

Current Israeli Perspectives on EU-Mediterranean Relations¹

Alfred Tovias*

RÉSUMÉ

Le PEM n'abordait pas du tout les besoins d'Israël, une société post-industrielle avec de nombreuses caractéristiques correspondant à un petit pays européen comme l'Irlande, le Danemark ou la Finlande. Aux yeux des Israéliens, il était un programme de développement Nord-Sud à travers le commerce et s'il a échoué c'est pour deux raisons. D'abord et avant tout, parce que l'UE avait exclu des accords d'association les biens agricoles et les services intensifs de main-d'œuvre et le cumul des règles d'origine ont pris beaucoup de temps à être mis en place et, deuxièmement, parce que les membres arabes du PEM ont échoué à mettre en place des réformes économiques et politiques. Israël n'est pas à blâmer pour tout cela. En ce qui concerne le nouveau projet de l'UPM, Israël a un intérêt à faire le plus de ce qu'il peut pour le faire réussir, une fois qu'il est devenu clair que la politique européenne de voisinage de 2003 est là pour rester. Dans le cadre de l'UPM, Israël va probablement avoir tendance à privilégier de nombreux, plutôt que seuls quelques projets, comme plus de micro "projets" sont les moins susceptibles d'être politisés.

ABSTRACT

The by now old EMP did not address at all the needs of Israel, a post-industrial society with many features corresponding to a small-sized European country such as Ireland, Denmark or Finland.. In the eyes of Israelis, it was a North-South development-through-trade program and if it has failed it is for two reasons. First and foremost, because the EU had excluded from the association agreements agricultural goods and labour-intensive services and the cumulation of origin rules have taken a lot of time to be introduced; and second, because the Arab members of the EMP have failed to reform economically and politically. Israel is not to blame for all this. Regarding the new UfM project, Israel has an interest in doing the most it can to have it succeed, once it has become clear that the European Neighbourhood Policy of 2003 is here to stay. In the context of the UfM, Israel will probably have a tendency to privilege many, rather than only a few projects. The more and more "micro" the projects are the less likely can they be politicized.

* Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Background

The various EC and later on EU initiatives, such as the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy of 1990, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in the framework of the Barcelona Process in 1995, and the New European Neighborhood Policy of All these policies were supposed to promote the stabilization of the region through the virtues of free trade. More recently, Europe requested from its Mediterranean partners to adhere to its system of values, in particular to democracy and the rule of law; in exchange for which Europe proposed to share the prosperity of its liberal economy. It also promised to those countries implementing fastest the new Neighborhood policy that they could benefit, at least partly, from the “four liberties”. However, these diverse propositions have convinced none of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries which were reluctant to operate rapid political and social changes, but for the singular cases of Israel and more recently, Morocco. The on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict has complicated any attempt of cooperation and finally has led the Barcelona Process to a political deadlock. Can the project of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), not yet formally inaugurated as these lines are being written, resolve these problems or overcome these obstacles?

There has been over the years a consensus building up, at least among political establishments and academic experts, that the Barcelona Process had not been a big success, although by far not a total failure, as the people in charge of the project for the creation of a “Mediterranean Union” in France around the spring of 2007 were boldly stating. In any case the EMP had failed to diminish the economic gap between the North and the South around the Mediterranean. However it also appeared that there was no consensus whatsoever about the reasons for these odd results. For example, for Arab countries involved in the EMP, it was the aggravation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the failure of the Oslo Process which was the main culprit². This was of course rejected by Israeli experts, who stressed that the EMP was not created to lead to peace in the Middle East and for the matter to resolution of open conflicts in the Mediterranean (be it between Algeria and Morocco or between Cyprus and Turkey). Israeli scholars have been stressing that the EMP was a North-South development-through-trade program and that it had failed for two reasons. First and foremost, because the EU had excluded from the association agreements agricultural goods and labour-intensive services and the cumulation of origin rules had taken a lot of time to be introduced; and second, because the Arab members of the EMP had failed to reform economically and politically³.

