

TOWARDS A SOCIALIST REFORM IN THE GREEK EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM? (a situational approach)*

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ABSTRACT

An historical account of the major reforms attempted in the Greek educational system over the last seventy years shows that stability has characterized the system since its establishment in 1830. Reforms have been either strongly opposed or interrupted by the conservative and reactionary forces that have almost exclusively governed Greece.

A few liberal measures introduced into the system had never had the chance to "flourish into full-fledged" progressive reforms. The so-called "PASOK phenomenon" which successfully managed to put together all anti-conservative forces of Greek society and capitalized on their true thirst for *Allaghi* (Change) in the 1981 general elections, has promised to radically alter the philosophy and the structure of the Greek educational system. The factors, however, contributing to the stability of the system and, more so, the stagnant economy, do not leave much room for such substantial changes despite the many rhetorics of the PASOK people and its "charismatic" leader A. Papandreou. As long as the social and economic apparatus of Greek society remains basically unchanged, major and socialist-like reforms in education will not be materialized. More than a full year of PASOK government has definitely been a better but far from socialist administration on both the internal and external fronts. The few minor changes introduced into the Greek society do not seem, so far, to challenge the longstanding tradition of stability. Education stands as an illustration of that continuing tradition.

RÉSUMÉ

Une revue historique des plus grandes réformes du système grec de l'éducation pendant les derniers soixante-dix ans nous montre que la stabilité fut une des caractéristiques depuis son établissement en 1830. Les réformes rencontrèrent une forte opposition ou bien elles furent interrompues par les forces réactionnaires qui ont presque exclusivement gouverné la Grèce. Quelques mesures libérales introduites dans le système n'ont jamais eu la chance de devenir des réformes progressistes. Le "phénomène" PASOK qui a réuni une coalition des forces anti-conservatrices de la société grecque aux élections de 1981 en se basant sur leur soif pour *Allaghi* (changement), avait promis de changer radicalement la philosophie et la structure du système de l'éducation grecque. Cependant, les facteurs qui ont contribué à la stabilité du système aussi bien que l'économie stagnante du pays ne laissent pas de grandes possibilités de changements essentiels malgré les discours réformistes des gens de PASOK et de son leader "charismatique" Andréas Papandréou. Aussi longtemps que les structures sociales et économiques de la société grecque restent essentiellement inchangées, il n'est pas possible d'espérer des transformations en profondeur et de nature socialiste dans le domaine de l'éducation. Plus d'un an de gouvernement de PASOK a montré qu'il s'agit sans aucun doute d'une meilleure administration par rapport aux gouvernements précédents, mais loin d'une administration socialiste, tant sur le plan interne que sur le plan externe. Les quelques changements introduits ne semblent pas mettre en cause la longue tradition de stabilité des structures de la société grecque. Le cas de l'éducation est un exemple caractéristique de ce point de vue.

Introduction

This paper attempts a critical evaluation of the educational reform promised by the newly elected Greek socialist government of *PA*nellinio *S*ocialistiko *K*inima (PASOK: Pan-hellenic Socialist Movement). The evaluation is being carried out within the historical framework of the Greek educational system, the major reforms that have marked its history, and the principal characteristics of the system that seem to have outlived the reforms themselves. Furthermore, the present analysis touches upon the two major explanatory theories of development, modernization and dependency theory, the two

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theories of development which have been elaborated when examining the transformation of the so-called underdeveloped nations into developing countries. An attempt is also made, keeping in mind the differences between Third-World nations and Greek society, to "categorize" the various reforms of the Greek educational system under the former or the latter theory of development. Emphasis is placed, in particular, on the educational reforms promised by the present Greek government. The extent of possible implementation of the proposed reforms is critically examined while a brief account of the "educational performance" of one year of PASOK government is presented at the end of this analysis.

In short, the thesis of this paper is: a) The educational program of PASOK does not differ considerably from previous major reforms of the Greek educational system — so far modernization seems to be the theory mostly favoured by all Greek reformers from the beginning of the century while some elements of dependency theory can be found in each reform; b) Beyond the many rhetorics, especially during the last months of the electoral campaign, the educational platform of PASOK is not going to "break" the Greek tradition that is geared toward the stability and the sclerosis of the educational system; and c) Only minor changes will be eventually introduced into the educational system. The structure and the philosophy of that system are going to outlive the present ambitious and well-intended Greek Socialist government.

I. A Brief Theoretical Framework of Development

Invariably, social scientists, in trying to examine and understand the transformation of Third World countries and their "passage" from the underdeveloped to the developed stage, have formulated a number of theories with respective explanatory models. Modernization theory and dependency theory have been the two most prevalent theories in that respect. With some variations, most social analysts subscribe to either of these theories and within those theoretical frameworks the "developing process" of Third World countries is examined. Chronologically, modernization theory has preceded dependency theory. It is not an unusual phenomenon, however, to find elements of both theories amongst the development strategies adopted by Third World countries — and amongst some European countries for that matter.

Briefly then, modernization theory might be seen as a continuation of Karl Marx's thoughts in the 19th century when he was writing about the important socio-political issues of the then colonized nations of Asia, mainly India. Marx argued in favor of the "benevolent nature" of colonizers, although such a position might sound quite paradoxical to some young Marxists today. For Marx the colonizers were promoting his well-known theme of the "proletarian class". He believed that colonization was transforming feudalism in these countries and introduced changes leading to the formation of a working class. Thereafter modernization theorists have argued that development should be examined and understood historically and that the meanings of development are often ambiguous. In the early 1960's modernization theory was given its name by those involved in studying developing nations and, from then on, the theory has had a profound influence on educational research and theory.

Those subscribing to modernization theory are critically examining such issues as the "human capital" and the impact of schooling to "modernity"¹. They are also proposing new technologies of educational expansion in most of the developing countries and have strongly advocated the view that there is a linear relationship between education and modernity. Among others, Inkeles and Smith (1974) have argued that in "...large-scale complex societies no attribute of the person predicts his attitudes, values, and behavior more consistently or more powerfully than the amount of schooling he has received"². They have also pointed out that formal schooling by itself makes a person to be "decidedly more modern".

In a similar vein of argument Margaret Gillett (1969) notes that education is an essential institution in every modern society:

Education is therefore essential in a democratic society, and it must be equally accessible to all... Thus it can be said, as much for spiritual and humanistic as for practical reasons, that modern society, at once industrial and democratic by nature, is dependent more than ever before on the education of everyone over a longer period of time³.

Modernization theorists, like the social philosophers of a century before, have seen education as a powerful device for achieving social change. Apparently, faith in the schools as the social and economic leveler, or what Greer has called "the great school legend", has been pervasive:

Thus, one can say that the educational system has served as a kind of laboratory where current social values and social attitudes have changed most rapidly and to the largest extent. In this manner, the system of education has served as an indirect agent of social change and has played the role of a dynamic element in modern society⁴.

Dependency theory, on the other hand, has emerged as a critique of modernization theory. Education in developing countries is seen as inherently inegalitarian. The introduction into the developing societies of "western-type" educational systems serves no other purpose than that of establishing a new kind of colonialism that the dependency theorists call "cultural imperialism".

Dependency theory places great emphasis on the indigenous culture of the developing nations and advocates "self-reliance" for the security, the autonomy, and the integrity of both the individual and the society. The relevance of formal schooling and the validity of the argument regarding the linear relationship between education and modernity has been under constant criticism by dependency theorists. They have been arguing that the nature of the economic system has a great deal more influence on the distribution of income and occupational status than does the system of schooling. They, furthermore, argue that:

...the belief that highly industrialized society requires twelve to twenty years of prior processing of the young is an illusion or a hoax. The evidence is strong that there is no correlation between school performance and life achievement in any of the professions, whether medicine, law, engineering, journalism or business⁵.

Dependency theorists have gone as far as to suggest that there is no point of having formal school at all since schools do not serve either the needs of the individuals or the needs of a democratic society. Illich's book "Deschooling Society" stands as the "bible" in that tradition whereas other educators have theorized along similar lines:

The most obvious barrier between our children and the kind of education that can free their enormous potential seems to be the educational system itself: a vast, suffocating web of people, practices and presumptions, kindly in intent, ponderous in response. Now, when true educational alternatives are at last becoming clear, we may overlook the simplest: no school⁶.

Dependency theorists point out that the only way to achieve development and a new national culture is through a national struggle for liberation from the existing domination. The absence of struggle, or even of participation, by the colonized masses precludes the possibility of forming liberated "cultural forms".

