

ETUDES HELLENIQUES

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**LA DIASPORA GRECQUE
THE GREEK DIASPORA**

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2

A Global World Greek Lobby

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RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur de cet article dresse le portrait du lobby grec à travers le monde, en insistant plus particulièrement sur le lobby helléno-américain. Il examine sa structure et son fonctionnement et surtout sa contribution à faire avancer les intérêts grecs auprès de gouvernements de pays où s'activent d'importantes communautés grecques. C'est en premier lieu le cas de l'important lobby grec aux États-Unis et en second lieu les communautés d'Australie, du Canada et de l'Europe occidentale. L'auteur souligne en particulier la mobilisation de la communauté chypriote de Grande Bretagne en faveur de Chypre et contre l'occupation turque d'une partie de l'île.

ABSTRACT

The author of this article depicts the Global World Greek Lobby with special reference to the Greek American lobby. The author examines its structure and functioning, and especially its contribution in advancing Greek interests with the governments of countries with large Greek communities. This is mainly the case of the important Greek lobby in the United States and secondarily in other countries, such as Australia, Canada and Western Europe. The author underlines in particular the mobilization of the Cypriot community in Britain against the Turkish occupation of a part of the island.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Diaspora

The Greek diaspora is the continuation of Hellenism in the five continents and represents a serious political force that could help Greece to promote the Hellenic Culture and give the necessary support for its national issues. Article 108 of the Greek Constitution refers to the Greek diaspora and uses the term 'Hellenes Abroad'. With the revision of the constitution in 2001, this article has even been completed, with reference to the obligations of the Greek State to the

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Greeks abroad (care for the “maintenance of ties with the motherland” and “for education and social and professional advancement of Greeks working outside the country”) and a reference to the “organization, function and responsibilities of the Council of Hellenes Abroad” has been added.

1. The State shall care for emigrant Greeks and the maintenance of ties with the motherland. It will also ensure education and social and professional advancement of Greeks working outside the territory.
2. A law provides for the organization, function and responsibilities of the Council of Hellenes Abroad, whose mission is to express globally the Greeks abroad.¹

The fact that this article refers to the «Greeks abroad» creates several problems at the practical level, as well as in the scientific study of the matter itself. Conceptually, expatriate Greeks are those who emigrated abroad. But hardly could be identified as expatriate Greeks those of the historical communities abroad, who are living in historic cradles of Hellenism for many centuries or even those of the second and third generation immigrant diaspora in countries like the U.S., Canada and Australia. In fact the term “diaspora” may cover better the various components of this Hellenism outside the Greek territory but does not mean that it doesn’t also present difficulties on a conceptual and practical level. Even so, the study of the Greek diaspora raises a number of epistemological problems in dealing with sciences like history, sociology, political science etc. A key problem is that of its definition. Nowadays, the Greek diaspora can be defined only in relation to the Greek national state. The fact that the Greek diaspora exists before the creation of this state, certainly puts into question this definition, as the same happens with other variances of diasporas that occurred prior to the nation-state building, as the Jewish and Armenian. These issues are discussed through the study of enlightenment, which creates the conditions for the nation-state building.²

The Lobby

The creation of the Greek state, the issue of irredentism, the issue of the historical Greek communities outside the Ottoman Empire, are complicating the notion of diaspora. These problems however relate more to the history today. So as for the Greek lobby we will limit ourselves to the current reality. After the

Asia Minor Catastrophe we can talk about historical and immigration diaspora. The term historical diaspora covers the Hellenism of the historic communities (what has survived), such as the Greeks of Egypt and the Hellenism that survived in some historical centers (Black Sea countries, Northern Epirus, etc.). The term immigrant diaspora covers the communities created after the establishment of the Greek state and especially those of USA, Canada, Australia and Western Europe. The diaspora that has been more studied in the form of the lobby is of course the Greek-American one. However, the Greek-Canadian and the Greek-Australian diasporas present also a special interest when acting as a lobby for the Greek interests in their respective countries. Hence all Greek communities abroad under certain specific circumstances get involved in lobbying, in favor of the Greek interests.

There is a whole ‘mythology’ about the role of the Greek lobby, especially the Greek-American one which hinders proper understanding of its role. Although there have been some remarkable studies showing the limits of its influence, its shortcomings and successes, the fact remains that its “canonization” prevented the cold sociological study of this important phenomenon. It should of course be said here that the study of large national lobbies and their role in shaping international relations is a relatively recent phenomenon.³ Moreover, the role of the Greek lobby, and especially the Greek-American one, can not be an “emotional” case, it should be seen and studied in the context of the triadic relationship that every national lobby develops, involving itself, the country of origin and the host country. Its study and assessment must be done by political criteria and based on the methodological rules of the social sciences.

In this context, the effectiveness of the lobby, as seen from the Greek perspective, depends on the integration within a broader strategic plan for Greece’s international relations. Since there is not such a national strategy, but more improvisations in Greek foreign policy, any successes, failures and weaknesses should be viewed also from this angle.

The “National Centre”

Another serious problem concerns the relationship of this diaspora with the Greek state, what is usually called the “national center”. There are basically two philosophies for this relationship: One is “Hellenocentric” considering that the “national centre” has the primary role in coordinating the activities of the

diaspora. The other is the theory of the Milky Way which sees the Greek communities as autonomous from the “national centre” and goes back to a romantic quest of communitarianism of the period of Ottoman domination. This is an idealised approach which is not supported historically. The Community Mechanism of that period, oligarchic and without democratic structures, was serving more for the collection of taxes from the rayah on behalf of the Ottoman administration.⁴

But in today’s assimilative societies without the support even of this distorted and entrenched numb Athenian state, without coordinating with it, the Greeks of diaspora will resemble one day with this community that Cavafy described once with great flair in his historical poem *Poseidoniatatai* (*The Poseidonians*) based on the inscription of Athenaeus (*Deipnosophistai*, Book 14, 31A [632]), about the Greek city Poseidonia in the Tyrrhenian Gulf: “εκβαρβαρώσθαι Τυρρηνοίς ή Ρωμαίοις γεγονόσι και την τη φωνήν μεταβεβληκέναι, τα τε πολλά των επιτηδευμάτων». (They have been submitted to Tyrrhenians and Romans forgetting their language and traditions). The only thing that remained to them was a Greek festival every year “εν ή συνιότες αναμμινήσκονται των αρχαίων ονομάτων τε και νομίμων» (during which the participants remind the ancient names and the traditions, and then finish and go “with weeps and tears each other” («απολοφυράμενοι προς αλλήλους και δακρύσαντες»). Based on the above inscription Constantine Cavafy, the great modern Greek Poet, wrote on the fate of Poseidonians:

The Poseidonians forgot the Greek language
after so many centuries of mingling
with Tyrrhenians, Latins, and other foreigners.
The only thing surviving from their ancestors
was a Greek festival, with beautiful rites,
with lyres and flutes, contests and wreaths.
And it was their habit toward the festival’s end
to tell each other about their ancient customs
and once again to speak Greek names
that only a few of them still recognized.
And so their festival always had a melancholy ending
because they remembered that they too were Greeks,
they too once upon a time were citizens of Magna Graecia;

and how low they'd fallen now, what they'd become,
living and speaking like barbarians,
cut off so disastrously from the Greek way of life.⁵

Certainly the notion that Hellenism may be limited within territorial limits is dangerous and will be the last and perhaps fatal decline that will occur after so many others. If the theory of galaxy has a meaning, it is because it still insists on the idea of Ecumenical Hellenism. Historically Hellenism never has been closed in a state or geographical boundaries. Nevertheless it has always had one or more centres that could support the universality of its tentacles.

The theory of the Galaxy is another form of the Great Idea, a modern version bothering no one, once it doesn't refer to territorial ambitions and a change of borders, but to a cultural universality. But to enable it to survive, the universality needs to be removed from the utopia of the free communalism without national center. But the concept of a national center is not a one way concept. If the recognition of its importance for the survival of the Ecumenical Hellenism is a *sine qua non*, this does not mean it has a monopoly of decision over his faith. The national centre should not be Rome within a papal sense of infallibility. But there may be Athens - in the sense of the classical era - and Alexandria - in the sense of the Hellenistic era. The future of the Ecumenical Hellenism and its survival depends on the common goal which will be the result of the dialectical synthesis of the diversity of views expressed by the communities of the diaspora and those of the national centre.

Ultimately communalism would lead to «εκβαρβαρώσθαι Τυρηνοίς ή Ρωμαίοις», to the loss of identity, but dependence of the Athenian contemporary Greek State would lead also to “spiritual decline, stagnation and eventual extinction”⁶ of the diaspora and of course its universality. This does not mean ghettoization of the diaspora communities. As rightly argues Professor Harris Psomiades “Greek interests may be better served by a diaspora which is integrated into and participates fully in the political, economic and social life of the country in which it is endemic.”⁷ But the only way in this case to maintain the minimum of the culture of origine⁸ which connects the universal Hellenism is the development of Greek culture and education in the widest sense. Simultaneously the production of culture from both the diaspora and the metropolitan centre in a dialectical relationship is always an issue and remains a challenge.

Regarding especially the Greek-American lobby, one has to note the deep crisis inside the Greek Community because of the conflict that resulted when the Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S. tried and finally succeeded to place all community institutions as such under the direct control of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, a movement successfully inaugurated by Archbishop Iakovos in the 1960's. One also has to note the conflict between Archbishop Iakovos and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew after Iakovos supported a move by 29 bishops towards the administrative unification of Eastern Orthodox churches in America which eventually would lead to an autocephalous Orthodox Church in America. He was forced to resign in 1996. In order to reaffirm his authority over the American Greek Orthodox Church Bartholomew, in 1996, proceeded to the split of the one Archdiocese, dividing the administration of the American continent into four parts (America, Canada, Central America, and South America) and leaving only the territory of the United States for the Archdiocese of America. Even inside this territory he limited dangerously the authority of the Archdiocese in order to exercise his absolute control over the Greek American Orthodox Church.

II. THE GREEK AMERICAN LOBBY

In the Footsteps of the Greek-American lobby

The First Steps

The first steps of the Greek-American lobby, have been made with reference to the Cyprus problem in the period immediately after World War II and the Cold War in full intensity.⁹ From the outset it was clear that the Greek Americans access to the U.S. executive was difficult contrary to the legislature that was more affordable.

In the 1950s AHEPA which was - and remains today - the largest Greek-American organization tried with the Church to raise the Cyprus issue through the U.S. Congress. Although these efforts did not produce any results - especially at that time the legislature had very limited influence in shaping American foreign policy - the lobby gained valuable experience and confirmed that Congress was a more accessible target for the action concerning the Greek national issues.

Besides Congress, efforts were made to mobilize for the Cyprus cause the local elected leaders in various states and cities, governors, mayors, etc. Typical example was the case of the mayor and the governor of New York. The emphasis was placed at the anti-colonial struggle and the principle of self-determination. Greek-Americans understood that they could not present the Cyprus issue as a matter of union with Greece to the American politicians. The mobilization should be based on international law and UN principles such as the principle of self-determination.

But it should be noted that the Greek-American lobby has avoided to exert any straight pressure on President Eisenhower and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Foster Dulles. It seems that the climate of that time was not appropriate because ethnic lobbies had been very little developed and on the other hand there was a common line, mostly on foreign policy, between the two major parties as it was the era of the Cold War. It has been also supported that the AHEPA, which was basically an expression of the Greek-American lobby at that time, did not want to create tension in relations with the U.S. leadership. So it continued its annual meetings, its ceremonial visits to Eisenhower and the “photo opportunity”.¹⁰

Of course one should remember that in the 1950's the Cyprus problem did not directly concern the U.S. It concerned Britain of which Cyprus was a colony. So the Americans wanted to present themselves as neutral and to ask their stakeholders allies involved - Britain and Greece at the beginning, but also Turkey afterwards - to find a peaceful solution. In fact, both at the UN and the diplomatic field in general, Americans will support Britain. Their concern was mainly the weakening of the south-eastern flank of NATO and the role of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc in general supporting the principle of self-determination for the people of Cyprus. But it is obvious since then that the Americans-in contrast with the British who following the beaten track and offering Cypriots self-government but with all the partitionist elements under incubation-favor a kind of division beneath the mantle of the Union.

The Cyprus Crisis of 1964

The Cyprus crisis of 1963-64 reactivated the Greek-American lobby. This time, unlike the 1950's, the Americans are directly involved and seek to impose the solution of the double union - that is to say partition of the island between Greece and Turkey - with the Acheson Plan, named after the former U.S. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Dean Acheson.

The Greek American leadership raised again the principle of self-determination for Cyprus as well as general principles of law to which is committed the American people. But it acted very carefully not to come in a vertical rift with the U.S. Government and particularly with President Johnson. Especially as the Greek Americans are generally supporters of the Democratic Party.

President Lyndon B. Johnson called to Washington the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey in mid-June 1964 and tried to impose the American view of the double union for a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. The effort for a solution failed but at least prevented a Greek-Turkish conflict. Johnson had sent his famous letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu on June 5, 1964 which effectively was forbidding Turkey military landing in Cyprus as threatened. At the same time the Americans have brought unbearable pressure on the Greek side to accept a double union—partition that would satisfy Turkey itself. Johnson himself threatened Greece and Papandreou, leaving clear innuendos for the April dictatorship that followed.¹¹

Throughout this period the role of the Greek-American lobby is almost non-existent or very low-key.

