

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

HELLENIC STUDIES

LA CRISE CHYPRIOTE THE CYPRUS CRISIS

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What Future for the Cyprus Problem?

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RÉSUMÉ

L'histoire de la question chypriote est pensée comme une histoire d'«occasions manquées». Ce document se penche sur cette pensée tout en suggérant que le discours sur les «occasions perdues» est articulé autour de certains préjugés et préférences politiques. La dernière initiative de l'ONU sur le problème de Chypre (2008-2012) est exemplaire. Les acteurs de l'ONU et d'autres ont vu une «occasion unique» dans deux leaders individuels. Ils se sont trompés dans leur jugement et leurs attentes. Rien ne laisse penser qu'une nouvelle «opportunité» ait vu le jour avec l'élection de M. Anastasiades à la présidence de Chypre. En fin de compte, le discours sur les «opportunités» constitue un passif considérable du problème de Chypre. Après tant d'échecs, il est grand temps d'envisager d'interdire le «discours d'opportunité» et de se concentrer sur les réalités du problème de Chypre.

ABSTRACT

The history of the Cyprus problem is thought to be a history of “lost opportunities.” This paper reflects on that thought and suggests that the discourse on “lost opportunities” is framed around certain political biases and preferences. The latest UN initiative on the Cyprus problem (2008-2012) is paradigmatic. The UN and other actors saw a “unique opportunity” in two individual leaders. They were wrong in their judgment and expectations. There is little evidence that a new “opportunity” has emerged with the election of Mr. Anastasiades to the Presidency of Cyprus. In the end, the discourse on “opportunities” constitutes a considerable liability of the Cyprus Problem. After so many failures, it is high time to consider banning the “opportunity discourse” and focus on the realities of the Cyprus problem.

Introduction

There is little doubt that the Cyprus problem is one of the most resilient international conflicts. The political, social, economic and cultural perplexity around that conflict is such that it is even difficult to mark its emergence in the international system. The Cyprus Question, as it is also known in the

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literature,¹ may be considered in the context of great power politics and a struggle for dominance and control on the island of Cyprus since the era of Thucydides.² In the contemporary—post-Westphalia—international system, the Cyprus problem was pertinent to the rise and fall of Empires and the emergence of the states system in Europe and the Middle East.³ In the context of the post-World War II era, the island of Cyprus became prey of a peculiar—yet asymmetric—struggle between the UK, Turkey and Greece.⁴ A strong link was forged between regional geopolitical re-arrangements and Cyprus' anti-colonial struggle for self-determination.⁵ Ultimately, geopolitics was superimposed over self-determination.

The historical contingency of 1950s engendered a political process that led into the creation of a new state; the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus may have joined the ranks of post-imperial states, but it was primed to fail.⁶ The declaration of independence of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 marked a new phase of the Cyprus problem. That phase may be defined as the strive of a tiny island in the Eastern Mediterranean to survive as a sovereign and independent state amid internal and external challenges. Since 1960, the Cyprus problem forms an intractable regional security complex that involves local, regional, and international actors.⁷

Since the declaration of independence, Cyprus' survival struggle took a number of turns. In 1961, just two years after the completion of the London-Zurich Agreements, the Republic of Cyprus dealt with a constitutional crisis. Turkish Cypriot House Representatives rejected a law that would prolong government's tax policy and the Turkish Cypriot Vice President exercised his right of veto over the implementation of a constitutional provision for the establishment of the Cypriot Army. That crisis was a bad omen for Cyprus. Two years later, in 1963, the President of Cyprus put forth some amendments over the Constitution of 1960.⁸ Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected Makarios' proposition for constitutional amendments. Within days, the uneasy political situation in Cyprus was cultivated into a violent crisis.⁹ The year that followed was crucial, for it restructured the political, social, legal and demographic situation on the island for good. In an effort to protest against the proposed constitutional amendments and promote a certain political agenda, Turkish Cypriot law makers, the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, and other members and officers of the governmental apparatus

“failed to turn up and were persistently refusing to exercise the functions of their respective offices.”¹⁰ Hence the Republic of Cyprus had to function under a peculiar legal doctrine of necessity.¹¹

After the events of 1963, Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership pursued a policy of secession. In parallel, some groups of Greek Cypriots thought that the struggle for self-determination must continue. Union with Greece (enosis) was their ultimate goal.¹² The Turkish policy of secession and the new political movement of enosis had some ramifications for the Republic of Cyprus. At the political level, the state of Cyprus faced an existential threat. Turkish Cypriots were organized in pockets and Turkey threatened to use physical force against Cyprus, which it actually did in the summer of 1964.¹³ At the international level, the UN Security Council issued a pivotal resolution on Cyprus and established a peacekeeping force on the island.¹⁴ The situation on the ground gradually evolved into a highly unstable political turbulence. Inter- and intra-communal violence, as well as foreign intervention, drew Cyprus into a deep crisis. By late 1960s, the government of the Republic of Cyprus could neither exercise its sovereign rights over its territory and population in an effective way nor deter internal and external threats. The coup in Greece in 1967 seems to have set a teleological design for the Cyprus problem.¹⁵ After a brief coup against Makarios’ government in 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus and by August 1974 some 40% of the island’s territory came under its occupation. The status quo was dramatically changed and the demographic structure of Cyprus was artificially and violently altered.¹⁶

After the events of 1974, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots thought that they were in a more advantageous position to further, and ultimately complete, their secessionist policy. In 1975, Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared the establishment of “The Turkish Federal Republic of Cyprus”, an alleged constituent part of a future federal structure in Cyprus. Eight years later, in 1983, Turkish Cypriots made a second unilateral declaration; this time they declared the establishment of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”). With 13 votes to, 1 against (Pakistan) and 1 abstention (Jordan), the UN Security Council deplored “the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus,” considered “the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal,” and called upon all States “to respect the sovereignty,

independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus” and “not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.”¹⁷ Apart from Turkey, no other state recognizes the breakaway “TRNC.”

UN efforts to mediate a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem yielded no fruition. Since 1964 and up until 2004, a number of ideas, proposals, and plans were submitted and discussed by various actors, without however any concrete outcome.¹⁸ The most comprehensive proposal for the solution of the Cyprus problem was submitted in 2002 by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. After two years of negotiations that involved the two Cypriot communities, Greece, Turkey, the UK, the US, the UN, the EU, and a number of other mediators, that plan was put on two separate, simultaneous referenda in April 2004. The Greek Cypriot Community rejected that plan by 76%, while the Turkish Cypriot community endorsed that plan by 65%.¹⁹

The evolution of the Cyprus problem, however, must be also considered beyond the confines of the UN. Having established an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1972, the Republic of Cyprus managed to develop and enhance its relationship with the European Union (EU), and gradually join the Union in 2004.²⁰ Greece and Greek Cypriots considered Cyprus’ route to the EU a means to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Entrance to the EU was deemed essential for achieving a settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the Union’s founding principles.²¹ Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, considered Cyprus’ bid for EU accession a negative development that would undermine their negotiating position. Ultimately, Cyprus’ progress to EU accession was closely linked with the UN efforts to promote a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s bid for joining the Union.²² Although it is difficult to take a firm position, on retrospect, the “EU factor” had a negative impact on the Cyprus problem. The stance of some pivotal officials of the EU during, and after, the Annan plan process, alienated both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who gradually became skeptical on the Union’s impact on the Cyprus problem. Greek and Turkish Cypriots may have different take-off points on the EU, but they seem to have come to the same point, i.e. that the EU is not trustworthy.²³

