

The Mediterranean Union from the Perspective of the Mediterranean Island States

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RÉSUMÉ

Les deux États-îles Méditerranéens de l'Union Européenne, Chypre et Malte ont un fort grand intérêt dans les initiatives méditerranéennes qui mettent l'accent sur la stabilité et la sécurité régionales. Comme la majorité des autres États méditerranéens, ils ont tous deux soutenu le lancement de l'Union pour la Méditerranée. Toutefois, les deux petits États ont une conception différente de ce que l'UPM devrait accomplir, Chypre mettant un accent particulier sur la résolution des conflits régionaux, tandis que Malte adoptant une approche plus fonctionnelle s'attache à la protection des ressources halieutiques et à la dé-pollution. Les deux États semblent ignorer les nombreux problèmes qui minent cette initiative, comme le manque de financement pour ses projets et les interférences entre les institutions de l'UPM et celles de l'Union Européenne. Une autre question est de savoir dans quelle mesure les deux États peuvent influencer sur le processus interne ou si les rivalités internes entre les plus grands États membres de l'Union Européenne pourraient les marginaliser. Ces deux petits États peuvent-ils jouer le rôle d'honnêtes courtiers que l'on associe souvent aux États faibles et petits?

ABSTRACT

The two EU, Mediterranean island-states of Cyprus and Malta have a strong interest in Mediterranean initiatives that enhance regional stability and security. In line with the majority of the other Mediterranean states, they both supported the launching of the Union for the Mediterranean. However, both small states have a different conception of what the UfM should achieve, with Cyprus laying special emphasis on resolution of regional conflicts while Malta taking a more functionalist approach emphasising the protection of fish resources and de-pollution. Both states seem to overlook the many problems which beset the initiative such as the lack of finances for its projects and the interface between the UfM and the EU institutions. Another issue is whether the two island states can influence the internal processes or whether internal rivalries between the larger EU states could see them side-lined? Can these small states play the role of 'honest brokers' normally associated with small and weak states?

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Introduction

The launching of the Mediterranean Union (MU) came at an opportune time when the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was in crisis.¹ It was therefore cast as an attempt to free the EMP from the stagnation in which it had fallen. Now re-baptized the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the initiative provides both opportunities and challenges to the EU's Mediterranean island-states of Cyprus and Malta. Both stand to benefit if it shakes up relations in the region and encourages them to develop in a more positive direction. Therefore it is in both states' interest to ensure that the momentum which the UfM has picked up is not lost. However, apart from these points of convergence, the two island-states do not have identical interests in everything and their approaches to the UfM differ in some key aspects. Cyprus thinks that priority should be given to the resolution of regional conflicts. This is no doubt motivated by its greatest concern, the Cyprus Problem. However, experience shows that the most dismal record in Euro-Mediterranean relations so far has been precisely in the political domain and in conflict resolution. Malta's main focus is more functionalist, focusing on the maritime aspect such as the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, strengthening maritime communications and protecting fish resources – all of which raise important challenges for the island and the region. The more salient points of convergence between the two island states comprise the need to combat climate change, deal with water stress and develop low carbon (alternative) energy resources. Both agreed that the Arab League should be involved in the UfM. They also agreed that the EU's Mediterranean partners' participation in or "Co-Ownership" of the UfM must be strengthened. Cyprus and Malta (perhaps unwittingly) concur as well when they fail to provide any proposals as to how the institutions of the UfM will interface with the EU's – given that the latter is the provider of the giant share of the funding for the Mediterranean projects and when they fail to make concrete proposals on how the extra financial resources needed to finance them will be found particularly in the face of the deepening global recession.

What is also relevant is that the launching of the MU has instigated Cyprus and Malta to start refocusing more strongly on the politics of the Mediterranean region which they had neglected during the years in which they were negotiating membership and during the first five years of membership when their priority was the adoption of the EU's *acquis communautaire*. This new "more outward looking phase" appears to be slightly more pronounced in the case of Malta and less so in Cyprus's case which continues to be overtly preoccupied with the Cyprus Problem often at the expense of other policies.

For example, one could have predicted that in its reaction to the MU proposal, Malta would place a high priority on irregular immigration, but without neglecting the issue it did not place it at the very top of its 'wish list' thereby indicating that it has a wider focus than immediate national priorities and is also looking at the longer-term prospects of the region. The latter point is interesting because, while EU citizens in general find immigration the least important issue for co-operation with neighbouring states, 88% of the Maltese think the opposite.² Hence one can expect Malta to press this issue more strongly at a later stage in the life of UfM.

Also in the longer-term perspective, both Cyprus and Malta are aware that there are a number of challenges such as global warming, pollution, water and energy security to mention a few, which raise grave concerns in the region. Left unresolved these threats can negatively impact on their own security.

Another important question is: "to what extent are Cyprus and Malta, two of the smaller Member States of the EU, able to influence decision-making within the UfM in the direction that best suits their interests?" Do they have the weight to make their views known and felt in the Union for the Mediterranean?

These questions are discussed in this article where, as is customary in such analysis, I begin with a short summary of its thrust and objectives. The first part consists of a brief assessment of the evolution of the MU project from its inception up to its transformation into the UfM. This provides the background for further discussion. From there onwards, the analysis shifts first to a discussion of small versus large state behaviour in the context of MU/UfM, the dynamics of the "Olive Group" initiative and subsequently to the position of the two island Mediterranean States on the UfM. Relying mainly on public statements and information, as well as some interviews with diplomats in the field³, the analysis seeks to scratch a little below the surface of the very generic statement, to which most EU Mediterranean states have subscribed, including Cyprus and Malta, that the UfM is a welcome initiative.⁴ A third portion of the analysis and perhaps the most slippery is prescriptive: what should the two island-states be shopping for in the MU and what are they actually pursuing? In the final part all these treads are brought together and the main conclusions are drawn.