In fact the Israeli political establishment, as well academic experts, consider that the EMP does not address at all the needs of Israel, a post-industrial society with many features corresponding to a small-sized European country such as Ireland, Denmark or Finland. In cultural terms and values, Israel is part of the West; it is a Western country in the Middle East. It has achieved a development level which is going to allow its entry into the OECD in 2010, together with Chile, Slovenia and Estonia.

Recent elections both in Israel and key European countries have contributed to an on-going silent convergence of Israeli views to European ones. The last elections in Germany, France and Italy have put at the helm of these three countries leaders (i.e. Merkel, Sarkozy and Berlusconi) that are very sympathetic to Israeli development and security needs. The reinstatement of Benjamin Nethaniaou as Prime Minister has led to the nomination of Mr. Lieberman as Foreign Minister and Mr. Ehoud Barak as Defense Minister. It so happens that the first has included EU membership for Israel in his party's political agenda, reflecting the European tendencies of his voters, mainly from Russia, Moldova and the Ukraine.

Current State of EU-Israel Bilateral Relations

In April 2009, the European Union and Israel marked fifty years of partnership celebrating the 1959 establishment of official diplomatic relations between Israel and its European neighbors. During this period of relations, many successful milestones have been met which have increased economic, cultural and political cooperation and interdependence between the EU and Israel. How this relationship will continue to evolve is as much a critical point of topic in EU dialogue as it is in Israel, as it seeks to advance forward in the context of the ENP agreement established in 1995. Beginning in 1975 with the first co-operation agreement, EU-Israeli relations have continued to evolve over time from an economic, political and cultural perspective. The EU is Israel's most important trading partner, ranking first in Israeli imports, second in its exports. Although Israel only ranks 30th in terms of the EU's imports and 22nd in its overall exports, it is considered a significant trading partner in the Euro-Mediterranean area for the EU. The legal foundation of the EC-Israel Cooperation Agreement was redefined in 2000 replacing the initial 1975 agreement, which served to expand greater economic bilateral links, dialogue and cooperation in a number of fields while maintaining the existing free trade area. Furthermore, the agreement sought to establish "a framework for regular

political dialogue and aims at promoting peace, security and regional cooperation. It includes provisions for the strengthening, on the widest possible basis, of economic and socio-cultural collaborative endeavours, including freedom of establishment, liberalization of services, unrestricted movement of capital, and free market competition". In March 2007, EU and Israeli leaders reached a mutual consensus to establish a framework for enhancing relations, referred to as the 'Reflection Group', which would seek to identify new opportunities for cooperation, integration and areas of interdependence. This decision was based on different models the EC first and then the EU have considered to further develop closer relations with non member countries. In a June 2008 report on the European Commission's enlargement strategy, it was noted by the former chairman of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee that "something between the European Neighborhood Policy and full-fledged membership" should develop between the EU and its neighbors.

In June 2008, the EU-Israeli Association Council convened in Luxembourg, and made a very revealing statement including the following:

2. *Last year, during the seventh Meeting of the EU-Israel Association Council, Israel proposed to upgrade its relations with the European Union... The EU, responding positively to Israel's request, expresses its deep satisfaction with the fact that this EU-Israeli Association Council will mark a new phase in our relations.*
3. *Our common goal to upgrade relations stems from our awareness of the traditional links, the cultural and human values, and the economic and security interests that we share. Israel is a key partner of the EU in the Mediterranean. It has contributed to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since its origins in 1995. As a vibrant market economy, with a well-developed public administration and a functioning rule of law, Israel also possesses the necessary institutional structures which permits it to work even more closely and intensively with the European Union.*
4. *Since its conception in 2003, the European Neighborhood Policy has contributed to an increase in both the quantity and quality of relations between the EU and Israel. The European Neighbourhood Policy provides a flexible framework for the further strengthening of relations with all ENP partners, including the Palestinian Authority, on the basis of the principle of differentiation, ensuring equal possibilities for all partners. Further upgrading of relations will take place within this context. The EU considers that the upgrading of relations with Israel serves the purpose of pursuing the common objectives and interests of both parties.*