The long history of, and the relevant complexity around, the Cyprus problem make it an intractable international conflict which is quite difficult to be settled. This paper takes stock of the most recent UN initiative to mediate a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, and critically reflects upon the possibility of a breakthrough under a peculiar historical contingency that emerged in Cyprus in 2012-2013. That historical contingency comprises a number of factors, the most important of which are: 1. the deep economic crisis of the Republic of Cyprus, the worst in its history, 2. the discovery of abundant hydrocarbon reserves in Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 3. the uncertainty that surrounds the region of Eastern Mediterranean, and 4. the coming into power of Mr. Anastasiades, who was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2013. All these factors are considered by the UN, the EU and other international actors to form a unique momentum for pushing a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem "in the coming months or years."²⁴ Although there is little substantial evidence (if any), some commentators convey systematically the idea that the ongoing historical contingency entails a grand opportunity for the Cyprus problem.²⁵ There is maybe a good chance for shifting the Cyprus problem from the current state of affairs into a new one, but, in any way, the Cyprus problem has been shifted to a number of states of affairs in the past. The question is always whether the new state of affairs would be better or worse than the previous one. It remains to be seen whether there is a chance for a new dramatic shift in the coming months or years or whether this is just another bombastic announcement of a new UN initiative that will vindicate the rule of thumb, i.e. that in the aftermath of a UN initiative on the Cyprus problem things are getting terribly worse.²⁶

The Discourse of "Lost Opportunities"

By doing away the complexity that surrounds the Cyprus problem, one may opine that the history of that problem is a history of lost opportunities.²⁷ There is some value in contemplating such an approach. Maybe there are some lessons to be drawn from a problem's history and the contingency upon which certain political agents acted and/or failed to act. The way in which one looks into a problem's past, however, depends on how they perceive history, agency and causality.²⁸ An investigation into the history of an international conflict

without a concrete philosophical and methodological account of inquiry would confine one's account into a certain interpretive analysis of "facts."²⁹ In the particular case of the Cyprus problem, political preferences and biases may frame one's sense of "opportunity."³⁰

Although a discussion on "lost opportunities" is relatively problematic – from an academic and a practical standpoint –, the history of the Cyprus problem is saturated with proclamations about "new opportunities" that should not be lost and/or assertions about "new windows of opportunities" that shall stay open for a limited time. The paradox with that "opportunity fixation" is that every previously "lost opportunity" for the Cyprus problem was deemed the last one.³¹ After so many errors in judgment about "missed" or "new" opportunities, it is maybe reasonable to reconsider that line of reasoning about the Cyprus problem and its future.³² Maybe the discourse about "opportunities" could be part of that problem and a considerable obstacle for its solution.

For quite a long time now, the situation on the ground is undeniably fabricated around a discourse of "opportunities." On that account, some reflection on the fixation of "lost opportunities" may be instructive. How could such a trend be explained? Why the deliberators of the culture of "opportunities" are keen in reproducing that discourse? How does a "lost opportunity" ultimately bear a new one? The discourse on "opportunities" is like déjà vu all over again, and again. On reflection, the reiterated public discourse of "opportunities" seems to be pertinent to an exercise of "expectation elevation" and/or a process of a self-imposed mission to deliver on a perceived sense of "opportunity." Sometimes this seems to be a tactic of a deliberate effort to drive the process into a certain direction.

Taking, for instance, the case of the Annan plan, those who talked about an "opportunity" were those who, one way or another, supported that plan. A media report that compares reactions on the Annan Plan in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, the UK, Germany, Italy, the US and other countries and regions on December 2002,³³ shows that there was a mixture of perceptions about that plan. Only an empirical investigation may show "who" and "why" considered that plan "opportunity" or "misfortune." The very use of the concepts of "opportunity" and "misfortune" in the context of a discourse on the Cyprus problem presupposes a strong bias toward certain political preferences. These

preferences however are not necessarily incompatible with one another, i.e. a person who saw the Annan plan as an “opportunity” was not necessarily a “pro-solution” figure, like a person who saw the Annan plan a “misfortune” was not necessarily an “anti-solution” figure, and vice versa. It is only in cases where political bias drives one’s considerations all the way down that absolute conclusion(s) may be drawn.

Looking into a sample of academic scholarship one may discern various political biases. The work of Tocci, for instance, is a paradigmatic contribution to the discourse of “lost opportunities.”³⁴ On the other hand, Palley, for instance, suggests that the Annan plan was a “misfortune” for Cyprus, the UN and the broader international community.³⁵ Individual biases and standpoints may shape preferences and lead to certain conclusions, but they should not be considered in an “either/or” perspective. It is quite problematic to try to frame the political “reality” around the Cyprus problem over certain biases and/or standpoints. To the contrary, the Cyprus problem should be considered from a pluralistic angle.

Unfortunately, the UN team that dealt with the Cyprus problem in the aftermath of the Annan plan failure perpetuated the discourse of “opportunities.” In one of his reports on his mission of good offices, the UN Secretary-General epitomized that discourse:

*The Cyprus problem has been on the agenda of the Security Council for close to 47 years. The Secretary-General was first asked to use his good offices to seek out a durable solution in Cyprus in March 1964 (Security Council resolution 186 (1964)). Since then successive Secretaries-General and their Special Advisers have undertaken efforts, including the intense yet unsuccessful efforts between 1999 and 2004, to assist the two sides in achieving a comprehensive settlement. As more than four decades of reports to the Security Council have documented, there have been many missed opportunities...The Security Council subsequently adopted resolution 1930 (2010) on 15 June 2010, in which it strongly urged the leaders to increase the momentum in the negotiations to ensure the full exploitation of this opportunity to reach a comprehensive settlement.*³⁶

Although there is an understanding of the many challenges that the Cyprus

problem entails, the emphasis is mostly attached on the “opportunity discourse.” This may be a deliberate effort to encourage and push the parties for a compromise. At the same time however the “opportunity discourse” is coupled with a number of “warning signals,” such as “this is the last opportunity,” if it is not seized “the status quo in Cyprus will be unattainable.”³⁷ With the benefit of hindsight, the “opportunity discourse” is used as a political instrument for communication purposes. The aim is always to lever the parties into agreement, especially the party which is considered the most vulnerable one.

Another “Lost Opportunity”?

