

The Umbilical Relationship: Greece and the United States

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RÉSUMÉ

Dans cet article l'auteur examine les relations gréco-américaines de l'après guerre et en particulier la période après 1974. Il souligne que le sujet dominant de ces relations est celui de la sécurité. Ce facteur demeure toujours plus important pour la Grèce que pour le États-Unis aussi longtemps que la Turquie tente de modifier l'équilibre des forces en Méditerranée orientale.

Par ailleurs, l'auteur souligne que la Grèce et les États-Unis entament une nouvelle phase de leurs relations, qui est caractérisée par une maturité nouvelle de la part des deux acteurs.

ABSTRACT

In this article, the author examines the post-WW II and especially the post 1974 Greco-American relations. The author underlines that the one constant, dominant and characteristic factor that stands out in the relations between the two states is security. The security factor will remain more important for Greece rather than the USA as long as Turkey threatens the balance of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean.

However, the author underlines that Greece and the United States are entering a new phase in their relations which is characterized by a new maturity by both parties.

The Umbilical Relationship: Greece and the United States

From the perspective of Athens, half a century after the Truman Doctrine, Greek relations with the United States remain dependent on the US in matters of security.

The Greek-US security relationship was founded on mutual need, convenience and expediency, all consequences of a common security threat. Greece desperately needed US political and military support to counter the post-WWII Communist threat against its political system and its territorial integrity. The US needed to secure its lines of communication in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in the context of its global strategy to contain (and counter) the Soviet Union, and its regional strategy for unhindered access to the oil wealth of the greater Middle East.¹ The Greek-US bilateral relationship, that was established by the 1947 Truman Doctrine, was further strengthened and enhanced with the 1952 admission of Greece into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

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Until the mid-fifties, the security relationship between Greece and US was as good as it could get. Through bilateral and multilateral treaties, Greece opened up its land and sea facilities to American forces and agreed to the disposition of its army, in accordance with alliance directives, in exchange for massive military and economic aid but, most importantly, for an American and NATO guarantee of its independence and territorial integrity.

The Cold War was at its height and the Americans and the NATO alliance, which Americans led by consensus, identified only one enemy against whom their guarantee was good: Soviet-backed communism. The domestic politics notwithstanding, Greece, one of the poorest and weakest members of the Atlantic Alliance, was content with the guarantee offered because without it Greece was dangerously exposed.

The Greek-US security relationship began to change from the mid-fifties onward. The change was almost imperceptible at first. But by 1975, the change was such that Greek security policies were at odds with those of the US and of the NATO alliance. From 1955 to 1975, Greece, reluctantly at first and almost against its will, but, left without a choice after being pushed to the wall and nationally humiliated in Cyprus in 1974, modified its defense doctrine. It downgraded the threat from the north, that is from the Soviet Union and its allies, and substituted it with the threat from the east, that is from Turkey. By the mid-eighties, Greek defense planners were totally immersed with ways to counter an attack from Turkey and were unconcerned with any threat from the north. The Greek Prime Minister at the time identified Turkey as a country threatening Greece's territorial integrity.³ When in 1987 war between Greece and Turkey seemed imminent, Greece's Foreign Minister was dispatched to communist Bulgaria to solicit that country's help in case war did break out between Greece and Turkey.⁴

Turkey was, however, a prized US ally and, in the context of the Cold War, viewed as strategically more important than Greece. It was also a NATO member and as such Greece's nominal ally. Furthermore the US was the most important arms supplier for both Greece and Turkey.⁵ Neither the US nor NATO were willing to accept or act upon the Greek thesis that one member of the Atlantic alliance was threatening the territorial integrity of another. And the alliance, at any rate, had no mechanism and was unwilling, even on an ad-hoc basis, to act either as a mediator or a conciliator between Greece and Turkey.⁶

Because of the centrality of Turkey in Greek foreign policy and defense planning, the vital importance to Greece and Turkey of the US as leader of NATO and as the most important ally of both countries on a bilateral level and, in the context of arms supplies to both countries, as the state holding the key to the political and military balance between Greece and Turkey, relations between Greece and the US cannot be studied or understood unless viewed within the nexus of Greek-US-Turkish relations. The same cannot be said if one were to study the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the US. That relationship can be examined apart of US relations with Greece without must distortion. But not the relationship between Greece and the US, if Turkey were to be ignored.

