

The Imia Files - Dossier d'une crise

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Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Talking Points Concerning Unilateral Turkish Claims to the Imia Rocks

Introduction

International treaties and agreements, dating back to 1923, establish unequivocally that the Imia rocky islets constitute an integral part of Greek sovereign territory.

The fact that the tension caused by the recent Turkish claims to the Imia rocks did not erupt into immediate conflict does not in the least mean that the danger has receded. On the contrary, Turkey, through its former Prime Minister's explicit threat to use military force against Greece, continues to press claims that are unfounded both in international law and in the established practice of civilized relations among nations.

This recent crisis was particularly serious because Turkey's principal argument establishing its claim to these islets is that the International Treaties that set down the territorial status of the southeastern Aegean are not necessarily binding on Turkey. By questioning the sovereignty of the Imia rocks Turkey thus seeks to overthrow the territorial status of the entire region.

At the same time, Turkey has consistently refused to support the assertions it has suddenly put forward through peaceful and legal avenues, by bringing them to the International Court of Justice, as both Greece, a number of European Union countries, and the United States have repeatedly suggested.

As will be seen in greater detail in the following paragraphs, the Imia rocks have been under Greek sovereignty since the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty with Italy in 1947. For half a century Turkey did not raise any questions concerning the status of the islets and rocks. Unfortunately, the reason she does so now falls within the well-documented pattern of illegal Turkish intentions and actions over the past twenty years.

More specifically, in 1974, Turkey invaded and occupied Cyprus in defiance of international law and in the face of the indignation of the international community, as expressed in numerous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

At the same time, she turned her sights to the rest of the Aegean, by setting up the so-called «Army of the Aegean,» a overtly offensive military force equipped with the largest fleet of landing craft in the Mediterranean. Turkey also raised

claims against Greek sovereign rights concerning the continental shelf, control of the air space of the area, as well as Greece's right, as established in international law, to extend her territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. (n.m.)

In June of last year, the Turkish Parliament passed an unprecedented resolution authorizing the Turkish government to use all means, including military ones, should Greece exercise her legitimate rights concerning the extension of its territorial waters.

Turkey also challenges Greece's national air space, backing up its claims by frequent and at times massive violations of the air space by its military aircraft.

Unfortunately, the threat of the use of military force seems to be an integral part of Turkish foreign policy. Just as in the case of the territorial waters, during the Imia incident Turkey brandished the threat of war in order to impose her objectives, declaring that any attempt to question self-proclaimed «Turkish sovereignty» would constitute a *casus belli*.

These actions, encouraged - at least initially - by the lack of any firm reaction on the part of the international community, have now been proven to be part of Turkey's design to question Greece's internationally established rights in the Aegean, and to usurp sovereignty of at least half of the Aegean, by officially rejecting the established legal status quo.

If Turkey's attempts to question the binding force of international agreements were valid, then the majority of the treaties regulating international frontiers after the First and Second World Wars would collapse.

The Crisis

On the 25th of December 1995, the Turkish Cargo boat «Figen Akat» ran aground on one of the Imia rocks, situated 2,5 miles from the Greek island of Kalolimnos. Although the accident occurred in Greek territorial waters, the captain of the «Figen Akat» refused assistance from the competent Greek authorities, claiming that he was within Turkish territorial waters. Despite assurances to the contrary, the captain sought assistance from the Turkish authorities.

Finally, in agreement with the Turkish company that owned the ship, the «Figen Akat» was set free with the aid of a Greek tug boat, owned by the company Matsas Star, and towed to the Turkish port of Gulluk.

On the 29th of December, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed a Verbal Note to the Embassy of Greece in Ankara, asserting for the first time that Imia constitutes a part of Turkish territory, as it was registered in the land registry of the Turkish province of Mugla. It should be noted that this was the first time that Turkey openly laid claims over actual Greek territory.

In response to Turkey's claims, on the 10th of January 1996, the Greek

Embassy addressed a Verbal Note to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that Note the Turkish claim to the islets was rejected. The Note underlined the fact that Turkey had reaffirmed Imia as belonging to Italy by virtue of a bilateral agreement signed between the two countries in 1932, and that the islets were subsequently ceded to Greece with the rest of the Dodecanese island chain by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.

