

TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF GREEK POLITICS

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Resume

Cet article expose l'evolution de la formation sociale grecque au cours des 30 dernieres annees. L'argument avance est que la configuration politique actuelle de la Grece n'est pas simplement le resultat de l'evolution naturelle des dernieres decennies, mais plutot que les politiques grecques d'aujourd'hui (independamment de leur orientation) sont aux prises avec des contradictions qui ont, pour la premiere fois, fait leur apparition au debut de annees 1960. L'economie grecque presente un developpement inegal et schizophrenique, alor qu'elle entretient une relation principalement d'association, plutot que de dependance, avec l'imperialisme par le biais de la marine marchande, du capital financier et commercial. C'est cette situation economique et les contradictions politiques et sociales qu'elle a generees que confrontent, non seulement les politiques gouvernementales actuelles, mais aussi celles de l'opposition. On a de plus, tente de determiner les origines de la configuration politiques actuelle, et plus precisement de demontrer l'articulation du "socialisme" du P.A.S.O.K. a la situation politique du milieu des annees 60 et au "mouvement" de resistance durant le regime militaire.

Abstract

This article outlines developments in the Greek social formation over the past 30 years. The argument it tries to put forward is that today's political configuration in Greece is not simply the natural evolution of the last few decades. Rather, Greek politics today, regardless of their orientation, are struggling to come to terms with contradictions which first appeared in the early 1960's. The Greek economy presents a schizophrenic and uneven development along the lines of a partnership with - and not a mere dependency on - imperialism (through shipping, financial and commercial capital). It is this economic situation along with the social and political contradictions which it generated that confront not only the present day governmental policies, but those opposed to them as well. In addition, an attempt is made to locate the origins of today's political configuration. More concretely, to locate the articulation of "socialism" by the P.A.S.O.K. in the political events of the mid-60's and the resistance "movement" during the dark days of the junta.

Numerous articles of journalistic or even scientific pretence

have attempted to analyze the current political situation in Greece and/or more concretely the nature of the phenomenon P.A.S.O.K. What these projects usually are lacking, regardless of their significance or inventiveness is an historical perspective on the subject matter. By historical perspective we do not simply mean the location of today's politics in some kind of factual sequence. Historical perspective, at least in this context, is more than that - it is the analysis in which the material conditions of the "political" are described historically.

This article aims to do just that: it describes/analyses - of course within the constraints of an article - the economic, social and political development of Greece over the past thirty years. To us this need does not arise from some kind of abstract methodological imperative. We firmly believe that in order to understand the geneology, the contradictions, and the dynamics of things such as the political affiliations after 1974, governmental policies, the meaning of Greek socialism as it has been articulated by P.A.S.O.K and the traditional left, the nature of political parties, etc. one must go beyond opportunistic deliberate slogans and/or catastrophic, simplistic reductions. In what follows, we hope not to fall into such traps.

A Peculiar Economic Development

There is very little agreement in the literature regarding Greece's post-World War II development. In fact there are two basic schools of thought: the first, with a main stream orientation, claims, with variations, that Greece is an "underdeveloped" or at best a developing country. The lack of industrial development and the difused concentration of capital are among their main arguments in support of this thesis.² The second approach, of a more radical, and often Marxist orientation, has overemphasized the role of foreign capital, the U.S. influence, again the lack of a strong secondary sector, adopting, with variations, the metropolis -- periphery dichotomy.³ It is our thesis that this approach has undermined a number of important characteristics of the Greek political economy and often this analysis has become the victim of political strategy and practice. To us, theses of this type often create the impression that Greece is a stage for a puppet show which is performed by alien, subversive forces. It is an understanding which indicates the naivety of the researcher, develops a fatal disease for the study of history and creates an unacceptable alibi for politicians. In fact the latter has led some of them to ridiculous claims such as "Greece was the first U.S. experiment of the Viet-Nam type". (A. Papandreou).⁴

Our understanding of Greek post-war development and the Greek political economy is quite different. Greece is an advanced capitalist country, whose relation to the imperialist centre is not

that of dependency, but that of partnership. Greece's participation in the international division of labour is that of interdependence with imperialism; it is of course a partnership of "unequal partners sharing a mutuality of interests", of a parasitic type, a partnership which nevertheless, puts Greece into the camp of the imperialist powers and not into that of the third world. This participation in the imperialist league came about by means of the dominant role which Greek shipping capital plays in the world's transport industry. This understanding of the post-war political economy has been put forward by a number of less politically influential, but rather more rigorous students.⁵

By the end of the war, expatriate capital, which traditionally had been as we have seen, the dominant fraction of the Greek bourgeoisie, had no room left for colonial expansion. (Greek capital, according to at least one source, was second only to Britain in investment in Africa during the interwar period).⁶ Thus, after the 1940's Greek capital turned to a new but not unfamiliar area: that of shipping. There were many reasons for such a development; a development which tied Greece to the imperialist west in a unique way and led to the grossly unbalanced growth of the Greek economy.

Serafetinidis et al. explain the reasons for such a "preference" on the part of Greek capital.⁷ First they point out the historical familiarity of Greeks with the shipping sector as well as the ready availability of a relatively cheap, but highly skilled labour force. Secondly, although the shipping industry in the '50's was mainly financed by foreign creditors, it was the close ties which existed between shipping and financial capital which led the latter to become the guarantor of shipping's financing. In return, it was primarily through the strengthening of shipping capital that the Greek financial sector gradually became established internationally. Thirdly, Serafetinidis points to the tremendous benefits "bestowed upon shipping capital by the Greek state." In the words of the chairman of the Union of Shipowners, "the shipping industry in Greece was made by the Legislative Decree 1687/1953".⁸ It was a bill which allowed shipping capital the maximum possible flexibility and protection. It is interesting that the bill has been criticized by radical scholars because of the scandalous status it created for foreign capital but rarely of its significance for the shipping industry. Finally, according to Serafetinidis, there was another reason for this lop-sided development of Greek capitalism - its partnership with U.S. imperialism. After the end of the civil war, the victorious conservative forces had to tie the country to the U.S. controlled western wagon, for obvious political reasons. Shipping appeared to be the easiest link not only because of structural constraints and possibilities, but also because it happened to coincide with U.S. interests at the time. The U.S. needed to control -- but not to own, since they had in front of them different, and more profitable alternatives -- a tramp and

tanker fleet. Greek shipowners were as good as anybody to play that role; in fact they had a comparative advantage, that of integrating an unstable country into the U.S. sphere of influence. Thus, during the 1950's, the unquestionable Greek support for U.S. imperialism (e.g. Korea) was not a deliberate choice of the Greek right but arose from the fact that the strengthening and the expansion of U.S. imperialism implied economic development and prosperity for Greek shipowners.

However, it seems to us that these reasons by themselves cannot fully explain the pattern of development of Greek capitalism. The focus of the above analysis is that of capital requirements in a narrow (economistic) sense and other factors such as social conditions and dynamics should be taken into account. The "State of the Right" (To Kratos tis Dexias) and its oppressive apparatus had to put forward policies which would be a barrier to the development of the working class movement. It seemed that the development of shipping and the support of the primary sector based on small ownership and not the development of industry would promote the expansion of petty-commodity production, and the booming of the service sector in a fashion which would be devastating for the working class. Thus, the "State of the Right" in the 1950's did not neutralize the radical movement only through oppression, but also by throwing at it the dream of petty bourgeoisification. It was a dream which in the post-war years of economic prosperity was not a pie in the sky idea, but an everyday reality.

