

# Greece's Mediterranean Perspective and the French Initiative

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## RÉSUMÉ

Après l'eupéanisation des relations gréco-turques dans le milieu des années 1990, la Méditerranée est devenue peu à peu une terre retrouvée d'opportunité pour les décideurs de la politique grecque, représentant un point de vue établi depuis longtemps que la Grèce doit atteindre un équilibre entre ses priorités de politique étrangère européennes, balkaniques et méditerranéennes. Initialement, en s'appuyant sur l'approche régionale de l'UE et, plus récemment, en soutenant l'initiative française, de nombreuses opportunités sont apparues pour la Grèce d'améliorer son profil régional, y compris un nouveau paramètre dans les relations gréco-turques. Cet article examine la participation accrue de la Grèce afin de changer l'ordre du jour euro-méditerranéen, en évaluant les défis et les opportunités que cette nouvelle initiative génère pour les intérêts stratégiques et économiques du pays. Il conclut avec des réflexions sur l'action future dans le cadre institutionnel, nouvellement institué, tant en ce qui concerne les projets de coopération de plus grande valeur pour la Grèce et en vue de contribuer davantage au processus plus large de systématiser les relations régionales.

## ABSTRACT

After the europeanization of Greco-Turkish relations in the mid-1990s, the Mediterranean has gradually become a rediscovered land of opportunity for Greek policy-makers, representing an embodiment of a long-standing view that Greece has to strike a balance between its European, Balkan and Mediterranean foreign policy priorities. Initially, by building on the European Union's regional approach and, more recently, by supporting the French Mediterranean initiative, numerous opportunities have arisen for Greece to upgrade its regional profile, including a new parameter in Greco-Turkish relations. This article examines Greece's increased involvement in changing Euro-Mediterranean agenda by assessing both the challenges and the opportunities that the new initiative generates for the country's strategic and economic interests. It concludes with thoughts on future action in the newly instituted framework,

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both regarding cooperative projects of higher value for Greece and in view of further contributing to the wider process of systematizing regional relations.

## **Introduction**

Since antiquity, the Mediterranean has played a pivotal role in the development of Greece's history, politics and society. Since 1981, the country's borders are the limits of European Union's (EU) zone of peace, stability and prosperity with the clashing military, political, religious, and socio-cultural entities of the Middle East and the Balkans. Being an integral part of the Balkan system, sharing a common heritage and culture with Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria, and FYROM) but also those approaching the Middle East (Turkey and Cyprus) and North Africa (Egypt and Libya), Greece's complex external relations with these three sets of neighbors typify the difficulties and challenges involved in seeking cooperation in these areas.

Greece's accession in the European Community had a profound impact on its' stability, political, societal and economic development. There is no doubt, however that economic prospects will be significantly increased in the ever-more globalized financial environment, if a way is found to address regional disputes and enhance stability. This is why Greece has been supporting all European policies and regional initiatives promoting peace, stability and development in the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, it has shown strong interest in the formation of a vibrant and viable Euro-Mediterranean space, improving its Mediterranean relations both bilaterally and multilaterally, within the formal framework of the Barcelona Process and in the context of the Mediterranean Forum. More recently, Athens has shown almost unconditional support to Nicola Sarkozy's Mediterranean initiative. The newly established Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), except for new economic opportunities, it also provides for an additional framework to manage relations with Turkey, as well as, to address controversial issues in the eastern Mediterranean, including, delimitation, migration and terrorism.

## **The Shaping of Greece's Mediterranean Policy**

Greece exhibits a firm European orientation, whilst maintaining a number of particular Balkan and Mediterranean concerns, some of them aligned with those of the rest of the EU's southern members. As Veremis put it, "the

proximity of Portugal, Spain and Italy to North Africa and the common borders of Greece and Italy with the troubled Balkans, helps explain each country's regional line of work".<sup>1</sup> Greek foreign policy has been defined along the lines, on the one hand, of its Europeaness and, on the other, its affinity to the Balkans and the Mediterranean, with the latter itself constituting from a Greek perspective a southern European periphery. Greece has good relations with most southern Mediterranean countries not least due to the long-established presence of Greek communities around the Mediterranean basin, although it maintains relatively little politico-economic relations as compared to its Balkan neighbours. Due to new security concerns that the disintegration of the Balkans created at the country's northern borders, as well as, the centrality of religion in Greek identity, Greece's foreign policy has been focusing more on the Balkans than the Mediterranean. Yet, the challenges and the course of events in the southern Mediterranean rim should be followed more closely. A potential rebooting of the conflict in various hotspots of the Middle East could increase violence and terrorism incidents in the region, affecting maritime transportation, the tourism industry and other critical economic activities.

Greece has often been accused by other members of the EU of maintaining a fixed preoccupation over the Aegean and the Cyprus issues with Turkey.<sup>2</sup> Most analysts agree that since the establishment of the modern Greek state, there is a deeply rooted sense of threat in the Greek society, which has been greatly enhanced after the invasion in Cyprus in 1974 and, later, Turkey's revisionism in the Aegean.<sup>3</sup> The Cyprus issue was also the reason that Greece, one of the key bulwarks for the American interests in the region, to temporarily withdraw from the military structure of NATO. Attempting to decrease dependence on US, and while France appeared to be the most sincere supporter of its accession in the Community, the popular logo "Greece-France-Alliance" was not simply a rhetorical scheme, but also reflected the intention to ally with the politically most powerful country in western Europe.<sup>4</sup> But for a small-medium country with the intense threat from Turkey, the problem of dependence on the US remained unresolved despite efforts made by both the "Gaullist" Constantinos Karamanlis in the 1970s and the "non-aligned" Andreas Papandreou in the 1980s.<sup>5</sup> Both administrations did not exceed the bipolar restrictions in the regional system, neither did they question - despite their different rhetoric- the stakes of US in the region.<sup>6</sup> Both remained relatively firm in terms of their objectives, and although differently prioritized they can be summarized as follows:

- To ensure Arab support regarding the Cyprus issue;<sup>7</sup>
- To manage the country's heavy energy dependence on Arab oil;
- To further economic relations with Arab countries;
- To search for regional allies to balance US pressures on sensitive national issues.
- To try to isolate Turkey from the Arab countries and balance strategic cooperation developed between Turkey and Israel ;<sup>8</sup>
- To protect the Greek communities and ensure the privileges of the Orthodox Patriarchates in Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem as well as the St. Catherine Monastery at Sinai;
- The safeguarding of the Greek Diaspora communities and their interests, at least for as long as they were sustained.<sup>9</sup>

