

Union for the Mediterranean National and Regional Perspectives

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The Mediterranean Cooperation *Problématique*

The Mediterranean has always been a space of competition and contestation, reflecting, in no small part, its fragmented geography and the politico-economic structures it produced in various historical times.¹ Today no other part of the globe exemplifies better the post-bipolar trends towards fragmentation and revival of “ancient feuds” than the Mediterranean, with security questions becoming increasingly indivisible, regardless of diverse sub-regional features.² As “Mediterranean regions” do not share the features traditionally found in international regionalism (i.e. a “common co-operation space”³), this means that co-operation and security across the Mediterranean are possible but cannot be taken for granted, as they require an effort of will and “specific management”.⁴

The Post-Cold War wider Euro-Mediterranean system is characterized by a pluri-causal dynamism pushing towards a new mapping of its component parts, reformulated in its emerging inter-regional governance structures.⁵ But with vast political economic and demographic disproportions and dividing religious and cultural fault lines, the 1989 shift in international relations has gradually transformed the Mediterranean in one of the most critical sources of instability for Europe.⁶ Since then, systemic tension has been steadily increasing with the revival of radical Islam,⁷ the events that followed September 11th, as well as the importance attached to transnational security threats, such as massive waves of illegal immigrants, cross-border organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.⁸

At the same time, the region’s economic indicators are not positive. The region has lost in its relative attractiveness, with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) backsliding for many years, with a significant increase only since 2005,

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due to large privatizations and the expansion of oil activities in Egypt.⁹ North-South economic disparities are resulting in a permanent “poverty curtain” across the Mediterranean, as southern economies are stagnating and the demographic time-bomb continues to escalate, while unemployment continues to increase and illiteracy remains at alarmingly high levels. Economic vulnerability and insecurity reflect the fact many human security indicators in the Mediterranean countries are static or even worsening, cleaving into two very different and distant worlds of affluence and order, and of poverty, need and disorder.¹⁰ No doubt, the region’s fault lines are getting deeper and obstacles to human development are stubborn because of the fragility of the region’s political, economic and social structures, the lack of people-centered development policies, and the vulnerability to outside intervention.¹¹

Europe’s “big bang” enlargement to twenty-seven countries was not a win-win deal for all. It has become clear that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, most of the European Union’s (EU) political and economic attention has been directed for the swift transition of post-communist Europe. From the early 1990s, southern EU members are trying to balance the focus of international community in eastern Europe. Particularly, France, Spain and Italy during 1995 and 1996 with their consecutive EU presidencies revealed common foreign policy concerns pointing to a more homogenous stance within international organizations such as NATO, EU, OSCE, and WEU, parallel to the launching of land and maritime forces - Eurofor and Euromarfor-, partly offsetting the predominant position of the American Sixth Fleet.¹² Despite the fact that their economic objectives have been harmonised in the context of their participation in the EU and although a “Mediterranean solidarity” is evident in their interactions, these are not enough to be reflected in permanent and structured political solidarity to arrive in common strategies and means for the Mediterranean. Southern EU members have not yet formed a cohesive block in relation to the EU’s eastwards enlargement and, even more so, with regards to the future of the EU itself.¹³ Yet any comparison of their policies reveals marked contrasts regarding the prioritization of areas of interest. One of the starkest contrasts is that between the two Iberian neighbours Spain and Portugal: while Spain’s interest in the Mediterranean is deeply rooted in history and has been the subject of considerable engagement since the late 1970s,¹⁴ Portugal only began to develop a Mediterranean policy when entered the Community in mid 1980s.¹⁵ In the same line, Veremis asserted that, “the proximity of Portugal, Spain and Italy to North Africa and the common

borders of Greece and Italy with the troubled Balkans, helps explain each country's regional line of work".¹⁶