5. The European Union wants to continue to develop its partnership with Israel in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and in the framework of the broader objective to promote stability, cooperation, and prosperity in the Middle East.⁴

Since this resolution to advance relations was defined, the EU and Israel have been active partners in outlining a framework to increase bilateral integration within the context of the ENP, which is evidenced by progress reached in implementing priorities defined in the Action Plan. However, as this cooperative relationship continues to deepen, it will become increasingly important for Israel to exhibit willingness to engage in constructive dialogue with the EU on sensitive foreign policy initiatives for greater political integration to be achieved. It is not astonishing that at present and in the wake of the January 2009 Gaza crisis the EU has decided to postpone implementation of the Action Plan. But it does not speak of a "freeze". This means that for both the EU and Israel the preservation and for most actors the deepening of EU-Israel relations is of the first order of importance contrasting with the low priority that Europeans and Israelis assign to Mediterranean affairs in practice.

The Union for the Mediterranean in Israeli Eyes

Given the clear preference that Israel has for deepening first and foremost the bilateral relations with the EU, it is, not surprisingly, particularly concerned by the following five dimensions of the UfM project (which does not need presentation here, given that other parts of this special issue do amply review the contents and form of the UfM).

The geo-economic dimension

Israelis have dropped since more than a decade now the idea of (creating) a New Middle East. Are they likely to be charmed by the idea of a "New Mediterranean" in the form of the UfM? South-South economic cooperation has proved to be a pipedream, even more so after Oslo. Is not the UfM a distraction as far as Israel is concerned? To be sure, there is still a minority of Israeli intellectuals and businessmen, some of them very influential (such as industrialist and Israel Prize winner Steff Wertheimer) which still dream of integrating Israel in the Near East or the Eastern Mediterranean. They have been rejoined once again by President Peres who has lauded several times the initial and original ideas put forward by the new President of France, Sarkozy, as if they were a continuation of the theories of Jean Monnet. In a speech at

the headquarters of the French business association MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France), while on an official visit to France in the spring of 2008, President Peres said that Jean Monnet was more important than Karl Marx because the former's influence was enduring. Then, in the State dinner with President Sarkozy, President Peres said: "The idea that the European Union should serve as a model for the Mediterranean region is daring and interesting. Following 1,000 years of war and bloodshed, an economic merger came along that succeeded in overcoming Europe's political wounds. Sarkozy is a groundbreaking leader. "He operates like a whirlwind: He doesn't dally, he leaps. The fact that he is unpopular should not affect his mode of behavior, because if leaders acted according to the polls, they would all have to be conservative and do nothing".⁵ He added that he was convinced that Sarkozy would overcome opposition to his plan within the EU.

President Peres even tried to almost convince President Sarkozy to include one of the former's pet projects in the initial Sarkozy's priority list, namely the so-called "Peace Valley" project (including the construction of a Dead Sea canal) involving at least Israel and two of its neighbours. This being said, the press did report at the time that he also extracted a pledge from President Sarkozy to make the issue of upgrading Israel's relationships with the European Union one of his priorities during his term as the EU's rotating president. In this President Peres reflects very well what Israel's real priorities are.

Basically, the Israeli government is interested in pursuing the bilateral track favored by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, because it better takes into account Israel's high development level than the old EMP launched in 1995 and now the UfM. Not only this. Israel among ENP countries is the one having least to fear from the positive conditionality built-in in the ENP and which so much worries countries such as Algeria or Egypt. The reason is that Israel, a Western democracy and a developed country, shares by and large norms, standards and values prevailing in the EU. And the EU does not intend to transform the political system of Israel.