The latest UN initiative that was commenced in March 2008 was heavily premised on the well-established – yet ineffective – “opportunity discourse.” That was supposed to be the “greatest opportunity ever.” Before exploring the credentials of that “opportunity,” it is worth referring to the way in which the previously “lost opportunity” was rationalized by the UN.³⁸ Overall there are two major lines of rationalization. The first one relates to the decision of the EU to invite Cyprus to join the Union without a solution of its political problem being a precondition. According to a report prepared by David Harland:

In the years leading up to 2004, both sides [Greek and Turkish Cypriots] had an incentive to cooperate on a settlement, knowing that a compromise settlement might help get them into the EU. This was presumably a major factor to the Turkish ‘yes’ vote in 2004 referendum. Once the EU decided that the Republic of Cyprus could be admitted to the EU even without a settlement, the Greek Cypriots had very little incentive to compromise. This presumably helps to account for the size of the Greek Cypriot ‘no’ vote in 2004... When the EU was enthusiastic about “enlarging,” Turkey had an incentive to be cooperative on Cyprus, as a way to smooth its own path to the EU. Now the EU is less keen on enlarging, and conspicuously less keen on enlarging in Turkey’s direction, Turkey’s incentives to cooperate on a Cyprus settlement are less.³⁹

That line of reasoning about the “EU factor” is prevalent across the “opportunity discourse” literature.⁴⁰ The aforementioned report however seems to consider the nexus between the Cyprus problem, the EU, and Turkey in isolation of the historical contingency within which that nexus was

developed in the years leading up to Cyprus accession to the EU (1990-2004). Although this is not the primary aim of this paper, some thoughts about that issue could be put forth:

1. In 1990, the Republic of Cyprus made an application for EU accession on behalf of all Cypriots. That application was accepted by the EU, but, when invited to participate in the Cyprus team for accession negotiations (March 1998), Turkish Cypriot leadership decided not to participate and harden its position in the Cyprus problem.⁴¹
2. On December 2002, the newly elected Turkish government of Gul-Erdogan rejected Annan plan II. Had Turkey accepted that plan in Copenhagen, Greek Cypriots would have left with very few options.⁴²
3. In March 2003, Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected Annan plan III and declined the Secretary-General's proposal to put that plan on referendum.⁴³
4. The way in which the UN team exercised arbitration in finalizing Annan plan V is highly contested.⁴⁴ In a detailed report on the post-referendum situation in the Cyprus problem, Sir Kieran Prendergast, Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, admitted that the Annan plan failed to accommodate some major concerns of Greek Cypriots.⁴⁵

If considered out of context, all these stages could be considered as “lost opportunities” for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. In the case at hand, some proponents of the “opportunity discourse” camp see the transformation of “the Greek Cypriot incentive structure” as a primary cause of the Annan plan “lost opportunity”.⁴⁶ This seems more like a blame game than a comprehensive analysis. Oversimplification and monothematic approaches form an integral part of the Cyprus problem.

The second most popular line of rationalization for the Annan plan “lost opportunity” relates to the prevalence of a rejectionist attitude across the Greek Cypriot community. Following the first point above, had the Greek Cypriots not been given assurances about EU accession without a settlement, they would have probably developed a more reconciliatory attitude toward the Annan plan. At this point, the UN stresses the factor of leadership. Greek Cypriot leadership, it is assumed, was rejectionist all the way down.⁴⁷

Once again, “opportunity discourse” proponents miss some important points. Greek Cypriots never had crystal clear assurance for EU accession without settlement. Paragraph 9b of the Helsinki Council Conclusions, on which that assumption is premised, refers that:

*The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.*⁴⁸

On careful examination, that paragraph carries both a carrot (i.e. “the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above [settlement] being a precondition”) and a stick (i.e. “the Council will take account of all relevant factors”). In the years leading up to the 2002 decision of the European Council, which actually invited Cyprus to join the EU,⁴⁹ Greek Cypriot leadership thought that it had no other choice but to behave in a reconciliatory mode during a critical period of negotiations (1999-2002).⁵⁰ Greek Cypriot reconciliatory attitude yielded a number of concessions, the greatest of which was the acceptance of Annan plan I as a basis for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.⁵¹ EU accession was never taken as a given up until the very last moment.⁵²

The “opportunity discourse” camp may admit that Greek Cypriot leadership was acting on a reconciliatory purpose, but up to a point. The election of Tassos Papadopoulos to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in 2003 is thought to have shifted the Greek Cypriot attitude. After all, Papadopoulos was the one who rejected that plan and urged Greek Cypriots to do the same.⁵³ In other words, the second argument for rationalizing the Annan plan “lost opportunity” is reduced to the preferences and choices of the Greek Cypriot leadership.⁵⁴ Paradoxically the UN saw Papadopoulos as both a reconciliatory figure (February 2003-February 2004)⁵⁵ and a rejectionist figure (February 2004-April 2004).⁵⁶ The UN (and other critics of Papadopoulos) can hardly claim to be objective judges. The weeks leading up to the finalization of the Annan plan and its rejection (March-April 2004) took place in a highly polarized environment.⁵⁷

For a period of four years the “opportunity discourse” camp saw no “window of opportunity” for the Cyprus Problem. For as long as Tassos

Papadopoulos—an allegedly rejectionist figure—was in power, no “true opportunity” was expected to emerge. The proponents of “opportunities” saw no actual hope when Mr. Papadopoulos mended ties with Mr. Kofi Annan in Paris in February 2006, and together they reached an agreement on how to move forward.⁵⁸ Neither did they see a “new opportunity” after Mr. Talat and Mr. Papadopoulos met and reached a five points agreement in July 2006.⁵⁹ Conventional wisdom mouthed by the “opportunity discourse” proponents suggests that Papadopoulos was an “opportunity damper.” There was no expectation for a “window of opportunity” under his reign. To the contrary, the expectation was a drift to partition.⁶⁰

On the assumption that “opportunities” derive from individual attitudes and preferences the UN (and other interested parties) saw the defeat of Papadopoulos in 2008 as a clear indication of a new “window of opportunity.”⁶¹ Having the rejectionist figures out, the pro-solution figures in and the EU role in limbo, a new “window for a settlement” opened. According to a high ranked UN official:

*On the island, it has never been more promising for a settlement. For the first time since the Turkish invasion of 1974, there are two leaders – Mr. Christofias and Mr. Talat—who are, in the terminology of the process, “pro-solution.”*⁶²

Some prominent followers of the “opportunity discourse” camp seconded that optimistic outlook. Following its typical tactic, the International Crisis Group (ICG) published a number of reports for claiming that the “new opportunity” is “the last one.”⁶³ If that opportunity was not seized, ICG estimated, “partition” would have been the certain outcome. In its monthly report, the Economist Intelligence Unit presented a similar assessment, suggesting that “[t]his is the first time that a solution is openly favored by both Cypriot leaders.”⁶⁴ That report however was cautious on the potential outcome of the new process; it put “the chances of a settlement during the outlook period at about 40%,” without giving any further explanation on how that percentage was calculated.

According to a DPA report, the new “window of opportunity” had some “veiled’ timelines.”⁶⁵ In view of leadership shift in the Turkish Cypriot community, the UN pushed (once more) for an “endgame” approach to the

Cyprus problem. In April 2009, following closed door consultation with Alexander Downer, the Security Council issued a report that “strongly urge[d] the leaders to increase the momentum in the negotiations to ensure the full exploitation of this *opportunity* to reach a comprehensive settlement based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions.”⁶⁶ The Council “also emphasized the importance of all parties engaging ‘fully, flexibly and constructively’ and looked forward to decisive progress in the negotiations in the near future.”⁶⁷

UN strategy was twofold. First, the process had to be accelerated before a possible leadership shift in the Turkish Cypriot community and second, Mr. Talat had to be provided with any help needed in order to consolidate his power and stay in the leadership of his community. The schedule of negotiations was implemented as it was originally planned.⁶⁸ Some progress was achieved, but the relevant UN reporters could not be optimistic about a swift outcome.⁶⁹ Some of the so-called negotiation chapters, such as property, territory and security could not be concluded without the express consent of Turkey. In view of the first political challenge for Mr. Talat in April 2009, UN officials took some extraordinary steps in order to keep “the window of opportunity” open. Two of these initiatives stand out.