Turkey then addressed a second Verbal Note to Greece on the 29th of January 1996, wherein the initial claim was repeated and extended with the request for negotiations concerning the status of all the islands, islets and rocks whose status, according to Turkey, is not well determined.

In response Greece addressed a Verbal Note to Turkey on February 16, 1996. In that Note Greece presented international legal documents and other facts establishing unequivocally the territorial status of all islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean. Greece emphasized that no country, including Turkey, had ever challenged that status in the past. The Note concluded that, as is only natural, Greece would not negotiate with Turkey matters pertaining to its territorial sovereignty as established by international law and treaties.

The tension over Imia began to escalate on the 27th of January, when Turkish journalists from the newspaper *Hurriyet* took down the Greek flag from the larger of the two Imia islets and raised the Turkish one. On the 28th of January, a Greek navy detachment replaced the Greek flag.

Initially, there were no naval units in the area except one Greek unit and a Turkish torpedo boat. On January 30, however, Turkey sent several ships to the area, prompting Greece to send an equal number. A Turkish frigate violated Greek territorial waters targeting a Greek gunboat that was patrolling the area. A Turkish helicopter taking off from one of the Turkish frigates flew over the Imia rocks. At the same time, Turkish warplanes repeatedly violated Greek air space.

The tension reached its peak in the early morning hours of January 31, when the Turkish army landed some men on the smaller of the Imia rocks. An American mediation effort had already been initiated by means of repeated telephone contacts between President Clinton and Prime Minister Simitis, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Under Secretary Holbrooke with Foreign Minister Pangalos, and the Ministers of Defense Arsenis and Perry.

After a special session of the Government's National Security Council in the early hours of January 31, the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs announced that an understanding had been reached by means of American mediation. Both sides would withdraw their forces from the area of Imia and the situation would return to its previous condition (the «status quo ante»).

The Legal Status of Imia

The Imia islets lie at a distance of 1.9 nautical miles from the Greek island of Kalolimnos, 5.3 n.m. from the Greek island of Kalymnos, 3.65 n.m. from the Turkish coast and 2.3 n.m. from the Turkish island of Cavus (formerly Kato). Like the rest of the Dodecanese island chain, they were ceded to Italy by virtue of article 15 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923.

At least three international agreements establish unambiguously Greece's ownership of Imia.

The first is the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, which limits Turkish sovereignty - with the exception of Imbros, Tenedos and the Rabbit islands - explicitly only over islands lying within a three-mile limit off the Turkish coast (Article 12). As noted above, however, the Imia islets are 3.65 n.m. off the Turkish coast.

Under Article 16 of the same Peace Treaty, Turkey «renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.»

The second is the January 4, 1932 Agreement between Italy and Turkey and its supplementary agreement of December 28, 1932. More specifically, the January 4 Agreement set down with precision the maritime frontier between the island of Castellorizo and the Turkish coast. The day this Agreement was signed, the two parties exchanged official letters by which they mutually asserted that there was no difference between them as to their respective territorial sovereignty, and called for a joint Italo-Turkish technical committee to be set up for the purpose of precisely delimiting the rest of the maritime boundary between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast.

In accordance with this Agreement, the representatives of Italy and Turkey signed in Ankara, on December 28, 1932, a supplementary agreement by which the rest of the maritime frontier between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast was precisely delimited. The agreement fixes 37 pairs of reference points between which the maritime boundary dividing Turkish and Italian territory (which, at the time, included the Aegean Dodecanese islands) was drawn.

Point 30 of this agreement states that the maritime frontier north of Kalymnos will pass at a median distance between the Imia rocks (on the Italian side) and Kato island (on the Turkish side). Thus, Italian sovereignty over Imia is confirmed by the explicit reference made to them in the text itself.

The third international agreement was the Paris Treaty of 1947, signed between Italy and the Allied Powers after the conclusion of World War II. In that treaty Italy ceded the Dodecanese islands and all adjacent islets to Greece. As it is well known, under international law, the successor state automatically

assumes all the rights and obligations that have been established by international treaty between the initial possessor state and every third party (in this case, between Italy and Turkey).

