the relationship between knowledge and power as part of a rationalistic paradigm where the state, seeking help, turns to "scientists"[21]. The second sees an indirect relationship between knowledge and power, where knowledge is diffused and influences power centres as part of a "common wisdom". The third understands knowledge and power as organically related and seeks to explain the emergence of other power centres such as policy research institutes. Regardless, any evaluation of the validity of these three pathways requires an analysis of the meso-level if we are to shed light on the existing networks and processes of policy change.

One of the most interesting and useful approaches to understanding the role of experts in foreign policy, is *epistemic communities*. These may be defined as networks of specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of policies to which they should be applied[22].

What unites these specialists is their belief that a particular form of knowledge can be applied to policy development. Policy-makers turn to experts because of the uncertainty that they have to face. Policy-makers might indeed use only the knowledge that legitimizes their decisions, but Haas argues that epistemic communities will probably at some point influence policy makers by providing them with alternatives[23]. The primary resource of epistemic communities remains their possession of scientific knowledge. Indeed Haas describes think tanks as a "key location" for epistemic communities[24]. Adler and Haas claim that epistemic communities dispense advice from within their national borders through interaction with other specialists through conferences or publications[25]. When epistemic communities are transnational, as is increasingly the case within the EU, they are expected to produce a convergence of policy preferences through the

diffusion of knowledge. Furthermore, Adler and Haas argue that if policy diffusion is translated into learning, it can mean the adoption of either new practices or new goals[26].

According to Haas, four features define an epistemic community: (a) shared normative and principled beliefs (b) shared causal beliefs (c) shared notions of validity and (d) a common policy enterprise[27]. Within the EU framework, the transnationality of epistemic communities and of all four features is enhanced. In particular, "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization affect the beliefs, norms and policy goals of epistemic communities. Antoniades distinguishes between two levels of action for the epistemic communities. The first level is the "cognitive" level where epistemic communities are (re)producing social reality and the second level is the "practical" level where epistemic communities are directly related to policy change. The two levels interact with each other[28]. At the cognitive level, change is directed to the discourse and worldview of a society, while at the "practical" level the epistemic communities' action is linked to the policy process itself. Involvement can be direct by having members of the epistemic community participate in the process as policy-makers, or indirect, by having them participate as advisors to policy-makers.

A few problems exist with the notion of *epistemic communities:* First, the concept concentrates on knowledge élites who possess expertise; however, it is possible to have other kinds of agents, e.g., groups without any expert knowledge representing oppressed people, yet interacting within the same framework. Second, when notions such as epistemic communities are used as explanatory models, one should be aware of counterfactuals that are not related to knowledge, but are still important reasons for policy change, for example the structural power of financial sector markets. Finally, the *epistemic communities framework* does not provide an explanation of policy inertia whereby experts' knowledge is simply not taken into account. The key to the successful use of the epistemic community framework is to use it interchangeably with other frameworks such as advocacy coalitions and policy networks. It should be preferred only when there is good reason for doing so, as in the case of an exploration of the increased role of experts in foreign policy.

In order to use and develop the above theoretical assumptions, a methodology and specific hypotheses are needed. Haas argues that in relation to a specific community the members involved should be identified, their principled and causal beliefs should be determined and their activities designed to influence decision makers should be demonstrated[29]. Furthermore, the use

of counterfactuals may prove useful, such as the identification of alternative credible outcomes, in case of lack of influence on the part of the epistemic community or the exploration of alternative explanations for the actions of decisionmakers. The main argument put forward here is that Europeanization increases the importance of the role of epistemic communities by emphasizing the rational and technical aspects of public policies. It also enhances the transnational character of epistemic communities through increased interaction. Actually, "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization are possible primarily through the activities of epistemic communities. The field of EU foreign policy in which low levels of regulation exist provides fertile ground for demonstrating the above argument.

Europeanization, Foreign Policy and the Role of Experts in Greece

Has the role of experts in Greek foreign policy increased and, if so, is this a feature of its Europeanization? Answering this particular empirical question will help us both shed light on recent developments in Greek foreign policy and come to a conclusion about the theoretical argument presented in the previous section. Accordingly, the characteristics of European foreign policy are discussed; the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy explored. Special emphasis is placed upon the existence of epistemic communities, think-tanks and other knowledge locations. Finally, a specific case study illustrating increased participation of experts in foreign policy-making is analyzed. The case concerns the Greek foreign policy shift towards an acceptance of Turkey's aspirations for entry in the EU.