The impact of shipping on the other sectors of the Greek economy was not insignificant. Financial capital, as we have already noted, experienced a disproportional growth, relative to production levels. It expanded abroad backing shipping capital in its adventures. However, given its dependent relation to the latter, it did not manage to expand its activities into the secondary sector except to a limited extent. Manufacturing was the sector which suffered the most from this gigantic development of shipping. Its 15 per cent employment of the active population in the interwar period changed to only 19.1 in 1961. The small size of the domestic market, the lack of available skilled and culturally oriented labour, the competition from foreign manufactured goods, as well as opportunities for more profitable ventures in other sectors, were the basic reasons for the dismal situation of the Greek secondary sector.⁹ This situation does not mean the complete absence of activities in the secondary sector. It rather means that it was fragmented, and unproductive. It was mainly oriented towards unproductive areas, namely construction and tourism. For example, contrary to the general rule of concentration of capital, the estimated 75,000 industries and other productive units in the pre-war period became 125,000 by 1963, 10 from which 104,308 were employing from 0 to 4 people! The agricultural sector experienced growth during this period based on

the introduction of machinery. However, the small lots, and the lack of a strong industrial sector to attract the labour from the countryside made primary production inefficient, as it continued to employ more than half the active population. Thus, at least in the short run "the boiling pot of large unemployed masses" of the countryside simmered down only through mass emigration.¹¹

Ibe Crisis

In spite of the high rates of growth during the period,¹² the development, which Greece was experiencing was bound to run up against contradictions. First, although the portion of agricultural production in GNP declined from 36 per cent in 1951 to 27.7 in 1960, the population employed by that sector showed little change, moving from 51.9 per cent in 1951 to 48.9 in 1958.¹³ Thus, the farmers who in effect constituted almost half of the economically active population were receiving less than 1/3 of the national product. Second, gross inequalities started to appear in the manufacturing sector with the coexistence of a plethora of small units with much larger ones.¹⁴ The combination of big capital operations with petty commodity producers assists the former to lower the wages, and increase the levels of relative and absolute surplus-value since the household heavily subsidizes the reproduction of the labour force of the latter.¹⁵ This condition was putting tremendous pressure on the working class. At the same time it was putting the aspirations for growth of the army of people employed in the retail/distribution sector on hold since the capacity of the domestic market was shrinking.

Thus, the growth and prosperity of monopoly capital in Greece was realized at the expense not only of the working class, but also, if not primarily, at the expense of all the middle strata as well as the small holding farmers. In fact, the two latter social categories, who participated in the production both as exploiters and exploited started to display signs of discontent. Urbanization, the narrowing gap between urban centers and countryside as well as their gradual integration into the capitalist relations allowed less room for their paternalistic integration into the political process. These masses were indicating strong signs of moving away from clientilism as their main mobilization path. The mass rallies in support of the Cypriot liberation struggle in the late '50's and most importantly the advancement of E.D.A. as the leading opposition political party - it received a quarter of the electorate (1958 Election) - were strong positive indicators of such a movement.

Furthermore, on the other side of the fence, the dominant fraction of capital (shipping) was faced with some tough decisions. The Cuban crisis and the emergence of liberation movements were the first signs for the decline of U.S. imperialism - or at least the saturation of its expansion. Thus, the Greek shipowners

started to think that an unconditional link with the U.S. was putting constraints on the expansion of their activities. To the latter, the creation of the E.E.C. was an important contributing factor. This fact, in combination with the lack of any decent industrial base, and therefore market for their services forced them into a reorientation of both their political and economic practices. At the political level they started to reconsider their exclusively one-sided "friendship" with the U.S. and the west in general, while at the economic level, some emphasis on the secondary sector did not any longer appear a useless exercise.

Thus, by the late 1950's and early 1960's, we saw a peculiar coincidence of interests on the parts of capital and the popular classes and strata: the common denomination being political change capable of "rationalizing" the political and economic processes. This was the reason for the decline of the Right, the reappearance of the Centre as a political force and generally all the events of the 60's which will be examined below. For the moment it is sufficient to understand the contradictory nature of this tendency. It is the key to an analysis of not only the events which followed immediately thereafter, but the politics of Greece until today. The crisis, which resulted from the 1950's development has not yet been resolved in Greece. It caused the emergence of the Centre, the political turmoil of the middle '60's, the thunderstorm of a dictatorship, the revitalization of the Right and finally brought P.A.S.O.K. to power; however, its resolution is as remote as ever before.

1961 - 1974: Fifteen Long Years of Germination

By the very beginning of the 1960's, two clear conflicting tendencies had developed in the power block. One was composed of a small fraction of the shipowners, industrialists, and the "traditional" petty-bourgeoisie; while the other was composed of the majority of shipowners and the social groups which based their parasitic existence on the state apparatus. The first advocated the modernization of the country's economy along industrial lines: the renegotiation of the country's relations with imperialism; and finally the restructuring of the state's dated structure in such a way as to enable incorporation of the growing mass movement. The latter tendency was more short-sighted. It sought the continuation of the existing accumulation and political process: organization of the internal markets; preservation and expansion of the accumulation which had taken place abroad; and resistance to industrial development. They also wanted the political process to remain as it was: concentrated around the Crown and the Army while the masses were to stay outside the "house of power" even if force had to be applied to keep them there.

The Political Alignment

The most significant development of Greek politics in the 1960's as a result of the above mentioned crisis was the revitalization of the Centre. In September 1961 all the liberal political forces under the leadership of G. Papandreou and with the active involvement of the Americans¹⁶ managed to unite into a new party: The Centre Union (Enosi kentrou). The C.U. claimed the liberal/Venizelist tradition of the country and was essentially the political expression of the modernizing tendency of the bourgeoisie. Its policies, the political discourse adopted, and the class participation especially in its higher ranks,¹⁷ indicated precisely that.

The C.U. entered the arena of politics in a very dynamic way and only two months after its establishment managed to capture 1/3 of both the popular vote and the seats in the general election. In fact, it required a series of scandalous initiatives of the most reactionary sort on the part of the right to hold the C.U.'s growing influence at that level. The 1961 election went down in Greek history as the "black election".¹⁸ However, it was this election which clearly indicated the termination of the right wing reign and the incapability of the traditional left (E.D.A.) to take advantage of the crisis (it lost 10 per cent of the vote: from 24.43 % to 14.63 %). But most importantly, the election demonstrated a growing tendency of the mass movement to move away from the confines of patronage and towards more open and direct political mobilization.

Soon after the election, G. Papandreou announced the "Anendotos Agonas" (Intransigent Struggle) against the Right. Its obvious purpose was the popularization of C.U.'s policies and the Centre's return to power. However, its real necessity was made clear by G. Papandreou when he justified it to the King as an attempt to contain popular unrest.¹⁹ During the campaign, G. Papandreou, making use of his charisma, covered thousands of miles criss-crossing the country talking to huge mass gatherings, not only visiting the cities, but also the remote areas. "For a whole year and while sophisticated politicians doubted whether the game was a winner, the old man was trekking the countryside in a curiously enthusiastic yet almost mythical communion with the people".²⁰

The policies of the C.U. as they were expressed by their slogans during the campaign did not differ much from E.D.A.'s programs of the 1950's. These policies were the crystallization of the common denominator of the social alliance which the C.U. was expressing. They advocated economic growth and a more just distribution of income, "democratization" of the country and "national independence". "Democratization" meant the elimination of all the special un-democratic measures and institutions which were established during, and immediately after the civil war. It never went so far as to challenge, even by implication, the

position of the monarchy in the state structure.²¹ Independence in foreign policy for the C.U. meant the pursuing of a more flexible foreign policy. Any questioning of the country's close ties with the West was never even implied. As G. Papandreou himself said later on during his programmatic declarations as Prime Minister (Dec. 1963), it meant in addition to the maintenance of ties with the West, that friendly economic and cultural relations with Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. should be sought.²² It was a foreign policy which, although it appeared radical in the context of the period, it was, as we saw above, in accordance with the objective interests of Greek capital.

