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HELLENIC STUDIES

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Volume 20, No 1, Spring / Printemps 2012

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Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Dilemma and Objections

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article mettra l'accent sur la relation entre l'Union européenne et la Turquie dans ses dimensions historiques, institutionnelles et politiques. La Turquie se qualifie comme un État sui generis par rapport aux États européens et occidentaux en raison des différences dans ses institutions sociales et sa culture politique. Il y a un déficit en matière de démocratisation et de primauté du droit. L'armée avait jusqu'à très récemment un rôle dominant dans le système politique. Il y a une interdépendance entre les développements politiques internes et le rôle auquel la Turquie aspire dans les affaires internationales, ce qui semble influencer sur son avenir européen. L'UE a fixé certains critères que la Turquie doit respecter, notamment en ce qui concerne la nécessité de symbiose pacifique, le respect du droit international et les règles en ce qui concerne la Grèce et Chypre et aussi, la démocratisation du système politique. Ce sont les conditions évidentes pour devenir membre et adhérer de façon définitive à l'Union européenne. Il y a aussi des craintes implicites dans les pays européens, principalement en Allemagne et en France, concernant la taille de la Turquie et sa démographie, ainsi que la légalisation du mouvement migratoire de masse dans l'éventualité où ce pays devrait faire partie de l'UE.

ABSTRACT

This paper will focus upon the relationship between the European Union and Turkey in its historical, institutional and political dimensions. Turkey qualifies as a sui generis state when compared to the European and Western states because of the differences in its social institutions and political culture. There is a deficit regarding democratization and rule of law. The army had until very recently a dominant role in the political system. There is an interdependence between internal political developments and the role that Turkey is projecting in international affairs, which appears to influence its European future as well. The EU has laid down certain criteria which Turkey has to abide by, particularly as they relate to necessity for peaceful symbiosis, respect of international law and rules that concern Greece and Cyprus and also, the changes in the political system concerning democratization. These are the obvious conditions for the membership and final accession to the EU. There are also implicit fears in the European Countries, mainly in Germany and France, concerning Turkey's size and demography and the legalization of the mass migration movement should it become part of the EU.

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1. Introduction:

Germany and France have principal institutional objections regarding Turkey's accession into the European Union, on the grounds that any country interested in joining the E.U. should unconditionally harmonize with E.U. values and principles and the *acquis communautaire*, effectively uphold fundamental principles, such as the rule of law, democracy, respect of international humanitarian law, the human rights declarations, minority rights, political asylum rights and civil liberties (Theophanous, 2008: 205 and Jovanovic, 2008: 123).

Democratic political stability and financial restructuring, the modernization of public administration and regulation of social and economic competition policies, constitute additional basic requirements (Joseph, 2006: 5-6). These are generally regarded among EU institutions and member states to constitute the foundations of democratic and sound political institutions and of a competitively functioning free market economy and as such, determined the institutional framework, of French and German objections, requirements or conditions to Turkey's EU accession.

Another key issue whose significance can hardly be exaggerated, and one of grave concern, mainly for Germany and France but also for other EU member-states, is demography: the high rate of population growth in Turkey (Chislett, 2008: 73) and the mass migration movement of the Turkish labour force, and its implications for the future national identity of individual E.U. countries, as well as for the internal EU political balance and decision-making process.

The former Social democrat German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, depicted these concerns in his book "Germany after the Cold War and Europe", stressing that they are embedded in Franco-German political culture. Regarding the first issue of the rapid Turkish population growth, he maintains that it is or could soon become "threatening" to EU national and community balances. Simply put, Turkey is not any accession state candidate, but one which could become the largest state within the E.U. In 2050, Turkey will probably have twice the population of Germany and France combined (Schmidt, 1997: 266-267).

As a result, the voting power (that is based on the member country's population) of Turkey in various E.U. institutions, like the European Parliament, will be substantially larger than that of Germany and France, and thus, Turkey will be able to greatly influence and in some cases control or determine the decision making mechanisms of the E.U. (Güney, 2005: 314).

