

# Fetishistic Internationalism: Jousting with unreality in Greece

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## RÉSUMÉ

Cette analyse se veut fondamentalement une étude de la philosophie politique des relations internationales, en relation avec les tendances générales et la diplomatie d'un petit pays comme la Grèce. L'auteur explore quelques aspects fondamentaux de la théorie actuelle des relations internationales, plus particulièrement ceux qui concernent les nouvelles tendances et structures au niveau international. En se référant sur les approches alternatives développées dans les années 90, l'auteur conclut qu'aucune de ces approches n'est crédible face au paradigme de la souveraineté-anarchie.

Se penchant sur le cas de la Grèce, l'auteur se réfère à des points de vue représentatifs qui montrent que le discours académique et politique, endorse presque sans questionnement, la forme la plus radicale de "l'idéologie néo-libérale". Enfin, l'auteur suggère que la politique étrangère d'un petit pays est soit rationnelle, avec comme critère et axiome suprêmes, l'intérêt national, soit irrationnelle; dans ce deuxième cas, elle est improductive.

## ABSTRACT

This analysis is basically a study of political philosophy of international relations relating both to general trends and to the diplomacy of a small state, namely Greece. The author examines some fundamental aspects of current IR theory as regards evolving trends and structures at the international level. Referring to alternative approaches as they develop in the 1990s, the author concludes that, no credible alternative to the sovereignty/anarchy paradigm is provided. Turning to Greece, the author refers to representative views which show the academic and political discourse endorse, almost unquestionably, the most radical form of "neoliberal ideology". The foreign policy of a small state, it is suggested, is either rational, in which case it has national interest as a supreme criterion and as a beacon for orientation, or it is irrational and counterproductive.

## Introduction and Some Basic Questions

This article attempts to sketch some basic trends as regards Greek foreign policy. What are the main issues for Greek national strategy? As any other small state situated in an unstable region like the Balkans, Greece faces foreign policy and defense dilemmas.<sup>1</sup> When a country faces direct military threats, one crucial issue is the adoption and implementation of an effective deterrence strategy.<sup>2</sup> Vital preconditions for effectiveness include the ability to define and achieve consensus across a critical mass of

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the societal corpus - the 'survival' and the 'vital' national interests, plus the ability to adopt rational diplomatic and military strategies in harmony with the predominant trends in interstate relations.<sup>3</sup> The questions Greek politicians should ask are many and the answers controversial and complex: Is the international system a self-help system? Perhaps the degree of regulation and governance at the interstate level allows for relaxation and reduction of the defense effort.<sup>4</sup> Should, however, the threatened nation face the dangers along the lines of internal and external balancing? Perhaps the appropriate diplomatic course is reliance on international instances such as the United Nations or the International Court of Justice. Should one country's diplomacy favor 'international intervention' in the internal affairs of other sovereign states? Should Greek diplomats favor NATO's development into a regional security organization with far reaching competencies as regards interstate (or even intra-state) disputes? Or, should it favor its gradual abolition and the creation of a "Federal Europe" with collective military capability?

Should Greek diplomacy submit to hegemonic demands, because, as some argue, this is something inevitable? Or, should it, instead, in its relations to bigger powers, continuously pursue autonomy of decision making and independently minded diplomatic attitudes? Should, diplomatic representatives, pursue a balanced patron-client relationship? Should they, instead, seek big powers' benevolence by systematically and unconditionally supporting their strategic aims? Further questions may query international institutions as an independent variable and international politics as dependent variable. Of course, the wisdom and the very definition of international law may be questioned. How is international law influencing great power strategies? Lastly, if Greece appeals for the application of international law in the Aegean sea or Cyprus, how do big powers determine their positions?

The answers to the above questions are paramount for all states - small and large, weak and strong. In all cases, a precondition for rational answers is the correct evaluation of the "form and character" of the international system in the historical and contemporary context. That is, a critical mass, both at the élite and societal level, should be competent enough so as to think, plan and function, in ways which do not contradict underlying trends in the international system. Undoubtedly, at the élite level, the issue is, *inter alia*, related to the talents of the political and military leadership; i.e., its wisdom, and its knowledge of historical and geopolitical trends. Farsighted leaders ignore opposition and seek to follow strategies which strengthen their nations' role and position in the international system.<sup>5</sup> Historical evidence, even in the exceptional case of Woodrow Wilson, is telling: Utopianism / internationalism and diplomacy based on

national interests are incompatible concepts. Utopian political leadership, in other words, leadership which ranks its utopian philosophical preferences higher than rational considerations of international reality, could prove detrimental for the security and the other national interests of the country. Small states cannot afford utopianism and (diplomatic) jousting with unreality.

