Dark Knights in the Balkans: for how long will the EU remain the only 'game' in town?

Ilia Roubanis* & Marilena Koppa**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article analyse la transformation de l'environnement de la politique étrangère des Balkans à partir du milieu des années 1990 jusqu'à aujourd'hui. L'argument avancé est que l'UE et l'OTAN ont essentiellement opéré comme deux piliers d'un régime unique euro-atlantique dans la région de façon incontestée pendant près de deux décennies. La politique des deux organisations internationales a été, à bien des égards, révisionniste et basée sur des principes utilitaires plutôt que sur des principes normatifs internationaux pour la révision du statut quo territorial et la reconnaissance des États successeurs de l'ex-Yougoslavie.

L'article expose aussi les conditions historiques qui ont favorisé l'émergence de ce qui est considéré comme un paradigme unipolaire-multilatéral dans les Balkans, ayant surgi dans les années 1990. Il évoque ensuite la résurgence des options diplomatiques traditionnelles multipolaires-bilatérales en matière de politique étrangère dans des Balkans pendant la première décennie de ce siècle, principalement associées à un effet de levier croissant de la Turquie et la Russie dans la région. Enfin, il y a un débat sur les conditions propices à une friction entre ces deux approches culturellement distinctes de la politique étrangère.

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the transformation of the Balkan foreign policy environment from the middle of the 1990's until today. The argument put forward is that the EU and NATO have essentially operated as twin pillars of a single Euro-Atlantic regime in the region that has for nearly two decades been uncontested. The policy of the two international organizations had in many ways been revisionist in that utilitarian principles rather than established normative international principles were employed for the revision of the territorial status quo and the recognition of successor states in the former Yugoslavia.

The article introduces the historical conditions that were conducive to the emergence

* Democritus University of Thrace, Greece
** Panteion University, Athens.

of what is hereby referred to as a unipolar-multilateral paradigm of diplomacy in the Balkans, which emerged in the 1990s. It then goes on to discuss the resurgence of traditional multipolar-bilateral diplomatic options in Balkan diplomacy in the first decade of this century, which is mainly associated with the increasing leverage of Turkey and Russia in the region. Finally, there is a discussion of the conditions that are conducive to a paradigmatic friction between these two culturally distinct approaches to foreign policy.

The choice with which small, economically weak and war tormented Balkan states are presented today is not alignment with one hegemonic alliance or another; such were the dilemmas of the Cold War. Nowadays the critical dilemma is between diplomatic paradigms. The argument put forward in this paper is that the Balkan region is gradually shifting away from a diplomatic regime where the diplomatic paradigm of *unipolar multilateralism* was simply unchallenged. In the current transitional phase, Balkan states may have to resume a traditional, *multipolar-bilateral* approach to foreign policy, that is, a diplomatic paradigm informed by the traditional hypothesis of a basically anarchic system of international relations.

What is meant by the term 'unipolar multilateralism' is a diplomatic paradigm associated with a Euro-Atlantic identity, which goes hand in hand with the objective of joining NATO and the EU. This paradigm is unipolar in that it is founded upon the assumption that Washington will remain a 'political Rome' that promotes and guarantees democratic pluralism and an open market economy in global governance. In turn, it is a multilateral paradigm in that states committed to a Euro-Atlantic identity are coextensively committed to acting in concert rather than unilaterally through the *fora* of NATO and the EU; in turn, this implies and explicit commitment to the vision of ever deepening socioeconomic integration in the European continent.

By contrast multipolar bilateralism refers to the cultivation of traditional bilateral relations with emerging regional powers, such as Russia and Turkey; such an approach assumes that the role of the USA in global governance is less than hegemonic. It is a multipolar paradigm in that it assumes that there is no single hegemonic centre that enforces a single set of values and institutional blueprints, which means that foreign policy experts must explore all options in foreign policy. In sum, this more traditional approach to foreign policy assumes that the common vision for a united Europe has been called into question. Thus diplomacy becomes the art of forming bilateral, short lived and issue-specific alliances.

The coexistence of the two diplomatic paradigms in the Balkans increases the likelihood for the emergence of the 'dark knight' dilemma. The image of the 'dark knight' is associated with the philosophical conflict between a moral principle and an overwhelming utilitarian consideration.[1] Thus any position of power is founded upon a normatively delineated mandate, which maybe anything from a treaty to a simple code of conduct. This foundation is expected to be comprehensive, covering a number of situations; but, there are always situations emerging where following the rules as given creates a conflict with a more fundamental duty. For instance, 'collateral damage' is often seen as an inescapable consequence of any and every military intervention, although civilian casualties are by definition illegal casualties; this is a conflict of rules of conduct with utilitarian considerations all generals learn to live with. In this scheme, everyone in a position of responsibility will sooner or later confront the 'dark knight's dilemma.

In foreign policy the 'dark knight's' dilemma is usually associated with hegemonic power-politics. More often than not, it is a great power that can decide to either operate within the normative framework of the existing status quo or, alternatively, to act on the basis of a utilitarian principle and – in a revisionist fashion – redefine its normative mandate. On the contrary, the choice for peripheral or 'weak' states is usually more dramatic: alignment with the status quo or systemic marginalization. But, when great power competition is dynamic or, in other words, if the norms of the international system are themselves in a transitional phase, then small states are confronted with a single utilitarian or indeed existential dilemma, namely to find themselves on the victor's side or suffer the consequences. The choice of diplomatic paradigms today is in many respects a choice between status quo diplomacy or revisionism. And it is a dilemma increasingly pressing in the Balkans, because the political commitment of the Euro-Atlantic community in the region has been called into question.

This paper introduces the historical conditions that were conducive to the emergence of what is hereby referred to as a unipolar-multilateral paradigm of diplomacy in the Balkans, which emerged in the 1990s. It then goes on to discuss the resurgence of traditional multipolar-bilateral diplomatic options in Balkan diplomacy in the first decade of this century, which is mainly associated with the increasing leverage of Turkey and Russia in the region. Finally, there is a discussion of the conditions that are conducive to a paradigmatic friction between these two culturally distinct approaches to foreign policy.

The Emergence of Unipolar Revisionism

The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia was a mutually constitutive experience, both for the nature and scope of the Euro-Atlantic identity and for individual Balkan states. In Yugoslavia it became evident that the former Cold War allies of 'the West' would follow a revisionist policy in the region, which would capitalize on the receding influence of Russia to advance democratic values, market economy and a new security architecture. Driven mainly by utilitarian and ideological principles this policy was by necessity in friction with the established normative foundations of global governance and, in this sense, it constituted a risky response to the dark knight's dilemma. What ameliorated the effects of this value-driven revisionist strategy was that both the EU and NATO engaged the region in a gradual member-state-building process. Thus a new status quo was being constructed as soon as old systemic certainties were being revised.