The Period of the Military Dictatorship (1967-1974)

During this period the official Greek American leadership, headed by Archbishop Iakovos took position essentially in favor of the dictatorship. But anti-dictatorial organizations had been established in the grassroots of the Greek-American communities, trying to promote the condemnation of the military regime in Athens. Once again the attention of these anti-dictatorial organizations turned to Congress. There some senators and representatives were taking stand against the dictatorship, in contrast to the official American policy.

This attitude of the Church, the visits of Iakovos to Athens and his meetings with Papadopoulos and the other leaders of the junta are well documented and need not be stressed too much. Some people claimed that he was forced to maintain some kind of relationship with the regime - but at the very least he could ask to stop the mistreatment of political prisoners and violation of the basic human rights. The attitude of the official secular Greek-American leadership was not different of that of Iakovos. In fact it was not the question of the necessary “formal relationship” with the mother country but the wholehearted “embracement” of the junta.

This led to a schism within the very Greek-American communities. The split was much more deep in places where lived first-generation Greek immigrants like New York and Canada and places where were active Greek students and academics.

Under these conditions of course the effectiveness and efficiency of the lobby against the dictatorship has been limited, although it should be credited the fact that voices never stopped to be heard in favour of democracy in Greece, both in Congress and among academic and more generally the liberal circles of the American public opinion.¹²

The Greek-American Lobby Comes of Age

The invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974 served as the catalyst to awaken the Greek American community and led to the age of the maturation of the Greek-American lobby. Moreover, many - if not most who dealt with the study of the Greek-American lobby - place its very birth in 1974. This view is not based on reality. The Greek-American lobby existed before – in a very weak form is true and without self-consciousness of its role. Moreover, the fact is that neither the conditions of the American politics favored the very existence of ethnic lobbies in the previous period, nor political science has shown interest to study the ethnic lobbies before the 1970's, if not the 1980's.

In 1974, the conditions are ripe for the development of an effective lobby. There is first the challenge of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. In this respect, the Greek Americans are united. There is secondly the democratic Greece which realizes for the first time the need to promote national issues in Washington through an organized lobby. Finally, there is the development of a favorable climate for ethnic lobbies in the U.S. The policy of the melting pot has failed, the McCarthy era has passed, U.S. citizens of various ethnic origins defend the interests of their countries of origine in an effort to connect with their American counterparts and with the principles of democracy and international law.

Within this context will be initiated and developed the Greek-American lobby in this period. It is the period (1974-1978) of the great successes and the birth of the mythology surrounding its role and influence in Washington. It is its “heroic” age of the imposition of the embargo by Congress on arms sales to Turkey.

To understand the success of the Greek-American lobby, one should be transferred to the political climate prevailing in Washington at this time. It is the time of the Watergate crisis, the weakening and ultimately the resignation of President Nixon. The foreign policy has actually been exercised by Henry Kissinger. Moreover, the Congress for the first time in the postwar era claims a major role in shaping U.S. foreign policy, especially after the trauma of Vietnam.

In the first stage -1974, early 1975- the reaction against the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was of a spontaneous nature. In fact there is no lobby.¹³ The traditional American leadership, that of the Church and AHEPA, is overtaken by the popular reaction inside the Greek Community. Several committees in support of Cyprus sprang through the Greek American Community and in fact refused to follow the traditional leadership considered too conservative, while blaming it for having cooperated with the military regime in Athens and being responsible for the Cyprus tragedy.

Simultaneously in Washington, Eugene Rossides who served in the Nixon administration, founded the American Hellenic Institute (AHI), which could be considered the first Greek-American professional lobby. To avoid losing control of the situation Archbishop Iakovos will create in Chicago through Andrew Athens, the Hellenic American Congress.

At the same time a small group of senators and representatives which included those of Greek origin, all of the Democratic Party, reacted to the Turkish invasion before it barely mobilized the Greek American community. The same group had also reacted to the coup of the junta against Makarios when the official American leadership, and particularly Archbishop Iakovos, remained silent. The group met with Foreign Minister Henry Kissinger in August (1974) and complained about the passive U.S attitude toward the Turkish invasion. After the second round of the Turkish invasion, the number of protesting members of Congress rose and for the first time was put forward the idea of the embargo on arms sales to Turkey.

The foundation of the American Hellenic Institute, AHI by Eugene Rossides was an attempt to coordinate actions, both of AHEPA, the Archdiocese of America, and the other Greek-American organizations, while at the same time being their link with the group of Congress.¹⁴ Moreover, Rossides knew the weakness of these organizations to act as an effective lobby, if not their reluctance to do so.

The Greek-American lobby on Rossides's insistence and in accord with the players of the congressional team senators Brademas, Rosenthal and Sarbanes moved its efforts on the legal level, stressing that Turkey illegally used U.S. weapons in its military intervention in Cyprus.

It appeared from the beginning that many senators and representatives were very sensitive to issues of law enforcement. They also had the experience of its breach during both the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal. Under U.S. law the weapons the U.S. supplied to Turkey could not be used unless for defense only and not for operations against another country which was not at all threatening it. Kissinger questioned on August 19, 1974 on this issue said that a group of jurists of the legal section of the State Department was studying the issue, whether Turkey's intervention in Cyprus had violated U.S. law. Two weeks later, however, it was revealed that there was already a legal advice from this group of the State Department on this issue and that the reason it was not disclosed was Kissinger's attempt to alter it in favor of Turkey's interests.

Senator Thomas Eagleton addressing the Senate in September charged that President Ford had been ill-advised or misinformed of the legal implications of his inaction over the Cyprus crisis. Making even an apparent reference to Watergate, he warned: "We have learned that the policies created in ignorance or in spite of the law are doomed to failure." Later he confronted Kissinger who was addressing the Democratic caucus in Capitol Hill, with the words «Mr. Secretary, you do not understand the rule of law».¹⁵

From now on, the whole effort will continue on the same basis, the same principle, respect of the law, "the rule of law". Since the end of September 1974 a series of measures steps had been adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives, that ultimately led to the February 1975 embargo imposed on Turkey (5 February 1975).

There is no doubt that the Greek American community mobilized and deployed its efforts for this purpose. On the other hand it is obvious that all this effort paid off because it got into the hands of a small group in Congress who believed that the U.S. law was not respected. Therefore the Greek-American lobby succeeded because its goals coincided with those of a legislature, anxious about the promotion of a U.S. foreign policy that violated the famous principle imposing «the rule of law». Of course, this sudden ethical consideration of the

American politics hides a deeper conflict between the legislative and executive power because of the trauma of Vietnam, where the legislature had been overridden. The Congress also feels strong enough after Nixon's resignation –another traumatic experience– to impose its will on the executive in matters of foreign policy or at least to define the framework of its implementation. It is therefore clear that the weakness of the executive during this period in conjunction with the struggle of the legislature to regain lost power, helped the Greek-American lobby effort to impose an embargo on Turkey.

For Cyprus of course and the Greek interests, the presence of President Ford in this critical period at the head of the Chief Executive was probably a misfortune –as well as the transitional period of conflict for the impeachment of Nixon– given that Henry Kissinger, known for his positioning in favor of the military regime in Athens and his tolerance of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus –that others presented as a favourable position towards Turkey and others as a wrong strategy–¹⁶ had in his hands almost the exclusive management of U.S. foreign policy for this period.

Naturally, the Greek-American lobby had been “credited” the success of the embargo. The mythology of a “powerful” lobby took shape. Paradoxically, to the creation of this mythology contributed Kissinger himself who wanted to show that the pro-embargo group in Congress team was not promoting “the rule of law” but the interests of one ethnic group, which in addition were contrary to the broader U.S. strategic interests. Public commentators painted a picture of an all-powerful Greek-American lobby. *The New York Times* for example wrote on July 21, 1975: “Individual congressmen have been pressed hard by the so-called Greek lobby to reaffirm previous House votes and prevent Turkey from receiving further American arms until it makes significant concessions to the Greek-Cypriotes”. In the same newspaper, a senior journalist, Cyrus Sulzberger, writing from London where Ford and Kissinger were attending a Nato summit, noted, on June 4, 1975, that “The Administration realizes that in all these foreign policy matters its position is being weakened by special ethnic groups in Washington” which included “the splendidly organised ‘Greek Lobby’”.

Nevertheless, the organization of the lobby was poor at that time. It is worth noting that the Greek-American Congress of Andrew Athens –created as stated by Archbishop Iakovos to have his own “moderate” voice– was founded in Chicago in the summer of 1975, six months after the imposition of the embargo.¹⁷

With the exception of some Greek-American experienced politicians such as Sarbanes and Rossides, the Greek-American lobby didn't have the "wisdom" to realize that the embargo should not be presented as either a "pro-Greek" or as an "anti-Turkish" activity, but exactly what was presented to Congress, "the rule of law". Otherwise –and that what's happened at the end– the Greek-American lobby would fall into the trap of Kissinger who was insisting that an ethnic group could not even steer American foreign policy, nor endanger American interests in such a critical strategic area such as the Eastern Mediterranean.

Of course, the responsibility for this lies not only on the Greek-American lobby, but on Greece and Cyprus as well, which not only did not properly guided it, but encouraged "triumphalism", if not "winning" paeans, in Athens and Nicosia.

The American press and various commentators in the meantime, did not cease to refer to a "powerful" Greek-American lobby and talking about the damage that it could cause to U.S. interests.¹⁸

The accusations of sabotage of the American national interests by the Greek American lobby intensified in the summer of 1975 while Kissinger was making an effort to achieve at least a partial lifting of the embargo.¹⁹ Among other things it was stated that the lobby was financed by Greece, that members of Congress were placed intolerable pressures, etc. Meanwhile, the executive was putting pressure on Congress highlighting the Turkish threats to close the American bases in Turkey.

Within this charged atmosphere and unbearable pressure in early October 1975 (2 October 1975) the Congress decided to partially lift the embargo, with some vague promises by the executive that it would promote a "fair" settlement of the Cyprus problem. The compromise achieved allowed Turkey to get weapons that had been ordered before the embargo and was letting the American government other possibilities to give military assistance to enable it to fulfill its commitments to NATO. In practice, of course, the embargo ban was never implemented because Turkey was taking weapons through NATO and third countries. But it had a strong political symbolism and created problems both in Ankara and Washington.

The Interim Period

Despite the partial lifting of the embargo the Greek-American lobby was still believing in its potential success. This time, efforts focused on the presidential election campaign in order to convince the candidates to commit to maintain the embargo and to press Turkey to withdraw its occupation troops from Cyprus. Attention focused particularly on the Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter who promised to maintain the embargo until the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus.

When Carter won the election in November 1976, the enthusiasm in Athens and Nicosia was so great because Ford and Kissinger would finally be leaving and a “philhellene” president would take over the reins of power in Washington, that in Nicosia the bells of churches rang joyfully and the world celebrated the victory as its own! And of course, because American foreign policy –like any other serious foreign policy– is not decided by emotional criteria or forced election promises, the «Philhellene» Jimmy Carter found out later that Turkey was a valuable ally that did not deserve to be punished by the embargo.

Moreover with the rise of Carter in power, data and balances between the various power centers in Washington changed. The presidency and the executive generally will recover the ground lost to the Congress by Nixon and Ford. Carter will present the American Foreign policy guided by new moral principles in contrast to those put forward by Nixon-Kissinger. These new moral principles seek to respect the American law and promote the democratization of the friendly to U.S brutal dictatorships in the world. Thus these new moral principles in U.S. foreign policy were even concerning human rights. This phraseology sounded positive in Congress, especially in its democratic majority which now had to face not a Republican president, as in the Nixon and Ford era, but a Democrat one.

Nevertheless, the battle for the embargo will be given in the Congress in the summer of 1978, and will be lost for the Greek-American lobby with a narrow majority which decided to lift it. The pressure to lift the embargo was strong and in terms of the executive and by vested interests. It also appears that the Caramanlis government in Athens was convinced by the Americans to accept the lifting of the embargo in exchange for the known ratio of U.S. military aid 7: 10 to Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the battle moved back to the issue that ethnic lobbies can not determine the Foreign Policy of America.²⁰ It is

characteristic what wrote the *Wall Street Journal*, known for its huge influence and connections with the various power centers which stated “that the only reason for maintaining the embargo is that there are more Greek voters than those of Turkish origin for the election of members of Congress”.²¹

At the same time the MP in the House of Representatives Paul Fiendly stated that the embargo was decided because “the Greek-Americans have a strong presence in each constituency for the Congress.”²² Certainly this is not at all the case actually. As noted by Professor Nicholas Stavrou, “the average population of Greek origin in the 435 constituencies voting for the Congress is about 0.08%. Only in ten regions the ethnic Greek population (voting) is more than 1%. In practice this means that the Greek vote is not decisive anywhere except in case of very tiny difference (of votes) between the candidates, as happened in the presidential election between Carter and Ford in 1976. Stavrou even notes that the four regions with the largest population of Greek origin (New York, Michigan, Illinois and California) are less successful in the election of Greek-Americans in various offices, while there are also among them elected officials with strong positions in favor of Turkey.”²³

Yet the myth of the “powerful” Greek-American lobby –which does not withstand serious analysis– seems to serve the executive which was using it to exercise pressure on Congress considering that it was accepting the influence of an ethnic lobby instead of supporting the reasonable American interests. It seems also to serve a certain Greek-American leadership that could be presented both in Washington, Athens and Nicosia, with serious claims, or influence - particularly in the formulation of the Greek Foreign policy, and developments in the Cyprus problem - or to serve other interests as it is going to be shown in the analysis that will follow.

