

Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis*

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article pose la question de l'évolution de la discipline des relations internationales en Grèce et de son influence sur la politique extérieure du pays. L'auteur s'efforce de montrer les rapports dialectiques entre la théorie et la praxis, entre les hommes politiques et la communauté académique dans le débat sur l'orientation de la politique extérieure hellénique.

Deux influences majeures se manifestent dans ce débat: l'une provient des diverses théories des relations internationales, tardivement introduites en Grèce - et mal assimilées dans certains cas -, et l'autre résulte des péripéties historiques et des particularités socio-culturelles du pays.

Bien que les relations internationales constituent une discipline nouvelle, introduite dans les universités grecques seulement après 1974, on est en mesure de déceler une série de problématiques soulevées dans le débat en cours, ainsi que leur lien étroit avec la pratique et l'étude empirique de la politique étrangère de la Grèce.

ABSTRACT

This paper presents the evolution of the field of international relations in Greece and its subsequent influence on the country's foreign policy. The author tries to demonstrate the existence of a dialectical relationship between theory and praxis, between the politicians and the academia on the formulation of Greek foreign policy.

Two major influences-currents emerge: one originates from the various schools of international relations introduced late in Greece -and not well assimilated in some instances- and the other is the result of the historical episodes and socio-cultural characteristics of the country.

Even though international relations constitute a new field, introduced in Hellenic universities only after 1974, we can detect a series of problematics raised in the current debate and their close link with the practice and empirical study of Greece's foreign policy.

I. Introduction

The current state in the theory of international relations in Greece is undoubtedly in an embryonic situation. Greek scholars in this field are usually limited to empirical studies based on history or international law. Systematic research, theoretically founded, is just at its beginning as studies in the field have generally been confined to a descriptive account of events.

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This situation in the country that gave us Thucydides, the father and first theorist of international relations, constitutes somewhat of a paradox. There is, however, an explanation.

Indeed the field of international relations in Greece was introduced as a subject for teaching in the universities only after 1974; i.e., more than half a century behind the USA and a generation behind the Western European countries¹.

A few efforts in teaching international relations were made before 1974 in diplomatic history and international law. Yet it was only after 1974 that any real development in the field of social sciences took place². Sociology and political science were introduced in universities and international relations also, became a regularly taught subject.

It was inevitable under these circumstances that this new field of study has been developed under conditions of theoretical confusion. The scholars of the new discipline came from different backgrounds, having studied or taught abroad in different countries. They brought the experience of those countries with them. Furthermore, they had different academic backgrounds; i.e., some of them had completed their first university degree in law, history or economics. Since there was no Greek tradition of international relations as a discipline, they tried to build one, each scholar contributing according to his background and foreign tradition.

As a result, there were two basic orientations seeking to influence the establishment of a Greek tradition in the field of international relations. The first orientation, the Anglo-Saxon, originated essentially in the USA. The second, the European was imported essentially from France and Germany. To these two main influences, we must add a third, the influence of the Greek diaspora. Scholars of Greek origin abroad had fruitful exchanges with their colleagues in the 'homeland' and exercised an important influence on the foundation of the discipline in Greece.

The theoretical trends in each of the above orientations are numerous but generally not clear. However they may be divided into two streams: the first stream is linked with international theoretical approaches; the second, with the 'ideologico-political' realities of the country.

It is therefore possible, even though the theoretical work in the field is in an embryonic state, to try to tease out some trends in the discipline of international relations in Greece and particularly to link its theoretical orientation with practical applications. Especially in recent years, as we witness a confrontation between opposing theoretical approaches, there are sometimes more efforts to justify the choices of Greek foreign policy *a posteriori*.

II. The Influence of the International Theories

If we follow the American model, we can say that the two schools of thought in Greece regarding the orientation of the study of international relations are now realism and idealism.

From a European perspective, we can perceive three schools of thought and analysis: the classic-realist paradigm, the idealist-transnationalist-interdependence paradigm and the Marxist-dependency paradigm with its various trends³. Let us discuss each one.

1. The Realist School of Thought

It is well known that the realist school of thought in International Relations can be traced back to the Greek historian Thucydides and through the classical political philosophers to Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz. Among the contemporary theorists of realism, one must mention Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron; and among neo-realists: Kenneth Waltz and Barry Buzan⁴. The main assumptions of this school are the importance granted to the state as the central actor in world politics, the importance of the concept of nation-state and balance of power. Realist theorists are also interested in the concept of national interest as the focus of international affairs. Furthermore, the international system is one of structural anarchy and conflict and the action of states is motivated by a search for power, survival and security.

Many scholars of international relations in Greece have been strongly influenced by the realist school. Nevertheless, this influence is not always clear and is not often acknowledged.

What brings Greek scholars close to the realist problematic is undoubtedly nationalism. In a country with major problems from what is seen as the threat of Turkish expansionism, and an unstable Balkan region, nationalism is a kind of ideological defense.

Beyond that, we can not trace a real theoretical development of realism in Greece nor speak of a genuine theorist in the field but only of an effort to apply realist theory in different case studies.

2. The Transnational School of Interdependence

This school of thought appeared in reaction to realism. Against the concept of the State, the transnationalists have put the community of citizens and a world without boundaries. We find its origin in Stoicism and later in Christianity. Liberalism has completed this vision of the world as a metaphor of the free market.