Thus, if Israel always considered the EMP as a side-show, how can it consider the UfM as more than that? Moreover, Israeli observers are aware that trade policy is dealt with by Brussels, and immigration policies increasingly so. There is a Common Agricultural Policy and a Common Competition Policy that are also decided in Brussels, not in Paris. This leaves practically only energy, education and environmental issues for the UfM. The creation of a common audiovisual space sounds attractive but hollow, when it is well known that Israel has never been accepted as part of the *Francophonie*, because of Arab

countries' opposition. The establishment of a Mediterranean Investment Bank was another pet initiative Israel promoted with Egypt in the context of the multilateral track of negotiations of the Madrid Peace Process in the mid-1990s. Unfortunately for Israel, Germany and other powerful OECD countries have been since then consistently against the idea alleging that there were enough existing multilateral banking institutions (e.g. the EIB, the World Bank) with no apparent need in creating yet another one. There is lingering skepticism about Israel being let in by other prospective partners in new projects for non-relevant reasons.

The "Essen" dimension

Some Israelis asked themselves early on in 2007 whether the President Sarkozy's project for a Mediterranean Union was not a French overreaction against the ENP very much supported by Germany, a country already in favor of differentiating Israel among other Mediterranean Non-Member Countries way back in 1994 (i.e. the so-called "Essen Declaration"). Israel has always been delighted with Germany's policy in this respect. Israel is really delighted these days of being integrated in the Research and Development space of the EU after some initial hesitations. And the EU is willing now to consider Israel membership in some EU-created agencies in other domains. This is "deep integration" with a gigantic economic bloc of 27 developed countries, rather than "shallow integration" of the sort the Barcelona Process was striving at. And of course, it is also much more than sheer intergovernmental cooperation (rather than integration, merger and fusion) among 43 countries, including middle-income developing countries, which is what the UfM is to be about. As Rosa Balfour insists in a recent article⁶, the UfM is a down-sized project compared to what was initially suggested by President Sarkozy, which, of course, cannot rival in the case of Israel with the benefits that the Action Plan adopted in the context of the ENP promises to a country like Israel.

The project dimension

In terms of content for the Union, the idea of launching projects on a regional basis really suits Israel. As indicated above, President Peres has requested that any idea of Mediterranean Union be linked to his own vision focusing on "the two seas canal" and the "valley of peace" and apparently President Sarkozy responded early on that he intended to turn the Med-Dead canal into a flagship project of France and Europe, and had instructed his aides to study the subject.

Israel has acquired since several years a lot of experience in micro-regional transnational projects after creating two QIZ, i.e. Qualified Industrial Zones, with Jordan and Egypt. Basically it has negotiated an amendment with the United States to the US-Israel FTA agreement of 1985, whereby duty-free access into the US market is extended to goods produced in these QIZ located in Jordanian and Egyptian territory, provided there is sufficient Israeli inputs and value added in the goods exported from this QIZ to the US. This has enormously promoted trade between these three ancient belligerents, something Jean Monnet would certainly have found as very positive.

Israel could only be positive when France proposed to create an ERASMUS student-exchange facility for the benefit of Mediterranean students, including Israelis. Of course this is so provided it goes beyond the present ERASMUS-Mundus scheme monitored by the EU Commission and to which Israel is already enthusiastically participating.

A clear advantage for Israel of the project approach is that it is not ideological but technocratic, even more so, paradoxically, than the EU-Israel 1995 association agreement. In the case of the latter, issues like rules of origin were sufficiently "macro" to make the press headlines. On the other hand there has not been any politicization around the QIZ because of their technical character. In passing, it so happens that all the projects which are scheduled to be tackled by the UfM in the initial two years and having been mentioned until now, do not involve problematic agents of civil society from an Israeli viewpoint (such as women associations; intellectuals, artists or the media). On the other hand the possible involvement of businessmen and private investors is seen as positive.

Regarding several of the first projects selected, Israel has acquired a lot of technical expertise over time, such as a project on Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan, suggested by the French Delegation⁷.

The institutional dimension

Israel is not, on the contrary, against the principle of co-ownership adopted early on as one of the basic principles of the UfM. In fact, Israel has succeeded in achieving a reasonable compromise in this respect. What bothered Israel was the consensus among European and Arab leaders that the Arab League should become, if not a full member of the UfM, at least an observer with no voting power. Israel was opposed to any Arab League participation in the UfM. But it was convinced to retreat from this extreme position against being promised that one of the Deputy General Secretary of the UfM would be Israeli in the

first two years of functioning of the new Secretariat of the UfM to be established in Barcelona, Spain.