Typically, receding Russian influence is the foundation of every classical transition narrative in former communist Europe. Such narratives begin with Gorbachev's triple policy of *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and military withdrawal from Eastern Europe.[2] Conventional wisdom holds that once communist autocrats were deprived of the implicit 'stick' of a possible or probable Russian invasion, they could no longer tame domestic opposition[3] and, therefore, the collapse of communism was a matter of time. In the Balkans this remains a potent, albeit not totally convincing argument for two reasons: first, because only Bulgaria fitted the description of a 'Soviet satellite' where the Russian troops could and potentially would come marching in, if the polity was to significantly deviate from Moscow's orbit; secondly, because the most traumatic transitional experience in the Balkans was experienced in the leading metropolis of the non-aligned movement, namely Yugoslavia.

Surely, the ethnic decomposition of Yugoslavia was not dictated by international actors, including receding Russian influence. Since 1974, Tito had become an institution by himself, because during his lifetime the rotational character of the Yugoslav Presidency had been suspended. In making himself an institution, Tito also attached to his office a sense of biological mortality. With the coming to power of Milosevic a different project of Yugoslav recentralization began, founded on hijacking the rotational character of the regime. Mobilizing the forces of Serbian nationalism, Milosevic placed the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, as well as the Republic of Montenegro, within the 'orbit' of the

Republic of Serbia. In placing stooge representatives of his trust in leadership positions of these territories, he effectively appropriated their federal leverage, thereby acquiring the possibility to dictate or bring to standstill the decision-making process in the collective Presidium.[4] In sum, the Yugoslav deferral process was institutionally de-substantiated and, coextensively, ethnic regimentation and politics of secession gained eminence.

However, as the Yugoslav crisis unfolded, the 'international system' did not move to preserve its own normative foundations; instead, the Euro-Atlantic actors, empowered by uncontested geopolitical and ideological leverage, condoned if not encouraged the revision of the territorial status quo. As early as July 1991, Austria and Germany had declared their preference for an early recognition of the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia. Initially the EC members resisted this notion on a normative-systemic basis, arguing that the recognition of any seceding republics should only be the result of an overall negotiated settlement;[5] the same view was shared by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. However, the argument put forward by Germany and Austria was that as long as violence in Yugoslavia was treated as a civil conflict, it would escalate. Thus, on January 15, 1992 the European Council's presidency declared that the Community and its member states would proceed with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

This decision made by the European Council is a typical case of the 'black knight' dilemma. This single act of recognition forfeited the possibility of international law providing stability by limiting the political options of the national(ist) actors involved in favour of systemic or normative stability; instead EC member states condoned secession on the basis of a morally utilitarian argument. The argument was straightforward: the security of human lives took precedence over the established international principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs; human security was thus deemed of greater benefit to the preservation of sovereignty. In making this choice EC member states were, perhaps, not fully aware of the consequences. For instance, it was at the time suggested that border settlement could have been based on the *uti possedetis* principle (have what you have had) which, based on the precedent of decolonization in Africa, would have allowed the gradual 'upgrading' of former regional-republican administrative boundaries to international borders.[6] But, the orderly decomposition of Yugoslavia was no longer possible for a twofold reason: because inter-ethnic 'bargaining' took place through 'blood an iron;' because a signal was sent to all interested parties that the creation of a status quo by other than legal means could gain *post-facto*

international validation. Therefore, the utilitarian objective was not served by the violation of normative principles.

On retrospect, it is doubtful that refusing to recognize the secession of Croatia and Slovenia in 1992 would have allowed for the return to a *status quo ante*. However, it should be remembered that the idea of a loose Yugoslav Confederation within the EU was discussed at the time as a legitimate option. After all, Yugoslavia which was outside COMECON, had a long and privileged relationship with the EC, with a range of economic agreements dating as far back as the 1970s. But, Germany moved to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in December 17, 1991, albeit postponing the implementation of this recognition, effectively threatening to act unilaterally. And what Chancellor Kohl called a 'great triumph for German foreign policy' was the establishment of a precedent whereby certain member-states of particular weight would be able to enforce their foreign policy priorities by threatening to undermine the multilateral consent that the EC aspired to create as an international actor; clearly, France, Greece, Spain and Italy only reluctantly joined the German-driven 'consensus.'[7] But, the consensus was formed and it was a revisionist consensus.

The message was clear: state making on the basis of national self-determination was now possible. This legal possibility gave rise to a normative abomination known as quasi-states which, prior to 1989, was reduced to the occupied territories of northern Cyprus. Much like Nagorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan,[8] Abkhazia and Ossetia in Georgia, and Transnistria in Moldova, ethnic military forces in former Yugoslavia sought to turn *de facto* controlled territories into permanent and internationally recognized state-like entities or protectorates. Guerilla groups in Republika Srbska (1991), in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Krajina in Croatia (1991-1998), and the Republic of Kosovo in Serbia (1999) have been involved in activities designed to present the international community with a *fait accompli*.

i. Krajina was a case where the Serbian minority found in a compact mass within Croatia declared its loyalty to the federal Constitution of Yugoslavia, refusing to become a minority in the realms of a unitary state.

ii. In November 1991, the outcome of a Bosnian Serb plebiscite reflected support for BiH to remain within the SFRY. However, from 29 February to 1 March 1992 an overwhelming majority of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats voted for independence. Indeed, on 3 March 1992 independence was proclaimed. This was followed on 27 March 1992 by

the formal proclamation of the Serbian Republic of BiH, later renamed Republika Srpska.

iii. Kosovo was in turn a clear-cut case of secession following an armed struggle, which would not have been viable without NATO's decision to bomb Serbia.[9]

In most of the aforementioned cases the initial Euro-Atlantic decision to pursue a strategy of utilitarian revisionism has led both the EU and NATO to endorse, promote, or tacitly compromise with the emerging territorial status quo. Clearly, when dealing with the phenomenon of quasi-states, the Euro-Atlantic partners no longer had the option of impartiality, for what defines partiality amongst other things is a sense of making rules as you go along. Thus the initial decision in 1992 has in many ways committed 'the West' to subsequent developments. Time and again the dark knight dilemma haunts policy makers from Washington to Brussels, presenting them with the trivial task of deciding whether 'this case' is, once again, 'exceptional' or should be dismissed as 'illegal.' And in post-facto validating the emerging status quo, the EU and NATO must also assume the responsibility of essentially institutionalizing their utilitarian preferences and through normative revisionism redefine the status quo; for no stable international order can maintain stability without the effective predictability of diplomatic action provided by international norms.

