

The Barcelona Process and its Prospects after the Union for the Mediterranean

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article illustre la nouvelle architecture euro-méditerranéenne émergente après les importants changements entrepris lors du Sommet de Juillet 2008 à Paris et la Conférence des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères tenue à Marseille, qui ont élaboré le «Processus multi-couches de Barcelone» au sein duquel l'Union pour la Méditerranée travaille en collaboration étroite avec la Politique Européenne de Voisinage et la gamme des politiques de la Commission en faveur de la Méditerranée visant à remplacer le Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen. En faisant une évaluation des transformations politiques et institutionnelles, du point de vue tant des relations euro-méditerranéennes que de la politique étrangère et de sécurité de l'Union Européenne, cet article fait valoir que ce que nous avons aujourd'hui est une organisation internationale paritaire, l'Union pour la Méditerranée, d'un côté et les deux cadres d'élaboration de la politique de l'Union Européenne de l'autre côté. L'article met en doute la capacité du nouveau cadre à répondre aux défis régionaux de manière plus efficace que la politique du couple actuel d'organismes élaborant des politiques. L'auteur conclut en formulant des pensées critiques quant à la viabilité institutionnelle et les perspectives globales de l'Union à contribuer à la résolution des conflits régionaux ainsi que d'aborder des réformes internes. Il souligne que l'orientation stratégique actuelle tournée de plus en plus sur le Golfe et l'Asie Centrale et la fragmentation qui en découle dans la Méditerranée requiert une organisation euro-méditerranéenne qui serait à la fois plus souple à l'intérieur du bassin méditerranéen et plus ouverte à l'égard du Moyen Orient.

ABSTRACT

This article, illustrates the emerging Euro-Med architecture after the important changes undertaken with the July 2008 Paris Summit and the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Marseille, which configured a multi-layered "Barcelona Process" in which the Union for the Mediterranean is working side by side with the European Neighbourhood Policy and the array of Commission's policies towards the Mediterranean which, in fact, are bound to replace the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

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Providing an evaluation of political and institutional alterations, from the point of view of both Euro-Mediterranean relations and EU foreign and security policy, this article claims that, what we have today is an international organisation of peers, the Union for the Mediterranean, on one side, and the two EU policy frameworks on the other side. The article doubts the ability of the new framework to respond to regional challenges more effectively than the policy couple. It concludes with critical thoughts for the institutional viability and the overall prospects of the Union to contribute to regional conflict resolution as well as to deal with domestic reforms, pointing out that current growing strategic focus on the Gulf and Central Asia and the consequent fragmentation in the Mediterranean requires a Euro-Mediterranean organisation being, at the same time, more flexible inside the Mediterranean basin and more open to the Middle East.

Introduction

The launch of the Union for the Mediterranean-UFM by the July 13, 2008 Paris Summit of 43 heads of State and Government from the Mediterranean basin plus the European Union-EU has radically changed the long standing EU policy towards that area and the nature of relations between EU and non-EU nations in the Euro-Mediterranean framework. Since 2000 – when attempts at agreeing upon a Charter supposed to enshrine a Mediterranean common ground did fail – many proposals for reforming the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership-EMP were put forward with a view to reviving and giving substance to the Barcelona Process.¹ None of them succeeded, though. Somehow unexpectedly, a 2007 French national initiative to form a “Union Méditerranéenne” limited to Mediterranean coastal countries turned into a French-German proposal for an EU initiative to institute a UFM, which was submitted to the March 13, 2008 EU Council. This proposal, rather than reforming the EMP, has initiated a new Euro-Mediterranean policy, based on a new framework and new criteria for political action and cooperation.²

The UFM has replaced the EMP as the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This replacement should not risk to be misunderstood, though. For, if the EMP’s format - the Euro-Mediterranean policy framework shared by the EU and its Southern partners - has been replaced by the UFM, EMP’s substance - EU policy towards the Mediterranean - remains. The final documents issued by the July Paris Summit and the 3-4 November 2008 Conference of Foreign Ministers in Marseille³ have configured a multi-layered “Barcelona Process” in which the UFM is working side by side with the

European Neighbourhood Policy- ENP and the policy which, in fact, is bound to replace the EMP by bringing together the variety of regional policies the EU is still conducting towards the Mediterranean regional dimension (bilateral relations being dealt by the ENP). In sum, what we have today is an international organisation of peers, the UFM, on one side. On the other side, we have two EU policy frameworks - the ENP, and the Mediterranean regional dimension – which, taken together, form today's EU overall Mediterranean policy. Thus, the UFM has replaced the EMP, yet the latter, while disappearing in name, is staying in its substance as EU policy towards the Mediterranean region. In next section, we delve into the complexities of this emerging Euro-Mediterranean architecture.