In the post-1974 relationship between Greece and the US a number of episodes can be cited to confirm the above thesis. I shall confine myself to just one that is particularly revealing. On March 26, 1976, the United States and Turkey signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) which, *inter alia*, called "for defense support for Turkey consisting of grants, credits and loan guarantees of \$1.000.000.000 during the first four years this Agreement shall remain in effect."⁷ The signing of this agreement (which by mutual consent was never implemented) so alarmed - panicked may be the most appropriate word - the Karamanlis government that the Prime Minister dispatched his Foreign Minister to Washington literally overnight, with an Olympic Airways plane exclusively used for this purpose, in order to meet and discuss the effects of the American-Turkish DECA on Greece.⁸ Foreign Minister Dimitri Bitsios met with the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on 10 April 1976. The meeting had been preceded by an urgent communication from the Greek to the American government in which the Greeks were expressing their grave concern over American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁹ The Bitsios-Kissinger meeting produced the 'Kissinger letter' which represents the closest the US ever came in acceding to the Greek supplication for a security guarantee against Turkey and by implication accepting the Greek thesis about Turkey as a presumed aggressor. The 10 April 1976 Kissinger letter to Bitsios contains "a carefully hedged but not insignificant security guarantee...."¹⁰ *Inter alia*, the letter read:

"You have asked about our attitude toward the resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and particularly in the Aegean area. In this regard I should like to reiterate our conviction that these disputes must be settled through peaceful procedures and that each side should avoid provocative actions. We have previously stated our belief that neither side should seek a military solution and will make a major effort to prevent such a course of action."¹¹

Not insignificantly and in addition to the signing of the US-Turkish DECA, the Kissinger letter was preceded by the announcement, in February 1976, that the Turkish research ship, the *Hora*, later renamed *Sismik*, would conduct research in the Aegean sea. The decision signaled Turkey's intention to assert or re-assert Turkish claims on the Aegean seabed and in Aegean airspace, claims that were officially put forward in November 1973 and reinforced by Turkish actions in the Aegean during the war on Cyprus.¹² Greek fears of Turkey's aggressive intentions against it (as opposed to designs against Cyprus, where presumably the issues were more complicated but the stakes not that high) and for which the American guarantee was sought, were confirmed with the August 1976 first real Aegean confrontation between Greece and Turkey. That crisis prompted Greece to seek recourse against Turkey both from the U.N. Security Council and the International Court of Justice.¹³ It was, incidentally, during this period and in the context of this crisis, that Turkey inaugurated its policy of coercive diplomacy against Greece and publicly pronounced the policy of *casus belli* if Greece were to exercise its right to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles.¹⁴

The Kissinger letter, in the form of an exchange of letters with Bitsios, found its way into the never implemented 1977 Greek-US DECA. Later, and following an unsuccessful attempt by the Greek Socialist government to obtain a NATO guarantee,¹⁵ which once again spoke to the territorial insecurity of Greece *vis-à-vis* Turkey, Greece sought and obtained renewed assurances that the US was against any attempt to settle Greek-Turkish differences other than by peaceful means. These assurances were incorporated into the preamble of the 1990 US-Greek Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) couched with the appropriate diplomatic language. In this most revealing statement of principles, the US and Greece reaffirmed their respect for international law including existing treaties of particular relevance to the [Aegean] region, and their resolve to act in accordance with treaties as well as bilateral and multilateral arrangements to which they are both party, including the North Atlantic Treaty and the Helsinki Final Act.¹⁶

