

CYPRUS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS SINCE 1960

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RESUMÉ

Cet article examine des aspects de maintien de la paix par les Nations unies et d'autres organisations régionales dans le cas de Chypre. L'article met l'accent sur le rôle des Etats Unis avant et après la guerre froide. Motivés par des intérêts stratégiques en Méditerranée orientale, le Proche Orient et dernièrement par ce qui se passe dans les Balkans et l'Asie centrale, les Etats Unis ont fait la promotion des intérêts de la Turquie dans le cas de Chypre, ont soutenu de façon selective l'implantation des décisions unanimes du Conseil de sécurité sur l'île et n'ont pas insisté à l'application du droit international. L'article examine et rejette le "paquet d'idées" de Boutros-Ghali d'août 1992 et les soi-disantes mesures de confiance. Aucune de ces approches ne conduira à une solution viable et fonctionnelle du problème chypriote, une solution qui protégerait les intérêts de tous les Chypriotes. L'article conclut avec des suggestions pour l'avenir.

ABSTRACT

The paper examines aspects of peacekeeping and peacemaking by the United Nations and other regional organizations in the Cyprus problem. The paper focuses on the role of the United States during and after the Cold War. Motivated by strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and as of recent in the Balkans and in Central Asia, the United States has promoted Turkey's interests in the Cyprus problem, has taken a selective view on the implementation of the unanimous Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, and has failed to promote the rule of law. The paper examines and rejects the Boutros-Ghali "set of ideas" of August 1992, and the so-called confidence building measures. Neither approach would lead to a viable and functional solution of the Cyprus problem, one that would protect the rights of all Cypriots. The paper concludes with suggestions for the future.

Cyprus became independent in 1960. The alternative appeared to have been the partition of the island by the British under the 1958 Macmillan plan. The 1959 London and Zurich agreements reflected the Greek, Turkish and British compromise over the future of Cyprus which was reached without any consultation with the Cypriots.

The three founding treaties signed in the spring of 1959 by Britain, Greece and Turkey, were imposed on the Greek Cypriot majority. These treaties were the Treaty of Establishment Concerning the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance, which were complemented by various memoranda of understanding, some of which remained secret until recently.¹ The constitution of the republic formalized the role of the guarantor powers in the affairs of this independent republic; guaranteed the bi-communal character of the state; and perpetuated communal cleavages. The constitutional crisis that erupted in November 1963, was not unexpected.² It has yet to be resolved.

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The causes of this constitutional crisis have been discussed extensively elsewhere,³ and so have the attempts at a negotiated settlement of this dispute prior to the 1974 Turkish invasion.⁴ A domestic dispute involving the political aspirations and power sharing conceptions of two ethnic communities has been complicated by the strategic interests of the superpowers and the involvement of Greece and Turkey in the problem.

The government of Cyprus, prior to 1974, had rejected all federation and/or cantonization proposals presented by Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and the United States, because such proposals were seen as a cover for the eventual partition of Cyprus. The threat and the fear of the partition of Cyprus has been the foremost concern of the Greek Cypriot political leaders since the early 1950's. This is why, prior to 1974, the government of Cyprus rejected all plans that diminished its authority over the island republic, as in the case of the 1964 NATO plan, or plans that aimed at the partition of the island as in the case of the 1964 Acheson plan.

During the 1964-74 period, the government of Cyprus was in control of most of the territory of the republic. This period was marked by secret Greco-Turkish talks over the future of Cyprus; the destabilization of the government of Cyprus by the junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974; the formation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and threats of a Turkish military intervention.⁵ The negotiating positions of the Greek Cypriots were supported by United Nations resolutions upholding the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cyprus. With the negotiating balance of power in favor of the Greek Cypriots in the U.N. sponsored talks on Cyprus from 1968 to 1974, the Turkish Cypriots had accepted virtually all of the "13 points" proposed by president Makarios in 1963 for amending the Cypriot constitution. The point of contention remaining to be fully resolved just prior to the 1974 coup and the Turkish invasion was the form of local administration to be granted to the Turkish Cypriots⁶, an issue that was affected by the Greek Cypriot suspicions that the Turkish Cypriot demands were a cover for the eventual partition of Cyprus.

The Greek sponsored coup of July 15, 1974, against the government of Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish invasion and occupation of nearly 39% of the island republic radically changed the balance of power on Cyprus. The 1975 forcible population exchange and the expulsion of nearly all Greek Cypriots from the occupied areas created for the first time two largely homogeneous ethnic zones on the island. Consequently, the idea of establishing a federal Cyprus appeared as a viable constitutional option. Prior to 1974, the idea of federation had been rejected not only by the government of Cyprus, but also by constitutional authorities such as Lord Radcliffe in 1956, and the U.N. mediator Galo Plaza in 1965.

The fundamental question that has dominated all negotiations on Cyprus since

the events of 1974, is how to restructure Cyprus constitutionally into a viable and functional federal bi-communal system, and territorially into a bi-zonal system, while maintaining the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the republic and protecting the rights of all Cypriots. These questions were complicated by the presence of nearly 35 000 Turkish troops in the occupied areas, of tens of thousands of Turkish mainland settlers⁷, and Turkey's insistence that a new constitutional agreement must include provisions for the stationing of large numbers of Turkish troops on Cyprus and for Turkey's right of military intervention in Cyprus. Additional complications emerged as the evolving Turkish/Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals substantially diverged from those of the government of Cyprus. In contrast to the framework for a federation proposed by the government of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot proposals sought the creation of a loose confederation of two ethnically homogeneous sovereign states which amounted to the formal partition of Cyprus.

