Doomed to Play Second Fiddle?

Emerging Actors and Processes in the Formation of Greece's Foreign Policy

Panayotis Tsakonas*

Change in Greece's Foreign Policy

As noted by many observers[1] and foreign policy analysts[2] since the mid-90s the "defensive", "static", "inward-looking" nature of Greece's foreign policy, arguing – *inter alia* – for the isolation of Turkey by all means and at all costs, was followed by a "post-nationalist", "outward-looking", "pro-active", "flexible", and much more confident foreign policy based on long-term planning, a willingness to take calculated risks and the faith that Greece's national interests are better served via multilateral efforts. This new foreign policy attempted to overcome the country's nationalist biases, to abandon its "zero-sum game" mentality and to adjust to the post-Cold War environment.

It should be stressed that there was a strong intention and a purposeful action by the Greek administration in the mid-1990s to transfer into the Greek political system a model of governance reflecting the values, norms and principles upon which the EU system and those of its member states are constructed.[3] In other words, there was a political as well as an ideological program for intended change and reform towards a parallel process of "Europeanizing" Greek foreign policy while pursuing a modernizing domestic reform process[4] or "towards 'modernization', and therefore, 'Europeanization' ".[5] More specifically, the modernization of the Greek political system and membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU) were viewed as the means to put an end to the "Greek exceptionality" and move Greece from the periphery to the epicentre of the European developments. Thus, the modernization program and the reformist agenda of the Greek government had a complementary policy externally, arguing for Greece's full integration into the international distribution of labour and European structures and the redefinition of Greek identity within the framework of an open, multicultural European society.

* University of the Aegean

Facing the burden of the counterproductive foreign policy of the early 1990s, that made Greece look "as an immature Balkan parvenu in the Western European milieu while its very membership of the EU was [put] in question"[6], the Greek government was called upon overcoming nationalist rigidities, adapt to the new post-Cold War environment, recover from the traumas of Greece's Balkan policy of the 1989-1995 period and manage to elevate the country's role in the Balkans, thus raising the country's credibility in the eyes of the international, especially European, community[7].

Towards meeting these new demands, Greek foreign policy went on to the rapid adaptation of its diplomacy by placing in its agenda the new sorts of "soft power", such as diplomatic, economic, cultural and moral influence. The development of foreign policy in a globalized environment also demonstrated the connection and interdependence of the various means of exercise of foreign policy, such as the economy and defense. Several non-state actors (NGOs, corporations) entered the stage not only as agents of exercise (and eventually of formation) of Greece's foreign policy, but also as partners in the management of major foreign policy issues [8].

As this new approach matured, its effects soon became visible with positive consequences for the country's international credibility and its role in the Balkans. Indeed, Greece's relations with its Balkan neighbors were normalized; the ground was laid for a new relationship with its major strategic opponent, Turkey; its membership in the European Union was solidified politically and economically (with Greece's accession to the common currency); and, finally, its ties with the United States, the sole superpower in the post-bipolar international system, were strengthened, despite the fact that a series of occasions, with the NATO air-strikes in Kosovo foremost among them, spurred the anti-American reflexes of the Greek public opinion. Thus, change in Greece's foreign policy seemed to eventually succeed in putting Greek politics back to European normalcy, in cementing peace with economic rationality and the Euro-Atlantic structures, and, most importantly, in making the Greek public to start showing concern for the broader long term questions of Greece's future in the context of a highly competitive post-Cold War world [9].

Accounting for Change and Foreign Policy Formation: "New Actors in Town"

How this change occurred and, most importantly, who should get the credit for that change? Should the credit be exclusively given to the socialist

government that came to power in the mid-1990s with an unambiguously pro-European position? Furthermore, should particular personalities - responsible for the design and implementation of Greece's foreign policy - get the credit, given that, traditionally, personalities dominate over institutions[10] in the country's foreign policy making process?