Interestingly, at least most of the impetus has come from France, seeking to continue project influence in the Mediterranean, partly as a response to the growth of German influence within Europe.¹⁷ The relative lack of US interest in the western Mediterranean¹⁸ allowed France to undertake the initiative to organize the Forum on the West Mediterranean (Five + Five initiative) in 1990.¹⁹ However, there was a disjuncture with the Italian-Spanish initiative for a "wider" Conference on the Security and the Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) along the lines of the Helsinki Process, including all the Mediterranean states and the US. France considered this enlargement "immature" and hardly compromising in the context of its geographically restricted attempt to enhance co-operation in the west Mediterranean sector.²⁰ Although the ambitious CSCM failed to get off the ground,²¹ its existence indicated Spanish and Italian reservations about the French project. On the other hand, the Five + Five initiative was suspended as a result of the crisis in Algeria and the Lockerbie affair, which placed a strain on the prospects of an EU-Maghreb Partnership.²² Parallel to these initiatives, the Mediterranean Forum was also inaugurated in Alexandria in 1994 - a rare example of a regional initiative assessed as fully working, co-operating in the fields of political, economic, social and cultural affairs on the basis of very efficiency-oriented guidelines.²³ Hence, since the signing of Barcelona Declaration in November 1995, considerations for the Mediterranean have primarily been through the EU's new multilateral framework, with the Mediterranean Forum existing more informally, grouping 11 countries compared with Barcelona Process' membership of 27, and operating as a policy-framing body.²⁴

Despite the fact that the Mediterranean dimension in its foreign policy has significantly been reduced in recent decades, France's participation in any Mediterranean related structure is indispensable, something also evident in the increased interest for the region after the announcement of Sarkozy's initiative.²⁵ Beyond German and British traditional reservations, although France is generally considered as the leader in promoting Mediterranean issues, countries like Spain are not willing to accept a French leadership in the EU's relations with the Mediterranean.²⁶ But while those countries play a more active role in setting the EU's Mediterranean agenda, smaller countries like Greece, Malta and Cyprus face in a more direct manner the potential and real waves of regional instability. Despite their relative lack of influence within the EU's multilateral framework they all valued the Barcelona Process as the most

comprehensive and promising response to regional challenges despite the poor results since 1995. They all seem to overlook the many problems which beset the recent French initiative, hence, the perspective of the two Mediterranean Island States with a traditionally strong interest in regional initiatives is different; Cyprus is laying special emphasis on the resolution of regional conflicts while Malta is taking a more functionalist approach emphasising the protection of fish resources and de-pollution.²⁷

While enlargement plans have secured the success of EU's policies in the eastern neighborhood, the perceived impact of collective European efforts to strengthen relations with the Mediterranean has been much lower. But southern EU members have not yet formed a cohesive block in relation to the future of the Mediterranean and the EU's involvement. There is no doubt, however, that Mediterranean economic prospects will be significantly increased, if a way is found to address regional disputes and enhance regional stability. This has become more urging as differences and economic disparities between North and South of Europe have resulted in a divide in the Euro zone: a split between those who have capitalized on globalization, and those who have not. It is widely acknowledged that in the framework of current economic recession, those at higher risk in Europe are Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, who stayed stuck as their nimbler competitors revived export and job growth by venturing abroad. Current economic trends have brought higher rates, designed to slow inflation in strong economies like Germany and could choke what little growth is left in southern Europe.²⁸ This stoking political tension is further exacerbating the divergence between Euro-economies. Yet, the old consensus that the South was held back by a more protective attitude toward social policy, has been replaced by a new view that wants the above mentioned countries to have "missed the boat" on flexible labor, outsourcing and selling to emerging markets. Leaders from Southern Europe are convinced that the slowly emerging southern Mediterranean markets is what they need to catch up, hoping that Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon can do for them what Eastern Europe has done for the North of Europe.²⁹

From the Launch of the UfM Project in Toulon to Gaza and Beyond

The plan for a Mediterranean Union was announced by Sarkozy, before his election, in his speech in Toulon in May 2007 and since then it has been consistently developed.³⁰ This idea of creating a new power bloc in Southern

Europe, North Africa and the Middle East is not new. Already in 1997 Brzezinski acknowledged that “France not only seeks a central political role in a unified Europe but also sees itself as the nucleus of a Mediterranean-North African cluster of states that share common concerns”.³¹ However, from the outset the plan suffered from the absence of coalition building, as many feared that it will favor an unofficial redistribution of roles in the region, facilitating the emergence of a powerful group of the EU Mediterranean countries. Although the majority of the latter viewed the initiative in a positive way, because of its vague and uncertain content, they hesitated to fully endorse it.³² Too many incoherencies, improvisations and announcements undermined the value of the French initiative.³³ On the other hand, despite support from Greece, Italy and Spain,³⁴ this project has met the Commission’s strong resistance and, with the tacit support of other EU members a compromise was struck, allowing for the participation of all EU states.