In view of a visit of Mr. Talat to New York and in anticipation of political challenge that the latter would likely face, Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe, wrote a strictly confidential note to the Secretary-General “to strongly advise” him “to grant Mr. Talat an audience on one of the suggested dates.”⁷⁰ The UN official urged the Secretary-General to meet Talat with two political goals in mind. On the one hand, such a meeting would send a political message to the Greek Cypriot community that the process needs to be accelerated. In particular Pascoe wrote:

Although the strong link between them [Christofias and Talat] remains the bedrock of the negotiation process, their bond alone will not be sufficient to reach a comprehensive settlement. The meetings thus far have already exposed a plethora of divergent views where the flexibility of the two leaders will be required for a settlement to be reached. However, this is a time where the political environment on the island seems to be hardening.⁷¹

Knowing the political sensitivity of the Greek Cypriot community with Turkey and Turkish Cypriot efforts to upgrade “TRNC’s” international status, Pascoe stated implicitly his intention to irritate Mr. Christofias with the aim of signalling him the potential repercussions of a delayed process. That old tactic however just adds to the scepticism of the Greek Cypriot community with regard to the true intentions of UN officials.

The second goal of Pascoe was stated in an explicit manner. He wrote that:

Mr. Talat faces problems of his own. His party is likely to suffer electoral defeat in the upcoming “Parliamentary” elections on 19 April. The hard-line opposition National Party (UBP) is expected to unseat Mr. Soyer of the CTP, the current “Prime Minister.” This will narrow Mr. Talat’s scope for negotiating. The meeting with Mr. Talat would offer an opportunity to pass on, at the highest level, some messages to the Turkish Cypriot leader including the need to remain committed to reaching a comprehensive settlement and send positive signals to a public which is increasingly losing confidence in the process...Failure to meet Talat would certainly be perceived by the Turkish Cypriot community and in particular its media, as a “snub.” Such a perception should be avoided, as it could further undermine Mr. Talat’s pivotal position in the negotiations.⁷²

Independent of the many efforts of Mr. Pascoe and other UN officials, Mr. Talat could not consolidate his political power. Although UN people knew that Talat would lose ground, not due to his negotiation tactics, but mainly due to other factors,⁷³ they refused to reflect on their tactics. Neither did they reflect on the damage that these tactics would inflict on the Greek Cypriot public opinion nor did they make any second thoughts. In his report, Mr. Pascoe is indifferent with the impact of his stratagems on the Greek Cypriot community.

It may sound like a typical cliché, but it seems that UN officials never learn from their mistakes. After the April 2009 failure to boost Talat’s chances in avoiding a political defeat, UN officials thought that, in view of the April 2010 challenge, they should try even harder. This time Talat’s leadership in the Turkish Cypriot community was “threatened” by Mr. Eroglu, an allegedly hardliner. On the assumption that Eroglu’s leadership would tarnish the momentum and take the negotiation process into a different direction, some

UN officials thought that they should take some drastic measures. The decision was to intensify the negotiation process and invite the Secretary-General in Cyprus at the end of these intensified negotiations. After two rounds of intensified negotiations in January 2010 no agreement was reached in the sensitive chapters. The UN opined that “we will need even more courage and determination in the period ahead to bring these talks to a successful conclusion.”⁷⁴ Still, the UN was “convinced that these two leaders can achieve a mutually beneficial solution.”⁷⁵

The ultimate result however was disappointing. After 40 meetings in the first round of negotiations (September 2008-August 2009), several other meetings in the second round (September 2009-January 2010), two intensive rounds of talks in January 2010 and three meetings in March 2010, the “Christofias-Talat opportunity” was “lost.” A more systematic and careful analysis of these negotiations would show whether the rhetoric of the “opportunity discourse” camp had any credentials whatsoever. With the benefit of the hindsight such an “opportunity” hardly ever existed.

UN officials could not resist the temptation to make a last minute move. In an effort to project the image of Mr. Talat as their preferred leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, UN officials arranged a “surprised” meeting of the Secretary-General and Mr. Talat to the “presidential palace” of the latter when the former was in Cyprus in January 2010. That was the first time that a UN official visited the Turkish Cypriot leader in a place that symbolizes the “Turkish Cypriot state,” and that person was the Secretary-General. All these tactics and stratagems by UN officials yielded no result. In April 2010, Mr. Eroglu succeeded Mr. Talat to the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community. UN seem not to understand that the scepticism about their true intentions across Cyprus is such that when they try so explicitly to promote and impose their preferences the public opinion will generally move into the opposite direction.

The alleged “window of opportunity” may have closed in April 2010, but UN-sponsored negotiations continued. In May 2010, inter-communal talks were resumed. The new round of negotiations entailed regular meetings between Mr. Christofias and Mr. Eroglu, meetings with the UN Secretary-General, shuttled diplomacy, and Working Group discussions at a technical level.⁷⁶ A number of new “veiled deadlines” were tried out without any

concrete result however. The chasm between the positions of the two communities remained unbridgeable. Ultimately, in May 2012 the process reached another stalemate. UN officials however never expressed resentment about their error in judgment and their misleading tactics. In retrospect, there are some things that the UN officials who planned and pursued policies and tactics which were proven essentially flawed must re-consider, as well as some lessons to learn.

Enter Anastasiades, etc.

There is one crucial lesson to learn from the Cyprus problem: Individual preferences and choices, personality and personal relations alone do not have a decisive impact on conflict resolution. This does not only apply to the case of Cyprus. It is common sense understanding in the broader domain of International Relations.⁷⁷ An estimation or assessment of a situation must take into account other level dynamics, beyond the individual level, as well as a number of contingent dynamics. With that caveat in mind, the election of Mr. Anastasiades to the Presidency of Cyprus alone shall not yield a dramatic shift in the Cyprus problem.

Some prominent speculators of the “opportunity discourse” camp see in Anastasiades’ election the missing part of an emerging perfect storm in Cyprus.⁷⁸ The assumption here is that Cyprus’ terrible economic situation and the cumulative trouble around its energy resources would exert enormous psychological and political pressure on Greek Cypriots in the coming months and/or years.⁷⁹ That situation entails a unique “opportunity,” so the argument goes, for driving Cyprus and Turkey together into common enterprises and mutual gains. What is missing is a determined leader in the Greek Cypriot community who will be eager to make the best out of that “opportunity.” In this section I take up these two assumptions, i.e. that a set of unprecedented factors were recently fused to create a sense of perfect storm in Cyprus and that Anastasiades would be keen to bandwagon on a master plan that will reconstruct Cyprus-Turkey relations.