Institutional revisionism has largely failed to fulfil its utilitarian objectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the beginning of the 1990s 'the West' was confronted with the repeated failure of mediation attempts by the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and individual states. The reason seems clear: ethnic factions would accept nothing less than the creation of a unitary nation-state, annexation to a motherland or, at the very least, a self governed autonomous territory. Thus the Dayton-Paris agreements (1995) were little more than an admission of conflict resolution failure, aiming instead at conflict transformation by means of complex constitutional engineering. The result was the institutionalization of ethnic regimentation via a Byzantine structure of two semi-sovereign entities, three constituent peoples, five presidents, four vice presidents, 13 prime ministers, 14 parliaments, 147 ministers and 700 members of Parliament. Thereby, this status agreement ensured that any substantially federative process would almost certainly be derailed by an ethnic veto, revealing the office of the High Representative, who was originally envisaged as merely an interethnic broker of compromise, as the *de facto*

dictator. In sum, the permanent engagement of both NATO and the EU in the region became permanent, necessary and even constitutionally required.

The sterility of this engineering was made abundantly clear when in 11 March 2005 the Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy, better known as the Venice Commission, recommended that the Bosnian government pursues a process of constitutional reform. At the time, it was envisaged that a consensus might be reached prior to the 2006 legislative elections. However, between Brussels, New York, and Sarajevo, numerous formal and informal meetings, nothing concrete was ever produced. Over the years, each party, each MP, each assembly, each ministerial position, has been linked with the ethnically defined interests of a specific constituent nationality.[10] In a sense, the dark knight dilemma is as haunting today as it was fifteen years ago.

Another case of the dark knight's dilemma is Kosovo. Following the bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO in 1999, Serbian troops were forced to withdraw from the region. This military intervention was justified on the utilitarian basis of humanitarian-civilian protection, without prior authorization from the UN's Security Council.[11] Predictably, the violation of international legal norms generated a number of normative challenges, including the complete absence of a valid legal basis for the governance of Kosovo. For instance, it was impossible in 1999 to decide by whose law one should be imprisoned, prosecuted, or released.[12] This is the closest one could get to a Hobbsian Leviathan, since there was no law to rule by and thus very difficult to specify what rule of law meant. In the years to come the process of negotiating a final status agreement acceptable to all negotiating parties, mediated by Ahtisaari, failed, not least because the international community was more than the honest broker and mediator. Instead, Ahtisaari emerged as a *deus ex machine,* burdened both with the mission of creating a normative foundation for the governance of the territory *ex nihilio* and with the enforcement of an inter-ethnic ceasefire.

The Emergence of Unipolar Multilateralism

But, what appears to be as a normatively revisionist strategy in the Balkans has gained post-facto legitimacy by means of EU and NATO expansion. This parallel expansion of the two organizations in the region has created a multilateral framework of cooperation, which has all the credentials of a thorough normative mandate. Thus a Euro-Atlantic identity is emerging in the

Balkans, which appears to be unipolar in terms of identity and multilateral in the sense of diplomatic means; and indeed, the EU-NATO architecture is simply unmatched in the Balkans when it comes to economic, social, political and military leverage. Through a strategy of member-state building, utilitarian considerations that emerged in the early 1990s are becoming institutionalized, laying the normative foundations for a new status quo.

Thus NATO is pushing forward with a fast track accession process in the Balkans; the EU remains politically committed to the full integration of the region as well, although not until member-states have been sufficiently reformed. Deviance in the pace of enlargement is in part understandable due to diverging institutional agendas, structures, cultures, competencies and objectives of the two organizations. However, no one can seriously question that the two organizations are laying the foundations of a single regional Euro-Atlantic regime.

In principle NATO has yet to acquire 'fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance,'[13] although democratic governance seems to weigh increasingly more as a criterion and with good reason. Of course, historically, NATO was not a democracy promoting organization. The Cold War's military arm of the 'free world' originally enlisted its members by assessing first and foremost their geopolitical weight and anti-communist credentials. This should be self-evident given the fact that Portugal, Greece, and Turkey have been dictatorial regimes while, simultaneously being NATO members. However, since 1989, Turkey is the only member state whose democratic credentials have been questioned by Freedom House Indicators. And, besides the chiliastic neo-Wilsonian calls for the completion of a democratic world-order, there is a functional-utilitarian rationale underlying this change of normative-systemic priorities over the last two decades.

Following the 9/11 events, the institutional agenda of NATO has moved from traditional 'defense cooperation' to 'defense and security.' The term 'security' connotes the preparation of each member state against asymmetrical threats, including terrorism, laying the foundations of organizational interoperability for the preservation of 'human security.' Clearly, coordinating security rather than merely defense anchors 'democratic interoperability' firmly in the organization's agenda. For this level of cooperation brings to the fore challenges that are explicitly linked to democratic governance. In this respect, the scope of Security Sector Reform for NATO is limited, merely involving the harmonization of security gathering practices. However, the democratic

challenges are concrete such as, for example, the need to balance the right to security with the protection of individual freedoms. Thus all former communist states undergoing a democratic transition are provided with a Euro-Atlantic roadmap of reforms.

Towards this democratic end, NATO employs universally accepted normative yardsticks for the assessment of a regime's democratic consolidation: the UN charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, etc. However, the assessment of a state's democratic credentials is also 'contextually sensitive,' that is, sensitive to utilitarian requirements. Specifically, the process whereby a state joins the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) entails the initial drafting of a Framework Document, setting specific undertakings of democratic reform, which are tailor made for each aspirant member state. To a great extend, gaining PfP membership is considered as a ritual of passage where 'peer states' recognize demonstrated commitment to reforms; thus, more often than not, it is followed by a NATO membership application that requires deeper level institutional transformation. At this point, the institutional cooperation evolves into an Individual Partnership Program, which is designed to create the foundations of political and military interoperability. Specifically, individual programs are analyzed into annual Partnership Work Programs (PWP), developed through a Planning and Review Process (PARP). Currently, all the states in the Balkans are either full NATO members or PfP partners (Table 1).

Table 1: PfP Membership in the Balkans

The Scope of Partnership for Peace (PfP)	**Balkan PfP Membership**
Facilitating • Transparency in national defense planning & budgeting • Ensuring democratic control of defense forces	Bulgaria 1994, full membership 2004 Slovenia 1994, full membership 2004 FYROM 1995 Albania 1994, full membership 2009 Croatia 2000, full membership 2009 Bosnia-Herzegovina 2006 Montenegro 2006 Serbia 2006

A similar step-by-step approach has been ingrained in the process of European integration since its inception. Since the mid-1990's, across the former socialist bloc, democratization is often likened to a race with laggards and frontrunners in a continuous race towards EU membership,[14] complete with regular reports being compiled by the Commission to mark 'progress' or 'challenges.' Indeed, it has been noted that the political geography of former socialist regimes in Europe has been reformulated along the lines of 'ins,' 'pre-ins' and 'outs.'[15] In this unidirectional and purposeful progress-race, the yardstick of success is the adoption of the EU's *acquis communitaire*, that is, a body of legislation no smaller than 80.000 pages.