To summarize then, there seems to be a clear difference between the function of an educational system as seen by modernization theorists (Developmentalists) and its function as seen by dependency theorists. Modernization theorists view schooling as a liberating process in which the child is transformed from a traditional individual to a modern one. This kind of transition is supposed to enable the child to become creative as well as functional. Schooling is also supposed to enable the graduate to contribute to the

economy, polity, and society. Bowles and Gintis (1976) in their well-known work "Schooling in Capitalist America" advance the argument on the importance of the nature of the economic system vis-a-vis the educational system and remark emphatically in their review of American education that:

Despite persistent setbacks in practice, the liberal faith in the equalizing power of schooling has dominated both intellectual and policy circles. Education has been considered not only a powerful tool for self-development and social integration; it has been seen, at least since Horace Mann coined the phrase well over a century ago, as the "great equalizer"⁷.

According to dependency theory, the transformation that takes place in school cannot be liberating since the person is simply changed from one role in a dependent system to a different role. Among others, Christopher Jencks et al (1972) in their highly publicized study "Inequality" have argued that a more egalitarian school system would do very little to create a more equal distribution of income or opportunity, while Bowles and Gintis (1976) in examining educational reforms in the U.S. have stressed that "...movements for educational reform have faltered through refusing to call into question the basic structure of property and power in economic life"⁸. Furthermore, the argument goes, while the new role may be more economically rewarding, it still leaves the individual in a conditional situation, one which is dominated by the culture, technology and goods of the dominant (developed) countries⁹.

Within the above brief theoretical framework, and carefully considering the fact that Greece is not another "case" of a Third-World country, this analysis will undertake the task of discussing and examining the various reforms in the Greek educational system. A more lengthy consideration will be devoted to analyzing the educational program of the newly elected Greek socialist government of PASOK against: a) the "tradition" of reforms in the Greek educational system; b) the two theories of development already discussed; and c) the larger societal and international challenges facing the new government in Greece. In addition, a mere descriptive account of the major educational measures taken by the PASOK government during its one full year in office will be briefly outlined along with a synopsis of the main arguments surrounding these measures. It should be stressed, from the outset, that the total lack of documentation (at both the theoretical and empirical level) of the "educational performance" of PASOK compounded by the geographical distance of this author from the "scene of the action", make this analysis only tentative and very exploratory in approach and content.

II. A Historical Perspective of the Greek Educational System:

Some general characteristics

Around 1830 Greece was emerging as an independent nation after almost 400 years of conquest by the Ottoman Empire. The Greek National Revolution of 1821 and the subsequent official recognition of the Greek independent nation mark a new era in the long history of what has often been called "the glorious Hellas".

Greek society had to be "unhooked" from all regressive dreams about the glorious past and start the painful efforts of reconstruction and re-adjustment to a new reality.

The new Greek state was much smaller in geographical terms than it is today but the so-called "big idea of a **grand Hellas**" remained in the minds of many of its people. Nevertheless, the reconstruction and the modernization processes of this newly liberated nation had to be pursued in light of international developments. The "adherents to our glorious Hellenic past" on the one hand and the "realists" on the other were destined to co-exist — although more often fighting each other than co-operating amongst themselves. This perennial internal fight has permeated all aspects of Greek life — education included — even up to the present day. Dictators, in line with conservative politicians and educators, have traditionally advocated the return to the glorious past whereas liberal-socialist politi-

cians and educators have demanded the re-adjustment to the new reality and the establishment of a modern Greek nation based on the needs of all Greek people. It is true, however, that regardless of their differences and fights from those early days, education was seen as one of the most essential tools of transforming and developing Greek society and its members.

The Greek educational system was established in the 1830's through legislation and, undoubtedly, the conservative-liberal fight has left its mark on that system. Even today, after more than 150 years of continuous development, very few changes can be observed in the Greek educational system. As Alexis Dimaras notes: "Since its establishment through legislation in the 1830's, the Greek educational system has been characterized by structural and philosophical stability... On the other hand, the history of the system is marked by constant demands for reform"¹⁰. Most of the legislations pertaining to the educational system have been short lived. Every time there has been a change of the ruling party new legislation is introduced with new priorities and directions up until the next change in government. Continuation of educational reforms is totally lacking in the case of the Greek educational system. Stability prevails.

This structural and philosophical stability along with the constant demands for reform can be better understood in the context of a brief historical account of the various educational changes that were attempted throughout the history of the Greek educational system. At the outset, it is of interest to note that most of the demands and the actual implementation of the various educational changes were not due to pressures within the educational system itself but rather due to outside forces and factors. Furthermore, what is characteristic of all educational changes that have been introduced in the system is the fact that legislation preceded empirical and theoretical research on educational issues. The consequences of such an approach are of great significance not only for the quality of the reforms but, more so, for the longevity of those reforms. To that effect, one should point another important characteristic of the system that has contributed to the maintenance of its own stability: "...the system has been oriented toward clearly middle-class values, leaving little, if any, room for the introduction of new ideas or methods which might lead to more general socio-political changes"¹¹.

A number of educators who have critically examined the Greek educational system maintain that there are three main factors which have contributed to the stability of the system over the years: a) centralization; b) lack of funds; and c) the so-called language question. Among others, Maria Eliou¹² points emphatically to the excessive centralization that has always characterized the system: "I cannot refrain from noting that Greek education suffers, apart from anything else, from excessive centralization." Even today, after the so-called massive educational reform of 1976, the ultimate responsibility and control of educational matters is in the hands of the State. In one of her recent works T. Anthodalidou-Vassilakakis (1981)¹³ remarks that "...the fundamentally decisive powers — adoption and pursuance of general educational policy, legislative regulations, establishment of central councils — are in the hands of the government."

The Ministry of Education and Religion has the exclusive responsibility and always the final say on every educational issue — textbooks, curriculum, methods, personnel, and the like. Virtually every "educational paper and directive" must bear the Minister's approval and signature before the content and substance of that paper can be implemented at any educational level. There is little, if any, community (teachers, students, parents) involvement in the various processes of decision making although there have been numerous criticisms against this practice. Furthermore, for a system as centralized as the Greek, it is significant to note the frequent change of the Minister of Education.

Between the years 1833 and 1974 there have been 211 ministers of education in Greece, each minister serving in office no more than an average of 8 months. The negative influences, then, of the "centralization factor" upon prospective educational reforms have been compounded by this almost continuous change of Ministers. Educational reforms, under these circumstances, invariably become "unfinished business". Each minister, with the great centralized power in his hands, starts all over again when trying out his own ideas and policies. Also the fact that at the ministerial level education and religion co-exist under the same roof, is definitely not a sign of decentralization — there are people who

would argue that, over the years, this co-existence under the same Ministry is more of a symbolic nature rather than of substance. That argument, however, cannot be easily substantiated by empirical evidence since the Church's ideological conservatism has always been influencing, one way or the other, educational planning and reform in the Greek educational system. In fact, to a lesser extent, this trend can be observed even today.

The second and very crucial factor that has traditionally and repeatedly undermined each one of the educational reforms in the Greek educational system and has rendered it to "arterio-sclerotic" stability, is the lack of funds. Money, or the lack of it, is known to be the number one obstacle for educational reform in many developing nations. Greece has not excluded itself from that rule. A great number of well-intentioned educational changes that have been promised and proposed by honest people have not been materialized, principally due to lack of needed funds. No Greek government — be that rightist, centrist, liberal or conservative — has been able, so far, to successfully overcome this economic hurdle regardless of its good or bad educational planning. This point is equally valid, and may be more so due to the international economic crisis, today. It is a reality that the present socialist government cannot afford to deny or ignore. (Recent public statements by the Minister of Education himself with regard to abolishing private institutions are the most eloquent illustration of that tough economic reality)¹⁴.

The third factor that has contributed to the stability of the Greek educational system has been identified as the "language question". It is true that the so-called "language question" seems to have been settled after the last reform of 1976. But still, the chronic "echoes" of this social issue have not disappeared completely from Greek society. The successive legislations of 1975, 1976 and 1977 have relaxed to an extent the fighting between the two camps regarding the "language question", but this issue seems far from settled.

Briefly, Greek society has been preoccupied with the language issue for many years. Language has been one of the many aspects of the perennial fight between the "adherents to the glorious past" and the "realists". One type of language, **Demotike**, (language of Demos, of the People) has been the language of everyday usage, the language spoken by most people in their daily interactions. The other type of language, **Katharevousa**, ("kathari", pure language) has been the language taught in schools — more so in secondary and higher education institutions. **Katharevousa** has been the language of most conservative intellectuals and those in higher status occupations, including government. There have been many instances, for example, where people have been complaining of not being able to understand a particular governmental document because of the language in which it was written. Needless to say, the "adherents to the glorious past" have been advocating the use of **Katharevousa** which is seen as the only language that should be taught in schools. The "realists" — liberals — have been arguing, on the other hand, in favor of the language of the people, **Demotike**, and have been doing so with good reason.