In a speech in the Moroccan city of Tangier in October 2007, President Sarkozy started to spell out the nature of the Mediterranean Union, seen as a “Union of Projects” and invited Heads of Mediterranean riparian states to a summit scheduled to take place on July 13th 2008 in Paris. The Union was supposed to include only littoral states and function like the G8 meetings of Heads of States and governments, with a Council of the Mediterranean modeled on the Council of Europe. Before it was emptied to a large degree from its initial inception by inter-European negotiations in the first quarter of 2008,³⁵ at the December 2007 meeting between France, Italy and Spain, after the latter’s proposal it was decided that the initial idea of a “Mediterranean Union” will be transformed to a “Union *for* the Mediterranean”. Beyond the utmost continuity between the EMP and the French proposal, during this meeting the guidelines of the initiative were made more explicit making clear that it will not replace existing structures, but instead complement and enhance them, as well as that it will not be used as an alternative proposal for the Turkish accession process or an impediment in the Croatian Stabilization and Association Agreement.

By March 2008, after coordinated pressures by Germany who wanted the UfM not to be detached from the EU mechanisms and the Commission’s leading role,³⁶ France had to pull back and incorporate the UfM in the wider Euro-Mediterranean mechanism, thus allowing for the participation of all EU members.³⁷ With this major change, initial concerns, regarding France’s attempts to expand its regional strategic influence to the detriment of its European partners have been appeased. Tensions between inclusion and

exclusion, the technocratic approach of the EU vs. the grand political rhetoric of Sarkozy, and the question of EU institutions and processes vs. the bold visions of individual European leaders were only settled when the new initiative was fully integrated in the wider EU framework, thus expected not to jeopardize the Barcelona *acquis*, in both procedural and regulatory expectations. Focusing on the possibilities (and not the limits) of a more targeted and efficient cooperation in the Mediterranean, the UfM is expected to have an added value by implementing specific projects with immediate and tangible benefits for Mediterranean peoples, as well as, by contributing positively to the region's overall economic and societal development.

Despite criticisms, the southern Mediterranean leaders, as in the case of the Tunisian President, insisted on the importance of not detaching the new Union project from the EMP, believing that this “will be called on to contribute towards a re-launching of the EMP, by working to assure a synergy with the existing Euro-Mediterranean instruments”.³⁸ Beyond the negative attitude adopted from the begging by Turkey,³⁹ President Sarkozy's opening to Israel⁴⁰ created difficulties for many Arab leaders to participate in the founding Summit in Paris in July 2008, and certainly didn't prevent them from accusing Israeli for its settlements policy. The only major Mediterranean nation that did not participate was Libya, whose leader, Muammar Gaddafi, turned down an invitation to attend.⁴¹ The Kings of Morocco and Jordan also did not attend, pleading other engagements, but sent high-ranking officials in their stead.

Sometimes, in the name of diplomacy, great leaders sometimes play little tricks. At the Summit in Paris, after offering a glowing report on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Sarkozy simultaneously shook hands with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas, as cameras snapped away. Then he slyly drew his own hands together, and theirs with his - leading to a richly symbolic three-way handshake. Beyond that, the Summit was a real diplomatic success, as it effectively ended the political isolation of the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, who has long been regarded as a political pariah by the US previous administration. In a heavily publicized event, Assad sat down at the same negotiating table with Israel's prime minister. This was the first occasion when the respective heads of the two states occupied the same room, following three rounds in recent months of negotiations between them, under Turkish mediation. Another success of the Summit was Assad's and the new Lebanese president, Michel Suleiman, agreement to open embassies in each other's capitals.⁴²