EU membership was explicitly proposed to all Western Balkan States in the Feira European Council (June 2000). In the following Zagreb Summit (November 2000), the EU established a 'contract' with the States of the Western Balkans: in return for the prospect of accession – and assistance to achieve it – the countries of the region would undertake to implement a rigid agenda of political and economic reforms. Thus specifically for the Western Balkans, the EU created a framework of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA). It should be noted that SAA agreements are considered an exploratory phase of pre-accession negotiations, which is why they are covered by DG Enlargement rather than DG External Relations. Finally, the Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003) bolstered EU's commitment to integrate the Western Balkans by enriching the SAA process with new instruments for the promotion of institutional reform, including European Partnerships, which contribute to the generation of a more detailed roadmap with short and medium-term benchmarks.[16]

In fact, the very term 'conditionality' seems to have become part of the communitarian daily vocabulary when the EU engaged the Western Balkans, although it was coined in the 1990s. The reason is clear: integration in this part of Europe was considered an open-ended process rather than limited by specific deadlines. The premise is that states in the region will surely become members, but only when ready to do so. The objective of this member-state building strategy is, initially, to create the institutional foundations for the fulfillment of the Copenhagen accession criteria (1993), that is, to demonstrate 'stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.' Incidentally, many of these criteria have also been the utilitarian principles of status quo revisionism during the 1990s.

Moving from value-alignment to institutional alignment each state in the

region is then expected to reach a deep level of functional-institutional competences which, in NATO's parlance, could be referred to as *interoperability*. This final stage of functional and political alignment is assumed to be completed through a chapter-by-chapter accession negotiation process (Table 2).

Table No.2: Road to EU Membership for the Western Balkans



Undoubtedly, therefore, the expansion of both EU and NATO has become increasingly parallel over the last decade. Of course not all NATO members are automatically accepted as EU members. However, all NATO members are EU candidate members with the sole exception of Norway and this is by choice not by exclusion. In fact, EU aspirant members today must develop an institutional link with NATO. This is because a state wishing to join the EU must align itself with a specific chapter of the *acquis*, namely the structures and mechanisms of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including its military dimension. Ever since the signing of the Berlin Plus agreement (December 16th 2002), EU member states must either be full NATO members or, at the very least, participate in the PfP program. Otherwise known as the comprehensive package of agreements or the CJTF mechanism, Berlin Plus effectively facilitates the use of NATO's military

assets for the purposes of EU peacekeeping operations. In sum, an EU member that does not have an institutional link to NATO is automatically excluded from ESDP operations confirming the role of 'Europe' as an international (Euro-Atlantic) security actor.

The Emergence of Multipolar Bilateralism: Russia

Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Russia has never challenged the role of 'Europe' as a socioeconomic or political actor; in fact, Russian attempts have been made to join the EU in fulfillment of De Gaulle's prophecy for a united continent from the Atlantic to the Urals. In the early 1990s it was speculated that the disintegration of *Pax Sovietica* and of communist regimes would lead to great power cooperation, especially in the Balkans. In this scheme, Russia did join the PfP program and was even a party to a permanent Joint Council with NATO. Moreover, when the UN-declared no-fly zone over Bosnia and the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia was imposed, the Yeltsin government was engaged to exert pressure on Belgrade in order to stop the bloodshed in Sarajevo in 1994.[17]

But, time and again, final resolutions excluded Russia from the decision making process, starting from the Deyton agreements. Russian objections have been raised against both the principle of utilitarian revisionism and the unequivocal commitment of the EU to a 'Euro-Atlantic' security architecture. And with good reason, for the preeminence of the UN Security Council would guarantee a Russian veto in global governance. But, during the 1990s, Russian objections were met in Brussels in a condescending manner: as Moscow came close to an economic meltdown in 1998, as its repeated objections against 'humanitarian intervention' against Serbia in 1999 were simply inconsequential, Russia appeared as a second-rate power of no particular consequence in the Balkans and, perhaps, beyond.

But, this is no longer the case. Russia is now undermining European multilateralism by cultivating a nexus of ever-deepening bilateral economic relations, not merely with Balkan states but, perhaps more significantly, with EU member states. Moreover, Moscow is now claiming the sovereign prerogative to act upon the precedent of normative violations initiated by the Euro-Atlantic axis in what it considers to be its own geopolitical 'breathing space.' In sum, Russia is reclaiming its role as a geopolitical pole amongst many, questioning the dominance of a multilateral-unipolar regime in the Balkans, in Europe and, perhaps, beyond.

In any event, for Russia it was Kosovo that was felt as a slap in the face. Upon receiving the news that the bombing campaign was about to begin, Foreign Minister Primakov ordered his plane to turn around as he was flying to Washington; Moscow then attempted to supply Belgrade with military equipment and Russians exploded with national pride as their paratroopers marched from Bosnia to Kosovo in June; Russia swiftly moved to suspend its participation in NATO's PfP program and the Permanent Joint Council (PJC);[18] last but not least, Kosovar Albanians were branded 'terrorists' and Moscow dismissed the intervention as a neocolonial and illegal venture, threatening to derail the whole international rule of law regime.[19] In sum, Kosovo was perceived in Moscow's strategic circles as a unilateral declaration by NATO of the right to act in Europe outside the normative mandate of the UN and OSCE, over and beyond the territory of NATO's member states; perhaps more significantly, to act as if Russia did not exist. In the words of Alexei Arbatov, a member of the Russian *Duma* Defense Committee and security analyst, the message of Kosovo was clear:

> *The main lesson learned is that the goal justifies the means. The use of force is he most efficient problem solver, if applied decisively and massively. Negotiations are of dubious value and are to be used as a cover for military action. Legality of state actions, observation of laws and legal procedures, and humanitarian suffering are of secondary significance relative to achieving the goal. Limiting one's own troop casualties is worth imposing massive devastation and collateral fatalities on civilian populations.*[20]

It might have been argued that Russia's relation to NATO was in crisis following the bombardment of Kosovo (1999), but this was not necessarily the case for relations with the EU. After all, the launch of ESDP soon after the Kosovo crisis was received in Moscow with the hope that Europe might have been pursuing a multipolar rather than merely multilateral approach to security in the continent. However, subsequent NATO enlargement, the expansion of the PfP program[21] and, eventually, the Berlin Plus protocol made abundantly clear that the EU was firmly anchored in its Euro-Atlantic identity.