The two types of language differ in syntax, semantics, and grammar to the extent that many words of **Katharevousa** bear not even perceptual resemblance to the corresponding words of **Demotike**. However, the "language question" has gone much beyond these differences by making its central theme the social meaning that each type of language carries. It has been argued and well-documented over the years that **Demotike** is the language of the poor and the lower-class people whereas **Katharevousa** is the language of the conservatives and the elite who have almost always held power. More so, liberal critics have suggested that the various elites of Greek society — monopolizers of **Katharevousa** — have intentionally kept the language issue alive and the two types of language separate. Their attempt has been aimed at perpetuating existing social inequalities. The creation and reinforcement of the "language barrier" has played a decisive role in the exclusion of lower class people from the powerful and high status occupations.

All in all, **Katharevousa** has served to draw the line between the educated few and the semi-literate masses, between the rulers and the followers, since it was impossible to learn it in the 6 years of compulsory schooling¹⁵.

As early as 1911 it was made certain that **Katharevousa** must be the language of the schools. To that effect, in the Greek constitution of 1911 a specific clause was included making **Katharevousa** the official language of the State and thus forbidding the propagation of **Demotike**. The letter of that specific clause, with the exception of elementary school during some liberal governments, has persisted well up to the mid 1970's — up until the implementation of the educational reform of 1976. And the statement made often by educators and politicians that,

...No other controversial issue has divided politician and educator alike in Greece and has become the cause of so many unfulfilled promises and irregularities in the development of our educational system as the language question¹⁶,

is not an exaggeration, though it might appear very strange to those unfamiliar with Greek society.

Having said all that about the stability of the Greek educational system and having discussed the factors that contributed to that stability, one further point ought to be made clear. This stability is in no way an "accidental" event in the realm of Greek society. This type of stability which traditionally has not presented any serious threat to the existing status quo has been supported and legitimized by almost all governments which have ruled Greece since independence. It is of interest to note that, as the historical accounts show, regardless of political orientation, Greek governments have not attacked the factors that contribute to that stability of the system. It seems as though only those educational reforms have been implemented and lasted which have "touched only the surface and not the roots" of the educational issues. The controversy in Greece over education is still alive. Needless to say, the present socialist government of PASOK is expected to operate and function within the framework and in the light of all these historical developments in the Greek educational system. Dimaras (1978) states clearly that there is no doubt whatsoever that "this stability has served strong socio-political interests and that it has been facilitated by the similarity in political orientation between the conservative and liberal parties which have ruled Greece since independence"¹⁷.

Of course, the record also shows that Greece has been ruled mostly by conservative and, at times, extreme rightist governments. A case in point is the fact that since the elections of 1946, the liberals have only ruled twice (1950-52 and 1963-65) — the present government being only the third in the liberal tradition. To a very large extent, the Greek educational reality with its stable character reflects mostly the policies and practices of the conservative educational and philosophical thought. The few reforms present in the system have been supported and introduced by liberal governments (politicians and educators alike).

III. The Major Reforms

Most analysts of the Greek educational system seem to agree that, on the whole, there have been five major reforms since the establishment of the new independent Greek state — with the sixth perhaps getting underway with the present Socialist government of PASOK. No doubt, there have been, throughout the educational system's history, other minor movements and changes but as A. Dimaras (1978) notes such changes cannot be taken as constituting major reforms because they only "touched" upon one level of the entire "educational pyramid". Thus, Dimaras, in examining the latest massive reform of 1976 (which will be discussed later in this section) and its impact on the total educational system, points out that

There are, in the history of Greek education, four periods when major reform plans were formulated: 1913, 1929, 1959, and 1964. Three of these (1913, 1929 and 1964) have in common a number of characteristics. They were compiled by liberal governments, they proposed the extension of compulsory schooling, they supported **Demotike**, and they viewed the system in a global way. In fact,

they are successive stages of the same attempt to organize and reform the system¹⁸.

The fifth major reform is that of 1976 which was introduced by the then conservative government of the New Democracy Party under the leadership of the present President of the country, Constantine Karamanlis. The conservative government in 1975 had found itself in a very difficult position. The constant demands for major reforms in the educational system were strong and continuous after the fall of the military dictatorship in July 1974. The governing party of New Democracy — willing or not — had no other alternative. The chaos created by the junta of 1967-74 in the entire educational system along with the Greek people's "thirst" for some new (democratic and modern) ideas in education "pushed" the conservative government into reforming the educational system at all levels. For the most part, the reform of 1976 was based on the reform of 1964 proposed by the centrist government of George Papandreou, a reform that had been opposed as too progressive by the conservatives, the same conservatives who adopted the reform in 1976 as the panacea for the crippling system left behind by the colonels.

Without going into detail about each educational reform, it is of importance to note that the three reforms compiled by liberal governments had not had the chance to make their presence felt in the Greek educational system. Thus, the first reform (1913) was never implemented because of the strong opposition exerted by both influential party members (liberals) and the "conservative strongholds such as the University of Athens". The other two liberal reforms, although they had the opportunity to be tried in practice — with the support of the majority of the Greek people — were not destined to last for long. Two oppressive — extreme rightist — dictatorships literally attacked these progressive approaches to education (1935 and 1967) and, unfortunately, the reforms were definitely abolished. On the whole, the reforms of 1913, 1929, and 1964 and to an extent, of 1976, were aimed at promoting vocational and technical education.

The well known themes that have been associated with almost every educational reform across social-national contexts were not missing from the "Greek case". The notions of democratization, modernization, equal opportunity for all peoples, and more so, the creation of the "thinking citizen" were the declared goals of these liberal reformers. The reform of 1959 consisted basically of a piece of legislation which focused on the organization of technical and vocational education. No settlement was reached during those years of conservative government (late 1950's) regarding the perennial "language question". The appointed committee (1957), which had the mandate to study the issues and prepare recommendations for educational reforms, paid no attention to the crucial issue of democratizing the system.

Some other minor changes have been introduced into the Greek educational system from the beginning of this century up to the present day. These minor, however, changes had not had a great impact on the system either because of their partiality (aimed at one part of the educational system) or because they didn't even challenge the structure and philosophical orientation of the system. Thus, in 1917, **Demotike** became the official language of the primary school only. In the same year, primary school textbooks were made more "child centered". Of course, as already said, in 1911 **Katharevousa** had become the official language of the Greek State and from the same year on, elementary education has been considered compulsory.

The latest massive reform of 1976, which for the most part is still in effect, was embodied in three laws: Law 186/75 "on KEME (Center of Educational Studies and In Service Training)", Law 309/76 "on the Organization and Administration of General Education", and Law 576/77 "on the Organization and Administration of Secondary and Higher Vocational and Technical Education"¹⁹.

The 1976 reform came right after the fall of the colonels' dictatorship. During those years the demands for educational reform from all strata of Greek society were more pressing than ever. The conservative government of the New Democracy Party, even if it wanted to, could not ignore the disastrous consequences of the dictators' ruling in social, economic, political, and educational matters. In education, in particular, the military jun-

ta had created a chaotic situation. A brief report published outside Greece in the early seventies on "Education in Greece under the Military dictatorship"²⁰ is very characteristic:

The limit of compulsory education has been lowered from nine years to six...**Demotike**, the spoken language, is no longer taught in the schools...University entrance: Now 15% of the places are assigned to individuals who are exempted from the exams on the basis of their "high moral character and national concern"...grants: All candidates must possess two documents: a certificate of absence of criminal record; a certificate of loyalty issued by the local police staff.

Furthermore as it has been documented in the book "Inside the Colonels' Greece":

The number of students entering higher education fell from 19,000 to about 11,000 between 1967 and 1969...But most of the effort to get rid of the undesirables took place at the universities themselves rather than by controlling entry...the purge of university teachers can also be considered a preventive measure...In all, the universities lost about a third of their teaching staff. It is not difficult to picture the harm this did to the efficiency of higher education in Greece...For the first time since 1930, the purist language, (**Katharevousa**) which is closely bound up with reactionary attitudes, was introduced into primary education, ..."teachers must abandon their role as researchers" the dictator (Papadopoulos) had said in one of his speeches at the University of Thessaloniki...Dismissed teachers are not authorized to teach, even privately. Many university teachers are not allowed to travel abroad, even to attend conferences...²¹

Under such an educational reality and pressured by the constant demands for reform the conservative government of Constantine Karamanlis "developed a whole package" of educational reform which, for the most part, was based on the 1964 reform initiated by the liberal government of George Papandreou. Persianis (1978) remarks that the two well known values of democratization and modernization underlay the 1976 reform. The stated aim of the 1976 reform was to democratize and modernize the educational system so that the societal needs could be met. But, as M. Kondilis (1981) notes, there was also an "undeclared" objective behind the 1976 reform: to control the number of students entering the different institutions of higher education by devising techniques for selection among the high school students. This is why "...all reform efforts focused precisely on the secondary level of education, while different solutions are planned for post-secondary education"²².