More specifically, Papandreou's party was appealing to almost all sides of the social arena by putting forward something concrete for each one of them. Thus, it appealed to industrial capital through its policies for national/productive economic growth while the inflow of foreign capital was not threatened. As far as the interests of the shipowners were concerned, the promise to reorient foreign policy appeared to serve them particularly well. To the middle class, Papandreou promised equitable taxation, salary increases in the service sector, and both public and private and reforms to the educational system which would make "education free for all".²³ The latter was particularly appealing not only to this class, but to almost every other social group. Greek society, as we have seen, was/is a society with widespread middle class aspirations and values and education appeared to be the path of upward social mobility. The emphasis on productive economic policies was indirectly a promise to the working class. However, an explicit promise for higher wages was made as well. Furthermore a commitment to reform labour legislation and the democratization of trade unions was made.²⁴ Finally, to the peasants in addition to general democratic reforms, which would relax the stifling environment in the countryside, the promise of financial support was made.

However, it was not the policies of C.U. which were the novel element in Greek politics but rather the effects of the "Anendotos" itself. The "Anendotos" broke the old forms of political organization and caused the terminal illness of clientilism.²⁵ Papandreou was the first to address the rural masses as a socially coherent group and to ask for their support as such.²⁶ The "Anendotos" introduced politics into the country on the basis of a political discourse on specific issues and not through the atomization of politics and their articulation through personal favours and accommodations. Another effect of the "Anendotos" campaign was the undermining of the oppressive state apparatus. Papandreou's campaign managed to bring out into the open the cumulative frustration of the masses by voicing them. In spite of its initial goal to contain the mass movement, the latter soon felt self confident and in effect cornered at least temporarily, the legal and semi-legal oppressive institutions (e.g.

the para-military, the national guards).²⁷ Finally, the "Anendotos" and its victorious outcome democratized the ideological discourse to unprecedented levels. The C.U. march to power and its victory paved the way for the development of cultural activities, and new intensive ideological debates in a fashion that by the mid-60's a completely new climate had been created.²⁸ In summary, "Anendotos" marked the entrance of the masses into politics in all its glory and with all its contradictions.

While the growing mass mobilization was boosting C.U.'s influence, the growing discontent had the opposite results on the left of the political spectrum. E.D.A. not only did not manage to take advantage of the situation but also lost considerable support (from 24.43 per cent in 1958 to 11.8 in 1964). To attribute E.D.A.'s failure solely to right wing terrorism or to the anticommunist atmosphere in general is to adopt at least an incomplete understanding of the phenomenon. It is our understanding that the subjective factors such as E.D.A.'s policies and structure were at least as important.

In the 1960's E.D.A. continued the moderate policies of the 1950's, which differed very little from those advocated by G. Papandreou's new party. E.D.A. talked about reorientation of the economy towards productive activities and a more equitable distribution of income. It also rallied for democratization of the political institutions, criticizing the dominant role of the U.S. in the country's politics. It never implied any challenge to the regime and never questioned the role of the Crown in it. However, it was not simply the striking similarity of its policies with those of the C.U., but the fact that it made no effort to differentiate itself ideologically from the Centre, which led to its marginalization within the context albeit, of an unfavourable climate.

Furthermore, although E.D.A. was probably the only party without clientelistic ties between its deputies and their constituents, it remained a highly centralized and not particularly democratic party. Discussions were of course held at the rank and file level, but they rarely had any effect on the final policies of the party. Political directives and initiatives were always the exclusive territory of the top leadership. This organizational pattern was not only contradictory to the party's policies for democratizing the political system, but it was also less appealing to the masses, whose political energies had been suppressed for so long. The C.U.'s open and much more direct approach to the mass movement, although in essence it was not any more democratic, was creating the impression of being so, and therefore seemed more appealing to the masses.

In addition to all these factors, E.D.A. was the victim of theoretical bankruptcy of the underground C.P.E., which was

operating within the party and in effect controlled it. The articulation of both the politics of peaceful co-existence and the "stage theory" was translated into meaningless attempts to form some kind of a front with the "patriotic" forces of the Centre. The latter was completely ridiculous, since the C.U. itself repeatedly defined its "Anendotos" struggle as "two-fronted": against the right and against the communists. Thus, E.D.A. for all these reasons, did not only miss the opportunity to give a left-wing dynamic to the growing mobilization, but also, almost voluntarily, it pushed itself to the margins of the political arena. In 1964, E.D.A. voluntarily and without receiving any promises in return, withdrew its candidates from certain constituencies in order to boost the C.U. electoral victory.²⁹ E.D.A., the main body of the left movement in the 1960's, had become simply an appendage of Papandreou's Party.

E.D.A.'s policies and structure did not remain uncriticized from within. In addition to a Maoist split as a result of the U.S.S.R.-China relations breakup (1963) -- something which was not unusual throughout the world -- a number of factions and tendencies sprang up within the party. (e.g., "Friends of New Countries", "New Left"). It was the first time in the country's left history that a section of the traditional left, however small it was, started to look for a left alternative outside of that tradition.

The events of the 1960's did not leave the dominant right wing party (E.R.E.) untouched. E.R.E., representing the most conservative element of the power block, could not resist the tidal wave of the entrance of the masses into politics. Its record in power and its class participation did not help its adjustment to the new circumstances. In the summer of 1963, Karamanlis resigned because of a disagreement which developed around the issue of the Royal visit to England. The incident, however, hinged on the role of the Crown in the political system which Karamanlis wanted to constitutionally modify.³⁰ The right thus lost its unifying leading personality in parliament and given C.U. successes began to display symptoms of a fatal disease. It lost two consecutive elections (Nov. 1963, Feb. 1964) and by the mid-'60's appeared completely incapacitated. Thus the political representation of the right was objectively left to extra parliamentary roles of power: the Crown and the military.

Towards a Stalemate

"Anendotos" brought G. Papandreou's Party to power by the end of 1963. In spite of the mass mobilization and the "radicalism" of the campaign, C.U. policies, when in power, were not by any means destructive of the status quo. After all, E.R.E. and C.U. were essentially representing different fractions of capital.³¹ Their differences were only in the tactics of achieving

and exercising power, as well as in the the articulation of socio-economic tendencies as they were derived from the contradictions of the late '50's early '60's.

Thus, in power, the C.U. not only intensified industrialization, but also did so by consistently promoting the inflow of foreign direct investment. As G. Papandreou has put it "foreign capital was not only welcome, but necessary to the realization of our overall targets".³² Most of this capital was primarily European. By 1966 the inflow of capital of West German and French origin had almost counterbalanced the American.³³ Most of this capital went to the manufacturing of export goods,³⁴ which became the 60 per cent of the country's overall exports.³⁵

The economic orientation of the country and the closer ties with the growing European powers allowed Papandreou to attempt a redefinition of the country's relations with the U.S. This attempt did not take place by taking any anti-American stands on international issues, but rather by attempting to control the agencies of U.S. power within the country. Thus, Papandreou, very much like his predecessor Karamanlis, but with greater consistency and determination tried to strengthen his government's political authority. That meant bringing the military under the political control of parliament. The latter, in turn, given the close ties between Army and Crown, meant in effect, the undermining of the Monarch's power and control of the political process.