A part from the mythology that was created –and the fact that Athens and Nicosia sometimes enticed it– for the first time the Greek-Americans realized that they possessed a political force. And whether these lobbies were until then dominated by amateurism, they began to appear various kinds of professional lobbyists –who are often just as amateurs– trying to sell the products of their art in Washington and in Athens. Thus was born the industry of the Greek-American lobby that has little to do with the masses of Greek-Americans, the Greek community -*omogeneia*- whose interest in Greek affairs, welfare and progress of Greece remains high and unquestionable.

The Decades 1980, 1990

After the failure of 1978, will begin slowly the decline and retreat of the Greek-American lobby. Although this decline is evident to every serious observer and scholar, the mythology of the ‘powerful’ lobby, is still alive, not only in Greece and Cyprus but also in the various Greek communities of the diaspora.

Three things characterize the last two decades: At the organizational level, the governments of Greece and Cyprus have intervened to help create new structures, at the level of activity the “professionalism” makes its appearance, while we experience a strongly reverse influence phenomenon, the activity of the lobby influencing the formulation and conduct of the foreign policy of the country of origin in favor of U.S. interests. Even on the organizational level, the cards are redistributed again in recent years with the various interlaced interests to seek to be present and heard at the level of the Greek-American lobby.

Interventions of Greek and Cypriot Governments

First, the Cyprus government, following the difficult situation created by the Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus, will try to create a global network of the Cypriot diaspora to support the cause of Cyprus. Thus, it was created in the late 1970s, the World Federation of Overseas Cypriots-POMAK and the International Coordinating Committee Justice for Cyprus-PSEKA. POMAK is based in London, as in Britain are established most expatriate Cypriots, while PSEKA headquartered in New York because in the U.S. takes place the largest effort to promote the Cyprus issue, and the action of any serious lobby. In particular, the hegemonic position of U.S. in the post-Cold War era, is justifying the effort to influence U.S. foreign policy.

Somewhat belatedly, the Greek government moved in 1995 to the creation of the Council of Hellenes Abroad-SAE (*Symvoulío Apodimou Ellinismou*) to coordinate the activities of the Greek diaspora (December 1995, Thessaloniki). The SAE is a world wide umbrella organization of which the presidency was for a long time based in the USA. The SAE of America which included until 2006, apart from the U.S., Canada and Latin America, is the most important component of this new global organisation. After the international meeting in Thessaloniki in December 2006 and under the new law 3480/2006, Latin America and Canada became separate regions.

If the initiative of the Cypriot government did not create big problems, since related only to the Cypriots and the Cyprus question, the same didn't happen with the initiative of the Greek government with the creation of SAE.

The first reaction came from the Church, especially by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which considers the Greek diaspora –more the orthodox of the Greek diaspora– as its flock, under its own responsibility and jurisdiction. Previously, with Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis, the Greek Orthodox Church of America under the Patriarchate had opposed even the creation of the State Secretariat for Greeks Abroad. The situation was further complicated because at the same period that SAE was established the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I ordered Archbishop Iakovos to resign, while the Greek government provided him support. The paradox in this story is the alliance of Iakovos with the Greek government, as it is known that the Archbishop not only collaborated with the junta, but also fought PASOK when it was in opposition.²⁴ But it is a fact that Iakovos reversed the negative climate that existed in PASOK towards him in the early years of its governance, and soon became the “official” interlocutor of the government, as happened with the military regime, and the Caramanlis government. It has been reported by many that Andreas Papandreou, who knew Iakovos and his role in the period of dictatorship, had to reconcile with him hoping in the support of the Greek-Americans in a difficult era for Greece. The settlement with Iakovos restored a degree of unity in the Greek American community, but also left a bitter taste to those who stood by Papandreou in other difficult times –the period of dictatorship– most of whom were demobilised by the lobby. It is very likely that Papandreou has succumbed to the myth that managed to establish Iakovos as a major player, that he was exercising his influence on American decision-making centers. In a stunning declaration, a partner of Iakovos for many years, Metropolitan Anthony of Dardanelles of the Diocese of San Francisco, said on this topic: “Everything that has been said or written about the power and influence exercised by Iakovos at the White House is a legend created by the media. “Iakovos, Anthony continues, “was a master conductor in public relations and this was necessary because the power of the Diaspora is probably exaggerated”. The same Metropolitan concluded that over the last thirty years the Greek-American lobby has not achieved many things, and that the so-called access to the White House led to the exploitation of the Diaspora.²⁵ These estimates of Antony may be too

excessive, but they partly coincide with similar assessments of other observers as will be shown later in this analysis.

Thus, in December 1995, Iakovos who was still archbishop –but on the point to resign– supported the effort for the creation of the SAE and in return his confidant Andrew Athens became the president of the organization. Unlike Iakovos, Archbishop Stylianos of Australia boycotted the effort of SAE and the church communities, –parishes in reality– of Australia are not represented in the organisation. Of course the case of Australia and the role of Stylianos is a fairly complex issue with which we are not going to deal.

The Patriarchate, despite its cautious stance and some representations, didn't take any dramatic decisions which would cut the bridges with the Greek state. Nevertheless it proceeded through the replacement of Iakovos, and took no account of the advice of the Greek government to give him the chance to stay at least for a time in position, nor its advice on choosing his successor.

Then, the traditional institutions of the Diaspora in the U.S., and personalities with an influence did not accept the leadership of SAE. Over the years, SAE gives the impression not to be the coordinating body of the Diaspora, but of an additional organization among those which claim a guiding role. Moreover, it is striking that even during minor events –not to mention the important ones– SAE participates as one of many organizations.

Many of these reactions were of course related to personal ambitions or interests. Generally, however, the whole way they faced SAE has to do with the philosophy of Greek Americans of the second and third generation who can hardly accept the fact that Greece –which for them is only the land of their parents or grandparents– comes with a presidential decree to impose an agency - coordinating body for their various activities. There are even formal-legal problems for the operation of SAE in the USA, difficulties in facing things from the same perspective, different priorities, etc.

For the first-generation Greek immigrants –as is particularly the case in Canada – there are other serious issues such as representation, and the favorable treatment of the Church from the Greek state at the expense of large communities and other urban organizations. In Canada, for example, Greek-Canadians created their own umbrella organization, the Hellenic Canadian Congress. With many weaknesses, it is true, but it exists and all the major communities are represented in it, the

church parishes and various other organizations. The Greek state, however, which is defining the number of the representatives for the SAE Assemblies, has essentially distributed them equally between the Congress and the Church. It is strange that a government like that of PASOK facing problems with the Hellenic Church, was strengthening the Church abroad at the expense of the civil organizations.

Thus, it appears that the efforts of the SAE didn't deliver the expected results. An indication of this is the fact of creating new structures among Greek-Americans – this is the case of the fabulously rich Angelo Tsakopoulos who created his own group - the intense debate within the American Greek Orthodox Church and its circle as well as the ambiguous attitude of the then Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis towards a creature he inherited from Andreas Papandreou.²⁶ The government of Costas Karamanlis remained trapped in the same policy. The recent crisis in Greece put in practice an end to SAE activities.

As for the Cypriot organizations POMAK and PSEKA they have been reduced over time to inefficient bureaucratic organizations.

The Professional Lobby

In practice, the current Greek-American lobby is professional, regardless of its quality.

The American Hellenic Institute - AHI was perhaps the first professional lobby among Greek-Americans (founded in 1974) but not in the strict sense, namely the creation of a business lobby, but in the sense of working to address the issues of the lobby. Its work is considered among the most serious and is surrounded by scientists and professionals.

The Company «Manatos and Manatos» founded by Andrew Manatos is the case of a purely professional - business lobby. The company was receiving for a quite long period funds from the governments of Greece and Cyprus. Andrew Manatos has been a consultant to the president of SAE Andrew Athens and the organizer of the annual conferences of PSEKA in Washington, and the activities of the United Hellenic American Congress of Athens (UHAO). So the Manatos Company acts as the major professional lobby for government funded organisations of the Diaspora.

Likewise considered the Western Policy Center-WPC of the fabulously rich

sponsor of President Clinton, Angelo Tsakopoulos, may be considered professional as well. It was founded in Sacramento, California - minor body in the beginning, in 1995 - before being transferred to Washington in 1998. This organization joined the Woodrow Wilson International Center in 2004. Later it was totally absorbed by the Woodrow Wilson International Center. The WPC stated “as its objective purpose the promotion of the geopolitical interests of U.S. and the Western values to the South-Eastern Europe and the settlement of the Greek-Turkish and south-balkan problems”. In promoting its objectives, especially those in developing “close U.S. relations with Greece and Turkey, it does not consider the issue of Turkish presence in Cyprus as an obstacle to the development of these relations.”²⁷ Under these circumstances one wonders if WPC is a Greek-American lobby promoting Greek interests in Washington or instead a lobby to promote American interests by exerting pressure on Athens.

Even in recent years the Greek and Cypriot governments, sublet the services of lobby companies for the promotion of Greek interests. Such kind of hiring have brought significant benefits to Turkey which uses these professional companies – due to the lack of a significant Turkish presence in U.S.- in a planned and long term fashion way. For the Greek interests these companies have not been successful because they have not been used in a planned or rational way nor in a broader strategy.

In general, the professional business lobby has replaced the old one, often spontaneous mobilization of the Diaspora. The quality of this professionalism is often questionable judging from the results, but also by the detailed breakdown analysis of certain activities.

The Chronological Periodisation

Chronologically, we can delimit the decades 1980, 1990 and 2000 into five periods: the period of the Reagan presidency (1981-1988), that of the Bush presidency (1989-1992), that of the Clinton presidency (1993-2000), that of the Bush's son presidency (2001-2008) and that of Obama (2009-).²⁸

The Reagan Period (1981-1988)

During this period the U.S. interest for the Cyprus and Greek issues in general is reduced. The Reagan administration will further enhance its relations with Turkey and even will try to reverse the ratio 7: 10 for military assistance to

Greece and Turkey. As already mentioned, this ratio - based on a law of the Congress passed in 1978 in exchange for lifting the embargo - provides that for every ten U.S. dollars military aid to Turkey would be granted seven to Greece. The purpose of this ratio is to maintain a relative military balance between the two countries. In recent years this ratio has basically lost all meaning, given the realised cuts.

The reasons for this downgrading of the Cypriot and Greek issues in Washington for this period, are associated with the strong anti-communist policy of the Reagan administration and the perception that Turkey was for this purpose, a valuable ally. It coincided also with the arrival of PASOK in power in Greece. The anticommunist hysteria in a climate of new Cold War affected the bilateral relations, while Washington was accusing Greece of tolerance for terrorism and independent policy within NATO. It is significant that Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense - who was second in command at the Pentagon - and amid the most enthusiastic supporters of Turkey along with Defense Minister Caspar Weinberger, left the government in 1988 and created a private company - lobby which took on the promotion of the Turkish interests in Washington.

Another reason for the deterioration of the Greek issues in Washington is the creation of a truly powerful lobby in favor of Turkey in response to the mobilization of the Greek Americans in previous years. As Turkey had not a strong Turkish American community to mobilize in Washington, the Turkish lobby went through public relations professional brands, retired generals and representatives of the military industries. At the same time was created a network to promote Turkish interests in the academic community. Turkey had also funded the Institute of Turkish Studies in Washington which works directly for the development of this academic network.

The Turkish lobby in the period of the Reagan presidency will achieve connection with the executive, particularly the Pentagon and the State Department. Further, it will manage to find supports in Congress, especially among Republicans.

Without underestimating the efforts of the Greek-American lobby over this period, one notes a countdown over the period 1974-1980 that had a 'monopoly' presence, particularly on the Cyprus question. The effectiveness of the Turkish lobby will retrograde to the second rank the Greek-American lobby.

The Bush Era Period (1989-1992)

It is known that George Bush won the election in November 1988 over the Greek-American Michael Dukakis, candidate for the Democratic Party. Dukakis's candidacy had created high expectations in the Greek American Community but also in Greece and Cyprus. Dukakis himself was very attentive during his campaign and did not give specific pledges on Greek themes, unlike previous candidates of the Democratic Party like Carter or Clinton. Although one can only do hypotheses in this case, knowing the mechanisms and decision-makers in Washington, it is doubtful whether the U.S. foreign policy would change at all with Dukaki's election. But the fact that a son of Greek immigrants arrived so close to the highest office of the most powerful country in the world, gave special pride to the Greek Americans who started realizing their potential. At this juncture, Archbishop Iakovos supported essentially Bush.

The Bush presidency coincides with the end of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War. These major events had shaken the Cold War climate of the Reagan era, especially the first four years.

In this new climate and with the Mitsotakis government in Athens, the Greek-American relations got better. The Greek-American lobby became more active, and President Bush, during his visit to Greece and Turkey in July 1991, announced his intention to work towards resolving the Cyprus problem. This effort did not work, despite the good personal relations of Mitsotakis with the U.S. President. Neither the U.S. policy to consider Turkey as a key factor of stability in the region to serve their interests will change. It was a confirmation of the priority of geopolitical and geostrategic interests on any personal relationships.

Meanwhile the Greek-American lobby is required now in Washington to support new Greek themes: the Macedonian question and the Greek minority issue in Albania. So, next to the Greek-Turkish problems are now added and the Balkan issues.

The Clinton Era (1993-2000)

In the presidential election campaign of 1992 a Greek-American still claims the nomination as candidate for the Democratic Party, former Senator Paul Tsongas. Finally Bill Clinton will get the Democratic nomination, and be elected U.S. president, against George Bush.