Sharing the view that there was indeed a major change in Greece's foreign policy in the mid-1990s, contributions in this special issue examine the role of secondary actors (such as the media, civil society, epistemic communities and think-tanks) as well as of certain processes (such as immigration) in the change occurred in the Greek foreign policy during the second-half of the first post-Cold War decade. As the various contributions illustrate, although personalities remained the key-features of Greece's foreign policy design and implementation and kept playing a decisive role in the formation of the country's foreign policy, yet other secondary actors and processes intervened in the formation of Greece's foreign policy and also played a role in the change of the country's foreign policy style, problem-solving approaches, narratives and discourses.

It is worth noting that the change of Greek foreign policy in the mid-1990s – as well as, more generally, the formation of the country's foreign policy – was so far attributed to the "policy impact of Europeanization", i.e. the impact of European integration on policy making, including actors, policy problems, instruments, resources and styles.[11] The contributions in this special issue argue that there have also been other types of Europeanization which have impacted on Greece's foreign policy and, by implication, the change in Greece's foreign policy should be also explored and explained as a process of "political", "societal", and "discursive Europeanization"[12].

More specifically, "political Europeanization" refers to the impact of European integration on domestic institutional structures (national executives and administrative structures)[13] as well as on political actors (such as political parties and parliaments)[14], interest groups (such as civil society, epistemic communities, the media and the church)[15] and processes (such as immigration). "Societal Europeanization" is defined as a process of change in the "construction of systems of meanings and collective understandings" within the context of European integration[16]. In other words, the EU becomes a reference point in the construction of social identities and alters the way in which such identities are constructed and represented. Societal Europeanization can thus be understood as a process of international socialization, entailing the internalization of the EU constitutive beliefs and practices, in a state's international environme[17]. By implication, societal self-

perceptions evolve and change in accordance with the EU norms and practices and coordination and synchronization with other member-states is encouraged, even in domains such as foreign policy.[18] Needless to say, although operating on a fundamental level, this type of Europeanization is rather difficult to be identified and/or measured. Finally, "discursive Europeanization" refers to a more in-depth internalization of the EU norms and practices in the public discourse, thus making key-actors as well as secondary political actors, interest groups and processes to make reference to the EU, i.e. to specific EU actors and policies[19].

Contributions in this volume further argue that the aforementioned types of Europeanization have not only allowed for, but have also empowered, particular actors and processes, such as civil society, media, epistemic communities, and immigration, among others, to intervene and, most importantly, to affect the formation of Greece's foreign policy either directly or indirectly, through two particular, and interrelated, pathways, namely by constructing and determining the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed, and by changing the public discourse in foreign policy issues.

Less "enthusiastic" on the Greek foreign policy in the mid-1990's is a specific contribution in this volume from an academic outside of Greece, Stephanos Constantinides, with an article on the Greek transnational lobby and its influence in the formulation of the Greek foreign policy. Greek diaspora has played in the past a significant role in the creation and the development of the modern Greek state. This role has diminished nowadays but, nevertheless, it's always present.

The Role of Civil Society

George Kalpadakis and Dimitri Sotiropoulos' well-elaborated contribution is very telling about how a particular interest group, namely the civil society, was influenced by the force of Europeanization while it in turn affected the formation of Greece's foreign policy. The authors argue that Greece's participation in the process of European integration brought about certain changes vis-à-vis civil society. These included the advocacy of greater transparency in existing institutions and the promotion of new ones (i.e. citizens' initiatives, NGOs, etc); the rise of local collective actors such as inter-municipal enterprises, the weakening of the traditional "vertically" organized patron-client system due to the changing institutional relations between the state, the EU and civil society, and the emergence of new policy initiatives by regional and local government authorities (e.g., on environmental protection,

gender equity, youth and employment issues) aimed at broadening opportunities for actors from civil society to mobilize.

However, the rise of the Greek civil society as an arena open to non-partisan mobilization by the end of 1980s was due to disillusionment with the public services and political parties. At the same time, there was an upsurge of nationalist elements whose agendas seemed consonant with the foreign policy followed by Greek governments throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, namely "nationalist populism". From 1990 to 1996, two successive Greek governments (ND in 1990-1993 and PASOK in 1993-1996) tended to adopt a "simplistic explanatory framework" (often taking the form of "encirclement theories" and "imaginary alliances") and adopted "maximalist theses" on two of Greece's national issues at the time, namely the Macedonian issue and relations with Serbia. Indeed, despite PASOK's "desire to appear forward-looking" in 1993, foreign policy with respect to FYROM and Serbia remained within the framework set out by the previous conservative government. Promises were made for "an even tougher stance on FYROM", and Greece's ties with Milosevic's Serbia were strengthened.