Scientific and technical progress, the birth of the global village, transnational human contacts, globalization of the market economy, all have given rise to complex interdependence and have reinforced this school which is looking for answers on international affairs beyond the nation-state, in political, social and economic linkages. These transnational linkages led to the emergence of new non-state actors in international affairs, e.g. international organizations and multinational corporations, as well as to values that transcend those of the nation-state.

This idealistic approach to international problems is also present in the emphasis on international law and morality rather than power politics. The influence of Kant and Grotius, the great optimists, is also very present in the transnationalist theory, notably in their idealistic conception of international law as a substitute for war.

More recently, American scholars, Robert O'Keohane, Joseph Nye, James Rosenau and Richard Cooper, as well as the French scholar Marcel Merle and the German scholar Karl Kaiser⁵ have come to the forefront as the main figures of this school.

Their ideas were introduced to Greece by jurists and 'modernists' who favoured the integration of Greece into Europe. The former insisted on the importance of international law as a guide for the Greek foreign policy, the latter consider European linkage as the way to face threats from Turkey and resolve difficulties with Balkan neighbours.

Nevertheless scholars of this orientation have not really developed a consistent way of thinking other than their attachment to Europe and their opposition to nationalism.

3. The Marxist-Dependency School

Classic Marxism doesn't really treat international problems, but as a theory it offers patterns of analysis in this area, since class values and interests transcend those of nations. Lenin with his book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, introduced a theoretical approach based on economic factors.

Rosa Luxembourgh and the neo-Marxists continued in the same direction, so the concept of imperialism and dependency became central to their analysis of international relations. Furthermore the ideas of the Centre and Periphery have also been introduced by neo-Marxists, as well as the concept of unequal exchange (Samir Amin, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Arghiri Emmanuel, Andre Gunder Frank, etc.)

In Greece, this school was introduced by PASOK (the Panhellenic Socialist Movement). Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the party, a scholar who taught economics in Berkeley, popularised the theory of dependency and imperialism

and the other concepts of this model in his writings, which served as a platform for the foreign policy of his party⁶. We must also mention the limited influence exercised by the orthodox Soviet visions of international relations as well as the Eurocommunist visions. The communist movement in Greece, had links with these two orientations of communism in the seventies, thus it was only natural to see efforts of “theorisation” of their position (KKE was and still is the “orthodox” Communist party, the extinct KKE interior was the Eurocommunist party). Finally, there have also been some analysts, especially historians, influenced by Marxism-Maoism.

Generally speaking, the Marxist influence (including its several variants) was important in Greece in the seventies. After the fall of dictatorship in 1974, we could say that it was a dominant vision which would go on for several years. But after 1990 -and even before- the Marxist-dependency influence diminished rapidly in favour of realism.

III. The Influence of the Greek ‘Ideologico-Political’ Patterns

There have been in Greece, even before independence (1830), two basic ‘ideologico-political’ currents which have an important influence in the vision Greeks have of the place of their country in the world. The first current after the Enlightenment maintains that Greece belongs to Western Europe. Adamantios Korais (1748-1833), a notable figure of the Greek Enlightenment who lived much of his life in Western Europe (Amsterdam, Montpellier and Paris), is an eminent representative of this current. He worked to convey to Greeks the Western ideas of statehood, nationality and rationality. He regarded the modern Greeks as the legitimate descendants of the ancient Hellenes and the heirs to the classical Greek culture, rejecting Byzantium as a medieval period. The second current considers that Greece belongs to the East, where the roots of neohellenism are found in Byzantium. Consequently Greece has to resist Western influence.

These East-West patterns are ideological and political references, “largely imaginary constructs”⁷. Scholars and intellectuals of this orientation are convinced that their nation could not imitate any other culture and that Hellenism had to be based on its own sources, rejecting Western ideas. Sometime in the beginning of the twentieth century, when Eleftherios Venizelos, the eminent representative of Greek bourgeoisie, succeeded with a kind of Europeanization of the state, others were seeking “a sense of mission in the East”, in “framing” even “the ideology of a multinational Eastern State” comprising Greeks and Turks.⁸ As Thanos Veremis put it out, “strangely enough, it took a civil servant (Ion Dragoumis) and an officer of the Greek army (Athanasios Souliotis) to formulate the most systematic criticism against the state and propose a viable alternative to it.” At the time when Venizelos reformed the Greek State and set it on course toward Europeanization, Dragoumis and Souliotis proposed the alternative of the “multinational Eastern”, Greco-Turkish state.⁹

This idea is not really a new one. It goes back to the Ottoman Empire when the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Greek elites were in a sense part of the Ottoman administration. Even before in Byzantium, the Church and part of the elites resisted to the efforts of the pope and the Latin West to instore their spiritual and dogmatic domination on the Greek Orthodox. On the contrary under the Ottoman Empire, Greek Orthodox Church of Constantinople became a real political power over all Orthodox inside the Empire.