While this article is being written, the UFM revolution, announced for the beginning of 2009, seems far from being implemented, though. In fact, immediately after the November 2008 Marseille Conference had arranged for the array of details bound to make the UFM actually work, Israel's December 2008-January 2009 military intervention in Gaza convinced UFM Arab partners to plainly suspend the implementation of the new policy. Unless this incident will turn into a break – which seems highly improbable - and will bring further changes in the Euro-Mediterranean picture, it is very likely that the necessary actions to implement the UFM will be resumed soon. However, as we will argue in the following, this is more than an incident. It looks like a negative test regarding the viability of the new policy framework. In any case, it will certainly be uneasy to get out of this incident by simply saying “heri dicebamus”.

However that may be, this article, first of all, illustrates the emerging Euro-Med architecture after the important changes undertaken in Paris. Second, it provides an evaluation of political and institutional alterations in the current Euro-Med context, from the point of view of both Euro-Mediterranean relations and EU foreign and security policy. Third it comments on Euro-Mediterranean perspectives after the introduction of the UFM.

A Multi-layered Euro-Med Framework

This section illustrates the Euro-Mediterranean framework of organised relations as it is today, after the establishment of the UFM and the changes it entailed.

To begin with, the UFM is a biennial summit of head of States and Governments which appoints for the next two years a Co-Presidency

composed by one Co-President from the North and one from the South. The agenda of the summit meetings is prepared and implemented by an annual conference of Ministers whose deliberations are prepared and implemented by a conference of Senior Officials (which in turn is supported, on a daily basis, by a Joint Permanent Committee of national officials). In preparing the agenda, the Senior Officials receive inputs from their respective governments and from the Secretariat of the UFM. The European Commission-EC, as pointed out, is a member of the UFM. As such, it can take initiatives and submit proposals to the Senior Officials with a view to have them incorporated in the agenda of the Ministers and the heads of State and Government. Thus, inputs can come from the EC as well. On the other hand, both the EC and the other components of the UFM organisation can be requested by the UFM leadership to contribute to the implementation of the UFM's decisions and actions.

The daily life of the organisation will have to be steered and harmonised by the biennial Co-Presidency, which will contribute to shape the agenda, ask for contributions to implementation and take political initiatives within the limits of the top leadership's broad mandates.

The Secretariat is in charge of implementing the big regional projects decided by the head of States and Governments and the Ministers in their conferences, conceiving of new ones, and raising funds in order to achieve them. The Paris summit conference decided to launch six main projects.⁴ The Secretariat has to be headed by a Secretary coming from a non-EU country. The rather reduced staff of the Secretary will be formed by seconded officials from both the South and the North.

Apparently, there are three basic ideas behind the UFM. First, setting up a Euro-Mediterranean decision-making body at the highest level so as to engage governments to generate political agreements and common actions in a framework which has proved impervious to both so far. Second, setting up a body of peers to stimulate Southern ownership and cooperation. Third, providing Mediterranean governments with the opportunity to select big regional projects that would be able to bring tangible and visible benefits to citizens and, thus, visibility to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

All these three ideas sound as responses to criticisms addressed to the EMP all along its fifteen years of life. In fact, the more visible and more visibly beneficial projects are expected to be a response to the allegedly far from light-footed activity of the EC and its technocratic style. The inter-governmental

structure of peers wishes to be a response to the ineffective political dialogue conducted in the EMP - i. e. in the unequal framework of what used to be a EU policy rather than a truly equal partnership. The highest level of the UFM is expected to be a response to the weakness of the CFSP, more in general EU political capabilities, as expressed in the EMP by the Senior Official Committee. All that explains the innovative role of the Summit conferences as well as the Co-Presidency (in which framework the agenda will have now to be negotiated, whereas in the EMP was just given by the EU Presidency, albeit after consultations), as well as the Secretariat (in which projects will be selected and implemented in tune with Southern partners' needs and sensitivities rather than EU's only). In sum, the UFM wishes to be, most of all, a response to EMP's unilateral nature, the nearly unilateral role played in it by the EU, and its political ineptitude. Hence a clear "reprise en main" by the governments and the restoration of a more classic mode of international relations.