As it appears today, six years after the reform, the conservative reformers of the New Democracy Party were not concerned at that time with the fact that the proposed educational measures were to serve the 1964 needs and not necessarily those of 1976. Nevertheless, the educational reform legislated and initiated in 1975-77 can be summarized in the following main policies:

The replacement of **Katharevousa** with **Demotike** as the official language, thus putting an end to our national "bilingual problem", the extension of compulsory schooling from 6 to 9 years (6 in primary and 3 in high school), the establishment of the Center for Educational Studies and Teacher Training, and the organizational development of technical and vocational education as an important part of the educational system at the secondary and higher levels²³.

Strong criticisms against some of the introduced changes and the stated intentions of the government were voiced by all opposition parties inside the parliament and outside.

The then official opposition of PASOK — the present Greek government — had harsh words to say about the elitist policies and the heavy burden laid on the young children's shoulders having to go through successive entrance examinations from their fifteenth year onward. PASOK was, and still is, arguing that the 1975-77 reform did not actually address itself to the roots of the educational problems facing Greece. Mr. Papandreou and his team have been voicing their strong criticisms of the 1976 reform stressing that the stated values of democratization and modernization, so much publicized by the conservative government of K. Karamanlis, were not reflected in the adopted policies.

In a similar vein, Maria Eliou (1978) has attacked the "democratization issue" of the 1976 reform pointing out that the official documents (draft legislation and government announcements) show that

"the reform will raise on the one hand the educational level of the country as a whole but it will also magnify existing inequalities on the other. Those whom reforms forgot, those in one way or another educationally deprived, have a definite social identity. Low income, agricultural employment, distance from the city and particularly from the capital, limited participation in cultural activities on the one hand and educational opportunity on the other"²⁴.

Analogous arguments against the 1976 reform have been expressed by many other scholars who have adopted a rather marxist and neo-marxist perspective²⁵.

IV. Today's Educational Reality

It seems appropriate at this point to briefly present an overall picture of current educational issues and concerns prevailing in Greek society along with some illustrative figures so that, in the next section, the educational program of the present socialist government can be examined. The conservatives have been claiming that the 1976 reform stands as a "corner stone" in the Greek educational system whereas the liberals continue to voice specific criticisms about various issues such as: non-existence of systematic graduate studies, lack of research centers, early separation of the secondary school into General and Vocational-Technical Lycea, limited number of students entering higher education institutions, flourishing of para-educational and costly institutions (**Frontistiria**: private, very expensive tutorial services which are essential in preparing students to succeed in university entrance examinations), insufficient number of student hostels, and the complete absence of any program whatsoever aimed at the thousands of illiterates and semi-literates.

Official statistics show that: in 1971, 32,3% of the total Greek population had not completed primary school; in 1951 the percentage of illiterates in the total population was 24%, in 1961 it was 18% and in 1971 the illiterates were down to 14,2% — this decrease is observed not due to the very little official solicitude but rather due to the mortality rate²⁶; in 1976, the total number of illiterates was 1,007,844 while 1,767,580 Greeks had not completed high school (by 1976 high school completion had become compulsory)²⁷; in September 1977 among 80,000 candidates who took part in entrance examinations to higher education only 4,000 indicated higher technical colleges as their first choice²⁸; it has been calculated that out of 100 pupils who enroll in the first grade of primary school 60 will enter secondary education and 6,7 will eventually graduate from a university level institution²⁹; the number of students in the higher education institutions from 25,658 in 1960-61 has jumped to 72,269 in 1970-71 and to 96,000 in 1977-78. There are also 30,000 students in universities outside Greece³⁰. The number of Greek students attending universities outside Greece has been steadily increasing due to the "closed entrance system" in the Greek universities. Thus while in 1964 there were 8,727 Greek students in universities outside Greece, in 1974 their number had been more than doubled (17,034)³¹.

For every thousand people the number of students in higher education institutions was³²:

HELLENIC STUDIES/ETUDES HELLENIQUES

	1912-13	1964-65	1974-75
Greece	1,3	6,8	10,9
W. Germany	1,2	6,3	12,7
France	0,9	10,9	18,8
Italy	---	7,8	16,8
Belgium	---	8,9	15,5
United Kingdom	0,7	7,9	11,6
Denmark	1,0	10,9	20,9
Holland	0,9	12,4	19,5
Ireland	---	7,6	12,3

The prime minister George Rallis (of the last conservative government, 1977-1981) has said in public that out of 200 university professors and assistant professors that were hired the last two years (1974-76) in higher education institutions, 150 of them had come from European and American universities; Greece allocates the least money for research among all other European countries. For the period between 1969-71 the money given for research corresponded to \$1.2 per inhabitant or to a percentage of 0,2% of the GNP³³; it is of importance to note the percentage of the GNP that Greece spends for the education of its people. The following comparative table shows in the most eloquent fashion that Greece is substantially far behind from other countries in money spent in education³⁴:

% GNP for Education

Denmark	6,94	USA	5,98	Bangladesh	1,20
W. Germany	4,15	Canada	7,37	Ethiopia	2,40
Belgium	4,76	Australia	5,20	Nepal	0,73
Luxemburg	2,75	Japan	2,91	Zaire	4,37
France	2,91	Spain	1,81	India	2,69
Ireland	2,61	Portugal	3,55	Afghanistan	1,18
Holland	5,54	Sweden	5,00	Pakistan	2,80
United Kingdom	5,34	Finland	5,55	Sudan	5,03
Italy	5,35	Norway	7,08	Greece	2,00

The average spending for education of the GNP for the countries of the EEC is 4,37%, for the industrialized countries 5,365%, for the countries of the Iberian peninsula 2,68%, for the Scandinavian countries the percentage is 5,88%, and for Mediterranean countries the percentage is 3,21%. Last, but not least, it should be pointed out that while the number of candidates seeking entrance to institutions of higher education has been increasing dramatically, the number of those actually admitted (through the entrance examinations) remains almost unchanged. Percentagewise, there has been a dramatic decrease of students entering higher education. The "cry" for democratization in the whole Greek educational system has become even stronger during the last fifteen years among all Greek people since, as the table below shows, higher education has become the privilege of the few³⁵:

year	Number of students—higher education		Percentage
	Candidates taking the entrance exam	Admitted	
1964	27,000	12,350	45,7
1968	44,453	12,655	28,5
1976	78,136	13,000	16,5
1978	79,951	13,945	17,0

A final piece of information should be added to this descriptive account of the Greek educational reality. On the whole, and regardless of the numerous and quite expensive private institutions that flourish today in Greece, according to the Greek constitution (Article 16, Paragraph 2,)

...education constitutes a basic responsibility of the State, and is provided free of charge. The State fulfills this obligation, at least formally, at all educational levels: all state schools, from kindergartens to universities, offer free education. Tuition and examination fees have been abolished, and even books are provided free of charge (A. Sideris, 1981)³⁶.

V. Evaluation of PASOK's Program

As the historical analysis of the Greek educational system has shown, one of the principal themes in each electoral campaign in modern Greece has been undoubtedly the "slogan" of educational reform. In one form or another each Greek political party — be that rightist, centrist, or leftist — has included in its governmental program major changes in the educational system of the country and has made promises of carrying out these changes upon winning the elections. This recurring phenomenon can be seen in the election fights of the 1930's, 1950's, 1960's, and no doubt, in the 1970's. Even the various dictatorial and repressive governments which ruled Greece several times in recent decades have given all their efforts to persuade the Greek people about upcoming educational reforms. Needless to point out again that the known issues of democratization, modernization, equal opportunity for all, and education of a higher quality have always been the central preoccupations of educational reformers. How these issues have been interpreted and tried in educational practice by the various governments has varied. On the whole, however, the general characteristics of the Greek educational system have outlived both conservative and liberal governments — for reasons explained earlier.

The new socialist government of Greece, under the leadership of Dr. Andreas Papandreu, that assumed power after winning a comfortable majority in parliament (172 MPs out of 300) in the October 1981 general elections, is another case in point. Actually, the newly formed government of PASOK has promised that educational reform will be its number one priority and that governmental expenditures for education will reach an almost equal footing with that of national defense. Once again, the main goals of the educational reform promised by the new Greek government centers around the well known themes of modernization and, mainly, of democratization and equal opportunity for all Greeks. Characteristically, the respective sub-section on education of the entire political program of PASOK ("contract with the people") bears the title "Education: The foundations of change". It is of interest to note that the word "Allaghi" (change) was the general electoral slogan of PASOK and of all other parties opposing the conservative New Democracy party.