The Reaction of the European Parliament

The European Parliament, on February 15, 1996, adopted a resolution entitled «On the Provocative Actions and Contestation of Sovereign Rights by Turkey Against a Member State of the Union» by an overwhelming 342 to 21 majority. In that resolution the Parliament found that «the islet of Imia belongs to the Dodecanese group of islands» pursuant to the 1923, 1932 and 1947 treaties. The Parliament also condemned «the dangerous violation by Turkey of the sovereign rights of Greece,» and called on Turkey to comply «with international treaties» and to abstain from non-peaceful actions or threats of such actions.

It should be noted that the Parliament, a few months earlier, had ratified the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU. It should further be noted that the Common Position of the Council, set out at the EU-Turkey Association Council meeting of March 6, 1995, stated that it was «of paramount importance to encourage good neighborly relations between Turkey and its neighboring Member States of the EU.» The Parliament, in its February 16, 1996 resolution, emphasized that «these privileged relations between the Union and Turkey should automatically preclude any military aggression.»

The International Court of Justice

After the crisis, the U.S. administration suggested that Turkey's Imia claims be taken for peaceful resolution to the International Court of Justice.

Similarly, on February 26, 1996, the Italian Presidency of the European Union issued the summary of discussions that took place that day among the EU's fifteen Foreign Ministers on the issue of Imia. In that announcement the Presidency, among other things, emphasized that «territorial disputes must be resolved only through recourse to Law, that is to say, by the International Court of Justice.»

Turkey immediately turned down both appeals. In contrast, from the beginning of the crisis Greece has stated that it would consider such an adjudication should Turkey, which is the party raising the territorial claims in the present instance, where to apply to the Court.

It should be noted that, unlike Greece, Turkey has not yet accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

Turkey's Legal Assertions

The principal argument on which Turkey bases its claim is the assertion that the

legal procedures of the agreement of December 1932 were not completed and that it was not registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

However, the December Agreement was supplementary to that of January, which set the maritime frontier between Castellorizo and the Turkish coast and settled an issue concerning the sovereignty of some islets around Castellorizo, over which there was a difference of opinion between the two sides. The December agreement did not aim at settling any territorial difference between the two countries, as was stated both in the text of the agreement itself and in the letters exchanged on the 4th of January 1932, between the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the then Italian Ambassador in Ankara, by which the two parties declared that there existed no difference as to the territorial sovereignty of each side. The December agreement merely sets with precision the remaining maritime frontier between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast. For this reason it did not need separate registration with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. It is thus not surprising that the delimitation of the frontier set by this agreement was never in the past contested by Turkey or Italy, even after the Dodecanese was ceded to Greece.

Turkey has further asserted that Greece allegedly had doubts, at the time of the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, concerning the validity of the 1932 agreements. This Turkish argument is unfounded both in law and in fact. As noted above, according to international law, the successor state succeeds to all rights and obligations established by international treaties between the original possessor state and any third party. Greece had no doubt as to the validity of the aforementioned agreements nor had Turkey or Italy, since they both immediately implemented the provisions of the Agreement and abided by them thereafter. There is clearly no need for any confirmation of the validity of any treaty regulating the status of the ceded territories.

This is further evidenced by other international agreements and maps of the immediate post World-War period, according to which this delimitation is officially recognized by Turkey as its frontier line with Greece. To mention just two, there is the map attached to the 1950 ICAO Regional Agreement adopted by the Council of the Organization, and also the official Turkish map included in the 1953 edition of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Navigation through the Straits.

Furthermore, not only Greece and Turkish maps, but also official maps of other countries such as the United States and Italy include the Imia rocks within Greek national territory.