In other levels Papandreou did carry out some of its promises. He introduced impressive and extended educational reforms and undertook measures which greatly improved living conditions and income in the countryside. But the most important reform it brought about was the liberal democratic climate which his "populist" style brought to the country. The latter broke the previously existing undemocratic, often terrorist conditions of social mobilization. This development appeared to be extremely important since the contradictory nature of the alliance which the C.U. was representing soon reached its limits and there was a lot to protect over and/or react to.

Papandreou's democratic reforms met with severe reaction. The reaction came primarily from the Crown, whose authority was indirectly undermined by the reforms, but it was soon transmitted to the upper bourgeois elements of C.U.'s top leadership. In 1965 Papandreou decided to move himself into the portfolio of the Minister of Defence in an attempt to penetrate the "parliament prof" military apparatus, and bring it under government control. The King refused to approve the cabinet shuffle and Papandreou warned the Crown orally that this might lead to his resignation. Within one hour the King had nominated a new Prime Minister, dismissing Papandreou who just a year earlier had led the polls

with 53 per cent of the electorate. This was the Royal coup of the mid-'60's³⁶ and as it is seen in retrospect as the fatal stroke to a sick democracy.

The governments which followed Papandreou's dismissal were conscious attempts to split the C.U. and therefore undermine its intimidating mass support. The split was led by the upper bourgeois elements³⁷ of the party, but also according to various press reports, millions of drachmas were used by the Crown to buy the integrity and the votes of a number of C.U. M.P.'s. The Royal coup, however, did not have the expected results. The more the party was purged of its bourgeois elements, the more united the peasant, petty-bourgeois and working class alliance/base of the party was strengthened. Soon the radical masses took to the streets creating one of the most deep hegemonic crises of modern Greek history.

It was the first time since the German occupation that the peasants had to a large extent broken away from the patronage system and had become aware of their class interests in the political struggle. Peasant demands were concentrated on the government's agricultural policies. They knew that the only way to secure their interest was to democratize the system politically so that their voices could be effective. The role they had played in the victorious "Anendotos"; the positive measures Papandreou's government had taken for them was living proof of their capacities and the main reason for their new mobilization against the Royal coup.

The radical petty-bourgeoisie was objectively in a contradictory position to which it had somehow contributed. The inflow of foreign capital and industrialization process which started before the C.U. victory, continued with Papandreou's government and was intensified by the governments of the "apostates", which had started to create problems for the petty-bourgeoisie's reproduction. On the other hand Papandreou's reforms of the educational system and especially his attempts at reorientation of foreign policies were met with growing petty-bourgeois nationalism and their dream of social reproduction. The latter made them perhaps the most active part of the social alliance which protested the Royal coup.

Finally, the economic policies of the late '50's and mid-'60's had strengthened the working class. In 1964-65 Greece was leading the world in strikes.³⁸ In spite of the record high levels of industrial production, the working class was not "receiving a fair share of the increased productivity".³⁹ Thus, they had good reasons to grab the opportunity and protect the anti-democratic measures taken by the traditional poles of power, which had already started to pass numerous anti-labour laws.⁴⁰

At that point, though it is obvious, we have to say that the common denominator of the convergence of all these social groups into a powerful radical mass movement was democratic reform. Politics and not explicit class interests was behind the movement of the mid'60's. However, the spontaneous mass protest which took place in the streets of the major urban centres quickly bypassed the policies of both C.U. and E.D.A. and got out of hand. The open challenge to the patriotic feelings of the Monarchy by appealing to the famous last article of the constitution, and the dominant anti-monarch slogan "The people do not like you: Take your mother and get out",⁴¹ strongly suggested that the masses were challenging the foundation of the regime itself. At the same time both C.U. and E.D.A. were calling for constitutional order! For a whole week hundreds of thousands of unguided masses rallied along these lines. By doing so, in spite of their class origins, they had touched and shaken the pillars of the existing socio-political order: the Crown, the role of the Army and U.S. imperialism which supported them.

The events of July 1965 were so unusual, so out of any realm of any simple protest that they have led some students to suggest that the country went through a very short period of revolutionary conditions.⁴² Regardless of whether anyone agrees with both the theoretical assumptions and the analysis of these studies, one thing is certain: the radicalized masses tried to articulate something which was not, and could not be articulated by their official political expressions. The failure of the masses to do so is not only to be found in the contradiction existing in the basis of this mobilization, cut also in the profound lack of a non-organic intelligentsia and/or a party capable of positively articulating the dynamics of that protest. The resolution of this political unrest was left to the naivety of the liberals and the stubbornly criminal reformism of the official left.

Soon after his dismissal, faced with this tremendous mobilization, G. Papandreou announced the beginning of a second "Anendotos". But we already know that history repeats itself first as tragedy and then as farce. This "Anendotos" developed as an attempt to contain the radicalism of the masses. Papandreou, ignoring or rather bending the popular demands for radical changes, called for a return to the old constitutional order. E.D.A.'s policies were very similar to Papandreou's initiatives. In fact, the leadership of the two parties often appeared together on many occasions of at least symbolic significance. (e.g. the funeral of Sotiris Petroulas; a dissident figure of E.D.A.'s youth who had been assassinated in a demonstration).

A. Papandreou, the son of the leader, who already had been involved in disagreements with his father on the C.U.'s political tactics, led the move. His relatively young age, his prestigious academic background and most of all, his charisma, were the basis

of the rapidly rising appeal of this young leader. Andreas, as his friends called him, managed to gather 'round him the most radical elements of this party, namely the young M.P.'s and the youth organization (E.D.E.N.) This faction of the party, soon to be called the "centre-left", did not dispute the party's overall strategic choices. However, it did bring a more uncompromising and nationalist rhetoric into the political discourse. For example, the "centre-left" under the young Papandreou's rhetoric were more explicit about the need for national control over the military and the intelligencia⁴³ and less respectful of the Crown's authority. But they never went so far as to actively challenge the main line of the second "Anendotos" -- that of return to the constitutional order. Furthermore, the new aspect of this "Centre-left" tendency was its not unusual co-operation with parts of E.D.A. on various local or sectoral issues.⁴⁴ Although this practice never achieved the open endorsement of Andreas it was extremely significant symbolically, given the "two front" nature of the "Anendotos".

The "centre-left" was to gradually grow away from the mainstream for the party. It was the dictatorship, which once and for all, brought about their divorce. The Andreas faction would develop into a separate resistance organization, which after 1974 would transform itself into P.A.S.O.K. However, as we will see, the latter carries within it all the contradictions of this period of gestation.

The attempt of the Crown to avoid Papandreou's reforms had completely failed. Not only had the Crown not managed to establish a legitimate parliamentary alternative to C.U. policies, but it has also discredited itself to the point of no return. The mass movement, however immature, and the real social basis for the needed reforms were the main causes of this failure.

By the middle '60's no single agent of power was able to legitimately re-establish the badly injured hegemony. On the one hand parliament was incapable of "re-establishing the constitutional order" which meant reconciliation with the shaken authority of the Crown. Under the circumstances no parliamentary party could function unless "deep reforms" were introduced. This was something that even conservative leaders of the right recognized.⁴⁵ However, these reforms would have left political power open even wider to the mass movement.