In seeking the resolution of the Cyprus problem the government of Cyprus faced additional difficulties. It had to negotiate under the threat of force from the occupied area. It felt abandoned by the influential members of the international community which, while extending verbal support for the plight of Cyprus, subordinated their legal and moral obligations to regional political and security considerations. It was in this setting that the government of Cyprus pursued a multifaceted policy in search of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

The Policy of Internationalization

The government of Cyprus since 1964, and particularly in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion has actively pursued the policy of internationalization of the Cyprus problem. This policy has focused on keeping the issue of Cyprus visible in various international fora until a just, viable, and functional solution was reached through negotiations under United Nations auspices, free from the threat of force. The policy of internationalization served multiple objectives. First though a clarification on this policy. The government of Cyprus was fully aware of the differences in the political potential of each of the international fora at which it presented the problem of Cyprus. Such fora included, among others, the meetings of the Non-aligned Movement, the Council of Europe, and the Commonwealth. These organizations did not have the ability or the authority to engage in the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Further, the United States opposed the involvement of these organizations in the Cyprus problem because it could not control their actions, and because of the membership and functions of these organizations the United States expected that their actions would conflict with the American objectives. For example, actions taken by the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe⁸ dealt only with a specific, albeit important, facet of the Cyprus problem. Positions adopted and actions taken by each of these international bodies served an important complementary support-

ive role for policies pursued by the government of Cyprus at the United Nations, and for influencing the U.S. Congress.

The policy of internationalization was a form of public international mobilization intended to break the isolation felt by the Cypriots, and to pressure the influential members of the international community to act along rule of law principles, rather than on the basis of realpolitik considerations. This policy served additional objectives: It kept the Cyprus problem in front of the international community. It sought the adoption of resolutions condemning Turkey's actions in and around Cyprus, and called for the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. It countered schemes that undermined the unity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and disregarded majority rights. It sought the endorsement of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and of the rights of the Cypriots, through resolutions and communiqués adopted by various international bodies on Cyprus. It sought to engage the United Nations and its influential members in the search for a negotiated solution, free from the threat of force by Turkey, and on the basis of principles and procedures incorporated in unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The policy of internationalization reaffirmed the international status of the government of Cyprus as the government of the republic of Cyprus and not as the administration of the Greek Cypriot community as Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots argued. Priority was given to this objective following the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the government of Cyprus in 1964. This objective attained even greater priority in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion, and the creation by the occupation army of the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" on November 15, 1983, following the Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence.

Another objective of the policy of internationalization has been the quest to impose sanctions on Turkey for her violations of international law, regional treaties, and American legislation, on the basis of decisions and findings by international bodies such as the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe. Further, the government of Cyprus sought to establish that Turkey's 1974 action amounted to the invasion and occupation of an independent country, and to condemn actions such as the massive introduction of Turkish mainland settlers that altered the demographic balance on Cyprus in general, and among the Turkish Cypriots in particular.

The successful pursuit of the policy of internationalization by the government of Cyprus explains why the United States and Turkey specifically sought the de-internationalization of the Cyprus problem. The latter part of the paper will analyze why the United States modified its policy on the involvement of the United Nations on the Cyprus problem in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War. The United States and Turkey preferred a solution of the

Cyprus problem through intercommunal talks, under United Nations auspices, on the basis of political equality, away from international fora, and along principles that substantially diverged from those endorsed by international fora such as the Commonwealth.

The policy of internationalization has not directly contributed to the resolution of the Cyprus problem. However, it remains an important source of pressure and embarrassment on countries such as Turkey and the United States who have sought to close the book on Cyprus with any solution acceptable to Turkey. This policy has also exposed the contradictions and double standards in the policies of influential members of the international community, particularly in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

The peacemaking limitations of international organizations such as the United Nations can be attributed to other reasons than just the attitude and policies of the United States in this dispute. States are members of multiple international and regional organizations. Consequently, influential members such as the former Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and others, face conflicting policy priorities and cross pressures. Positions endorsed by government representatives and other experts at one level, may be disregarded or downgraded at another when these positions conflict with policies that have higher priority for that government. In contrast, states that maintain consistent positions at all international or regional organizations often do not have the ability to influence the resolution of a dispute.

The post-1974 Period and the Search for a Negotiated Settlement

Earlier sections of the paper addressed policies of the government of Cyprus intended to deal with the consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion, as well as the objectives of the policy of internationalization. At the same time the government of Cyprus sought the peaceful resolution of the problems created by the Turkish invasion through intercommunal talks with the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots under the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Under the urging of the United States, the Cyprus government made some very painful concessions to the Turkish Cypriots in order to open serious negotiations on the resolution of the Cyprus problem after the deadlock that had developed in five rounds of intercommunal talks that had been held in Vienna. The concessions were included in a communique issued on February 12, 1977, at the end of a U.N. sponsored meeting between president Makarios of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash.⁹ In this meeting the government of Cyprus accepted the principle that the constitutional structure of the republic would be a bi-communal federation, based on a bi-zonal territorial allocation. These concessions were made prior to the commencement of negotiations with

the Turkish Cypriots, and without any concessions on their part. The four point Makarios-Denktash agreement introduced two additional fundamental concepts that have influenced all subsequent proposals for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. The first was the acceptance by the government of Cyprus of the vague principle that the territory under the administration of each community will be determined on the basis of its "economic viability, productivity, and land ownership." The second was that the acceptance of the three freedoms was qualified by the bi-communal nature of the federation, and "certain practical difficulties" that may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. This fateful agreement undermined the resolutions attained by the government of Cyprus at the Security Council and the General Assembly, and provided justification for the confederal proposals that have been presented since then by the United States and the Turkish Cypriots for the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots maintained consistent positions in the various negotiating cycles with the government of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots were asked for specific concessions in order to bring the Turkish Cypriots to the negotiating table. The negotiations usually ended in stalemate because the Turkish Cypriots failed to meet any of the Greek Cypriot constitutional and political concerns. Everyone agreed that the solution of the Cyprus problem would be based on a constitutional v. land trade off. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, however, consistently refused to submit a map considerably reducing the territory under occupation which would allow for the return of large numbers of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes.