The present Greek government of PASOK will inevitably have to function within the limits of a system which is geared toward stability. Moreover the PASOK government will have to face a very tough social reality not only within Greek society itself but also the international crises which are shaking the entire globe today. As John Dewey³⁷ and many others have suggested, educational reforms and movements cannot be considered in isolation but rather within the larger societal-institutional context. The task then of the Greek government, with all its ambitious plans, is extremely difficult. Its task of reforming the Greek schooling system so that democratization, modernization, *and* self-reliance needs are fulfilled — as stated in the electoral promises — is not easy either. At this point in time of course nothing can be said with absolute certainty. We may, however, try to sketch out the parameters within which the educational planning of PASOK will have to operate. Even only the name, "socialist government", is the very first experience of its kind in Greek society since independence. "L'avènement du PASOK constitue un phénomène nouveau dans la vie politique grecque" remarks F.S. Larrabee in one of his articles written a few days after the electoral victory of PASOK in Greece³⁸.

Summarizing the educational program of PASOK, as it had been presented throughout the campaign and was recently adopted by the new Greek parliament, the following (synoptic) points illustrate the great emphasis placed on education as the “tool” for social change, development, and liberation from external control — mainly American³⁹.

Education (**Paidia**) is not only an investment to be pursued but it is, at the same time, an end in itself for every human being. Education, throughout a man's life, is something which the state ought to offer to everyone... For us, education is the very foundation of change... The basic educational options have direct relationship with the national, social, economic, and cultural options of a government. We are talking then about basic political options.

In subsequent paragraphs the program goes into details of the political options of PASOK and emphasizes that:

Our primary goal is the change in the domain of values, in content and the directions of education...

...we will put an end to discrimination, we pursue equality of the sexes and make people aware of the basic principles of democratic procedure.

...emphasis on continuing and adult education, development of graduate studies along with research relevant to the needs of our country.

...education is the whole nation's affair and the state is responsible for providing education to everyone.

...satisfactory teacher-student ratios

...a truly free educational system for all Greek people.

...abolition of private and “privileged” schools.

...democratization and modernization of higher education institutions.

...relations between students and professors, methods of teaching, and the control of learning change drastically.

...exaltation of technical-vocational education and drastic changes in entrance procedures for all higher education institutions.

...the basic principle of our new system is that there will be always an “open door” policy to the higher educational levels.

...unlimited opportunities will reward students' efforts.

...no irrevocable decisions concerning our youth's future will be made.

...abolition of the Panhellenic entrance examination for the senior high school (Lycea).

...Abolition also of the present Panhellenic entrance examinations for higher education institutions.

...securing by legislation the university's asylum for all members of the university's community.

...The popular language (**Demotike**) will be consolidated at all educational levels. There will also be a simplification of the orthography.

...generalization of the pre-school education in public kindergartens along with child care centers.

...establishment of efficient public centres for children with special problems.

...consolidation of the 9 years compulsory education which soon will be raised to 10 years and, in the long run, 12 years.

...drastic secondary education changes.

...unification of the general and technical-vocational lycea with many opportunities and directions open.

...establishment of higher education institutions for elementary school teachers in the universities (education departments).

...establishment of new universities in the periphery of the country.

...improvement of technical-vocational education.

...special emphasis in the teaching of foreign languages — two foreign languages will be taught in elementary and secondary school, one being compulsory.

...emphasis in the "parallel education" with special programs for illiterates, development of educational technology (T.V.) and free open universities in municipalities of the country.

It is quite clear that, as with all other previous reforms, PASOK's philosophy and proposed educational changes bear heavily on the modernization theory of development. Although there are strong criticisms of the educational system and its elitist conservative nature, the fact remains, however, that for PASOK "education is the foundation of social liberation and change". This approach does not seem to differ significantly from the writings of modernization theorists when they argue that "In short, by virtue of having had more formal schooling, their personal character (of those people concerned in the discussion) was decidedly more modern." To that effect, PASOK has promised to modernize the entire Greek educational system by introducing new technologies and by expanding educational theory and research to the point that individual and societal needs are met. With regard to democratization, PASOK's reform aims at democratizing the system by giving free school for all Greeks throughout their lives, by putting an end to discrimination, by abolishing private and privileged schools, by establishing new university departments and abolishing entrance examinations, and by taking drastic measures to combat the problem of illiteracy. The proposed compulsory teaching of foreign languages from the elementary school along with the possible expansion of compulsory schooling beyond grade nine, and the statement that "Education is the whole nation's affair and the state has the responsibility of providing free education to everyone" show in the most eloquent manner the "modernizing nature" that education bears for PASOK.

True, PASOK's program makes special reference to the fact that "education is not only an investment to be pursued by people but it is, at the same time, an end in itself for every human being", that the national culture of the country must be a part of the curriculum, and that the popular language (**Demotike**) will be consolidated at all educational levels. But this type of educational promises which might "comfort" some dependency theorists are not completely new in the Greek educational history. All previous reformers have touched upon such "dependency themes". The great emphasis, however, has been placed on aspects that may be loosely categorized under modernization theory.

For example, in 1964 George Papandreou's liberal government (G. Papandreou was the father of today's Greek Prime Minister) was arguing for the role of education "in creating the thinking citizen", and the importance of national culture and popular language was recognized as early as 1913. It might be argued that PASOK has gone some steps further towards the dependency theory but not to the point of even slightly adhering to it. The Greek educational tradition that has found "its roof" under modernization theory — along with some "consumatory" rhetorics — is now continuing its process having to deal with another liberal (perhaps more ambitious) government. Definitely, no PASOK document or speech makes the slightest reference to the alleged irrelevance of the formal schooling system, a theme so much favoured by the radical critics of modernization theory.

Thus, the differences between the educational program of PASOK and all other previous reformers are more on the tone and the phrasing of the proposed measures than on the substance. The over-used notions of modernization and democratization, notions with ambiguous and often subjective meanings, "literally reign over" the educational program of PASOK. No figures and numbers appear anywhere in the entire program. Anna Frangoudakis (1981), in a rather prophetic tone, wrote a little before the October 1981 elections:

If someone examines carefully the educational programmes of PASOK and KKE (Communist Party of Greece) he will find out that, beyond the many rhetorics about democratization, equality, renovation, new spirit, justice, popular education, and many other such phrases which mean different things to different people, or do not mean anything at all, the specific proposed changes are: the simplification of orthography and the abolition of private schools. I would dare to say "only the orthography" because I cannot see how PASOK is going to abolish private schools⁴⁰.

Furthermore, A. Sideris' analysis (1981) of the private educational institutions in Greece sheds more light upon the prevalent ideology and the official State policies with regard to the existence/operation of private schools. The investigator points to the "free enterprise" framework within which private education flourishes, an economic framework that PASOK does not appear willing and/or able to "attack". Sideris remarks that, on the whole,

State policies in the private education sector are inspired by the principle that private schools operate under the laws of free enterprise. The state cannot interfere in the financial aspects of their operation and especially in employer/employee relations. In the area of private schools, recent state policy has been to support and maintain the extensive private school system and to leave small neighbourhood schools to sink or swim⁴¹.

Is the educational reform of PASOK going to "break" the Greek educational tradition which is geared toward the stability of the educational system? Many Greeks today want to believe that such a "breakdown" is going to happen. The thousands of PASOK supporters are claiming that this new Greek socialist government does not simply represent another change in governmental posts (in the liberal tradition of politics) but rather a unique experience that is going to change the entire social philosophy and structure of Greek society (through, of course, democratic means). But such beliefs need to be examined analytically and against the background of a great number of factors if meaningful conclusions are to be drawn.

Briefly, these background factors can be classified into two types: the internal *and* external. According to the Prime Minister himself, Greece is in a very difficult economic situation — largely due to the previous conservative government's mismanagement of the economy. There is currently a huge national deficit of about 350 billion drachmas (roughly, 7 billion dollars) and no increase is expected in the Gross National Product of the country for this year. Inflation ranges between 24-26% and the demands for wage increases have become stronger than ever. There are very serious and acute ecological problems while in Athens itself the pollution sends people to hospitals on a daily basis. Almost all rural regions of the country have been deserted over the years and the agricultural sector is far from healthy and productive. The Greek army, that for many years has stayed loyal to conservatives and royalists, does not appear quite ready to accept a "secondary role" under the socialist government of PASOK. There is definitely — and very well documented — a split inside the socialist party of PASOK itself forming the so-called "left" and "right" wings of the party. Andreas Papandreou himself seems to have chosen more elements of the party's "right" wing, especially in the eve of and upon assuming office. "His immediate installation of notably moderate, like-minded cabinet ministers...was taken as an auspicious sign" wrote right after the 1981 elections M. McDonald in the Canadian magazine *MacLeans*⁴².

In addition, one of the most often heard criticisms about PASOK and its leader A. Papandreou is the "one man show" syndrome that seems to characterize this allegedly socialist party:

En dépit de son implantation à la base, le PASOK demeure la propriété de son fondateur, qui le mène avec une main de fer sans le moindre esprit de tolérance pour les dissensions internes ou les déviations. Les méthodes autocratiques de Papandreou ont conduit à de nombreuses expulsions et l'on déplore souvent le manque de démocratie interne dans le parti⁴³.