But, it was not only a sense of growing skepticism vis a vis the emergent multilateral architecture in Europe that changed the Muscovite mindset since 1999. From 1999 to 2005 the Russian GDP tripled. Moreover, Russia abandoned its plans for CIS reintegration and promoted its own version of multilateral cooperation projects in the former soviet space via the Common

Economic Space project, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and, further east, the Shangai Cooperation Organization. Moreover, Russia began to explore the possibility of cultivating its 'soft power' leverage as a host country of millions of immigrants from the former Soviet space, sponsoring specific political factions in electoral campaigns, cultivating the influence of the Russian language and relations with the Diaspora, whilst making extensive use of its central position in the fossil fuel production and distribution market.[22]

But, Russian 'soft power' was not only felt in the former soviet space. Upon assuming the presidency, President Putin was quick to recognise the importance of energy as a political tool. According to the Russian Federation's 'Energy Strategy of Russia to 2020' (August 2003), 'the role of the country in world energy markets to a large extent determines its geopolitical influence.' Putin thus swiftly nationalized the oil and gas sectors, gaining a near monopoly leverage in the European fossil fuel market by promoting two major pipeline projects (North Stream and South Stream) that would bypass Ukraine. Simultaneously, Russia seems to be presenting the EU with a soft-power Trojan horse designed to infringe upon the Union's multilateral solidarity. In 2007 the European Commission published its policy paper 'An Energy Policy for Europe' and in 2008 a Strategic Energy Review. There the Commission produced proposals that would loosen the grip of Gazprom upon the European market. But, little action has been taken to that effect. Putin made deals with major German energy companies and secured the services of former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, as chief lobbyist. Thus the Baltic Sea pipeline project seems secure, despite the Commission's objections. And on the South Stream front, Putin made deals with Austria, Bulgaria and Greece, as well as Turkmenistan, with the aim of sabotaging the Commission-preferred Nabucco pipeline.[23]

Granted that the Balkan region is the gate for fossil fuels from the Caspian basin to the European market, one should expect growing Russian interest in the region. Hence, one should also note that these two regions present coextensive strategic dilemmas for Europe, since these are the most decisive geopolitical fronts for the energy security of the European Union. However, rather than taking this development into account and engage Russia constructively in both regions, the Euro-Atlantic community seems to be estranging Russia.

The USA and its leading EU allies bypassed, once again, the UN Security Council to grant Kosovo independence in February 2008. But, this time Moscow was far stronger than it had been in 1999 and responded in a twofold

manner: first, it lobbied other countries who worry about that precedent with regard to their own secessionist-minded minorities, including a number of EU member states; second, Russia stepped up its support for secessionist movements in Georgia, only to follow up with full-scale military intervention. In taking these measures Russia is anything but isolated. China and India have worried about the Kosovo precedent. And EU-three assurances (London, Berlin, Paris) that Kosovo is a unique case were less than convincing to a number of states.[24] Meanwhile, the recent ruling by the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo's unilateral secession[25] will probably deepen the cynical attitude of Russia and Serbia vis a vis the emerging international normative regime.

A Decisive Front for Diplomatic Paradigms: Turkey

Between an increasingly ineffective framework of multilateral unipolarism and an ascending paradigm of multipolar bilateralism there is one country that has managed to combine the better of two worlds, namely Turkey. Turkish soft-power grand strategy is founded upon its vision to emerge as an indispensable energy hub, equally significant to both Moscow and Brussels. Rather than being consumed by the fear of estranging traditional allies, Turkey is boosting its geopolitical significance as a complementary building block to Russia's mastering role in the European energy-security architecture. Meanwhile, it maintains all options open for future business ventures that may deviate from Moscow's preference. The key objective for Turkey is to become an indispensable catalyst for the promotion of any and every diplomatic initiative rather than passively choose sides. In the words of the former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and chief Nabucco-project lobbyist:

> *It can't be said often enough: Turkey is situated in a highly sensitive geopolitical location, particularly where Europe's security is concerned. The eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, the western Balkans, the Caspian region and the southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East are all areas where the West will achieve nothing or very little without Turkey's support. And this is true in terms not only of security policy, but also of energy policy if you're looking for alternatives to Europe's growing reliance on Russian energy supplies. (…)*
>
> *Europe's security in the 21st century will be determined to a significant degree in its neighborhood in the southeast – exactly*

> *where Turkey is crucial for Europe's security interests now and, increasingly, in the future. But, rather than binding Turkey as closely as possible to Europe and the West, European policy is driving Turkey into the arms of Russia and Iran.*[26]

It should be noted that all competing scenarios for the emerging European energy architecture are built around the notion of Turkish centrality; and this is the result of Turkish diplomacy, not merely location. Not putting all its eggs in one basket, Turkey only reluctantly endorsed the official Russian offer for the Blue Stream II project in 2005, giving priority to the US-EU sponsored Nabucco project intended to connect Turkey and Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. Russia thus turned to the Balkans, established an alliance with Italy, and pursued the design of an alternative route from the Russian Black Sea coast via an offshore pipeline to Bulgaria;[27] however, Bulgaria is stalling the project either on the basis of economic or environmental considerations, which seems to be favoring the Nabucco project.[28] While a final investment decision on either the Nabucco or the South Stream project is yet to be made, neither Russia nor the EU can afford to exclude Turkey from their fossil fuel grand strategy.

However, given that Turkey has made little progress in EU accession negotiations since 2003, the argument for seeking opportunities for growth in the East are indeed compelling. Energy is not the only dimension of the Russo-Turkish axis: since 2008 Russia became Turkey's biggest trading partner; Russia is a major market for Turkish manufactured goods and a major tourist source market. And the potential of this relationship is only beginning to be explored: in the recent visit of President Medvedev to Turkey, no less than 17 agreements were concluded, opening new roads for cooperation in the tourist industry, nuclear energy projects, education, trade and, of course, pipelines.[29] Still, this deepening relation with Russia does not imply a strategic decision to ignore either US or EU interests; Turkey maintains the position of a broker, or ' a bridge' to use the term of preference for Turkish diplomats, which seems well founded on both shores.

Meanwhile, President Sarcozy of France and Chancellor Merkel still live in a day and age when Turkey could be treated as the 'sick man of Europe,' making essentialist claims about European borders, responding more to their xenophobic constituents, rather than the real geopolitical challenges at hand.[30] Moreover, there seems to be diminishing leverage by the US in Turkey and the Caucasus region, not only because the Nabucco pipeline network does not

have guaranteed access to gas supply, but also because the Georgian incident proved the US unwilling, if not unable, to project its military power in the wider region. When in August 2008 the Russian campaign against South Ossetia and Abkhazia was met in Washington with little more than a verbal condemnation; Ankara could not be accused for being 'out of tune' by pursuing precisely the same diplomatic line.