The Mediterranean Union: The Battle of the Gullivers

The Mediterranean Union was the brain child of the President of France Nicolas Sarkozy. Without going through the details of its development, this

section dwells on those aspects which are most relevant to the discussion in this article. President Sarkozy launched the idea of a MU during the French presidential campaign in early 2007. Initially it made no major impact, but when Mr Sarkozy referred to it again in his Presidential inaugural speech, the proposal was transformed from what many had considered to be a piece of electioneering rhetoric into a policy statement. The proposal immediately became controversial, partly because of its vagueness and for this reason it left many questions unanswered, but most of all because it irritated a number of key players. When it was still in its initial stages, it was interpreted as aiming to keep Turkey out of the EU by offering it a closer relationship with the EU within the MU. This of course angered Ankara which immediately sought and obtained clarifications that this was not the case. Hence the emphasis that has been made in practically all of the MU/UfM documents that it is not an alternative to EU membership for those participating states which are eligible to join the EU. However, it was not Turkey alone which was upset by the proposal. Indeed, Sarkozy's initiative led to differences between France on the one hand and Spain and Germany on the other.

Following his election, Mr Sarkozy visited a number of countries in the Mediterranean region with the double aim of strengthening France's bilateral relations in the area and measuring support and enthusiasm for the MU project. On the first of these visits, which took him to Morocco, President Sarkozy elaborated on the idea of a MU in various speeches, though many of the major questions surrounding the proposal at that point remained unanswered.⁵ In countries like Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt his proposal eventually met with support. But reactions in other countries such as Syria and Algeria were more guarded, while Libya eventually came out strongly against it, on the pretext that it would obstruct African and Arab unity. While Mr Sarkozy tested the ground in the Mediterranean region he also busied himself with the more important challenges to his proposal coming from Germany and Spain.

The original proposal was that the MU would include only the Mediterranean littoral states. But this raised a lot of misgivings in Berlin. Germany rightly feared that if plans went ahead for a strictly Mediterranean Union on such lines, the EU would be divided. Mr Sarkozy later would deny that he had any such intention in mind when launching the proposal, which indeed, also proposed the inclusion of the European Commission and observer status for the northern EU Member States. German misgivings apart, Sarkozy's proposal also raised concern in Madrid where it was seen as an attempt to

eclipse the Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership started in 1995 by Spain then holding the EU Presidency.

In December 2007, Spain, Italy and France held a summit in Rome where they discussed all the problems and decided to work together. They agreed that “The Union is not intended to encroach on the preserve of the cooperation and dialogue procedures already uniting the Mediterranean countries, but to supplement these and give them an extra boost seeking to complement and work in cooperation with all the existing institutions. So the Barcelona Process and European Neighbourhood Policy will remain central in the partnership between the European Union as a whole and its Mediterranean partners.”⁶ Time alone will tell whether this will be the case.

With one major divisive issue bridged, the focus shifted to Franco-German differences. German’s main bone of contention can be found in what the German Chancellor Angela Merkel later told *Reuters* news agency (after the differences with Paris had been settled) that “the original plan would have split the EU and siphoned off common funds for the benefit of a few members and their former colonies.”⁷ Franco-German differences were resolved at a meeting in Hanover in March 2008 between Mrs Merkel and Mr Sarkozy. In Hanover, the two leaders decided to present a joint plan to the other EU leaders at their next Council meeting. EU leaders eventually approved the project at the March 2008 Council in Brussels. The Council decided to call the Union “Barcelona Process – Union for the Mediterranean” (BP-UfM) and that it was to include all the EU Member States and the non-member littoral states. It also agreed to convene a Mediterranean summit in Paris which actually took place on July 13⁸, and asked the Commission to prepare a document on the modalities for this BP-UfM.⁹ An earlier proposal to have two summits, one exclusively for the Mediterranean littoral states preceding the grander union of all EU and Mediterranean states was also dropped.

The Paris summit led to agreement on a number of projects falling under six main headings as outlined below. It was followed by another meeting, this time involving the foreign ministers of the EU and the Mediterranean partners, which took place in Marseilles in between the 3-4 November 2008. The main decision taken at Marseilles was to deepen the scope of the agreement reached in Paris, namely that the Union would be project-based and financed from existing EU financial programmes for the region, but with some additional funding from other sources. Existing Initiatives under the EMP were meshed in with the new projects agreed in Paris and gathered under four main headings: a political and security dialogue; maritime safety; an economic and

financial partnership including energy, transport, agriculture, urban development, water, the environment and the information society; and last but not least social, human and cultural cooperation.¹⁰ Ministers also took stock of the ‘state of progress’ of the projects identified in Paris within the following domains: the de-pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highways, civil protection, alternative energies – Mediterranean solar plan, Higher Education and Research as well as the Euro-Mediterranean University based in Slovenia, (a recent ‘convert’ to the Mediterranean identity) and finally the Mediterranean business development initiative.

Most welcome too was the decision to shorten the name of the initiative from “Barcelona Process – Union for the Mediterranean”, to the simpler title “Union for the Mediterranean”.

At Marseilles ministers agreed that the Arab League should participate in all meetings at all levels of the UfM, though it will only have observer status. This decision supported by both Cyprus and Malta was somewhat controversial as shall be discussed further on, since fears were expressed that it would lead to the isolation of Israel in the process. It was also decided that the UfM would be led by two co-presidencies and that the seat of the secretariat would be established in Barcelona. On the sidelines of the gathering, agreement was reached to open an EU-Arab League liaison office in Malta. In this respect it is important to note that the first ever EU-Arab League ministerial conference was hosted in Malta in between February 11-12, 2008.¹¹

The Significance of these Events for Small States

These events can be analyzed from various angles. Should the creation of the Mediterranean Union supply new impetus to the flagging Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, then it goes without saying that the initiative will benefit the region. But in the context of this discussion on the role of Cyprus and Malta in the UfM and the manner in which it has been launched, there are some lessons which these two small states need to ponder upon very carefully.