The founding Summit in Paris left many issues regarding the UfM structures, functions and effectiveness to be decided at the Euro-Mediterranean meeting in Marseille in November 2008. At this meeting Ministers of Foreign Affairs decided that a Permanent Commission of the EU member states and the southern partners to be established in order to strengthen co-ownership. It was also decided that the Heads of Governments of the member states, as well as senior officials will have the initiative's political control. A small and flexible, mainly of technical nature, Secretariat will also be established for the examination/evaluation of the projects; Headquarters will be in Barcelona and the General Secretary will always be from a partner country. The Secretary will be assisted by five under-secretaries, from Greece, Italy, Malta, the Palestinian Authority and Israel. It was also decided that the Arab League will participate in all Summits and at all levels of the UfM – a decision that however increased the number of actors with the power to block decisions.⁴³

After the Marseille Conference had arranged for the array of details bound to make the UFM actually work, Israel's December 2008-January 2009 military intervention in Gaza convinced UFM Arab partners to plainly suspend the implementation of the new policy and all related meetings. As the French Minister Bernard Kouchner stated: “[i]t will be really difficult to see any progress unless the situation in the Middle East is clarified. The Summit supposed to take place in Monaco has been postponed. This is not encouraging.”⁴⁴ Nevertheless, in late June, the French Minister of Environment attempted to renew interest for the UfM with a conference for the evaluation of new projects. Although a positive sign arrived that Arab states will rejoin the “frozen” UfM, despite reservations about sitting down again with Israel,⁴⁵ many Euro-Med experts wonder about the prospects of the Union and how it might evolve in the long term, and whether it will prove a more sustainable framework to the widely criticized EMP. The view shared by the majority of them and, informally, even by some French diplomats, is that the prospects are rather bleak.⁴⁶ But even if the UfM overcomes the current stalemate in Gaza, it will inevitably be decayed in a series of development programs, which will not even be placed in a substantive political backdrop. As Pace urges, interactions in the UfM have relapsed back into the same old patterns of behaviour and therefore the UfM is meant to end unless remedial action is taken quickly. “It may not be long before the UfM joins the roll call of dead, unsung and unlamented Mediterranean policies”.⁴⁷

What future for UfM? National and regional perspectives

The newly established framework of regional co-operation, however controversial, offered more political attention for the Mediterranean and the vast challenges littoral states are facing. By bringing together an outstanding line-up of Euro-Mediterranean experts, this special issue attempts to provide an updated overview of the southern EU members' views, goals and strategies vis-à-vis the French initiative; to assess the shifts in their perspectives over the newly instituted UfM; to explain certain EU and/or Mediterranean countries' support or caution vis-à-vis UfM; and to assess the UfM ability to deal with the issues related to Mediterranean instability more effectively than its predecessor, namely the "Barcelona Process", and/or other current EU frameworks and policies, i.e. the "European Neighborhood Policy".

The transformation of the French plan and the process of establishing the UfM within the wider EU approach have indeed been central in all contributions of this special issue. In his analysis on the Barcelona Process and its prospects after the UfM, *Roberto Aliboni* illustrates the emerging Euro-Med architecture after the Paris Summit and the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Marseille, which configured a multi-layered "Barcelona Process" in which the UfM is working side by side with the Neighborhood Policy and the array of Commission's policies towards the Mediterranean which, in fact, are bound to replace the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Providing an evaluation of political and institutional alterations, he argues that, what we have today is an international organisation of peers, the UfM, on one side, and the two EU policy frameworks on the other side. He also doubts the ability of the new framework to respond to regional challenges more effectively than the policy couple, concluding with critical thoughts for the institutional viability and the overall prospects of the Union to contribute to regional conflict resolution as well as to deal with domestic reforms, unless it becomes more flexible inside the Mediterranean basin and more open to the Middle East.

Addressing the challenges of transition from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the UfM from an arab perspective, *Gema Martín Muñoz* argues that the French proposal must start from the achievements of the Barcelona Process and strengthen that initiative in aspects it has not yet been able to achieve, and which the Barcelona Declaration explicitly expresses. Although difficult to improve this Declaration of Principles it is possible to apply it better. Martín-Munoz argues that for the UfM to be a success, it is important that it takes into consideration both the results of the Barcelona process and

the causes of its lacunae. The tendency to re-invent from scratch could be very costly.