A European Foreign Policy?

Foreign policy is not among the most developed policies in the EU. It is an area where co-operation among member-states exists in almost an intergovernmental mode. Nevertheless, an effort for close co-operation exists. Hill (2004: 145) defines European foreign policy as "the ensemble of the international activities of the EU, including output from all three of the EU's pillars, and not just that relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)"[30]. There are two dimensions in the discussion of the EU foreign policy: the institutional and the operational. Both are treated here.

The development or lack of a European foreign policy is one of the most political issues confronted by the EU; hence, any development in this area has an impact on the actual nature of the European polity. The implementation of a common foreign policy would mean that the EU was moving towards a

federal state model[31]. The most important step towards such closer co-operation was made in Maastricht with the adoption of CFSP. The CFSP was designed so that the EU would have a common foreign policy. However, the decision-making process remained intergovernmental because in practice unanimity was required for any decision and the international relations of the EU were the responsibility of the Presidency of the EU which rotates every six months among EU member-states. The Treaty of Amsterdam complicated matters even further by introducing the position of High Representative of the CFSP. This post is occupied by the General Secretary of the Council and co-exists with the Presidency. The Draft Constitution proposed the introduction of a Foreign Minister in order to increase the visibility of EU foreign policy and simplify its function[32]. Since 1998, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has also been in place with the following aims: 1. give the EU some real military capability; 2. allow the West European Union (WEU) to dissolve in order to make the EU relationship with NATO more direct; 3. bind the UK into EU foreign and security policy[33].

Evaluating the operational level and the penetration of European foreign policy is a complex task. Lack of agreement over the Iraq crisis has been used as the most eloquent example of the inapplicability of the CFSP. Bush's decision to strike Iraq deeply divided Europe. The UK was determined to support the Americans while Germany steadily opposed any intervention and France tried to keep a middle position. The rest of the member-states also divided into camps with Italy and Spain showing more sympathy to the US, and Greece and the "neutrals" lining up at the other end of the spectrum. The CFSP remained silent, although all the actors tried to use the EU in order to strengthen their positions. That being said, in other cases, such as the immediate reaction after September 11 and the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan, the EU has shown greater unity[34].

In Europeanization terms, one must ask whether domestic foreign policies are actually converging or not. Hill, after analyzing the examples discussed in the previous paragraph, has argued that both renationalization and regrouping can be observed[35]. It is argued that in order to obtain a more concrete picture of the outcomes of EU foreign policy, its mechanisms and domestic mediating factors should be taken into account. From the institutional discussion of EU foreign policy is evident that "soft" and not "hard" mechanisms of Europeanization are in place. This means that although operationally foreign policy decisions of member-states do not necessarily converge, informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms are becoming more

similar. Smith argues that the impact of Europeanization can be observed in four areas which are: 1) élite socialization, 2) bureaucratic reorganization, 3) constitutional change and 4) increase in the public support for European political co-operation[36]. Elite socialization signifies the internalization of co-operative habits and the formation of "epistemic communities" for the handling of technical issues. This article is taking this argument further in order to explore whether the whole policy style and direction of a domestic foreign policy can be actually affected by the increased participation of experts due to Europeanization.

Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy and the Role of Experts

Scholars generally agree that there has been strong evidence of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy since the country's entry into the EU[37]. The current focus of the discussion is rather on the form that this Europeanization process has taken[38] and its completeness[39]. In this section, some of the main arguments about the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy are discussed and a description of the organisation of experts since Greece's EU début is provided.

The impact of the EU on Greek foreign policy divides easily into two categories: style and substance[40]. An increased role for experts is one of the key characteristics of a Europeanized policy style. It is expected that their increased participation also affects the substance of foreign policy. In terms of substance, the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy equals Westernization and modernization. This is also the case with the rest of public policies[41]. One of the main substantive changes has been the translocation of Greek policy preference and interests regarding two key issues: Cyprus and Turkey. Observers have also noted increased interest in matters beyond the region and greater involvement in international humanitarian and peacekeeping activities in Southeastern Europe as well as other areas[42].