In spite of the fact that the latter never had any aspiration to challenge the socio-economic order,⁴⁶ this was potentially dangerous. However, its dynamism and the nature of the political reforms would not have left any agents of real power at the exclusive disposal of the bourgeoisie and its imperialist partners. This had paralyzed any attempts to impose a solution to the crisis through parliament. Both G. Papandreou and P. Kanelopoulos (new leader of E.R.E.) had come to that realization and under the

auspices of the King came to a secret agreement for the formation of common government after the election schedule for May 1967.⁴⁷

On the other hand the radical mass movement was "out in the cold" on its own -- without leadership, without any positive sense of where it wanted to go. The conjunctural nature of the social alliance which it was composed of, crippled the possibility of imposing its own hegemonic order.

The country was in a complete stalemate. The only structure that had the capacity to impose its will was the military, which had remained active on the margin of this political turmoil. This authoritarian solution appeared the only way out of the crisis. To the Americans it meant an unchallenged and continuous presence in the country -- something which was almost guaranteed given their close ties with the military. To the more conservative elements of the bourgeoisie, it meant a return to the good old order and a definite move away from liberal experiments, which the more liberal and nationally oriented faction of the bourgeoisie, given its dependent position on these conservative elements, and the unpredictability of the mass movement, could tolerate.

The dictatorship in Greece came about as a result of the vacuum which arose from the mid'60's liberal experiment and reactions to it. It was a classic case of the type which Miliband describes as "replacement of 'bourgeois democracy' by conservative authoritarianism" when the popular movements "far from constituting a genuine threat to the capitalist order were... deeply confused".⁴⁸ When the tanks of the colonels rolled into downtown Athens, bypassing the plans of the generals for a Royal coup,⁴⁹ not only the discomfort of bourgeoisie, but also the exhausted agony of the popular masses was terminated.

Dictatorship and Resistance

The bankruptcy of the pre-dictatorship policies of both the C.U. and E.D.A. became depressingly clear from the easy time which the colonels had in establishing their order. The psychological preparation of the masses could at best be translated into confronting the police in the streets, but it never went so far as to anticipate a confrontation with the Army.⁵⁰ The naivety of the two parties and their unquestionably firm belief in the liberal democratic rules of the political game had once more left the people alone, "unarmed" and powerless. Thus, this lack of power of the movement and the coincidence of the attitudes of the radical middle class with the nationalist rhetoric of the colonels, broke the backbone of the mass movement and consequently any possibility for autonomous horizontal/class based modes of organizing.

In spite of all this, it did not take much time before a number of resistance groups emerged. However, this resistance never became a mass movement. It was mainly composed of a small number of people, usually middle class intellectuals. Although their political origins were within the old parties, we cannot say that the majority of them were representing the mainstream of these parties. Once more, the resistance, however limited, was to be carried by the left. The right, or at least the part which did not collaborate with the regime, limited its activities to a paper war and to international public relations.

The main characteristics of the resistance, (of course with exceptions) were first that its base was primarily abroad (mainly in Western Europe) and secondly that its primary consideration was to return to the dictatorship regime. Let us have a look at the developments of the left wing resistance since, to us, they have significantly influenced today's (post 1974) political configuration.

A couple of days after the coup, active members of E.D.A. and the C.P. established the Panhellenic Liberation Front (P.A.M.) From the beginning its primary goal was the unity of all the resistance organizations in order to "oust the dictatorship; re-establish constitutional and democratic freedoms, (secure) the freedom of all parties and organizations...(and) for free elections with proportional representation... to be organized by a government of all parties".⁵¹ To achieve these goals, P.A.M. adopted all the expressions of struggle "from the most simple to the most decisive".⁵² It was very hesitant to openly adopt and promote armed struggle against the regime. However, many sections of the organization not rarely undertook some dynamic initiatives against the regime.

But the most significant development of the traditional left during the period was the split of the Communist Party. In February 1968, during the 12th conference of the central committee, the party split over the issue of jurisdiction of its two political bureaus (interior-exterior).⁵³ The two factions entered a vicious competition for the membership and the approval of the Soviet C.P. Finally, the Bureau of the Exterior, although by a minority, was recognized by Moscow and a rapid political differentiation of the two factions started.

The C.P. of the interior gradually adopted a style, more in terms of rhetoric and less in practice, which was more nationalist and often shockingly moderate. Thus, through P.A.M., they called upon the resistance to orient itself towards the goal of "National Democratic Change",⁵⁴ not, in fact, much different from E.D.A.'s program of the 1950's. Furthermore, they called for "a socialism which will be based on the Greek reality and which will capitalize on the positive and negative experience of building socialism

elsewhere, (and which will) avoid the adoption of foreign models".⁵⁵ Although these claims were very appealing since they were simmering among many left activists well before 1967, they soon became associated with reformist politics due to the way in which the C.P. (interior) was articulating them within the resistance movement. Thus, they first called for an attempt to politically exploit the contradiction between the King and the Junta, while soon after they declared that their struggle was exclusively "anti-dictatoric".⁵⁶ They tried to unite the resistance, including the right wingers, which created problems not only for the other left resistance groups, but also for their membership.

On the other hand, the polit bureau of the exterior had trouble reorganizing the party. However, with the assistance of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European parties and with the promotion of a more radical rhetoric, than the "other" C.P., it managed to regroup. The C.P. (exterior) claimed that the struggle was "democratic and anti-imperialist". It characterized the country as "industrial-agricultural" (sic) and that the ultimate goal of the left movement is the achievement of a "New Democracy" which would allow an economic development on anti-imperialist grounds and pave the road towards socialism.⁵⁷ In practice, however, the "Party" was not any more radical than its "interior" counterpart. It condemned armed resistance and it was not until 1972 that it made any real contribution to the resistance.

The result of the C.P.'s split had devastating results on the participation of the traditional left in the resistance. The preoccupation of the two parties with their internal affairs made them almost completely ineffective. Only "Rigas Fereos", the youth section of C.P. (interior) and the student front organization of the pro-Moscow party, (although much later) can claim some contribution to the struggle against the Junta.

The main weight of the resistance was thus left on the shoulders of organizations which had little or no relation to the pre-dictatorship political schemes.

Democratic Defence (Demokratiki Amina - D.A.) was established virtually the day after the coup. It was composed of independent leftists (not all of them Marxists), radical liberals and activists who had dropped out of traditional left politics (E.D.A.). It was perhaps the largest organization of the resistance. It was the only resistance group, which came close to the claim of a mass organization. However, D.A.'s membership never exceeded a few hundred. Having active members both abroad, but mainly inside the country, D.A.'s main goal was the "overthrowing of the Junta by all possible means". It claimed for itself the title of "socialist organization" and made clear that its struggle was for "national independence, popular sovereignty as well as for relieving the country from every foreign dependency and particularly from

American imperialism -- (which was) supporting the internal reactionary forces".⁵⁸ Its goals were tacitly articulated by excluding the right from any form of co-operation while it actively promoted the unity of all the rest of the resistance groups.⁵⁹ The D.A. had also adopted very dynamic action against the regime including bombings and boycotts.

The D.A.'s significance, was that it was the first of the resistance groups to carry some weight with people of "centre-left" origin who had been radicalized by the dictatorship's experience. This was to become the trend of almost all the independent groups. By the end of the dictatorship the radical liberal core of the 1967 group had been transformed into a genuine socialist organization.⁶⁰

With the direct involvement of the U.S. embassy and the lobbying of some international personalities, the regime freed A. Papandreou a few months after the coup. It did not take long for the dynamic leader to gather a number of his old friends from the left-wing of the C.U. and establish the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (P.A.K.). P.A.K. called opposition to the regime a "national liberation struggle"⁶¹ and was soon joined by a number of students and intellectuals living mainly abroad (Western Europe and North America). Its membership never reached any significance within the country.