For the moment, the only legal instrument in the context of the UfM is the Paris Joint Declaration. This was the only minimum common denominator for the 43 potential signatories. But is it realistic to think about an Agreement or a Treaty, even in regards to one of the projects, to be signed both by Israel and Syria?

There are then several more hypothetical scenarios, which must nevertheless be addressed. For instance would Arab countries ever accept an Israeli co-president of the Council of the UfM? Would Israel ever be able to accept a Syrian, Lebanese or Libyan citizen being named co-president? Clearly, if as agreed, the Co-President representing Mediterranean countries must be chosen by consensus, the number of possible candidates might be limited to those originating in Jordan, Egypt and possibly Morocco.

The Israeli-Palestinian dimension

Several Arab countries initially said that they could not accept the new initiative of France if the latter did not engage more actively in the Peace process, expecting President Sarkozy to pressure Israel⁸. This was notably the case of Algeria⁹. Not only that. Some commentators in this country stated that they did not see how Israel could be included at all in the new project if Maghreb countries were expected to participate¹⁰. This of course was and is not at all the view in Israel. In fact, it sees the UfM as a way to expand ties with Arab states and one of the roads to normalization.

On the other hand, very important for Israel is that the UfM will not deal with issues related to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict nor for the matter with security issues, whether soft or hard. This is quite a departure in relation to the Barcelona Process, which is also multilateral in its nature, but which, in spite of its original intentions not to interfere with the Oslo Process at the time treaded here and there in murky waters. For instance at the Second EMP Ministerial Meeting held in Malta in 1996, under the Dutch Presidency, the latter kidnapped it by pushing obsessively for a meeting between Chairman Arafat of the PLO and Mr. David Levy, at the time Israel's Foreign Minister. In any case, Israel can be expected to decline paying the price of heavy interference or, even worse, an imposed political settlement only to keep its seat at the table of the UfM.

Another positive point is that the UfM has sparked interest in the United

States and it is not inconceivable that the US might participate in a capacity or another in some of the projects. Israel can only see this as very positive, in contrast to the EMP from which the US was totally excluded.¹¹

This being said, there are early signs that again, as for the EMP, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is contaminating the new UfM. The recent Gaza conflict has had as a result the suspension sine die of the Senior Officials meeting scheduled for January 2009 which was to deal with critical organizational matters related to the UfM.

Conclusions

Israel has an interest in doing the most it can to have the new UfM succeed, once it has become clear that the ENP is here to stay. Not only that. Germany and other Northern and Central European countries, traditional allies of Israel, are firmly on board of the UfM. There is thus no risk whatsoever of seeing the project kidnapped by other countries to transform it in an arena politically hostile to Israel. This is remarkable because the UfM with 43 countries participating, looks like a mini-United Nations.

Israel will probably have a tendency to privilege many, rather than only a few projects. The more and more “micro” the projects are the less likely can they be politicized. Related to what was just said, it is not necessary in Israeli eyes, contrary to what has been suggested elsewhere, that each individual project be highly visible, because in such an event, it will attract the media, which is always there to embarrass moderate leaders in the Arab world willing to cooperate with Israel, even before peace is signed. If Arab countries consider that Israel is too much of a developed country to be classified as a Southern Mediterranean country and should be placed among the “Northern owners” of the UfM, together with the EU, Israel should certainly go along with such a proposal. This would be a way of making sure that Israel can assure in the future one of the two Co-Presidencies (e.g. together with Morocco or Egypt).