Thus it was not until the mid-1990s when a different bipartite convergence began to take place between New Democracy and PASOK. This convergence has centered around an agenda based on the common assumption that the nationalist populism of Greece's foreign policy in the previous years was counterproductive; it has been seen as a drive to achieve the political and economic standards set by the EU (the first Simitis government placed emphasis on meeting the Maastricht economic convergence criteria), and it thus favoured Europeanism instead of populism. Most importantly, civil society and non-state actors were not merely a secondary question to the restructuring of the economy and polity, but figured as *essential pillars of Europeanism* (our emphasis). By implication, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to build up its undeveloped sector of "developmental diplomacy" (establishment – *inter alia* – of the General Directorate for International Development and Cooperation and the Committee of NGOs). It had thus succeeded – although with reactions from traditionalist diplomats – in the partial institutionalization of the Greek civil society, by providing the more internationally-oriented social actors with an operational framework in which to promote their goals. The MFA succeeded in this endeavour by broadening its own policy framework, in order to include a novel dimension of diplomacy relating to international development as well as to enhance the sector of economic diplomacy. It is worth noting that a series of other developments were also vital in creating a climate favourable to the further

development of the Greek civil society, such as the devolution of power attempted by the government through administrative decentralization and the empowerment of municipalities, the establishment of independent administrative authorities that could ensure greater transparency such as the Greek Ombudsman, the growing independence of trade unions and interest groups and their inclusion in policy formulation through the establishment of the Economic and Social Committee, the proliferation of think-tanks, voluntary organizations, and institutes.

For Kalpadakis and Sotiropoulos, the drive towards European integration had stimulated the rise of civil society in Greece. As an agent of reform, the EU has had a multifarious impact on civil society by facilitating the establishment of domestic institutional preconditions for the development of civil society, the creation of new rights for Greek citizens accruing from a viable legal framework that protects them, and the setting up of new regional cooperative structures based on regional development policy.

What all the above point to, the authors argue, is the tendency since the mid-1990s to adopt policy tools and to resort to conceptual aspects of foreign-policy decision-making which were hardly present before Greece's integration in the EU, namely the interaction between the MFA and various NGOs at the stage of policy making and the occasional "use" of NGOs at the stage of policy implementation ("political Europeanization"). Most importantly, the conceptual frameworks and modes of thinking, with which MFA policy advisors and even some diplomats formulated policy, began to converge with points of view emanating from Brussels ("societal Europeanization"). By implication, the prevalence of Europeanism after 1996, owing not least to the growing new bipartite (New Democracy-PASOK) convergence in foreign policy, ushered in an era of networking between MFA services and NGOs and facilitated the above noted "societal Europeanization'. All in all, empowered by the force of Europeanization the Greek civil society had intervened in Greece's foreign policy formation since the mid-1990s not only by affecting the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed, and less explicitly changing the public discourse in foreign policy issues, but also by affecting the physiognomy of Greece's foreign policy.

The Role of Experts and/or Epistemic Communities

Stella Ladi's contribution focuses on the role of experts and/or "epistemic community" in the formation of Greece's foreign policy, and particularly, their role during the policy shift in Greek-Turkish relations that started in 1996. By

following a three-step approach that distinguishes between "soft" and "hard" mechanisms of Europeanization, continues with the analysis of the mediating factors of change and concludes with the possible outcomes of Europeanization, the author examines how these "soft mechanisms" of Europeanization function through the diffusion of knowledge, and change the policy styles of member-states. Ladi argues that the impact of Europeanization can be particularly identified in "elite socialization". The latter in turn signifies the internalization of co-operative habits and the facilitation of the formation of "epistemic communities" for the handling of technical issues. Ladi takes this argument further in order to explore whether the whole policy style and direction of Greece's foreign policy has been actually affected by the increased participation of experts due to Europeanization.