The president of the country with all the "super-powers" given to him by the Greek Constitution (powers that have been strongly criticized in the past by A. Papandreou himself) bears a conservative identity and consciousness. It seems very unlikely that the Greek president Constantine Karamanlis is willing to go against his long-term beliefs by making substantial concessions to the Papandreou government (e.g. the participation of Greece in the organizations of the EEC and NATO).

What will be the business world's and the investors' reactions to fundamental social changes? The prime minister made it clear from his first days in office that "we need the money and we will seek co-operation and not fight." Last, but not least, there still exists the conservative party of New Democracy as the official opposition in the Greek political arena. It has held about 40% of the vote and has stated repeatedly that it will fight any attempt which might threaten the "roots" of the status quo.

Some of the external factors and pressures that the PASOK government will have to consider before proceeding with its social reform program are already known to most people. There is always present the so called "Turkish danger" and the threat of a future war (of some kind) with neighbouring Turkey. Neither the "Cyprus problem" nor the dispute over the Aegean Sea territory have been settled. PASOK has said that it would take Greece out of both NATO and the EEC. In the months before the elections and upon assuming office the position has been "watered" down to a considerable extent (some cynics point out that this is the "adjustment" of a government to reality). "In no way shall we lead the country into any form of adventure", Papandreou was saying right after his winning of the elections in response to questions about future withdrawal of Greece from NATO and the EEC.

Depuis les élections, il a fait plusieurs fois la preuve de sa modération, notamment en déclarant aux journalistes de la chaîne ABC au cours de l'émission "Issues and Answers" ("Questions et Réponses") qu'il n'était "pas prêt à prendre des mesures unilatérales" mais qu'il "entamerait des négociations", tant sur la question de sa participation à l'organisation militaire de l'Alliance Atlantique, que sur la question des bases américaines⁴⁴.

In addition, the world-wide economic crisis with all its disastrous consequences cannot be ignored by the present Greek government.

It seems that A. Papandreou and his team in the various cabinets are totally aware of all these and many other internal *and* external factors within which they will have to function and administer the governmental apparatus. It is quite evident by now that the rhetorics and the radical statements of the previous years (when in opposition) have been modified and reworded in both appearance and substance. A. Papandreou himself made it abundantly clear that there will be no "adventures". In his very first public speech after the election victory Papandreou sounded very much like a "traditional and compromised" politician when he said to the Greek people, "we will be a good and honest government for *all* Greeks and not only to our supporters, voters and PASOK members." Most analysts agree that he seems to have chosen to please mostly and foremost the "right wing" of his own party — resignations of leftist members of PASOK and concrete accusations of key governmental positions being given to conservative individuals testify to that argument. Social changes and reforms will be materialized within the "realm of today's reality" has been the latest slogan of the PASOK government. Even the so much publicized "nationalization" that eventually became "socialization" (meaning different things to different people, if that term means anything at all) of some of the main Greek industries will give another — hopefully better — face to the Greek status quo.

Having said all that, the educational reform of PASOK cannot be other than the reflection and the expression of this larger social reality as interpreted by the present government. The educational reforms that will be introduced are not going to challenge the system's basic structure. The long tradition of stability is not going to "break". Even under the best situational circumstances, even without the "language question" and a possible partial solution to the "centralization factor" that have contributed over the years to the stability of the system, the lack of money alone will, no doubt, force the Greek government to compromise — even more than it wants to. As a matter of fact, the promised governmental expenditures for education, the second item in priority in the national budget after defense, cannot be taken as a sign of great difference from previous governments. For example, the last government of the conservative New Democracy party had put its educational expenses at the very top of its budget: "To this effect, educational expenses are the highest item in the public investment budget for 1978"⁴⁵.

Surely there will be minor and low-cost changes in the Greek educational system. It is certain that the majority of the Greek people will feel more comfortable and euphoric for some time with a progressive government. There is no doubt that there are honest, able, and dedicated individuals in the Socialist government of PASOK who took office victoriously on October 18, 1981. Furthermore, it is an historical truth that whatever progressive educational measures exist today have been the "product" of previous Greek liberal governments. The government of PASOK will, no doubt, follow the liberal tradition in educational matters and Greek education will become more modern and democratic. Likewise, minor social changes will be materialized little by little for the benefit (mostly) of the so called "non-privileged". The entire Greek social structure, however, along with its educational counterpart are not going to change drastically — although this has been the stated intention of the present socialist government of PASOK, especially so when its members of parliament were sitting on the opposition benches.

In short, then, it seems certain that as long as the dominant ideology and the existing social apparatus remain basically unchanged across Greek society, substantial educational reform — regardless of intentions and desires — is very unlikely to be materialized. To that effect, John Dewey in America and B. Noutsos in Greece, among many other scholars, have emphasized the crucial direct relationship between educational and the larger societal issues⁴⁶. The "PASOK case" will be one additional illustration of this well-documented relationship.

VI. Postscript*

In concluding this analysis, a few final words should be added here briefly about the overall "performance" of the PASOK government and, more so, its major "educational steps". No doubt, the relative recency of the PASOK "regime" compounded with the lack of data and the mere geographical distance of this author from the "scene of the action" make such an analysis more difficult and only tentative in approach. That in itself, however, does not and should not prevent us from going ahead with a sketchy description of the PASOK performance anyway.

More than a full year has passed since PASOK entered triumphically the new era of the much publicized *Allagi* (Change) and became the very first Socialist government in the modern Greek state's history. It took office by presenting itself as a radical "new type" of government, by using as its primary and basic slogan "Greece belongs to Greeks", and by promising to pursue the goals of social liberation/justice, territorial integrity, participation of all Greeks in the decision making, and structural and institutional changes across Greek society. In short, PASOK came to power signing "A contract with the Greek people" the main points of which stressed the termination of the conservative administration that has governed Greece (almost) since Independence, the creation of a new "Greek mentality" and the democratic/thinking citizen, and a whole new and progressive series of internal and external policies — the final goal being the socialist transformation of the entire Greek society⁴⁷.

Although, as said, an overall examination of the government's performance lies well beyond the scope of this analysis, a number of "commonly accepted" things may be discussed about the first "birthday" of the Panellinio Socialistiko Kinima (PASOK) in power. It appears that, for the most part, even PASOK's opponents/critics admit both privately and publicly that there have definitely been a number of changes over the last year in many sectors *within* Greek society — changes which are characterized as progressive steps by all people in Greece with the exception of course of the conservative party of the "New Democracy". For example, progressive steps have been taken in public administration, education, health and welfare, low wages and pensions, national television/radio, the recognition (officially) of the Greek National Resistance and some measures to democratize the army and the judicial system of the country. Furthermore, most people in Greece today admit that there is a general feeling of being free and without the previous fears of even being persecuted for one's beliefs, ideas, and public political behaviour. The "total atmosphere" in both private and public life seems to have undergone quite a few changes and most people feel much "better" with the PASOK

* This part was added in November 1982.

government — often this feeling of “better” cannot be defined concretely and with precision, an indication, perhaps, that it is mostly on the ideological level that the “PASOK phenomenon works”. The so-called “man in the street” appears to enjoy all these changes being introduced into Greek society but the adverse effects of a rather stagnant Greek economy are also felt and resented by everyone — the government itself, inevitably, receives much of the blame/anger for the severe economic hardships⁴⁸.

With regard to the external policies and the overall performance of the government in the international scene, things appear more difficult to analyze and much controversy is growing among Greeks depending on the political orientation and the attachments of each individual and group concerned. On the one hand, PASOK members and strong supporters of the party claim that there is a definite “socialism à la Grec”, or “the third road to socialism” followed by the government in every external policy — including the highly controversial and “delicate” issues of Greece’s participation in NATO/EEC, the future of the American military bases on Greek soil, the Cyprus question, and the Aegean/Turkish problems. With perhaps a few exceptions (and these “exceptions” have been expelled or have resigned from the party) these people fully endorse all policies of the government and every maneuvering of PASOK pointing out that the present government has imposed a “strong and proud national presence” on the international scene promoting the true needs and interests of all Greek people. PASOK members perceive their unquestionable and charismatic leader A. Papandreou as a radically different and much better prime minister from any previous government in Greece. All policies of the government are seen as both progressive and consistent with the pre-electoral promises delivered by the party. For them, the pre-electoral slogan for change “HERE and NOW” remains the strategic/long term goal regardless of the present maneuvering which is seen as a tactical methodology necessitated by the existing circumstances.