In order to comprehend the utopian and distorted character of Greek internationalist dogmas, it is necessary to include, in the forthcoming pages, some elementary analysis of the basic dilemmas and issues in current international relations theory. Included are an outline of the debate among IR theorists, a projection of the trends in the post-Cold War era and an attempt at conclusions relevant to the foreign policy of a small state such as Greece. Since the purpose is not to offer an introduction to current International Relations (IR) theory, the references to the debate will not be extensive.

### **Greek Internationalism: *Prolegomena***

Greek internationalism is composed of many stripes, colors and shades. The three most identifiable brands of Greek internationalism are, first, mainstream communist thinking of the Stalinist tradition, second, neo-liberal internationalism and, third, European supranationalism.<sup>6</sup> In the 1990s, a predominant trend cut across traditional political parties and produced a most peculiar 'ideological animal' which draws from all three traditions<sup>7</sup> and converges on a common neo-ultra conservative/neoliberal platform.<sup>8</sup> In other words it acknowledges American hegemony in a way which differs little from corresponding ultra-conservative political attitudes of the 1940s.<sup>9</sup> External penetration and external dependence since Greek independence prevented the development of an identifiable 'indigenous' ideology regarding Greece's foreign policy<sup>10</sup>, its role in regional and world affairs and its fundamental orientations regarding vital national interests in time and in space. In terms of IR theory, the Greek state of the 1990s is, ideologically, a most "penetrated" political system. Certainly, the purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that the antidote to ultra-conservatism is a reversion to missionary anti-imperialistic rhetoric in Greek foreign policy in a way which reproduces the counterproductive attitudes of the 1980s. Instead the purpose is to suggest that modern diplomacy should not be regarded as a zero sum game between options whose color is limited solely to "black and white". The dialectics of missionary anti-imperialistic rhetoric is a completely different thing if compared to what is suggested here: 1) internal balancing and a defense policy safeguarding a robust deterrence strategy against external threats, 2) external balancing of threats through rational external linkages, 3)

prudent as well as "cool" strategies which seek balanced patron-client relations with big powers, and 4) attitudes and policies which ceaselessly aim at strengthening state sovereignty, at increasing national autonomy and at safeguarding sufficient margins of national independence. Such approaches, it is suggested here, are incompatible with internationalist ideologies of all shades and of all colors. In any one country, a foreign policy is either rational, in which case it has national interest as a supreme criterion and a beacon for orientation, or it is irrational and counter-productive because it is thrown off by the baffling winds of internationalist nonsense or alien criteria by external actors which penetrated the political and societal system. As argued in this paper, fetishist internationalism has traditionally been some sort of political epidemic casting a shadow over Greek diplomacy throughout the post war era.

#### INTERNATIONALISM IN GREECE AND ELSEWHERE:

#### **Misconception of Interstate Reality in Historical and Contemporary Context**

##### **Some Basic Questions**

A basic question regarding peace and stability at the international level refers to the degree of governance or anarchy in the international system. Another basic issue, possibly the single most important source of conflict in interstate relations, refers to hegemony. That is to the cases when stronger states or their agents attempt to achieve a dominant position and to benefit from superior/subordinate or strong/weak relationships. Hegemonic behavior may result in unwarranted influence or may lead to resistance by the subordinate unit and eventually even to conflict. Irrespective of morals in such a situation, there may also be "temporary"<sup>11</sup> hegemonic governance and stability.

Implementing fully the principle<sup>12</sup> of state sovereignty or establishing supranational rules and institutions beyond the nation state is an endeavor related to extremely complex and controversial issues. The world is divided into distinct and heterogeneous polities aspiring to autonomy, independence and sovereignty. That is, we have a world fragmented into distinct "nation states".<sup>13</sup> The system is thus diffused and fragmented in terms of ethics, culture and governing rules.