Greek foreign policy has been *grosso modo* Arab-friendly – despite minor differentiations depending on the administration, at least until 1990, when Constantine Mistotakis balanced this deficit normalizing relations with Israel. Greece's pro-Arab attitude has been shaped by four discourses: a historical, which emphasizes Greece's special linkage with the region; a geopolitical, which associates Greece's foreign policy with questions about its broader international orientation; a security, which constructs the Middle East as another field where the antagonistic Greek-Turkish relationship evolves; and a discourse on justice, which highlights the ethical dimension of the Arab-Israel conflict. The interaction between these four discourses has traditionally led to a pro-Palestinian inclination, which is still evident, despite the attempts of Greek governments to pursue a more equidistant approach.<sup>10</sup>

Although Greek-Arab relations were one of the most important issues of Andreas Papandreou's foreign policy at least at the beginning of his mandate, his unconditional Arab-friendly attitude mistakenly led to treating the Arab world as a whole, often led to the Greek involvement in the intra-Arab and Muslim disputes.<sup>11</sup> Greek foreign policy has been described as “irrational”, “parochial”, “aggressive”, even “crazy” underlying the absence of a systemic institutional framework. The embargo on FYROM and the threatening to veto the EU-Turkey Customs Union are such examples. Ioakimidis stresses the role of politicians like Constantinos Karamanlis, Constantinos Mitsotakis and Andreas Papandreou, talented but often flamboyant and unpredictable, driving without the brakes because of the virtual absence of a capable and

trusted bureaucracy to check them, has plagued Greek foreign policy, and on occasion has led to isolation in the EU and NATO.<sup>12</sup> Although his analysis ends in 1996, he was right to predict that the technocratic administration of Costas Simitis will provide with a more responsible leadership for the country's national interest. The rise of Simitis' "modernizers" to the leadership of the country has steered Greece away from its nationalist foreign policy to a truly modernist-Europeanist direction<sup>13</sup> and from the so-called strategy of "conditional sanctions" to the one of "conditional rewards" in relation to Turkey's EU candidacy. The new policy of "conditional rewards" was received positively by the Turkish elite, who was now prepared to accept a compromise deal for the resolution of its long-standing conflict with an EU member. L' 'entente' between the two countries was exhibited further after the destructive earthquakes both countries experienced in 2000. But the causes for such an improvement should be explored in relation to the pressures caused by Europe.

With the drastic change in the logic of the conflict between Greece and Turkey and the new era in Turkey's EU relations, new orientations for the country's foreign policy emerged, including the Euro-Mediterranean setting. Although the Greece's participation in the EU has generally advanced regional relations, its Mediterranean policy has been generally reactive, thus letting other actors determine the parameters of the EU's respective policy. This was changed in the mid-1990s (Corfu European Council)<sup>14</sup> and even more in the framework of the latest Hellenic Presidency of the European Council. During her more recent EU Presidency, Greece promoted peace and stability in the region, as part of the European integration project and its regional security building through European Security and Defence Policy's (ESDP) Mediterranean dimension.<sup>15</sup> During a particularly difficult era of escalating crisis in the Middle East and the pending war in Iraq, Greek Presidency set up realistic and substantive objectives for progress to be made. This is reflected in the successful outcome of the Intermediary Euro-Med Ministerial Conference held in Crete on May 26-27, 2003, where the Presidency proposals found their way to the Conclusions and the Declaration of Crete was adopted unanimously by all Ministers.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, during the Presidency, a Parliamentary Assembly was also set up, with the participation of national and European parliamentarians, bestowing the Partnership with higher levels of legitimacy.<sup>17</sup>

Building on the EU's Mediterranean approach, the new regional space has gradually become a rediscovered land of opportunity for Greek policy-makers, representing an embodiment of a long-standing view that Greece has to strike a balance between its European, Balkan and Mediterranean foreign policy

priorities. Greece intensified its efforts to develop diplomatic links and to promote economic and cultural ties with southern Mediterranean states. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been active in promoting Greek business abroad by setting up a department to coordinate between NGOs, private sector organizations and Greek embassies and consulates in the Mediterranean to foster economic and commercial ties. Despite the many complex problems, efforts to foster both multilateral and bilateral links based on historical and cultural ties and affinities, as well as on common economic and commercial experience were intensified. More recently, Costas Karamanlis administration's strong support to Sarkozy's plan after the establishing of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), is presenting with new opportunities to upgrade the country's regional strategic and economic profile.

### **Explaining Greece's Positive Attitude towards the French Initiative**

Greece has supported the French initiative since its early inception, when only littoral countries were supposed to participate. It kept a positive stance towards the French initiative having continuously expressed the intention to contribute actively with its concrete proposals based upon specific principles (see below). The primary reason for this positive attitude lies at the fact that every effort which could enhance European interest for the region and strengthen cooperation ties among Mediterranean states has always been supported by Greece, especially those initiated from south European countries, such as the "Olive Group". Therefore, it was important for Greece to participate in the French initiative from the beginning, in order to be at the core of the countries to shape its' final outcome.

Secondly, that was a French initiative after all. The long-standing bilateral relations between the two countries have their roots in France's role during the Greek dictatorship, when a great number of prominent political figures moved to Paris, but also in the country's accession to the Community in 1981. Another such example is also the Union for the Mediterranean.<sup>18</sup> Hence, the visit of Nicola Sarkozy in Athens in June 2008 –the first visit of a French president since 1982-, undoubtedly helped to gain Karamanlis' support to his Mediterranean project, in addition to the full support he offered at NATO's 2008 Summit in Bucharest, regarding FYROM's accession in the Alliance with its constitutional name.

Thirdly, Athens view largely coincided with that of France on the Barcelona Process, which after more than twelve years of operation it has neither specified

its identity nor met the expectations it raised in the '90s. Indeed, the expectations and ideals advocated in the text of the preamble of the Barcelona Declaration such as to turn the Mediterranean basin into "an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity" has yet to emerge. The whole Barcelona project has been questioned, especially regarding the lack of contributing in the Middle East peace process, as well as, for the absence of any tangible achievements, capable to balance its gaps and failures in offering to the Mediterranean partners a genuine and balanced framework for co-operation.