Finally, the fact that both Greece and Turkey considered the agreements of 1932 as valid, is shown by the fact that Greece was the country that exercised sovereign rights over the Imia islets all this time without Turkey ever raising any protest. The Greek Geographic Service repeatedly visited the Imia islets

and used a trigonometric marker on the larger rock which it had installed for its purposes, Greek fishermen fished regularly in the waters surrounding these islets, and Greek shepherds are the owners of the goats that graze on the islets. Finally environmental activities both by Greece and the European Union were carried out on the Imia rocks since 1984.

Most recently, through a written statement in mid-March 1996, Turkey asserted that, in the case of the Aegean, it abides only by those international agreements that it itself considers valid, and then only by those that both it and Greece have signed.

In other words, Turkey indirectly denied the binding power of the Italian-Turkish agreement of 1932 (which reaffirmed Italy's sovereignty over Imia, among other islands and islets) and of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 (in which Italy, in turn, ceded the Dodecanese islands and all adjacent islets to Greece). Thus, for the first time, Turkey questioned Greek sovereignty not just over Imia, but over all the Dodecanese islands.

Political Aspects of the Dispute

From the outset of the Imia crisis Greece has asked the Turkish government to affirm officially and unequivocally its adherence to three fundamental principles that guide relations among all civilized nations: that it respects international law and treaties; that it condemns the use of force or the threat of such use in relations between nations; and that the country raising novel territorial claims - in this case, Turkey - must seek their resolution by peaceful means, under international law, at the International Court of Justice.

Among world nations today, these principles are self-evident. Any country that finds it difficult to state its unequivocal acceptance of them is a country that questions the very basis upon which peaceful relations among nations are built.

Unfortunately, in the past two months Turkey has consistently refused to make even these minimal and self-evident commitments. Its refusal persisted in the face of constant efforts by a number of Greece's European Union partners, as well as the United States, urging Turkey to do just that. On March 25, 1996, the Turkish government refused to commit itself to similar principles, which had previously been incorporated in the draft Common Position of the EU Foreign Ministers. As a consequence, the Council of Ministers had to postpone for the near future the scheduled EU-Turkey Association Council.

Recognizing the paucity of its legal arguments, Turkey has recently claimed that the matter (as well as other legal claims that Turkey unilaterally raises against Greek sovereignty) should be settled through negotiations. It goes without saying that all legitimate differences should be settled through dialogue. Greece has repeatedly invited Turkey to a sincere dialogue over the

strengthening of the economic and cultural ties between the two countries. It has also invited Turkey to negotiations over the drafting of a compromise for the submittal of the two countries' differences over the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice.

Turkey has refused both of these proposals. Instead, in the case of Imia, it wishes to coerce Greece into bilateral negotiations over Greek sovereign rights, under the specter of the use of force. No civilized nation would willingly submit to such a process, let alone to the open disregard of international law, and neither will Greece. As seen above, the territorial status of the islets and rocks is absolutely clear, and Turkey herself - understandably - never challenged it in the past.

Unfortunately, Turkey's proposal appears to be nothing more than a thinly-veiled attempt to legitimize in the eyes of the international community an otherwise insupportable claim of sovereignty over territory that belongs to another sovereign nation. Indeed, when one compares Turkey's proposal for dialogue with the belligerent declarations made by former Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller in the aftermath of the Imia crisis - i.e., that 1,000 islands in the Aegean are Turkish (she later raised that figure to 3,000, which is roughly the total number of islands in the area) - Turkey's real intentions become even more obvious. The former Turkish Prime Minister added that any attempt on the part of Greece to challenge her assessment would be a *casus belli*. This second threat of war comes at the heels of the Turkish Parliament's aforementioned resolution concerning the extension of Greece's territorial waters.

By challenging Greece's internationally recognized frontiers, and by using the threat of force to do so, Turkey violates the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and respect for international frontiers, which, as a signatory to the Charter of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, it has pledged to respect. In so doing, Turkey establishes itself as a real and direct threat to the peace and stability of the area and, in consequence, of Europe. If allowed to continue unchallenged, this will create an extremely dangerous precedent for all those countries that, for one reason or another, consider that the present borders of Europe are unjust.