This societal fragmentation preceded the establishment of the international -politically fragmented - system based on distinct normative structures.<sup>14</sup> That is, society precedes normative structures. The problem with utopian thinking in international relations, be it in hegemonic states

or in small states such as Greece, is that purpose and fact are often confused. In international relations, as Edward H. Carr notes, "the utopian sets up an ethical standard which purports to be independent of politics, and seeks to make politics conform to it. ... the absolute standard of the utopian is conditioned and dictated by the social order, and is therefore political. Morality can only be relative not universal. Ethics must be interpreted in terms of politics; and the search for an ethical norm outside politics is doomed to frustration".<sup>15</sup>

At issue here are the norms and values for regulating relations among the distinct states of the world. How then are interstate relations regulated? Do we have constant balance of power which provides stability (and, unfortunately so, at certain cases instability)? However questionable in ethical terms, do we have hegemonic regulation and hegemonic stability? By eroding national sovereignty and by escaping state control, is the 'invisible hand' of transnational actors going to regulate the system? Or, alternatively, is the 'hand' of the transnational forces, such as multinationals or means of mass communication regulating the system for the benefit of the 'metropolis'? 'Interdependence' and 'penetration',<sup>16</sup> are they by themselves, regulating processes? Or do they operate for the benefit of the strong and for the detriment of the weak?<sup>17</sup> These questions and dilemmas suffice to make obvious that the issue of regulation of interstate relations involves complex and controversial questions.

The absence of legitimate governance at the international level is what makes the world anarchic. In such a context, each different and distinct nation state makes up its foreign policy decisions on the grounds of what its members perceive as their collective national interest. Perceptions of national interest at the level of the nation state is therefore the single most important input in diplomatic behavior. It is also the most rational basis for interstate interactions.<sup>18</sup> International institutions and international normative settings of whatever kind, certainly play a role. However, they are intermediary variables, the dependent variables of war / peace / cooperation / conflict and the independent variable of international politics; in other words, the interaction of national interest and consequences of anarchy and structural shifts of power at the global level.<sup>19</sup> National interests and interactions among the poles of power at the regional and the world levels are the decisive factors which influence the form and character of whatever normative structures exist beyond state sovereignty.<sup>20</sup> Any international normative order and its operation draw legitimacy not from a coherent and identifiable societal corpus, but from the predominant balance of power making up the international system.<sup>21</sup> An important characteristic of this sort of normative structure is its democratic deficit and the many opportunities it provides for hegemonic powers

to achieve hierarchical dominance and superior/subordinate relationships.<sup>22</sup> In fact, by definition, any normative structure at the international level which remains without a controlling societal corpus is 1) either essentially intergovernmental, 2) or hegemonic (or 3) a combination of the two). Various ideas proposed in the 1990s lead to a paternalistic institutionalized hegemonic control in new and existing intergovernmental organizations. These ideas will be explored in what follows.

Cosmopolitanism<sup>23</sup>, as a political stand in a small state, is of little or no relevance to the real world, diplomatic practice, foreign policy goals and priorities. An abundance of historical evidence and the very history of the United States<sup>24</sup>, leave no doubt that cosmopolitan rhetoric has always been the mantle of hegemonic aspirations. It is precisely in this context that, Edward H. Carr, in his 1939 monumental analysis of perennial value, observed that, "pleas for international solidarity and world union comes from those dominant nations which may hope to exercise control over a unified world".<sup>25</sup> Also Carr "diagnosed" that, nebulous statements on "orders" over and above state sovereignty are never "innocent". This is a symptom, he pointed out, not of a change of heart, but of the fact that they are now approaching the time when they may become strong enough to espouse internationalism. 'International order' and 'international solidarity' will always be slogans of those who feel strong enough to impose it on the others."<sup>26</sup>

In other words, internationalist rhetoric is the privilege of the strong. As the Athenian diplomats pronounced to the Melian representatives in the famous dialogue reproduced by Thucydides, 'in fact, the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept'.<sup>27</sup> In fact, state sovereignty essentially exists to safeguard the weak through the exercise of internal self-determination in accordance with predominant preferences within each societal system. This is particularly significant for weak states. If cosmopolitanism prevails, if borderlines defined by the existence of heterogeneous and distinct sovereignties are eliminated, the sovereignty of smaller states would be penetrated, thus easing the way for the power factors of the strong states. Another serious side effect, of course, would be the shift from the state of anarchy (no governance over and above the states) to the state of chaos (all against all and a paradise for criminals, opportunists, mafia and everyone else who dislikes regulation at the international level).