Given that foreign policy remains an area where mainly "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization are in place, it is interesting to see the impact of this process on the very style of Greek foreign policy. Tsardanidis and Stavridis argue that Europeanization has increased as never before since 1996[43]. Although to a large extent the process has been a top-down one, since 1996 there is more evidence of a bottom-up process when some of Greece's priorities have been successfully promoted, e.g., Cyprus's accession to the EU. Two key changes can be observed as far as style is concerned. Foreign policy-making has become more consensual and more multilateral.

Moreover, there is strong evidence that élite socialization has also been taking place. One practical example is the increased input of foreign policy actors either through the ministries or through NGOs in the formulation of Greek positions regarding the EU[44]. Within this context, informed knowledge is increasingly important; the role of experts, strengthened.

If we go a step further and evaluate the role of experts in Greek foreign policy, we need a mapping of experts' locations. Based on previous research on the topic, one can argue that the development of independent research institutes and think-tanks has been limited following the general pattern of a weak civil society and the lack of an associational culture in Greece[45]. Five locations for foreign policy experts can be identified.

1) University Departments and Academics:

International relations (IR) and EU scholars are often part of epistemic communities and policy networks working close to the government. The institutional impact of university departments is much lower although nine Greek universities have either independent IR departments or relevant sections in related departments. Tsakonas argues that the IR academic community rather than acting as an agent of reform promoting the Europeanization and rationalisation of Greek foreign policy has been quite passive. Indeed, if anything, it reproduces and legitimizes existing stereotypes[46]. Nevertheless, individual academics working as formal or informal consultants close to ministers of foreign affairs, or in other similar posts, have been crucial in the Europeanization process.

2) In-house Experts and Government-Funded Research Institutes:

The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has its own in-house experts that have limited capabilities. The clientelistic nature of the Greek state system and the bureaucratization of the MFA have a negative impact upon their performance. Research institutes funded by the government are the oldest type of research institute in this area. In the 1980s, the government began recognizing the increased need for some research input, and organizations such as the Foundation for Mediterranean Studies (IMM, Ίδρυμα Μεσογειακών Μελετών) and the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM, Ελληνικό Κέντρο Ευρωπαϊκών Μελετών) emerged. These are non-profit organizations under the supervision of Ministries. They seek to enhance research opportunities. For example, EKEM was founded in 1988 and its main objective is "the study of issues that are at the heart of developments in the European Union and Europe in general and,

consequently affect Greek politics" (EKEM, Information Leaflet). Under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its research and administrative committee includes academics and diplomats. These research institutes are not really policy-oriented and their contribution remains academic.

3) Policy Research Institutes:

Within the same decade, a small number of non-profit organisations seeking to advise and influence the government appeared. Organisations such as the Hellenic Foundation for European and International Affairs (ELIAMEP, Ελληνικό Ίδρυμα Ευρωπαϊκής και Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής), which was created in 1988, and the Maragopoulou Institute for Human Rights (IMDA, Ίδρυμα Μαραγκοπούλου για τα Δικαιώματα του Ανθρώπου), which came into existence in 1978, fall into this category. The emphasis was placed on issues related to foreign affairs with organisations working on areas such as minorities, the relationship with the Balkans and international economic affairs[47]. Interestingly enough, most of these institutes are closely linked to universities and attract governmental as well as private funding. As in Italy, their staff members are mainly academics also paid by universities, and their institutional affiliation is essential for the reputation of the institute[48].

4) Research Institutes affiliated to Political Parties:

In the 1990s, political parties organized in-house research capacity, based on the German model[49]. For example, in 1995, the research institute ISTAME (Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών και Αναπτυξιακών Μελετών) was set up by PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement - Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) to provide a forum for research and political discussion so as to inform political practice. In 1998, the New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία, ND) established the "Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy" (Ινστιτούτο Δημοκρατίας Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής) to research a range of social, political and economic issues. Although policy research in these institutes may not be limited to foreign policy, it is one of their main areas of concern[50].