The East-West patterns present a new dimension in the eighteenth century when the Greek diaspora composed of bourgeois and intellectual elements, mainly in Western and Central Europe, received the influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution and began to work on Greek nation-building, preparing the war of independence. The ideals of liberalism -economic and 'ideologico-political'- and enlightenment were to form the weapon opposed to internal conservative elements like landed notables and the ecclesiastic administration. The Church defended traditional values and generally "the status quo as it existed in the framework of the Ottoman Empire"¹⁰. As was mentioned above, we can go even further to find the roots of these patterns at the time of the Schism (1054) between the Eastern Orthodox Church of Constantinople and the Catholic Church of Rome. The anti-European attitude of Orthodox Greeks was also influenced by «the sack of Constantinople by the "crusaders" in 1204» and "left a legacy of extreme suspicion if, not to say hostility towards the presence of Western Europeans in the eastern Mediterranean and the adjacent lands."¹¹

It would be, however, a mistake to consider that the patterns involved in this conflict are clear. As one scholar noted "reality is always more complex and less clear-cut than such constructs propose."¹²

It was supposed that this conflict was over when Greece became a member of the European Union in 1981. Nevertheless, there is always a strong group of intellectuals and others known as the neo-Orthodox who continue to express this anti-Western position favouring a non-Western Greece with a romantic vision: "organic communities", "anti-rationalism", a return to the roots, to the lost paradise of traditional values, etc. As Thanos Veremis noted, this romantic view of communal life under the Ottomans survives even today and is presented as a model against the nation-state considered to be a "western" product that has nothing to do with the values and culture of Hellenism. Veremis points out that "the myth surrounding communal life was challenged by historical works presenting the communities as a functional component of the Ottoman tax system rather than a product of national volition."¹³

Even the Nobelist poet, Odysseus Elytis, insisted on the importance of tradition, worried about Greek identity and considered that the West was always hostile to the Greek nation. Elytis also referred to the Schism and the crusades

and declared: «The West always tried to make us dance to their tune. And these days it has succeeded in doing so. From now on we have to walk with the one foot in the European Community and with the other in NATO.»¹⁴

To this traditional vision, the 'Europeanists' oppose the modernizing trends; i.e., economic development and integration to Europe.

There are also those who accept some aspects of the neo-Orthodox patterns, but try to insert it in a European schema, as an element reinforcing Greek ethno-cultural identity.

From another point of view, nationalism is a very strong current influencing the formulation of Greek external policy. Nationalism may coincide in some points with the neo-Orthodox vision but it doesn't reject (at least its most important components) the European orientation.

It should be remembered that Greek nationalism was initially the product of Western influence. Nationalism shaped the Greek identity by favouring the building of the Greek nation-state *vis-à-vis* the cultural identity put forward by the Church and her allies (who preferred the framework of the Ottoman Empire).¹⁵

The question to ask at this point is how these 'ideologico-political' orientations can be combined with the different schools of thought on international relations coming from abroad in order to trace the theoretical trends that scholars use.

There is no doubt that we can link the 'Europeanist-modernists' (at least most of them) to the school of transnationalism-interdependence. They try to escape from the scheme of 'real politik' and the logic of balance of power or the nation-state power as it is proclaimed by the school of realism. The importance they give to the economic development and integration of Greece within Europe, the development of better economic and political relations within the Balkan countries, the under-evaluation of national issues¹⁶, opposition to nationalism, insistence on international law, importance of transnational relations, are but a few examples demonstrating that Europeanist-Modernists belong to the transnational school of thought.

More specifically, this trend is expressed by a group of scholars associated with ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy).¹⁷ It is also expressed by some retired diplomats¹⁸, social scientists (economists, sociologists, etc.)¹⁹, journalists²⁰ and Greek scholars of the diaspora.

The school of realism, on the other hand, is influenced by nationalism and partly by neo-Orthodox thought. It could be argued that an important part of this school is also pro-European. But contrary to the 'modernists'-'Europeanists', the pro-European realists want a Europe based on strong nation-states and reject

the idea of a supranational federation. This group of realists believe that neo-Orthodox thought could be incorporated into this kind of European orientation reinforcing the Hellenic ethnocultural identity.

A small minority of intellectuals who do not necessarily belong to the realist school would like to see Greece sever relations with Europe. They are not necessarily specialists in international relations but they do participate in the debate concerning the place of Greece within the contemporary world.

These intellectuals are inspired from the so-called Byzantine Orthodox tradition and have made this tradition an ideological arm opposing it in a mythical way to Western modernism²¹. They equate a form of cultural identity which is defensive and introverted with the national political identity, which is dynamic and extroverted. The first one, the cultural identity, which functioned during the time of the Ottoman Empire, is also represented today by a group of neo-Orthodox intellectuals. They opposed it to the ethno-political identity which coincides with the nation-state, a concept imported from the West, according to them, and thus foreign to Greek traditions²².

More precisely, we can say that realists are presented as moderate Europeanists or even rationalists and, by their opponents, as ethnopopulists. This current is represented by a group of scholars in Panteion University and its Institute of International Relations. It is also represented by some journalists and academics in the diaspora.²³

The Marxist school, especially its variation of dependency and imperialism, has been influenced by Third World theorists -Samir Amin, André Gunder Frank, Paul Sweezy, etc. Nationalism and populism also influenced this particular school of thought, partly because of the official political line of PASOK, the Greek socialist party, during the years the party was the opposition. After PASOK became the government of the country (1981), the dependency school of thought was also influenced by realism, underscoring the weight of nation-state power, regional equilibrium and security. This mixture of thought is partly the result of a dialectical relation between academic visions and practical realities.