P.A.K. was one of the organizations, which although not originating on the left, tied the political struggle against the Junta to radical social changes. Thus, in a two day seminar of P.A.K.'s friends in Virtsburg, West Germany, P.A.K. called for popular sovereignty which (was) to achieve through armed confrontation; social and political organization of the country according to a concept of numerous decentralized councils for the regular Army's replacement by a popular militia; and since the country was considered to be under foreign occupation an alliance with liberation movements were to be sought. Furthermore, Papandreou became a self-proclaimed "non-dogmatic marxist" and even an "anarchist" in the sense that he believed in the eventual disappearance of the state.⁶²

Papandreou burned all the bridges between himself and the old C.U.⁶³ At the same time, however, he avoided developing smooth relations with the other resistance organization. He did so either by demanding an unreasonable basis of co-operation (usually P.A.K.'s full platform), or by claiming indirectly that the leadership of the proposed front the organization was far from conducive to resistance unity.⁶⁴ The systematic boycott of the unity of the resistance by P.A.K. can be attributed to the aspirations of its leadership to appropriate the resistance (e.g. when the request for D.A. and P.A.M. to be considered one organization in the coordinating body of the National Council of

the Resistance and to be fear of red-baiting (e.g. when P.A.K. asked for right wing representation in the co-ordinating body of the resistance).⁶⁵ Papandreou appeared to be particularly reserved vis-a-vis D.A. which more or less had the same origin and base as his organization. This latter point is rather important to keep in mind because of what happened in 1975 within PA.SO.K. when the core of the old D.A. which was, at least on paper, the co-founder of PA.SO.K. was in effect ousted from it.

The structure of P.A.K. is worth considering in the context of this project. P.A.K. was run by its "National Council" while its undisputed leader was A. Papandreou. In effect, however, and using the excuse of the extenuating circumstances of the resistance, Papandreou himself was the alpha and the omega of the organization.⁶⁶

P.A.K., in spite of the fact that its rhetoric had bypassed by far the mold of the traditional left, never managed to carry out any major direct action against the Junta. There was a lot of talk, preparation, as well as individual participation in anti-Junta activities, but very little action in the country by the organization which was basically based abroad.⁶⁷

In addition to these three major resistance organizations there were numerous others which mushroomed basically outside the country. Their main characteristic was their commitment to dynamic resistance and their deep influence from the left movement of Europe. Their importance for post-Junta politics was that -- although most of them disappeared -- many of the issues with which they were preoccupied did later appear scattered throughout PA.SO.K.'s platform. Thus, for example, references to self-management, a concern with the decision making process and the dream of solidarity with the movements of the Mediterranean and Europe became part of PA.SO.K.'s political discourse and a big attraction of the party for a great part of the non-traditional left.

As we already said, the organized resistance never became a mass movement and as such never really threatened the regime. The 1973 student uprising can be considered the only exception to this rule. In the fall of '73 the students took advantage of the regime's attempt to relax some measures, and bypassing the initial reactions of the C.P. they revolted.⁶⁸ They occupied the Polytechnic School for three days and were joined by thousands of people.

The regime had again to bring the tanks to downtown Athens -- the same thing happened to other major cities where universities existed in order to crush the revolt. The rebels, however, who left behind them hundreds of dead and wounded, had clearly demonstrated the popular tendencies after the

authoritarian experience. They made it clear that "the main prerequisite for the solution of the problems of the people is the immediate overthrow of the tyrannical regime of the Junta and the simultaneous establishment of popular sovereignty... (and that) the establishment of popular sovereignty is intertwined with the national independence from foreign interest which for years have been supporting tyranny in our country".⁶⁹ Furthermore, the open condemnation of N.A.T.O. and U.S. imperialism, as well as the appearance of slogans, such as "Greece to the Greeks"⁷⁰, were clearly anticipated in the post-1974 political environment. The Polytechnic School uprising did not achieve much more than the intensification of the friction between the various factions of the Junta. However, it definitely made it clear that post-dictatorship politics could not resemble those prior to 1967.

The colonels called their regime a "revolution" and with no major problems managed to put freedoms and civil rights in a "cast".⁷¹ They made it clear from the beginning that, as one of their theoreticians put it, "the revolution was to intensify economic development... which had been destroyed by previous political anarchy".⁷² Indeed from the very beginning their policies were precisely aiming to develop and expand the country's economy through intensifying industrialization, without abandoning, and in fact stimulating the traditional patterns of accumulation.

The economics of Junta were not anything new to Greece. It was precisely the program that the governments of C.U. and not of the right had initiated a few years earlier!⁷³ In fact, it has been claimed that the first 5 year plan of the regime was nothing but a duplicate of Papandreou's plan for the 1966-1970 period.⁷⁴ It is rather arbitrary on the part of some writers to attribute the economic evils of the country (the deficit in the balance of trade, the increasing foreign and internal borrowing of the country, etc.) to the Junta and to assume a deterioration in real incomes because of the regime.⁷⁵ The former was simply a result of the structural contradictions of the Greek economy while the latter was simply not true. Economic misery and authoritarian/exceptional regimes do not necessarily go together.⁷⁶ In fact, in the case of Greece between 1966 and 1971 increases in the salaries of wage labour were averaging 9.8 per cent while the consumer price index was increasing by only 2.1 per cent.⁷⁷ It is in such facts that an explanation of the "bloodless" coup and an answer to the failure of the resistance to become popular must be sought.

The crisis of the dictatorship came about as a result of the contradictions of the economic development of the country. It was a combination of the unplanned inflow of foreign capital (in the 1967-71 period, 62 per cent more than 1962-66), the international crisis of the early 1970's and its inflationary effects, the increase in friction between the domestic bourgeoisie (usually

industrial) and its internationally oriented counterpart, as well as the crisis in Cyprus. As Poulantzas claims, it is obvious that the form of the regime of the dictatorship cannot guarantee the peaceful and harmless resolution of the contradictions between the various fractions of the bourgeoisie.⁷⁸ The crisis in Cyprus and the possibility of war contributed to the Junta looking for a less dangerous bridge to pass power safely to the politicians. A general military draft in an authoritarian regime and with the increasing discontent of the population, appeared to be the least desirable position for the regime to be in. Thus, it was this unpredictability rather than the strength of the "popular factor" which contributed to the final fall of the Junta.

At the social level pressure against the regime was coming from the convergence of interest of various diverse and more often competing classes and strata. The anti-foreign sentiment could rally the indigenous bourgeoisie, the traditional petty-bourgeoisie sections of the working class who had a recent peasant background (hoping for more rational industrialization and development) and the peasantry, which was forced to be proletarians in the cities or abroad. In spite of this convergence of the popular classes, they did not manage to organize and articulate their voices and have a say in the political change of the summer of 1974. It was in reality a change from above.

When K. Karamanlis took his place as the new Prime Minister, he knew that these structural contradictions of Greek economy had to be resolved soon. But he, as well as almost everyone else, knew that the solutions to these contradictions, which had aged since the early 1960's, had to be resolved but under completely new political conditions.