The events show beyond any doubt that when a major, new Mediterranean proposal is launched by an individual state, which initiative may be crucial to these two island-states’ security viewed in its broader meaning, the divisions that may ensue among the bigger states can create opportunities and dangers for small states. On the one hand, while the Gulliver’s struggle to have their

proposals accepted, the smaller states may see their importance augmented as the larger states canvass them for support. On the other hand they may also risk being left helpless on the sidelines with the main decisions being taken by the stronger contestants. In the latter scenario, the fiercer the struggle between the big states becomes, the more sidelined the small states may become. This may seem 'natural', but quite unorthodox from the perspective of most of the literature on small states in international relations, which often depicts small states in similar situations, as either being capable of exploiting the lack of agreement amongst the large states to their advantage or of acting as "honest brokers" in helping to bridge their differences. Numerous studies show how small EU states acting in either of these two capacities, have been capable of influencing the EU decision-making process to their advantage, to take policy leadership and break internal EU policy stalemates.¹² In the wider academic literature we encounter examples of small and weak states behaving as "honest brokers" in international organizations or multilateral negotiations. During the Cold War, the neutral and non-aligned states (NNA) played such a role within the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).¹³

However, strong disagreements among the more powerful states have also been known to preclude small states from playing the "honest broker" role in such multilateral gatherings. Albert W. Sherer, Chief of the U.S. negotiating team at the Geneva Conference of the CSCE (1974-1975) and at the Belgrade preparatory meeting (1977), observed that in periods of confrontation between the superpowers in the CSCE, the NNA found it more difficult to play their "honest broker" role.¹⁴ Similarly, up to the Paris BP-UfM Summit, the small EU member states found themselves in an identical position. Furthermore, if in the future Franco-Spanish or other big state rivalry intensify within the UfM, it will be difficult or very tricky for the smaller states to exercise influence on the process.

One potential avenue which small states can follow in order to mitigate similar situations from developing, is to successfully encourage prior consultation at all levels. This provides some peace of mind – though the danger will not be entirely eliminated – that new initiatives do not 'pop up' out of nowhere. Cyprus and Malta thus need to ensure that informal groups like the so called 'Olive Group' – a gathering of EU Mediterranean states – continue to strengthen their coherence in the future and provide a forum for real and timely consultation. They also need to work closer together, share information and try to pre-empt situations before they develop into standoffs.

The Need to Strengthen Cooperation

If there is one general statement that can be made about the Mediterranean EU Member States, it is that in the past they have shown a weak propensity to coordinate their positions, particularly on issues that affect the Mediterranean region as a whole. One could at times also sense a ‘prima donna syndrome’ whereby some states engaging in prestige politics vie with each other for the honour of being first with a proposal that would as it were shape the politics of the region. Of course, none of these initiatives have so far helped resolve the old Mediterranean conflicts in a definite way, though on balance they have led to some benefits, while the advantages of “being first with a new initiative” normally lasts for only a few months until the arduous tasks of putting flesh on the policy’s bones begins in earnest – at which point the original proposal might undergo acute metamorphosis.

President Sarkozy’s proposal for a Mediterranean Union has many of the trappings of this vexed approach, although it needs to be said that his initiative came at a time when the EMP was at a stand still and most EU member states and their Mediterranean partners were in agreement that it was in serious difficulties. Notwithstanding this tendency to work alone, the Mediterranean countries are beginning to realise the advantages of co-operation and convergence of views as opposed to unrestrained competition. It is never too late to draw the indisputable conclusion that in the EU-27, the Mediterranean states are a minority and that they are better off working together on Mediterranean issues than struggling apart.¹⁵

Positively, Cyprus and Malta have also been affected by this co-operative spirit and in December 2008 they agreed to strengthen co-operation between their two foreign ministries and to man a joint mission in Tel Aviv and Ramallah.¹⁶ A few months before, in February 2008, the foreign ministers of the two countries had signed a protocol reinforcing co-operation between their respective ministries of Foreign Affairs and providing for an annual meeting between senior officials. Four main areas have been designated for co-operation, namely bilateral and political issues, the Cyprus question, regional and international matters of common interest and issues related to the EU, “such as its future, the process of enlargement, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the foreign and security common policy.”¹⁷ It would be interesting to see in the future whether this bilateral co-operation succeeds and whether it is extended to other areas, or whether it will turn out to be a dead letter agreement.

The Olive Group

The Mediterranean states' foreign ministers have also been meeting informally and more frequently in order to co-ordinate their positions on crucial regional issues. The first meeting of the "Olive Group", as it has been called, took place in Lagonissi, Athens, in 2006. It consisted of France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia. At the Valletta meeting held on February 1 and 2, 2007, it was agreed to extend the group to include Romania and Bulgaria which had just joined the EU.

During his visit to Malta in late October 2008, Italy's Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni also proposed that Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta should form an informal group to lobby for stronger EU action to control immigration in the Mediterranean. But this proposal has since been stifled by an ongoing dispute between Malta and Italy over responsibility for asylum seekers rescued in Malta's search and rescue area. Rome insists that these are Malta's responsibility, while Valletta counters this by insisting that any refugees rescued at sea must be taken to the nearest port of call.¹⁸ Maroni criticised Malta's position during a Pan-Mediterranean Conference on immigration held in Rome on April 17, 2009¹⁹ which immediately elicited Malta's reaction.²⁰ Mr Maroni was reported to have cancelled a planned visit to Malta. This shows that such informal gatherings are not easy.

The creation and expansion of the 'Olive Group' has strengthened the Mediterranean caucus within the EU in so far as numbers are concerned. Positively, the Black Sea region which shares a number of commonalities with the rest of the Mediterranean region, was brought more and more within the Group's focus. However, the bigger the group and the broader the geographic area it covers, the more numerous are the problems and challenges falling within its scope, making convergence of views more difficult to achieve. In turn, this is certainly not helped by the heterogeneity of approaches and differing state interests. Another difficulty is that for the sake of coherence and effectiveness, agreed policy stances of the "Olive Group" have to be pursued consistently, both within the EU Council and in similar formal gatherings such as the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meetings within Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) / UM / UfM, and the informal ones such as the "5+5" in the Western Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Forum, as well as in the Black Sea fora.²¹ All these difficulties are being highlighted just to avoid any possible misconception that such informal "Gymnich" style meetings are a "one way street" producing only advantages and minimising costs.