In examining the question whether the new initiative represents only a change in the name or a real change on the rules of game in the Mediterranean under French supervision, *Dorothee Schmid* argues that the UfM is consistent with France's traditional diplomatic options. While the French have partly relied for the last 15 years on European capacities to uphold a Mediterranean development perspective, their somewhat troubled relationship with the EU and disillusionment with the European Neighborhood Policy finally led them to search for new geopolitical options which would match better their national interests, as well as, Nicolas Sarkozy's new diplomatic ambitions and style.

Esther Barbé and *Eduard Soler i Lecha* in their assessment on Spain's attitude towards the UfM argue that the Spanish government's reaction to Sarkozy's moves is consistent with the Spanish logic placing the Mediterranean policy within EU's framework, first by insisting to carry on the Barcelona Process principles and later, by adapting the pursuit of its own interests in the framework of the UfM. Barbé and Soler i Lecha examine how Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union has enabled Spain to pursue, through a strategy of soft Europeanization, the utmost continuity between the Euro-Mediterranean Process and the French proposal, concluding on Spain's EU presidency in 2010, in which Spain will try to recuperate its centrality in Euro-Mediterranean affairs, notably via the Barcelona UfM Secretariat.

Italy's Mediterranean policy is hindered by the same setbacks which have prompted the country not to positively act in the wider context of international politics hitherto. In examining Italian "Mediterraneanness", *Donatella Cugliandro* claims that its notorious "politics-of-the-chair-attitude" meets the so-called "catering diplomacy", leaving no room for a more substantial policy to be implemented in the region. Cugliandro argues that the balance between regional arrangements and bilateral relations risks undermining Italy's credibility in the basin. With lack of a clear strategy the added value Italy may provide to the area remains a bottom-up cultural foreign policy.

In their article on Greece's Mediterranean perspective and the UfM, *Dimitris Xenakis* and *Charalambos Tsardanidis*, argue that after the europeanization of Greco-Turkish relations in the mid-1990s, the Mediterranean gradually became a rediscovered land of opportunity for Greek policy-makers. Initially, by building on the EU's regional approach and, more recently, by supporting

the French initiative, numerous opportunities have arisen for Greece to upgrade its regional profile, including a new parameter in Greco-Turkish relations. Xenakis and Tsardanidis examine Greece's increased involvement in changing Euro-Mediterranean agenda by assessing both the challenges and the opportunities that the new initiative generates for the country's strategic and economic interests as well as, to address controversial issues in the eastern Mediterranean, including, delimitation, migration and terrorism. They conclude with thoughts on future action in the newly instituted framework, both regarding cooperative projects of higher value for Greece and in view of further contributing to the wider process of systematizing regional relations.

Roderick Pace examined the UfM from the Perspective of the Mediterranean Island States of Cyprus and Malta, as both countries have a strong interest in Mediterranean initiatives that enhance regional stability and security they supported the launching of the UfM. However, Pace's analysis reveals that they have a different conception of what the UfM should achieve, with Cyprus laying special emphasis on resolution of regional conflicts while Malta taking a more functionalist approach emphasising the protection of fish resources and de-pollution. Both states seem however to overlook the many problems which beset the initiative. Finally it is also questioned whether the two island states can influence the internal processes or internal rivalries between the larger EU states could see them side-lined and if these small states could play the role of 'honest brokers' normally associated with weak and neutral states.

From a historical perspective, Turkey's conceptualization of the Mediterranean diverges considerably from that of the EU. Examining in historical perspective the patterns of change and continuity in Turkey's approach to the establishment of the UfM, *Atila Eralp* and *Petek Karatekelioğlu* argue that 2008 was an important turning point both in terms of restructuring the EU's Mediterranean policy and rethinking Turkey's role within this specific area. Eralp and Karatekelioğlu analyze Turkey's perspective on EU's Mediterranean policy in general and specifically on the UfM. Turkey-EU relations dynamics and the credibility of membership, geopolitical concerns and the image of the Mediterranean, the objectives and efficiency of the Barcelona Process, are all major factors in the shaping of Turkish perspective on the EU's Mediterranean policy.