As Greek Americans generally vote for Democratic candidates so far, and this time they still supported Bill Clinton on whom they placed many hopes. They were expecting that the new president, if not supporting the Greek positions, at least he would be closer to a policy of respect for human rights and principles of international law, which would facilitate - with some pressure on Turkey - a solution to the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish disputes.

In fact, the program of the Democratic Party before the elections reiterated a standing American position that the U.S. would work to find a solution to the Cyprus problem in accordance with UN resolutions. It pledged to bring the matter to the agenda of American diplomacy. For the Macedonian question, it was promised that it would be sensitive to the Greek concerns with the name Macedonia.

Clinton himself as a candidate, in a letter to Angelo Tsakopoulos, who was chairman of a group of his Greek-American supporters, said that the Cyprus issue would be a priority, and that it “should put an end to the illegal Turkish occupation of Cyprus”.²⁹ He had given promises even to Cypriot U.S personalities sounding similar to those of Carter.

The election of Clinton, however, has not changed the substance of U.S. policy on Cyprus. There was certainly a mobility all the years of his presidency, but the priority of U.S. policy remained the same: first Turkey and close relationship with her. Thus, although the Greek-American lobby players were going and coming all these years in the White House-and Greek parliamentarians and politicians as well - it was more a question of public relations for Clinton and some Greek American actors (as well), with lots of photos rather than promoting Greek issues. The situation was such that the explosive exuberant Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos - beyond any diplomatic caution and civility - called Clinton a liar and caused the wrath of Americans. Certainly the Americans were waiting him in the corner, and with the Ocalan case he was dismissed from the Foreign Ministry, while the new minister who took over the Greek foreign policy, George Papandreou, was favored by Washington. Later on, Pangalos, with his well known inconsistencies, tried to have a *rapprochement* with Americans, particularly with the support he gave to the Annan plan, but his efforts were rather unsuccessful.

Unlike the public relations of the Greek-American lobby - with at least the exception of the AHI of Eugene Rossides - the Turks have obtained far more

from President Clinton, than from any previous president: the alliance with Israel, support for their European candidacy, recognition essentially of the merits of the Turkish presence in Cyprus, the support in the persecution of the Kurds, military and economic assistance, praise for the repression by the Turkish military establishment, which was presented as a contribution to the fight against terrorism and support for construction of the major pipeline Baku-Ceyhan.

As for the Macedonian question and the problems with Albania, the only thing American policy achieved was to play a mediating role for appeasement, and led the parties to the negotiating table.

There was so much frustration from the Clinton policy - at least for those interested in and beyond public relations and photography at the White House, or even the overnight stay in the Lincoln bedroom - that even a prelate, Metropolitan Anthony of Dardanelles, of the Diocese of San Francisco, stated: The visit of President Clinton in Greece was for the sake of Hillary who was then preparing to claim the seat of New York Senator. The Metropolitan went on saying that he hoped that Hillary will lose, because Clinton, while he is "going through the end of his second term of four years, and while he had made many promises to Greek Americans, did not fulfill them. "Anthony even suggests that, instead of making contributions to candidates who take advantage of the Greek-American community, the money should be given "to create institutions and foundations in order to support future generations." And as an example he cited the Vryonis Centre for the Study of Hellenism, "which is worth one hundred visits to the White House."³⁰

This fatigue with promises, with visits and smiles at the White House is reflected into the views expressed by many young Greek-Americans through the Internet, where there is confusion about the Greek foreign policy of *rapprochement* with Turkey which they see as ineffective, given that only Greece is constantly backing down - at least as they perceive things - while Ankara is always uncompromising.

The disappointment is reflected also during this period, in discussions with many Greek Americans, in comments to radio broadcasts, newspapers etc. There is a strong feeling that U.S. foreign policy is favoring Turkey and that the leadership of the Greek-American lobby is not operating properly nor has the skills and the necessary political stature to oppose the U.S. plans favoring Turkey.

The Era of George Bush's Son Presidency (2001-2008)

This period has nothing significant to present in terms of activation of the Greek-American lobby. To the contrary it shows most weakened than ever. First, the Greek influence on the Republican Party has always been very limited. The exception is the relationship maintained by the Bush family with the Greek-American businessman Alex Spanos but whose interest in Greek subjects are from limited to nonexistent.³¹ Some have also talked about relations of Bush's father, former President of the USA, with the shipowner Latsis' family, whom they hosted several times in the Greek islands. More serious is the case of Senator Olympia Snowe, who together with Michael Bilirakis in the House of Representatives are the two Republicans in Congress who defended occasionally the Greek issues. The Greek presence in the executive branch with John Negroponte certainly does not affect U.S. foreign policy in favor of the Greek issues. Besides, it would be illusory to believe that the presence to the executive of people of one or another ethnic origin beyond a certain symbolism can change the direction of U.S. policy in favor of one country or another.

The traditional Greek-American lobby continued also during this time its routine activities, but without significant results. The visits to the White House for the 'traditional' photography continued, although not with the same frequency as in the Clinton era. With a strong pro 'Turkish' team around Bush, especially at the Pentagon, the U.S. policy tended to be even more close to Ankara. As to the Cyprus question particularly, support was given to the Turkish claims over the Annan plan. Even the Americans have brought unbearable pressure on the Cypriots to accept the plan - including funding groups that supported it on the eve of the referendum - and after its rejection at the referendum of April 2004, they made efforts to upgrade the occupation regime in Cyprus.

The Obama Era³²

The traditional Greek-American lobby continued also during the Obama era its routine activities, but without significant results. In Washington for all practical purposes, the supposed Greek lobby is considered as "the fading Greek lobby" with diminishing clout in foreign policy. Even if Obama can still count on a strong majority of the self-identified Greek vote, in fact he got a pass from the Greek lobby. The priorities of his external policy to fight terrorism and in the same time to realise an opening to moderate Islam upgraded Turkey. In one way

or another Turkey is a strategic asset for the USA. The importance of Greece is in a way secondary for Americans compared to Turkey, but also is taken for granted. In the Balkans American interests don't coincide with these of Greece.

Another inconvenient is the absence of leading Greek-Americans in the Congress after the retirement of Paul Sarbanes and Olympia Snowe. With Senator Snowe's retirement in the elections of 2012 and Shelly Berkley's narrow loss in the Nevada Senate race, there is no longer a single Hellene in the U.S. Senate. It's a notable loss for the Greek lobby on the Senate side of the Capitol. For over three decades, there has been a Hellene in the United States Senate.

Nevertheless the main problem for the Greek lobby in Washington, regardless of objective difficulties due to the direction of U.S. foreign policy, is its inability due to the lack of effective structures, lack of capable leadership, lack of clear objectives and lack of coordination with Athens and Nicosia.

The Countdown

The impression a Greek citizen has when we talk about the Greek-American lobby is of course that it works for the promotion of Greek interests in Washington. That was true at the good old times. The countdown has begun long ago. Today the triadic relationship Greek-American lobby, Washington, Athens (and of course Nicosia) implies that the Greek-American lobby also promotes American interests in Athens. This may sound strange but this is the reality that has long been noted by those who follow and study the evolution of the Greek-American lobby.³³

Professor Vangelis Coufoudakis already mentioned in the '70s and '80s two cases, where the Greek foreign policy changed because of the influence of Greek-American lobby, one of which dates back to 1976 – it concerned the defense cooperation agreement between Greece and U.S. - and the other at the beginning of the PASOK government, and it was regarding the restoration of the statue of Truman as a goodwill gesture to the Americans. Always according to Coufoudakis – who writes in the early 1990's - and in a series of other issues, the Greek-American lobby influenced the PASOK government to change its policy, but stresses that it was not the deciding factor for this change. He refers, for example, to the more “pragmatic” foreign policy of PASOK since 1986 and the lowering of tones of anti-American rhetoric, the negotiations on the American bases and the decision on the issue of Palestinian “terrorist” Mohammed Rashid.³⁴

For this period one could indicate also the restoration of friendly relations between the government of PASOK and Archbishop Iakovos. Although we are unable to know to what extent Iakovos influenced Papandreou to meet with Ozal in Davos, it is certain that the Archbishop had at that time cordial relations with both. It is the time that he still aspired to reach the patriarchal throne of Constantinople, and to this end he has developed close relations with Ozal. Iakovos' close relationships with the centers of American power throughout this period are also well known. Whether one can not argue that the contribution of Iakovos was decisive to the *rapprochement* between Greece and Turkey that led to the meeting in Davos - other more important interests of both countries, and ambitions of their leaders, were more decisive factors - it would be naïve for anyone not to see a certain influence of the triadic relationship of the Archbishop with the interested parties.

The tendency of some persons of the Greek-American lobby to promote American interests more than the Greek ones increased in the '90s. A typical example of this tendency is the case of the Western Policy Center, founded by the Greek-American businessman Angelo Tsakopoulos, to which reference has already been made.

All the Greek Governments tried to avoid conflict with the Greek-American lobby. Even the PASOK Government in the early years in power and despite its anti-American rhetoric, restored cordial relations with Iakovos, despite his past-junta's support, hostile attitude towards PAK but also towards the PASOK during the years it was in the opposition. Although it was repeatedly stressed that the Greek foreign policy was decided in Athens, on the other hand all the governments reiterated that they were listening attentively to the views of Greek Americans. Thus, despite any tensions at times, the relations were held to a level of mutual understanding. Some discords on the Greek minority in Albania or the Macedonian question do not change this picture. Above all, these discords-criticism of Greek foreign policy on these issues—were coming from regional organizations such as the Panepirotiki or Pammakedoniki and not from the Church, or the main lobby groups. Moreover, the contradictions within the Greek-American lobby gave the possibility of some kind of maneuverability to the Greek Governments.

From the side of the third partner in this triadic relationship, the U.S., the interest to use the Greek-Americans to lobby for changing the policy of Athens and Nicosia was always intense. The various power centers in Washington used *ad*

nauseam the Greek-American lobby for this purpose, but it is true with a very discreet way more often and in the form of friendly recommendations. Usually, these centers were presenting to the Greek-American lobby, some ideas regarding the relations of Greece with Ankara or even with its Balkan neighbors, that they would promote and ask Athens or Nicosia to “help” these efforts of mediation, their “understanding” or to show “flexibility and good faith”. Thus, the Greek-American lobby was transferring the pressure of Washington to the governments of Athens and Nicosia. Furthermore, it was becoming an “advisory” body to the two Governments that certainly was nothing but a kind of pressure.

If this triadic relationship –Greek-American lobby, Greece (Cyprus), US– operated somewhat balanced for some years after 1974, due to the charged atmosphere of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and because of the compromised relationship of the traditional Greek-American leaders with the junta, but also because of the pressure of the masses on the grassroots of the Diaspora, things have changed gradually against Greek interests. In recent years especially, more pressure is exerted on Greece and Cyprus –it is really discreet– to make concessions, instead of exercising pressure against Turkey which remains adamant in its positions both in Cyprus and the Aegean. Greek-American organizations are visiting Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, visits organized by the U.S. services –for example the case of AHEPA in April 1998– transferring the American positions, mediators on Cyprus succeed one another and are presented as the successes of the Greek-American lobby, regardless of their missions’ outcome. Greek-American big businessmen are increasingly matching all the more openly to American positions on the Greek issues accompanying even American officials on their visits to Greece, while the SAE and its President Andrew Athens see only positive initiatives undertaken by the U.S.

While in the past, frequent visits of Greek politicians to the U.S. were bothering the Greek American leadership since they came into contact with the masses of the Diaspora, today they are usually the official guests of this leadership and a series of photographs at the White House is also part of their tour.

Professor Nicholas Stavrou wrote a few years ago ironically that “after 25 years of illusions, the ‘Greek lobby’ has found a new way to be helpful. It redefined its influence from Washington to Athens. Now instead of putting pressure on the State Department and the White House to stop the hypocrisy and support the enforcement of international law in Cyprus, the Aegean and the

Balkans, Greek American leaders are rushing to Athens, either by opening the door to ‘Special American Envoys’ or escorting them.³⁵

Eugene Rossides said himself that “today there is even a group, whose positions on various ethnic issues are close to those of Turkey”.³⁶ Rossides photographs the Tsakopoulos group –the Western Policy Center– of which the director John Sitalides with lectures at various universities becomes the forerunner of American ideas and views on Greek issues.

The other view which promotes constantly the Greek-American lobby in Athens is the economic and political stability and improvements in the investment climate by reducing tensions in the region. This position is of course the one promoted firmly also by the State Department supporting by all means the Greek-Turkish *rapprochement*, but without putting any real pressure or even making any suggestion towards Turkey for concessions from its intransigent positions.

There is no doubt that during the Greek-Turkish *rapprochement* –as part of the “earthquake diplomacy”– a portion of the Greek-American lobby has played an important role. It is mainly the Tsakopoulos group, some Greek-American businessmen, the SAE and the Church. But there are significant differences among them as expressed by the Greek American Hellenic Institute of Rossides and even AHEPA. Finally and yet, strong opposition to this policy is expressed by the grass roots of the Diaspora. Not of course to the Greek-Turkish *rapprochement* to which no one objects, but in fact to the leveling of everything, where the occupation of Cyprus is presented as something almost secondary to the improvement of investment climate and to the prevention of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.³⁷ In the same context notable is the pressure exerted by the Greek-American lobby towards Athens about the so called terrorism issues. In essence this lobby was adopting the American position on these matters drawn up for years by Washington, that the Greek government did not pay the necessary efforts to dismantle terrorism.