This point can be illustrated by reference to the Olive Group's stand on the Mediterranean Union. At their meeting in Paphos the ministers expressed their support for reflection on the creation of a Union for the Mediterranean, that would be project based, include all the EU member states, be complementary to the existing co-operation framework in the region and not try to be a substitute for enlargement.²² At the meeting in Taormina, Sicily, held between the 15 and 16 December 2008, Ministers referred to the crucial role of the Union for the Mediterranean in fostering an integrated and prosperous Mediterranean region. They called for the quick establishment of well-functioning institutions of the Union, the steady implementation of the projects including their financial means to be defined through a stronger involvement of the business community. The ministers underlined that the project was "wholeheartedly European" implying a wider and more active participation of all the EU member states.²³

These public statements showed a concurrence of views on key UfM issues, but there is no indication as to whether the more divisive issues referred to in this article had been discussed within the meetings of the Olive Group or whether they were wholly dealt with bilaterally by France as seems to have been the case. It is also not very clear what the role of the Olive Group was in dealing with other hot UfM issues, not least amongst these the structure and location of the seat of the secretariat and the financial resources for successfully launching the UfM projects as well as the participation of the Arab League. The seat of the secretariat was desired by many participating states and particularly by Malta, Spain and Tunisia. At Marseilles the decision was taken to establish the secretariat in Barcelona. This certainly looked like a *quid pro quo* in which Spanish support for the French initiative was repaid by the location of the UfM's secretariat in Barcelona. But did this issue feature in the Olive Group meetings or was it left to be thrashed out by France and Spain on a bilateral level as is most likely to have happened?

The point being made here is that although informal consultative groups such as the 'Olive Group' could be extremely beneficial to all Mediterranean states and to small states in particular, it does not entail that they will always be useful in helping small states achieve their foreign policy objectives. What a small state may consider as one of its major foreign policy goals, is often treated by the larger states as just another chip to be gambled on the table. At the same time, without such fora, small states run bigger risks because they will have fewer consultative frameworks and networks which help them promote their agendas. For example, a small state foreign minister will not need to travel

to an X number of capitals if foreign ministers meet periodically in such informal gatherings.

The Positions of Cyprus and Malta

In this section we analyse the position of Cyprus and Malta on the Mediterranean Union. It must be stressed from the start that both countries strongly support this initiative and concur on many of its aspects including the participation of the Arab League. While many have lauded Sarkozy's project as a means of injecting renewed vigour in the EMP, it must be added that this proposal may also help Cyprus and Malta refocus on the regional issues. Since the start of their negotiations to join the EU and in the five years following membership, the two Mediterranean countries have been primarily absorbed by their adoption of the EU *acquis* at the expense of relations with their neighbours. In an interview with the Cyprus News Agency (CAN), Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou said that old allies in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Arab World and the Middle East must be won back by Cyprus, adding "We seem to have neglected to some degree this aspect of our foreign policy because of our accession course to the EU."²⁴ As for Malta the regional refocus may be said to have begun in October 2007 during the Finnish Presidency of the EU, when Malta proposed a structured dialogue between the Arab League and the EU at ministerial level. The first conference convened in Malta in February 2008. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Tonio Borg, visited Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in mid-April 2009 where a series of double taxation agreements were signed. However, a political co-operation protocol was signed with Syria in Damascus in which both sides agreed to pursue discussions on the Mediterranean Union, the Middle East Problem and EU-Arab League co-operation.²⁵

There are a number of important elements which are neglected by both Cyprus and Malta and one of them is the development of a parliamentary dimension of MU. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly after first establishing itself as the parliamentary dimension of the EMP, acts in the same role for the UfM. Parliamentary encounters of this sort are important for small states because if they are effective, they can help bridge the gap between civil societies on both sides of the Mediterranean littoral, act as conduits for the transmission of democratic and market values from north to south and the southern cultural values to the north, and they may also lay the ground for conflict resolution if they become the locus of dialogue instead of

the arenas of confrontation. Malta and to a more significant effect also Cyprus, do not appear to have parliamentary co-operation much within their focus in the context of UfM. In Malta's case, this may be blamed on the fact that Malta hosts the secretariat of the Parliamentary Union of the Mediterranean (PAM).²⁶ However, this is unlikely. Malta's Foreign Minister, Dr Tonio Borg, makes a clear distinction between PAM and EMPA highlighting the importance of each:

“We wanted to give to the Mediterranean a unique forum that would be exclusive to the Mediterranean States, enabling the parliaments involved to examine issues of direct concern to themselves and the Region. The Secretariat General of the PAM is, rightly so, located in Malta. The difference between PAM and EMPA is that the former is an autonomous initiative coming from all Mediterranean States (Libya included), whereas EMPA is an EU initiative of partnership between the entire EU and Mediterranean States.”²⁷

A spokesman for the Malta Labour Party, Dr George Vella, made a less than a diplomatic assessment stating that when Mr Sarkozy had launched the idea for a Union of the Mediterranean, “we were incensed by the fact” that PAM had already been proposed as the parliamentary component of such a Union, “but as fate, and may I say, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, would have it, this was not to be, and it has now been decided that the parliamentary arm of the UfM... will be EMPA, already established within the Barcelona Process and Programme of Action.”²⁸ Dr Vella had in the past and since 1982, been calling for the establishment of a Mediterranean Parliamentary assembly.

Cyprus

When at the beginning of 2008, Mr Dimitris Christofias was elected President of Cyprus, he made it quite clear that the primary objective of his government was to create a new momentum in the search of a solution to the Cyprus Problem. A solution of the Cyprus Problem has been the overriding priority of all Cypriot governments since the forcible division of the island by Turkey in 1974. But in recent years, particularly after the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot community, and the hardening of positions on all sides involved in the conflict, the peace process had stalled despite periodic flurries of activities and optimism that it may be moving forward. Hence it is not surprising that Mr Christofias's government prioritises the issue in its government programme. One important outcome of this for Cyprus's attitude towards the UfM is that the latter is seen as coming second in

importance after the solution of the Cyprus Problem or (another way of seeing it) that the UfM could be instrumental in resolving the problem.