5) Non-Governmental Organisation with a Research Focus:

The latest development has been the emergence of a variety of organizations, e.g., the Organisation for the Modernisation of Society (OPEK, Όμιλος Προβληματισμού για τον Εκσυγχρονισμό της Κοινωνίας) and Citizens' Union Paremvassi (Ένωση Πολιτών Παρέμβαση) in the 1990s. Ideologically, they belong to the centre-left and aim to assist the government

in modernizing the country[51]. Even if they do not conduct research themselves, they have an important role in disseminating research findings and in stimulating debate. These organizations bring together networks of policy-makers, academics and policy activists and are active in all policy areas including foreign policy and EU matters.

The Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Relations

The improvement of Greek-Turkish relations since 1996 has been described in both countries to a large extent as a result of the Europeanization process[52]. Taking this as a starting point and considering the primacy of Greek-Turkish relations for Greek foreign policy, this article selects this issue as an example for the concrete exploration of the argument developed up to now. *What has been the role of experts during the shift of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey? Have processes of Europeanization facilitated an increased role for experts?* In this section, a brief description of the main changes that have occurred is given and then the existence of an epistemic community that has pushed for these changes is explored.

Adopted in the mid-1990s, the new Greek strategy towards Turkey has remained unchanged. Greece had traditionally relied on a combination of "internal" balancing (strong armed forces) and "external" balancing (participation in security and political organizations)[53]. The combination of a serious crisis in 1996 over the islets of Imia, and a newly elected government in Greece, provided the impulse for radical change. The newly elected government may have been socialist, but it was led by Costas Simitis who wanted to appear and act as a modernizer. His vision was to develop a "comprehensive strategy" that would challenge the bipolar character of the relation and the logic of *casus belli*. He proposed bringing the issue to the EU and considering Greek-Turkish relations as part of Greece's strategy to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU)[54]. The strategy that was adopted introduced the idea of Turkey's engagement in the EU. The rationale was that Turkey's European orientation would force Istanbul to adopt less aggressive behaviour towards an EU member-state[55].

In fact, during the Helsinki European Council in 1999, Greece decided not to use its veto and allowed the EU to grant Turkey candidacy status. As a result, Turkey had to commit to resolve any border disputes, and in case of failure, the country would be brought in front of the International Court of Justice. This meant that progress on Turkey's EU membership was linked to the resolution of its border disputes with Greece. Since then, there has been an

improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. Co-operation has been achieved in a number of areas, and official visits have become routine. Unavoidably, there have been instances of tension such as Turkish fighter jets accused of harassing Greek jets in the summer of 2003. However, more important is the fact that the two governments have chosen not to escalate the crisis. Moreover, the change of government in both countries has not altered the main strategy.[56]

From the above discussion, it is evident that although Greek-Turkish relations have not been dealt with through the CFSP, or other EU foreign policy tools, "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization have been in place and the EU has played an important role in Greece's strategy shift. The observable change in Greece's policy style reflects a more consensual and more multilateral strategy towards Turkey. All the more interesting is the realization that this shift was characterized by a dynamic epistemic community working on the side of the Minister of Foreign Policy, George Papandreou (N.B. information from interviews). Was this epistemic community a result of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy or was it just a result of the will of the particular leadership of the MFA? There is evidence that another epistemic community worked close to the government at that point. Antoniades argues that after the Imia Crisis, an epistemic community to which belonged both the Prime Minister (C. Simitis) and deputy minister of Foreign Affairs (C. Rozakis) put forth the idea that Greece had such strong legal evidence proving the islets were Greek that it was to Greece's advantage to propose a solution through the International Court of Justice[57].

In favour of Greece's support to the Turkish candidacy for the EU, a different epistemic community was created. No institutional role may be attributed to university departments; however, individual academics participated and played a decisive role in the formulation of the concept, but also in its implementation[58]. Neither MFA in-house experts, nor government-funded research institutes such as EKEM, had an impact on the shift of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey. Again, their role was limited to in-house experts who participated in the epistemic community due to personal interest or through their good relationship with George Papandreou[59]. Policy research institutes such as ELIAMEP can only be described as actors on the periphery of the policy process. They had no access to MFA's leadership. Their role was limited to supporting the decision with articles in the press and the organisation of relevant conferences and lectures[60]. Research institutes affiliated to political parties and non-governmental organisation with a research focus, also played a minimal role by mainly re-enforcing the discourse towards change[61].