The preamble further declared the mutual commitment of the two countries to "respect the principle of refraining from actions threatening peace;" reiterated their determination to mutually protect their respective countries against "actions threatening peace, including armed attack or threat thereof;" confirmed their resolve "to oppose actively and unequivocally any such attempt or action and their commitment to make appropriate major efforts to prevent such course of action;" and finally the two countries reaffirmed, their dedication to the principle that international disputes shall be settled through peaceful means, and their continuing

resolve to contribute actively to the early and just settlement of existing international disputes in the [Aegean] region with particular concern either Party to this Agreement through peaceful means that accord to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.¹⁷

The last words of the preamble noted that “nothing in this Agreement is intended to harm the relations of either Party with any third country,” did nothing to ameliorate Turkey’s concern over the language of the preamble. Turkey was in fact “extremely hostile” to the wording of the preamble and Turkish-American relations were set back even after Ankara extracted the appropriate public disclaimers from the Americans that Turkey was not that “third country.”¹⁸ But the chain reaction that commenced with the 1976 US-Turkish DECA, the Greek reaction to it and the American balancing act, illustrated only too well the complex and intricate relationship between Athens, Washington and Ankara and provided a paradigm for similar or analogous actions that were to follow over the next two decades and up until current times.

The 1976 Bitsios-Kissinger meeting, in addition to the Kissinger letter, produced a set of principles that were to guide Greek-US relations ever since and, in particular, on the critical matter for Greece of American security assistance to Greece.¹⁹ Out of these principles and with the supplementary role of the American Congress, within a few years, evolved the seven-ten ratio (7:10) of US military assistance credits to Greece and Turkey. The 7:10 ratio would soon thereafter become a landmark. It would define not only the parameters of Greek-US and Turkish relations, but would assume a highly symbolic importance for both Greece and Turkey. The former tried to sustain it, with the help of Congress, against attempts by the Turks, sometimes aided by the US Administration and sometimes not, to break it.

The matter warrants some discussion because it highlights the complexities and nuances of the Greek-US security relationship. The 7:10 ratio provides an acknowledgment of the necessity for a military balance between Greece and Turkey, a balance unsustainable without the American input. Its very existence speaks of an implied threat against Greece, while its almost religious pursuit by Greece demonstrates the shift of the Greek threat perception from the north to the east. Finally, the 7:10 ratio highlights the critical role of the American Congress which, over the last twenty years, has acted as a cushion between Greece and the American Administration whenever Greek-US relations, as for example during the first part of the decade of the eighties, were severely strained.

The origins of the 7:10 ratio may very well be traced to the two signed but never implemented defense agreements between the US and Turkey in the 1976 and the US and Greece in 1977. The former called for one billion dollars in grants, credits and loan guarantees to Turkey over a four year period while the Bitsios-Kissinger principles referred to earlier, and incorporated into the 1977 Greek DECA, made reference to an American four-year commitment of military credits and grant aid to Greece totaling \$700,000,000.²⁰

Following the lifting of the Congressionally mandated partial arms embargo against Turkey, imposed on account of her invasion and subsequent actions on Cyprus that violated the legislative conditions of US arms supplies to Turkey, the relevant Congressional legislation referred, *inter alia*, to the need that the present balance of military strength among countries in the region, including between Greece and Turkey, were preserved.²² While no specific mention is made of the actual ratio in the relevant legislation, a Congressional tradition has evolved since based on the arithmetical ratio of the aid numbers in the two DECAS.²²

During the Reagan Administration and in particular while Richard Perle, as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, held sway over American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Administration persistently attempted to break the 7:10 ratio in favor of Turkey.²³ In this effort the Administration was aided by numerous well paid lobbying firms working for Ankara. But it never succeeded. Congress religiously restored the ratio. The Administration's concern was that the ratio prevented the appropriation of funds needed to modernize Turkey's armed forces in the aftermath of its upgraded strategic role following the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.²⁴ Its officials argued incessantly before Congressional committees that the ratio distorted US and NATO military priorities and that these should be set on the basis of military merit and not through a mechanical ratio based on political considerations.²⁵