Fourthly, Greece's good relations with Arab countries and the increased developmental aid that it has generated towards southern Mediterranean countries have not yet led to a consolidation of Greece's regional economic relations, or to increased FDI. Important economic opportunities could arise from the new initiative for Greece. Aiming to implement projects and create new economic opportunities across the Mediterranean, it offers the opportunity for Greece to enlarge its economic ties in the traditionally dominated by the France and Spain markets in western Mediterranean, parallel to the upgrade of existing frameworks of collaboration in the eastern shore, especially that with Egypt.<sup>19</sup>

Fifthly, today the area between northern Africa and southern Europe –the Mediterranean and Aegean seas– is a major transit route and focal point for those attempting migration or seeking asylum. In Greece, as in other southern Mediterranean countries, the chief sources of immigration are overwhelmingly Muslim, something that cultivates racism and these areas are depicted as zones of "endemic terrorism". Associating with Greece's position on the problem of illegal immigration, EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security Jacques Barrot warned that the influx of immigrants and refugees threatens to destabilize certain countries, also adding that were their EU partners to leave them on their own, this problem would probably be exploited by extremists.<sup>20</sup> Greek society has been alarmed recently with the issue of increasing illegal migration. Barely a day goes by without a horrific report of desperate groups of migrants stranded or drowning in the attempt to reach Europe, and one of Sarkozy's main priorities is to ensure tighter immigration and police controls to prevent migrants leaving their country of origin in the first place.<sup>21</sup> Due to its complex sea-borders, boats full of refugees arrive in Greece from various Mediterranean places, but mostly departing from Turkey, Libya<sup>22</sup> and Egypt<sup>23</sup> and often remain (illegally) for years. Greece expects that the UfM will have a positive effect on this issue of increased internal interest.

Sixthly, the French initiative provided certain advantages for Greek foreign policy in the management of Greek-Turkish relations, by presenting a realistic alternative for Turkey's stalled prospect of EU full-membership.<sup>24</sup> As the creation of the UfM did not finally obstruct Turkey's accession negotiations, then the Greek strategy to "socialize the enemy"<sup>25</sup> could continue without any obstacles. Greece has adopted from the mid 90s' a comprehensive policy to support Turkey's accession process and if this prospect is to be driven away - either because of increasing opposition in the EU and its member states or due to internal pressures in Turkey-<sup>26</sup>, then this strategy would reach its limits. In such a case, the UfM could be used as an alternative means for Athens in the management of relations with Turkey. Hence, it was important that Sarkozy's initiative (with Chancellor Merkel's support) opened the discussion for a different EU-Turkey future without Greece being at the forefront of this idea. Otherwise, there was the risk of Turkey turning to a different direction, forming exclusive bilateral relations with US, or closer cooperation with the Muslim world,<sup>27</sup> something which would diminish Athens' ability to press Ankara in bilateral negotiations.

Finally there is the issue of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).<sup>28</sup> Greece has not yet claimed an exclusive economic zone in the Aegean, although it is entitled to do so, as per UNCLOS 1982, as well as customary international law. The reason for its inaction is related to Greco-Turkish relations.<sup>29</sup> As Kariotis observes, "[f]or more than thirty years now, Greece has been insisting that its only dispute is of legal nature and is related to the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean. This makes particularly happy Turkish policy makers as Greece does not discuss the issue of EEZ. The main reason for this great elation is that Greece could gain much from the delimitation of the Aegean Sea".<sup>30</sup> Kastelorizo, Greece's south-eastern island is securing contact with the Cypriot EEZ, something that restricts significantly the Turkish EEZ expansion in eastern Mediterranean with Egypt. As Cyprus has moved to the delimitation and now promotes the development of her own EEZ, Turkey is attempting to create a grey area in the Aegean by starting oil-research project south of Cyprus and Kastelorizo.<sup>31</sup> Greece by no means should harden or militarize this dispute. Before that there are political pressures that can do the job, including the friendly framework of the UfM and the alliance with France, who's numerous overseas *départements* and territories scattered on all oceans of the planet, compose the second-largest EEZ in the world, covering 11,035,000 km.

## Dilemmas and Principles

Before it was emptied to a large degree from its initial inception by inter-European negotiations in the first quarter of 2008,<sup>32</sup> the French initiative has generated questions for Greek foreign policy, including first of all, the question of overlapping structures in the Mediterranean. The new Union could overload the already overhauled framework of European policies in the Mediterranean, considering its parallel function with other schemes and regional initiatives. Increased worries were already expressed regarding the Barcelona Process and the ENP co-function in different domains. There is a clear distinction between the region-building logic of the Barcelona Process and the logic of bilateralism and differentiation through conditionality exemplified by the ENP. Greece has a special interest in the ENP's further development, and supports its geographical cohesion to balance between its already working "eastern" dimension and the one still to be functional in the South. The UfM actually draws on the ENP's model: it is an intergovernmental project, democracy and human rights are out, security and stability are paramount, a buffer zone is being created.<sup>33</sup>

A second related question regards the issue of participation. The initial French proposal would consist of sixteen southern European, Middle Eastern and North African countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. That proposal made the new initiative to resemble an upgraded version of the Five plus Five Initiative for western Mediterranean. As several European countries insisted that all EU members should participate and became clear that it was not possible for the non-Mediterranean states to be excluded, Athens adopted the view of the voluntary participation.<sup>34</sup> However, from the beginning of the initiative Greece has supported the need of maintaining the Barcelona Process at the heart of Euro-Mediterranean relations,<sup>35</sup> as well as, the need for the EU to pay more attention to all coastal Mediterranean countries, including those in western Balkans, for which Greece has pressed to be included in the new framework.

Another question relates to the critical issue of financing the UfM projects given that most of the appropriate EU funds are already committed until 2013. France has proposed the establishment of a Mediterranean Investment Bank, as well as, financing from sources, such as local authorities, international investment organizations, private investments from the Gulf countries and even from the creation of a Fund for immigrants from the Mediterranean countries, or the establishment of a non EU financial body. However, Greece considered the EU as the only institution that could finance effectively large-scale regional

projects. The amount of investments for the implementation of different programs will be enormous and for their management an effective bureaucratic mechanism would be required. Hence, European Commission did not seem to agree and made it clear that it is not possible for the budget channeled through the ENP to be used for the implementation of programs from the UfM. In this framework Greece proposed the creation of a unit in the framework of the European Investment Bank (in which mechanisms are already familiar and there is no risk of further bureaucracy or delays), as well as the creation of three Mutual Funds in the form of 'private equities' financed 80% from the private sector and 20% from the public sector of the member states.<sup>36</sup>

Greece's support to the UfM is based on the following principles:

- The principle of co-ownership. This principle, absent from EU's Barcelona project, is meaning equal participation and in the framework of the UfM it was expected to give new impetus in Euro-Mediterranean relations. Establishing a co-presidency has maybe increased and improved the balance of cooperation. However, since the Gaza war in December 2008, "France, in its capacity as co-president and self-proclaimed leader of the Union, has allowed the Arab group to kidnap the entire Union". Moreover, Schumacher notes that "the decision of the EU's Swedish presidency to allow France to continue to co-chair all high-level meetings of the Union for the Mediterranean on the EU's behalf, is a situation that puts it at odds with the EU's system of representation on foreign policy and with stipulations in the Lisbon treaty, ... increasing [at the same time] the risks of poor management and empty promises."<sup>37</sup>
- The principle of complementarity. The UfM should be complementary and not substitute to the wider Barcelona process. As Prime Minister Karamanlis told reporters at the end of the EU spring Summit in Brussels, "the specific proposal should not be a substitute of current forms of cooperation, such as the Barcelona Process or the Union's Neighborhood Policy, but function in a complementary and auxiliary manner"<sup>38</sup>. Complementarity is of great importance for regional integration.
- The principle of horizontal action. Projects should not only benefit specific states but should also be of added value for the wider geographical area. It would be worthless for example for an infrastructure project in the southern shore to take place without considering the relevant infrastructures in the north. As southern partners have often expressed their disappointment for the inherent asymmetry, existing infrastructures in the North should be

expanded in the South, establishing a real network of cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Finding and connecting the missing links between the two shores of the Mediterranean could boost the utilization of regional developmental programs.<sup>39</sup>

- The principle of balanced development in both sectors of the Mediterranean. As the opportunities for economic development and cooperation are more in the western part, a balanced distribution of opportunities is required. Therefore UfM projects should be jointly agreed on a fair basis and the financial instrument to be established should only function effectively but also with high levels of transparency.
- The principle of unanimity in the decisions regarding the UfM projects. These should be implemented according to the principle of variable geometry, as to prevent blocking from other stakeholders. Variable geometry also means that three or more states can implement projects under the existing institutions, without any further political approval. Projects should involve partners both from shores of the Mediterranean and have realistic budgets and explicit timetables. Regarding their financing, they should aim to mobilize additional resources, beyond those already planned in the framework of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. The idea is to attract more resources from international and financial organizations and the private sector.

After the Summit in Paris, Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis noted that “it has really been an impressive meeting that marked the peak of the French President Mr. Sarkozy’s initiative” but she mainly referred to existing and anticipated project proposals, pointing out the new economic opportunities for the country.<sup>40</sup> Indeed, the UfM is expected to have an added value by implementing specific projects with immediate and tangible benefits for Mediterranean peoples, as well as, by contributing positively to the region’s overall economic and societal development. The definition of priority sectors was greatly appreciated as Greece has shown special interest for implementing projects on “sea corridors” to improve connections between Mediterranean ports, in developing renewable energy sources, boosting cooperation for illegal immigration, a cleanup of the Mediterranean’s waters and coastal areas and greater cooperation in civil protection and response to natural disasters, such as fires and earthquakes.<sup>41</sup>

Greece, beyond its political commitment, is also expected to play an important role in the implementation of projects due to its institutional role

as an under-secretary for the UfM.<sup>42</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has shown increased interest in coordinating the preparation of proposals in different domains and launched a Public Consultation process for projects to be implemented within the UfM framework.<sup>43</sup> All priority areas of the UfM are important for Greece but, given the magnitude of the country's merchant marine and the extreme length of its' sea frontiers, it naturally places special emphasis on those related to Sea. More specifically, Greece has prepared to submit programs in three areas: the so called "Motorways of the Sea"<sup>44</sup>, the solar air conditioning<sup>45</sup> and the water pro-active management<sup>46</sup>. Moreover, Athens has actively supported the framework for the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI). To that end, an Academic Consortium and a Research Centre on the Eastern Mediterranean were established at the University of the Aegean (Rhodes) to promote research in the areas of conservation and enhancement of cultural heritage, environment, local and regional security and migration and make proposals on the political and economic dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations.<sup>47</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also promotes a proposal for the construction of a shipyard in Egypt, as well as, the proposal of the University of Piraeus (Department of Maritime Studies) to establish a centre for the study of transportation in the eastern Mediterranean.

As Greece has shown increased interest for the development of "Land and Sea Highways" it will also be important to implement projects relating to increase maritime security in the eastern Mediterranean. Today, all the warning signs indicate the highest states of alert for terrorist attacks against the maritime sector worldwide. The October 2002 suicide bombing of the French tanker *Limburg* in the Gulf of Aden serves as a stark reminder that military and economic vessels, as well as, cruise ships represent targets to terrorist groups. In the Rand report entitled "Maritime and Terrorism: Risk and Liability"<sup>48</sup>, maritime terrorism risk includes cruise ships and ferries. International terrorism is the greatest danger to the maritime sector, both against military and commercial ships of varying sizes navigating Mediterranean waterways, or against ports and related facilities. Ports, indeed, are threatened either as actual targets for attack or as entry points for smuggled weapons, including those of mass destruction. Another potential component in this concept is for terrorist groups to lease ships and boats to transport weapons from a multiplicity of suppliers to their intended recipients in and around the Mediterranean. Acts of sea piracy, the smuggling of narcotics, arms and humans via sea routes, and the use of waterways by terrorist groups are interconnected. Due to its complex

sea-geography, Greece should explore projects enhancing co-operation in this strategic area of contemporary international affairs.

Additionally, one more parameter could be added regarding “sea corridors” securitization that could also link the issue of illegal migration. Following tougher restrictions on legal entry in many European countries, the maritime route has become the best chance to enter Europe for many would-be immigrants and refugees. While European countries try to come up with adequate solutions to illegal immigration, the situation is pressing and collaboration with countries of origin and transit is crucial.<sup>49</sup> Greece and southern European countries should utilize their co-operation in the framework of the UfM to arrive at a common policy and means to address effectively this critical issue, including the active collaboration of its neighbours to take illegal refugees back (readmission agreements), as well as, technical/financial assistance and equipment for a more thorough control of southern partners borders. In parallel, FRONTEX should be substantially strengthened, able to deploy a sufficient number of coast guard control boats to intercept refugees on the high seas and return them to their ports of origin. This will require a friendly and active cooperation from its neighbour governments.<sup>50</sup> In the short term, the reinforcement of the “Poseidon operation” at the Greek-Bulgarian-Turkish borders (one of the important routes of illegal migration to the EU) and the engagement of FRONTEX is expected to provide an added value to the national border-management system is a good case in point.<sup>51</sup> Ideally however, one should immediately investigate the feasibility of establishing the FRONTEX operation in the Mediterranean into a permanent Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard Agency (EMCA) that would be mandated to co-ordinate the co-operative security network with a mission statement and plan of action similar to those carried out by a coastguard. The EMCA should initially carry out stop and search exercises in two principal areas, maritime safety and maritime pollution, while at a later stage it should be enhanced by monitoring other aspects of security, including trafficking of narcotics and illegal migrants.<sup>52</sup>