By identifying and exploring the role of five particular groups of foreign policy experts and/or epistemic communities (University departments and academics, in-house experts and government-funded research institutes, policy research institutes, research institutes affiliated to political parties and non-governmental organization with a research focus), the author finds evidence for an important role of two particular and rather dynamic epistemic communities – that lie outside the explored group of five – in Greece's strategy shift towards Turkey. The first epistemic community worked on the side of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs while the other, activated after the Imia crisis, pushed forward the idea that Greece had so strong legal evidence that the islets were Greek that it was to its advantage to propose a solution through the International Court of Justice. Both epistemic communities were also in favour of Greece's support to the Turkish candidacy for the EU. As for the role of all other five groups of epistemic communities, Ladi argues that although they did not have an impact on the shift of Greece's policy towards Turkey, one may credit some of them for strengthening the foreign policy discourse towards change through articles in the press and the organization of relevant conferences and lectures.

Most importantly, Ladi finds evidence that a network of experts (an epistemic community) was formed around the then Foreign Minister and designed as well as implemented Greece's turn towards Turkey. According to her empirical findings, initially, committees were founded at the MFA with the participation of academics, in-house experts, former ambassadors and in general experts that the leadership trusted, that had as a mission the exploration of the impact that a shift of strategy would have internally, but also among the other EU member-states. The epistemic community that was formed continued its work informally and the result has been the shift in Greece's strategy towards Turkey.

All in all, Ladi's contribution suggests that "soft" mechanisms of Europeanization have been in place as far as Greek foreign policy is concerned and their impact upon informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms has been significant. Moreover, Europeanization has made the participation more possible through its "soft" mechanisms such as elite socialization and policy learning. By implication, epistemic communities are being created. More specifically, in cases such as the Greek-Turkish relations the state followed the rationalistic paradigm and asked for experts' help. A particular epistemic community with shared beliefs and a common policy enterprise towards Turkey was formulated around the then Minister of Foreign affairs and is the one, Ladi argues, that played an important and prominent role in the strategic shift of Greece's policy towards Turkey in the mid-1990s. By implication, it is this network of experts that should get part of the credit for the change occurred in the mid-1990s in the most critical aspect of Greece's foreign policy, namely its strategy towards Turkey. At the same time, a diffusion of knowledge and a change in foreign policy discourse had also taken place through articles in the press and conferences organized by other less influential epistemic communities, such as institutions and policy research institutes (a clear indication of "societal" and - to a certain extent - "discursive Europeanization").

The Influence of the Greek Lobby

Stephanos Constantinides' contribution focuses on the transnational Greek lobby which emerged from the world large Greek diaspora. He examines how this lobby influences the foreign policymaking in Athens in the framework of a triadic relation: the host country, the lobby itself and the country of origin. Even if this Greek lobby was in the beginning looking to influence the foreign policymaking of the host country in favour of the Greek interests, a reverse phenomenon is in process for some years now. Especially in the case of the Greek-American lobby, the most important component of the trans-national one, this reverse phenomenon, i.e. the promotion of American interests in Athens, is nowadays almost a standard affair. The author analyses the present influence of the Greek lobby in Athens in terms of its interests and its vision of Greece, i.e. the interests of the Greek diaspora and its vision of Greece as a component of Hellenism. Furthermore, the author argues that the lobby doesn't have a monolithic vision of Greek foreign policy. Some voices, especially those of the business community, favour the revisionism introduced in Greek foreign policy in the mid-1990's under the paradigm of "Europeanization" or

"modernization", while others stay attached to its traditional patterns, especially the popular masses. Academics, on the other hand, are more nuanced, considering the "modernization" or "Europeanization" of the Greek foreign policy as a necessity. But, in the meantime, some of them argue against methods and practices used to attain its objectives. Others contest even the goals fixed by such policy in areas like the Cyprus question, the Aegean contention or the Balkan equation. On the other hand, few are the academics who see a profound major change of Greek foreign policy, especially in terms of modernisation, in the mid-1990's, some of them arguing even that the so-called change reflects more the communication patterns of this period than the reality.In a historical reference Constantinides presents the contribution of the Greek diaspora in the creation and expansion of the modern Greek state during the 19th and 20th century. The author considers that the influence of the Greek lobby in the foreign policymaking process in Athens is related in part to the historical and sentimental ties of the Greek nation with its diaspora and in part to its present political and economic power in the host countries. In conclusion, however, he considers the present influence of diaspora to be limited compared with what it had been in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, when the Greek bourgeoisie of the diaspora dominated Greek politics.