Greece spent an enormous amount of energy and political capital in Washington in order to maintain the 7:10 ratio more for what it stood politically than for what it provided her militarily.²⁶ The political message was that Congress agreed with the Greek position, that Turkey's policies were threatening to Greece and Cyprus and that Congress may once again impose sanctions on Turkey if her behavior became overtly aggressive in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In recent times the Administration has all but given up efforts to change the ratio with the Turks going along so well. The ratio has in fact become, as Monteagle Stearns has brilliantly argued, "an all-purpose bureaucratic device that serves everyone's interests, even those of the Turks."²⁷ It is logical, serviceable and above all, notes Stearns, expedient. The existence of the ratio allow the US, Greece and the Turks "a politically expedient excuse for doing the politically expedient thing."²⁸ The Administration would otherwise have had to explain annually to Congress how aid figures other than those expressed by the 7:10 ratio complied with the legislative requirement of preserving the military balance between Greece and Turkey; the Greek government would have had to explain to its public the high levels of US aid to Turkey; and by not receiving the desired amount of aid, the Turks were justified in imposing restrictions on US activities at American bases in Turkey a practice they have been implementing on and off since 1964.²⁹

It is true that during the decade of the eighties, when Greece was run by the Socialists and its leader A. Papandreou, attempts were made and the declaratory and confrontationist foreign policy record of the Greek socialists, give credence to the view that the Greeks attempted to strike the umbilical security chord with the US. Careful analysis however suggests that this was not the case.³⁰ Papandreou postured, gambled a lot and did walk on a tight rope on a number of occasions and at a dear cost to Greece.³¹ But he never followed the logic of his arguments and never took that fateful decision that would have damaged Greek-American relations irreparably. Papandreou was at heart and philosophically an Adlai Stevenson liberal.³² He was also aware that anti-Americanism, though present, did not run deep in Greek society. It was more a reaction to real and perceived injustices against a friend than hatred against an enemy. He was aware, for example, that the Greek public, or at any rate a vast majority of it, would not kick the Americans out of Greece as PASOK's manifestos and he himself proclaimed. But more importantly he was keenly aware that the US held the key to the balance of power between his country and Turkey, and his generals were there to remind him of that were he to forget it or allow his rhetoric to get in the way of Greece's security interests.

Papandreou's pragmatism was evident throughout the eighties. He did accept Greece's reintegration into the military structure of NATO, negotiated by the Greek conservatives but really made possible by American pressure on Turkey³³, despite the fact that the terms of reintegration were less favorable to Greece than those existing prior to the withdrawal. Of course Papandreou did this because he recognized that Greece's security *vis-à-vis* Turkey could be better defended from within NATO's integrated

structure than from without. This explains why Papandreou, while accusing NATO and the Americans for not taking a stand against Turkey's aggressive behavior, confined himself to vetoing NATO communiqués, refused to participate in NATO exercises, but did not withdraw from the integrated command. The 1974-1980 period of withdrawal from NATO's integrated command had been a sober lesson to the entire Greek political leadership, except perhaps the Communists, because it underscored Greek vulnerability *vis-à-vis* Turkey. The absence of Greece from the integrated command permitted Turkey to 'legitimize' within NATO its claims to 'defend' Aegean airspace beyond Turkey's borders. Turkey achieved this claim by saying that the country was feeling a 'gap' within NATO air defenses created by the withdrawal of Greece, when in fact Turkey was implementing a revisionist strategy against Greece. This explains the urgency with which Greek conservatives pressed for the reintegration of Greece into NATO's command structure and the subsequent socialist acquiescence to that policy.

Another classic example demonstrating Greece's unwillingness to damage Greek-American relations came with the signing of the 1983 Greek-US DECA. Papandreou finally signed an agreement in which the authentic Greek text stipulated that at the end of five years (1988), the American military presence in Greece would 'terminate' (*termatizetai*) whereas the equally authentic English text stated that the DECA was 'terminable' in five years; i.e., it could be renewed.³⁴ In this manner Papandreou and his socialists could claim domestic victory by fulfilling their promise to close the bases in five years but in fact they were conceding to the Americans that they might not. Indeed, they did not.