## Final Remarks

For many years Greek foreign and security policy makers maintained particular concerns regarding cooperation in Mediterranean, mainly restricted by the overarching framework of tense Greco-Turkish relations.<sup>53</sup> With its accession in the European Community in the early 1980s, Greece has

enhanced further the strategic significance of the Mediterranean for Europe, not least because its' borders constitute a crucial fault-line with the Muslim world and an important shipping route for the transportation of energy from the oil-rich surrounding areas to Europe. Since the mid-90s', initially through EU's multilateral approach and more recently through the more traditional patterns of international relations that the UfM has brought in Euro-Mediterranean politics, new opportunities for Greece in the Mediterranean have arisen in order:

- To enhance its strategic importance in the Mediterranean by maintaining strong bilateral relations with the most powerful maritime actor in the region, namely the US. Greece and its seas are of great strategic and economic value, as its numerous islands have been one of the major maritime routes throughout history. While the post-Cold War shifts in international relations have downgraded the strategic importance of Greece, crises and operations in the Middle East and the Gulf have had the opposite effect with reference to the strategic importance of Crete. Due to its geographic location, Crete is an ideal base to control and access the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, as well as North Africa and the Suez Canal.
- To secure the continuity of the Greek defence space with that of Turkey's in the Middle East. The recent upgrade of Turkey's strategic role in the Middle East and the Muslim world should be balanced with the advancement of Greece's strategic value for both the US and European powers, firstly through the use of its FIR for strategic operations in the Mediterranean; and secondly, through enhancing its image as a maritime power able to contribute in the regional crises, as shown in the 2006 crisis in Lebanon.
- To enhance its regional profile by participating in both the Middle East Peace Process and the new Euro-Mediterranean structure. Taking advantage of its geopolitical location in the eastern hub of the Mediterranean, but also of the good neighborhood relations with both Arab countries and Israel, today Greece is called upon to play an important role in regional affairs.

These would require the significant upgrade of its foreign policy's Mediterranean dimension by devoting more resources in policy oriented research and in advancing its Mediterranean diplomatic team. Greece, as a credible regional actor, should continue to contribute to its full capacity in the dynamics of Euro-Mediterranean order-building and the gradual systemic convergence of southern countries with new initiatives to balance the over-enlarged EU and new strategic partnerships in the project-oriented UfM.<sup>54</sup>

Athens has actively participated in the establishment of the UfM, convinced that it shall bring about an essential upgrading in the quality of cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean countries, primarily through the implementation of specific projects. These projects should have a regional and sub-regional dimension, as well as a strong developmental, environmental, social and human character, resulting in direct and tangible benefits for the Mediterranean peoples. This is precisely where the added value of the "Union of Projects" lies for Greece and the southern EU members. Perhaps even more so in the framework of the current economic recession Greek and other southern European Leaders hope that the slowly emerging southern Mediterranean markets is what they need to catch up with the northern EU economies, and that Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon will do for them what eastern Europe has done for Germany and Britain.

The function of the UfM and the implementation of the envisaged projects will depend heavily, as did during the wearisome decade of the Barcelona Process, on the situation in the Middle East. Only a year since its founding, it has become evident that the idea the UfM was established not in spite of the Israel-Palestine conflict, but because of it, is proving to be too simplistic.<sup>55</sup> As the Summits of the Heads of States and governments are established in the framework of the UfM, all controversial issues should be in agenda of discussions, regardless of the fact that some would prefer to abstain from such discussions to avoid political stalemate. Greece supports the view that political challenges in the region should not be left outside the UfM. It is argued that the UfM would only be successful if there could be found ways of submitting proposals and taking decisions notwithstanding relations among Mediterranean countries. Hence, issues such as illegal immigration and counter-terrorism should find their way in discussions. This is particularly important regarding Turkey's EU membership, because, as the EU's frontiers expand, drawing in countries that used to be buffers between First World prosperity and Third World poverty, the lines of demarcation between affluence and misery, democracy and extremism, become crucial security frontiers. If Turkey eventually accedes, Europe will border Syria, Iran, Iraq, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and illegal immigration will become a real security issue for Europe.

The UfM though primarily of economic drive, if it remains limited to a narrow framework of additional developmental programs for the South - although they are indeed necessary-, for sure, southern Mediterranean partners do not only expect additional EU aid for their economic development, but

also deeper cooperation leading to a community capable to deal with the political and socio-cultural challenges they face. The focus on the implementation of projects should not set aside critical region-wide issues, such as democracy-promotion, political reform and the strengthening of civil society, not to mention the prevention of another major outbreak of violence. No doubt, pressures for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be increased, but perhaps more important from a Greek perspective is that the chances for regional co-operation would dramatically increase if a viable solution for the Cyprus question is found and Greek-Turkish relations could further normalize, so that both countries can take advantage of the benefits stemming from their position at the regional crossroads. Greek and Turkish Cypriots are in talks that, over the next year, will decide whether the two divided sides of the Mediterranean island will reunite, or whether, after three decades of failed attempts, they will continue the slide to full partition. Considering that Barcelona Process' political and security pillar experienced the greatest difficulties, it is rather paradoxical for the ambitious UfM to avoid discussions on major regional questions, instead of facing up to the challenges they generate through a commonly formulated agenda.

## NOTES

1. Thanos Veremis, "International Relations in Southern Europe" in John Loughlin (ed.), *Southern European Studies Guide*, London, Bauker-Saur, 1993, p. 210.
2. Christos Rozakis, "Greek foreign policy 1974-85: Modernization and the international role of a small state" [Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική 1974-85: Εκσυγχρονισμός και ο διεθνής ρόλος ενός μικρού κράτους] in Antonis Manassis *et al.* (eds.), *Greece in Motion* [Η Ελλάδα σε Εξέλιξη], Athens, Exandas, 1986, p. 185.
3. See among others in Dimitris Conostas, "Systemic Influences on a Weak, Aligned State in the Post-1974 Era" in Dimitris Conostas (ed.), *The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1991, pp. 129-139.
4. Panayotis Tsakaloyiannis, "Greek Foreign Policy and Systemic Change" [Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική και Συστημική Αλλαγή] in Constantinos Arvanitopoulos and Marilenna Korpa (eds.), *30 Years Greek Foreign Policy - 1974-2004* [30 Χρόνια Ελληνικής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής, 1974-2004], Livanis, Athens, 2005, p. 76 and p. 445.