In his analysis of the Israeli perspective on the EU's Mediterranean policies and the UfM, *Alfred Toviás* stresses the disappointment of Israel, from the Barcelona Process, arguing that in the eyes of Israelis, it was a North-South

development-through-trade program and failed for two reasons: first and foremost, because the EU had excluded from the association agreements agricultural goods and labour-intensive services and the cumulation of origin rules have taken a lot of time to be introduced; and second, because the Arab partners failed to implement substantial political and economic reforms. Regarding the new UfM project, Israel adopted a positive attitude, once it became clear that the European Neighbourhood Policy was not going to be replaced. In the context of the UfM, Israel will probably have a tendency to privilege many, rather than only a few projects, as more “micro” projects are the less likely to be politicized.

In times of French-inspired Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, *Tobias Schumacher* claims that the agreement reached to establish the UfM was not the result of a collective evaluation and a true needs assessment. Instead, it was the consequence of a complex web of interstate interaction processes and of the joint, informally orchestrated opposition of non-Mediterranean EU governments to unilateral French efforts to establish an exclusive cooperation framework. By going beyond the static concept of traditional foreign policy analysis and drawing on a theory-informed angle, Schumacher analyzes the foreign policies of Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the Mediterranean region in general and French President Nicolas Sarkozy's original plan in particular, arguing that their struggle with France generated counter-productive results and considerably eroded the foundations of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Finally, *Stelios Stavridis* and *George Tzogopoulos* address the debate over Sarkozy's Mediterranean initiative at the European Parliament. As the latter is a growing actor in both European politics and international relations, the authors question if there is evidence of a Europeanized view on the subject among Members of the European Parliament, or whether instead national preferences still prevail. After showing how controversial and divisive the Sarkozy Initiative has been, especially among Northern EU states and the European Commission but, not surprisingly, in Spain they argue that that even within the European Parliament, the Sarkozy Initiative was dealt with in a way that clearly had more to do with internal domestic politics than any Europeanised political debate.

NOTES

1. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Vols. I & II, 5th edition, London, Fontana Press, 1987.
2. See Stephen C. Calleya, *Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World. Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area*, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997, pp. 89-140.
3. Fulvio Attinà, "Regional Cooperation in Global Perspective. The Case of the Mediterranean Regions", *Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics*, No. 4, Euro-Med Centre of Excellence, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 1996.
4. Roberto Aliboni, "European Security Across the Mediterranean", *Chaillot Papers*, No 2, WEU Institute, Paris, 1991.
5. Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chrysoschoou, *The emerging Euro-Mediterranean system*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2001.
6. See for example Peter Ludlow (ed.), *Europe and the Mediterranean*, London - CEPS for Brassey's, 1994 and Roberto Aliboni, George Joffe and Tim Niblock (eds.), *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, London, Frank Cass, 1996.
7. The end of the Cold War signalled the re-arrangement of world order, reducing East-West antagonism to a minimum, while re-emphasising the Orient-Occident and North-South divides, offering useful ammunition to those arguing that the dominant conflict post-Cold War is between Occidental and Oriental values, or between a technological 'post-historical' world and a 'historical' one. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, 1992 and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Touchstone, 1996.
8. Thanos Dokos, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 95-116.
9. See UNCTAD, *The World Investment Report*, Geneva, 2006 and World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, Washington DC, 2006.
10. United Nations Development Program, *Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries*, New York, UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2009, <http://www.arab-hdr.org/contents/index.aspx?rid=5>
11. Rami G. Khouri, "The Seven Pillars of Arab Vulnerability and Fragility", *Agence Global*, 27 July 2009, <http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2080>
12. See Calleya, *Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World*, *op.cit.*, pp. 103-107.