Andreas Papandreou, the former premier, was in one sense a theorist, popularizing the dependency theory through his various speeches and articles, while fulfilling his statesman duties and being responsible for the drafting of Greek foreign policy.

Papandreou wrote in *Metropolis, Periphery, Independent Development and Socialist Change* (one of his more important theoretical articles yet popularizing *in extremis*) that “with the polarization between the metropolis and the periphery of capitalism, the “class struggle” at the international level takes more and more the form of a clash between the metropolis and the periphery”²⁴; and concerning Greece:

National independence constitutes the corner-stone of the policy of PASOK and at the same time the decisive “lodestone” for the Greek people’s movement. Ever since the revolution of ’21, our country has not succeeded in disentangling itself from the bonds of dependence. The great options of strategic importance come from foreign, not from Greek centers of decisions. This concerns, too, the whole spectrum of options—the economic, the social, the political and cultural dimensions of our existence as a nation.

During the last decades after the German-Italian occupation and the civil war, and the USA’s “protector” power role, the dependence of our country took the characteristic form which is in keeping with the new image of modern monopoly capitalism, which started approximately at the end of the Second World War (...) Greece has a very bitter experience because it is perhaps the first country of the post-war period which has been corroded systematically by the services of the USA in the context of the Truman Doctrine²⁵. [But] (...) it would be a mistake to consider that the “participant” Greeks are “agents” in the normal connotation of that word. The “participant” Greeks have been “convinced” that our national interest is identified with the policy of the metropolitan center, that is to say of the USA or its substitutes West Germany and generally of Western Europe. Any other position for Greece either isn’t reasonable to them as a realistic alternative solution, or it constitutes a nationally suspicious position. The creation of such a climate, of such a dominant ideology, is an indispensable condition for the corrosion of the political bearers of the marginal country, as well as their state functionaries²⁶.

At that time (1977), Papandreou was against Greek participation in NATO, pointing out that “for every country, with exception of the USA, but particularly for a small country like Greece, participation in NATO means a loss of our national independence.”²⁷ And he goes on to mention that “the consequences of our joining the Common Market are not different. Because the Common Market is the other side of NATO.”²⁸

Of course, these positions later changed and Papandreou played the game inside NATO and the European Union from the same theoretical and ideological point of view, based on dependency theory, up to 1989.

IV. The Discussion on the Greek Foreign Policy

Greek foreign policy these days may be viewed as a confrontation between the two major theoretical orientations, realism and transnationalism. It is important to repeat that these orientations are not well structured and differences between them are not always clear.

1. The Realist Approach

Realists were influenced by dependency and Marxist theory, as well as by the Hellenic tradition of nationalism and Orthodox thought. These influences explain why it is difficult to be well integrated. Nevertheless, in recent years, this current is moving to more realist positions, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union and the weakening of Marxism.

More and more scholars of dependency and the Marxist tradition moved toward realist positions, especially from the political spectrum of PASOK. With Papandreou in power after the collapse of Eastern Europe, realism became the dominant paradigm, influencing the approach of Greek foreign policy.

It may be argued that there is now in Greece a well-established realist school of thought, composed of scholars, journalists and other intellectuals. They do confront transnationalists in animated debates. We will expose some of their arguments later.

2. The Transnationalist-Interdependence Approach

In the last few years the transnationalist interdependence paradigm appears to be very dynamic. This paradigm comes from the outside world and is applied to the Greek reality. This current challenges some of the most important ideological patterns which have long constituted the central axis of Greek foreign policy: nationalism, Orthodoxy, populism, etc. What is more, this theoretical orientation presents a kind of "revisionism", compared with some basic ideas which dominated Greek diplomacy for many years; i.e., concessions on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Cyprus question and on the differences with Turkey.

The axis of this 'revisionist' policy is the European orientation of Greek foreign policy. In this sense, the theorists of this vision are opposed to the neo-Orthodox scholars and intellectuals who propose a pan-Orthodox axis in the Balkans, based on the idea that the Greek Balkan policy must follow the European line. Therefore economic and cultural cooperation in the Balkans is more important than any Orthodox axis.

And it is under this European orientation that it will be possible to treat national issues of Greece with openness to the world, leaving behind this umbilical isolation of the past.

3. The Marxist-Dependency School

As mentioned, this school of thought was introduced in Greece essentially by PASOK and its leader Andreas Papandreou. One can say that for some years (1974-1985) the Marxist-dependency school was a powerful current and the dominant orientation inside the academic community and among the

intelligentsia. Once again we must differentiate the dependency theory from the Orthodox pro-Soviet Marxist paradigm expressed by theorists of the Greek Communist Party and from the Euro-communist version expressed by a circle of intellectuals and academics.

Today all these orientations have declined and academics and intellectuals of the dependency school have joined and reinforced the realist school of thought, at the same time as PASOK foreign policy evolved in the same direction: i.e., from dependency theory to realist vision.

Nevertheless some Eurocommunists reinforced the transnationalist-interdependence school. Later a number of the dependency school followed suit. With the retirement of Papandreou as prime minister, changes may be expected in the whole orientation of Greek foreign policy.