Currently Germany and France are the countries with the greater voting power within the EU.

The second substantial fear of the German and French elites and indeed the public at large, concerns the crucial issue of free movement of workers and other social groups between E.U. members (*Today's Zaman*, 21/11/2008). If Turkey joins the E.U., millions more of Turkish workers would be able to freely move into European cities. Free movement of labour is a defining characteristic of integration, an EU right and privilege from which no member country could be excluded from, via national and permanent derogations.

However, given the sheer size of Turkey, according to some EU officials (*Hurriyet*), the right of free movement for Turkish citizens could pose major additional problems for the national identity and social and cultural cohesion of EU member states, something that is outright undesirable to both their governments and public opinion.

The last concern of Germany and France concerns the relationship between Turkish civilization and European civilization. Could Islam become a pillar of European culture? Can the Ottoman heritage, be reconciled and integrated in European affairs? These are fundamental and difficult questions on European identity and future, which cannot be easily brushed aside with simplistic stereotypes and anything but problem-free ideological schemas of "multiculturalism", and which, consequently, continue to cause concern and controversy among politicians and intellectuals of practically the entire ideological spectrum all around Europe.

Equally crucial to Turkey's bid to join the EU, are the attitudes and policies of Greece (and, since its 2004 accession, of Cyprus too) (*Ifantis*, 2004: 263-265). Analyses of the position of Greece, often distinguish its strategic from its tactical aspects and point out that it was primarily on the tactical level that this position evolved in two broadly distinguishable periods or phases.

During the first period of EU membership, following its 1980 accession, Greece was firmly opposed to any prospect of Turkey's accession, because of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus (1974), the multiplying Turkish claims against Greek sovereignty and rights over the Aegean, which led the two countries to the brink of war in at least three occasions (the 1976, 1987 and 1996 crises) and the rivalry with Turkey for regional influence in the Balkans (*Brewin*, 2000: 114-115).

Overall, and at the risk of oversimplification, EU membership gave Greece a major comparative political advantage that balanced Turkey's military supremacy, whose clearest manifestation has been the continuing to date,

illegal occupation of well over a third of the territory of the State of Cyprus (the Republic of Cyprus) (Guerot, 2008: 165) and the permanent maintenance of a massive and heavily armed military force of well over 40.000 troops (The Economist, 19/4/2010) enjoying decisive support by the near-by based Turkish air force and reinforced by systemic Turkish colonization of the occupied area of the island.

The repeated Greek blockage of attempts to open the way for Turkey's EU accession, with continuing Turkish aggression remaining intact was maintained from 1980 to 1999, although a certain policy adjustment took place in March 1995, when Greece lifted a veto on Turkey's EU Custom Union in exchange for securing a firm timetable for the commencement of Cyprus' EU accession negotiations in 1998 (Christou, 2004: 132).

As these negotiations were advancing the point of successful completion, in December 1999, at the Helsinki Summit, Greece, without changing in essence its strategy, agreed at the tactical level with Turkey's candidacy status for EU accession, which included an "enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession" (Helsinki European Council, 10-11/12/2009).

Two main political reasons led to this further adjustment of Greek strategy. In the first place, the Greek government realized that the refusal of the European powers to allow Turkey become an E.U. member, was mainly structural in nature, related to strategic concerns. In this context, Athens had no real reason of its own to want to be held responsible by other member states for standing in the way of Turkish membership (Kazamias, 2006: 138-149).

Moreover, Greece, by agreeing to Turkey's E.U. accession "candidacy", secured full and unconditional EU accession for the Republic of Cyprus (Kazamias, 2006: 138-149). Until 1999, the accession of Cyprus, was considered uncertain, not because Cyprus did not satisfy EU accession criteria, but because of the problem of the continuing Turkish occupation of part of the island republic (Christou, 2004: 86-87).