A second and very politically involved group of people, mainly the members of the KKE (the Greek Communist Party which is often referred to as the pro-Soviet party of the Greek left) admit that there are very few and minor progressive steps of the government on the international scene. In addition, however, these people strongly criticize and attack PASOK mainly on two grounds: a) for its inconsistency between the pre-electoral promises and the government’s policies; and b) for not taking those concrete and substantial measures with regard to NATO/EEC and the American bases issues, measures that would have differentiated the PASOK government from all other previous Greek governments. Although, except once or twice, the KKE leadership has tried to avoid a blatant political confrontation with the present government, the so-called “basis” of the party has always been more militant and expressed disillusionment for the prospect of a “real change” (*pragmatiki allagi*) across the Greek society under the PASOK regime. And it is on the external policies of the government that most of the KKE criticisms have been voiced.

The third “camp” on the Greek political scene is the one which may be loosely defined as the “reactionary group” that is composed of “New Democracy” members, various conservative groups and individuals, and a handful of faithfuls of the ex-king of Greece and dictators like I. Metaxas and G. Papadopoulos. According to these people, the PASOK government is, little by little, “landing into the tough reality” and its entire performance is no more no less than a continuation of the previous conservative government’s “realistic and pragmatic policies.” The very few “socialist-like” policies attempted by PASOK are seen either as a kind of “smoke screen” for PASOK supporters, or, otherwise, as disastrous measures undermining the national and international “Greek integrity”. Especially those individuals with many vested interests in the existing status quo of Greek society express their “latent” zeal and deep concern for the future of the country under the PASOK government. With every means at their disposal, these people struggle to prevent any substantial changes that would alter the existing balance of the Greek social apparatus.

Last, but not least, there is a fourth group of basically “unorganized” individuals of the left, some of whom had been PASOK supporters and voters up to the last general elections of October 1981. These people, admitting and congratulating the positive steps taken by the present government and simultaneously rejecting as ill-founded the conservatives’ criticisms, present their own critical evaluation of the government from the

“left”. They strongly accuse PASOK for not “sticking to its pre-electoral promises” with regard to the socialist transformation of Greek society and, more so, with regard to the withdrawal of Greece from NATO and EEC and the “ripping” of the American military bases from Greek soil. Occasionally these individuals seem to join their critical voice with the KKE on several issues but, in no way, do they identify themselves with the overall orientation/philosophy of the KKE and the official party line promoted by the KKE.

Having said that, a quick account of the government’s external policies shows that, except for a few instances where the government has put up a “strong show of the Greek case” in both NATO and EEC⁴⁹, no substantial change from the general guidelines of previous governments can be observed. There is no reference about definite withdrawal “HERE and NOW” from either NATO or EEC although that was clearly promised before PASOK assumed power. The negotiations with the U.S. officials for the future of the American military presence in Greece seem to focus now on the process of finding a kind of “working formula for the maintenance” and not the much publicized “ripping” of the military bases⁵⁰

All government officials state over and over again now that it is one thing to be in opposition and quite another to be the government of the country with all the responsibilities and the difficulties that governing Greece effectively and constructively entails. PASOK upon assuming power has been trying to convey the message to the Greek people of the “desired” and “plausible”, the long-term and strategic goal and the “feasible” under the existing tough realities affecting the entire Greek society. In no way PASOK admits the criticisms of “broken promises” voiced by all parties of the Greek political spectrum. A. Papandreou himself has blatantly rejected the idea of a united front with the other parties of the left offered by the leadership of the KKE⁵¹.

On the whole, then, along with the strong satisfaction expressed mainly by PASOK members and the equally strong criticisms voiced by both the right and left wings in the Greek political and social scene, most people seem willing — but not satisfied — to give PASOK more time to prove what it can and wants to accomplish. It seems that the “wait and see” principle is prevailing among the vast majority of the Greek people since, in the present circumstances, no other alternative appears over the “Greek political horizon”⁵². Thus, education and promised educational reforms are rationalized along similar lines. The “wait and see” attitude seems to prevail in the Greek educational sphere as well.

In concluding, a very synoptic and descriptive account of the measures in education taken by the present government is presented without any further analysis:

1) A comprehensive legislation to radically re-organize the institutions of higher education (according to most people this re-organization is a miniature-like of the North-American organization of higher education). The Minister of Education has said about this legislation which is the major educational step of the present government:

The government has repeatedly stressed that with the new legislation we direct the Greek University to the service of our social needs and the development of the country... with the new legislation we have radical changes. Not only we lay the ground to overcome the existing crisis but, in addition, we attempt to have the Greek University play an important role in the struggle of our country for self-development and national independence... the law has been into effect since July 16, 1982 and the Education Ministry has determined the time-table within which the step-by-step implementation of the law will take place.⁵³

In short, the main points of the new legislation can be summarized as follows:

- a) To fortify and secure the University asylum (that has often been violated and abused in the past);
- b) Creation of the EAGE (*Ethniki Acadimia Grammaton ke Epistimon*: National Academy of Letters and Sciences) and the ESAP (*Ethniko Symvoulío Anotatis Paidias*: National Council of Higher Education). These two bodies will advise the government on various issues affecting the Greek higher education;
- c) New organization and structure of the Greek Universities with faculties, departments and sectors — the basic academic unit being the department;

d) Participation of university students in the election of all university bodies (committees, councils and the like);
 e) Full time employment for all teaching personnel in the universities;
 f) Creation of a single bearer of university personnel with four degrees of teachers: professor, associate professor, assistant professor, and lecturer;
 g) New organization of studies with semesters, credits, and compulsory courses;
 h) All existing university faculties which grant degrees are becoming departments;
 i) Creation of graduate (master and doctorate) studies on an organized basis along with emphasis on research (basic and applied);
 and j) The existing Pedagogical Academies (elementary teachers training) and the Academy for the Physical education teachers are embodied to universities.

2) Abolition of entrance examination into Lycea (senior high school)

3) Writing of new textbooks, and all other school books eventually

4) Construction of more school buildings and appointment of more teachers for kindergarten, elementary, and high school

5) A sudden change of the Education Minister in exactly eight months from the electoral victory of PASOK— a number of Ministers were changed or “r elieved” from their duties without anyone from the government saying the “why” for these changes.

6) Creation of a new deputy minister of Research and Technology.

7) Discussions with the people concerned for the abolition of private schools and tutorials (**Frontistiria**) and the eventual creation of some sort of public tutorial services for the students needing extra assistance.

8) The replacement of the existing position of **Epitheoritis** (Superintendent) with that of **Sholikos Symvoulos** (School Councelor), a replacement that is seen by all people concerned with the organization of elementary schools as very progressive and positive step. In the eyes of the primary education people the post of the **Epitheoritis** was an anachronistic and authoritarian post.

9) An increase of the number of students that have entered the various schools of higher education and, more so, of technical/vocational schools and colleges.

10) Sporadic attempts to get the private sector into the financing of research in and outside the Greek universities.

The above being the major “educational steps” of the PASOK government which has already celebrated its first “birthday”, and with the legislation for the re-organization of higher education being in the forefront of controversies and discussions on educational matters⁵⁴, the reader is left to make his/her own evaluation and predictions about the prospect of “promised socialist reform” of the Greek educational system. The almost “diabolic” coincidence of the replacement of the Education Minister in his eighth month (keeping thus the long tradition in that respect) and the lack of needed money in education as has been shown in various behaviours of the government⁵⁵, ought not to escape the attention of the critical analyst of the Greek educational system. A. Papandreou himself, when speaking to PASOK members one year after the electoral victory of October 1981, said about his government’s educational measures: “The major changes in educational matters, are: the new legislation for higher education, the abolition of entrance examination into the Lycea and a new way of selecting students for the institutions of higher education”⁵⁶. No doubt, as more time is allowed for the present government to systematize and implement its entire educational program and, at the same time, as more theoretical and empirical data on these issues are becoming available, we may better analyze and understand the so-called “PASOK phenomenon” and its real effect on the Greek educational system.

Notes

1. See for example, among others, **Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant**, by John D. Powell, Harvard University Press, 1971; **Studies in Development Planning**, edited by Hollis B. Chenery, Harvard University Press, 1971; and **Economic Nationalism and the Politics of International Dependence: The Case of Copper in Chile, 1945-1973**, by Theodore Moran, Princeton University Press, 1974.