Contrary to Papandreou's "third world" oriented foreign policy, the new Greek Premier Costas Simitis (1996) and his group are convinced 'Europeanists', 'reformers', pragmatists, rather than ideologists. As there is always a dialectic relation between theory and praxis, especially in the case of Greece, we can observe the support that the new team has received from transnationalists and in the meantime the criticism exercised from realists concerning some of their choices in foreign policy.

Under the circumstances, the question is if there is a school of dependency in Greece any more. The answer is yes, but it is too weak. The same thing can be said for all other Marxist approaches.

4. Present Debate

With a marginal dependency school, the main debate is between realists and transnationalists. It is not really a theoretical one, but merely a discussion on Greek foreign policy with theoretical references. For instance, the transnationalists argue in favour of a European orientation for Greek foreign policy. As Veremis and Couloumbis point out "the greater danger for our country is to tumble into atavism and to yield up to the sirens' temptation of chauvinism, irredentism, ethnoreligious fanaticism and of the theory of world clash - leaving its European and Atlantic supports in the name of an ambiguous cultural relationship of the so-called axis of slave-Orthodoxy"²⁹. And they go on arguing in favour of a policy which will take in consideration the new realities with the end of the cold war: the importance of international law and international institutions, respect of human rights and generally an open and active diplomacy in all directions. They suggest moving from an ethnocentric isolationist viewpoint to a global and European perspective through Balkan and Mediterranean co-operation.

Dimitri Conostas, a leading figure of realist thought, is very critical of the

transnationalists' positions and considers their analysis wrong. He refers to the concessions that they have made on national issues and their abandonment of the concept of national interest as anachronistic.³⁰ Panayiotis Ifestos, another realist scholar, goes even further and attacks particularly the models of Couloumbis-Veremis, which from his point of view, are unfounded and «idyllic», especially their model of international relations at the end of the Cold War; i.e., common strategy of the great powers, financing of environmental programs, control of nuclear weapons, respect of international boundaries, pacific resolution of conflicts and protection of human rights.³¹

On another occasion Conostas wrote against the domination of the international relations debate in Greece by transnationalists. He cited their «idealistic-liberal conceptions reminding us of the ideas between the two world wars, and of harmony between the interests of the powerful and the weak of this planet». He stresses that in the international academic community, «the dominant school of thought is political realism and neorealism with the axis of analysis in national power, and its advance in comparison with transnationalist and interstate ideological products.» Conostas considers that this school of thought enriches academic life, strengthens the scientific independence of international relations and contributes to the effective planning of our foreign policy.³²

Finally Conostas worries about the positions of some jurists who consider sufficient the Greek legal approach of international issues and face with disdain for any other kind of analysis, especially if it is not idealistic.

Paradoxically, an articulate response to transnationalist arguments came from journalist Chryzanthos Lazaridis, one of the most representative spokesmen of realist thought. Lazaridis says that “without theoretical rigour and practical clarity, the public discussion on foreign policy, very often leads to oppose different subjectivisms and to yield up to populist temptations... So we became divided between “nationalists” and “internationalists” or if you prefer “patriots” and “traitors”, “Europeanists” and “anti-Europeanists”, “pacifists” and “warriors”, etc. And he adds: “Before discussing foreign policy we have to define the theoretical field of reference. We put out globally three proposals:

First of all, international relations is a field of antagonism of interest and imposition of balance of power.

Second, the international cooperation that is institutionalized does not end national antagonisms, but simply consolidates the existing balance of power.

Third, even where international cooperation is a reality, one observes the development of hegemonic relations³³.

Especially concerning the concept of “deterrence” he points out “that in Greece some people had never heard about it.”³⁴

With the latest Aegean crisis concerning the Imia islet, the debate on Greek foreign policy continues. The realists ask for the “Israelisation” of Greek foreign policy; i.e., that Israel provides a model to follow. Greece should, therefore, adopt a policy of military preparedness. Realist scholar Athanasios Platias, for example, argues in favour of such a strategy, while he attacks transnationalists, who are against this model considering it as a dangerous militarization of the country.³⁵ A number of Greek politicians, journalists and intellectuals also share this idea.³⁶

Responding to these arguments and the following dilemma of “Israelisation” or “Finlandisation”, Theodore Couloumbis, one of the most prominent transnationalist scholars, considers “Europeanisation” as the only worthy choice for Greece. Couloumbis also asserts that “the Israeli model is misunderstood and distorted” by Greek scholars «who dub themselves ‘ncorealists’» because they fail “to understand that Israel, involved in the process of nation-building and surrounded in the period 1947-73 by genuinely hostile entities (as Greece was in the 19th century), has nonetheless sought and managed to cultivate relations with most of its neighbours, including the Palestinians.”³⁷

V. The Influence of Theoretical Orientations in the Application of Greek Foreign Policy

It is clear from what has been said so far that there is a dialectical relation between the theory and the praxis of Greek foreign policy. In some cases, it is not sure if the theoretical visions proceed to the praxis, or if this praxis produces theoretical orientations.

As we enter a new era of transition for the international system, Greek scholars try, with great difficulty, to link theory with praxis in international relations. Decision-making in this field is a little old-fashioned but, undoubtedly, it proceeds in a dialectical manner. Of course decision-making is influenced by many factors, such as cultural values and customs, economic reality, political power and information.