As for SAE –although its role was confined for a long time more to create “medical centers” by Andrew Athens in the former Soviet republics– it is also a channel diffusing American positions and opinions in Athens and Nicosia. If we analyze the statements and views expressed at times by the SAE we will find out a flaccidity of the kind “Americans do everything they can”, so do

Greece and Cyprus, it remains to convince Turkey that it is in its interest to appear more willing to make some compromises, in order to find solutions to all Greek-Turkish differences.

Indeed, the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and the “earthquake diplomacy” adopted by George Papandreou in 1999 is approved by a proportion of the Greek-American lobby which has interests and important links to the American centers of power and interrelated interests in Athens. On the contrary at the grassroots of the diaspora exists a great concern, since Turkey has not made the slightest gesture of goodwill. Even on an issue such as the Theological School of Halki, for which there is virtually no cost to Turkey, and despite repeated promises by the Turkish officials since the Ozal era, it has done absolutely nothing.

There is no doubt that the triadic relationship evolves slowly in favor of U.S. interests, rather than Greek. This situation, which is likely to deteriorate over time against Greece, is explained by two main reasons: the first is Americanization, assimilation of Greek Americans who are now members of the second, third and fourth generation. It is natural for them to feel as Americans first and less as Greeks. Most of them keep more of a folk-emotional relationship with Greece. The Greek-American community ceased now to be renewed with new immigrants from Greece and the balances that existed within and among new immigrants and the generations of Greek-American born in the U.S. are overturned. Probably in the future we will talk more about philhellenes rather than Greeks.

The second reason for the change of balance in the triangle Greek-American lobby, Greece (Cyprus), USA in favor of the USA, are the Greek-American big businessmen interests. Greece is now a door of their entry to Europe and the Balkans. This of course requires to avoid tensions in the region and improvement of investment climate.

To these two reasons, one should probably add also the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with which powerful Greek-American businessmen maintain close relationships. The relaxation of tension in the area allows the Patriarchate a certain freedom of movement and of course –even under the constant Turkish pressure– it is seeking to defuse tension in the Greek-Turkish relations, even with sacrifices in Cyprus and the Aegean.

Certainly it would be wrong to underestimate the reactions to this course of the triangle relation within the Greek-American community. These reactions

may come even from young people of the second, third or fourth generation who at some time discover their roots and react strongly to Americanization. Currently there is such a movement in the Greek American community, although it is too weak to be able to reverse the balance. Reactions may come even-and they already exist but they are weak-from Greek-American scholars who have a different perception of Greece. It shouldn't also be underestimated the likely grassroots reaction of the Diaspora, especially if at some point the Greek or the Cypriot Government are forced to react to possible pressures from the Greek-American lobby. Finally, the differences that exist either on the ideological or in the practical level, either on the level of interests between the different groups of the Greek-American lobby, is another factor maintaining the balance hampering at the moment, the full reversal of equilibria in the triadic relation.

Of course, much depends on the policy that will be followed by Athens (and Nicosia). Athens can - but discreetly - influence in its favor the balance inside the Greek-American lobby. It can support those forces that support Greek interests. It can invest properly in the academic community as Turkey has done with a lot of success. It can above all integrate the theme of the lobby in a national strategy it had never had on the national issues.

However, this issue of the triadic relationship is the expression of a momentum for each ethnic lobby, not only the Greek-American. Sociologists who study the issue find that it is a complex issue both in terms of interest and on the emotional level. In general, however, as the agents of the ethnic lobby draw away from the first generation of migrants, interests outweigh the emotional factor.

A Neglected Parameter: The Field of American Education

Usually when referring to the Greek-American lobby is stressed the Turkish penetration in U.S. universities and the strong efforts of Turkey to create a foothold in the field of American academia. It is true that Turkey has shown considerable success in this area and has spent large sums for this purpose. Even in occupied Cyprus, some American universities have entered into relationships with the so-called Turkish Cypriot universities which are either annexes of those of Turkey or created more for political propaganda purposes rather than to fulfill the actual needs of the Turkish Cypriots.

But, apart from the academia, there is the general area of American education

in which the various ethno-cultural communities have made great efforts in the postwar era to influence in their favor the new curriculum that were created.

As it was noted in a communication to the Third World Congress of the Research Institutes of Hellenism in Montreal in May 1999³⁸ by the well-known Greek-American scholar Speros Vryonis, the revolutionary changes in postwar American education system went unnoticed by both the Greek-American community and Greece itself. Even when we have seen these changes, said Professor Vryonis, little has been done to study the phenomenon and its effects in shaping the whole personality of American citizens, their political attitudes and choices. Because these new curricula have changed the whole historical and cultural context of American education, they edify the American people through a new historical-cultural proposal.

What has essentially been done was the removal of classical education from the curriculum and its strengthening with cultural elements associated with the new postwar reality. For example, the emphasis was on African American culture, the techno-utilitarian orientation of education and its enrichment with cultural references that reflect more the composition of American society on the ethnocultural level.

Other ethno-cultural communities, particularly the Jewish, Armenian and African American, not only intervened in the process of reforming the educational programs, but also created chairs in the universities, scholarships institutions around the production of a sufficient number of teachers in all levels of education who can teach elements of their culture and history. And all this in a long-term planning in order to be able to form through education the American public opinion. And in particular in order to form through education the American elite, which will be later in the decision-making positions affecting the shaping of U.S. foreign policy.³⁹ Even the Turkish government has invested huge sums in the field of American education in recent years with the result to manage slowly to create a positive image of Turkey in American public opinion.

However, neither the Greek-American community, neither Greece saw this matter in a methodical and serious planning in this regard. Some “investments” made at (the) university level, were convulsive, made without study and planning. The same, unfortunately, is done in other countries like Australia and Canada. The result is devastating and the situation will be even worse in the

future. The new strains of American diplomacy, of academia, the key decision makers, will not have any knowledge of Greek culture beyond some stereotypes.

Previously they had at least some knowledge of ancient Greek culture as taught at various levels of the American education system. Once again the Greeks, due to their mistakes, they lost an opportunity to seriously invest in a so sensitive area. They will continue, however, to blame for all these, in a manichean way, the Americans, as usual, ignoring their own responsibilities.

We know, however, that Greek-Americans have one of the highest levels of education. And as Professor Speros Vryonis put it “this is a contradictory phenomenon in that the Greek-Americans have been classified as one of the two highly educated groups in the nation” (e.g. in the U.S.) regardless their indifference to influence the new curriculum. He will stress, however, immediately that in fact this education (of the Greek-Americans) is in technical areas and not in the broad education “. Which means - and it is established - that the Greek-Americans have turned themselves more to the so-called liberal professions, and there is a tremendous deficit in the social sciences, teachers in areas of primary and secondary education, in the arts and in general in the field of letters and humanities. The human groups, however, societies and communities in general, that do not have to show achievements in these fields, are doomed. From these fields is popping culture, civilisation more broadly, the ideological-political choices of the various societies and communities. Here there is indeed a clear distinction between the concepts of education and training.

So under these conditions, both Athens and the Greek-American community would have to incorporate this issue within their broader strategy and to address it directly whether they want to have some positive results in the future.

The Structures of the American Lobby

As already mentioned, the Greek-American lobby has a multiple fragmentation, disjointed structure, without a central coordinating body. For many years the Orthodox Church was a sort of link, a kind of relay despite intense criticism and pressure from other groups in the Diaspora. The charismatic personality of Archbishop Iakovos contributed greatly to this role of the Church, as also the close relationships he developed over time with the American, the Greek, and sometimes with the Turkish, Governments.

The policy of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to force the resignation of Iakovos and divide the Greek Orthodox Church of America in four districts - Canada, USA, Mexico, Latin America - with his unfortunate continuing interventions, has weakened the Church and now undergoes a deep crisis. The heirs of Iakovos, Spyridon and Dimitrios, didn't have the same strong personality as him. In addition because they received the undermining from friends of the former Archbishop, and the stranglehold of Bartholomew and that of his Greek-American friends, they failed to keep the Church in the forefront. Even in the U.S., the Archbishop's position has weakened with the upgrading of bishoprics to metropolises. So the role of the Church seriously degraded in recent years.

The foundation of the SAE, which aimed to create a central coordinating body also failed and the body is far less important than some traditional organizations such as AHEPA.

The way in which SAE was created by the Greek state, the way in which it operates, lack of capable leadership, leaves many questions about the Greek state's vision and shows a lack of strategic and long-term planning for such a serious matter.

Some believe that AHEPA remains the most important organization of the Diaspora, with the greatest influence.⁴⁰ Surely AHEPA has a history - it was founded in 1922 - some of its activities marked the Greek-American community, but as a lobby actor it is doubtful whether it can be seen as the most important organization. Surely it is also the agency with branches throughout the U.S. and Canada, and in that only the Church with its parishes can compete with it, with a major organizational structure in comparison with other organizations, but it never claimed the leadership in Greek-American lobby. Neither, however, refused to contribute to its efforts. On the other hand, it remains a deeply conservative institution, it tolerated or even supported the dictatorship in Greece and in some occasions it embraced the American options on the Greek-US relations.

The American Hellenic Institute - AHI - founded by Eugene Rossides in 1974 is perhaps the most professional team, as already mentioned, of the Greek-American lobby, which has a serious work planning with constant positions. In contrast to the AHEPA, it is not a mass organization, but a group of businessmen, professionals and academics. The conservative Rossides's past - he served as Undersecretary of trade in the Nixon administration - and his relations with the

Republican Party, even the sympathy or tolerance he showed for the dictatorship in Greece, are considered by many to be the weak point of the American Hellenic Institute. The AHI was strongly opposed to the creation of SAE and has refused any cooperation with it, while it worked occasionally with AHEPA and the Church, and other Greek-American organizations.

The United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC), a creation of Archbishop Iakovos in 1975, who placed at its head Andrew Athens, was actually a kind of ‘secular’ political expression of the Archdiocese of America. Following the promotion of Athens as the president of SAE and the departure of Iakovos, the UHAC remains a minor organization in the Chicago area.

The National Council of America is another umbrella organization of various clubs, associations and individuals which participate in the SAE where it unsuccessfully opposed the promotion of Andrew Athens in the office of president. Its activities on the lobby level are limited. And its whole appearance is not at all convincing.

After 1974, especially the first years after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, several organizations and committees had been created, which over the years disappeared. These were teams coming from the grassroots of the Greek-American community with significant participation of academics and students. In many cases they came as the transformation of groups that fought the dictatorship in Greece. They were quite radical, with intense anti-Americanism, and often they clashed with traditional conservative organizations and the Church. Their presence, however, helped to mobilize Greek Americans for Cyprus and forced the traditional conservative organizations to adopt more advanced positions under pressure from the mass protests of those organizations.⁴¹

The Cypriot organizations are heavily involved in the PSEKA, as already mentioned, which has at its head Philip Christopher (Philippos Christoforidis, first-generation Cypriot who Americanized his name). Many criticisms have been made from time to time for PSEKA, especially its president and the way it operates. PSEKA has always worked closely with Andrew Athens and the “Manatos and Manatos” Company. For a long time its Secretary was a senior government official in Nicosia.

Finally, there are some significant federations consisted from local ethnic clubs representing a region of Greece. Those who are mainly active at the lobby level

are the *Pan-Epirotic Union of America (Panepirotiki)* for the Greeks of Albania and the Greek-Albanian relations and Pan-Macedonian (*Pammakedoniki*) for the Macedonian question. Also the Pan-Pontian Federation of USA and Canada is struggling for the recognition of genocide of Greeks of Pontos and of Asia Minor. This Federation has obtained recognition of the Pontian genocide by the governors of New York, George Patakis and of New Jersey Jim McGreevy. The second has even «instituted the September 9, 2001 as a day of remembrance of the destruction of Smyrna and the genocide of Greeks of Pontos and Asia Minor».⁴²

The American academic community - or at least part of it - is also involved in the activities of the Greek-American lobby, as well as the student world. Assistance to certain institutions and their presence in them is always positive, though often these institutions overridden by the businessmen are not always able to appreciate their role.

The Greek-American Press is another element in the structure of Greek-American Community, which certainly affects the course of Greek-American lobby. In New York - which is always the heart of the Community - is published *The National Herald (Ethnikos Kyrikas)*, the oldest Greek daily newspaper in the U.S. In the same city was still published till 2001 a second Greek-language daily newspaper, *The Morning (I Proïni)*. There are still dozens of weekly newspapers. It is also important the presence of Greek newspapers in English which deal with Greek subjects. For example, the weekly *Hellenic Chronicle* of Boston which has now been closed was claiming the largest circulation among Greek Americans. Its publisher Peter Agkris was received in 1975 by President Ford and Kissinger in an attempt to mitigate criticism of U.S. policy in Cyprus after the Turkish invasion. There is generally a rise of English-speaking Greek-American press and a fall of the Greek-speaking one.⁴³ There have been published also bulletins of certain organizations such as AHEPA and AHI, which are sent selectively to those who hold important positions in American society – on the political, economic and academic levels.

Nowadays the role of the social media such as Websites, blogs, facebook is also important, since it keeps many organisations in contact. Among them the American Hellenic Media Project, sought to present a balanced picture of Greece, and to respond to articles in the American press which distorted the Greek reality. This effort was stopped because it was not supported.

After all, the fragmentation and lack of coordination, remains one of the weaknesses of the Greek-American lobby.