In 1999, Greece succeeded in making all its EU partners agree that Cyprus' EU future would no longer be held hostage of Turkish aggression, especially since successive Cypriot governments, with Greece's support, were committed to a peaceful UN-led negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, as the only way to terminate the Turkish occupation.

In short, the 1999 adjustment of the policy of Greece vis-à-vis the question of Turkey's EU accession was determined by realist considerations. Athens acknowledged and accepted a strategic Turkish objective or ambition, EU

accession, not as a national retreat but as a means to facilitate its own national policy objectives and future changes in Ankara's policies, in the context of their harmonization with EU values and principles.

2. Turkey's historical route to Europe

Turkey, in its Ottoman tradition, has been perceiving the West, as a destination of a long geopolitical journey, from central Asia to Constantinople and Europe. The Ottoman empire had a "special relationship", of great power competition to Western states, especially Great Britain ("the Eastern Question" (Polar, 1995: 10-16 and Wheatcroft, 1994: 133-197)) but continued to look up to the West and Europe, as an anchor of stability and prosperity, that was the main reason of the military route to Europe.

After 1648, when its armies were stopped outside Vienna, the Ottoman Empire experienced a protracted process that eventually came down to its dissolution. The peak point, in political terms, was the period of "Tanzimat" (1838-1866), (Caha, 2008: 86). The essential development of the Turkish route to Europe was the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Rocthus, 2008: 27-28).

Kemal Attaturk was strongly convinced that Turkey should become an integral part of European and western political culture (Saribay, 1986). To that end, he established revolutionary new Turkish political, social and cultural structures. He believed and declared that Islam had no place in the New Turkey of prosperity and progress (Caha, 2008: 87). His beliefs and principles were upheld by all the Turkish governments after his death, and especially the leaderships from the early 1960s until the end of 1990.

In 1963, Turkey, closely watching and following Greece, applied for association membership to the European Economic Community, and this objective was achieved through the Ankara Agreement in 1964 (Brewin, 2000: 18). Full accession, was -and remains since- the ultimate objective, one that posed an identity problem of Turkey.

In the years that followed, the Greek-Turkish conflict, over Cyprus and also, increasingly, the Aegean, intensified, decisively influencing both states' efforts to strengthen their international position (Athanasopoulos, 2001: 96-97). Europe became a rivalry area, in which Turkey sought to catch-up and balance Greece's presence. Ankara's European route was halted several times, because of the constitutionally legitimated military interventions in Turkish politics. The 1972 and 1980 military coups were cases in point (Kotsovilis, 2006: 48).

On the other side of the Aegean, Greece succeeded in becoming a full EEC member-state, in 1980. In the late 1980s, the Turkish Ozal government emphasized its European orientation, but did not succeed in convincing the European Community to accept a Turkish candidacy for accession (Tibi, 1998: 5).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military and political elites of Turkey believed strongly that its loss of traditional geopolitical importance for NATO and the USA, through the neighborhood to the ex-imperium, could be recovered through its growing influence in central Asia. Turkish Prime Minister Ozal declared, in his book "Turkey and Europe", that Turkey aspired to become - and, also, to be internationally acknowledged as - a guiding model of western state and society to the new emerging states in the former Soviet Union, as well as to Middle Eastern states (Yiallourides and Langides, 2010: 151).

3. The position of Greece concerning the European orientation of Turkey

Reinforcing its national-state security, as a fundamental prerequisite of upgrading its overall international position, was as crucial a motive for Greece's EU accession, as were its domestic modernization and prosperity. Vis-à-vis Turkey, Greece used its EC/EU membership to bargain Turkey's candidacy status for a change of Turkish policy in Cyprus issue and the Aegean (Athanasopoulos, 2001: 96-97). For their part, other European states had an interest in pushing Greece to the front, to wash their own hands on the issue of Turkey's EC/EU orientation. Greece paid a cost for that, while at the same time failing to persuade Turkey to make concessions in Cyprus, an international problem of invasion and occupation, and/or the bilateral front, in main areas of the Greek-Turkish conflict.