If we analyse the impact of theories in the post-dictatorial period of Greek foreign policy, (1974-1996), based on developments that preceded, it is clear that they exercised considerable influence in decision-making. But it is also clear that during this period theoretical patterns were confused without clear lines and without real development.

The right wing government of Constantine Caramanlis (1974-1980) was of course more pragmatic in the crafting of its foreign policy. From a theoretical point of view, the Caramanlis government experienced different influences, but the main insistence on international law, pacific conflict resolution and cooperation, indicates that the transnational-idealistic patterns had the most important

input and influence in practice. The European orientation is another indication of this influence. It should be remembered that Greece was at that time in a weak military and diplomatic position after seven years of dictatorship and after the Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus. The question, of course, is to know whether Caramanlis' foreign policy is more the result of necessity than of a clear choice.

Of course nationalism and the dependency theory did exercise some pressure on Caramanlis' government and forced it to go ahead with certain policies which under other circumstances would have been refused, e.g. the withdrawal of the country from NATO. In some cases the pressure from PASOK advancing dependency and 'Marxist' theoretical patterns accelerated government decisions to develop friendly relations with the Communist bloc -read Greece's Balkan neighbours- and the Third World.

The socialist government of Andreas Papandreou (1981-1989) did not constitute a radical change in Greek foreign policy. PASOK had set up the theoretical framework within dependency and imperialism during its opposition era and used the same language in government, but abandoned its main position to leave NATO and European community in practice. From the beginning it was clear that the realist theoretical orientation had also gained ground, at least in formal declarations and positions. We could advance the idea that at the end of PASOK's first period (1985), realism was more present as a theoretical tool of its foreign policy than the dependency theory. Nevertheless one has to proceed with caution because nothing is so clear. In some cases during this period, however, there is ideological and theoretical confusion. For example, the Davos summit³⁸ can not be explained in terms of realist or dependency theory but rather in terms of transnationalism.

The return of the Right to power with Premier Constantine Mitsotakis (1990-1993) changed radically the theoretical framework of Greek foreign policy. This time it was clear that the transnationalist-interdependence patterns had gained ground. Neoliberalism reinforced this vision, along with European and pro-allied positions.

Nevertheless nationalism is an obstacle to such an orientation, especially the exasperation on the Macedonian issue. Prime Minister Mitsotakis was unable to impose his vision on even his foreign minister Antonis Samaras, a convinced nationalist.

PASOK's return to power in 1993 marks a kind of revisionism in Greek foreign policy, compared with the party's first two mandates.

The Greek foreign policy of this period began to obey the logic of the interdependence paradigm more and more, although the strong current of nationalism forced the government to have a discourse which did not always correspond to

its actions. At times we also observed some contradiction in the way the government acted. For example, some government actions obeyed the realist logic; others, interdependence logic.

It seems that with Constantine Simitis as prime minister (1996), the interdependence-transnational paradigm has gained ground. We can simply observe how the realist scholars and intellectuals criticize the government's new orientation in foreign policy and how interdependentists praise it.

At the turn of the millennium, the theoretical and conceptual framework of Greek foreign policy has become clear and discussions among followers of different schools of thought could permit politicians to understand better the realities of international politics. After all, the discipline of international relations in Greece will be celebrating a quarter century, so it will be time to rethink what has been achieved and what will be the future of the discipline.

Provisional Conclusions

It is clear from what had been said that there is currently in Greece a theoretical confrontation between the 'ethno-realists' and the 'transnationalists-idealists' with practical repercussions throughout Greek foreign policy.

The result of this confrontation is a certain confusion because discussion deteriorates rapidly from the academic-theoretical point to a political one if not to partisan politics and personal disputes. Besides, these discussions lead to a simplification of the reality and finally to a Manichean bipolarism.

Furthermore, within the context of these discussions, the dependency school and other marginal 'theoretical-political' currents (e.g. the feminist or environmental paradigms) are put aside. And of course in this simplification, important variations of each of the main schools have been also omitted.

Under these circumstances, the theoretical discussion may also be subordinated to the political or even partisan logic at a time when the discipline of international relations is underdeveloped.

It is necessary at this point to broaden and enrich the theoretical debate with elements from Greek reality. The practical prolongation will follow. In any case, we can not separate theory from practice. Their relation is dialectical. Because in one way or another politicians also produce theory and examples from Greek or international political life are not lacking it.

It is important, however, to emphasize that the theoretical contribution of Greek scholars to international relations is very limited and poor. There are, of course, references to theory inside the empirical and historical studies on Greek foreign policy. But the main opposition between ethno-realists and transnationalists is increasingly situated at the political and ideological level rather than at

the theoretical field. It is no accident that these discussions take place in newspapers and magazines rather than in academic journals.

Obviously this article simplifies to a degree the general image of the discipline of international relations in Greece. But we must remember the lack of studies and research in this field. As a result, this article is only an attempt to present what is going on in the field of Greek international relations theory with the hope that a debate at an academic level will help the development of international relations in Greece.

NOTES

1. George Tenekides, a pioneer in the field of international relations in Greece, wrote that the discipline was taught for the first time in Greece in 1964 at the Panteion School of Political Science.