At the international level, the regulation of transactions among groups or individuals necessitates either benevolence (by the stronger units of the system) or an international authority which would distribute roles, costs and benefits in a way acceptable to all parties involved. Hitherto the only

and the imperfect method is defined by the principle of state sovereignty, which prevents chaos and provides tolerable/acceptable regulation in the context of a *de facto* anarchic international context. Interestingly, even authors searching for alternative international regimes acknowledge the fact that state sovereignty is the only 'institution' on the basis of which some sort of regulation at the international level is accomplished. Robert Keohane, for example, acknowledges that, "Hobbes dilemma cannot be ignored. Without well developed constitutional institutions, the alternative (to state sovereignty) in many countries lie between anarchy and predation, neither of which is attractive".<sup>28</sup> This said, it is now time to sketch the fundamental characteristics of the international system.

### **State Sovereignty, Hegemony and International Law: Complex Interrelationships**

One way to begin is to identify borderlines between interstate and intrastate order. Once the current state of affairs regarding governance is defined, another way is to distinguish between 'many' and 'few' international normative structures. (Please see table.) As earlier supported, the fundamental character of intrastate order is the existence of a societal corpus and institutions drawing their legitimacy from it; i.e., the existence of a viable normative structure. (Please see column one.) Correspondingly, the basic characteristics of the intrastate order are heterogeneity among the units, absence of a regulating overlay, unequal growth among the states and constant hegemonic behavior.

What is 'international law' and what is the role of international organizations?<sup>29</sup> In a non-legalistic definition, the underpinnings of international law may be four basic principles: 1) interstate parity, 2) non intervention in the internal affairs of other states, 3) no use of violence (or threat to use violence), 4) adherence to peaceful means to solve disputes and societal self-determination within the boundaries of each state. The fact that states do not always respect them is subsequent to the fact we have "principles" and not "rules" (as we understand them in the social and institutional context of interstate order). Expressed differently, while for intrastate rules the terms for political interchange are defined in the context of a critical societal consensus, the rules at the international level are inevitably conditioned by the complexity of international politics, the antagonistic national interests and the fragmented societal base. Fundamentally, at the international level, we do not speak about a strictly binding legal structure<sup>30</sup>, but about principles which the states promise - basically a political promise - to abide by. When a state violates these principles, none exists to 'enforce the law'.<sup>31</sup> Only rarely and only when big powers are in agreement, the Security Council of the United Nations compels competing parties to

comply. This may be attributed either to the defender's ability to face the threat, or the existence of strong national interests held in other states which will unilaterally or through the Security Council take action against the aggressor. As regards the latter aspect, it is common knowledge that the preconditions for an effective Security Council intervention is agreement among the permanent members, and strong interest by one or more permanent members.

### **A Brief Review of the Debate in IR Theory**

The debate among IR theorists on alternative organizational structures, particularly in relation to collective security, is controversial and open-ended. Earlier this century, Rationalists, Grotians and Realist analysts, were disciplined in respecting the borderline separating utopian or imaginary schemes and pragmatic approaches which pursued peace and stability on the grounds of the principle of state sovereignty.<sup>32</sup> The evolution of the theory of international relations since World War II is adventuresome. In the course of the three decades following this war, monumental works by such scholars as Edward H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, George Kennan and Henry Kissinger were succeeded by a wave of writings of, by and large, marginal value. In many writings, especially by behaviourists, only scant attention was given to the fundamental causes of instability and conflict, much less so to the internal logic, the philosophical questions and the moral foundations of ethics of interstate relations and of 'international interventions'. The fragmentation of the world into distinct societies, which if not peacefully integrated are perpetually aspiring for power, sovereignty, autonomy and fulfillment of national interests, were all questions overlooked on the grounds of ideological and other expediencies.<sup>33</sup> The common ground of many writings was, first, a nebulous (and misleading) attachment to universality (and "idealism"), concepts never really defined with precision; second, a nebulous and never really explained ideological hostility against state sovereignty as the principle governing regime of the international system; third, an equally nebulous support of transnational, supranational and internationalist institutions<sup>34</sup> and, fourth, as regards methodology, attachment to an almost irrelevant empiricism.