The Role of Accidental Events

Almost the whole literature in Greek-Turkish relations deals with the rapprochement that followed the catastrophic earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 as a result of actions and decisions undertaken by the two governments before and after the earthquake and/or as a result of "Europeanization" of Greece's foreign policy. Interestingly enough, the main argument in Eugenia Vathakou' s contribution is that the system of Greek-Turkish cooperation, manifested in the two states' rapprochement, was not the result of a rational decision making process nor it developed by a super-system, which was acting under a specific rationale of cooperation and peace in the broader region of the Aegean Sea.

By employing Niklas Luhmann's "modern systems theory", Vathakou discusses how an accidental event, a natural disaster such as the devastating earthquake that occurred in Turkey in 1999, have had a "butterfly effect", namely triggered a chain of changes, which led to the emergence of a system of Greek-Turkish co-operation. Focusing on the timing of the developments and the dynamics that emerged after the earthquake, Vathakou's analysis – based on primary research with Greek and Turkish politicians, diplomats, academics,

journalists and civil society representatives – understands and explains the Greek-Turkish rapprochement as the evolution of society that enabled the amplification and intensification of communication processes that constituted the new system. The unexpected appearance of the earthquake and the events and actions that followed it were incorporated and endowed with meaning and causality by social systems. By implication, the author argues, the new order emerged in the course of the "autopoiesis", the ongoing self-renewal of modern functionally differentiated society. It was not imposed from outside, it emerged from within Greece and Turkey.

Although Vathakou's analysis departs decisively from the methodological rule that guides all other contributions in this volume, namely from a deterministic approach that seeks to uncover cause-effect relationships, it should be viewed as a welcome contribution to our understanding of the influence of secondary actors and/or processes in the formation of Greece's foreign policy. Indeed, so far determinations of meaning and social structures like themes, institutions, persons and organizations provided adequate grounds for the functional specification and institutionalization of a Greek-Turkish system of cooperation. Vathakou's analysis explores not only the role different social systems, such as the media, diplomacy, civil society organizations and politics can play in conflict transformation, but it also sheds light to the role contingency and chance can play. Thus, through such an analysis the author finds that the accidental event of the earthquake had set in motion certain changes that the Greek – and Turkish – government was not in the position to control, let alone to design these developments. By implication, the Greek – and Turkish – system was hijacked by these dramatic developments while the pro-Turkish camp within the EU raised its voice urging solidarity with Ankara and asked the Union to reconsider Turkey's candidate status. Facing these new pressures within the EU, the author argues, the Greek government perceived the emergence of a stream of sympathy for the Turkish victims of the earthquake within Greece, *as an opportune moment to change its policy with regard to the veto* on the Turkish candidacy for membership in the EU (our emphasis). High-ranking officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceived that this shift of attitudes, Vathakou further argues, would decrease reactions against both the release of the funds by the EU towards Turkey with Greek consent and also the potential lift of the Greek veto at the Helsinki Summit.

Moreover, the earthquake and the developments it brought about broke down and eventually replaced the old well-established differences supportive of the Greek-Turkish conflict (i.e. Greek vs. Turkish interests, Greek state vs.

Turkish state), by new differences (i.e. civil society vs. state, Greeks/Turks vs. politicians, enmity vs. friendship) which found connections in existing referential substrata of both countries.