The first assumption has some merit, but, at the same time, the emerging economic situation on the island may take different shapes. Nobody denies the fact that Cyprus is in a deep economic crisis. A survey shows that the economic crisis engendered an even deeper crisis of confidence and trust

across the entire socio-political spectrum in Cyprus.⁸⁰ Macroeconomic trends do not look good in terms of fiscal policy, national debt, national deficit, unemployment, consumer spending power, etc.⁸¹ Uncertainty prevails across all social strata. A bailout agreement between Cyprus and troika (i.e. the European Commission, the European Bank, and IMF)⁸² – which also entailed a painful bail-in for the depositors of the two largest Cypriot banks⁸³ – shall be implemented in Cyprus as of April 2013.⁸⁴ By submitting to the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding and a bailout loan, Cyprus will secure some 10 billion on a relatively low interest rate.⁸ The implementation of that agreement however will come at a high price. Cyprus will lose sovereignty over crucial economic, fiscal and financial affairs. All decisions that relate to these affairs shall be made in consultation with troika, with the latter having the last say. Troika shall review Cyprus' adjustment program on a periodical basis and, if it deems necessary, push for further austerity measures and economic/financial adjustments.

The record of troika-sponsored bailouts is pathetic⁸⁶ and there is no guarantee that Cyprus will be different. With the financial sector of Cyprus at the break of collapse – a sector that provided more than 45% of Cyprus' GDP – the country shall suffer a dramatic decline of its overall GDP and may find its economy embroiled in a spiral of recessions. In practical terms this implies that Greek Cypriots will see a remarkable dwindle in their standard of living, employment chance, property ownership, and life-chances in general. Foreign direct investments are expected to wane significantly. Tourism – which accounts to 9-10% of Cyprus' GDP – is the only sector that has a potential to stay intact or even grow.

The only hope is the anticipated income from the exploitation of Cyprus' natural resources. Natural gas upstream however shall yield substantial income in some years from now (2016-2018). The government of Cyprus licensed six plots of its EEZ to multinational corporations. Noble energy already explores block 12, ENI/KOGAS consortium shall explore blocks 2, 3 and 9 and TOTAL blocks 10 and 11. In summer 2013, Noble Energy shall proceed with a verification drilling in plot 12. That plot is estimated to have at least one reservoir worth of seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and potentially some considerable reserves of crude oil. Noble is considering an exploitation drilling in a second reservoir in the same plot. If the verification

drilling is successful, the content of plot 12 shall be readily available for monetization.⁸⁷ Noble and the government of Cyprus came to an agreement over the construction of an LNG plant, which is likely to be developed in Vasiliko, Cyprus.⁸⁸ At this point, some plans are on the making on how to proceed with that plant and seek the relevant investment for constructing it.

It is rather difficult to estimate how and when energy plans will reverse the gloomy picture of the economy.⁸⁹ There are a couple of scenarios that may be considered here. The proponents of the “opportunity discourse” believe that Cyprus may attract some foreign investment and secure the revenues it urgently needs if it decides to channel its natural gas to Turkey and from there to Europe via a pipeline.⁹⁰ Such a prospect requires a package deal between Cyprus and Turkey in the context of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership are keen on that scenario.⁹¹ That prospect is promoted by others as well.⁹²

The monetization of Cyprus’ natural gas however has other chances in both the short and the long run. The current government of Cyprus pursues a number of deals with neighboring countries. In particular, Cyprus looks forward to making an agreement with Israel, Lebanon and potentially the Palestinian Authority. Turkey is not part of that planning. The aim is to strike individual agreements so that Cyprus may become an energy hub in the Eastern Mediterranean. The main idea is to have natural gas from Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and, at the later stage, the Palestinian Authority or the Palestinian state, channeled to Vasiliko LNG plant for liquefaction and export. The government of Cyprus will be satisfied if it strikes one agreement, more likely with Israel.⁹³ If that plan does not pay off, the government of Cyprus is determined to proceed with the construction of the LNG plant for exporting its own natural gas. The “pipeline to Turkey” option is a non-starter.⁹⁴

Turning now to Anastasiades’ intentions, one needs to note that he is a man who speaks with two mouths. Looking into his record, the scenario that he will be keen to embark on the “opportunity discourse” wagon—i.e. to work for a package deal on the Cyprus problem and the co-exploitation of Cyprus’ natural resources—is quite plausible. Concerning the Cyprus problem, Anastasiades was a fervent supporter of the Annan plan. When that plan was submitted in 2002, he was among the first to support it and recommend to be accepted as the basis for a solution to the Cyprus problem. He also supported

the New York agreement of February 2004, urged President Papadopoulos to accept Annan plan V, and campaigned for the endorsement of that plan in April 2004. After the rejection of that plan, Anastasiades stressed that this was a “lost opportunity” for Cyprus and that any future negotiations for a comprehensive settlement must be based on that plan. He even suggested putting that plan to a second referendum.

Anastasiades view on the Annan plan was reiterated in many occasions. For example, in a meeting with the US Ambassador in Nicosia in 2008, Mr. Anastasiades was so adamant to claim that Tasso Papadopoulos “was stupid beyond belief not to negotiate that plan [the Anan plan] in good faith.”⁹⁵ “Renegotiating the basis of a Cyprus solution,” Anastasiades was recorded to say to the Ambassador, “seemed contradictory to Greek Cypriot goals.”⁹⁶ Anastasiades “actually favored retabling the Annan plan and aiming for changes designed to assuage G/C concerns over Turkish-T/C non-implementation.”⁹⁷ During Christofias-Talat negotiations, he accused the Greek Cypriot leader for not taking the Annan plan as the basis for an agreement.⁹⁸ In a meeting with the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Alexander Downer, in January 2009, he contended that “[h]ad agreement been reached over the use of the Annan Plan as a basis for the current negotiations, the process could have moved more quickly.”⁹⁹

Concerning Anastasiades’ view on the monetization of Cyprus’ natural gas, in the past he maintained a pluralistic attitude. In an interview to a Cyprus-based daily newspaper “O Fileleftheros” he did not discard the “pipeline to Turkey” option.¹⁰⁰ He rather considered it one among other options. Greek Cypriot critics of Anastasiades suggest that what matters is not what he is saying in public, but what he is capable of doing. During the presidential campaign in 2013, Anastasiades was accused by his two major opponents, Mr. Malas and Mr. Lillikas, for promoting the “pipeline to Turkey” option. Anastasiades rejected that criticism and stated that he shall not consider that option when President.

As a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus, and as a President afterwards, Anastasiades appeared with a new face in both fronts (i.e. the Cyprus problem and energy policy). As already stated, he rejected the “pipeline to Turkey” option and he works on the “LNG plant” option. In April 2013 he made a public announcement that his government made a final decision on the construction of an LNG plant. In May 2013, he will visit Israel

to discuss possible synergies between the two countries. Nicosia appears to have a strong intention toward a comprehensive agreement on energy security with Israel. If such an agreement is reached, and especially if Israel decides to export some of its natural gas via Cyprus' LNG plant, a new geo-political structure shall emerge in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a structure will be incompatible with the ideas conveyed by the "opportunity discourse" camp. Turkey will not make it easy for Cyprus, but if some credible multinational companies express an interest in investing for an LNG plant, that new geo-political structure will have some implications for the Cyprus problem as well.