What is interesting is that although no institutions participated in the preparation of the foreign policy shift, many agree that a network of experts (an epistemic community) was formed around the Foreign Minister. This network, in effect, both designed and implemented Greece's turn towards Turkey[62]. Initially, committees were struck at the MFA with the participation of academics, in-house experts, former ambassadors and experts trusted by the leadership. Their mission was to explore the impact that a shift of strategy would have internally but also esternally; i.e., among the other EU member-states[63]. That epistemic community continued its work informally, and the result has been the strategy described at the beginning of this article. There is general consensus that the leadership of the MFA at this point was particularly open to the participation of experts. Although the result was positive, this does not mean that such participation will continue[64]. To a large extent, it lies in the hands of each minister of foreign affairs to decide whether he/she will activate an epistemic community. As far as Europeanization is concerned, it can be argued that a "window of opportunity" opens due to a change in the policy style of Greek foreign policy for the increased participation of experts, but there is no guarantee or obligation for the consacration of such a practice[65].

Conclusions

The following conclusions relate to "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization, the role of experts and the specific example of the Greek government's shift of strategy regarding to Turkey's EU candidacy.

Undoubtedly, "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization have been in place, as far as Greek foreign policy is concerned. Equally strong is the evidence that their impact upon informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms has been significant. With regard to the role of experts, it can be argued that élite socialization has taken place and epistemic communities are being created. Both main paradigms explaining the relationship between knowledge, power and public policy relate to Greek foreign policy. In cases such as the Greek-Turkish relations, the State followed the rationalistic paradigm and asked for experts' assistance. At the same time, a diffusion of knowledge took place through articles in the press and conferences organized by policy research institutes.

Futher conclusions concern the formation and operation of an epistemic community in relation to the change of strategy in Greek foreign policy with

respect to Turkish EU candidacy. An epistemic community with shared beliefs and a common policy enterprise towards Turkey was formulated around George Papandreou, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. The epistemic community was initiated by the MFA but continued functioning informally. Most observers agree that it played an important role during this period of change[66]. Despite such success, such a practice has not become the norm in Greek foreign policy and depends largely upon MFA leadership. What can be argued, however, is that Europeanization has facilitated such participation through its "soft" mechanisms such as élite socialization and policy learning.

List of Interviews

#1 Interview with Academic, Athens, 30/1/07.

#2 Telephone Interview with Academic and Foreign Minister Advisor, Athens, 31/1/07.

#3 Interview with Former Ambassador, Athens, 5/2/07.

#4 Interview with Former Director of Policy Research Institute, Athens, 7/2/07.

#5 Interview with Academic and Foreign Minister Advisor, Athens, 12/2/07.

#6 Interview with Foreign Minister Advisor, Athens, 14/2/07.

NOTES

1. See Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction" in Maria Green Cowles, James A. Caporaso, and Thomas Risse (eds), *Europeanization and Domestic Change* (New York, Ithaca, 2001), pp. 1-20 and Claudio Radaelli, "The Europeanization of Public Policy" in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 27-56.

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8. For example Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1994, pp. 69-88.

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11. Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", *op. cit.*, p. 1.

12. Claudio Radaelli, "The Europeanization of Public Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 30.

13. Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", *op. cit.*

14. Vivien Schmidt, "Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustement", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 6, 2002, pp. 894-912.

15. Christopher Knill, *The Europeanisation of National Administrations*, *op. cit.*

16. Stella Ladi, "Europeanization and Environmental Policy Change," *Policy and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2005a, pp. 1-15.

17. Christopher Knill, *The Europeanisation of National Administrations*, *op. cit*, pp. 221-225.

18. Edward Page, "Europeanization and the Persistence of Administrative Systems" in Jack Hayward and Anand Menon (eds), *Governing Europe* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 162-76.

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60. Interview #4.

61. All interviews.

62. All interviews.

63. Interview #1 and interview #6.

64. All interviews.

65. Interview #5.

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