Prospects

In a revealing article entitled ‘Dead End: The Decline and Fall of the Greek Lobby in America, in *Odyssey* magazine (November-December 1995), a Washington-based well known British journalist and activist Christopher Hitchens, made a brief but impressive anatomy of the Greek-American lobby.⁴⁴ Noting that the success of the embargo in 1974 was the result of a broad coalition of many forces, not just «a few legislators with Attic name-endings», he refers to the fact that it was Kissinger who used first the term “Greek lobby” in order to present it as narrowly ‘ethnic’ one. He emphasizes the principle that the Greek affairs went well when they were identified with the rule of law and justice. But he notes that this line was not always followed and refers to two typical cases which caused damage to the Greek affairs.

The first case is a public statement by Philip Christopher, President of PSEKA, in August 1994 in Nicosia, before President Clerides and other officials, according to which if Cyprus had spent 50 million U.S. dollars annually for three years in support of the lobby in America, the Cyprus problem would be solved! How is it possible, asks Hitchens, a man in which Cyprus has entrusted the case of the lobby in U.S. to make such cynical statements publicly, without causing damage? We know of course that the financing of election campaigns in the U.S. is part of the political game and each lobbyist who respects himself deals also with the financial support of presidential candidates, senators, etc. But here, inversely, applies the well-known saying about Caesar’s wife, who may well not be honest – as long as the U.S. law is not grabbing her - but she must, at least, appear as such. Moreover, there is an excessive cynicism to believe that a small country can cope with this kind of competition with Turkey, which has always the possibility, says Hitchens, to spend much more. A strong financial contribution to an election campaign may ensure for some fabulously rich Greek Americans to sleep in the “Lincoln bedroom” in the White House, but certainly not the solution to the Cyprus problem!

The second case refers to the publication-revelation in the *Wall Street Journal* of January 10, 1990 of a letter sent by Andrew Athens to the then President of Cyprus George Vassiliou - which was prepared by Andrew Manatos. Athens

wrote to Vassiliou, as “a buisnessman to another” – Vassiliou has been a leading businessman before to assuming the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus – exposing to him the economic needs of the lobby he was guiding along with Manatos, in order to bring positive effects on the Cyprus issue. “Let me lay out for you what resources are necessary to properly mobilize our network of people and bring to closure a successful result of all our efforts for Cyprus.” This letter asked for a five-year commitment of \$200,000 per annum-a mere million. The release of the letter, which the Journal acidly described as “a bottom line appeal from a US citizen to the head of a foreign state to gain influence in Congress over US foreign policy” was mysterious. Especially at a moment the Greek-Americans spoke of the «rule of law».

Having established the slippery slope that took the Greek-American lobby after 1978, Hitchens quotes - mostly anonymously - the views of American and Greek diplomats, American journalists and even senators and other officials of the Congress, who not at all believe in its effectiveness. Thus, a high official at the State Department said that the Greek lobby is “a myth in which only the Turkish lobby believes.”, while an editor from the *Washington Post* talked about a «Welfare System for a few Profiles». A hard-working press officer at a Greek embassy put down his knife and fork and laughed for almost a full minute. “What lobby?” inquired another. In Athens, officials at the Foreign Ministry spoke bitterly about the existence of a “Greek lobby” which was used by Washington to lobby Greece. Going on, Hitchens notes: “The most thoughtful off-the-record comment I (over) heard came from George Stephanopoulos”, former Clinton adviser. “The Greek cause has managed to seize the moral low ground in Washington,” he said. “Anyone taking a pro-Greek or pro-Cypriot position is assumed by the political community to be doing so from cynical motives. It is actually thought that you display more integrity and independence by being pro-Turkish.”

Of course, the Greek-American players of the lobby reacted strongly to this article, it is true with serious arguments in some times (Rossides, Manatos, Savvides from AHEPA, Sytilidis on behalf of Tsakopoulos etc.). Nevertheless there was some applause of this article, mainly in the academic community.

The article of Hitchens may in some respects be exaggerated, but dissects a reality that has not changed even today, and one can not ignore. Unless of course if all, officials or not, are satisfied with the ceremonial visits in recent years in

the White House and dispute on who would acquire better position for the photo next to President Clinton or George Bush.⁴⁵ One should not underestimate of course all these rituals, and even the human vanity of the photo.

However as Nicholas Gage, a journalist and author of Greek origin put it:

When there is an issue regarding Greece at stake, for example, all the advocates of the Greek position have names that end in s –names like Athens, Rossides and Spyropoulos– and Americans who hear them discount what they have to say as being ethnically partisan and perhaps not good for America.

When there is an issue regarding Turkey, all the advocates of the Turkish position don't have names like Gursel or Kazanglou, but names like Brent Scowcroft and Robert Livingston, American names, so that those who hear them feel that what they have to say must be good for America because such prominent Americans are saying it.

I am not saying that we should not use Greek Americans in promoting Greek issues. They have an important role to play because they are well liked and highly regarded in the United States. But if we want to be effective in America we have to use American instruments of influence as well as Greek Americans.⁴⁶

So what are today the prospects of the Greek-American lobby? The experience of the past 30 years can be only negatively assessed?

Sure, it would be wrong to make only a negative evaluation. There are good things from this experience. If anything, the Greek-American lobby today knows how to act, what doors to knock at, it got known, even if its activities of all these years have not brought results. It could also make one rightly ask what would be the situation for Greek issues in Washington without its presence, even with all its weaknesses. Even the mythology that developed around its role, it should not be viewed only negatively.

The comparisons made routinely with the Jewish lobby are not always founded. The case of the Jews has a specificity for several reasons: First, the strategic importance of Israel is far more important to Americans than that of Greece. Although many do not want to admit it - as Eugene Rossides of AHI - only Turkey can be compared with Israel strategically. There is also the trauma of the Holocaust from which the Jewish lobby derives a considerable advantage over the Greek lobby or any other.

The Jewish lobby also has huge economic potential and is not funded by Tel Aviv. The opposite is the case, the Jewish-American Community is funding Tel Aviv. The Greek lobby, however, is begging to Athens and Nicosia, as shown above. Some can speak about Greek Croesus in America, and they certainly exist, but the financial support provided to Greece, compared with that given by the Jews to Israel is from non-existent to a minimum. When for example Evangelos Averoff, as defense minister, called on Greek Americans to raise money for the purchase of two naval vessels after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974, the result was disappointing.⁴⁷

Of course, nobody excludes that the Greek-American lobby can take some lessons from the way the Hebrew one works. This does not mean that it can simply copy its methods to succeed. Each case presents a peculiarity and has its own dynamics.

The perspectives presented by the Greek-American lobby can be considered positive under certain conditions. What are these conditions?

The first prerequisite is the organizational structure. Any serious researcher of the Greek-American lobby finds with a naked eye weaknesses of structures that were created under conditions different from today's reality and do not meet its needs. A better organizational structure does not mean abolition of pluralism and diversity that are characteristic of a dynamic team. But it does mean structures that reflect the current realities and needs of the modern lobby and coordination between these structures.

The second condition is that a strong lobby needs efficiency at the technical level. Especially in this era of technological revolution, the possibilities offered are huge. At this stage one should not forget that professionalism is essential, an integral component of effectiveness.

The third condition for success of the Greek-American lobby is linked with coordinating the various components and the groups, as already mentioned. Coordination is also necessary with Greece and Cyprus.

The fourth condition for success is linked with clear objectives. Since the lobby is struggling to convince the various decision-makers about the justice, accuracy and the validity of its claims, the objectives should be clear and understandable. The often labyrinthine way of presenting them, is causing damage and difficulty in promoting them. Furthermore one needs to set up

priorities. One cannot defend multiple cases simultaneously, sometimes prioritizing minor and secondary matters.

Last prerequisite for the success of the Greek-American lobby - but just as important as the previous ones - is the presence of adequate leadership.

These requirements - as outlined above - are not met by the Greek-American lobby. Whether their lack may not be absolute, but still to an extent that does not allow it to be successful.

Beyond these conditions, Greece's role remains essential, its whole strategy and how the Greek-American lobby is integrated as part of it. Such a strategy is lacking both on the Greek and Cyprus side. Amateurism is the main feature of Greek foreign policy in this field. It should certainly be noted that important elements of the Greek-American community do not accept Greece as a "national center" seeking to be autonomous. Something that certainly complicates even further the role of Greece.

So long as there will not be a strategy that is acceptable to everyone - Greece, Cyprus, communities of the diaspora - and as such will have been built jointly, the Greek American community will not be able to build a strong lobby, will continue without a compass the same trip and the Greeks will experience an uncertain future without the ability to meet the challenges of the new millennium.

If you add to the above mentioned and the reverse mobilization by Washington of Greek American lobby, the fact that Greek-Americans in the future will feel and act first as Americans, rather than Greeks, it becomes obvious that the time has come for serious and balanced accounts and to see the Greek-American lobby devoid of sentimentality.

Conclusion

The Greek-American lobby is more than a matter of interests. After all, Turkey has managed, without having a large Turkish community in the U.S., to have a much more powerful lobby in Washington than Greece. The Greek-American community is for Greece an extension of the universality(oecumenism) of Hellenism. After the successive shrinkage they suffered in the 20th century in historic homelands where they lived for centuries and millennia, the Greeks are given a chance again to recompose this universality without borders, which was

always their main feature. The circumstances are certainly different today. It is a tragic mistake to believe - and many are those who believe it - that we could have communities in the “New World” - U.S., Canada, Australia basically - such as those of Alexandria, Constantinople, Trieste, Vienna, Venice or Odessa. The social structures of these technologically advanced societies in which there is now a living part of the Greek diaspora are quite different from those of the predominantly rural societies where flourished in the past the Greek communities. The Greeks in these communities were usually part of the then emerging urban bourgeois classes. The Greeks of the immigrant diaspora were farmers and laborers, and only the second and third generation are fully integrated into local communities and penetrating the bourgeois classes and their elite. These societies are also by nature strongly assimilative, which was in a much lesser extent the case of the communities in which flourished the historic Greek diaspora. But Hellenism is of protean DNA. If Hellenism didn't have this protean ability to adapt each time under different conditions it would have disappeared long ago.

The Greek-American lobby is therefore an important issue. But it is not the only issue. The important is to find a poet who will bring to the art a Greek Dream through the maze of theories and the brutal reality, a human dream without national borders, and without national distortions.

We come from the Arab land, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, the small state of Commagene which will faint 'like a small oil lamp. We come from the sands of the desert, from the seas of Proteus. The boat which travels is called Agony 2016.⁴⁸

III. THE HELLENIC LOBBY IN CANADA⁴⁹

The Hellenic lobby in Canada emerges basically in the '60s and '70s, coinciding with the period of major Greek immigration in this country. Until then there were only small Greek Canadian communities that had always been interested in what was happening in Greece. Especially in the period of World War II they organized the shipping of substantial assistance to needy Greek people. The great wave of postwar immigration to Canada led to the creation of the current Greek communities.

The Hellenic lobby was active in three major Greek themes: anti-dictatorial struggle, the Cyprus problem and the Macedonian question. Other issues, such

as the Greek-Turkish relations, the return of the Elgin marbles, etc., also had been on its agenda at times.

The Anti-Dictatorship Struggle

The dictatorship of April 21, 1967 provoked strong reactions among the Greek Canadians. Several local anti-dictatorial movements had been founded and others which were branches of broader Greek anti-dictatorship organizations which were active on a global scale. It is important to recall the presence in Toronto of Andreas Papandreou, leader of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement-PAK. What were trying all these organizations was to influence the Canadian government and to encourage it to condemn the dictatorial regime, to suspend its diplomatic relations with it, and to impose to it economic and political sanctions.

Despite the sympathy of the Canadian people to the struggle against the dictatorship and the support encountered by intellectuals, trade unions, some political parties, and political personalities from across the political spectrum, the Canadian government followed the line of other NATO countries not to openly condemn the dictatorship. However Canada kept some distance from the military regime in Athens.

The Cyprus Question

The interest of Greek-Canadians for Cyprus is evident since 1964, particularly because Canada is part since that time of the United Nations' peacekeeping force in Cyprus. But their strong activation for this issue occurs after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. So they create various committees to support the struggle of Cypriots to defend the independence of their island and ask the Canadian government to oppose the occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey. The policy, however, of the Canadian government generally coincides with that of U.S. and Britain. In 1993 Canada decided to withdraw its troops from the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus after thirty years of presence on the island. They used the excuse that their presence in Cyprus didn't help in finding a solution, as it was ensuring peace, while on the other hand, Canada could not meet its responsibilities of sending troops in other parts of the world where it was most needed. Despite the reaction of the Hellenic Canadian lobby in this decision, the Canadian government moved to implement it.

Generally, the Canadian position on the Cyprus issue could be described as 'neutral', although Canada was aligned itself, with some slight variations in style than substance, with the U.S. and Britain. At the same time Canada was seeking to protect its commercial interests in Turkey. At times it had been particularly mentioned that Turkey was about to purchase a Canadian nuclear reactor, or that Canadian companies would undertake the construction of the metro in Ankara. But it should also be recognized the weakness of the Canadian Hellenic lobby to influence effectively the shaping of Canadian foreign policy. While there were occasional significant popular protests, the weakness of the organized lobby, lack of coordination of the various Greek Canadian organizations, the lack of capable leadership and organizational structure, have limited its efficiency.