Concerning the pre- and post-election face of Anastasiades in the Cyprus problem, he made a number of commitments, public statements, as well as he gave pledges in writing for a new approach to that problem. If pursued and turned into policy, his record will be reversed completely. Looking into his manifesto for the Cyprus problem,¹⁰¹ one may discern a number of interesting remarks that indicate a comprehensive depart from his old views. For example, he states that:

1. He is not committed to Christofias proposals on government (i.e. the proposal for rotating presidency and a standardized voting system) and on demographics (i.e. the proposal for awarding citizenship to 50000 Turkish settlers). His commitment is that these proposals will be waived from future Greek Cypriot propositions.
2. The so-called Cyprus-led, Cyprus-owned process has failed. His commitment is that he will pursue a new process and claimed that the EU will be an integral part of that process.
3. He will not accept any timelines or UN arbitration.
4. He will not follow the established trend in the negotiations whereby the President of Cyprus was, at the same time, the Greek Cypriot negotiator. His commitment is that, although he will keep that role, he will also assign a Greek Cypriot chief negotiator so that talks with the Turkish Cypriot community may be preceded without the community leaders being present.
5. No new round of negotiations will be commenced before the economic situation in Cyprus is relatively stable.
6. He contends that the rejection of the Annan plan is irreversible and he is thus committed to that rejection and he shall not accept that plan to be

brought back for negotiation as a whole, in part, or with some “cosmetic amendments.”

7. Before a new round of talks, the basis of the negotiations must be clarified and agreed upon by the leaders of the two communities.

If Anastasiades sticks to his manifesto (and other commitments he made in public) it is hard to see how a new round of talks may begin. In the end, what matters is not what commitments he made during his campaign and afterwards, but what decisions he will make in the future. Much will depend, of course, on the intentions and decisions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. As Mirelli notes, the current position of the Turkish side is akin to a two-state solution.¹⁰²

Another dimension that matters is domestic politics. Anastasiades coalition government comprises of his party, right-wing Democratic Rally (DISI), center-right Democratic Party (DIKO), and right-wing European Party (EYROKO). The preferences of the current leadership of DISI are closer to Anastasiades’ old record, but it is keen to lean into any direction, for as long as Anastasiades is happy with that. DIKO and EYROKO are typically considered to promote a much harder line in the Cyprus problem. Looking into DIKO, the current leadership of that party is difficult to predict.¹⁰³ The leader of that party, Karoyian, who in the past supported Christofias government, seems to be at odds with the “rejectionist camp” in his party. In a meeting with Downer in 2009, when challenged about his party’s intention to support a settlement, Karoyian “insisted that the base would follow the leadership and he would face the challenge from rejectionists who have been fielded as candidates stated.”¹⁰⁴ Things are quite different today. In public, at least, Anastasiades’ political reverse in the Cyprus problem was deemed essentially necessary for securing the support of DIKO followers. At this stage, Karoyian is not in position to support any choices of Anastasiades in the Cyprus problem that will divert from the detailed agreement the latter made with DIKO in summer 2012. The case of EYROKO is much clearer. For securing the support of that party, Anastasiades was willing not to make any express references to a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation during his campaign. Traditionally, EYROKO supporters reject federation as an option for the constitutional reconstruction of Cyprus in the framework of a comprehensive settlement.

On a final remark about the domestic dimension, one needs to note that Anastasiades will hardly get AKEL's support. Due to an ineffective Christofias term in power, AKEL lost considerable political ground that wishes to take back. It has no other choice but to play a hard role in the opposition. AKEL leadership believes that the troika arrangement provide the party with a "golden opportunity" to attack popular support and re-capitalize its political power. AKEL expressed skepticism over that arrangement and it took a firm position against the provisions of the Bailout. Concerning the Cyprus problem, one needs to note that the leadership of AKEL was split over the Annan plan. In the end, the party had to adjust with the vast majority of its supporters who made a strong petition for the rejection of the Annan plan. It is also worth referring that, to some extent, Christofias negotiated in accordance with certain provisions of the Annan plan, but he rejected vital aspects of that plan (e.g. security arrangements, territorial adjustments, transitional period, certain structures of the federal arrangement, and some other provisions). Putting everything together, if Anastasiades enters negotiations with his old views, he should not expect that AEKL will be a readily available ally in the Cyprus problem.

In the end, some may think that the crucial question is which of the two Anastasiades will prevail. Even though this cannot be predetermined, what matters is not what intentions and preferences he may have, but how he will respond to domestic and international constraints.

Conclusion

Any consideration about the Cyprus problem must take into account its long past. The history of that problem draws much beyond the Greco-Turkish disputes and certainly it entails more dimensions than these which are contemplated in the context of inter-communal talks. The Cyprus problem will have a chance of being settled if it is considered away from the current banality.

This paper makes an argument for banning the "opportunity discourse" and looking beyond the unit-level aspects of the problem. Individual perceptions and intentions do matter, but, in the end, it is not that much what an individual thinks or intends, but how he acts. The Cyprus problem is a

victim of a naïve and/or a deliberate effort of the UN and other international mediators to extol the virtues and deprecate the vices of individual leaders at the expense of other, maybe more important, dimensions of the problem.

In effect, it is high time to take onboard second- and third-level dimensions of the problem. History suggests that the Cyprus problem is a problem of geo-political and geo-economic antagonism and the quest for a viable sovereign arrangement on the island in accordance with the standards of international society.¹⁰⁵ All these vital dimensions of the problem can hardly be addressed by the “opportunity discourse” camp. If another deadly “perfect storm” is to be avoided,¹⁰⁶ the stability and security of the region, as well as human life and dignity, must be put ahead of any opportunity phantoms.

NOTES

1. There is some disagreement over the proper reference to the situation in Cyprus. Most of the literature refers to a Cyprus problem. There are some authors, mostly of Turkish origin or affiliation, who prefer a reference to a Cyprus Question, e.g. Zaim M. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Nasuh Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations, 1959-2003* (Nova Science Publications, 2013); Michael Stephen, *The Cyprus Question: A Concise Guide to the History, Politics and Law of the Cyprus Question* (London: Northgate Publications, 2001).
2. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*. Translated by J. M. Dent. (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1910), I.94, I.112.
3. George Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940).
4. Ball, G. *The Past has Another Partner* (New York: Norton, 1982); Stern, L. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and Failure of American Diplomacy* (New York: Time Books, 1977); Van Coufoudakis ed., *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976).
5. For a comparative discussion, see Tözün, Bachel, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955* (London: Westview Press, 1990); Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992); James Corum, “British Strategy