The slow and painful evolution of the Cyprus problem found two more manifestations in the decade of the 1970's. One was the high level agreement between Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash and the new president of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou. This ten point agreement¹⁰ reaffirmed the Makarios Denktash agreement of February 12, 1977, but also the "U.N. resolutions relevant to the Cyprus Question." The Turkish Cypriots agreed that the intercommunal talks would deal with "all territorial and constitutional aspects," and that priority would be given to the resettlement of Varosha. For these reasons this ten point agreement can be seen as a belated attempt to refine the Makarios-Denktash agreement.

The second development was the presentation in November 1978 of the so-called "Western Framework for a Cyprus Settlement" known also as the "ABC" plan or the Nimetz plan.¹¹ This proposal promoted a loose bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as demanded by the Turkish Cypriots; relegated the U.N. resolutions to a secondary position compared to the Makarios-Denktash agreement; and avoided addressing issues fundamental to the Greek Cypriots, such as the three freedoms, the withdrawal of the Turkish forces and settlers, etc. This plan remain the foundation of subsequent negotiating proposals presented by the United States and the United Nations to the two sides.

The United Nations Resolutions, 1974-1989

One of the objectives of the Cypriot policy of internationalization was the implementation of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Cyprus that were adopted since 1974. This objective was not shared by the United States, Great Britain and some other influential members of the Security Council. They gave precedence to their political and strategic interests in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean and to their relations with Turkey. Consequently they subordinated these resolutions to the objectives outlined in the 1977 Makarios-Denktash agreement, and to the compromises made by the Greek Cypriots in the inconclusive rounds of the intercommunal talks.

The major objectives of the United Nations on Cyprus contradicted those of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and the United States. Only when the Security Council adopted resolution 649(1990), which reflected American and Turkish interests on Cyprus, did the United States endorse the principle of implementing this resolution.

It is the view of the government of Cyprus that the resolutions adopted by the Security Council from 1974 to 1989, contain substantive elements that provide the basis for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, and that these resolutions mandate their implementation. These resolutions included resolution 353(1974), resolution 3212(XXIX) unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, and resolutions 364(1974), 367(1975), 440(1978) 541(1983) and 550(1984).¹²

All resolutions adopted by the Security Council upheld all earlier actions by the Council and named specifically many of the resolutions mentioned in this paper. The provisions included in these resolutions, the specific calls for their implementation and the recognition that the terms of these resolutions provided principles for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, strengthened the negotiating position of the government of Cyprus. However, the non-implementation of these resolutions, the compromises made by the government of Cyprus in the intercommunal talks, and the willingness of the Secretary-General to pursue negotiations based on a framework other than the United Nations resolutions, weakened significantly the importance of these resolutions as well as the credibility of the United Nations.

The Gulf Crisis and the Implementation of U.N. Resolutions

When the Gulf crisis erupted in August 1990, the United States led the effort to restore the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Kuwait as well as its legitimate government. This was done under the auspices of an international coalition whose actions were authorized by unanimous Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. Throughout the war and its aftermath the United States and its coalition partners called on Iraq to comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

The issue of the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus gained prominence because of the Gulf War. The post-Cold War cooperation between the United States and Russia in the Security Council; the emphasis given to the “rule of law” as the foundation of the “new world order”; and the statements by president Bush that the status quo in Cyprus is unacceptable, encouraged the government of Cyprus to seek a new commitment by the United States and the United Nations to revitalize the stalemated intercommunal talks.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War the United States sought a quick negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem. However, Washington did not find any similarities between the cases of Kuwait and Cyprus. The United States argued that, in contrast to Iraq, Turkey had intervention rights in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee. Moreover, on the subject of the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker argued that in contrast to those on Kuwait, the resolutions on Cyprus were only of a procedural nature because they called for talks under the auspices of the United Nations. When confronted with evidence to the contrary, on February 4, 1991, the Department of State spokeswoman acknowledged the presence of other substantive clauses in these resolutions, but argued that the solution ought to be found through intercommunal negotiations.

On April 17, 1991, in hearings at the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, experts representing the administration argued that whereas the Kuwait resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, those on Cyprus had been adopted under Chapter VI. The implication of this argument was that the Council was under no obligation to enforce its unanimous resolutions. However, this argument is misleading. Several of the resolutions on Cyprus were adopted with the specific objective of addressing a threat to international peace. Resolution 186(1964), 353(1974), and 360(1974) are such examples. Resolutions 3212(XXIX), 365(1975), and 541(1983), contained specific provisions calling for the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, and for the compliance of all members with these resolutions. Finally, resolution 550(1984) authorized the Council to take appropriate measures in the event of the non-implementation of resolution 541(1983) and of resolution 550(1984).

Article 25 of the Charter reads that “...the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” Article 24 also confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. The contention that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to the enforcement measures under Chapter VII is not supported by international law authorities¹³ who argue that it is not possible to find in the Charter any support for this view. Article 25 applies to decisions by the Security Council adopted in accordance with the Charter. Moreover, this article is placed

not in Chapter VII of the Charter, but following article 24, the part of the Charter that deals with the powers and functions of the Security Council. If this article had reference solely to decisions of the Security Council concerning enforcement actions under articles 41 and 42, then the article would be superfluous since articles 48 and 49 of the Charter give the decisions of the Council under Chapter VII a binding effect.¹⁴

The Bush administration also argued that certain resolutions on Kuwait called for the restoration of its legitimate government, and thus, enforcement actions were taken to meet that objective. In contrast, the issue in Cyprus was the restructuring of its government so that once more there would be effective participation by the Turkish Cypriots. That could only be achieved through inter-communal negotiations. For these reasons Washington could not support enforcement actions against Turkey. However, Cyprus never requested the use of military force to implement these resolutions. The government of Cyprus expected that more traditional diplomatic efforts by permanent members of the Security Council and members of the European Community would bring about Turkey's compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

The fact that the United States raised these arguments in the case of Cyprus reflected a strict constructionist view of the Charter, as well as the reality that the enforcement of United Nations resolutions was not so much a legal issue as a political one. This was shown clearly after the adoption of resolution 649(1990) by the Security Council.