Conclusion

If we were to take the foregoing analysis seriously, we can no longer claim the post-1974 period as a new era. The apparent changes, which were introduced in the aftermath of the Junta (Metapolitefsi) -- e.g. democratic elections, ousting of the Crown, legalization of the C.P. and even recognition of the resistance, rights to women, civil marriage, etc. -- were the result of a phase of a class struggle which began twenty-five years ago. The fact that these reforms were introduced in a familiar watered-down fashion is the result of incapacity of the left to articulate a new discourse and practice, to establish its own hegemony and to become the true protagonist in political developments.

NOTES

1. This is a small part of my Doctoral thesis in process which is entitled: "The Development of Panhellenic Socialist

Movement: 1974-1984".

I would like to thank Helga Stefansson who took pains to make my english readable.

2. See for example: W.O. Candilis **The Economy of Greece**. New York, Praeger, 1968; X. Zolotas. **Monetary Equilibrium and Economic Development**. Athens, 1964; A. Kanellopoulos **The Economy Between Yesterday and Tomorrow**. (I Economia Anamesa sto hthes ke sto Avrio). Athens, Kaktos, 1980.
3. See for example: A. Papandreou **Democracy at Gunpoint**. London, Penguin, 1973; N. Poulantzas **The Crisis of Dictatorships**. (I Krisi ton Dictatorion). Athens, Papazisis, 1975; **Monthly Review** No. 7. Dec. 1972 esp. articles by F. Ladis and A. Papandreou; C. Tsoucalas **The Greek Tragedy**. Middlesex, Penguin, 1969; N. Mouzelis **Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment**. London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1978; S. Babanasis - K. Soula **Greece in the Periphery of Developed Countries**. (Kratos ke Kephalieo stin Ellada) Athens, Synchroni Epochi, 1978; K. Vergopoulos, "Introduction to the Study of MODern Greek Economy" **Monthly Review** (Greek ed.) No. 36, No. 37 May and June, 1983; M. Malios **The Contemporary Phase of Development of Capitalism in Greece**. (I Synchroni Phasi tis Anaptixis tou Kapitalismou stin Ellada). Athens, Synchroni Epochi, 1979.
4. A. Papandreou, "The Structures of Dependency" in **Mont Diplomatique** (Greek ed.) Nov. 1977, also in P. Papasarrantopoulos (ed.) **PA.SO.K. and Power** (PA.SO.K. ke Exdusia). Athens, Paratiritis, 1980. p. 186.
5. N. Psyroukis **History of Contemporary Greece**. (Istoria tis Synchronis Elladas) Athens, Epikerotita, 1976, esp. vols. II and III; M. Serafetinidis **The Breakdown of Parliamentary Democracy in Greece 1947-1967**. (unpublished Ph.D. thesis) London School of Economics and Political Science, 1979; M. Serafetinidis et al., "The Development of Greek Shipping Capital and its Implications for the Political Economy of Greece" **Cambridge Journal of Economics**. Fall 1981, pp. 289-310; V. Choraphas, "The Shipping Capital in Greece" **Antitheses**. No. 15; S. Eleftheriou, "Greek Capitalism: Problems and Dilemmas **Tetradia** (Notebooks). Nos 2-3, Fall 1981; J. Petras "Notes: Towards a Definition of Greek Political Economy" (mimeo); G. Karabelias, **Small-Middle Democracy** (Mikromesea Demokratia). Athens, Kommouna Editions, 1982.

6. G. Karabelias *op.cit.*, p. 128.
7. M. Serafetinidis et.al. *op.cit.*, pp. 292-296; J. Petras, *op.cit.*, pp. 6-8; M. Serafetinidis, *op.cit.*, Ch. I., pp. 49-66.
8. *Argo*, Jan. 1976, p. 66. Quoted in M. Serafetinidis et.al. *op.cit.*, p. 295.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 195; J. Petras, *op.cit.*, p. 6.
10. G. Karabelias, *op.cit.*, p. 33.
11. C. Tsoucalas, *op.cit.*, p. 137.
12. The average annual growth of GNP in constant prices between 1953-1961 was 6.25 %. **National Accounts of Greece**. No. 16, Athens, 1967.
13. M. Serafetinidis, *op.cit.*, p. 191.
14. G. Coutsoumaris, **The Morphology of Greek Industry**. Athens, Centre of Economic Research, 1963, pp. 59-60.
15. This is one of many cases where capital takes advantage of existing, "traditional" social relations. It would be interesting, for example, to examine in this context the role of women in the production process. Since for obvious reasons the extensive use of unpaid female labour, especially in the agricultural and simple commodity production sectors was vital to capital expansion.
16. It is known that the U.S. opts for existence of more than one political scenario that they have some control over, in some countries which they are heavily involved. Thus, in the June-July 1961 negotiations for the formation of Centre Union a top officer of the State Department (McGhee) participated actively promoting the idea. J. Meynaud **Political Forces in Greece** (*Politikes Dynameis tin Ellada*). Athens, Byron, 1966, pp. 106-107. (Also in English and in French).
17. The presence of a number of shipowners and industrialists in the top leadership of C.U. is well known (e.g. G. Mavros, K. Mitsotakis, P. Garouphalias et.al.)
18. After the election both C.U. and E.D.A. came out with what they called the "Black Bible" in which the irregularities of the biased election were outlined. In fact, the whole elections was organized in a military fashion under the code name "Pericles". See: B. Georgoulas **The**

- Biased Election of 1961 (I Nothes Ekloges tou 1961). Athens, 1975.
19. M. Serafetinidis *op.cit.*, p. 292.
 20. C. Tsoucalas *op.cit.*, p. 175.
 21. J. Meynaud *op.cit.*, pp. 292-297.
 22. Th. Coulombis **Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences**. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, p.174.
 23. M. Serafetinidis *op.cit.*, p. 194.
 24. Free collective bargaining was in effect unknown in Greece. The government was the ultimate arbitrator of wages and salaries, which had to be approved by ministerial decree. The same thing used to happen even in cases where the two parties (employers - employees) had agreed. Furthermore the leadership of the National Federation of Labour was not by any means democratically elected. The government, through a very complex set of legal, semi-legal and financial patterns managed to control Trade Unionism. Ch. Jechinis **Trade Unionism in Greece**. Chicago, Labour Education Division, Roosevelt University 1967, p. 160. Also see: Th. Katsanevas **The Contemporary Trade Union Movement in Greece** (To Synchrono Syndikalistiko Kinima stin Ellada). Athens, Nea Sinora, 1981.
 27. Here, clientelism is defined as a system of information, voluntary bipolar exchange(s)/relationship(s) between unequal partners where one party enters the relationship(s) with a set of services and promises, which often go beyond the public realm and the other promises in return, certain behaviour, usually electoral. In other parts of this thesis a detailed analysis of the roots and the evolution of clientelism has been made. It is our thesis that the patronage system which has prevailed in Greek politics and its origin are not to be attributed to racial characteristics. The peculiar development of the Greek political economy (since the 19th century) i.e., the failure of Greek capital to develop along industrial lines, the predominance of merchant, finance expatriate capital in the accumulation process, the subsequent overgrowth of the Greek state, and the isolated subjective living conditions of the population in the countryside are at its heart. Thus, clientelism developed as a pattern of reflecting Greek social - political contradictions and the class struggle itself - in the last analysis. In fact, it not only continues to change

along with the sociological developments but it also conditions the new social and political developments. This is a trend which is alive today and must be kept in mind if we are to understand patronage and favouritism in Greece in the 1980's.