In conservative circles, it is actually hoped that Turkey's central position as the bridge between Russia, the Black Sea basin, Central Asia and the Middle East will eventually weaken. Those who still adhere to Huntingtonian notions of inevitable civilizational encounters, prophesize that Turkey will eventually be confronted with Orthodox solidarity, which is destined to rise against Muslim solidarity. This apocalyptic prophecy points to the Balkans as the zone where this tectonic-civilization encounter will be fulfilled. In this scheme, Russia is supposed to be cultivating a deep relationship with the Orthodox Serbian brother, whilst Turkey is considered a traditional ally of Muslim minorities, Bosniaks and Albanians.[31] But, should the Russo-Turkish civilizational encounter prophecy fail to be fulfilled, Turkey may always be singled out as the next Islamic threat for the West. Indeed, in the realm of neoconservative conspiracy theories, Turkey is identified as the next 'neoconservative other' – along with Iran and Syria – in yet another version the dark trinity chiliastic fantasy inaugurated by G.W. Bush.[32]

This line of reasoning is not completely unfounded. Turkey's soft power is often cultivated as the logical extension of its historic role as the Muslim motherland in the Balkans.[33] For instance, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) invests in social infrastructures with a 'Muslim-Turkic brotherhood' undertone: the restoration of the Gorazde State Hospital in Bosnia, the creation of the Canakkale Martyrs Reading Room of the Dragas Municipal Library in Kosovo, the Renovation of Suleyman Demirel Turkish Secondary School for the Gagauz in Romania, and the renovation of the 90-years-old headquarters of the Muslim community in Tirana, are only some examples that testify to this implicit strategy.[34]

And Russia does cultivate the image of the Orthodox motherland. Apart from Russia's stand vis a vis Serbia in 1999, today, Belgrade counts on Moscow for opposing Kosovo's independence and no doubt welcomed the geopolitical significance of Serbia's inclusion in the South Stream pipeline project. And while the President and Foreign Minister of Russia were condemning the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign entity, the streets of Belgrade were stormed by a rioting crowd throwing Molotov cocktail bombs

to the US, Croatian and, of course, the Turkish embassies;[35] for Turkey was, after all, the first state to formally recognize the independence of Kosovo. And Turkey has expressed Muslim solidarity in other fronts as well; in April 2010, Turkey played a key role in persuading NATO to grant Bosnia-Herzegovina a Membership Action Plan, widely seen as the first step prior to full membership.[36]

But, for all the aura of an Orthodox motherland, Russia has set its foot in Serbia with more of a cut-throat business instinct than a maternal attitude. Belgrade chose Gazprom Neft without holding an international tender for the sale of 51% of NIS shares, that is, the national oil and gas company and one of the biggest employers in the country. And it agreed to sell this controlling stake for a mere €400 million, even after the international consultants Deloitte & Touche had valued NIS at €2.2 billion. No doubt Belgrade 'rewarded' Moscow for its stand on the Kosovo affair, but this was not merely an expression of gratitude: by selling the controlling stake in NIS at a deeply undervalued price the Serbian government expected Gazprom to reciprocate the favor by building a section of the South Stream gas transportation project in Serbian territory. But, this is merely a hope. Moscow pocketed those concessions but broke the linkage between the NIS sale and the South Stream project, which may be seen as a violation of the January 2008 Russian-Serbian agreement treating the NIS sale and the South Stream project as inseparable aspects of the transaction. So, if there is such a thing as Slavic-Orthodox solidarity, it comes at a dear price.[37]

And for all the Turkish rhetoric of Muslim solidarity, Turkey has entered the Balkans in other capacities as well. Turkey is gradually weaving an industrial, communication, finance, and transport web of economic leverage that complements its cultural-Islamic prestige.[38] Nor should Turkish pro-Islamic diplomacy in the Balkans be immediately perceived as anti-Orthodox. On the contrary, Turkey has capitalized on its good-faith credentials with the Bosniak community in order to emerge as a broker of political compromise with the Serbian community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In April 2010 President Gul persuaded Serbia's President, Boris Tadic, and the Bosniak member of Bosnia-Herzegovina's tripartite presidency, Haris Silajdzic, to sign the so-called 'Istanbul Declaration,' which reaffirmed a shared "commitment to take all necessary steps to ensure regional peace, stability and prosperity." Tadic, empowered by the Serbian Parliament's formal recognition of the Srebrenica genocide (30.03.2010), visited the city on July 11 to mark its 15th anniversary; in turn, Silajdzic agreed to make his first trip to Belgrade since

1992. Though Silajdzic's scheduled May visit was ultimately cancelled, probably due to Serbia's refusal to grant Silajdzic access to Ilija Jurisic, who was convicted of war crimes charges, both countries immediately called upon Turkey to again intercede to resolve their differences.

And Turkey's newfound diplomatic leverage in Belgrade is not only 'a show,' but a complete business proposal. Specifically, Turkish investment in strategic sectors in both Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina – spanning from the defence industry to aviation – has the potential to merge former Yugoslav strategic sectors of the economy under Turkish tutorship.[39]

Still, the Turkish presence in the Balkans evokes Huntigtonian chiliasm for a number of reasons. For instance, the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu in October 2009 in Bosnia did cause scepticism. His romanticized and highly nostalgic vision of the regeneration of *Pax Ottomanica* in the Balkans with 'common political values, economic interdependence, cooperation and cultural harmony' was received by the Orthodox commentators of the region – mainly Bosnian-Serb and Greek – as little more than an neo-imperialist ploy[40]. And these fears are not completely unfounded. Turkey's top diplomat book, 'Strategic Depth'(2001), is time and again quoted as the new testament of Turkish foreign policy and the source of its motto: "zero problems and maximum cooperation with neighbours."[41] But, apart from the catchy motto, the very same book often spells out a vision for the Balkans as little more than a *lebensraum*, envisaging Ankara as having a veto power and the prerogative of military intervention for the protection of Muslim minorities, making references to the precedent of Cyprus.[42]

But, Turkish emerging diplomatic capability has little to do with Islam and more to do with its consistent aspiration to be a broker; in this scheme, it has even acquired an actual veto power in the Euro-Atlantic community. This is because amongst the traditionally neutral states that have gained EU membership (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden), it is only Cyprus that is not a member of the PfP program and this is an institutional exception that is heatedly debated both in Nicosia and in Brussels.[43] Thus, paradoxically, Turkey, which is a NATO member and an EU aspirant member, is able to veto the participation of Cyprus in ESDP missions. The veto is possible because Turkey, unlike Cyprus, has corporate ownership of NATO infrastructures and, more significantly, ownership of military intelligence that is unwilling to share with a regime it does not even recognize (see Table 3).