Greece, perhaps more than any other nation, wishes to have as its neighbor a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Turkey. The absence of these factors can divert the imagination of some leaders to dangerous foreign policy adventures, as the Imia case illustrates. Greece wishes to develop friendly and peaceful relations with Turkey, and it will keep striving to achieve them in spite of any problems that may at times appear to block the way to friendship.

At the same time, neither Greece nor the international community can afford the destabilization of the Aegean region through the continuation or the encouragement of Turkey's illegal claims.

Greece, on its part, will continue to defend the principles of international law, respect for established borders, and the peaceful coexistence among nations both with respect to Turkey and with respect to all other countries in the region.

La position de la Turquie

*Le différend relatif aux rochers de Kardak en mer Égée entre la Turquie et la Grèce**

Les activités de sauvetage déployées en vue de sauver le bateau "Figen Akat" échoué sur les rochers de Kardak le 25 décembre 1995, au large de Rodrum en mer Égée, ont abouti à des revendications inacceptables de la Grèce sur l'appartenance de ces rochers, et constitué un différend sérieux entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

Cet accident maritime, survenu il y a plus d'un mois, d'une façon tout à fait hasardeuse, a fait l'objet de démarches diplomatiques successives entre les autorités compétentes des deux pays jusqu'à ce que ce problème soit dévoilé à la presse grecque le 20 janvier 1996.

Le gouvernement turc regrette cette divulgation qui a de nouveau fait surgir le problème de la délimitation des frontières maritimes entre les deux pays et a malheureusement débouché à ce brusque regain de tension entre les deux pays.

Le gouvernement turc est convaincu que les rochers de Kardak se trouvent sous la souveraineté turque. Mis à part toute référence aux arguments et documents légaux y afférents de nature à confirmer cette souveraineté, il est à souligner que les pêcheurs turcs ainsi que les bateaux commerciaux et touristiques turcs ont toujours pu mener librement leurs activités autour de ces rochers sans aucun empêchement jusqu'à l'éclatement de ce problème.

Le gouvernement turc croit fermement, face aux revendications grecques inacceptables et sans fondement légal d'appartenance sur ces rochers, qu'une issue à ce différend ne pourrait être trouvée que par la voie de négociations diplomatiques.

La Grèce essaie de faire dépendre ses revendications de souveraineté sur Kardak sur les accords turco-italiens de 1932 et prétend avoir hérité le droit italien découlant desdits traités.

Le Traité italo-turc du 4 janvier 1931 et le traité du 28 décembre 1932 concernant la possession des petites îles du Sud-Ouest de la mer Égée et la délimitation des eaux territoriales dans la région ont été négociées dans le contexte de la situation politique particulière précédant l'ère de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

Le premier accord ne concerne pas les Rochers de Kardak (Imia). Une référence a été faite aux Rochers de Kardak dans le Protocole de Décembre 1932. Cependant, les procédures légales à l'égard du Protocole de 1932 n'ont jamais été complétées. Elles n'ont pas non plus été enregistrées par la Société

*Source: Ambassade de Turquie en France. Paris le 30 janvier 1996

des Nations. En d'autres termes, un document légal valable n'existe pas dans ce domaine.

De plus, la proposition grecque se référant aux deux documents sus-mentionnés qui avait été soumise aux négociations du Traité de paix de Paris en 1947 n'avait pas été acceptée, et de plus aucune référence s'y rapportant n'avait été incluse dans le texte dudit Traité.

Le fait que la Grèce ait entrepris une démarche auprès du gouvernement turc en 1950 et encore une autre en 1953 consistant à proposer la tenue des pourparlers en vue d'aboutir à l'échange de lettres entre les deux gouvernements qui attesteraient la validité de ces deux documents aussi bien pour la Turquie et la Grèce démontre clairement que la Grèce elle-même portait des doutes concernant la validité des deux documents de 1932 sus-cités.

Le seul document légal auquel on peut se référer concernant les îles du Dodécannèse est le Traité de Paris de 1947. Ce traité stipule dans son article 14.1 que l'Italie a cédé à la Grèce les îles du Dodécannèse et les énumère une par une en citant leur nom. Le même article inclut aussi "le îlots adjacents" à ceux qui sont nommément cités.