- Against the Cyprus Insurgents, 1955-1959” in J. Corum, *Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008), pp. 79-122.
6. Adams, T. W., “The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution,” *The Western Political Quarterly*, 1966, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp. 475-470.
 7. On the theory of Regional Security Complexes, see Barry Buzan, *Regions and Powers: The Struggle of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
 8. These amendments are known as Makarios’ 13 points. For a brief discussion, see William Mallison, *A Modern History of Cyprus* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), Chapter 3.
 9. Since 1959, Turkey has been systematically arming Turkish Cypriot para-military groups in Cyprus. In reaction, Greek Cypriots organized a number of ad-hoc security forces with the aim of defending the constitutional order in Cyprus in case Turkey and Turkish Cypriot para-military groups resorted to the use of physical force against the state. Later community para-military forces turned against one another, as well as they resorted to intra-communal violence. Foreign intervention was an integral part of the situation. For an interesting discussion see Parker Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, A Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).
 10. Criton G. Tornaritis, *Cyprus and its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems*. Second Edition (Nicosia, 1980), p. 74.
 11. Tornaritis 1980 op. cit.
 12. The movement of enosis in 1960 did not enjoy any political support by the Greek state.
 13. A. Mark Weisburd, *Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World War II* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, 1997), pp. 128-131. It is worth noting that Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus in 1964. Its plans were thwarted by the US and the Soviet Union.
 14. UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964).
 15. Brendan O’Malley, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).
 16. For a comparative discussion see Yael Ronen, “Status of Settlers Implanted by Illegal Territorial Regimes” *The British Yearbook of International Law* 2008, pp. 194-263. References to the situation in Cyprus may be found in pages 217ff.
 17. UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983).
 18. Ideas and plans about the settlement of the Cyprus problem were submitted in the past by various actors. For a comprehensive discussion of the relevant ideas and plans between 1948 and 1978, see (in Greek) Νίκος Χριστοδουλίδης, *Τα Σχέδια*

Λύση του Κυπριακού (1948-1978) (Αθήνα, Εκδόσεις Καστανιώτη, 2009).

19. For a comprehensive discussion of the Annan plan, its ramifications for Cyprus, and its aftermath, see Claire Palley, *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005).
20. Joseph Joseph, "Cyprus at the Threshold of the European Union" *Mediterranean Quarterly* Volume 7, pp. 112-22.
21. These principles are spelled out in Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union.
22. This is explicitly stated by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in a report, see United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus" [S/2003/398], April 1, 2003.
23. It is worth mentioning here that in December 2003, Turkish Cypriots were demonstrating in favor of EU accession. After Cyprus joined the EU without settlement, Turkish Cypriots lost faith to the EU, Greek Cypriots who thought that the EU would be a catalyst to a "fair" and "viable" solution to the Cyprus problem have equally lost faith to the EU. The way in which Union officials treated the Republic of Cyprus after the rejection of the Annan plan is quite traumatic to Greek Cypriots. According to recent Eurobarometer surveys, Cypriots are among the Eurosceptic populations. The way in which the EU dealt with the economic crisis agitated Greek Cypriot skepticism even further.
24. This is what Mr. Downer, the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser believes. See Stefanos Evripidou, "Downer hoping to restart talks", *Cyprus Mail*, March 7, 2013.
25. Since November 2012, a number of articles about a potential new initiative for the Cyprus problem have been published. Among the contributors to that impression, "The Economist", "New York Times", "Financial Times", "Reuters", and "The Wall Street Journal" stand out.
26. The UN has a long record of failures. See, for instance, Jair Van Der Lijn, *Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Actually Contribute to Durable Peace?* (Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers, 2006); Othman Mahmood, *The Root Causes of the United Nations' Failure in Somalia* (Universe books, 2011); Dore Gold, *Tower of Babel: How the United Nations Has Fuelled Global Chaos* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004). Judged from a consequentialist viewpoint, the contribution of the UN to the Cyprus problem is hardly successful. For a portrayal of the UN role in Cyprus, see Margaret Bartlett, *Cyprus, United Nations and the Quest for Unity* (Cambridgeshire: Melrose Book Company, 2007).
27. Cf. Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza and Timothy Cullen, *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963* (Athens: Aristide D. Caratzas Pub., 1986); Natalie Tocci, "The missed opportunity to promote reunification in Cyprus" in N. Tocci, *The EU and Conflict Resolution* (Oxon: Rutledge, 2007), pp. 28-52.

28. For a basic discussion of that issue, see Day, M., *Philosophy of History: An Introduction* (London: Continuum, 2008); M. Stanford, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).
29. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011).
30. For a paradigmatic account, see Lord Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005). Hannay makes some three dozen of references (maybe more) to the concept of “opportunity.” The main problem with his account is that these “opportunities” are sometimes incompatible with one another.
31. The Annan plan process may be considered as the epitome of the discourse on “opportunities.” For example, the day after Mr. Annan put forward his plan for Cyprus, Javier Solana stated that “[t]here is now a window of opportunity for Cyprus. It will be up to the different actors to take their responsibilities and adopt a constructive approach”; (Council of the EU, “EU HR Solana’s statement on Cyprus”, ref. CL02-44EN).
32. Unfortunately, the old-fashioned trend of “missed/windows of opportunities” pertains even today. See, for instance, Chrysostomos Pericleous, “Cyprus: A Last Window of Opportunity?” *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 93-108.
33. Foreign Media Reaction, “Cyprus: Is Annan Plan ‘The Last Chance of Peace’”? (http://rejyy.freeshell.org/Foreign_Media_Reaction/2002/wwwwh21219.html, last accessed April 2013).
34. Tocci 2007, *op. cit.*
35. Palley 2005, *op. cit.*
36. United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus” [S/2010/603], November 24, 2010 (emphasis added).
37. I will get back to these points in the next section.
38. The analysis that follows presents the assessment of a DPA work plan (UN, Department of Political Affairs, “2009 Europe Division Work Plan,” February 2009) and the assessment of a “strictly confidential note” to Mr. Le Roy by David Harland (“Cyprus: Half Stick, No Carrots and a Difficult International Context,” March 22, 2009). These are unpublished UN documents.
39. Note to Mr. Le Roy, *op. cit.*
40. Cf. Nathalie Tocci and Thomas Diez eds., *Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); Nathalie Tocci, *EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalyzing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus?* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).
41. European Commission, “Regular Report on Cyprus’ Progress Towards Accession,” November 15, 1998.

42. It is worth mentioning here that, in view of ongoing negotiations, the European Council prepared two draft Presidency Conclusions for Cyprus; one in case of agreement and one in case there was no agreement. The former forged a strong link between Cyprus accession to the EU and the finalization of the Annan plan.
43. Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 2003, *op. cit.*
44. Palley 2005, *op. cit.*
45. Sir Kieran Prendergast Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, “Briefing to the Security Council on the Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus”, June 22, 2005.
46. Tocci 2004, 2007, *op.cit.*
47. *Cf.* United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” May 28 2004 [S/2004/437].
48. European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11, 1999.
49. European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen, December 12 and 13, 2002.
50. This was overtly admitted by Mr. Vassiliou, the chief negotiator of Cyprus in a television interview just after the Helsinki meeting in 1999 (Mega Channel Cyprus) and reiterated in many occasions by members of Clerides’ administration, including the President himself. Also see, Vassiliou, G. “Foreword by President Vassiliou”, in C. Stefanou (ed.), *Cyprus and the EU: The Road to Accession* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
51. On credible sources of information that the UN plans to put forward a comprehensive plan that would include a number of problematic provisions, President Clerides asked Attorney General Markides to send a letter to Mr. Annan asking him not to do that without consultation with the parties in Cyprus. That incident was reviled by Mr. Markides himself during a book presentation event at the University of Nicosia in 2010. He also admitted that, even though Annan plan I was in many respects problematic, in view of the European Council in Copenhagen, President Clerides had no choice but to accept it as a basis for the settlement of the Cyprus Problem.
52. This was admitted by Tassos Papadopoulos in a television interview in February 2008 (Mega Channel Cyprus).
53. For a typical “opportunity discourse” account on Papadopoulos’ televised address to the Greek Cypriot community, see Harry Anastasiou, *The Broken Olive Branch*, Volume 2 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), pp. 142ff.
54. *Cf.* Hannay, 2005, *op. cit.*