Discussion: the Uncertainty of Europe's Diplomatic Architecture

The engagement of many Balkan states in the process of Atlantic integration is conditioned upon the perception that this is a *sine qua non* condition of participating in the process of European integration. Indeed, in many Balkan constituencies, NATO's popularity is not exactly thriving and if it were not for the associated understanding of 'a package deal,' it is highly doubtful that NATO expansion would have proceeded as it did. But, the EU is haunted by enlargement fatigue and thus the whole unipolar-multilateral integration project is called into question; moreover, multilateral solidarity within the EU has been called into question vis a vis Russia and Turkey. In sum, the unipolar-multilateral architecture constructed in the 1990s suffers a deficit of credibility, as it is no longer clear that the states engaged in this diplomatic framework can be certain of their full integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Table No.3: Berlin Plus Participants



In the Balkans, the most obvious example of an emerging 'dark knight' dilemma is faced by Serbia. Serbia's PfP Presentation Document (July 2007) constitutes a clear political commitment to developing a partnership with NATO. However, Serbia Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) (2009) detailed a relatively modest security and defense agenda of reform. It is worth noting that unlike other IPP documents submitted by other Western Balkans states, Serbia's does not envisage membership in the Alliance as an end-stage

of cooperation with NATO, a choice leading to its exclusion from Membership Action Plan participation (MAP). In fact, Serbian officials have been straightforward in linking the possibility of NATO membership to the future status of Kosovo. And Kosovo seems like a lost battle in the Euro-Atlantic context. According to recent surveys, 50.1% of Serbian citizens claimed that Serbia should not seek NATO membership and only 26.1% are in support of this prospect.[44] And Kosovo is expected to remain an issue central to the Serbian political landscape, since the new Constitution (2006) includes a controversial provision stating that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. Hence, the skepticism on Serbia's Euro-Atlantic prospects is not likely to recede in the foreseeable future.

Montenegrin public opinion might have been expected to be more favourable to Euro-Atlantic integration. After all, Milo Đukanović is currently in his fifth consecutive term as a Prime Minister (1991-1993, 1993-1996, 1996-1998, 2009-currently), which indicates a relative focused commitment to a single political vision. And, although Đukanović begun his career as a close ally of Slobodan Milošević and a prominent Serbian nationalist, in 1998 he emerged as the voice of the 'West' in outcast Yugoslavia; and he honoured his profile in 2008 by moving swiftly to recognize Kosovo's independence. But, while Montenegrin loyalty is not in question, the Euro-Atlantic integration process is a costly endeavour.

One of the major dilemmas encountered after the declaration of secession in 2006 was whether or not a country of nearly 700,000 people needed and/or could afford to have Armed Forces. Having armed forces is of course an imperative to join a military alliance such as NATO. The decision was subsequently made to create a modest defence establishment (approximately 2,400 troops). But, the legitimating discourse of military 'formation' was specifically linked to the prospect of EU membership. In sum, a fading prospect of EU membership will no doubt imply disillusionment with Euro-Atlantic multilateralism.

In Croatia there were also certain roadblocks to NATO membership. The Croatian public associated NATO with the war in Iraq, which was widely opposed. NATO's role in the wars of the 1990s was not embraced either, nor its role in pressing for the arrest of Ante Gotovina, who is still considered a 'hero' by a non-negligible number of Croats. Some domestic critics even charged that NATO membership could lead to a militarization of Croatia's highly reputed coastline. Thus a special committee to promote the potential benefits of Croatia's membership in the Alliance to the public was needed.

These efforts were not altogether inconsequential, for backing for NATO membership rose from as low as only one third of Croatians in 2006 surveys to approximately 52% in 2009.[45] Of course the main argument put forward from successive Croatian administrations has, time and again, been the same: NATO membership is the lobby to EU membership.[46]

The problem at hand then is that public consensus on the unidirectional road to European Integration should not be taken for granted. 'What if,' for example, a certain number of EU member states held the view that the EU has 'reached its limits?' This no doubt would cause Turkey to change its foreign policy priorities and, perhaps, call into question the notion that the EU and NATO should be seen as the twin pillars of a single European architecture. Indeed, the decision to incorporate or exclude Turkey from the EU may emerge as a central dilemma threatening to decouple the perceived unity of the Euro-Atlantic community. But, even if the Turkish accession process remains on track – and this is a big 'if' – the question at hand remains 'what if' EU conditions for full accession are revealed as unrealistic, unacceptable or simply impossible to fulfill for other states. In this case, enlargement fatigue may turn into candidacy fatigue.

Moreover, in the Western Balkans organized crime continues to thrive; this maybe due to a close synergy or, at best, apathy of the political elite in states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. But, if this is the case, it remains unclear whether a top-down approach to democratic reform is possible, precisely because certain elites may have vested interests in the organized crime market. For if membership eventually implies a top-down process of lustration, it is unclear why those that stand to loose the most by this process should pursue this course. Alternative, a more flexible but increasingly beneficial cultivation of economic relations with countries like Turkey and Russia provide an alternative framework for the pursuit of market access, economic development, the attraction of foreign direct investment and, in time, even security cooperation. It should be noted that this option has already been domesticated by the nationalist and largely anti-Western opposition in Serbia. Perhaps, more significantly, 'what if' such an alternative diplomatic framework is presented as an 'either-or' choice, where Euro-Atlantic cooperation appears as a 'possibly-probably' option whilst bilateral choices emerge as a 'here-and-now' possibility.

In this scheme, there is no rational reason to dismiss an alternative diplomatic paradigm founded on multipolar bilateralism. After all, it is the EU suffering from enlargement fatigue. And should one count on the solidifying

role that Washington has as a hegemonic broker, one maybe tempted to note that the USA is no longer willing or able to be the main security provider in the region and, during the unfolding economic crisis, there is little evidence to suggest that an economic policy consensus exists between the two shores of the Atlantic. In sum, all options are open for Balkan states and the 'dark knight dilemma' is now haunting those less-than-hegemonic states who still wonder how to pursue utilitarian national interests on the basis of a multilateral diplomatic framework that is less-and-less convincing in its ability to deliver collective benefits, stability and systemic predictability to its members, let alone its perspective members.

NOTES

1. Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1973, pp. 160-180.
2. Levent Gonenc, *Prospects for Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Countries*, New York, Martnus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, pp. 123-124; cf. also Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 176, 182.
3. Jon Elster, *Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction,* The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, 1991, p. 456.
4. Robert H. Dorf, "Federalism in Eastern Europe: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?", *Publius*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 107-108.
5. EPC Declaration on Yugoslavia, Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 27 August 1991, EPC Press Release, pp. 84-91.
6. Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 86, No. 3, 1973, pp. 485-487; cf. also Ruti Teitel, 'Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation,' *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 106, No. 7, 1997, p. 2028.
7. James B. Steinberg, "The Role of European Institutions in Security After the Cold War: Some Lessons from Yugoslavia," *A Rand Note,* 1992, pp. 5-6, 16, 18-20, 30-31.
8. Manushak Arakelian, *Kosovo and Karabakh: parallel or different?,* Master's Thesis, Law Faculty, American University in Armenia, March 2010.