Since the early stages of the Cyprus problem in the 1950's, American policy had been affected by politico-strategic considerations in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, and appraisals of Turkey's role in the Cold War. The demise of the Cold War in the late 1980's did not diminish Turkey's politico-strategic value for the United States. Even though the threat posed by the former Soviet Union did not exist any more, new sources of concern to the United States revitalized Turkey's role. These concerns included the regional instability in the Middle East, the Gulf War and Turkey's contribution to that war, Turkey's role in the Turkic speaking republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as Turkey's interest in the developments in the Balkans. These developments provided new opportunities for strengthening Turco-American relations. Further, the Bush administration called for the development of a bilateral relationship with Turkey similar to the one existing between Israel and the United States, and encouraged Turkey to view itself as a regional power, with regional interests that went beyond parochial problems such as those in Greco-Turkish relations and Cyprus. In view of these assessments of Turkey's significance in the post-Gulf War era, it was unlikely that the United States would reverse its previous position on the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. Washington's search for a solution to the Cyprus problem reflects the following assumptions, most of which have not changed even under the Clinton administration:

a) The irreversibility of the 1974 Turkish invasion and of the 1983 Turkish Cypriot UDI.

b) That international sanctions against Turkey would make Turkey more inflexible in any future negotiations.

c) That the Cyprus problem is a case of lost opportunities and near misses, as in the case of the 1978 Nimetz plan, and Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar framework proposals of 1985, 1986, and 1989.

d) That the ideal solution of the Cyprus problem must be based on a constitutional v. territorial trade off. In return for substantial territorial concessions by the Turkish Cypriots that would allow a significant resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees, the United States endorsed the Turkish Cypriot confederal proposals, supported expanded veto provisions for the Turkish Cypriots, and recognized Turkey's claim for a major military presence on Cyprus and as a guarantor of the new constitution.

e) That the solution ought to be found through intercommunal talks, on equal footing, between the leaders of the two communities, with the support of Greece and Turkey.

f) That the European Community should not get involved in the Cyprus problem, and that it should not approve the Cypriot application for membership in the Community. The Community could not play a constructive role because Turkey was not a member, and the Turkish Cypriots had not participated in the application decision. These views were reflected in the Security Council resolutions that were adopted after 1990.

The United States, the United Nations and Resolutions 649(1990), 716(1991), 750(1992), 774(1992) and 789(1992)

With the end of the Cold War, the United States intensified its efforts to seek a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The active involvement of the U.S. Department of State Cyprus Coordinator on behalf of the good offices of the U.N. Secretary-General signified the coincidence of the American objectives on Cyprus with those of the United Nations.

Following the deadlocked high level meetings in New York, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Council on March 2, 1990, stated that under the terms of resolution 367(1975), his mandate was to assist in the drafting of a framework for a new constitution for Cyprus that would regulate the relations between the two communities on a federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal basis. He also indicated that the two communities would participate in these talks on an equal footing and that each community would give its consent separately to any new constitutional arrangements. The Secretary-General claimed that the terms of his mandate reflected the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements. He made no reference to the U.N. resolutions on Cyprus. Thus, the Secretary-General by his own actions undermined the effectiveness of his own institution. As a result of

the Secretary-General's report to the Council, resolutions 649(1990) was adopted unanimously.

This resolution met Turkish and American objectives because it presented the Cyprus problem as an intercommunal problem; it called for negotiations on an "equal footing", which had been a constant Turkish objective; it defined the parameters of the settlement, but remained silent on the issues of the implementation of United Nations resolutions, the withdrawal of Turkish forces and the Turkish settlers, the return of the refugees, the three freedoms, etc. The Cyprus government endorsed resolution 649(1990). This was another serious concession by the Greek Cypriots. Even though Cyprus had accepted the principle of bi-zonality and bi-communalism in 1977, that acceptance was part of an integrated whole that included the withdrawal of the Turkish forces and settlers, addressed Turkey's intervention rights, reaffirmed the three freedoms, etc. Moreover, resolution 649(1990) undermined the unity and sovereignty of Cyprus and the legitimacy of its government.

The end of the Gulf War intensified United Nations and American efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Visits to Greece and Turkey by president Bush, visits by Ambassador Nelson Ledsky U.S. Department of State Coordinator on Cyprus, and by representatives of the Secretary-General to the three capitals, were intended to revive the stalemated negotiations. Once the negotiations got under way the objective was to bring the parties within agreement range. A high level meeting would then be convened to conclude a framework agreement. The final accord would be signed at a conference attended by the Secretary-General, the leaders of Greece and Turkey, and the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. Needless to say that the proposed five party conference was another Cypriot concession. The traditional Cypriot position had called for an international conference, and that position had been reaffirmed a few weeks earlier in a joint meeting of the Greek prime minister with the president and the National Council of Cyprus.

The approach proposed by the United States and the United Nations implied that the Cyprus problem was both an intercommunal problem and a Greco-Turkish problem. Further, it actively engaged both Ambassador Ledsky and the Secretary-General in these talks. In the case of Perez de Cuellar, there was a notable shift in his role, i.e. from one of offering good offices to the parties to one of a mediator presenting a complete set of ideas for an overall framework agreement. Meanwhile, Mr. Denktash held to his earlier position that each side possessed sovereignty which it would retain after the establishment of a federation, along with the right of secession. The Secretary-General in his report to the Council of 8 October 1991, posited a solution based on the existence of one state of Cyprus, comprising of two communities, based on the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements and resolution 649(1990). Once more there was no mention of the other critical United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.

Despite the postponement of the talks because of the Turkish elections, the Secretary-General and Ambassador Ledsky continued their efforts to reopen the talks at the earliest time and from the point where the talks ended prior to the Turkish elections. The April 3, 1992, report to the Council by Boutros Ghali, the new Secretary-General, showed how far these negotiations had advanced; how closely the views of the United Nations and of Ambassador Ledsky reflected the fundamental Turkish positions and how Cyprus had compromised on most of its basic positions.