It was the conservative government of Mitsotakis that renewed the DECA before the final timetable for base closure was reached. The Socialists had by then been ousted from power. Of course, Papandreou would have done the same thing for the following three reasons. First, there was the March 1987 crisis, that is, the second serious Aegean crisis which brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Much has been said and written about that crisis, but the American role in diffusing it has not received due credit. While this article does not intend to dwell on that role, a few comments are necessary. The critical handling of the crisis took place within the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS/J-5).³⁵ It was coordinated by the officer handling Greek and Turkish affairs who had open channels with the American military missions in Greece and Turkey and the Greek and Turkish military commands and spoke for the JCS. A backchannel was also established between the JCS and the office of the Greek Prime Minister.³⁶ The Pentagon assessment was that the Greeks were going to stop the Sismik by whatever means if, under Turkish

military protection, it drilled on the Greek continental shelf. Their assessment was also that the Turkish military, through a decision in the National Security Council, had decided to proceed with drilling. This decision was taken in the absence of Prime Minister Ozal who at the time was in the US for medical treatment. It is well known that what diffused the crisis was the March 27, 1987, public statement by Ozal in London that the Turkish vessel would remain within Turkish territorial waters. What is not known is that it was the American Pentagon that made the critical assessment that the weak link in the Turkish war plans was the absence of Ozal from Turkey and that if he, as Prime Minister, were convinced to publicly pull rank on the Generals while outside Turkey they would have to go along. It was critical that Ozal did so while outside Turkey because within Turkey, he, like everyone else, had to march to the soldier's orders. For reasons of his own, Ozal went along. His return to Turkey was delayed in London where he presumably rested. The western, i.e., American, and NATO, successful intervention with Ozal took place with its known consequences.

Papandreou was kept informed of the intricate developments through the Washington backchannel referred to earlier and was aware that the crisis was under control before the public statement by Ozal.³⁷ The March 1987 crisis was the closest Papandreou personally came to war with Turkey. It had quite an effect on him and did lead to the unsuccessful Davos process.³⁸ But it also revealed to him the critical role and the weight of the American intervention in matters of war and peace affecting his country.

The second reason for Papandreou to have renewed the presence of American military bases, regardless of his party's declaration, was that by 1988, Papandreou had made his peace with the Americans. In fact, he was trying officially and through various emissaries to solicit an official invitation to visit Washington. The Americans sensed this from the outset and toyed with him relaying 'conditions' under which such an invitation would be extended. In the event none was extended but not for Papandreou's lack of trying.

The third reason was related to the rapidly changing international environment at the end of the 1980s when Eastern Europe was in turmoil. Yugoslavia was about to unravel with all kinds of unpredictable changes, especially changes affecting Greece. Saddam had invaded Kuwait and the US/UN-led coalition war was at hand and, with it, the upgrading of Turkey's regional role for the West and the US. Under these circumstances what Papandreou would have done was a foregone conclusion. When the conservative government of Mitsotakis signed a new DECA with the US in the summer of 1990, the Greek socialists had hardly anything to say.³⁹

In fact, Greek-US relations in the nineties have come full circle. Today the umbilical security chord is stronger than ever before, even when Greece lay prostrate during its civil war years. The irony is that during the height of the Yugoslav crisis, when Greece felt that the Macedonian question might eventually lead to the questioning of its northern borders, Greek governments, especially the Papandreou government, which returned to power in 1993, used security arguments drawn from the Truman period to solicit and ensure US support for its policies *vis-à-vis* the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.⁴⁰