In addition, the new system of the Greek-Turkish cooperation has been officially institutionalized by the two governments in a series of fields (politics, business, arts and the media), thus managing to "place in an avenue what had began in a narrow road". More importantly, the structures of cooperation consolidated a broader change of attitudes at the grassroots level, which can be described as a new system of cooperation. Last, but not least, the structural changes that emerged after the earthquake, Vathakou argues, were self-changes, which emerged through self-referential processes of communication. It was social systems themselves in both Greece and Turkey that perceived the developments after the earthquake as an important change to their environment. They picked up the irritation their environments provided them with and they attributed to it meaning, which in turn had a further effect on their own self-description. The reactivation of certain peace initiatives that had been suspended after the Ocalan crisis in February 1999 (i.e. The Greek-Turkish Forum, other initiatives of business-people and local governments) are but clear examples of the emergence of new self-descriptions by people who felt endowed with a different responsibility after the earthquake.

Vathakou's contribution shows that the new system of cooperation emerged from within Greece and Turkey as a new identity, and as a new attractor to order the new differences, interpret the new phenomenon and attribute meaning to aspects of Greek-Turkish relations from the past. Most importantly, the new system of the Greek-Turkish cooperation that was triggered by an accidental event was introduced to *rationalize* the situation following the earthquake (our emphasis).

The Role of Immigration

For Greek foreign policy, migration – mainly irregular migration – emerged as an important "national security" issue in the 1990s, almost immediately after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. At the time increasing flows of legal and mainly illegal migrants from these countries entered Greece. In a well-documented contribution, Charalambos Tsardanidis comes to the conclusion that international migration, particularly irregular migration, has become a basic concern in Greece's national security, since it has been perceived as a threat to Greece's national identity and political stability. More specifically, the migration

"wave" that Greece has experienced since the early 1990s led to the construction of new threat perceptions and to the development of a new discourse on Greece's international role and identity. By citing a plethora of examples, Tsardanidis shows how immigrants were perceived as a threat to Greece's major societal values and more particularly to Greece's national identity as well as to its economic well-being and political stability.

It is worth noting that the migration phenomenon had remained outside the confines of Europeanization and its impact in Greece's foreign policy. Tsardanidis argues that despite the successive legalisation programmes Greece faced – and continues to face – an immigration problem as flows of illegal immigrants and the cost of integration rise. For mitigating the real or/and perceived destabilising impact of international migration on its national security, Greek foreign policy turned to the EU and claimed that only the EU framework could provide the means for cementing a consistent immigration policy by making available the means of planning and implementing a successful adaptation policy of its own immigrants while – through the development of EU common policies – deter the inflow of additional immigrants.

Most importantly, by citing several examples, the author shows how immigration had greatly influenced – and keeps influencing– the formulation of Greece's foreign policy towards both individual countries of origin –mainly those from Eastern Mediterranean – and the Balkan region as a whole. By implication Greece's foreign policy in the Balkans, in general, and Greece's bilateral relations with Albania, in particular, was greatly influenced by considerations regarding the handling of Albanian immigrants by the Greek state. Moreover, Tsardanidis' empirical findings indicate that migration creates tensions with individual countries of origin, or aggravates already strained bilateral relations with others, thus impacting regional stability. The example of Greece and Turkey is a characteristic one: already strained by the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea and minority rights in Western Thrace and Istanbul, relations between Greece and Turkey have been further burdened by a series of incidents involving irregular immigrants transiting from Turkey into Western Europe via Greece. The case of Kurdish immigrants and refugees used as tools of what might be termed "private foreign policies", is another example. In such cases, some of the most active advocates of Kurdish immigrants to Greece appeared primarily concerned with the discrediting and ultimate change of regime in Turkey rather than with the plight of the Kurdish refugees themselves. Needless to say that the use of refugee admissions, as a tool of foreign policy, is an increasingly

dangerous game – as the Ocalan case proved – as it can backfire badly, in both domestic and foreign policy.

Interestingly enough, Tsardanidis' empirical findings also suggest that apart from directly influencing the formation of Greece's foreign policy, successive Greek governments have repeatedly used immigrants both as an instrument of statecraft (in order to impose restraints upon the actions of the home governments and for further deterring the immigrants population influx) and as a tool in order to promote and achieve particular foreign policy objectives. To this end, Tsardanidis' contribution identifies a series of policy instruments, which had become integral parts of Greece's foreign policy towards immigrants home countries in the Balkans and in Eastern Mediterranean and through which Greece's migration policies have attempted to combat illegal immigration.