Phrased differently, instead of setting out as primary and pragmatic objective the implementation of the Westphalia model, the political and academic debate was overflowed with unrealistic proposals for its transgression.<sup>35</sup> Still, societal and political reality at the world level makes the Westphalia model the only credible set of principles which, if respected, could form the basis for the *de facto* achievement of some sort of collective security system; i.e., an effective system which secures state



sovereignty as the governing regime of the international system. However, the Westphalia principles were never really implemented. Few would disagree that the single most important factor for this fact, was revisionism and hegemonic ambitions. Nonetheless, many focused their attention on supranationalism or even on more nebulous internationalist ideas<sup>36</sup> which targeted state sovereignty as the cause of nationalism, conflict and instability, and paid little or no attention to the principal cause of conflict, that is, hegemony and revisionism.

The transgression of “state sovereignty” as the regime on the basis of which the organization of the international system takes place, necessitates credible and workable proposals on at least two issues. First, approaches to overcome the societal heterogeneity of the world without violence and genocide, leading to the predominance of the strong and extermination, absorption or subordination of the weak. Second, the disappearance of hegemonic behavior among groups of differing strength, size, differential rates of growth and unequal capabilities.

The basic thesis on the aforementioned issues relies on four assumptions:

- First, there is only one kind of collective security system, the ‘ideal’, that is, basically, the one approaching the principles embodied in the Society of Nations.

- Second, a collective security system is viable only if big powers accept to respect the sovereignty of other nations and to commit the necessary resources for the restoration of state sovereignty, if and when it is attacked by revisionist states.

- Third, a collective security system is not an internationalist, transnationalist or supranational endeavor. It is precisely the opposite, that is, it is a set of principles aiming - on the basis of state sovereignty - at helping the state to defend itself against external aggression.

- Fourth, it could not get into nation-building activities. Instead, it could only strictly abide by what it is currently stipulated in Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, that is: “nothing shall authorize to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state”. In other words internal self-determination of independent societal systems should be respected and guarded against revisionism and hegemony.

International normative structures which would fail to take into account the political and social conditions are by definition deadlocked and confounded to failure by their inherent contradictions.<sup>37</sup> All prospective internationalist schemes must take into account the fact that the international societal structure is characterized by fragmentation. It does not exist one world society but one world composed of many different and

distinct societies. At the level of each distinct society, it takes place a distinct and different process of articulation and aggregation of interests, morals and values, as well as a distinct process of political socialization and recruitment.<sup>38</sup> Consequently, moral values and norms are fragmented leading to a corresponding number of state structures whose societies aspire to independence, sovereignty and undisturbed self-determination.

In a rather perennial process, the strongest units attempt to penetrate and promote their power factors while the weaker units struggle to deter attacks or establish a balanced framework of patron-client relations. Moreover, another political characteristic of the international system is that differing societal structures often lead to differing preferences on norms and values as regards global issues. A corollary of this reality is the differing opinions as to what is 'best for the world', that is, what is right or good for the 'universe of mankind'. As Hedley Bull correctly noted, "there is, indeed, no lack of appointed spokesmen of the common good of "space-ship earth"... In the end of course, it is confirmed that universal ideologies that are espoused by states are notoriously subservient to their special interests".<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Edward H. Carr notes that leaders such as Woodrow Wilson, Lord Cecil and Hitler, when they speak about the 'supreme interest of the same world' are in effect making the same claim, 'that their countrymen are the bearers of a higher ethic'.<sup>40</sup> 'Pleas for international solidarity and world union come from those dominant nations which may hope to exercise control over a unified world'.<sup>41</sup> Historical evidence suggests that, 'supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based on particular interpretation of national interest at particular time'.<sup>42</sup>

A fact never understood by Greek utopians is that interstate relations should be distinguished from inter-personal relations, two completely different matters. Similarly, that the internal logic and interconnections of such concepts as law, order, justice, morality, values and vision for a better world in the context of any given society, have a completely different application at the international level. These theoretical propositions, put forward by scholars such as Carr<sup>43</sup>, Bull<sup>44</sup> and Kennan<sup>45</sup>, are relevant to the position taken earlier, that the application of "law and order" at the interstate level is a completely different matter than law and order within the boundaries of any state. Expectations by the leaders of small states should be conditioned by this cruel reality. If they fail to do so, their states could be severely penalized.