Placing conflict resolution at the top of Cyprus's UfM perspective is very problematic and somewhat idealistic because the EMP has been notoriously unsuccessful in the political domain, unable to agree on a Security Charter and wholly impotent when it comes to conflict resolution. For this reason there is some merit in Mr Sarkozy's functionalist emphasis in his initial proposals.

However, in his intervention at the Paris summit of July 2008, President Christofias began by focusing on problems threatening the Mediterranean region such as global warming, water security and drought and the need to develop alternative energies and to harness the power of the sun. He also fully supported the list of projects included in the annex of the draft declaration. It was at the end of his speech that he laid special emphasis on the need of the Mediterranean Union to help in settling international problems that have troubled the region for years, adding that this could be achieved by respecting the principles of international law and UN Security Council Resolutions.

Official press statements by the Nicosia Government reversed the order of the points made by President Christofias starting with his appeal for the solution of the Mediterranean conflicts first and following it up by reference to the other points he made in his intervention. A press release issued by the Cyprus Government on July 15, 2008 following Mr Christofias's return from Paris, referred to his meetings on the fringes of the summit, with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Mr Christofias's first, with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and with the President of the Palestinian Authority Mr Mahmoud Abbas, but hardly made any mention of his stands on Mediterranean issues or what was discussed at the Paris Summit.²⁹ This is interesting from several angles firstly because it betrays a deliberate attempt to deflect the political thrust of the President's speech for "home consumption" which is all the more extraordinary because according to a 2007 public opinion survey by Eurobarometer, Cypriots are the most aware amongst EU citizens, of their neighbours in the Mediterranean region.³⁰ This bewilders many observers as to the real objectives Cyprus will pursue within the UfM.

Cyprus supported the inclusion of the Arab League in the UfM and the notion of "co-ownership" of the process.³¹ We will return to this issue further down.

Malta

When during the French presidential campaign, candidate Sarkozy had proposed the establishment of a Mediterranean Union, he mentioned all EU Mediterranean Member States as possible partners in this scheme, except Malta. The newspaper *Malta Today* claimed that this omission so displeased the Maltese government, that it instructed its ambassador in Paris to write to Mr Sarkozy expressing her government's regret at this mistake.³² According to the same newspaper, Mr Sarkozy later tried to make emends for this by holidaying in Malta just after his election as President of France and by inviting Malta to participate in the FRONTEX patrols in the Mediterranean.³³

When addressing the Paris Summit, Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi laid special emphasis on the need to tackle climate change because of the dire consequences this has for the region, particularly in increasing water stress and as a bi-product the flows of irregular immigrants. He proposed that the Mediterranean region could become the testing ground for the development of low carbon technologies.³⁴

In diplomatic activity behind the scenes, Malta affirmed the importance of maintaining what had already been achieved by the EMP.³⁵ It supported the UfM project because it would strengthen the working methods and effectiveness of the EMP as well as the Mediterranean Partners' participation in the decision-making process. Throughout the lifetime of the EMP, repeated calls had come from many quarters of the need to strengthen "co-ownership" of the EMP. Malta also supported the idea that the UfM would be "projects based" going on to prioritise the maritime aspect of these projects, particularly the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, the development of the maritime highways and the development of fishing resources in the Mediterranean.

On the institutional aspects, Malta supported the notion of a co-presidency and a small "projects based" secretariat adding that geographically speaking, Malta was ideally situated for the establishment of the seat of the secretariat. Malta supported the inclusion of the Arab League with observer status and the widening of the UfM to include other countries which up to then were not part of the Barcelona Process. It also supported the German notion that all the EU Member States should form part of the UfM. Last, but not least, Malta underlined that the UfM should not be seen as shifting the EU's attention and financial resources to the Mediterranean region and appealed for the EU to maintain a balanced approach by continuing to give importance to other EU

initiatives in the Black Sea and the Baltic region and by following up on the Polish-Swedish proposal for strengthening the Eastern dimension.

Encapsulating the Challenge

The UfM is still a work in progress and Cyprus and Malta can still become more involved in shaping the direction of its future development, provided of course that they are able to refocus on the regional challenges and to find a successful way of working with each other and with other states in the EU and the Mediterranean region. Both countries have overcome many, though not all, of the initial difficulties of EU membership and are adjusting well to membership. On January 1, 2008, Cyprus and Malta completed the final stage of European Monetary Union (EMU) and introduced the euro. Hence the prospects of a stronger engagement in the politics of the Mediterranean region look brighter. This is helped by the fresh impetus, as long as it lasts, that has been supplied by the UfM to the faltering EMP. The other side of the coin is that the global recession limits the amount of financial resources that can be diverted to the region and may make the EU member states more inward-looking causing them to neglect the Mediterranean region.

The success of the UfM is crucial for both Cyprus and Malta which are often perceived as the southernmost outposts of the EU. But from a totally different perspective they can also be seen as two relatively prosperous states lying at the centre of a region with enormous potential but which is equally bedevilled by enormous problems. It is in the two island-states' interest that they become not merely the southernmost tips of the European stability-prosperity zone, but the centres of an economically dynamic, politically stable region. Their own economic prosperity and social development depends on it as well.

The main Mediterranean challenges are well known. There are the unresolved conflicts such as the Middle East Problem, the Cyprus Problem and the Western Sahara where the efforts to resolve them have been "frozen" for a number of years. These conflicts continue to produce political turbulence in the region, which spills over into other domains and fuels the costly Middle East arms race. Then there is the challenge of global warming which if left unchecked could negatively affect the region in many ways primarily by increasing water stress. The Mediterranean region is already the most water-stressed region in the world and already the theatre of strong rivalries between states on access to this important resource. Climate change is also important for the development of tourism which has become one of the main economic

activities for most of the countries in the region and an engine of growth. This activity can also be jeopardised by the flare up of any of the above mentioned conflicts particularly the Middle East one.