The Macedonian Question

As far as the Macedonian question is concerned, there was a huge mobilization of the Greek Canadians to prevent the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia-FYROM with the name Macedonia. The political context - elections, and especially referendum on Quebec independence - helped the Hellenic Canadian lobby to prevent the Canadian government to proceed for the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's name. Despite this relative success, there were at that time and some deplorable incidents, such as, those provoked by general Nicolaos Gryllakis, special advisor of the Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, who had contacts in Canada with strong actors of the powerful lobby of the slavoMacedonian minority in favor of the name Macedonia. The general appointed even its representatives in Canada, who were acting alongside and in parallel with the official diplomatic services.⁵⁰

Conclusion

In conclusion, it was relatively easy for the Greek Canadian lobby to mobilize thousands of people to support the Greek positions. Protests made either against the military dictatorship, or for Cyprus and Macedonian question had tremendous success. Thousands took part in demonstrations on these matters in Montreal, Toronto and elsewhere, and thousands displaced themselves in some cases from across Canada outside the Canadian parliament in Ottawa. As already

mentioned, the results of these demonstrations have been limited, precisely because the organized structure of the Canadian Hellenic lobby was not able to take advantage of this dynamic. This is because the Canadian Hellenic lobby presents organizational weaknesses, lack of coordination and lack of capable leadership. Nor Greece had helped with its policy the organization of a dynamic Canadian Hellenic lobby. Besides the lack of clear aims in promoting those issues was another major shortcoming, largely due to the lack of clear goals in Greek foreign policy itself.

IV. THE GREEK LOBBY IN AUSTRALIA⁵¹

In Australia was noted at times an intense activity of the Greek lobby. There was a strong mobilization of the Greek organizations on Cyprus and Macedonia.

The mobilization in Australia for Cyprus is also due to the fact of the existence of a strong Cypriot community. The Cypriot community of Australia is the largest of the Cypriot diaspora after that of Great Britain. But in the mobilization for Cyprus participated also all the Greek organizations.

The election of the Gough Whitlam labour government(1972-75) “saw the radical transformation of Australia’s foreign policy” and “gave parliamentarians and community groups access to foreign policy formulation”.⁵² Whitlam received Andreas Papandreou, in exile at that time, and supported his anti-dictatorial movement. In the Cyprus issue Whitlam was more reserved but he was obliged to take in consideration the mobilization of the Greek Australian community. Even if successive Australian governments stated an interest to play an important role in the resolution of the Cyprus problem, it “should be borne in mind...that the Cyprus issue does not normally fall within the priorities of the foreign policy agenda of Australia.”⁵³ The Australian political parties “were not prepared to commit themselves to policies and practices opposed to those of the USA.”⁵⁴

The main lobby organizations for the Cyprus issue in Australia are the the Pan-Australian Justice for Cyprus Coordinating Committee (PASEKA) and the Justice for Cyprus South Australia (SEKA). SEKA is active in Melbourne and Victoria. It is comprised of representatives from all the Greek-Cypriot and Greek community organisations of Melbourne and Victoria. Meanwhile SEKA is well represented on the Pan-Australian Justice for Cyprus Coordinating Committee (PASEKA). PASEKA is the main umbrella organization not only for the

Cypriote organisations of the whole Australia but also for the Hellenic-Australian associations lobbying for Cyprus. Cypriote communities and their umbrella organisation the Federation of Cyprus Communities of Australia and New Zealand are also very active in the Cyprus issue either locally, or nationally inside PASEKA.

For Macedonia, the mobilization was also important and, in a certain degree, it was in response to a corresponding mobilization of Slavo-Macedonians who sought recognition of the FYROM from Australia. In general, the Greek-Australians succeeded in adopting by the Australian Government a policy for Macedonia that was closer to the Greek positions. But even in this case the predominance of the Greek-Australian lobby is recently eroded.

The Australian government has recently decided to change its directive concerning the Australian-Skopje community being recognized under the name “Macedonian” instead of “Slav-Macedonian”, used since 1994.

The decision was formally announced by AMHRCA (Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee) on its website, which also posted a letter of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship confirming the change in policies, which resulted after a year-long campaign led by the FYROM lobby in Australia.

According to the Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee (AMHRCA), this decision resulted after a sustained lobbying campaign. In its announcement, AMHRCA called on the Australian government to proceed now with recognizing FYROM under the name Republic of Macedonia.⁵⁵

Nevertheless the *Australian Department of Foreign Affairs* has reassured the Greek Australian community that the government’s position concerning the naming of FYROM remains unchanged.

The most prominent lobby organisation in the Macedonian issue is the Pan-Macedonian Federation of Australia, the peak umbrella organization. The federation serves as the voice of the Greek Macedonian communities in Australia and has taken active role in the Macedonia naming dispute. Its headquarters are located in Melbourne, where the non-profit organization of Pan-Macedonian Association of Melbourne and Victoria was established in 1961 while the Federation is also active in the entire Australia.

For Cyprus, the Hellenic Australian lobby has achieved a somewhat balanced policy of the country's government. Generally speaking, however, the policy of Australia for Cyprus was in line with that of other NATO countries. Usually the policy of the Labour government was more balanced and closer to the Greek positions.

Both on the Cyprus and on the Macedonian question the policy of Australia was affected by the strong presence of politicians of Greek (and Cypriot) origin who usually were active at the Labour Party of Australia. However despite the strong presence of the Greek-Australian lobby its effect was limited by the fact that Australia does not play an active role either in the Cyprus problem or in the Macedonian nor on other Greek issues. And this is certainly unlike the role played by countries like the U.S. and Great Britain. Even Canada is presented in, with a more active role, either because of the presence for many years of Canadian peacekeeping troops in Cyprus or because of a discreet mediator role Canada has in the international scene.

There is even the impression that “in the areas of Australian politics and foreign policy formulation, the role of the Greek lobby is dismal”,⁵⁶ especially in comparison with its relative success in the fields of welfare and education.

Finally the Greek-Australian lobby is fragmented, there is lack of professionalism and coordination and also presents organizational weaknesses.

V. THE GREEK LOBBY IN GREAT BRITAIN

In Britain, the Greek lobby, composed essentially by the Cypriot community, is active on the Cyprus question. The World Federation of Overseas Cypriots (POMAK), has its headquarters in London and works to promote Greek positions on Cyprus. Cypriots of Britain is the largest Cypriot community of the Cypriot diaspora and counts around 200 000 people, although The National Federation of Cypriots in the United Kingdom claims the presence of 300 000 Britons of Cypriot origin.⁵⁷ In the British capital population of Cypriot descent is estimated to surpass the 100 000. This is a remarkable force which, for many years, is making strong its presence in this country.

Certainly London is also the home to many Greek shipowners who also have a significant power, but typically their activity is limited to the financial sector.

The practice of establishing Greek shipowners in London was already 100 years-old by the mid-twentieth century.

The National Federation of Cypriots in the United Kingdom is the representative body and the acknowledged voice of the largest and most significant community of Cypriots outside of the island itself.

It is an umbrella organisation representing the Cypriot community associations and groups across the United Kingdom and, as such, it leads and co-ordinates the activities of Britons of Cypriot origin. It claims the presence of 300 000 Britons of Cypriot origin.

The Federation's objectives are presented as follows: "As the foremost representative body of UK Cypriots, the Federation performs a two-fold role. Firstly, it spearheads the British Cypriot community's efforts to promote the cause of a reunited Cyprus, free from Turkish occupation troops and illegal colonists, for the benefit of all Cypriots. Secondly, it coordinates the work of UK Cypriots in the political, social, cultural and educational spheres and lobbies and articulates the interests and concerns of the Cypriot community in the United Kingdom.

In pursuing its objectives, the Federation co-operates closely with the democratically elected President and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. It also fosters close links with the British Government, the leadership of British political parties, British parliamentarians, civic and community leaders, ethnic minorities, the mass media and other relevant institutions in the United Kingdom".⁵⁸

The Federation was founded immediately after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. It functions under a President, an Executive and a Secretariat elected every two years and is headquartered in North London.

London was also the base of an important anti-junta movement during the era of dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974). Using London as their base a number of Greek intellectuals and the distinguished journalist Eleni Vlachou campaigned tirelessly against military rule in Greece.

VI. IS THERE A GREEK LOBBY IN THE REST OF THE WORLD?

Based on the general concept of promotion and visibility of some Greek issues we can support that the Greek communities all around the world are doing this work to a greater or lesser extent. But most of the countries where the Greek communities exist have very limited role on the international scene to be able to affect the course of Greek issues. However, the sensitisation of both governments and public opinion in these countries should not be underestimated. Because it is possible to have some time to play a certain role in favour of Greek issues in the international organizations. Moreover, the presence of the Greek diaspora in these countries, even indirectly, enhances the Greek lobby in other countries which play a decisive role in the Greek issues. And certainly fosters its ecumenical dimension.

EPILOGUE

There is no doubt that, from the presentation of the Greek lobby, are resulting multiple weaknesses that have to do either within itself or the role of the so-called national centre. However it could also be raised that without this lobby, with all its negatives, things concerning Greek national interests would be much worse. So we can conclude this study with an optimistic note. And of course many things could, with some effort, change in order to achieve better results on Greek issues in Washington.

The discussion on the effectiveness of the Greek lobby considers mainly the Greek-American lobby as it is in the corridors of power in Washington where important decisions are made on Greek affairs in last years. The comments have been rather critical as to the influence of the “Lobby” in the United States. But in a general way neither the leaders of the lobby neither Athens or Nicosia consider the achievements of the lobby in a negative way. Those who criticise the lobby’s effectiveness are seen as marginal by both the leaders of the lobby and the Greek and Cypriot capitals. This is not the case, however, because there are serious and documented recherches on the matter. The achievements of the Greek lobby are measured in a negative way to these of the Turkish lobby and secondary to these of the Slavomacedonians. Another usual comparison is that of the Greek lobby with its counterparts, the Jewish, the Armenian and the Cuban lobbies. To any

third observer it is clear that the Greek lobby does not have neither the power nor the effectiveness of its Jewish, Armenian and Cuban counterparts.

Another point of controversy concerning the Greek lobby is even how to name it. In a general way the Greeks of first generation, in USA, in Australia, in Canada, etc. they use the term Greek lobby. But from the point of view of the second and third generation Greeks, this term is not acceptable. As these people consider themselves Greek Americans, Greek Canadians or Greek Australians, the correct term to use is Greek-American lobby, Greek-Australian, Greek-Canadian lobby etc. Moreover these people consider that the lobby is acting on the basis of what they consider is the interest of the host country.

Eugenios Rossidis, e. g., a prominent leader of the Greek-American lobby, put it in a very clear way concerning the Greek-American lobby: «The Greek-American lobby is acting on the basis of what we consider is the interest of the United States». It's a typical American way to put the question, that is to say, for exemple concerning Cyprus, that the American interest will be better served without the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus within an independent Republic of Cyprus. It's also the way the Greek-American lobby put in 1974 the question of the arms' embargo to Turkey. Not as a favor to the Greeks but as «the rule of law» serving American interests. It's a way to say, according to Rossides, «that we are Americans and that we act as citizens of this country defending its interests».⁵⁹

In other ways, as it was put by another Greek-American leader in order to “lobby,” “effectively regarding issues affecting U.S. relations with Greece and Cyprus, we need to frame our arguments within the context of `what's in the best interests of the United States.` After all, we are not an immigrant community any longer. And as such, we don't have any major ethnic community issues that we are concerned with today-thankfully. There are no more signs in restaurant windows that proclaim ‘No Dogs or Greeks Allowed’.”

“Overwhelmingly, Greek Americans identify themselves as Americans of Greek descent. Our concerns are that of any American-employment opportunities, national security, affordable education, crime prevention, affordable and good healthcare, the welfare of our children and families, etc.

“Having said this, I also believe that as Greek Americans, we should have a vested interest in advocating and promoting a strong U.S. relationship with Greece and Cyprus. This also serves the multifaceted national interests of the U.S., first

and foremost. To this extent, we should be more vigilant as to the consequences of U.S. policy towards Greece and Cyprus, because it has the potential to affect us as Americans and the national security interests of the U.S.”⁶⁰

These are the new ideas on the Greek-American lobby and this is the new direction things are going. Nevertheless not every body accepts this direction.

The discussion on the Greek lobby, on its nature and on its effectiveness, will continue for as long as it is!