One possible explanatory factor for Turkish intransigence - and, indeed, one of the main arguments against accepting Turkey's accession candidacy - was that Turkey was not a typical example of a western political system (Oguzlu, 2002: 59-63), in which internal social interests and demands and public opinion has considerable influence restricting the autonomy of the National Security Council military-dominated elite over foreign policy matters (Çalış, 2001: 53-75 and Robins, 1993: 657-676). In this, structural sense, of foreign policy "Black Box" (Hudson and Mershon, 1995: 209-238 and Singer, 1961: 77-92), Turkey was more similar to the former Soviet Union than to western states.

In the mid-late 1990s, the change of political leadership in Greece, led to a change of Greek approach and policy to the Turkish-EU question (Theodoropoulos, 1988: 9, 16, 338 and Ligeros, 2004: 4). This was a functional phenomenon, whereby leadership is the decisive policy variant. The New Greek leadership chose the 1999 Helsinki EU Summit as the new field of trying to persuade Turkey using new tactics and methodology in the art of political communication and dialogue and offering more carrot than stick (Churchill, 1951: 24) adopting the choice of acceptance the Turkish candidacy under the condition of the full membership of the Republic of Cyprus.

This was a double strategy of the twin Simitis-Papandreou, aspiring to resolve a zero sum game. On the one hand, Turkey was given the potential of a candidate for a future membership in the EU (Timmerman, Rohtus, Mels, 2008: 19). On the other, the full membership of Cyprus was secured.

4. The Helsinki Summit and the turn of Germany and France

Greece's great turn vis-a-vis Turkey, its acknowledgement of Turkey's European "candidacy", was instrumental in the two 'great powers' of the European Union, France and Germany's projection of their own reservations, for the first time officially, on this issue. These reservations concerned not the candidacy itself, but its context and duration. Every EU candidate country usually has a fixed time framework in which it should become member of the EU. France and Germany insisted that Turkey should be treated as an extraordinary case (Brewin, 2000: 18), with no time framework (Akcali, 2008: 53-54).

France and Germany, in different tones and with different arguments projected their position for a permanent postponement of Turkish accession, mostly because of the problems of Turkish integration in European societies, and of the question of the compatibility of western European values to those of the Ottoman, Islamic, Turkish society (Davutoğlu, 2008: 77-96 and Minagias, 2010: 36-40). This is a case underlining the vitality of cultural foundations in the theory and actual process of integration of structures and political systems. In this vein, President Sarkozy declared that the special role and position of Turkey is unique, at once outside and inside the EU. He initiated a special project, called "Mediterranean European project" (Bennhold, 10/5/2007 and Goldirova, 18/5/07 and Today's Zaman 12/7/2008), to accommodate Turkey and other non-EU Mediterranean countries, which may become the EU's "Near Abroad" (Yiallourides and Langides, 2010: 45).

5. The Dialectic Relationship between Fears, Expectations and Political Expediencies of the Great Powers and the Turkish Multifaceted Specificity

A central topic of discussion is the one concerning the progress of Turkey in its route to join the EU. That discussion is ultimately focused on the issue of European integration, the institutional framework and the program of Europe in its route to achieve the goal of political union and federation of the European political building. This requires social, economic and political convergence and integration of the parts of the European system into a unified sum of autonomous EU states.

The fears of Europeans, as mentioned before, consist of the size of Turkey and the diversity in accordance to the political philosophy of the structure of powers and the implementation of the democratic principle. Also, the socio-economic and cultural deficit of Turkey compared to Europe. For those reasons the reservations and concerns of the European political and institutional groups have increased, in reference to the road and the participation of Turkey to EU.