It appeared that by April 1992, the issues of territorial adjustments, the federal executive, and the displaced persons stood on the way of an overall framework agreement. Other differences included the practical application of "political equality". The Secretary-General endorsed a definition of "political equality" which did not mean equal numerical participation in all areas of the federal government as Mr. Denktash demanded. Political equality meant safeguards, participatory mechanisms, and identical powers and functions for each of the federated states. The report also affirmed that the solution must be based on the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements, and did not refer to any of the other crucial United Nations resolutions. The report made it clear that the three freedoms would be significantly restricted, and that the Turkish Cypriot community would enjoy expanded veto powers. The report also indicated the continuing validity of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, placed various economic obligations on the Greek Cypriots to revive and equalize the Turkish Cypriot economy, and expanded the Turkish Cypriot veto to include the question of membership in the European Community. Finally, the report pressured the government of Cyprus to move quickly toward a settlement by raising the possibility of the withdrawal of UNFICYP from Cyprus.

The Secretary-General's report was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council under resolution 750(1992), which affirmed resolutions 649(1990) and 716(1991), and all the principles contained in the recent reports of the Secretary-General and in these two resolutions. Because of French objections, the resolution excluded an endorsement of paragraph 26 of the report which dealt with the membership of Cyprus in the European Community. France felt that paragraph interfered with the powers of the European Community.

By the spring of 1992, the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem had developed a clear pattern. The representatives of the Secretary-General along with Ambassador Ledsky would visit the three capitals to keep the negotiating momentum alive and to bridge the gap in the positions of the two sides. The two Cypriot leaders would then be brought to New York for additional talks on a framework agreement. The Secretary-General would issue a report on his mission of good offices which would include an outline of the emerging compromise solution. Each report was endorsed by a Security Council resolution giving added legitimacy to the American led and inspired U.N. mission of good

offices. The commitment of the United States to implement these select resolutions increased tremendously the negotiating leverage of the Secretary-General, as well as the costs of a potential breakdown of these talks.

The negotiations at the three capitals resulted in a new round of proximity talks and later in face to face talks in New York between Boutros Ghali, president Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash, starting on July 15, 1992. The talks, with the active participation of Ambassador Ledsky, made significant progress on several issues but deadlocked over positions adopted by Mr. Denktash on issues such as territory and the map presented by the Secretary-General, the displaced persons, the federal executive, manifestations of legal definitions of sovereignty and equality in the federal constitution, and issues affecting the transitional arrangements. The Secretary-General's report and its annex¹⁵ vividly describes in 25 pages a confederal constitutional scheme in which the government of Cyprus has made all the concessions in the expectation of limited territorial compromises by the Turkish Cypriots.

This report describes even in greater detail than any of its predecessors the "ideas" for an overall framework agreement on Cyprus, and how closely these "ideas" reflect the basic Turkish and Turkish Cypriot positions on the Cyprus problem. On August 26, 1992, the Security Council unanimously endorsed this report and its annex as the basis for reaching an overall solution. Resolution 774(1992) also set in place a time table for the holding of separate ratification referenda on the proposed framework agreement.

Looking back at the Turkish positions on Cyprus since 1960, one is struck by their consistency. Let me summarize these positions:

- 1) The relationship of the two communities is not one of majority-minority, but one of equality.
- 2) The two communities are co-founders of the Cyprus republic.
- 3) The republic of Cyprus is based on the partnership and political equality of the two communities.
- 4) Despite its unitary appearance, the 1960 constitution established a functional federation in which two self administered communities were represented at all levels of government.
- 5) The Turkish Cypriots required Turkey's military guarantee and presence in order to protect their lives and property.
- 6) The problem of Cyprus must be resolved through intercommunal talks, on the basis of equality and away from international fora.
- 7) The government of Cyprus represented only the Greek Cypriots and not the republic as a whole.
- 8) Appropriate state mechanisms existed in areas under Turkish military protection (i.e. the TFSC from 1975 to 1983, and the TRNC after 1983).

9) The Cyprus government must be replaced by a transitional government in which the two communities are equally represented.

10) The equality and sovereignty of each of the two states.

11) The new constitution must provide broader veto powers to the Turkish Cypriots compared to those contained in the London and Zurich agreements.

12) The European Community should not be involved in the Cyprus problem, and that Cyprus should not become a European Community member without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots.

These Turkish/Turkish Cypriot positions were not political rhetoric designed only for domestic or foreign consumption. They were substantive positions that had direct constitutional implications, as shown clearly in the Secretary-General's proposals that were presented on August 21, 1992. Most of the Turkish positions have found specific application in these proposals. The Secretary-General's "framework of ideas", in contrast to the frameworks presented to the parties in 1985, 1986, and 1989, have been endorsed by the Security Council by resolutions 774 (1992) and 789 (1992).

In contrast, through a policy of concessions by the Greek Cypriots and the salami negotiating tactics of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the government of Cyprus accepted resolution 774 (1992), as the basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The set of ideas of August 21, 1992, had been prepared by Ambassador Ledsky and the British in cooperation with the Secretary-General. This set of ideas calls for the creation of a loose confederation on Cyprus; the establishment of a Turkish protectorate over all of Cyprus; and the continuation of Turkey's right of military intervention, because the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 would remain in effect, and a significant number of Turkish troops would remain in Cyprus.

Further, the Ledski-Ghali proposals include the effective denial of fundamental rights (the three freedoms) of all Cypriots; they undermine the prospects for the membership of Cyprus in the European Community; and they limit the applicability of European legislation in the internal affairs of Cyprus. Moreover, the framework does not provide for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, or of the estimated 80,000 Turkish settlers from the occupied areas as required by the U.N. resolutions. The framework does not provide any guarantees that a significant number of Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return to their homes. Finally, this framework establishes a cumbersome system of checks and balances that is unprecedented in modern constitutional history.

Despite the fact that the set of ideas met Turkey's objectives on Cyprus, Mr. Denktash, supported by Turkey, brought the negotiations into deadlock by refusing to discuss the Secretary-General's territorial proposals, and by raising new constitutional issues.