George TENEKIDES, **Themata koinoniologias ton Diethnon Scheseon (Subjects of Sociology of International Relations)**, Athens. Papazisis publishers, 1976, p.9. (in Greek)

2. As it is pointed out in the academic journal **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, Vol. 3, No1, Autumn 1994 (Editor's note, p. 7-8) "Research and dialogue in the social sciences as such have never been in the forefront of the mainstream Greek society. A variety of reasons have been offered for this seeming lack of interest in the social research field, the primary being some kind of 'socio-political conspiracy' on the part of the conservative élites that have governed Greece almost exclusively since Independence. As a matter of fact, it is not accidental that neither sociology, psychology nor education faculties exist in Greek universities, where systematic research on political and historical issues has been minimal." This point of view was presented for the first time in 1983 in the first issue of the journal. In the edition of 1994, it is pointed out: "We can repeat what we published in 1983 with slight modifications. As a matter of fact, in Greece progress has been made in numerous fields of studies and research in the social sciences, especially in the fields of sociology, psychology, education and political science. There is now an openness in the Greek universities. Research institutions have also appeared since 1983. Nevertheless, the situation is precarious and in comparison with other western countries, Greece remains behind in all these fields."

See also **Koinonikes kai Politikes Dynamis stin Ellada (Social and Political Forces in Greece)**, Hellenic Society of Political Science, Athens, Exantas Publishers, 1977 (in Greek)

3. Jacques HUNTZINGER, **Introduction aux relations internationales**, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1987

See also Paris ARNOPOULOS, **Sociopolitics**, Toronto, Guernica, 1995

4. Bibliography on this subject is enormous. One can find publications of scholars cited as an example above and an important number of others.

5. As in the case of the school of realism bibliography on transnational school thought is enormous. One can find the publications of scholars cited above and a significant number of others.

6. See for example a collection of articles of A. Papandreou in **PASOK, Socialist Transformation 2**, Athens, International Relations Committee, Series B, Publication no 2, 1977 (in English), **PASOK kai Exousia (PASOK and Power)**, Athens, Ed. Paratiritis, 1980 (in Greek)

7. Argyris FATOUROS, "Greece's Integration in the European Community" in Harry PSOMIADES and Stavros THOMADAKIS, **Greece, The New Europe and the Changing International Order**, New York, Pella Publishing Company, 1993, p.24

8. Thanos VEREMIS, From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910 in Martin BLINKHORN and Thanos VEREMIS, **Modern Greece: Nationalism & Nationality**, Athens, ELIAMEP, 1990, p.17

9. Thanos VEREMIS, *op.cit.*, p.17. See also Dimitri KITSIKIS, **Istoria tis Othomanikis Aftokratourias (History of the Ottoman Empire)**, Athens, Estia, 1985, p.85 (in Greek).

10. Argyris FATOUROS, *op. cit.*, p.25

Constantinos DIMARAS, **A History of Modern Greek Literature**, Albany, NY, S.U.N.Y. Press, 1972, p. 143-152 and the Greek editions of the same work, i.e. Athens, 1975, p.152-156

11. John CAMPBELL & Philip SHERRARD, **Modern Greece**, New York, Washington, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968, p.33

12. Argyris FATOUROS, *op. cit.*, p. 24

13. Thanos VEREMIS, *op. cit.*, p. 21

14. Interview of Odysseus Elytis to the Greek weekly **To Vima**, December 1978, cited in the monthly **Diavazo** (Athens), April 1996, p.74

15. D.G. TSAOUSHIS, **Ellinismos kai Ellinikotita (Hellenism and Greekness)**, Athens, Estia, 1983 (in Greek)

16. See Viron THEODOROPOULOS, Efstathios LAGAKOS, Georgios PAPOULIAS, Ioannis TZOUNIS, **Skepsis kai Provlmatismoi yia tin Exoteriki mas Politiki (Thoughts and Problems about our Foreign Policy)**, Athens, ELIAMEP, I. Sideris, 1995

This group of retired Greek diplomats propose, for example, to recognize a Turkish-Cypriot state in Cyprus, *ibid*, p. 81

17. See for example, Thanos VEREMIS and Theodoros COULOUMBIS,

Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki, Prooptikes ke Provlitasmoi, (Greek Foreign Policy, Perspectives and Problems) Athens, ELIAMEP, I. Sideris, 1994 (in Greek)

18. THEODOROPOULOS and others, **ibid.**

19. These positions are generally developed in articles published in Greek dailies and some influential weekly magazines. A good source of the arguments of transnationalists scholars and intellectuals - sociologists, economists, etc. - are the weekly **To Vima** and **Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, the bimonthly **To Anti** and the English language daily **Athens News**.