There is also the illegal immigration problem. Michael Emerson has succinctly paraphrased the crux of the problem thus:

All the coastal Mediterranean (EU) member states are in the front line facing huge migratory pressures, including the spectacular and often tragic trafficking of 'boat people' into the EU's southern islands – Canary islands, Lampedusa, Malta, the Aegean islands, Cyprus. Given the realities of the completely open Schengen area, responsibility for both practical border management and more strategic issues of migration policy have gravitated towards a significant EU role in cooperation with member states. Border management is a regular chapter in the EU's bilateral relations with the Mediterranean states (e.g. Action Plans of the ENP). The Frontex agency of the EU is operational, and since 2005 it has been responsible for 30 joint operations at the EU's external borders, including 9 operations consisting of countermeasures against illegal immigration flows at the EU's Southern maritime borders. Resources in support of these operations are scarce, and the operating teams for southern operations include participation from several Northern member states. March 2008 CEPS.³⁶

There is no single “silver bullet” which will resolve these challenges, in whose resolution Cyprus and Malta share a deep interest. A number of policies need to be pursued concurrently, particularly the stabilization of the situation in Africa by means of the proper aid programmes, combating the organized crime networks at the heart of this inhuman trade, patrolling borders both in the Mediterranean sea and land borders in Africa, repatriation schemes and a sounder EU immigration policy. The effort has begun on all fronts but the EU and its partners are still a long way from beginning to reap the results of their efforts.

However, two things need to be observed. The first of these is that for these policies to succeed they require an effort that is infinitely beyond that of any single EU member state, let alone that which can be supplied by Cyprus and Malta. Hence the latter must work through existing EU and UfM institutional structures and policies. The second is that for most of these policies to be successful the co-operation of the EU's Mediterranean partners is a *sine qua*

non. Their co-operation can be secured only if they see benefits accruing to them from their relationship with the EU. The UfM can play a pivotal role in cementing this north-south collaboration and in delivering to the southern neighbours the advantages which the EMP failed to deliver. But this ground has yet to be crossed in practice and past experience does not give rise to optimism. Similarly, the stress on “co-ownership” of the UfM is important but much remains to be seen as to how this will work. As the Italian proverb goes, “Fra il dire e il fare *c'è di mezzo il mare*.”³⁷

In this respect it is important to turn to the participation of the Arab League in the UfM. It is relevant to point out that the League also participates with observer status within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM). Also, when Mr Sarkozy proposed the MU, fears were expressed by Israel and the French Jewish community that Israel would be excluded. When later, the Arab countries started to insist on the participation of the Arab League in the UfM there were renewed fears that Israel would be excluded or that its participation in the UfM would later be rendered difficult or that it would be blocked all together. A mini-Arab summit hosted by Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi on 10 June 2008 and which brought together Syria, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia did not help matters. Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak was invited but Egyptian officials say that he was unable to attend because of a heavy work schedule. At the Tripoli summit, Ghaddafi lashed out at the MU, saying that it would harm African and Arab unity.³⁸ And this was not the only pressure on the UfM. In October 2008, Jordan postponed an important EMP conference on water following Israel's objection to the participation of the Arab League and in support for the Arab demand for the inclusion of the League in the UfM.³⁹ Egypt as co-leader with France of the UfM tried to pacify Arab fears about Israel's inclusion.⁴⁰ The issue of the Arab League's participation was resolved at the Marseilles Ministerial meeting by giving Israel a place in the secretariat for a period of three years with the possibility of it being renewed. But when hostilities flared up between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, Egypt suspended all activities related to the UfM.⁴¹

It does not appear that the Cypriot and Maltese support of the Arab League participation in the UfM is intended to exclude Israel, with whom both countries enjoy good relations. However, if concerted Arab efforts take place at some later date to seek to exclude Israel, Cyprus and Malta which have a tradition of neutrality will have to ensure that indeed they remain neutral (by opposing Israel's exclusions) and act as bridge builders between the two sides. This will confront the two island-states with an enormous challenge and

bilateral co-operation between themselves on the issue would perhaps hold the most promising potential of a mutually satisfying solution.

Finally there is the question of terrorism and its impact on the securitization of the political discourse in the Euro-Mediterranean area.⁴² The effort to combat terrorism is seen as obstructing the EU's democracy promotion policies in the Mediterranean region by retarding the process of political reform in many of the southern neighbours, producing what Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso have popularized as "Façade Democratic Reforms".⁴³ This has detrimental consequences for the economic and social development of the people of the southern shore countries and there is an acute need to re-embark on the road of proper reform.

A Possible Way Forward for Cyprus and Malta

Cyprus and Malta have strengths which they can put to better use in the region and weaknesses which they have to overcome. Being small they have the obvious lack of human resources, restricted diplomatic reach and lack of punch in international affairs, but they can overcome these hurdles because their membership of the EU provides them with a rich flow of information and they can use the EU's policies to achieve their own foreign policy objectives.

They also have an interest in strengthening multilateral initiatives in the region whether they are formal ministerial meetings in various formations under the aegis of the UfM or informal ones such as the Olive Group, the "Five Plus Five", the EU-Arab League encounters, the Mediterranean Forum and lest they are overlooked, the parliamentary initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM). These initiatives are based on the notion of equality of states and consultation. The less room that is left to unilateral or bilateral initiatives by large states, which leave the small states little alternative but to pursue a "reactive" foreign policy to them, the more can small states exercise influence on the politics of the region.

The Olive Group is of central importance because it is within it that Cyprus and Malta can first test their proposals and provide ideas. It would be important to strengthen this informal gathering as a coordinating unit before important meetings in other fora such as the UfM ministerial meetings, the "Five plus Five", the Black Sea Forum and the Mediterranean Forum.