NOTES

1. This article draws extensively from the author's contribution to Alfred Tovias, Roberto Aliboni, Ahmed Driss, Tobias Schumacher, “Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective”, *EuroMeSCo Paper*, No. 68, Lisbon, 2008. <http://www.euromesco.net/images/paper68eng.pdf>

2. Denis Bauchard, "L'Union Méditerranéenne: un défi européen", *Politique étrangère*, No. 1, 2008, pp. 51-64.
3. Michael Emerson, "Making Sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean", *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 155, March 7, 2008.
4. Commission of the EC, *European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument*, 2007.
5. Haaretz, *The Two presidents' Vision*, 16 March 2008.
6. Rosa Balfour, "The Transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2009, p. 102.
7. Roberto Aliboni and Fouad M. Ammor, "Under the Shadow of Barcelona: From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean", *Euromesco Papers*, No. 77, 2009, p. 17.
8. See Denis Bauchard's article mentioned in the list of references.
9. www.numedya.com, January 18, 2008.
10. www.forum-algerie.com, January 18, 2008.
11. See Aliboni and Ammor, *op.cit.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abouyoub Hassan, "Union pour la Méditerranée: le mythe de Sisyphe?", <http://www.eurosduvillage.com/Hassan-ABOUYOUB-Union-pour-la,1370>.
- Aliboni Roberto (a cura di), "L'iniziativa dell'Unione per il Mediterraneo: gli aspetti politici", *Contributi di Istituti di ricerca specializzati*, No. 85, Senato della Repubblica, January 2008.
- Balfour Rosa, and Schmid Dorothée, "Union for the Mediterranean, disunity for the EU?", *CEPS Policy Brief*, February 2008.
- Barbé Esther, Mestres i Camps Laia, Soler i Lecha Eduard, "La política mediterránea de España: entre el Proceso de Barcelona y la Política Europea de Vecindad", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, No. 79-80. December 2007.
- Bauchard Denis, "L'Union Méditerranéenne: un défi européen", *Politique étrangère*, No. 1, 2008, pp. 51-64.
- Brauch Hans-Günther, "From Confidence to Partnership-Building Measures in Europe and the Mediterranean: Conceptual and Political Efforts Revisited", in Hans-Günther Brauch, Antonio Marquina, Abdelwahab Biad (eds.), *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century*, Houndmills, Macmillan 2000.
- Brussels European Council, *Presidency conclusions*, March 13-14, 2008.

Collinson Sarah, "Security or Securitisation? Migration and the Pursuit of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Euro-Mediterranean Area", *EuroMeSCo Papers*, No. 19, November 2007, www.euromesco.net.

Commission Non-Paper on the "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean", no date indicated.

Conférence de presse conjointe de Mme Angela Merkel, Chancelier de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne et de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, March 3, 2008, web site of the French Republic Presidency.

Conférence de presse de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, lors du Conseil Européen de Bruxelles, Jeudi 13 mars 2008, web site of the French Republic Presidency.

Conférence organisée par l'IFRI, Paris le 11 mars 2008, les interventions de Nouria Chékib, président de l'Institut Arabe des Chefs d'Entreprises, Tunis et Abouyoub Hassan, ambassadeur itinérant du Maroc.

Daguzan Jean-François et autres, "Quelle Union Méditerranéenne?", *Géoéconomie*, No. 42, 2007.

Déclaration finale du sommet européen, Bruxelles, mars 13 et 14, 2008.

Deutschlandradio Kultur, "Brok lehnt Sarkozy Vorstoss zur Türkei ab", 8 June 2007.

El Pais, "La nueva paradoja francesa, Que pretende Sarkozy con su Union Mediterranea?", July 15, 2007.

Emerson, Michael, "Making Sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean", *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 155, March 7, 2008.

Emerson Michael and Tocci Nathalie, "A little clarification, please, on the Union of the Mediterranean", *CEPS Policy Brief*, June 8, 2007.

Escribano Gonzalo, y Lorca Alejandro, "La Unión Mediterránea: una unión en busca de proyecto", *Working Papers*, No. 13, Real Instituto Elcano, 2008, www.realinstitutoelcano.org

Eurostat/European Commission, *Euro-Mediterranean Statistics*, Luxemburg, Office for the Publications of the EC, 2006.

Florensa Senén, "Limites del proyecto de Unión Mediterránea: hacia una nueva fase del Proceso de Barcelona", *Afkar/Ideas*, IEMed, Fall, 2007.