26. M. Serafetinidis *op.cit.*, p. 299.
27. One of the striking incidents of this kind was a 5-hour battle between 7,000 policemen and demonstrators in Athens (April 20, 1962). *Ibid.*, p. 300.
28. C. Tsoucalas *op.cit.*, p. 183.
29. J. Meynaud *op.cit.*, pp. 121-123.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-118.
31. N. Svoronos "Sketch of Social and Political Evolution in Greece" in N. Svoronos **"Analekta" of Modern Greek History and Historiography** (Analekta Neoellinikis Istorias ke Istoriographias). Athens, Themelio, 1982; also in **Temps Modernes**. vol. 25, 276, Paris, 1968, -. 306.
32. A. Papandreou, Democracy..., *op.cit.*, p. 127. The inflow of foreign capital increased very rapidly and to unprecedented levels. In 1960 it was \$11.5 million, in 1963 \$50 million and in 1966 \$157.5 million. (N. Mouzelis, "Capitalism and the Development of the Greek State" in R. Scare (ed.)) **The State in Western Europe**. London, Croom Helm, 1980, p. 253. These figures become particularly impressive if we consider that U.S. military aid was terminated in 1964.
33. M. Serafetinidis *op.cit.*, p. 235.
34. Serafetinidis et.al. *op.cit.*, p. 301.
35. G. Karabelias *op.cit.*, p. 129.
36. For an extensive and impressively well researched analysis of the "Royal Coup" see: J. Meynaud **The Royal Deviation from Parliamentarism of July 1965**. Athens, Byron, 1974. Also published as **Rapport sur l'abolition de la democratie en Grece**. Montreal, Etudes de science politique, 1967.
37. It is not by accident that people like P. Garoufalias and K. Mitsotakis, an industrialist and a shipowner led the split and the "apostates".

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38. G. Karambelias *op.cit.*.
39. Ch. Jechinis *op.cit.*, pp. 159-160.
40. N. Psyroukis *op.cit.*, vol. III, pp. 360-361.
41. 114 was the last article of the 1952 constitution which was appealed to the patriotic feelings of the people of Greece for the preservation of democracy.
42. N. Psyroukis *op.cit.*, p. 359.
43. A. Papandreou *Democracy...*, *op.cit.*, p. 176.
44. C. Tsoucalas "Class Struggle and Dictatorship in Greece" in *New Left Review*, No. 56, July-August, 1969.
45. Karamanlis' interview in *Le Monde*. Nov. 29, 1967 quoted as an appendix in M. Genevois, *The Greece of Karamanlis*. London, Doris Publications, 1973.
46. C. Tsoucalas *op.cit.*.
47. S. Gregoriadis *History of the Dictatorship (istoria tis Diktatorias)*. Athens, Kapopoulos, 1975, vol. 1, pp. 38-39.
48. R. Miliband *The State in Capitalist Society*. London, Quarter Books, 1973, p. 247.
49. It is proven that the Crown was preparing a coup with the cooperation of the Generals (Royal Coup). The explanation to why the secret U.S. intelligence endorsed the young officers' action must be sought in both the class origin of the younger officers - they were much closer to the popular classes than the generals, who for years, had been associated with the corruption of the palace - and the internal structure of the officers' promotions. The stagnation of the younger officer to lower ranks for years made them the perfect candidates for the job. For a more extensive explanation of the latter point see: N. Mouzelis *Greece... op.cit.*, ch. 7.
50. J. Katris *The Genesis of Neo-Fascism in Greece (I Genesis tou Neofasismou stin Ellada)*. Athens, Papasisis, 1974, p. 256. Also in English as *Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power*. St. Louis, New Critics Press, 1971.
51. *New Word*, vol. 10/67, p. 9.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

53. Due to the underground conditions within which they had to operate, the Communist Party had two polit-bureaus: one in the country and one abroad with Prague as its base. There was always some friction as to exactly where the party line was to be produced. Although this friction was often expressed as a personality conflict, the political implications for the party's development and direction were tremendous.
54. M. Nikolinakos **Resistance and Opposition 1967-1974** (Antistasi ke Antipolitefsi). Athens, Olkos, 1975, p. 56. Also in German "Widerstand and Opposition in Griechenland".
55. **Ibid.**
56. **KOM.EP.** (Communist Review), vol. 6/1970, p. 23ff; and **KOM.EP.**, vol. 10/1971, p. 74ff.
57. **New World.** No. 3-4, March-April 1974.
58. **Democratic Defence's** (Demokratiki Amina). Constitution.
59. From personal interviews with a number of D.A.'s members: Summer 1983. Also see: **Exit** (Exodos). No. 8-11, p. 3-8.
60. Its 1974 program is a case in point.
61. See for example A. Papandreou's "Call for the Unity for the Liberation Struggle". Nov. 1970, in **From P.A.K. to PA.SO.K.** (Apo to P.A.K. sto PA.SO.K.) Athens, Ladias, 1976; and **The Liberation Struggle** (O Apelefterotikos Agonas). Published by P.A.K. in 1974.
62. **Struggle** (Agonas) 28/7 and 27/9, 1973.
63. In November 1971 he did not respond to an invitation to attend C.U. Conference. M. Nikolinakos **op.cit.**, p. 71.
64. Interviews with members of D.A. and other small resistance groups (Summer 1983).
65. Interviews **Ibid.** and also M. Nikolinakos **op.cit.**, pp. 66-72.
66. Interview with D. Vasiliadis leading member of P.A.K. in Munich during the dictatorship. July 17, 1984. More on P.A.K.'s structure see D. Vasiliades **P.A.K.-PA.SO.K.: Myth and Reality** (P.A.K.-PA.SO.K.: Mythos ke Pragmatikotita). Athens, Dialogos, 1977.

67. *Ibid.*
68. The C.P. in its international broadcasting, condemned the uprising as adventurous. The rapid success of the movement, however, led its student organization in Greece to get actively involved.
69. From the press release of the "Co-ordinating Committee" mimeo; also quoted in A. Papandreou "Greece: The Meandering of the November Uprising" in *Monthly Review*, vol. 25, No. 9, Feb. 1974, p. 9.
70. We all know the prominence of this slogan in P.A.S.O.K.'s political discourse.
71. There is a vast literature on the repressive, authoritarian aspect of the Junta regime. See for example: J. Katris *op.cit.*; S. Gregoriades *op.cit.*, vol. 1-3; G. Giannopoulos, R. Clogg (eds.) *Greece Under Military Rule*. London, Secker and Warburg, 1972; *Torture in Greece*. London, Amnesty International Publication, 1977; Ch. Korizis *The Autocratic Regime 1967-1974 (To Aftarchiko Kathestos 1967-1974)*. Athens, Gutenberg, 1975; S. Zorbala *The Neo-Facism in Greece 1967-1974 (O Neofasismos stin Ellada)*. Athens, Synchroni Epoche, 1978, et.al.
72. The Papakonstandinou, *Political Education*. Athens, Kabanos Hello, 1972.
73. N. Poulantzas *op.cit.*, p. 27.
74. M. Nikolinakos *op.cit.*, pp. 134-137.
75. See for example: J. Pesmatzoglou, "The Economic and Social Heritage of the Dictatorship in, July 24 1974: The Return to the Democracy and its Problems (I Epistropi stin Demokratia ke ta problimata tis)". Athens, Estia, 1975, pp. 20-36; V. Nefeloudis, *Demytholization in the Language of Numbers (Apomythopiisi stin Glossa ton Arithmon)*. Athens, Armos, 1973.
76. N. Poulantzas *op.cit.*, p.24-25.
77. From O.E.C.D. reports, quoted in *ibid.* p. 103.
78. *Ibid.* p. 41.