Cyprus and Malta could also benefit from devoting more resources to foreign

policy and particularly to regional politics. Strengthening mutual collaboration and information-sharing is also important in this respect. They also need to be closer to their southern neighbours so that the latter will find them trustworthy interlocutors in their relations with the EU and bridge builders.

Both island-states have a rich heritage to turn to if they want to play this role. As weak states, themselves former victims of colonialism, they share a lot of experiences with their southern neighbours. As former colonies which have successfully built a market economy within a democratic political framework and the rule of law, they can project themselves as role models for the other countries of the region. As former adherents to the now defunct non-aligned Movement and to the values of neutrality, they are ideally placed to project the values of peace and co-operation in the region and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The most potent tool in the small state's arsenal is norms. For example, it was by promoting the concept of the "Common Heritage" of mankind as an organizing concept for a new International Law of the Sea, that powerless Malta sought the answer to its own quest for a more equitable distribution of the resources on the seabed in the central Mediterranean.⁴⁴

Fear of marginalization in the decision-making process is natural to small states, but as Christine Ingebritsen (2004) has observed citing the example of small states in EU institutions and NATO, there are defining moments when small states can structure new alternatives even though they do not define the rules of the game in European institutions. Although they do not always share the same vision of European unification, they are increasingly seeing it as a more attractive means of securing stability and building prosperity in a more global international society.⁴⁵ Ingebritsen, again citing the experience of the Scandinavian countries, sees the small Scandinavian states as promoters of norms in international affairs, what she calls "norm entrepreneurs", which enables them to make an effective contribution to international affairs.⁴⁶ Although as she observes, not all small states behave in this way, the analysis above shows that Cyprus and Malta share the properties which would enable them to play a similar role. It may be argued that the promotion of norms is not the free choice of states but an imposition on the weak ones who have no other alternative. But this is not always true: often it is a deliberate conscious choice which states make. In addition, the power of ideas and norms does not have to be underrated or ignored. In 1958, Isaiah Berlin wrote: "Over a hundred years ago the German poet Heine warned the French not to underestimate the power of ideas: philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study could destroy a civilization". They could also make it.

NOTES

1. Without going into the well known details of how the Mediterranean Union became “Barcelona Process – Union for the Mediterranean” and finally “Union for the Mediterranean”, in this paper, MU is used to refer to the “Mediterranean Union”, UfM is used for “Union for the Mediterranean” and BP-UfM for “Barcelona Process – Union for the Mediterranean”.
2. Special Eurobarometer 285, “The EU’s Relations with its Neighbours”, European Commission, September 2007.
3. A note of caution: since this analysis is based upon publicly available information and personal encounters by the writer with diplomats working in the field, no systematic analysis has been possible of diplomatic exchanges which have taken place and which, had they to be analyzed, could throw up a different reality to the one that emerges from this article.
4. A minor but quite significant statement to illustrate this point is provided by the President of Cyprus, Mr Dimitris Christofias. During a press conference in Brussels on the sidelines of the Council in March 2008, Mr Christofias was asked whether he supported the MU to which he answered quite plainly, “Yes, of course. We are a Mediterranean country and we want to take an active part in this Union” – Transcript of the Press Conference, published by the Cypriot Embassy at The Hague and accessible at: <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/hagueembassy.nsf/All/36E6B9C170A4D041C125740C00510F43?OpenDocument> (accessed 19.03.2009)
5. President Sarkozy delivered a number of speeches on the Mediterranean Union during his visit to Morocco, the main ones being at Marshan Royal Palace Tangiers, on Tuesday, 23 October 2007; at Marrakesh and also Tuesday October 23, 2007 before the two houses of the Moroccan Parliament in Rabat on the same day and at the State Dinner held in his honour by His Majesty King Mohammed VI on Wednesday October 24.
6. Communiqué issued by the Presidency of France, Rome 20 December 2007, published on the web page of the Embassy of France at http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/France-Italy-and-Spain-call_for.html?var_recherche=mediterranean (accessed 20.03.2009)
7. Reuters Service at <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1468253220080314?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews> (accessed 19.03.2009)
8. See the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit For the Mediterranean published by the French Government at http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/07/0713_declaration_de_paris/Joint_declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf (accessed 20.03.2009)

9. Conclusions of the Presidency, Brussels European Council, 13-14 March 2008, Council Doc. 7652/1/08 Rev 1, Brussels may 20, 2008.
10. Final Declaration, “Barcelona Process Union for the Mediterranean” – Ministerial Conference, Doc. 15187/08 (Presse 314), Marseilles, November 4, 2008.
11. See the Malta Communiqué, EU-League of Arab States foreign affairs ministerial meeting Malta, 11-12 February 2008, Press Release 0259, Department of Information, Malta, February 12, 2008, at <http://www.gov.mt/frame.asp?l=1&url=http://www.doi.gov.mt> (accessed 10.02.2009)
12. It is not possible to give a comprehensive list of articles on this subject but some examples are included here: Braille Sasha, “The Seat of the European Institutions: An Example of Small State Influence in European Decision-Making?”, *EUI Working Paper*, RSC No 96/28, European University Institute, Florence, 1996; D. Arter, “Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case of Finland’s Northern Dimension Initiative”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2000, pp. 677–97; P.V. Jakobsen, “Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 47, Number 1, 2009, pp. 81–102;
13. Bloed Arie (ed), *From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990, p. 10; see also Michael W. Mosser, “Engineering Influence: The Subtle Power of Small States in the CSCE/OSCE” in *Small States and Alliances*, Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, eds., Heidelberg; New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001, pp. 63-84;
14. Albert W. Sherer, “Helsinki’s Child: Goldberg’s Variation”, *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1980, pp. 154-159.
15. In this respect we can consider the Mediterranean EU Member States as being France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal (even though this is on the Atlantic Coast), Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania are recent additions to this group which makes it 10 out of 27.
16. Press Release No 1938, Department of Information, Malta, 08.12.2008.
17. Protocol on Reinforced Co-operation Between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta signed in Valletta on February 12, 2008.
18. Malta and Italy both refused to take refugees rescued by a Panama registered ship, the *Pinar E*, within Malta’s Search and Rescue Area, but 41 km from the Italian island of Lampedusa and 114 km from Malta. Both sides traded some strong political statements. See “Dispute Turns into a War of Words”, *The Times of Malta*, 18 April 2009 and “Immigrazione, tensione Italia-Malta: Barcone bloccato a largo di Lampedusa”, *Il Messaggero*, April 17, 2009.