With the introduction of the UFM in the picture, what is at present EU Mediterranean policy about? Which is its architecture? It includes three layers. The UFM is the first layer of the new EU Mediterranean policy; it is a Euro-Mediterranean multilateral policy framework the EU shares with its Southern partners. The second and the third layers are the policies the EU is carrying out towards these same partners. One such policy is a set of bilateral policies, i.e. the ENP. The other regards the emerging multilateral dimension the EU is trying to foster across ENP bilateral relations.

This third layer, for true, is still undefined and unorganised. It includes multilateral relations eventually not included in the UFM and the multilateral legacy of the EMP (sidelined by the UFM).⁵ This framework has not been given an official name, as yet. We can call it "Mediterranean Partnership"-MP, taking advantage of its conceptual symmetry with the "Eastern Partnership" currently being launched in the Eastern sector of the ENP.⁶

While the ENP is by now well structured and, thanks to the implementation of so called "advanced statuses", it is aptly developing the comparative advantage included in the differentiation it brings about, the MP needs still to be somehow invented and re-built up by means of the debris of past experiences as well as the blocks of the newly emerging EU external and foreign policy's architecture.

In conclusion, the Euro-Mediterranean framework has evolved from a space shaped by EU's initiative only to one bound to be shaped by a plurality of

actors - although it is likely that the EU will keep on being the most active with respect to other stakeholders. As we will see in more detail in next section, this diversification of the Euro-Mediterranean setting reflects not only a shift of emphasis from the EU to governments, but also from a model of relations patterned on community-like relations to a more classic model of inter-state and inter-governmental relations. So, the new Euro-Mediterranean framework is multi-layered in many ways: because it includes a plurality of frameworks and because these frameworks are patterned on quite different model of interaction. Will it work? To respond to this questions, we have to delve into the main features of this emerging cluster of Euro-Mediterranean frameworks as well as into changes underway in the Mediterranean context.

Political, Institutional and Geopolitical Alterations

Developments in the 2000s have spurred considerable alterations in the Euro-Mediterranean area's political and institutional balance. These alterations reflect shifts and changes in the Euro-Mediterranean political context, on one hand, and the EU internal institutional balance, on the other.

Changes in the Euro-Mediterranean political context - There have been considerable shifts in the Euro-Mediterranean balance of power as a consequence of several factors such as remarkable economic improvements in a number of Southern Mediterranean partners; improved political and economic relations between Mediterranean and Gulf Arab countries; and the ability of Arab regimes to adapt to and/or resist external pressures for political reform. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that, after putting pressure for reforms and political change in the region, Western countries gradually reverted to their preference for stability and so went back to supporting existing regimes no matter their reformist record. This has obviously reinforced the regimes vis-à-vis both the US and Europe. In particular, with regard to Europe and Euro-Mediterranean relations, the EU has gradually changed and downgraded its early confident agenda for broad reforms across the region based on negative conditionality. The agenda, at the end of the day, came to be based on co-ownership and differentiation, which means that partners go forward on the path to reforms only if willing and to the extent they wish for and the EU policy has lost most of its ambitions to shape the regional "milieu" (to use Wolfers' concept)⁷.

It must also be stressed that the American wars in the Middle East have fulfilled the concept of Greater Middle East on which the Bush administration

set its agenda. Those wars have revived old conflicts, spurred new ones and stirred new alignments throughout the whole region, at the same time they have strategically unified the whole region and shifted its centre eastward, i.e. towards the Gulf and Afghanistan. As a consequence, today this region is more compact than before and its Mediterranean flank, the Near East, with its important conflicts, namely the Arab-Israeli ones, is integrated in the whole of the region more than it has ever used to be. This alteration has a divisive impact on the Mediterranean, contributing to weaken the inherently weak EU belief in the geopolitical unity of the area and its effort to get it more homogeneous and coherent.