Until very lately it was a regular phenomenon in Turkey's political life to rely on the principles of Kemal Ataturk (Steinbach, 1996: 140-142 and Karpath, 1974: 176-208). Especially, the military circles used those principles in order to "legalise" in this way, diverse and multidimensional interventions to the Turkish political system (Yiallourides and Tsakonas, 2002: 13). In the past, it's been said that "Ataturk governs his country from the mausoleum" (Yiallourides and Langides, 2010: 115). It is no exaggeration to say that for many decades that phrase had a specific amount of correctness. Of course it is very difficult to analyze, how much truth lies on that phrase or how the principles of Ataturk influence the management of the country's social, political and economic life and in what degree. What is more interesting is the verification that proves that the modernization and democratization "never were in Turkey a single procedure" but, in contrary, divided into different levels and periods (Ronneberger, 1981).

The existing problems are economic and social. Already it seems that the European partners began to worry because of "the great population, the large size of the country and the great poverty", as the former president of the European Parliament, Josep Borrel, mentioned. The interesting point is that in the same, exact domains there are huge cultural, economic and social gaps. Many Turkish intellectuals remark that "Turkey is a huge Bangladesh with small districts/islets of Belgium, France, Netherlands and Italy" (Yiallourides and Langides, 2010: 13).

That gap also proves the conflicting and contradictory perspectives of those who fervently wish and strive for Turkey to join the EU. On the one hand, the holders of the Kemalist ideology and the hardened supporters of the west reforms, long standing opponents of the delay that Islam implies, and on the other hand the Kemalist themselves. The first believe that the Turkey's integration to the EU will inhibit the Islamism and strengthen the Atatürkist "secularistic" state. The others are of the opinion that the unobstructed implementation of the Islamic principles or the Islamic type of behavior that the Kemalist military-bureaucrats impedes, would be enabled in the name of the democracy and the protection of human rights that the EU expresses.

The trend currently prevailing in the EU is to place Turkey in a special status, opinion mainly and actively supported by Paris and Berlin. As referred in Turkey, the partners would like Turkey to become "a member which won't be exactly a member" (Manisali, 8/10/2004 and Arcayurek, 9/10/2004). For that reason the same EU member states always were suspicious to their country's road towards European integration, integration that they wouldn't be in the position to control. Those states by setting from the start their terms, would want the EU to admit that Turkey has a "specific character" that is inherent to its national independence. Some analysts have been to the point of seeing the Turkey's road towards the EU as a continuation of the Greek-Turkish war in 1920-1922 (Toker, 2003: 403).

The following report from media reports in the kemalist/western oriented Turkish media indicates the current concerns related to the Turkey's road to Europe:

...In the meantime, the EU will continue showing the bat under the overcoat: Place the Kurdish people in a minority status, recognize the Armenian massacre, give Cyprus to the Greeks, abandon Greeks in the Aegean, distinguish the Alevi community, call the Jewish, criticize the military leaders... (Som, 8/10/2004).

Atatürk did not let any alternative solution in the structure and orientation of the Turkish state, rather than that of Europe and the West. That was the choice of progress, a choice that for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was a strategic one way road and could stand alone, without any other choices (Scharplipp, 1992: 13). Islam was for the founder of the Turkish Republic a retrograde step (Ahmad, 1977: 363-365) as a social behavior and as an ideological approach.

Today, the political Islam appears revolutionary pro-European, claiming a protagonist role in the country's European orientation as well as the overthrow of the Kemalist structure of power with an internal and international strategic

opening to Islam, choosing in that way the conflict with the “former regime”. Europe was for Turkey according to Atatürk’s perception, of a strategic significance cultural size, a political partner and an economic model of success that should become “a model for imitation for his country”, that is necessary to rise into “modern level of culture” (Pezmazoglou, 1993: 194-196).