5. Dimitris Keridis, "Greece and the Tension in the Euroatlantic Relations" [Η Ελλάδα και η Ένταση στις Ευρω-Ατλαντικές Σχέσεις] in Arvanitopoulos and Korra, *op.cit.*, p. 76.
6. See in detail in Sotiris Roussos, "The Greek Middle East Policy: Between 'Operational Mentality', 'Internal Policy' and 'New Challenges'" [Η Ελληνική Πολιτική στη Μέση Ανατολή: Μεταξύ 'Επιχειρησιακής Νοοτροπίας', 'Εσωτερικής πολιτικής' και 'Νέων προκλήσεων'] in Arvanitopoulos and Korra, *op.cit.*, 2005, pp. 79-98 and Vivi Kefala, "Greek Foreign Policy in the Middle East: 1990-2002" [Η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική στη Μέση Ανατολή: 1990-2002] in Panayotis J. Tsakonias (ed.), *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy – An Overall Approach* [Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική: Μια Συνολική Προσέγγιση], Athens, I. Sideris, 2003, p. 675.
7. Regarding Cyprus, the most crucial moment was in November 1983 and the proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot pseudo-State, when Greece launched an appeal in order to gain the support of the Arab countries. "A determining role against its recognition by the Muslim States was undoubtedly the firm resistance of the USA vis-à-vis this movement and more generally the status quo brought about by the Turkish invasion". Marios. L. Evriviades, "The US and the Search for a Negotiated Solution in Cyprus" in R. C. Sharma and Stavros Epaminondas (eds.), *Cyprus in Search of Peace and Justice*, p. 104-5, quoted in Roussos, *op.cit.*, p. 89.
8. Charalambos Tsardanides, *The 'Renewed' Mediterranean Policy of European Community and Greece's Mediterranean Policy* [Η «Ανανεωμένη» Μεσογειακή Πολιτική της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας και η Ελλάδα], Greek Centre of European Studies and Research, Athens, Papazisis, 1992, p. 102.
9. Thanos Dokos and Fillipos Pierros, *The Mediterranean towards the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Greece position* [Η Μεσόγειος προς τον 21<sup>ο</sup> Αιώνα. Η Θέση της Ελλάδας], Athens, Papazisis, 1995, pp. 292-3.
10. Apostolos Agnantopoulos, "Greece and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Discursive Constructivist Perspective", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2007, pp. 359-379.
11. Rozakis, "Greek foreign policy 1974-85", *op. cit.*, p. 186.
12. Panayotis C. Ioakimidis, "The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities versus Institutions" in Stavridis et.al, *op.cit.*, 1999, p. 140.
13. See among others Dimitris Kairidis, "The Foreign Policy of Modernisation" [Η Εξωτερική Πολιτική του Εκσυγχρονισμού] in Tsakonias, *op.cit.*, p. 298.
14. In June 1994 the Corfu European Council gave the initial impetus and in its communications of October 1994 and 8 March 1995 the European Commission tabled its proposals for a EMP that were endorsed by the European Council at its Essen and Cannes meetings in December 1994 and June 1995 respectively.

15. Following the mobilization of the Greek Presidency during the Informal Conference of Defense Ministers in Rethymno, in October 4-5, 2002, the prospect of ESDP have been set on a more stable basis. An additional line of communication was opened regarding the structure and nature of ESDP, for both clarifying European intentions and dispelling possible misinterpretations in the Mediterranean South. Greek proposals for extra-transparency, trust-building and the institutionalization of political dialogue in the Mediterranean enhanced the Barcelona Process security dimension. See more analytically in Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chrysochoou, "The 2003 Hellenic Presidency of the European Union: Mediterranean Perspectives on the ESDP", *Discussion Papers*, C 128, Center for European Integration, University of Bonn, 2003.
16. This document was prepared by the Presidency and contained the basic guidelines for the envisaged inter-cultural dialogue. The objectives, principles and activities of the Anna Lindh Foundation were also agreed with the view to promoting further the inter-cultural dialogue, as well as the role of the Civil Forum and its contribution to the Barcelona Process was upgraded, together with specific references on how to strengthen the role of women. Dimitris K. Xenakis, "The contribution of Greece to strengthening Euro-Mediterranean relations", *Perceptions*, Special Euro-Med Issue, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2003, pp. 173-208.
17. Roderick Pace, Stelios Stavrides and Dimitris K. Xenakis, "Parliaments and Civil Society Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2004, p. 79.
18. Yannis Valinakis, "Together in the Union for the Mediterranean" [Μαζί στην Ένωση για τη Μεσόγειο], *Kathimerini* (Greek Daily), 1 June 2008.
19. Speech of Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis Speech of Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis at the Permanent Parliamentary Committee of National Defense and Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Special Parliamentary Committee of European Affairs of the Hellenic Parliament for the Union for the Mediterranean, 23/7/2008, [http://www.aidfunding.mfa.gr/bpufm/nea\\_9\\_gr.htm](http://www.aidfunding.mfa.gr/bpufm/nea_9_gr.htm)
20. Commissioner Barrot was harsh on Turkey, while touching on the waves of illegal immigration leaving the Turkish shores to arrive on the Greek islands. He branded the fact that Turkey allows small vessels to sail from its shores and reach the Greek islands as unacceptable, since it had managed to put an end to the immigration waves during the 2004 Olympic Games. He then stressed that the uncontrollable waves of immigrants have really adverse influence on Greece, while the Greek authorities are swarmed with asylum petitions. See "Barrot Calls for Solidarity to Address Immigration", 14 July 2009 <http://news.ert.gr/en/24800-o-mparo-zita-allilegyi-gia-tilathromet-anasteysi.htm>
21. Driven by internal motives, Nicolas Sarkozy had a strong interest in building a consensus and in gaining votes from French migrants of Mediterranean origin.