13. Dimitris Conostas, "Southern European countries in the European Community" in John W. Holmes (ed.), *Maelstrom: The United States Southern Europe and the Challenges in the Mediterranean*, Cambridge Mass., World Peace Foundation, 1995, p. 127.
14. Richard Gillespie, *Spain and the Mediterranean: Developing a European Policy toward the South*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000. See also Alfred Tovias, *Foreign Economic Relations of the European Community- The Impact of Spain and Portugal*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1990.
15. Portugal's direct interests in the Mediterranean are small and concentrated in just certain countries of the Maghreb, mainly Morocco and to a lesser extent Tunisia. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, "Portugal: Pressing for an Open Europe" in Christopher Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 268-287 and "Portugal: The European Way" in Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Maria Joao Seabra (eds.), *Portugal: A European Story*, IEEI, Cascais, Principia, 2000, pp. 11-38.
16. Thanos Veremis, "International Relations in Southern Europe" in John Loughlin (ed.), *Southern European Studies Guide*, London, Bauker-Saur, 1993, p. 210.
17. Laurent Meyrede, "France's Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean" in Stavridis et al., *op.cit.*, p. 56.
18. Gareth M. Winrow, *Dialogue with the Mediterranean: The Role of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative*, New York, Garland, 2000. See also Ian O. Lesser, *Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for US Policy*, Santa Monica, RAND Co., 1992.
19. Five southern European countries – France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain – and the five Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) countries – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia participated to create a security forum in the Mediterranean based on a flexible structure of dialogue, consultation, and cooperation. Ministerial meetings were to be held once a year and working groups were set up to tackle issues of concern, such as desertification, migration flows, and the preservation of cultural heritage.
20. Christophe Carle, "France, the Mediterranean and Southern European Security" in Roberto Aliboni (ed.), *Southern European Security*, London, Pinter, 1992, p. 48.
21. While the Helsinki Process had to deal with problems essentially ideological in nature and had been created to overcome the artificial division of a culturally homogeneous continent, a CSCM would have to cope with economic and cultural disparities. Victor Yves Ghebali, "Toward a Mediterranean Helsinki-Type Process", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, p. 95.

22. Richard Gillespie, “Regionalism and Globalism in the EMP: The Limits to Western Mediterranean Co-operation”, Conference on *The Convergence of Civilizations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region*, Fundação Oriente, Lisboa, at the Convento da Arr_bida, Set_bal, 6-9 June 2002, p. 3.
23. Roberto Aliboni, “The Role of International Organisations in the Mediterranean”, *ELIAMEP Occasional Papers*, No. 1, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens, 2002.
24. In a workshop organised by the Italian Foreign Office's Directorate for the Countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East on “Measures for Conflict Prevention in the MedForum Framework” in Rome on 21-22 June 2002 regarding the rationale and the goals of the Mediterranean Forum (MedForum), all agreed on the special role MedForum countries can play as a precursor to the wider Euro-Med framework, anticipating ideas and joint actions that might not be mature within the context of the latter.
25. Stephen C. Calleya and Dimitris K. Xenakis, “France’s New Mediterranean Initiative: Lessons from Post-Cold War Regional Cooperation”, *Karamanlis Working Papers*, No. 4, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 2008, p. 6.
26. Gillespie, “Regionalism and Globalism in the EMP”, *op.cit.*, p. 13.
27. See more analytically in Roderick Pace, “The Mediterranean Union: from the Perspective of the Mediterranean Island States”, *Hellenic Studies*, Special EuroMed Issue, Autumn 2009, forthcoming.
28. Theodore Pelagidis, “Europe’s Structural Problems in the Spotlight” [Τα Διαρθρωτικά Προβλήματα της Ευρώπης στο Προσκήνιο] in Dimitris K. Xenakis and Theodore Pelagidis (eds.) *Interventions for Europe* [Παρεμβάσεις για την Ευρώπη], Athens, Centre for Progressive Policy Research - Centre for Institutional Reforms - Papazisis, 2009 (forthcoming).
29. Juliane von Reppert-Bismarck, “Why PIGS Can’t Fly”, *Newsweek*, 7 July 2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/143665>
30. Nicolas Sarkozy, Toulon presidential campaign discourse, 7 December 2007, http://www.u-m-p.org/site/index.php/s_informer/discours/nicolas_sarkozy_a_toulon
31. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, HarperCollins, 1997, p. 42.
32. Maria Ganniou, “Sarkozy’s Proposal for a Mediterranean Union”, *Policy Papers*, No. 3, Institute of International Relations, 2008, p. 11.
33. Jean Robert Henry, “French Initiative in the Mediterranean Region: Back to Square One?” in *Mediterranean Yearbook 2008*, IeMed, p. 5, <http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2008/asumari.php>