The Role of Media

Exploring the role of the media in the formation of the Greek foreign policy Christos Frangonikolopoulos' contribution argues that the media are neither only a significant medium – operating as the main provider of information to the public – nor they are only restricted to the reporting and coverage of issues. They, moreover, preserve an *autonomous* role by *determining and constructing the context* in which the foreign issues are discussed (our emphasis). By applying Robinson's "policy media interaction model", the author attempts to identify and specify the conditions under which the media may play a limited or significant role in Greece's foreign policy. In so doing he examines five particular cases: the Greek-Turkish oil-drilling crisis of 1987, the "Macedonian issue", the Imia crisis in 1996, the war of Kosovo in 1999, and the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999.

Functioning within a deficient decision-making system, the Greek media tend to promote a highly nationalistic perspective. Claiming that they represent the national sentiment and the collective consciousness of the nation, the media adjust their coverage and framing to the dominant, popular and comfortable views and perceptions of society. By implication, journalists and owners of media conglomerates fear that if they adopt an alternative position, one that differs from the rigid and closed ethnocentric ideas and norms of the public, it will be rejected by the viewers and audiences. Suffering from introversion, poor journalistic practices and habits and commercial anxieties, the media not only reinforce the reactionary defensiveness and victimization mentality of the Greek public, but also its ambiguity towards

European and international affairs. Nowhere is this clearer, the author argues, than on the perceptions regarding Greece's position in the EU.

Greece in general has a pro-EU profile, as presented by the Eurobarometer over the last ten years. Yet the author identifies a paradox since all findings illustrate that loyalty to Greece comes first and the symbolic cultural elements of Greek identity score very high, whereas the corresponding elements for identification with Europe score very low. The Greek media also represent the EU in the same way. Very little importance is given to the values on which the European Union project rests, or should rest. In most cases the "interests" of the nation are the dominant factor in the political and media discourse. By implication, the press comments more on the "national interest" in relation to the events or matters of the European Union

Most importantly, Frangonikolopoulos' examination of the particular five cases demonstrates that the media can have a decisive role in the formation of Greece's foreign policy by directing the policy agenda and dominating the discourse of the public sphere. As the oil drilling, Imia, Helsinki and Kosovo cases suggest the relationship between the key-actors in foreign policy (i.e. government and policy makers) and the media is essential for the role the media can play in the formation of the Greek foreign policy. Thus, when the government and policy makers are determined to pursue a particular action, they are unlikely to be influenced by the critical coverage of the media and the opposition of society. This was particularly clear in the Kosovo war, where the government and the political community of the country strategically manipulated the discourse of the media and society to promote its ambivalent position. It was also clear in the Helsinki Summit, where despite the skepticism and criticism of the opposition parties, the media was not able to pursue an influential role.

Interestingly enough, the author's analysis suggests that the media influence increases when it is framed in such a way as to multiply the perceptions and expectations of the public (e.g., the "Macedonian issue"). In Greece this has led to the reproduction and reinforcement of ethnocentric and nationalist discourse, sustaining a representation of Greece as being a nation under threat from the EU, the NATO alliance and the USA, and from its neighboring countries (Turkey, FYROM). Thus, Frangonikolopoulos' analysis suggests that the media contributed to the aggravation and perpetuation of tension and the cultivation of a siege mentality that makes Greeks defensive and oversensitive and helps exaggerate risks and turn them into threats. The consequences are severe for both the construction of the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed as well as for the content of the public

discourse in foreign policy issues. Indeed, the first is under pressure from what is on the media agenda, while the latter creates a fear to pursue and accept negotiated and conciliatory solutions to long-standing problems.