9. Michael Rywkin, "The Phenomenon of Quasi-states", *Diogenes*, Oct. 2002, No. 210, pp. 25-27.
10. R. Bruce Hitchner, "From Dayton to Brussels: The Story Behind the Constitutional and Governmental Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 2006, pp. 126-7, 129, 132.
11. Javier Solana, Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana on behalf of the North Atlantic Council following its meeting on Sunday, 17th January 1999, Press Release (99) 003; cf also John R. Bolton, "The United Nations and Kosovo's Independence", San Diego Union-Tribune, March 2, 2008.
12. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, "The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the 'Rule of Law", *Michigan Law Review*, Vol. 101, No. 7, June 2003, pp. 2279, 2290-2301.
13. Study of NATO Enlargement issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Brussels, September 3 1995, Chapter 1).
14. Gergana Noutcheva and Dimitar Bechev, "The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romania's Accession to the EU", *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2008; cf. also M. Steven Fish and Omar Choudry, "Democratization and Economic Liberalization in the Post-Communist World", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2007; cf. also Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Between Historical Legacies and the Promise of Western integration: Democratic Conditionality after Communism", *East European politics and Societies,* Vol. 21, No. 1, 2007.
15. Stephen White, Judy Batt, Paul G. Lewis [eds], *Developments in Central and East European Politics*, Basingstoke: Mcmillan, 2003, pp. 19-20; cf. also Lucan A. Way & Steven Levitsky, "Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-communist Divide," *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 2002, p. 48.
16. Iordache Bogzeanu, "The EU Intergration of the Western Balkan States and Turkey-Security Costs and Gains", *Strategic Impact*, No. 4, 2009, pp. 65-69.
17. Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, "The Great powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the post-Cold War Era", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No.1, March 1997, pp. 76-79.
18. Clelia Rontoyianni, "So Far, So Good? Russia and the ESDP", *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 78, No. 4, October 2002.
19. Jan Steinkohl, "Normative Power Rivalry? The European Union, Russia and the Question of Kosovo", College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 6/2010, pp. 16-20.
20. Georgiy Arbatov, "The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya", Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, July 2000, pp. 20-21.
21. Rontoyianni, "So Far, So Good? Russia and the ESDP", *op.cit.*

22. Andrei P. Tsygankov, "If not by Tanks, then by Banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin's Foreign Policy", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 7, November 2006.

23. Fraser Cameron, "The Politics of EU-Russia Energy Relations", Eurasia Centre, 2010.

24. Ted Galen Carpenter, "A New Era of Turbulence in the Balkans", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 6-22.

25. M. Grey, "Kosovo's independence is legal, court finds", CNN, 23 July 2010; cf. also "Kosovo: A chip off the old bloc", *Guardian*, 23 July 2010.

26. Joschka Fischer Joschka, "Who 'Lost' Turkey?", *Zaman*, 01 July 2010.

27. Yiđitgüden Yurdakul, "EU policy drives Turkey in the arms of Russia", *European Energy Review,* 02 June 2010.

28. "Bulgaria gets cold feet over South Stream", *EurActiv*, 14 July 2009; cf. also "Russia Prods Bulgaria over South Stream", *Sofia News Agency*, *Belene Projects,* 29 June 2010.

29. Ramadan Gozen, "Russian President Medvedev's Visit to Turkey", *TRT*, 21 May 2010.

30. "EU Presidency: Sarcozy Talks Turkey with Sweden", *Euronews*, 03 July 2009; cf. also "No Guarantee of EU accession for Turkey, says Merkel", *France 24*, 29 March 2010.

31. Brian Whitmore, "Moscow Visit by Turkish PM Underscores New Strategic Alliance", *Radio free Europe Radio Liberty,* 12 January 2010.

32. John Feffer, "Stealth Superpower: How Turkey is Chasing China to Become the Next Big Thing", TomDispatch.com, 13 June 2010.

33. Istar Gozaydin, "Religion as Soft Power in the International Relations of Turkey", *Political Studies Association Annual Conference*, Edinburgh, U.K., 29 March - 1 April 2010, pp. 5-7.

34. Available at: www.tika.gov.tr

35. "Russia Supports Serbia over Kosovo through South Stream Project", *Novosti*, 26 February 2008.

36. David Charter, "Serbia condemns 1995 Srebrenica massacre of 8,000 Muslim men and boys", *The Sunday Times*, 31 March, 2010; cf. also Bojana Barlovac, "Trip Cancelled Over Prison Visit", *BalkanInsight.com*, 26 May 2010.

37. Vladimir Socov, "Serbia's Oil Industry: A Christmas Gift to Gazprom", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1 June 2009.

38. *Hurriet Daily News*, "Turkish Mobile Venture Grows fast in Albania", 22 June 2010; *cf.* also "Diplomatic Diary", *Southeastern European Times*, 20 May 2010; cf. also Ian Bankroft, "Turkish Delights in the Balkans", *Business New Europe*, 16 June 2010.

39. Idem. Bancroft, 16 June 2010; cf. also K. Hoffman, "Turkish Airlines express interest in LOT, JAT buys", *Air Transport World,* 19 May, 2010.

40. John Feffer, "Stealth Superpower: How Turkey is Chasing China to Become the Next Big Thing", TomDispatch.com, 13 June, 2010; cf. also Angeliki Spanou, "Το Δόγμα Νταβούτογλου" [The Davutoglou Dogma], Makedonia [Greek Daily], 14 February 2010; cf. also Angelos Athanassopoulos, "Η νεο-οθωμανική (εξωτερική) πολιτική της Τουρκίας" [Turkey's neo-Ottoman foreign policy], *To Vima* [Athens Daily], 11 November, 2009.

41. Lamiya Adilgızı, Faruk Akkan and Bilal Şahin, "One year with Davutoğlu strengthens Turkey's foreign policy", *Zaman*, 2 May, 2010.

42. Ahmet Davutoglu, *Το Στρατηγικό Βάθος* [*Strategic Depth*], Athens, Ekdoseis Piotita, 2010.

43. Stefanos Evripidou, "Cyprus Problem Major Obstacle in EU-NATO Relations," Cyprus Mail, 20 Febrary 2009.

44. Jelena Radoman, *Serbia's Relations with NATO*, The Bridge: A Quarterly Review on European Integration, no.12, February 2009.

45. NATO's Parliamentary Assembly, 165 DSCFC 07 E rev 1 - THE THREE ADRIATIC ASPIRANTS: CAPABILITIES AND PREPARATIONS

46. Natasa Radic, "Croatia and Albania herald NATO anniversary" *Southeastern European Times*, April 8, 2010.