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2. Alex Inkeles and David Smith, **Becoming Modern: Individual Change In Six Developing Countries**, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 133.
3. Margaret Gillett (ed.) **Readings In the History of Education** (Montreal: McGraw-Hill Co., of Canada Ltd., 1969), p. 23.
4. Guy Rocher, "Formal Education: The Issue of Opportunity", in D. Forcese and S. Richer (eds) **Issues in Canadian Society: An Introduction to Sociology** (Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1975), p. 158.
5. Paul Goodman, "No Processing Whatever", in Ronald and Beatrice Gross (eds), **Radical School Reform** (New York: Published by Simon & Schuster 1969), p. 98.
6. George Leonard, **Education and Ecstasy** (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc. 1968), p. 101.
7. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, **Schooling In Capitalist America**, (New York: Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1976), p. 26.
8. Ibid., p. 14
9. Martin Carnoy, "International Educational Reform: The Ideology of Efficiency", in M. Carnoy & Henry Levin (eds) **The Limits of Educational Reform** (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1976).
10. Alexis Dimaras, "The Movement for Reform: A Historical Perspective", **Comparative Education Review**, 22, no 1 (February, 1978): pp. 11-20.
11. A. Dimaras, Ibid., p. 13.
12. Maria Eliou, "Those Whom Reform Forgot", **Comparative Education Review**, Ibid., pp. 60-70.
13. Theopoula Anthogalidou-Vassilakakis, "The Greek Educational System as it Has Developed since the 1976 Reforms", **Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora** Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1981), p. 34.
14. Public statements of one of the deputy Education ministers (Moralis in **Eleftherotyia**, November 1, 1982) and the recent national budget of the government according to which all public expenses are kept to the lowest possible level, and no wage increases are expected for the whole of 1983. According to the weekly paper of the Youth of KKE **Odigitis**, the funds allocated for Education in the 1983 budget are in fact less than in 1982—9.8% for 1982 and 9.2% for 1983 from the whole budget, (**Odigitis**, December 16, 1982).
15. A. Dimaras, Ibid., p. 15.
16. Evangelos Papanoutsos, "Educational Demoticism" **Comparative Education Review** (Ibid.), pp. 46-50.
17. A. Dimaras, Ibid., p. 18.
18. A. Dimaras, Ibid., p. 15.
19. P.K. Persianis, "Values Underlying the 1976-1977 Educational Reform in Greece" in **Comparative Education Review** (Ibid.), pp. 51-59.
20. This is a one page Report published anonymously in Montreal during the military junta of 1967 in Greece. It bears the title: **Report on Education in Greece under the Military Dictatorship**, and it is written in Greek. As has been the case with virtually all the Greeks in Diaspora, there was strong opposition against the junta in Greece by the majority of Greeks in Montreal and Canada.
21. "Atbenian", **Inside the Colonel's Greece** (translated by Richard Clogg) New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., pp. 88-95.
22. Marianna Kondilis, "The New Educational Policy of the 1976 Reform" **Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora** (Ibid.), p. 41.
23. Vasilis Kontogiannopoulos, "Goals of Educational Reform Policies" **Comparative Education Review** (Ibid.), pp. 3-6.
24. Maria Eliou, Ibid., p. 70.
25. There have been numerous such criticisms in Greek political reviews of **Anti** and **O Politis** and in many daily papers. People now in the PASOK government (Kaklamanis, Kassimatis, and A. Papandreou himself) and many others of the centre and left have criticized the 1976 reform for not responding to the true needs of the Greek people.

26. Maria Eliou, *Ibid.*, p. 61.
27. *Eleftherotypia*, July 15, 1981 (This is a daily news-paper with a centrist and occasional leftist orientation).
28. *Ta Nea*, September 22, 1977 (This is a daily Greek news-paper with long tradition supporting the centrist political parties in Greece and with some questions expressed by people about its "un-clear" role under the 1967 junta. Today *Ta Nea* fully endorses the PASOK government and its publisher is said to have "a say" in the business of the government).
29. E. Panagiotou, "I Roi tou Mathitikon Dynamikon eis to Ekpaideutiko Systema" (The Flow of the Student Population in the Educational System), in *Deltion Omospondias Leitourgon Mesis Ekpaideuseos*, 412 (1974), p. 11.
30. Leonidas Louloudis, "Ideologica Paralipomena mias Dimosias Syzitis" (Ideological omissions from a Public Discussion), *O Politis*, 40 (February 1981), p. 57.
31. Nikos Galatis, "Fititiki Metanasteusi" (Emigration of University Students), *Spoudastiki Fon*, 3 (January 1980), p. 10. Similar figures are presented by OECD Manpower Policy & Problems in Greece, (Paris, 1965), pp. 51-89.
32. Anny Vryhea & Costas Gavroglou, "Gia to Elliniko Panepistimio Simera: Kapla Nea Erotimata" (For the Greek University of Today: A Number of New Questions), *O Politis*, 40 (February 1981), p. 47. For more data on these issues look also in UNESCO, *Annual Statistics*, 1976.
33. Achilleas Gekas et al, "Ereuna-Technologia-Anaptyxi: Skepsis gia mia Elliniki Stratigiki" (Research-Technology-Development: Thoughts for a new Hellenic Strategy), *O Politis*, 39 (December 1980-January 1981), p. 29. See also in OECD: *International Tables*, DSTI/SPR/18.
34. Apostolis Andreou, "Provlimata tis Ellinikis Ekpaideuseis: A' Synedrio tis Paidias OIEAE" (Problems of the Greek Education: First Symposium on Education OIEAE), *O Politis*, 37 (August-September 1980), p. 80.
35. M. Giombazolias "Isagogikes Exetasis sta Anotata Ekpaideutika Idrymata" (Entrance Examinations in Institutions of Higher Education), in *Eleftherotypia*, August 23, 1978.
36. Aloe Sideris, "Some Information about Private Education in Greece", *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* (*Ibid.*), p. 55.
37. John Dewey, "The School and Society", in R. Archambault (ed.) *John Dewey On Education: Selected Writings* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1974), p. 296.
38. F. Stephen Larrabee, "La Grèce: Les Nouveaux Choix", *Politique Etrangère* No 4, Dec., 1981, p. 892.
39. Such positions have been "on the Greek political and social air" for many years now by all political parties with the exception of course of the conservative "New Democracy Party" and a few centrist people as well. All the political literature and the numerous promises for change in the Greek society make repeated references to this theme. The late "Contract with the Greek People" of PASOK is another illustration of such strong criticisms against the American presence in Greece.
40. Anna Frangoudakis, "I Ekpaideusi, I Paidia ke I Eperhomenes Ekioges" (Education, Culture, and the Upcoming Elections), *O Politis*, 46 (September 1981), p. 70.
41. A. Sideris, *Ibid.*, p. 60.
42. Marci McDonald, "Southern Europe Marches to the Left", *Macleans*, 94, no. 44 (November 2, 1981), p. 33.
43. F.S. Larrabee, *Ibid.*, p. 892.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 898.
45. Vasilis Kontogiannopoulos, *Ibid.*, p. 5.
46. John Dewey, *Ibid.*, and Charalambos Noutsos, "Programmata Mesis Ekpaideuseis ke Kinonikos Eleghos" (Programs of Secondary Education and Social Control) Athens: Themelio, 1979.

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47. See, for example, PASOK, *Diakrylxi Kyvernhtkls Politiks: Symvoleo me to Lao* (Declaration of Governmental Policy: Contract with the People), Summer 1981 — in pages 49-56 the educational program of PASOK is presented.
48. All formal and informal discussions among both the left and the right of the Greek political spectrum are more than willing to put the blame on the present government's shoulders. Its unsuccessful economic policies are said to make the international crisis even worse for the "average person" in Greece today. The perennial "war of words" in the newspapers has, for the most part, centered on the external and economic policies of the PASOK government. More so, the last (and rather conservative budget) has given more economic arguments to the PASOK opposition.
49. For example, the interviews of A. Papandreu in American and European channels where he has stressed the "particular position/needs of Greece" in both the NATO and EEC; The refusal to sign the joint communique of the NATO defense ministers last year; Not accepting the sanctions to Poland and the Soviet Union, and so on. Also, the stance taken by the Greek prime minister on the issues of nuclear weapons in Europe and the issue of World-Peace along with a relative pressure for the solution of the "Cyprus Crisis" and the provocation of the Turkish government over the Aegean sea.
50. See, among others, in the bi-monthly political review *Anh*, no.216 (October 15, 1982), p.5.
51. Long interview of the prime minister of Greece A. Papandreou in the daily *Ta Nea*, the main points of which were also published by most Greek newspapers during the last week of November 1982.
52. The danger of a new military junta is always in the mind of most Greeks. There is often reference to the fact that "a hasty movement" of the present Socialist government might have disastrous consequences for the Democracy in Greece. The parallel situation of the circumstances that led to the junta in Chile and the forcible fall of Allende worry many Greeks regardless of political affiliations. The government itself never stops of reminding the dangerous "à la Chile" outcome of a PASOK failure and mistake. And that behaviour in itself creates new worries and resentment on the part, mostly, of the leftist opposition.
53. *To Vima tis Kyriakis*, Oct. 3, 1982. (The same publisher and orientation as the daily *TA NEA*. *To Vima* is published, now, every Sunday only.
54. Most discussions on educational issues today in Greece center around the proposals in this legislation and possible "minuses" and "pluses" in that. An analogous legislation (Bill 815) proposed a few years ago by the then conservative government was never passed due to very strong opposition.
55. For example, the new national budget for the year 1983.
56. *To Vima tis Kyriakis*, October 3, 1982.