All cases included in this special issue have clearly demonstrated that the formation of Greece's foreign policy, and particularly its major change in the mid-1990s, had not been exclusively the result of the government's, at the time, thinking and decisions. Instead, a series of other actors and processes, empowered by the force of Europeanization, which – especially since the mid-1990s – had become the dominant theme in the country's foreign and domestic discourse, intervened in the formation of Greece's foreign policy and played a role in the change of the country's foreign policy style, problem-solving approaches, narratives and discourses. Indeed, particular actors and processes, such as civil society, media, epistemic communities, immigration, and even accidental events, have intervened and, most importantly, have affected the formation of Greece's foreign policy either directly or indirectly, by constructing and determining the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed, and by changing the public discourse in foreign policy issues. Needless to say that a more accurate inference on the role of the secondary actors and processes in the formation of Greece's foreign policy is taken if the list of the cases is complemented with the exploration of the role the Orthodox Church, the Greek political parties, the Greek public opinion, and/or the Parliament can play. Hopefully, this special issue will constitute a kick-off for further research of the various actors and processes that affect the formation of the contemporary Greek foreign policy.

NOTES

1. See – among others - Ian Lesser, Stephen F. Larrabee, Michele Zanini and Katia Vlachos-Dengler, *Greece's New Geopolitics* (RAND, National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, 2001).
2. See – among others – Charalambos Tsardanidis and Stelios Stavridis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal", *Journal of European Integration* (Vol. 27, No. 2, June 2005), pp. 217-239; Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment" in Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery* (London Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 73-94; and Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy: Progress and Problems" in Achilleas

Mitsos and E. Mossialos (eds), *Contemporary Greece and Europe* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), pp. 359-372.

3. See P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.,* pp. 74-75.
4. See Spyros Economides, "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy", *West European Politics* (Vol. 28, No. 2, March 2005), p. 481.
5. P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.,* p. 74.
6. S. Economides, *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy, op. cit.,* p. 481; see also Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question* (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000).
7. In an article about the future of the turbulent Balkan region, *The Economist* observed in January 1998 that "Greece is more interested in joining Europe's monetary union than in pursuing nationalist dreams", see *The Economist*, January 24, 1998 as quoted in P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 371: (fn) 6.
8. Such as the role played by the NGOs in the process of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1999 and in Greek-Turkish relations in general.
9. For these remarks, see Dimitris Keridis, "Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek Policy towards Turkey Today" in Christodoulos Yallourides and Panayotis Tsakonas (eds), *Greece and Turkey after the End of the Cold War* (New York, Melissa/Caratzas Publications, 2001), pp. 57-58.
10. See Panagiotis Ioakimidis, "The Planning Model for Foreign Policy in Greece: People vs. Institutions" in Panayotis Tsakonas (ed.), *Modern Greek Foreign Policy: A Holistic Approach*, Vol. 1 (Athens, Sideris, 2003), pp. 91-136 [in Greek].
11. For a definition of "policy Europeanization", see Claudio M. Radaelli, "Whither Europeanization? Concept, Stretching and Substantive Change", *European Integration Online Papers*, Vol. 4, No. 8, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm. For accounts of the change in Greece's foreign policy based on "policy-Europeanization", see – among others – P. Ioakimidis, *The Europeanization of Greece*, *op. cit.* and Spyros Economides, *The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy, op. cit.*
12. The common view is that Europeanization involves the impact of the EU dynamics on national politics and policy-making, discourse, identities, political cultures and public policies. See Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change", European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 4 (2000) NÆ 15, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm.
13. On the bureaucratic and institutional adaptation of Greece's foreign policy making structures, see P. Ioakimidis, The Europeanization of Greece, *op. cit.,* pp.

87-89. See also Dimitrios Kavakas, "Greece" in Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman (eds), *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000), pp. 145-148.

14. P. Mair, "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems", *West European Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2000, pp. 27-51.

15. Maria Green Cowles, "Whiter the Service Sectors? Globalization, Europeanization, and National Patterns of Capitalism", paper presented at the seventh conference of the European Community Studies Association, Madison Wisconsin, 2001.

16. Maria Green Cowles and Thomas Risse, "Transforming Europe: Conclusions" in M. G. Cowles, J. A. Caporaso and T. Risse (eds) *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Cornel University Press, Ithaca, 2001, p. 219.

17. Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2000, p. 111.

18. K. Glarbo, "Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy" in T. Christiansen, K. E. Jorgensen and A. Wiener (eds), *The Social Construction of Europe*, Sage, London, 2001, p. 140-57.

19. Thus, "a perfectly Europeanized public discourse" would see all political actors routinely make reference to the European level.