For sure, relations with Europe and the EU remain pivotal to Southern Mediterranean partners' economic development and foreign relations, yet they look more self-reliant with respect to Europe, with an accentuated division between the Maghreb, which remains broadly tied to Europe, and the Near East, which is, in contrast, deeply involved and attracted in the wider arena of the Greater Middle East. The decision of the Egyptian Co-president to suspend the implementation of the newly-born UFM in retaliation to Israel December 2008-January 2009 intervention on Gaza attest to a new Arab perception of Europe's relative weight in the spectre of their interests and, at the same time, to a more confident and self-reliant approach to foreign policy than in past years.

Shifting institutional balances in the EU - The UFM is a EU Mediterranean policy substantially differing from other EU policies such as the former EMP and, today, the ENP (along with the MP currently emerging from the EMP's dissolution). The former EMP, the ENP and the coming up MP are policy frameworks owed and run by the EU, whereas the UFM is an international organisation to which the EU and its member states are participating side by side with other states.

From another point of view, the establishment of the UFM means that EU Mediterranean policy is not uniquely predicated on the transposition to the region of its community-like model any more – according to standard EU foreign policy. Presently, it is predicated partly on this model – thanks to the ENP and the MP – and partly on the UFM conventional model of inter-state relations. Governments, both EU and non-EU, were allowed to play only a secondary role in the community-oriented framework of the EMP: non-EU governments because they were only “hosts” to the framework; the EU governments because they were acting as parties to a wider EU institutional

mechanism. In the new picture, governments play a full and direct role in their inter-state organisation, the UFM, beside EU-based policies and organisations.

All in all, with the UFM, the role of the EU in Euro-Mediterranean relations has been narrowed, whereas the role of governments has been neatly upgraded. Furthermore, the shift from a community-oriented approach to regional relations to a combination of community-oriented and inter-state approaches means that the former approach has been weakened by the sheer introduction of the latter in the picture. In conclusion, the UFM has introduced a completely new pattern of regional relations: from an EU-dominated regional policy to one in which governments and the EU share power and presence; from a regional policy based on a community-oriented model to a region in which this model cohabits with the conventional international model of relations.

The division of labour - as we may call it – will be, more or less, between high politics in the hands of governments and low politics in that of the EU with the risk of hard security, balance of power and state-centred security going back to enfeeble – if not replace – the drive towards soft security, cooperative security and human security that EU Mediterranean policy has tried to strengthen in the region.

In conclusion, for the best or the worst, political and institutional balances in the Mediterranean regions have been altered considerably. The Mediterranean region is fragmented and largely attracted by and involved in the Greater Middle East so that European effort to construe it as a Euro-Mediterranean framework is rather weakened. On the other hand, as the attempts at integrating the Euro-Mediterranean space on the basis of a community-oriented model failed, particularly from the point of view of political relations, governments have acquired a greater role and replaced the EU attempt at building up a community-like Euro-Mediterranean framework with a framework of conventional international relations. All in all, EU political role seems decidedly downgraded and so does EU normative and contractual approach.

Barcelona Process' Perspectives

Let's go back to our question: will this emerging Euro-Mediterranean multi-layered framework work? Will it work better or worse than the previous one?

The most significant feature in the new Euro-Med setting is governments'

upgraded role, the cohabitation of different models of inter-regional relations (community-like vs. conventional international relations), and a high politics vs. low politics division of labour between the UFM and EU policies. In this sense, one can imagine that, while the UFM would act to solve regional crises by means of conventional international instruments, the EU would work with its contractual and normative instruments, on a country-by-country basis, looking forward to introducing political changes in domestic arenas in the longer run. Furthermore, by providing its services and competences,⁸ the EU would support the implementation of the big regional projects the UFM is supposed to carry out; by assuring deep economic integration to the area, it would also provide structural coherence to the Euro-Med areas in the longer term.

For sure, one has to look forward to this picture of a working and judicious cooperation between governments and EU with their respective models of relations. The new arrangement may open an era of more effective and fruitful relations. There are doubts and problems that need to be pointed out, though.