55. Cf. Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 2003, op. cit.
56. Cf. Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 2004, op. cit.
57. Cf. Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, to the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan (June 7, 2004), which was circulated as an official document of the UN Security Council.
58. Giorgos Kentas, "The Paris Agreement: Why it was Possible?" *In Depth* 13, 2006 (<http://www.rcenter.intercol.edu/Newsletter/issue13/art03.htm>, last accessed April 2013).
59. UNFICYP, "Statement read out by Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari following today's meeting at the SRS's official residence in the UNPA, Nicosia with H.E. Tassos Papadopoulos and H.E. Mehmet Ali Talat" (http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=2116&tt=graphic&lang=11, last accessed April 2013).
60. Cf. International Crisis Group, "Cyprus: Reversing the Drift to Partition" (Europe Report N°190, January 10, 2008).
61. Cf. International Crisis Group, "Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet" (Europe Report N°194, June 23, 2008).
62. Note to Le Roy, op. cit. (emphasis in the original).
63. International Crisis Group, Europe Report N°190, op. cit.; International Crisis Group, Europe Report N°194, op. cit.; International Crisis Group, "Cyprus: Reunification or Partition?" (Europe Report N°201, September 10, 2009).
64. Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report: Cyprus," February 2009.
65. DPA work plan, 2009, op. cit.
66. Security Council 6115th Meeting, "Security Council Welcomes Progress Made In 'Fully Fledged Negotiations' Aimed At Reunification of Cyprus, In Presidential Statement", April 30, 2009 (emphasis added).
67. Ibid.
68. "Special Adviser of the Secretary-General in Cyprus" (unpublished UN document). Cf. "Mediation Support Unit Potential Assistance to 'Second Reading' Phase in the Talks on the Future of Cyprus, July-December 2009" June 22, 2009 (unpublished UN document).
69. Wlodek Cibor, Steven Burke, Donatella Giubilaro, and Fiona Mullen, "Negotiations Review and Observations on Next Steps", May 21, 2009 (unpublished UN document).

70. B. Lynn Pascoe, "Note to the Secretary-General," March 18, 2009 (unpublished UN document).
71. *Ibid.*
72. *Ibid.*
73. Steven Burke, "Final Report before Sunday, 19 April Vote in North Cyprus," April 17, 2009 (unpublished internal document of the UN).
74. Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Ban Ki Moon at a joint press conference with President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Talat in Cyprus, February 1, 2010.
75. *Ibid.*
76. For a synopsis of inter-communal negotiations, see Republic of Cyprus, Press and Information Office "Recent Developments". (http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/developments_en/developments_en?OpenDocument, last accessed, April 2013). A more detailed synopsis is made by Morelli, see Vincent Morelli, "Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive," Congressional Research Service, March 5, 2013.
77. Consider the seminal accounts of Waltz and Holsti and Smith; Waltz, Kenneth (1959) *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press; Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith (1990), *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
78. Cf. Chris Morris, "Crisis Offers Opportunity to Heal Cyprus Division," BBC News, March 29, 2013 (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21974466>, last accessed April 2013); Stephanos Evripidou, "Downer Hoping to Restart Talks," *Cyprus Mail* March 7, 2013 (<http://www.cyprus-mail.com/alexander-downer/downer-hoping-restart-talks/20130307>, last accessed April 2013).
79. James Kanter, "For Cyprus, a Sudden Need to Play Nice with Turkey," *New York Times*, March 27, 2013.
80. This survey was published in "Kathimerini," a Cyprus-based weekly newspaper on April 28, 2013.
81. Central Bank of Cyprus, "Annual Economic Indicators". (<http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf/ANNUALECONOMICINDICATORSAPRIL2013engNEW1.pdf>, last accessed April 2013).
82. This is an ad-hoc, extra-institutional, arrangement that was formed in order to deal with EU countries in need of financial and technical assistance.
83. Brain Blackstone, "Cyprus Averted Contagion, Says ECB," *Wall Street Journal* April 26, 2013. (<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324743704578446713186211992.html>, last accessed April 2013).

84. Certain provisions of a package agreement between Cyprus and troika have been implemented since 2012. Cyprus' bailout evolved in many stages to finally reach the March 2013 "consensus."
85. Interest rate is estimated around 2.5%, but this may slightly change.
86. Cf. Ambrose Evan-Pritchard, "Portugal Warns EU-IMF troika to back off on Austerity Demands," *The Telegraph*, January 2, 2013.
87. On the prospects of monetization, see Anastasios Giamourides, "The Offshore Discovery in the Republic of Cyprus: Monetization Prospects and Challenges," The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 65, July 2012.
88. Elias Hazou, "Creation of LNG Plant Looks Certain," *Cyprus Mail*, April 19, 2013.
89. Giorgos Kentas (2012), "Promised Gas Bonanza has yet to Dispel Economic Gloom", *Europe's World* 20:2.
90. James Kanter 2013, *op. cit.*, International Crisis Group, "Aphrodite's Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power, a New Dialogue?" (Europe Report N° 216, April 2, 2012).
91. International Crisis Group, N° 216, *op. cit.*
92. Cf. John Reed, "Israel Eyes Gas Exports to Neighbors", *Financial Times*, April 14, 2013.
93. There are some bilateral consultations on that potential (Interviews with a Cypriot and Israeli officials who asked not to be named, January-March 2013).
94. Stefanos Evripidou, "LNG terminal is the 'only way forward'," *Cyprus Mail*, March 7, 2013.
95. "Opposition Leader Pledges Full Support to Government's Negotiation Efforts," Confidential/Unclassified for Official Use Only, Reference ID 08NICOSIA273, April 30, 2008.
96. *Ibid.*
97. *Ibid.*
98. Cf. Interview to M. Drousiotis, *Politis* (Cyprus-based daily), April 11, 2008.
99. "Note of SASG Downer's Meeting with Nicos Anastasiades, President of the Democratic Rally (DISY) on 16 January, 2009, at 12:30, DISY Party HQ" (unpublished confidential UN document)".
100. Interview to *Philelephtheros* (Cyprus-based daily), September 18, 2011.
101. <http://www.anastasiades.com.cy/index.php?id=66>, last accessed April 2013.
102. Morelli, 2013, *op. cit.*
103. At the moment, DIKO has some serious internal problems to deal with.
104. "Note of SASG Downer's Meeting with Marios Karoyian President of the House

of Representatives, Republic of Cyprus, President of Democratic Party (DIKO), on 16 January, 2009, at 14:30, DIKO Party HQ” (unpublished classified UN document).

105. Cf. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
106. Cf. James E. Miller, “A Perfect Storm: Cyprus 1967-1974,” in J. E. Miller *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), pp. 176-200.