Les rochers de Kardak situé à 5,5 milles nautiques de l'île grecque la plus proche ne peuvent être définis ni comme adjacents ni considérés en terme d'îlots. Les centaines d'îles qui parsèment la mer Égée se divisent par ordre de taille décroissant en îles, îlots et rochers. Dans ce contexte, les rochers de Kardak qui sont situés à 3,8 milles nautiques de la côte turque appartiennent à la Turquie et le défi grec envers la souveraineté nationale de la Turquie ne peut être soutenu par le droit international.

De surcroît, en cherchant à évoquer un article d'un traité quelconque pour assumer les droits, l'on devrait également remplir en bonne foi les obligations qui en découlent. Dans cet ordre d'idées, il faut signaler que l'article 14.2 du Traité de paix de Paris de 1947 stipule clairement et sans équivoque que les îles du Dodécannèse devraient être et rester démilitarisées. Or, la Grèce continue de violer cette disposition.

(...)

En considération de ce qui précède, la Turquie ne peut en aucun cas accepter les revendications de la Grèce relatives au problème concernant les rochers de Kardak. Il est évident que la Grèce tente d'étendre sa souveraineté nationale sur des îles au-delà de celles qui lui ont été cédées par le Traité de paix de Lausanne de 1923 et le Traité de paix de Paris de 1947. La remise en cause grecque de la souveraineté turque sur les rochers Kardak ne peut être justifiée devant la loi internationale.

A la lumière de ce qui précède, il est évident que la possession d'autres petites îles, des îlots ou des rochers de l'Égée dont le statut n'a pas encore été clairement défini par des documents internationaux doit être déterminée par un accord. En conséquence, la tentative par la Grèce d'habiter les petites îles, îlots

ou rochers en question d'une manière artificielle et démonstrative ne peut en aucun cas créer des conséquences légales concernant leur statut.

Le gouvernement turc est prêt à entamer des négociations avec la Grèce dans le but de déterminer la possession des petites îles, îlots ou rochers de la mer Égée. A l'issue de telles négociations, le problème de la délimitation des eaux territoriales peut également faire l'objet de discussions. De ce fait, la Turquie suggère que les parties s'abstiennent de poser des actes unilatéraux qui pourraient aggraver la situation dans la région.

European Parliament

Adopted by a vote of 342 for, 21 against, 11 abstentions on February 15, 1996 on the provocative actions and contestation of sovereign rights by Turkey against a Member State of the Union

The European Parliament

A. having regard to Turkey's provocative military operations in relation to the isle of Imia in the Eastern Aegean,

B. concerned about the dangers of over-reaction if this dispute continues,

C. having regard to Turkey's official statements making territorial claims and contesting the sovereign rights of an EU Member State,

D. whereas the islet of Imia belongs to the Dodecanese group of islands, on the basis of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Protocol between Italy and Turkey of 1932 and the Paris Treaty of 1947, and whereas even on Turkish maps from the 1960s, these islets are shown as Greek territory,

E. whereas this action by Turkey forms part of a broader policy of questioning the status quo in the Aegean,

F. having regard to the common position of the Council set out at the association Council meeting of 6 March 1995 which considered it of paramount importance to encourage good-neighbourly relations between Turkey and its neighboring Member States of the EU, and whereas these privileged relations between the Union and Turkey should automatically preclude any military aggression,

1. Gravely concerned by the dangerous violation by Turkey of sovereign rights of Greece, a Member State of the European Union and by the build-up of military tension in the Aegean;

2. Deplores the fact that Greece and Turkey appeared to be on the brink of hostilities and calls for an immediate stop to all actions which endanger peace and stability in this area;

3. Stresses that Greece's borders are also part of the external borders of the European Union;

4. Calls for compliance by Turkey with international treaties, and in particular the OSCE, which insists that all disputes be settled by peaceful means in accordance with international law;

5. Deplores the failure of the European Union and its Member States in this crisis, to take effective action within the framework of the common foreign and security policy;

6. Calls on the Council to take appropriate initiatives for the amelioration of the relations between Greece and Turkey;

7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Government of Turkey, the Parliament of Greece and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.