The first question regards UFM's effectiveness and viability. The fundamental stumbling block which prevented EMP from working was the web of conflicts and crises in relations between Israel, the Palestinians and Arab countries. The Europeans conceived the EMP as a framework bound to support ongoing international diplomacy in solving Arab-Israeli conflicts and, at the same time, provide an efficient framework for post-conflict reconstruction and cooperation. As international diplomacy failed, the Arab-Israeli, more in particular the Palestinian-Israeli conflict moved from EMP's back stage to its forefront. The EMP was not equipped to cope with the conflict. Its inability to contribute to solve the conflict prevented the whole Partnership from succeeding. Will the UFM succeed where EMP has failed? In other words, will it be able to cope with Arab-Israeli and other conflicts in the area?

The early Sarkozy's project of "Union Méditerranéenne" was based on the perspective of building up a broad Mediterranean political solidarity stemming from the implementation of big regional economic projects rather than regional conflict resolution. It was an openly stated intention of Sarkozy's "Union" to keep aloof from regional conflict, more in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Has the "Europeanisation" of the UFM confirmed or changed this perspective? Will this "Europeanisation" introduce the Arab-Israeli conflict in the UFM? The response is uneasy. The UFM's emphasis on projects may attest

its will to abide by its early project. However, the political activism shown by leaders in the Paris Summit has presented the UFM as an initiative politically-intensive, directed at creating an instrument which would enable Euro-Mediterranean leaders to deal with regional issues the EMP did not succeed to cope with. The “Europeanisation” of the UFM, in other words, may have hybridised the early perspective of the “Union Méditerranéenne” (which was close to sheer stabilization’s aim included in the Italian-Spanish project for a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) and the long-standing EMP’s entanglement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In this perspective, UFM inter-governmental approach per se has no more chances than EMP approach to solve conflicts, in particular the Israeli-Palestinian one. In fact, whatever the perspective the founders of the UFM may have had in mind in Paris, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis of December 2008-January 2009 has heavily impacted on the UFM bringing about its suspension.

To be honest, this is not that surprising. Regional conflict cannot be held out of the door. At the end of the day, it would not make sense to upgrading political relations and, then, leave political questions aside. As a matter of fact, these questions will be part of the UFM, probably much more so than in the EMP. What was, maybe, a little bit more surprising was UFM inability to control the crisis unleashed in its own circle by developments in Gaza and the decision of its non-EU Co-president – Egypt’s Mubarak – to go on independently of its EU partners. Will the UFM be able to deal with crises in a cooperative way or will it prove even less unable than the EMP to provide solutions? As things stand today, UFM institutions look ineffective. Upgraded political institutions, as the UFM, proving unable to provide solutions would represent a much more serious failure than the EMP and their failure could be more dangerous than previous ones.

A second question regards European aims in the Mediterranean. What should Europeans aim at in the new multi-layered Euro-Mediterranean framework? Would their aims remain the same as in 1995 or would they change? Are they strengthened or weakened by the UFM? As well-known, the EU security doctrine points out that, in order to attain security, the EU has to be surrounded by a ring of well-governed countries.⁹ This is why EU policies have been directed towards fostering domestic reforms in partner countries, economic integration and effective multilateralism in the region, and have employed EU contractual and normative instruments with a view to

contributing to regional conflict resolution. With EMP failure and its replacement by the UFM, will the latter be able and willing to pursue these same objectives?

In the Euro-Med context, as of today, reforms, human rights and, more broadly speaking, the aims contemplated by the Copenhagen principles are confined to the ENP, in the framework of its Action Plans. It may well be that the emerging MP will deal with reforms and human rights to some extent. However, in what it is supposed to be the most relevant political dimension in today's Euro-Med relations, i.e. the UFM, reforms and human rights are far from prominent, to say the least. The UFM just does not contemplate to deal with reform, if not in a very general and rhetoric sense.

As a consequence it seems that the EU is less equipped than before to achieve the objective of a ring of well-governed friends in the Mediterranean. At best the UFM will be able to achieve good international relations. In terms of reforms on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, international good relations will not be that more effective than the (somehow despised) "good socialisation" achieved by the EMP among its members. Thus, the task of promoting reform will rest essentially on EU policies. The aim of establishing a ring of well-governed will depend more on the EU than the UFM. However, EU policies happen to have been weakened by the advent of the UFM and the new Euro-Med multi-layered architecture. In conclusion, the aim of establishing a ring of well-governed countries in the Mediterranean seems getting harder to achieve than in the previous context. European aims remain the same, in words; they look less attainable and clear, in deeds.