19. 'Conferenza Panmediterranea sull'immigrazione clandestina e sulla sicurezza delle frontiere esterne', on the web-page of the Italian Interior Ministry, http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stamp/norizie/2100_500_ministro/0504_2009_04_17_panmediterranea.html (accessed 19.04.2009)
20. Department of Information, Malta, Press Release No 0630, April 17, 2009.
21. The fifteenth foreign ministers' meeting of the Mediterranean Forum last met in Algiers in June 2008 where it discussed issues related to the then "Barcelona Process - Union for the Mediterranean". The "5+5" consists of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta together with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia and focuses mainly on the challenges of the Western Mediterranean.
22. Press Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, at <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/BA35403E200B5B5FC22573D40044C579?OpenDocument> (accessed 03.03.2009)
23. Copy of a press statement obtained from a diplomat who attended the meeting.
24. Foreign Minister – Interview to the Cyprus News Agency (by Ralli Papageorgiou, Nicosia 12.04.08).
25. Department of Information, Malta, Press Release 0610, April 16, 2009.
26. Roderick Pace, Stelios Stavridis, and Dimitris K. Xenakis "Parliaments and Civil Society Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter 2004; Ioannis Seimenis and Miltiadis Makriyannis, "Reinvigorating the Parliamentary Dimension of the Barcelona Process: The Establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Spring 2005; Stelios Stavridis and Roderick Pace, "The EMPA and parliamentary diplomacy in the Mediterranean: a preliminary assessment" in Stelios Stavridis, Natividad Fernández Sola (eds), *Factores políticos y de seguridad en el área euro-mediterránea*, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza (forthcoming 2009).
27. Welcome Speech by the Hon. Tonio Borg, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Mediterranean Day seminar, Palazzo Parisio, Valletta, March 23, 2009, <http://www.apm.org.mt/documents/pdfs/Welcome%20Speech%20Borg%20Med%20Day%20Seminar.pdf> (accessed 9.04.2009)
28. Address by the Hon Dr George Vella at the Mediterranean Day Seminar, <http://www.apm.org.mt/documents/pdfs/Med%20Day%20Colloquy%20Speech%20-%20Vella.pdf> (accessed 09.04.2009)
29. <http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/7C015843D1459B56C225748700218A04?OpenDocument&highlight=President%20Christofias%20Paris%20Summit&print> (accessed 19.03.2009).

30. Special Eurobarometer 285, September 2007, op.cit. page 12: In the Mediterranean, shared maritime borders seem to influence country results the most. Compared to the EU average, a higher share of respondents in Greece and Spain, Portugal and Malta but Cyprus in particular, perceive countries in the southeastern Mediterranean to be neighbours”.
31. Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou speaking in Nicosia on October 9, 2008 in a conference organized by the Daedalos Institute of Geopolitics, <http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/B919D65803674FC2C22574DD004702E9?OpenDocument&highlight=Mediterranean%20Union>
32. James Debono, “Sarko’s Mediterranean Council in Bighi? ‘Puro desiderio’, Frendo says”, *Malta Today*, Sunday September 9, 2007, <http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/2007/09/09/n7.html> (accessed 20.03.2009)
33. Frontex is the “European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” and was established by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004/ (26.10.2004, OJ L 349/25.11.2004).
34. Speech by the Hon Lawrence Gonzi, Prime Minister, at the Paris Summit on the Mediterranean, Sunday July 13, 2008; <http://www.gov.mt/frame.asp?l=1&curl=http://www.opm.gov.mt/> (accessed 21.03.2009)
35. The following two paragraphs are based on information which the writer has gathered from personal interviews with officials engaged in the MU initiative.
36. Emerson Michael (2008), “Making Sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean”, CEPS Policy Brief, No 155, March, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.
37. “An ocean lies in between what is proposed and what is actually done”.
38. “Khadafi Opposes EU Mediterranean Plan”, AFP, June 10, 2008, <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g8ht6f2TYywrkj9fuNrmWUO93KA> (accessed 10.04.2009)
39. “Jordan Calls off Euro-Med Water Conference”, *Arab News*, October 27, 2008 <http://www.arabnews.com/services/print/print.asp?artid=115821&d=27&m=10&y=2008&hl=Jordan%20calls%20off%20Euro-Med%20water%20conference> (accessed 10.04.2009)
40. “Egypt quells Arab Fears of Euro-Med Union”, *The Egyptian Gazette*, 129th year, Issue No 41,649, Thursday July 10, 2008, front page.
41. Alain Gresh, “Gaza War Changes Middle East Equation at Israel’s Expense”, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (English Edition), February 2009.
42. For a brief discussion of the impact of securitization on EU policies in the region see Aliboni et. al., “Union for the Mediterranean: Building on the Barcelona

- Acquis”, Report No 1, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Paris, May 13, 2008, pages 16-19.
43. Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso (eds.) *Beyond the Façade: Political Reform in the Arab World*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2008.
44. Address by Ambassador Arvid Pardo to the First Committee, UN General Assembly, Meeting 1515, 1 November 1967, Official Records, A/C.1/PV.1515, pp. 1-16; 1516 Meeting, November 1, 1967, Official Records, A/C.1/PV.1516, 16-18.
45. Ingebritsen Christine, “Learning fro Lilliput: Small States and EU Expansion”, *Scandinavian Studies*, Fall 2004, Volume 76, No 3, pp. 373-4.
46. Christine Ingebritsen and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), *Small States in International Relations*, University of Washington Press, 2006, pp. 273-92.