The decision by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to push for a solution that

legitimized the invasion, occupation and partition of Cyprus is shown clearly in the eighteen page document prepared by the Secretary-General's staff under the title "Summary of the Current Positions of the Two Sides in Relation to the Set of Ideas of August 21, 1992". The Turkish Cypriot side claims to agree with 91 of the 100 paragraphs of the set of ideas. The nine paragraphs over which they disagree include the following substantive points which contradict any constitutional notion of viability and functionality for the new constitution of Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriots insist on creating a loose confederation that would include a rotational presidency; equal representation of the two communities in the cabinet; the rotation of cabinet ministries and the principle of unanimity in cabinet decisions; the establishment of a transitional government with equal Turkish Cypriot participation and the dissolution of the internationally recognized government of Cyprus; the elimination of economic disparities between the two federated states; a Turkish Cypriot veto on all issues pertaining to membership in the European Community; the sovereignty of each federated state; the exclusion of the return of the displaced to their homes; the rejection of the Secretary-General's map with a new territorial allocation between the two units of the federation; and the issue of Turkey's military guarantee and the right of unilateral military intervention in Cyprus.

Even the Secretary-General, whose framework of August 21, 1992, met all of Turkey's substantive constitutional demands, found these new Turkish Cypriot demands and interpretations to be in variance with his framework and, for the first time, he found the Turkish Cypriots to be in variance with the terms of eleven United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and that these positions were in variance with the set of ideas on substantive issues such as the nature of the federation, the displaced persons, and the territorial adjustments. Boutros Ghali concluded that the Turkish Cypriots sought to maintain a fully sovereign state as apart of the federation; that this concept contradicted Security Council resolutions that called for a state with a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship; a state whose independence and territorial integrity would be safeguarded; and that Mr. Denktash's position on the displaced precluded the possibility that any Greek Cypriot would be able to return to their homes. The total separation of the two ethnic communities was incompatible with the views of the United Nations. Boutros Ghali also stated that Mr. Denktash refused to accept the map endorsed by the Security Council in August 1992 for the allocation of territory between the two communities. The Secretary-General therefore called on the Turkish Cypriots to adjust their positions to those of the United Nations, and recommended confidence building measures that could be implemented immediately in order to improve the confidence level between the two sides.

The findings of the Secretary-General confirm what the government of Cyprus has said all along, that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots aim to legit-

imize the partition of Cyprus, as well as the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion, and to establish a Turkish protectorate over all of Cyprus. Boutros Ghali did not go far enough in any of his reports to the Council. Calling for goodwill by the Turkish Cypriots did not bring their positions any closer to those of the United Nations. He also failed to recommend sanctions against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots for violating the United Nations mandate.

President Clerides views the Secretary-General's set of ideas as a framework for negotiation but not as the basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem. He correctly argues that a Cyprus settlement must conform to the European Convention on Human Rights; that it must guarantee the rights of all Cypriots; and the Cypriot membership in the European Union will guarantee the security and well being of all Cypriots.

Cyprus has applied for membership in the European Union. Despite American and British objections, the European Commission ruled that Cyprus qualifies for membership, and that only the continuing deadlock in the search for a political solution stood in the way of Cypriot membership. The Commission will reexamine the Cypriot application after January 1995, if a political solution has not been found by then. The European Union has also appointed an observer to the U.N. sponsored talks, but Turkey and Mr. Denktash refuse to cooperate with the representative of the European Union.

In the Summer of 1993 in an attempt to break the deadlock in the negotiations, the Secretary-General proposed a package of confidence building measures linking the reopening of the city of Varosha with that of the Nicosia International Airport. The government of Cyprus accepted in principle discussions on these measures despite the risks they entailed for the unity and sovereignty of Cyprus. It also indicated that these measures are not a substitute for a solution of the Cyprus problem.

The United Nations sponsored proximity talks between the U.N. Special Representative, the president of Cyprus and Mr. Denktash, with the assistance of Ambassador Lamb, the American Special Coordinator on Cyprus. The objective of the proximity talks was the implementation of the CBM's at the shortest possible time. The Secretary-General and his team of experts presented these measures "without prejudice to the respective positions of both sides on the overall settlement" and indicated that the CBM's are not "an end in themselves" but a step toward an integrated solution of the Cyprus problem.

It is amazing that Boutros Ghali could make this statement. The CBM's do prejudice the final settlement by lifting all restrictive measures that have been taken by the government of Cyprus against the pseudostate created by the occupation army, a state that has been condemned as illegal by resolutions of the Security Council, the European Union, and other international bodies. The

CBM's, as proposed, provide Mr. Denktash the opportunity to legalize his state and to attain its de facto recognition by the international community.

The measures linking the reopening of the Nicosia International Airport with portions of the city of Varosha represent another concession to Turkey. In the past, United Nations resolutions called for the return of Varosha to its legitimate inhabitants without any linkage to other issues. Further, Mr. Denktash agreed to give priority to the reopening of this city in his 1979 agreement with the then president of Cyprus Spiros Kyprianou.

The CBM's, as proposed by Boutros Ghali, undermine the unity and sovereignty of Cyprus, and the standing of its internationally recognized government because: (1) they equate the internationally recognized government of Cyprus with the illegal regime of Mr. Denktash; (2) they would allow the application of laws in effect only prior to December 1, 1963, in areas under U.N. administration, that is laws that were in effect before the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government of the republic. However, legislation adopted by the legitimate government of Cyprus since December 1963, would not have any effect in areas under U.N. administration; (3) it would create special status areas not under the control of the government of Cyprus. These areas would be administered by the United Nations which will have full administrative powers, including the power to legislate, to tax, and to police these areas. This proposal had first been made in the late 1970's by Willy Brandt, and had been rejected at the time; and (4) would not protect Cyprus from the influx of new illegal settlers from Turkey, and would not distinguish between the illegal settlers and the native Turkish Cypriots. Under the CBM's as proposed, the illegal settlers would be able to conduct business and reside in Varosha, and move freely in and out of the occupied areas.