In the previous section, we argued about the geopolitical weakening of the already geopolitically weak concept of Mediterranean as a consequence of developments in the 2000s and the advent of a more compact Greater Middle East. In this sense, a third question worth consideration is how a more and more complex Euro-Mediterranean structure of relations can match Middle Eastern polarisation and Mediterranean fragmentation. To cope with change, Euro-Mediterranean organisation needs to be more flexible in the area and more open to adjoining areas in the Middle East. While the ENP is attuned to ongoing geopolitical changes, as it adds flexibility to Euro-Mediterranean relations, the UFM, with its intention to get a more elaborated and strong Mediterranean political framework, is definitely less so, as it focuses on the Mediterranean at the very moment strategic focuses are shifting towards the Middle East. The EU needs to strengthen its relations with the Gulf countries

and Central Asia. This does not mean that the Mediterranean and the neighbourhood has to be set aside. It means that EU must strengthen its policies towards the Middle East and harmonise its Mediterranean policies with the Gulf countries and central Asia. The UFM and the new Euro-Mediterranean architecture not only fail to respond to the emerging strategic and geopolitical challenges, but seem to go against the stream.

Conclusions

In conclusion, let's try to summarise the main findings in this article. The latter has illustrated the emerging multilayered Euro-Mediterranean architecture after the UFM has replaced the EMP. In this new architecture the community-like model of Euro-Mediterranean relations the EU attempted introducing into the EMP is now cohabiting with the model of conventional international relations introduced by the UFM. The article argues that there are doubts in regard to the ability of the new framework, in particular the UFM, to respond to Euro-Mediterranean challenges more effectively than the EMP/ENP policy couple. These doubts concern UFM's ability to effectively contribute to regional conflict resolution as well as to deal with domestic reforms in Southern Mediterranean countries. Doubts are also raised as for the institutional viability of the UFM. On the other hand, the article points out that current growing strategic focus on the Gulf and Central Asia and the consequent fragmentation in the Mediterranean would require a Euro-Mediterranean organisation being, at the same time, more flexible inside the Mediterranean basin and more open to the Middle East. In contrast, according to the article, while the ENP is providing required flexibility in Euro-Mediterranean relations, the UFM is increasing Euro-Mediterranean political focus on the Mediterranean area and neglecting the Middle East.

NOTES

1. Dorothee Schmid, *Optimiser le processus de Barcelone*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers, No. 36, Julliet 2002, p. 52.
2. The UFM's transition gave way to many comments, in general mostly concerned with the need to "Europeanise" the French project rather than its merit in terms of improving EU Mediterranean policy: see the bibliographical references provided in Roberto Aliboni, Fouad Ammor, *Under the Shadow of 'Barcelona': From the EMP to*

- the Union for the Mediterranean*, EuroMeSCo, Paper No. 77, January.2009 (www.euromesco.net).
3. *Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean*, Paris, 13 July 2008; *Final Statement of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference*, Marseille, 3-4 November 2008 (both available on the web site of the EU).
 4. 1. De-pollution of the Mediterranean; 2. Maritime and Land Highways; 3. Civil Protection; 4. Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan; 5. Higher Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University; 6. The Mediterranean Business Development Initiative. See the *Final Statement of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference*, Marseille, 3-4 November 2008.
 5. In keeping with these developments, the early Unit for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the Relex has been replaced by a Unit dealing with “Euro-Med and Regional Issues”. This Unit will have the task of reconstructing a multilateral dimension in EU policies towards the Mediterranean.
 6. Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Eastern partnership*, COM(2008) 823 final, Brussels, 3.12.2008, and *Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Eastern Partnership*, SEC(2008) 2974/3.
 7. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962.
 8. See on this point Michael Emerson, *Making Sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean*, CEPS Policy Brief No. 155, March 2008.
 9. *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003. The document which has revisited the European Security Strategy during the second semester 2008 EU French Presidency, confirms that aim; see: *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels 11 December 2008.