Today, since Turkey is a candidate country, the views converge on the issue of setting a date for Turkey’s EU membership. The accession could be considered as just “a ten-year opaque mortgage in reference to the final positive outcome” for Turkey. It is common sense that “a new page opens for the history of Turkey. But also at the same time starts the main phase that would determine the Turkey’s fate” (Bila, 6/10/2004).

The question that emerges from the European perspective of Turkey focused not on the Turkey’s future form rather than on the shape of the European Union itself. It is widely known that only two possible versions could emerge. On the one hand the European Union would move towards a federal structure which is extremely difficult as is already proved by the unexpectedly negative outcome of referendums from the European people such as the French. On the other hand, the European Union would function in the framework of a fragile confederation orientation, a more political and economic alliance (Aktar, 2001) and less a Political Union. It is obvious that the US and the United Kingdom would wish the second version. (United Kingdom, as is said, sites less from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean than of the opposite coast of the Channel. The distance that separates United Kingdom from continental Europe is greater than that, which separates it from the US).

Turkey certainly expects the second development. It is not irrelevant the fact that the US insists Turkey to be included as a full member of the EU. As United Kingdom is situated in the one side and Turkey in the other, the US could feel safe that is not going to be created another pole that may challenge their global hegemony.

The decision of Helsinki is a perspective for Turkey. The historic goal of Turkey, from the last century until today, is linked with the willingness of the Turkish state to be part of a stable area and to acquire a European passport.

6. The Helsinki as the starting point of the EU-Turkey venture

Helsinki is not only a challenge for Turkey but also a vital issue. It is a challenge in the way of danger and not only of opportunity. The decision of

the Summit clears a very difficult way for those who wish to join the EU and especially for Turkish state's authoritarian structure. Turkey is a state which is considered a violator of Human Rights and Rule of Law (Selahattin, 1998: 85 and Zurcher, 2004: 402-409). The state, therefore, is not democratic and enters a phase in which it should prove in practice that it is transformed from an authoritarian to a democratic state (Kosebalaban, 2002: 130-136 and Bir, 2000: 30-32). A state, which complies with the European political culture.

The structures of the state could be reformed without a revolution, which means a procedure of internal adjustments and structural changes that may not necessarily be peaceful. Even if Turkey reaches the level of accession, it should recognize through its competent bodies and its institutional framework that a real and essential progress is necessary in its internal policy. Especially on the topic of Rule of Law, democratization of the parliamentary system, respect of human and minority rights, free, without constraint, universal function of the democratic principle. Turkey should walk a huge distance in order to show in practice some signs of European maturity.

The Helsinki Summit was undoubtedly a great Ankara's diplomatic success that ensured in a way that Turkey earned the desired "identity" of a potential European country. That diplomatic success, which was supported by many, would imply Turkey's automatic geostrategic upgrading to the status of the member of the western stability and security. The role and the involvement of Turkey increase because of the dangerous Middle East and increased essentially since the 11th of September 2001.

That analysis is however, misleading. In actual fact, the tactic benefit for Turkey is almost forfeit by its intense dispute with Union on the topic of NATO-"European army" during 2000-2002. The substance of the matter lies on the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria (1993). According to the estimation of the French top diplomat and historian, Eric Rouleau "implies the substantial decomposition of the Turkish state system" (Rouleau, 2000: 102).

The confrontation between Turkey and the European Union -France had a protagonist role - in reference to the "availability" of the NATO's force for KEPPA (Udum, 2002: 87-97), showed to the Franco-German core/axis that if Turkey joins the EU it would behave as a second and also loyal Albion sided with the US. By this it means that Turkey would internally prohibit the diplomatic and defensive emancipation of the EU.

Ankara did not hesitate to destroy twice, in December 2000 and in November 2001, the integration of the completion of the EU-NATO negotiations. It requested to participate -and indeed with the right of veto- in

the decision making process of the European Council, related to the EU's mission of Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Turkey also demanded to exercise the same rights as a member state of the EU in any case concerning the function of KEPPA. The EU wasn't at all pleased with that demand and wasn't prepared to accept or satisfy it (Udum, 2002: 87-97).