34. Spain, although initially agreed with France's initiative, later Moratinos made an unexpected gesture of expressing its own idea about a "Mediterranean Union". "Time has come ... to reconstruct a real geopolitical space, by establishing a Mediterranean Union" Minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Moratinos reported to *El País*. He proposed institutions like Euro-Med Council of heads of states and governments, Committee of permanent representatives, Standing committee (secretariat) and enhancement of the existent Euro-Med Parliamentary Assembly and the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between cultures.
35. See more analytically in Rosa Balfour and Dorothée Schmid, "Union for the Mediterranean, disunity for the EU?", Policy Briefs, Brussels, European Policy Centre, 2008.
36. Francis Dubois, "Tensions between France and Germany intensify over foreign and economic policy", *WSWS*, 13 March 2008, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/mar2008/fran-m13.shtml>
37. The mechanism and structure established by the extension of the EU in the Mediterranean will determine the level of Anglo-American influence in the Mediterranean. If the EU creates an overlapping mechanism in the Mediterranean where the Mediterranean nations are linked only directly with EU members bordering the Mediterranean and indirectly with other EU members, then Anglo-American influence will be much weaker than it would be in the case of full integration between the EU and Mediterranean. This type of relationship would greatly empower Paris and Berlin within the Mediterranean. Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, "The Mediterranean Union: Dividing the Middle East and North Africa", *Global Research*, Centre for Research on Globalization, 10 February 2008, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=6879>
38. Driss, "Southern Perceptions of the Union for the Mediterranean", *op.cit.*, p. 2.
39. Turkey has balked as it viewed the UfM as nothing more than a mechanism to keep Turkey out of the EU. This fear is not misplaced as keeping the EU closed to Turkey was part of Sarkozy's campaign platform. In fact, he has argued in the past that Turkey has always been part of Asia Minor and not Europe. Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued a statement before leaving for the UfM founding summit in Paris in which he sharply criticized France for its opposition to Turkey's EU membership, stressing that cooperation in the Mediterranean region and EU-Turkey negotiations are two different projects. Many believe that the only reason for Erdogan's attendance at the Summit in Paris was to use the opportunity to solicit support from the leaders of European and Middle Eastern states for his own battle against the Turkish Supreme Court, which was attempting to ban his party.
40. It may be a canny approach, but it's also a risky one. "Sarkozy in Israel acted as

an intermediary who could be heard by both sides, and he is more listened to in Israel than his predecessors”, says Gilles Kepel. Quoted in Eric Pape, “Mediterranean Bridge Building”, *Newsweek*, 19 July 2006, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/147680>

41. General Gaddafi argued that Libya is not going to participate in Sarkozy’s initiative, which “will divide the Arab and African nations . . . [and] . . . will touch off terrorist acts by Islamic groups”, which “will consider it as a Crusade plan”. In his view, the French initiative is “vague” and is actually a trick “to force Arabs to sit at the same table with Israelis”. Quoted in Ira Feloukatzi, “The Union for the Mediterranean” [Η Ένωση Βουτάει στη Μεσόγειο], *Eleftherotypia* (Greek Daily), 12 July 2008. See also “Kadhafi threatens to turn back on Africa”, *Agence France-Presse*, 29/2/2008 and “Libya’s Gaddafi says may pull Africa investments”, *Reuters*, 31 January 2008.
42. Stefan Steinberg, “France bids to extend its influence through founding of Mediterranean Union”, *WSWS*, 16 July 2008, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/jul2008/medu-j16.shtml>
43. Tobias Schumacher, “A fading Mediterranean dream”, *European Voice*, 16 July 2009, p. 7.
44. See *Kathimerini* (Greek daily), 20 May 2009, http://portal.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_kathbreak_1_20/05/2009_280559
45. “The whole Arab group will participate in the next meetings. We will not be the ones to block the process”, Mohammed al-Nasseri, head of the Euro-Arab cooperation department at the Arab League, reported to AFP. Arab members, including the Palestinians, would attend the July 7 meeting in Brussels to formally announce the UfM’s relaunch. See “DJ Arabs Back on Board for Mediterranean Union”, Cairo (AFP), 24 June 2009, <http://english.capital.gr/News.asp?id=762796>
46. Schumacher, “A fading Mediterranean dream”, *op.cit.*
47. Roderick Pace, “The Mediterranean Union risks being stillborn”, *Europe’s World*, Summer 2009, p. 148.