- See Dorothee Schmid, "Is France back in the Mediterranean?", Conference on *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP): Perspectives from the Mediterranean EU Countries*, Institute of International Economic Relations, University of Crete, October 26, 2007.
22. Martin Kreickenbaum, "Who is responsible for the Libyan refugee boat tragedy?", *WSWS*, April 8, 2009, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/apr2009/libya-a08.shtml>
  23. With an agreement signed in 1998, Greece and Egypt have institutionalised political consultations at the highest level on a six-monthly basis and between Foreign Ministers once per year. One subject of particular concern to both countries is the increasing movement of illegal migrants from Egypt to Greece over recent years. The authorities of both countries are working closely together to tackle this phenomenon, while negotiations are under way to prepare a repatriation treaty. See more analytically in <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/Mediterranean+-+Middle+East/Bilateral+Relations/Egypt/>
  24. Twenty-two countries have negotiated for EU membership in its history, and all were ultimately offered accession. But French President Sarkozy has long blocked Turkey's entry and his objections are no symbolic snag. France is a key EU country, and Paris's veto has frustrated Turkey's EU hopes. See for example Selçuk Gültaşlı, "France under Sarkozy is a hopeless case for Turkey", *Sunday Zaman*, 6 July 2008, <http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&mlink=146753>
  25. Panayotis J. Tsakonas, *The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greco-Turkish Relations: Grasping Greece's Socialization Strategy*, New York and Basingstoke, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2009.
  26. Bringing Turkey to Europe's door has been Prime Minister Erdogan's epochal achievement. However, over the four years since Turkey opened formal negotiations to join the EU, enthusiasm seems to be lost. Since accession talks began, the populist instincts of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party led its leaders to conclude that the reforms necessary to join would erode its popularity and thus dropped the idea. Grassroots anti-European thinking in the party, a legacy of its Islamist pedigree, accelerated this process. This emboldened Sarkozy to say no to Ankara on the grounds that Turkey is failing to become European—and the more times France vetoes Turkey's membership, the more Turks turn against the EU, thinking that the Union will never grant Ankara membership. See Soner Cagaptay, "Why Turkey Must Get In", *Newsweek*, 29 July 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/206912>
  27. The last two years Turkey is shifting away from US and Israel towards Arab radicalism. Although for years maintained close ties with Israel and Ankara acted

as a go-between for Jerusalem and Arab capitals, after Israel's Gaza campaign, Turkey is taking a strong anti-Israel and anti-Western stance. In Davos Meeting Erdogan has called the Israeli assault a "crime against humanity" and stormed out after accusing Shimon Peres of having a "guilt complex for killing people" and blasting the West for remaining "spectators". Turkey has also strengthening ties with Iran, including intelligence-sharing on Kurdish insurgents. At the same time Turkish policymakers insist that Ankara isn't taking sides. As the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu usually says "[w]e have more than one dimension in our foreign policy". Owen Matthews and Sami Kohen, "Turkey's New Tilt", *Newsweek*, January 31, 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/182553?tid=relatedd>

28. Under UN Convention on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS), an EEZ is a sea-zone over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources. It stretches from the edge of the state's territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles from its coast. In casual use, the term may include the territorial sea and even the continental shelf beyond the 200 mile limit. See more analytically in William R. Slomanson, *Fundamental Perspectives on International Law*, 5<sup>th</sup> edn, Belmont, CA, Thomson-Wadsworth, 2006, p. 294.
29. Turkey claims that the Aegean Sea's status as a semi-closed sea affords it a special nature (unlike other semi-closed seas, like the Adriatic, or even fully enclosed seas as the Black Sea). Moreover, Turkey is not among the signatories of UNLOS, which allows countries to expand the width of their territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. Even though Turkey is a persistent objector to the relevant article of UNCLOS, it has expanded its own territorial waters in the Black Sea to 12 nautical miles. In 1995, Turkey declared that if Greece expands the width of her territorial waters over 6 nautical miles, Turkey would conceive this action as a containment attempt and a direct offence to her sovereignty and therefore the Turkish Parliament decided that if Greece attempts to expand the width of her territorial waters it would be a cause of war (*casus belli*).
30. Theodore C. Kariotis, "A Greek Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean Sea", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2007, p. 56.
31. The decision was taken in July 2008 and the first attempt was with a Norwegian flag ship last November. After Greek Ministry's complains, Norwegians left, but as the head of Turkish Navy Metin Atats pointed "I recommend that eastern Mediterranean will become a hotbed of tensions and conflicts due to the energy importance it will gain in the near future. Because of its oil reserves it will be transformed into a second Arab Gulf. Turkey should be alarmed and ready to react". Stavros Lygeros, "Creating Crisis Mechanism" [Μηχανισμός πρόκλησης κρίσης], *Kathimerini* (daily press), July 24, /2009 [http://news.kathimerini.gr:80/4dcgi/\\_w\\_articles\\_columns\\_100103\\_24/07/2009\\_323319](http://news.kathimerini.gr:80/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_100103_24/07/2009_323319). See also on this

issue Theodore C. Kariotis, “Kastelorizo and the Law of the Seas” [Το Καστελόριζο και το Δίκαιο της Θάλασσας], *Philelefttheros* (Cyprus Sunday Press), July 25, 2009, p. 11, <http://www.philenews.com/AssetService/Image.ashx?t=2&pg10322&>

32. At the December 2007 meeting between France, Italy and Spain, after the latter’s proposal it was decided that the initial idea of a “Mediterranean Union” will be transformed to a “Union *for* the Mediterranean”. During this meeting the guidelines of the initiative were made more explicit making clear that it will not replace existing structures, such as the EMP and ENP, but instead, complement and enhance them, as well as, that it will not be used as an alternative proposal for the Turkish accession process or an impediment in the Croatian Stabilization and Association Agreement. By March 2008, after co-ordinated pressures France had to pull back and incorporate the UfM in the wider Euro-Mediterranean mechanism, thus allowing for the participation of all EU members.
33. Raffaella Del Sarto at the Conference “Mediterranean Unions’ Visions and Politics”, RAMSES, St Antony’s College, 7 July 2008, Conference report: [www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/ramses/MUconference\\_report.pdf](http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/ramses/MUconference_report.pdf)
34. As Greek Prime Minister put it “... a policy for the Mediterranean would capitalise on Community funds and therefore all EU member-states must participate in it”. “Greek PM Karamanlis hails presentation of Mediterranean Union proposal at EU Summit”, *ANA-MPA*, March 14, 2008 <http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showitem?service=132&listid=NewsList132&listpage=1&docid=6243441>
35. See <http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/European+Policy/External+Relations+Enlargement/Euro+mediterranean+Dialogue/>
36. Greece proposed: a) The creation of a Mediterranean Group within the European Investment Bank aiming to finance Euro-Med programs and initiatives. The argument is that the EIB has already acquired the necessary infrastructure, while the creation of a new Mediterranean Investment and Development Bank would slow down the process, spending most of its’ capital in functional and administrative issues. B) The establishment of Mediterranean Development Funds in the form of Private Equities. The financing of projects and initiatives in each domain would be between 2 and 5 billion euro for each, mainly attracted from the private sector, but also from member states of the UfM and the EU. These funds would be channeled for infrastructure projects with the private sector participation in funding enterprising initiatives etc. c) The upgrade of each country’s Enterprising Missions. Speech of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Petros Doukas at the Mediterranean Economic Forum, February 22, 2008, <http://www.petrosdoukas.gr/default.aspx?id=2&aid=83> See also “Greece intends to play leading role in the Union for the