The most ominous threat to Greece, however, still emanates from Turkey. In the nineties, this threat has become more insidious because it is no longer confined to undefined claims in the Aegean or threats against Cyprus, where Greece has important national and security interests. Everyone in Greece recognizes, even those who prior to the January 1996 Imia crisis had advocated or followed policies of accommodation with Turkey, that Turkey has territorial claims against Greece.⁴¹ People also generally recognize that Turkey abandoned any pretenses and threatened Greece with war unless Greece entered into political dialogue for the revision of the status quo in the Aegean. Worse for Greece, Turkey has taken a number of decisions in its arms procurement policies since 1987 and especially following the Persian Gulf War, of which there are no Greek equivalents. The military imbalance between the two countries is steadily deepening.⁴² If the current trends continue, Greece may soon have no credible military deterrence against Turkey.⁴³

In this respect, the 7:10 ratio is of little comfort to Greece because American military assistance to both Greece and Turkey has been decreasing steadily since the end of the Cold War. Turkey, as already mentioned, has taken a number of decisions that are dramatically increasing her military capabilities, independent of the American factor. The Turkish alliance with Israel, for example, is one such decision that enhances Turkey's military might.⁴⁴

These Turkish moves do not, by any means, free Turkey from dependence on the US and this is critical for peace in the region. But they do make Greece more dependent on the US politically and militarily than ever before. Richard Holbrook's averting the Imia crisis, a Greek-Turkish war, "while Europe slept" as he put it, demonstrates this situation dramatically. Even before Imia, the Papandreou government was taking steps to strengthen Greek-US relations. Papandreou was cognizant of the fact that only the US can help Greece balance off Turkey militarily and also act as a catalyst and even guarantor of a new security regime in the Eastern Mediterranean that would include Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.⁴⁵

This brief survey of Greek-US relations since 1974 has highlighted the one constant, dominant and characteristic factor that stands out in the relations between the two states. That factor is security. Security has been more important for Greece than for the US and will remain so in the future and for as long as Ankara remains a revisionist power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There are, no doubt, other important aspects in Greek-US relations that deserve attention. Greece and the United States are entering a new phase in their relations. This phase is characterized by a new maturity on the part of both. Greece is perceived by the US as an important regional player and an important stabilizing factor. In this sense and in contrast to Turkey, for example, Greece's most important assets are its democratic and pluralistic institutions of which there are hardly any to speak of in the Eastern Mediterranean or volatile Middle East.⁴⁶ Ambassador to Greece Nicholas Burns reflected on Greece's role in his confirmations hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He spoke of Greece "as a valued NATO ally, an increasingly prosperous member of the European Union, a leader in the Balkans, and as a force for peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean." Greece and the US, he said, "should have the closest possible relations."⁴⁷

Greece, on the other hand, has outgrown its ideological predilections. Through pragmatic policies the country has been working hard to straighten out its economy in order to keep pace with partners in the European Union. Greece has steadily improved relations with all neighbors including FYROM and has been working with the US in a number of projects aimed at strengthening democratic institutions in the region, establishing a more secure environment and creating opportunities for Greek and American business ventures.

Confrontation with Turkey remains the only bleak aspect in Greece's foreign relations. It is a dangerous bleak aspect that may yet lead to war. This possibility explains why all aspects of Greek-US relations must take second place to that of security, as has been highlighted in this work, at the expense of other important elements in relations between the two states.