The Secretary-General, his team of experts, and the American Special Coordinator on Cyprus Ambassador Lamb, were optimistic that they could provide practical answers to every problem associated with the measures. In a series of "non-papers" containing new ideas and answers to the concerns expressed by the government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots, they pressed both sides to accept these measures. The CBM's represent the final act in the process of closing the book on Cyprus, given that the international community is unwilling to enforce the rule of law in the case of Cyprus. In the final analysis, the acceptance and implementation of the CBM's would legitimize the partition of Cyprus, extend economic benefits to the occupied areas, undermine the economy of the republic and the legal standing of its government. This would end all efforts for an integrated solution of the Cyprus problem. Turkey and Mr. Denktash will have no incentive to negotiate if they can attain the legal and economic benefits they have demanded since the 1974 invasion without any concessions. Needless to say that the proximity talks deadlocked in June 1994 because of Mr. Denktash's intransigence. The United States, assisted by

Boutros Ghali's representatives, has continued to press for the implementation of the CBM's under some form of compromise that would combine the CBM's with some new form of discussions for a comprehensive solution of the problem. The United States initiatives have been justified under Security Council resolution 939(1994).

One little noticed aspect of the report of the United Nations technical experts on the CBM's has to do with the size of the population of the occupied areas. Analyzing the bad state of the economy in the occupied areas and the benefits the CBM's will bring to the North, the report on page eleven states that 40,000 young educated Turkish Cypriots have left Cyprus since 1974. At that time the Turkish Cypriot population amounted to less than 120,000. The experts conclude that the population in the occupied areas is currently at 170,000. Even though this may not have been the intent of this report, it provides an official confirmation that nearly 80,000 illegal Turkish settlers have come to the occupied areas since 1974. Today, the Turkish Cypriots have become a minority in their own land, this time outnumbered by the settlers and the occupation army.

In December 1993, president Clerides, in an attempt to break the deadlock in the U.N. sponsored negotiations proposed a dramatic plan for the demilitarization of Cyprus. The plan called for the use of savings from defense spending for the economic development of the North and for supporting an expanded U.N. peace keeping force in Cyprus. It also called for the removal of the occupation forces and the demilitarization of all of Cyprus. Turkey and Mr. Denktash rejected this proposal.

These developments, the consequences of the Yugoslav crisis, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, have created a clear and present danger for Cyprus. Turkey has redefined its strategic role, and neither the United States nor the European Union appear willing to force Turkey to comply with the rule of law in the case of Cyprus. Instead, Turkey has been allowed to act as an honest broker in the Cyprus dispute even though its forces still occupy Cyprus, and Cyprus remains the only divided and occupied country of Europe.

Another consequence of the Balkan crisis has been the acceptance of the break up of multi-ethnic states, the acceptance of ethnic cleansing, and the promotion of confederal constitutional schemes. The European Union and the Clinton administration support the implementation of the Ghali set of ideas which would establish a loose confederation on Cyprus and would legitimize the outcome of Turkey's invasion, conquest, and ethnic cleansing. Mr. Denktash believes that time is on his side and, that in these circumstances, his pseudostate will be recognized by the West much as it happened in the case of the former Yugoslav republics.

Concluding Remarks

Peacemaking by the United Nations has been ineffective for a number of rea-

sons. First is the unwillingness of member nations to implement resolutions for which they voted in the General Assembly and/or the Security Council. It was only after the adoption of resolution 649(1990) that the United States has shown any interest in the implementation of selected resolutions on Cyprus, because these resolutions include objectives sought by the United States and Turkey on Cyprus. Second, because influential members of the United Nations, including both superpowers, often placed their strategic interests above those of a viable and functional solution of the Cyprus problem. The United States in particular undermined and opposed United Nations procedures when they did not serve American interests in the dispute. The third and foremost factor involves the policies of Turkey which, since the mid-1950's, has consistently advocated the partition of Cyprus. After 1974, Turkey has pursued this objective through the imposition of the outcome of the 1974 invasion, and through the confederal proposals that have been presented for the resolution of the dispute.

Earlier, the paper examined the objectives of the Cypriot policy of internationalization. This dynamic policy has kept the Cyprus issue in front of the international community despite the fact that the resolutions of the United Nations and of other regional organizations remain unimplemented. Cyprus may have had the ability to build a wide ranging international coalition, but neither Cyprus nor its allies had the political influence to reorder the policy priorities of the influential powers of the international community. In the final analysis, the implementation of United Nations resolutions is a political and not a legal issue. Cyprus may have won the moral victory in various international fora, but realpolitik considerations of influential actors carried the day.

The shifting balance of power at the United Nations and the Secretary-General's willingness to promote objectives other than those of the pre-1990 resolutions on Cyprus, and to downgrade the positions adopted by other regional organizations, undermined the credibility of the United Nations. It also placed the government of Cyprus in an unenviable position. Having committed itself to the good-offices of the Secretary-General, to the implementation of United Nations resolutions, and to the need for the active involvement of the United States in the resolution of the Cyprus problem, the government of Cyprus found it impossible to reject the efforts of the United States and the United Nations. Consequently, in a series of compromises, successive Cypriot governments accepted principles that negated key United Nations resolutions.

This course of events could not have been predicted by the government of Cyprus. Earlier governments, unwittingly and under the pressures and consequences of the 1974 invasion and the promises of the United States to assist in bringing negotiating flexibility in Turkey's positions, entered into the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements which have been used to undermine the pre-1990 United Nations resolutions on Cyprus.

Twenty years have passed since the Turkish invasion and continued occupa-

tion of nearly 38% of Cyprus, twenty years marked by Greek Cypriot concessions and negotiating deadlock. Are there any unexplored options still available for the government of Cyprus that may help break the cycle of concessions and deadlock? There are no indications of a substantive change in American policy, nor is there any evidence that Russia's suggestions of a Security Council sponsored international conference will provide a viable negotiating alternative, unless the influential members of the Security Council and of the European Union change their policy as to what constitutes a viable settlement of the problem. Cyprus must not get involved in another round of negotiations and concessions if it is to avoid sanctioning its own partition. Cyprus must have the courage to redefine its negotiating positions from a zero base. The search for a peaceful solution must continue; it must involve Turkey, and must begin with the premise that all concessions made to date by the government of Cyprus are null and void. The concessions made since 1974 were made in anticipation of reciprocity by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Instead, their response has been unilateral actions, such as the 1983 UDI of Denktash's pseudostate, and demands for legitimizing this breakaway state.