Grimaud Nicole, *Etudes Internationales*, No. 67.

Haaretz, "Sarkozy's Mediterranean grandeur", January 11, 2008.

Haaretz, "At State dinner with Sarkozy, Peres sees "unparalleled" French-Israel relationship", March 12, 2008.

Haaretz, "A reception par excellence", March 14, 2008.

Haaretz, "The Two-president vision", March 16, 2008.

Henry Jean-Robert, «Union méditerranéenne et Union Euro-méditerranéenne», www.fundaciocampalans.com

Herman Lior, "An Action Plan or a Plan for Action? Israel and the European Neighbourhood Policy", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2006, pp. 371-95.

Institut de la Méditerranée, *Rapport du Groupe d'experts réuni par l'Institut de la Méditerranée sur le projet d'Union Méditerranéenne* (Rapport Reiffers), Marseilles, October 2007.

International Herald Tribune, "Sarkozy's proposal for Mediterranean bloc makes waves", 10 May 2007.

International Herald Tribune, "Plan drafted for deeper EU ties to its South", March 13, 2008.

International Herald Tribune, "Merkel and Sarkozy: *What did Israel gain?*", March 25, 2008.

Interview with British Official from the Foreign Office in Paris on September 11, 2007, "Medelhavsunionen à la Merkel" in: www.europanytt.se/default.asp?id=1670

Khader Bichara, "L'Union Méditerranéenne: une Union de projets ou un projet d'Union", *Confluences Méditerranée*, Analyses, November 23, 2007, www.confluences-mediterranee.com/v2/spip.php?article1704.

L'Appel de Rome pour l'Union pour la Méditerranée de la France, l'Italie et l'Espagne, 20 December 2007, web site of the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

La Croix, "La Méditerranée de Nicolas Sarkozy", October 9, 2007.

La Presse, "Le Président Sarkozy, à l'occasion de sa visite en Tunisie", July 7, 2007.

Le Figaro, "Le Président Ben Ali", January 4, 2008.

Le Figaro, "Méditerranée: l'UE entérine le nouveau projet", March 14, 2008.

Le Monde, "Accord franco-allemand sur l'Union pour la Méditerranée", March 4, 2008.

Le Monde, “Devançant l'Union pour la Méditerranée de M. Sarkozy, La Commission veut depolluer la rive sud avant 2020”, April 12, 2008.

Lerman, Eran, *The Mediterranean Idea*, New York, American Jewish Committee, 2007.

Libération, “Méditerranée: le malentendu”, July 9, 2007.

Majone Giandomenico, “Non majoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach”, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, No. 157, 2001.

Patrie Beatrice and Espanol Emmanuel, *Méditerranée. Adresse au président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy*, Paris, Sindbad, 2008.

Press conference of President Sarkozy at the Brussels European Council, March 13, 2008.

Schmid Dorothée, “Optimiser le processus de Barcelone”, *Occasional Papers*, No. 36, EU-Institute for Security Studies, 2002.

Schumacher Tobias, “From Barcelona to Valencia: The Limits of the EU's Political and Security Partnership with the Southern Mediterranean Countries” in Bo Hult, Mats Engman, Elisabeth Davidson (eds.), *Strategic Yearbook 2003. Euro-Mediterranean Security and the Barcelona Process*, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm 2002.

Schumacher Tobias, *Die Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur im südlichen Mittelmeerraum. Actor Capability' und EU-Mittelmeerpolitik*, Baden-Baden, NOMOS, 2005.

Schumacher Tobias, “The German EU Presidency and the Southern Mediterranean”, *EuroMeSCo e-news*, January 11, 2007, www.euromesco.net/media/enews11_en.pdf

Spiegel Online International, “Merkel Slams Sarkozy's Club Med Plans”, December 6, 2007.

Statement on “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” Annex 1, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, March 13-14, 2008.

Tovias A., “Israeli Policy Perspectives on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the Context of EU Enlargement”, *Mediterranean Politics*, 8/2-3, 2003, pp. 214-32.

Williamson Oliver E., *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism*, New York, Free Press, 1985.