ENDNOTES

1. See Melvyn R. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 141-311 passim; Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 68-129.
2. Cf. Yiannis P. Roubatis, *Tangled Webs: The US in Greece 1947-1967* (New York: Pella Publishing Press 1981), passim.
3. John O. Iatrides, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy" in Theodore C. Kariotis, editor, *The Greek Socialist Experiment* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1992). p. 154.
4. On this and related information see Yiannis P. Kapsis. *Oi 3 Meres tou Marti* (Athina: Ekdoseis Nea Europi: 1990).(In Greek in the text)
5. See Ellen B. Laipson, *US Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey, Greece and Cyprus* (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Report No. 83-735 of April 19, 1983), passim. Idem, "Greece and Turkey: US Foreign Assistance Facts" (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief No. 1B86065, Updated February 13, 1990), passim.
6. See Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1992), pp.77.
7. Ellen B. Laipson, *The Seven-Ten Ratio in Military Aid to Greece and Turkey: A Congressional Tradition* (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, Report No. 85-79 of 10 April 1985), p. 4.
8. For additional details see Stearns, *op.cit.*, p. 42-49.
9. *Ibid*, p. 47
10. *Ibid*.
11. For the full text see *ibid.*, Appendix C. The text is taken from *Pera apo ta Synora* (Athina:Estia 1982), sel. 253-54.(In Greek in the text)
12. See Marios L. Evriviades "The Problem of Cyprus" *Current History*, Vol. 70, No. 412 (January 1976), pp. 18-21 and 38-42.
13. See Andrew Wilson, *The Aegean Dispute* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 155, 1980) and Leo Gross "The Dispute Between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 71, No. 19 (October 1977).
14. See Sukru Elekdag's revealing article "2 1/2 War Strategy" in *Perceptions*, (Ankara) Vol. 1 No. 1 (March-May 1996), p. 41.
15. Stearns, *op.cit.*, pp. 100-101.
16. See citations in note 11 above.
17. *Ibid*.

18. Stearns, *op.cit.*, pp. 100.
19. See Laipson, **The Seven-Ten Ratio and Military Aid to Greece and Turkey**, *op.cit.*, p.4-5.
20. *Ibid.* See also Stearns discussion of the matter in chapter 3 (pp.40-50) of his excellent monograph. Stearns credits the Greeks for inventing the ratio by comparing the aggregate US aid totals to Greece and Turkey from 1946 to 1976 and demanding the ratio resulting from the comparison, in the 1977 negotiations.
21. For the text of the relevant legislation see Appendix C, (p.21) in Laipson, **The Seven Ten Ratio in Military Aid to Greece and Turkey**, *op.cit.*, pp.21-22.
22. *Ibid.* p.5
23. On Perle's thinking see his article, "Turkey and US Military Assistance" in George S. Harris, **The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations** (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, The Foreign Policy Institute of Ankara, 1985), pp. 23-26.
24. On the upgraded and strategic role of Turkey during the period see the contributions in Harris, *op.cit.*, On the Pentagon's plans to turn Turkey into a staging post for the Rapid Development Force and Perle's decisive role in this see Evripides L. Evriviades, "The Evolving Role of Turkey in US Contingency Planning and Soviet Reaction", study submitted at the John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, 1984.
25. Stearns, *op.cit.*, p. 45. Stearns demonstrates the spuriousness of this argument.
26. Actually in the eighties millions in military credits for Greece accumulated and were unused at a time when Turkey was absorbing its credits as fast as it could obtain them. The reasons for this situation were complicated but they also had to do with Greek procrastination in deciding how to spend the credits. This condition was seized upon by Administration officials (Richard Perle) who argued that since Greece was not using its credits it did not need them and there was no need for them. Therefore there was no threat from Turkey and the 7:10 ratio should be abolished.
27. Stearns, *op. cit.*, p. 43-44.
28. *Ibid.*
29. The on and off restrictions and closings of US military bases in Turkey commenced with the 1964 Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter that so incensed the Turks. It has gone on regularly ever since even in the aftermath of the lifting of the partial arms embargo. It has become a favorite Turkish tactic in negotiations with the Americans even in non military matters such as trade negotiations. And it is practised to this day with regards to American military activity at Incirlik base, for example, where the Americans are limited by a quota on how many planes they can deploy.
30. Cf. Van Coufoudakis "PASOK on Greco-Turkish Relations and Cyprus, 1981-1989: Ideology, Pragmatism, Deadlock," in Kariotis, *op.cit.*, pp. 161-178.