20. **To Vima, Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, **ibid.**

21. See the arguments of Christos Giannaras, a theologian teaching political philosophy at the Panteion University of Athens. Giannaras is one of the most articulated representatives of this 'neo-Orthodox' orientation but, at the same time, one of the most conservative scholars and intellectuals. Some opponents consider his positions even reactionary. See Christos GIANNARAS, **I Neoelliniki Taftotita (The Neohellenic Identity)**, Athens, Ekdotis Grigori, 1978 (in Greek) and **Aoristi Ellada, Konserto yia dyo Apodimies (Indefinite Greece, Concert for two Passages Abroad)**, Athens, Ekdotis Domos, 1994 (in Greek)

22. **Ibid.**

23. See arguments in favour of realism expressed by Dimitris Conostas, Athanasios Platias and Panayiotis Ifestos of Panteion University. Dimitri CONSTAS, "Exoteriki Politiki kai Diethnes Dikaio" ("Foreign Policy and International Law"), **To Vima**, August 27, 1995, Panayiotis IFESTOS, **Themeliodis Ptyches mias Ellinikis Ethnikis Stratigikis (Basic Aspects of a Greek National Strategy)**, unpublished communication to the **International Congress of the Hellenic Research Institutes**, Nicosia, November, 1995. Also **I Meleti Ton Diethnon Scheseon stin Ellada (The Study of International Relations in Greece)**, unpublished communication, conference of the Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, June 14-15 1995, Athanasios PLATIAS, "O schediasmos tis Ellinikis Exoterikis Politikis" ("The planning of Greek Foreign Policy") in **Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Esoterikes kai Diethnis Parametri (Greek Foreign Policy: Internal and External Dimensions)**, Athens, Institute of International Relations, Panteion University - Odysseas, 1994

A number of articles by PLATIAS and IFESTOS were also published in the dailies **Eleftherotypia** and **Ta Nea**. One can also follow the debate between the two schools of thought - transnationalism *vis-à-vis* realism- in **Eleftherotypia** during 1995 and in **Oikonomikos Tachydromos** and other Greek dailies or weeklies with the participation of P. IFESTOS, Ath. PLATIAS, Th. VEREMIS,

Krateros IOANNOU, Th. COULOUMBIS, Th. LIPOVITS, Nikos MOUZELIS and others.

24. **PASOK, Socialist Transformation 2**, Athens, International Relations Committee, series B, Publication no 2, 1977, p. 26

25. **Ibid**, p.26

26. **Ibid**, p.27

27. **Ibid**, p. 28

28. **Ibid**, p. 29, 30

29. Th. VEREMIS and Th. COULOUMBIS, **Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki**, op. cit., p. 99

30. **Eleftherotypia**, March 8, 1995

31. **Eleftherotypia**, March 16, 1995

32. D. CONSTAS, “Exoteriki Politiki ke Diethnes Dikaio” (“Foreign Policy and International Law”) **To Vima**, August 28, 1995

33. **Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, July 27, 1995

34. **Oikonomikos Tachydromos**, op. cit.

35. **Ta Nea**, 9 February 1996, “To Protypo tou Israel” (“The Israeli Model”)

36. See, in this sense, the article of Stelios Papatthemelis, “PASOK MP and former minister of security”, **To VIMA**, March 17, 1996

37. Th. COULOUMBIS, “A Country Worth Copying: Israel or Finland?” **Athens News**, April 4th, 1996

38. The Davos summit took place in February 1988 between the Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Turgut Ozal.

DOCUMENT

RESOLUTION 1000 (1995) (On the Cyprus Question)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3547th meeting, on 23 June 1995

The Security Council,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 15 June 1995 (S/1995/488 and Add.1),

Taking note of his recommendation that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the force in Cyprus beyond 30 June 1995,

Reaffirming its earlier relevant resolutions on Cyprus, and in particular resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and 969 (1994) of 21 December 1994,

Expressing its concern that there has been no progress towards a final political solution,

Noting that no progress has been made on extending the 1989 unmanning agreement,

Noting also that a review of the situation on the Secretary-General's mission of good offices in Cyprus remains in progress and looking forward to receiving a definitive report at an appropriate time,

1. **Decides** to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period ending on 31 December 1995;
2. **Calls upon** the military authorities on both sides to ensure that no incidents occur along the buffer zone and to extend their full cooperation to UNFICYP;
3. **Requests** the Secretary-General to keep under review the structure and strength of UNFICYP with a view to its possible restructuring, bearing in mind the possible implications of an agreement on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement;
4. **Expresses** concern about the modernization and upgrading of military forces in the Republic of Cyprus and the lack of progress towards a significant reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus, urges once again all concerned to commit themselves to such a reduction and to a reduction of defence spending in the Republic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces as described in the set of ideas (S/24472, annex), and calls upon the Secretary-General to promote efforts in this direction;
5. **Expresses** concern also about the failure by the military authorities on both sides to take reciprocal measures to prohibit along the cease-fire lines live ammunition or weapons other than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the firing of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone, and calls upon those authorities to enter into discussions with UNFICYP on this matter in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839 (1993) of 11 June 1993;
6. **Regrets** the failure to reach agreement on the extension of the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of the buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to each other, and calls upon the military authorities on both sides to cooperate urgently with UNFICYP to this end;
7. **Urges** the leaders of both communities to promote tolerance and reconciliation between the two communities as recommended in the relevant reports of the Secretary-General;
8. **Welcomes** the Secretary-General's decision to continue contacts with the two leaders, to make every effort to find common ground for the basis for a resumption of direct talks;
9. **Reaffirms** the importance it attaches to early progress being made on the substance of the Cyprus question and on the implementation of the confidence-building measures as called for in resolution 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994;
10. **Requests** the Secretary-General to submit a report by 10 December 1995 on the implementation of the present resolution and on any obstacles he may have encountered;
11. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.