The active involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus problem must be encouraged. All Cypriots can benefit from membership in the European Union, which can resolve issues such as the three freedoms, etc. But the temptation of membership in the European Union should not hide the seriousness of the British opposition and the risk of the indirect acceptance of the partition of Cyprus, if only the free areas are brought into the Union.

The Cyprus problem represents a classic example of the interplay of domestic and international politics. In respect to the latter, politico-strategic considerations affected the Cyprus problem from its genesis, as well as the involvement of the United Nations in this perpetuated dispute. The demise of the Cold War and the emergence of the so-called "new world order" appear not to have changed any of these conditions. On the contrary, the "new world order" may spell the end of the republic of Cyprus as we have known it.

NOTES

1. Great Britain, **Conference on Cyprus, Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House on 19th February 1959**, London: HMSO, 1959, Cmnd. 679.
2. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Analysis of the Cyprus Agreements," **Intelligence Report No. 8047**, July 14, 1959.
3. Thomas Ehrlich, "Cyprus-The Warlike Isle: Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis," **Stanford Law Review**, Vol. XVIII, May 1966, pp. 1021-1098. Stanley Kyriakides, **Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government**, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968.
4. Glafkos Clerides, **My Deposition**, 3 vols., Nicosia: Alithia Publishing Co., 1989-1992. Michael Dekleris, **Kypriako, 1972-1974: He Teleftaia Efkairia**, Athens: by the author, 1981. Polyvios Polyviou, **Cyprus in Search of a Constitution-Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals 1960-1975**, Nicosia: Nicolaou and Sons, Ltd., 1976.
5. Van Coufoudakis, "U.S. Foreign policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation," **Millenium, Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1976-77, pp. 245-268.
6. Glafkos Clerides, **op. cit.**, Vol. II (Greek edition), pp. 347-359.
7. Estimated to be at least 80 000 by 1993.
8. Van Coufoudakis, "Cyprus and the European Convention of Human Rights: The Law and Politics of Cyprus v. Turkey, Applications 6780/74 and 6950/75," **Human Rights Quarterly**, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1982, pp. 451-473, 497-507.
9. For the text see Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, **Cyprus Intercommunal Talks** (Nicosia: PIO, 1979), p. 23.
10. Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, **Cyprus Intercommunal Talks**, pp. 40-41.
11. Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, **ibid.**, pp. 62-65. "ABC" stood for American, British, Canadian, i.e. the three sponsors of the proposals. It was also known as the Nimetz plan because it was presented to the parties by Matthew Nimetz, the Counsellor of the U.S. Department of State.
12. For the text of these resolutionsn see Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, **Resolutions Adopted by the United Nations on the Cyprus Problem 1964-1990**, Nicosia: PIO, 1990.
13. Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., **International Organizations in their Legal Setting** (Minneapolis: West Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 403-405.
14. This was manifested in the Namibia case following the 1962 ICJ decision and the adoption of various resolutions terminating South Africa's Namibian mandate.
15. S/24472, 21 August 1992, and annex.

DOCUMENT

LA POLITIQUE CANADIENNE SUR LA QUESTION CHYPRIOTE



The Secretary of State for External Affairs

Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

Le 19 avril 1993

M. Stéphanos Constantinides
Comité Canadien Justice pour Chypre
C. P. 382 Succursale Outremont
Outremont (Québec)
H2V 4N3

Cher Monsieur,

Merci pour votre courrier du 29 novembre 1992 au sujet de la décision du Canada de retirer ses troupes de la Force de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies à Chypre (UNFICYP). Vous voudrez bien excuser le retard à répondre à votre lettre.

Le gouvernement du Canada a informé le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, le 11 décembre 1992, que le contingent canadien de maintien de la paix serait retiré de UNFICYP à compter du milieu de 1993. Cette décision a été prise en prévision du changement de mandat souhaité par le Secrétaire général pour la Force, qu'il y ait ou non accord politique.

Avant d'arriver à cette décision, j'ai procédé à un examen exhaustif de la situation; j'ai consulté notamment le Président George Vassiliou, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, les ministres des Affaires étrangères de Chypre, de Grèce et de Turquie, ainsi que des représentants d'autres nations intéressées. Je regrette n'avoir pu m'entretenir avec le chef de la communauté chypriote turque, Rauf Denktaş, car je crois que notre rencontre aurait été constructive. Cet examen a abouti à la conclusion que, malheureusement, la possibilité d'un règlement

faillait-il maintenir nos forces à Chypre pendant une période indéterminée? Comme vous le savez, le Canada fait partie d'UNFICYP depuis déjà 28 ans. Étant donné la faible chance de progrès et la demande croissante pour des forces de maintien de la paix ailleurs dans le monde, il nous est apparu difficile de maintenir indéfiniment notre présence à Chypre. Il ne s'agit pas d'un geste précipité puisque nous avons consulté les intéressés et que nous avons accordé un délai de six mois aux Nations Unies pour procéder aux ajustements rendus nécessaires par notre retrait.

Entre-temps, le Canada adhère totalement aux efforts déployés par le Secrétaire général pour amener les deux communautés de l'île à conclure un accord. Je déplore sincèrement que les parties ne soient pas parvenues à régler leur différend au cours de la dernière ronde de négociation tenue en octobre 1992. Le Canada continuera, conjointement avec le Secrétaire général et d'autres responsables, à encourager le Président Clerides et M. Danktaş à aborder les prochaines négociations dans un esprit positif et constructif.

Veuillez agréer, Cher Monsieur, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

Barbara McDougall