31. Iatrides, *op.cit.*, highlights these costs.

32. That is why those who knew him from his long sojourn in the US or got to know him extensively in Greece had no serious trouble with his outlook and disposition. Such persons included the prominent economist John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert Kennedy, Ambassador Monteagle Stearns and others. See also the critique against Papandreou by James Petras "The Contradictions of Greek Socialism" in Kariotis, *op.cit.*, esp. 115-119. According to Petras "Andreas Papandreou virtually abandoned even the bourgeois liberal legacy of his father and made Greece safer for US interests than at any time since the late Fifties."

33. On the American role see Mehmet Ali Birand, *The General's Coup in Turkey* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987), pp. 84-85.

34. See Iatrides, *op.cit.* p. 157. For the text of this agreement and other relevant and useful information see US House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee in Europe and the Middle East, Committee Print, U.S. Military Installations in NATO's Southern Region, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, October 7, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 329-346.

35. The account that follows is based on the author's notes and recollections while serving as an official of the Cyprus government in Washington during the period of the crisis.

36. The American officer involved was Colonel Ed Moore. The backchannel with Papandreou's office was established through a Greek journalist working in Washington.

37. See also the Kapsis account in his book cited earlier (note 4). No mention of the American role is made in this account.

38. On Davos see the Kapsis accounts and the documents cited. Cf. also Dimitri Conostas, editor, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s* (London: MacMillan, 1991).

39. Papandreou and the Socialists were by then discredited by a series of scandals. Papandreou had had serious health and personal problems and he was furthermore accused of corruption. Many of his top associates were put on trial or went to trial. On the other hand Prime Minister Mitsotakis was treated to the red carpet by the Bush Administration during his Washington visit.

40. The US has been extremely sensitive to Greek concerns over the Macedonian problem and implemented a sophisticated policy in order not to alienate Greece. The American Ambassador to Greece at the time, Thomas Niles, played an important role in this regard.

41. The Imia crisis had produced an avalanche of material. An informative and revealing work which includes extremely useful documentation on the crisis and on the Turkish mindset can be found in Alkis Kourkoulas, *Imia: Kritiki Prosegkisi tou Tourkikou Paragonta*. (Athina: I.Sideris, 1997). (In Greek in the text) See also Carol Midgalovitz, *Greece and Turkey Aegean Issues - Background and Recent Developments* (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service,

April 21, 1997) and idem, *Greece and Turkey: The Rocky Islet Crisis* (The Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, March 7, 1996).

42. See "Turkey's War Arsenal Grows", *Cosmos*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (October 1995), p. 2 (Analytical newsletter published monthly by the Institute of International Relations, Athens. See also the *Military Expenditure Database of SIPRI*, "Turkey, military spending 1986-1995" (www.sipri.se/) and also *SIPRI Yearbook 1996* - Chapter 8. During the 1993-95 period Turkey led all European states in arms import expenditure by spending USD 3 billion on arms.

43. See Athanasios Platias "Synergasia i Antagonismos me tin Tourkia; Realistiki Prosegkisi" *Epetirida Institutou Diethnon Scheseon 1996* (Athina: I.Sideris, 1996), sel. 17-29. (In Greek in the text)

44. On the alliance between the two countries see Marios L. Evriviades, "Israel and Turkey: An Alliance Now Flaunted," *The Greek-American*, July 20 1996. See also Marios Evriviades "I Prosfati Symfonia Isra'îl-Tourkias: Politiko-praktiki Simasia kai Epiptoseis", *Tetradia* Tomos 39-41. (Anoixi-Chimonas 1996) sel. 31-42. (In Greek in the text)

45. On this see the insightful suggestions by Ambassador Stearns in his study already cited. Stearns suggests a direct US and NATO involvement with a NATO guarantee of a Greek-Turkish non-aggression pact. See pp. 79-80 and pp. 145-153.

46. On the transformation of Greece see P. Nikiforos Diamantouros, "Greek Politics and Society in the 1990s" in Graham T. Allison, Kalypso Nicolaidis, editors, *The Greek Paradox* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 23-34.

47. The text of Ambassadorial nominee Nicholas Burns before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of September 23, 1997 has been made available through the "News from the USIA Washington File" on the Internet.