NOTES

1. www.hellenicparliament.gr/.../To-Politevma...
Under the present crisis the Greek State is unable to fulfill all these responsibilities.
2. The Greek diaspora during the Ottoman period, within which was developed the first rudimentary Greek bourgeoisie, played an essential role in the war of independence of 1821 and the building of the nation state. Within the diaspora it was also developed the movement of the Greek Enlightenment, another important pillar in the building of the nation-state. This diaspora is determined primarily in relation to the Ottoman Empire and secondary to a number of Greek communities outside its borders. For the methodological problems, concerning the periodization of the Greek diaspora and other related problems see:
J. I.K. Hassiotis, *Review of the History of Modern Diaspora*, Thessaloniki, Vanias publishing 1993 [In Greek], Stephanos Constantinides, “Greek Diaspora and History” in Damanakis M., Kardasis B., Michelakaki T., Hourdakias A., *History of Modern Greek Diaspora*, Rethymnon, University of Crete, EDIAMME 2004 [In Greek].
3. One of the first books to comprehensively study this issue in the 1980 is the *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (a number of articles from different scholars) issued by Gabriel Sheffer, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1986.
For the Greek lobby, the first comprehensive presentation is a collective volume published by Dimitris Conostas and Athanasios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, London, The Macmillan Press, 1993.
4. Apostolos Vakalopoulos, *Key issues in our history*, Greece, Thessaloniki, Vanias publishing, 1988, p. 185-186 [In Greek].
5. C.P. Cavafy, *Collected Poems*. Translated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard. Edited by George Savidis. Revised Edition, Princeton University Press, 1992.
6. Harry J. Rsoimiades, “Greece and the Diaspora: Problems and Prospects”, in *Greeks in English Speaking Countries*, Melbourne, Hellenic Studies Forum, 1993, p. 151.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

8. The term “cultural minimum” is of Michael Damanakis. See Michael Damanakis, “Expressions of Hellenism” in the collective volume: St. Constantinides, Th. Pelagidis (eds.), *Hellenism in the 21st century*, Athens, Papazisis, 2000, p. 389 [In Greek].
9. There is also the view supported by H. Psomiades and that places the beginning of the Greek-American lobby in the period of the Second World War, when 120 Greek-American organizations have created the Foundation *Greek War Relief Association* to help Greece during those hard times. Harry Psomiades “Ethnic Politics in America: Greek Americans,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 5, No. 1 Winter, (1994) p.56-64.
10. Alexander Kitroeff & Stephanos Constantinides, “The Greek-Americans and US Foreign Policy since 1950”, *Etudes helléniques-Hellenic Studies*, vol. 6, Spring 1998, p.8.
11. Reference to the Johnson policy and the political pressure exercised by him to the Greek side is made in Deane Philip (Philip Gigantes, Tsigantes), *I Should Have Died*, Toronto, Longman Canada, 1976, Atheneum, New York, Atheneum, 1977.
12. For this period exist dozens of articles in the Greek-American press but also in the Greek media.
See also, George Malouhos, *I, Iakovos*, Athens, Livanis Publishing, 2002 [In Greek].
13. A. Kitroeff, Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
14. A. Kitroeff, Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
15. A. Kitroeff, St. Constantinides, *op. cit.*, p.14-15.
16. I remember that when in Paris in a radio debate Raymond Aron, the great French philosopher and sociologist, was asked-one year after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus - to make an assessment of the Kissinger’s policy, he replied that his “weakness” to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was probably the weakest point of his career. Kissinger had a great appreciation for Aron - they were both Jewish - and was considering him as his teacher.
17. Basically it was an attempt by Iakovos, after the success of the embargo’s enforcement, to get back on the train of the Greek-American lobby at the moment of its “triumph”, and not to let the whole effort in the hands of more radical groups created in the roots by students, intellectuals and other non “controlled” elements.
18. See, for example, the New York Times, 21 July 1975, or the article by the famous American journalist Cyrus Sulzberger in the same newspaper on June, 4, 1975.
19. Russel Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, “The inside Workings of the US Greek lobby”, *The Sunday Sun* (Baltimore), September 7, section K, 1975. See also by the same authors, *The Power Peddlers; How Lobbyists Mold America’s Foreign Policy*, New York: Doubleday, 1977. A. Kitroeff, St. Constantinides, *op. cit.* p. 17.

20. And this was said in a country where the Jewish lobby, really powerful, imposes the cruise line to the American foreign policy in the Middle East. As if the Jewish lobby is a "special" case among the ethnic lobbies. But it is true that in recent years other powerful lobbies mainly with links to major interests in the Arab world are pushing for a certain balance of the U.S. foreign policy. Thus at the end of the Cold War, the Americans tried to adjust their policy from purely pro-Israeli to a policy of mediator. It is also right to stress that the successes of the Jewish lobby in Washington, apart from its influence, is due to the fact of the alignment of its goals with the strategic choices of the U.S. As Alexander Kitroeff wrote " it was not surprising that the most effective of all the ethnic lobbies, was the pro-Israeli Jewish-American, as its objectives were aligned with the strategic choices of the USA ". He believes that " in a great extent... the U.S. policy towards Israel and Cuba had already been taken for granted without the involvement of the respective lobbies "and " the success of other pressure groups was based on cyclical circumstantial factors." For Cuba this is certainly true, but for Israel it is not so sure that the U.S. would not keep at least some distance from Israel, given the data and their interests in the Arab world, if the American-Jewish lobby was not so effective.

Alexander Kitroeff, "The role of the Greek-American lobby" in Panagiotis Tsakonas, *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy*, Athens, I. Sideris, p. 401.

21. *The Wall Street Journal*, July 31, 1978.

22. Reported by A. Kitroeff, St. Constantinides, *op.cit.* p. 18.

23. Nicolaos Stavrou, «The Hellenic-American Community in Foreign Policy Considerations of the Motherland» in Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, London, The Macmillan Press, 1993, p.81.

24. During the Karamanlis Government, Archbishop Iakovos had made a request in his letter to George Rallis, then Foreign Minister: to intervene in order to prevent PASOK and KKE in succeeding in Canada and the U.S. in what they had failed to do in Greece, that is the separation of church and the state. (In the case of America and Canada that the Communities do not become secular, but remain ecclesiastical parishes). These letters of Iakovos to Rallis have been published by the Greek Newspaper *To Pontiki* on March 23, 1984. For the role of Iakovos as Archbishop of America both in Greek-Turkish relations and in the activation of the Greek-American lobby, in addition to numerous articles published in the Greek press and in the Greek language press of the Greek diaspora, one can consult two books that have been devoted to him: Kostas Athanasiadis, *Siakovos, This Merciless Despot*, Kampana Publishing, New York 1990. The book presents a penetrating critique of Iakovos not only for his stance on national issues but also on the "despotic" - tyrannical administration that he exercised on the Greek communities in America. George P. Malouchos, I, (Me), Iakovos, Athens, Livanis Publishing, 2002. This book is more laudatory of Iakovos and fails to expose data, such as letters to George Rallis,

- then Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1978, and in which he expressed his concern about the activity of the PASOK Canada branch which was driven as he wrote, from Athens and pursued in cooperation with the Communist Party-KKE the secularization of the communities that the Archbishop wanted ecclesiastical parishes. On these issues, see also Stephanos Constantinides, *The presence of Greeks in Canada*, Rethymnon, Crete University, EDIAMME, 2004.
25. *I Proini*, A Greek-American daily (New York), 2 May 2000.
 26. It is doubtful if Andreas Papandreou himself who was heavily sick in hospital, when in 1995 was organised the first conference of SAE have been able to follow the entire path of its achievement. Costas Simitis showed very little interest in the Greek diaspora. In his book- *Memoirs for the Periode as Premier*, there is no reference whatsoever to it. Perhaps this confirms the perception presented by some political analysts that over time most Greek politicians acquire the syndrome of Attica as equivalent of Greece. There is perhaps no coincidence that Greece, unlike most European countries-and not only-refuses to adopt the voting right for the Greeks of the diaspora, although discussions on this subject are indeed permanent in Athens.
 27. Michael Ignatiou, “Hope dies last for the Diaspora”, *O Politis*, a Cypriote daily, August 13, 2000.
 28. For the chronological periodisation of the Greek American Lobby see A. Kitroeff, St. Constantinides, *op. cit*, Chris P. Ioannides, «Greek Americans and the Cyprus Issue: 1980-1992», in *Greeks in English Speaking Countries*, Melbourne 1993, Hellenic Studies Forum, Eugene T. Rossides, “U.S.Relations with Greece and Cyprus, the ‘Tilt towards Turkey’, and the Challenges Facing the Greek-American Community” in Christos P. Ioannides, *Greeks in English Speaking Countries, Culture, Identity, Politics*, New York, Aristide D. Caratzas publisher, 1997, p. 439-466.
 29. Chris P. Ioannides, «Greek Americans and the Cyprus Issue: 1980-1992», in *Greeks in English Speaking Countries*, Melbourne 1993, Hellenic Studies Forum, p. 249.
 30. *I Proini*, (New York), May 2, 2000.
 31. Michael Ignatiou, “Hope dies last for the Diaspora”, *O Politis*, August 13, 2000.
 32. Information for the Obama era was collected from different sources, like newspapers and social media.
 33. Van Coufoudakis, “The Reverse Influence Phenomenon: The impact of the Greek-American Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Greece», in Dimitri Constan and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics, op. cit.*
A. Kitroeff, St. Constantinides, *op. cit.*
Nikolaos Stavrou, “Lobbyists: Total amateurs” special tribute of *Eleftherotypia*, the Greek daily to the Greek diaspora, p. 24, November 27, 1999.
 34. Van Coufoudakis, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
 35. Nikolaos Stavrou, *op. cit.*

36. Eugene Rossides, "The power centers in USA and our five movements," *Eleftherotypia*, a special tribute to the Greek diaspora, November 27, 1999, p. 22.
37. These concerns were expressed strongly in the conference held by AHEPA in Washington in March 2000. See the Greek-American daily *I Proini*, New York, 23 March 2000.
38. The conference was organized by the Centre of Hellenic Studies and Research Canada-KEEK, from 28 May to 1 June 1999 in Montreal, Canada. The references here are from a short text - summary of the paper of Professor Speros Vryonis presented in the conference, one of the leading Greek-American academics. Cf The archives of the Centre of Hellenic Studies and Research Canada-KEEK.
39. See the special issue of the academic journal *Etudes helléniques / Hellenic Studies*, vol. 14., No.2 (Montréal, 2006).
40. Paul Watanabe, «Ethnicity and Foreign Policy: Greek - American Activism and the Turkish Arms' Ban» in Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, *op.cit.*
41. Paul Watanabe, *op. cit.* p. 39-40.
42. A. Kitroeff, "The Role of the Greek-American Lobby in U.S. Foreign Policy: 1992-2001", *op. cit.* p. 415.
43. Alexander Kitroeff, "The Greek-American cultural identity in the 1990" in *History of the Greek Diaspora*, Volume II, Rethymnon, Crete-EDIAMME University, 2004 p. 93.
44. Christopher Hitchens, 'Dead End: The Decline and Fall of the Greek Lobby in America, in *Odyssey* magazine (November-December 1995).
I personally had the opportunity to take part in some organized events in Congress with U.S. senators and congressmen, as well as representatives of the executive. In one of these events inside the White House appeared President Clinton himself and addressed the representatives of the Greek-American lobby, and representatives of organizations from Canada, England and Australia. It was the end of his first four years mandate of his presidential office and had begun his election campaign for his second four years. Naturally he needed the support of the Greek-American element, and such an appearance was aiming to help revive the relationship with him.
45. Christopher Hitchens, an English journalist, is established since many years in Washington and has always supported the Greek position, especially in Cyprus. He is the coauthor of *Cyprus, Hostage of History*, London, Verso, 1984.
46. Nicholas Gage, *The Impact of Greek Americans on U.S. Greek Relations* www.intellectum.org
47. It refers to the article by Christopher Hitchens, *op. cit.*, p. 31
48. George Seferis, Last Stop (*Teleftaios Stathmos*), p. 212 and *In the Manner of G. S.*

- Poems, Athens, Ikaros, 1967, p. 99 and 212. The last verse with a slight change: They call the one ship that sails AGONY 2016, instead of AGONY 937. (Wherever I travel Greece wounds me, curtains of mountains, archipelagos, naked granite. They call the one ship that sails AGONY 937).
49. Developments on the Hellenic Canadian Lobby are based on Stephanos Constantinides, “The Role of the Greek Communities in the Formulation of Canadian Foreign Policy”, in Dimitris Conostas and Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, London, The Macmillan Press, 1993, p.107-124. and “The Impact of the Greek-Canadian Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Canada” in Christos P. Ioannides, *Greeks in English Speaking Countries, Culture, Identity, Politics*, New York, Aristide D. Caratzas publisher, 1997, p.379-400.
 50. Nicolaos Gryllakis, *I reveal* (Apokalypto), Athens, editions A. A. Livani, 2001, p.229.
 51. On the Greek lobby in Australia see Andrew C. Theofanous & Michalis S. Michael, “The Greek Community and Australian Foreign Policy: With Particular Reference to the Cyprus Issue”, in Dimitri Conostas & Athanassios Platias, *Diasporas in World Politics*, London, The Macmillan Press, 1993, Nicholas Ganzis, “The Cyprus Issue in Australian Politics: PASEKA & SEKA (SA) Perspectives”, in E. Close, M. Tsianikas and G. Frazis (Eds.) *Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Fourth Biennial Conference of Greek Studies*, Adelaide, Flinders University, Department of Languages—Modern Greek, September 2001, George Karaisaridis, “The Greek Lobby in Australia: Rethinking the Fundamentals” in Christos P. Ioannides, *Greeks in English Speaking Countries, Culture, Identity, Politics*, New York, Aristide D. Caratzas publisher, 1997, p. 413-431.
 52. Andrew C. Theofanous & Michalis S. Michael, *op. cit.*, p.88.
 53. *Ibid*, p.92.
 54. Nicholas Ganzis, *op. cit.* p.95.
 55. Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee, www.macedonianhr.org.au, *Greek Australia Reporter*, February 13, 2012, au.greekreporter.com/.../australian-governement-changes-slav
 56. George Karaisaridis, *op.cit.*, p. 414.
 57. www.cypriotfederation.org.uk
 58. *Ibid*
 59. Interview in APOPSI, Cypriot Political Journal (Nicosia), no 10 *magazine.apopsi.com.cy/2008/10/437*
 60. Nick Larigakis, AHI Executive Director, “What is the Greek Lobby?», Op-Ed: What is the *Greek Lobby?* - American Hellenic Institute www.aheworld.org/.../1130-op-ed-what-is-the-greek-l.