The Commission of the EU, according to the report dated October 6th, 2004 (Council of the European Union, 21/9/2005) and the Council Conclusions on 11th December 2006 (Council Conclusions 11/12/2006), at first gave the green light to Turkey for the start of accession negotiations to the EU and the mark out of a long and rocky road of Turkey, for the route which will lead to the final accession.

A variety of terms and conditions are set in the report, Turkey should comply with most of them, in order eventually to integrate the European family. The most striking part of that report is that for the first time in the history of the Union, it is alleged a strong possibility of discontinuation or non-completion of the negotiation process. At first glance it means that the EU cannot be ascertained that Turkey is capable of proceeding to those deep and extremely difficult for its political system, structural changes which would transform the kemalist state and convert it into a democratic state governed by law, according to the European standards.

The report expects from Turkey fundamental and radical changes in the political system, concerning the human rights and the personal freedom. Also it demands a change in the wider social and political institutions, the function of democracy, the economic modernization and the rural economy (more than half of the country's population is engaged in agriculture), the wider system of law but also in more specific topics of foreign policy concerning the neighbor countries like Greece and Turkey (Imbros, Ecumenical Patriarchate, reopening of the theological academy on the island of Halki, solution to the Cyprus problem) (Council Conclusions 11/12/2006).

It is clear and transparent not only from the report but also from the declarations of the European politicians that the European wish to promote, having exhausted all possible options that derive from the legal system, the institutional and legal culture of Europe, to "impede" to the highest possible level the accession road and mainly the final accession of Turkey's to the EU. Many of them deeply wish to be aligned with the German Christian Democrats who insist to a strong NO in Turkey's accession and a forceful YES to the special privileged partnership between Turkey - EU (The Economist, 21/10/2010).

The Europeans are not afraid of Turkey just because it is a Muslim state or a violator of human rights and freedoms but above all because Turkey is an emerging population giant that could continue growing rapidly and may eventually be the most powerful and dominant factor of the EU.

After the finalization of the route and the accession framework of Turkey at the Hague Summit in December 2004, a game of strategic confrontation between the Europeans and Turkey is being played. A virtual reality appears presenting the Europeans wishing Turkey to join the EU. The reality yet is totally different. The Europeans have a hidden hope that the Kemal's Land won't be able to adjust to the European standards, to the hard terms and conditions it had to meet and eventually will become bogged down in its negotiations.

7. Conclusions:

The great European powers like France and Germany, as well as also the governments and people of Europe (Schmidt, 1997: 296-297), don't wish at all a full accession of Turkey to the EU because they feel that this country will function as a threat for their national composition, their national identity and their population dynamics. Most of the Europeans strongly approve the case of the special relationship of the EU with Ankara, where the economy and geostrategic importance are the main criteria for the choice of that institutional framework.

The paradox in the triangle Ankara - Brussels - Nicosia consists of the fact that Turkey is a candidate for accession country to a potential con-federal state, to an international organization like the EU, where Cyprus is a member. How can a country that denies the existence and occupies the territory of an EU member that means a European territory, could enjoy the status of candidate for accession country to the EU?

Finally, there is a unique phenomenon in the international politics, where a country refuses to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, which is a member of the EU. Turkey should recognize institutionally, politically and contractually Cyprus and to accept the implementation of the Ankara Protocol that impose to the member states a minimum degree of cooperation between the accession countries and those who are contracting parties with the Union, with the member states of the EU.

That period but especially after the referendum of 12th September 2010, Kemalism shows a rapid and rising tension of shrinking. The Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is according to the outcome of the

referendum, the dominant ruler and triumphant of the “Ankara political scene” game. Now what remains is to crystallize its policy with reference to the relationship of the Islamic government with Democracy, Rule of Law and its willingness to realize the institutional obligations of the Turkish state in many EU levels.

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