- Mediterranean” [Βούληση της Ελλάδας να πρωταγωνιστήσει στην Ένωση για τη Μεσόγειο], *EMEA Business Monitor*, 5 March 2009, <http://www.emea.gr/default.asp?ElementId=15806&cpPage=2>
37. Tobias Schumacher, “A fading Mediterranean dream”, *European Voice*, 16 July 2009, p. 7
38. “Greek PM Karamanlis hails presentation of Mediterranean Union proposal at EU Summit”, *ANA-MPA*, March 14, 2008, <http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showitem?service=132&clstid=NewsList132&clstpage=1&docid=6243441>
39. Discussion with Secretary General for European Affairs, Dimitris K. Katsoudas, July 19, 2009.
40. Speech of Foreign Minister Ms. Dora Bakoyannis at the Permanent Parliamentary Committee of National Defense and Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Special Parliamentary Committee of European Affairs of the Hellenic Parliament for the Union for the Mediterranean, July 23, 2008, [http://www.aidfunding.mfa.gr/bpufm/nea\\_9\\_gr.htm](http://www.aidfunding.mfa.gr/bpufm/nea_9_gr.htm)
41. Discussion with Secretary General for European Affairs, Dimitris K. Katsoudas, July 19, 2009.
42. At the Euro-Mediterranean meeting in Marseille in November 2008 it was decided that a small and flexible, mainly of technical nature, Secretary will be established for the examination/evaluation of the projects; Headquarters will be based in Barcelona and it will be assisted by five under-secretaries. Greece has one for the first period; the remaining four are from Italy, Malta, the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
43. See [http://aidfunding.mfa.gr/bpufm/index\\_en.htm](http://aidfunding.mfa.gr/bpufm/index_en.htm)
44. The upgrade of combined land and maritime transfers to ease the flow of goods and peoples in eastern Mediterranean ports is based on the logic of diversion of cargos transportation from land to more environmental friendly transportations by the sea. Given the important know-how acquired from participation in the planning and implementation of the maritime corridor of the South-East Mediterranean and its expansion to the Black Sea, Greece submitted to the Commission a proposal for the improvement of combined transportations and the connection of Greek ports with these of Egypt, Libya and Syria; the creation of an observatory for the Mediterranean maritime highways aiming to gather, observe and record transportation flows and the functionality of the maritime highways; and the organization of a Ministerial Summit in Greece for these issues.
45. The initial idea came from Germany, but Greece also contacted other countries, such as France and Egypt, in order to promote this idea. Although European countries use the advantages of solar energy in numerous ways, the

- Mediterranean countries are limited only in systems for hot water. To that end Greece supports the extended use of solar energy systems.
46. The proposal aims to establish a network for better coordination in the proactive management of the challenges from the lack of water sources, aggravated by radical climate changes in the Mediterranean. See further Dimitris K. Katsoudas, "Union for the Mediterranean. From inception to implementation" [Ένωση για τη Μεσόγειο. Από την ιδέα στην εφαρμογή], *Evropaiki Proklisi*, February 2009, <http://proeuro.gr/articles.php?artid=2965&lang=1&catid=1&fid=23&fdpage=1>
  47. Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko and David S. Ortiz, *Maritime and Terrorism: Risk and Liability*, Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, RAND, 2006.
  48. Sarah Colisson, "Security or Securitisation? Migration and the Pursuit of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Euro-Mediterranean Area", *EuroMeSCo e-news*, No. 19, 2007, [http://www.euromesco.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogcategory&id=57&Itemid=38&lang=en](http://www.euromesco.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=57&Itemid=38&lang=en)
  49. Calleya and Xenakis, "France's Mediterranean Initiative", *op.cit.*
  50. George Tassiopoulos, "Greece and Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean", April 9, 2009, <http://jmecelabblog.wordpress.com/2009/04/09/greece-and-sarkozy's-union-for-the-mediterranean>
  51. See more analytically in Stephen C. Calleya and Dimitris K. Xenakis, "Security and Strategic Co-operation in the Mediterranean: Confidence Building and Conflict Prevention" [Ασφάλεια και Στρατηγική Συνεργασία στη Μεσόγειο: Οικοδόμηση Εμπιστοσύνης και Πρόληψη Συγκρούσεων], *Policy Papers*, No. 11, Athens, ELIAMEP, October 2008.
  52. Relations with Turkey remain tense since the end of the Cold War, while the traditional cycle of "conflict-negotiation-conflict" prevailed as the common feature of the new era. For a more detailed analysis see Thanos P. Dokos and Panagiotis J. Tsakons, "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era" in Chrestos G. Kollias, Gülay Günlük-Şenesen and Gülden Ayman (eds.), *Greece and Turkey in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A Political Economy Perspective*, New York: Nova Science, 2003, p. 9.
  53. See more analytically in Dimitris K. Xenakis, "Strategies to Upgrade the Greek Strategic Factor in the Mediterranean and Southern Europe" [Στρατηγικές Αναβάθμισης του Ελληνικού Παράγοντα στη Μεσόγειο και τη Νότιο Ευρώπη] in Dimitris K. Xenakis (ed.) *Guidelines for Progressive Governance* [Κατευθύνσεις Προοδευτικής Διακυβέρνησης], Centre for Progressive Policy Research, Athens, Papazisis, pp. 399-421.
  54. Stéphanie Colin, "The Union for the Mediterranean: Progress, Difficulties and

Way Forward”, *Trade Negotiations Insights*, Vol. 8, No. 5, 2009,  
<http://ictsd.net/i/news/tni/47668/>