At the intra-state level, order, the collective security of its members and parity before the law, are legal matters for the respect of which exist a normative structure, including police, courts of justice and societal "checks

and balances". Rules and the legitimizing moral values are defined by an identifiable social body. At the interstate level, most relations not only are of antagonistic, controversial and fluctuating nature, but in addition, there are no clear and easily identifiable norms and values to guide their application. For that very reason, order and security fluctuates in accordance to the national interests concerned, the differing (collective) moral values of the parties involved and the constellation of power relations at the desired level.

The reasons explaining convergence among states are limited and restricted to some broad principles, yet there could be several. First, states and their societies, are reluctant to accept anyone outside their boundaries as the one which determines the form and function of their internal interactions. Second and related, at any level and in all cases, a regulating authority is not ephemeral, only if it is founded on an articulated and sustainable societal system. At the required level, be it the world, a region or a state, a critical mass of people must converge on the definition of a critical mass of norms and values. At the international level, the fluctuation or differing societal situations debase transnational arrangements because they are not founded on such a critical and sustainable consensus. Third, one of the few substantial constraints that states accept, which stems directly from the above-mentioned principle of state sovereignty, is the commitment not to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Still, few accept it wholly. Most states continually try to penetrate others in order to increase their influence, although not always at the interest of the recipient. Fourth, there are objective and probably insurmountable difficulties in any attempt to reach a universal or regional consensus on great issues, great conflicts and historical antagonism among collectivities. History abounds with the effects of religion, culture, collective memories, ideology, differentials in economic growth, geopolitical antagonism for the control of resources or access to resources, and differing perceptions as to what is good or bad on many other international issues. Fifth, continuously guaranteeing the interstate territorial and sovereignty boundaries is probably not feasible. One should observe, in this respect, that territorial claims and other revisionist behavior not always unjustified or uncontroversial<sup>46</sup> relates to the fluctuations of power and the "windows of opportunity" created by these fluctuations. Sixth, as made clear from UN discussions on defining aggression and other related international practices, actual aggression is realized when it already has taken place. Thereafter, the process leads to the adaptation of the weak part to the faits accomplis rather than to the restoration of the territorial status quo ante.<sup>47</sup> Seventh, while within each state moral values and norms are the prerogative of a pre-defined societal corpus, at the international level, any attempt

to impose norms and values defined by other societies generates hostility. This hostility is almost always justified because hegemony is the rule rather than the exception. No doubt the prerogative to define the norms belongs to the strong and the strong who see matters from the angle of the prevailing values in its society.

In short, no credible internationalist scheme is identifiable on the horizon of international relations. Clearly seen are the following:

- 1) An ever increasing hegemonic tendency by dominant powers;
- 2) Globalization, interdependence and dependence which cause asymmetries in economic and political relations among states;
- 3) Immense problems in the North/South divide;
- 4) Anarchy and absence of legitimate international governance, and
- 5) very few chances to see international law and the Westphalia model (parity, non intervention, internal self-determination, no use of force) fully implemented. The preceding analysis, leads to the conclusion that we live in an 'imperfect' world and a self-help system.

## THE TRIUMPH OF NEO-LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM IN A SMALL STATE

### The Origins of Greek Internationalism

Unlike all other states of the earth which function and behave strictly on the basis of national interest, Greece<sup>48</sup> retains an unrealistic analysis which contemplates the world as cosmopolitan and the international system as governed by an ever-growing set of 'internationalist' norms and values<sup>49</sup> to which Greece, even at the expense of its vital national interests, is compelled to comply. References to positions taken by a representative sample<sup>50</sup> of academics, diplomats, intellectuals, politicians and 'mainstream' columnists in Greek media<sup>51</sup> reveal the paradox.

It should be noted that, as argued elsewhere<sup>52</sup>, theoretical speculation on international relations theory in Greece is poor or inexistent. Most often, publicly expressed opinions on international relations are not based on any valid theory but simply express the personal views of the writer. Until recently<sup>53</sup>, Greek diplomacy was tormented by internationalist rhetoric of Marxist origin. It is no exaggeration to argue that the majority of Greek intellectuals, who nowadays espouse neo-liberal doctrines, have their intellectual roots in Marxist internationalism. At the dawn of the 21st century, we observe the opposite. Nowadays mainstream thinkers, even of Marxist origin, either adopt fully the neo-liberal argument or adapt to the prevailing conventional wisdom on the superior powers of 'globalizing forces' with regard to which Greece has no option but to submit, in a process of a 'damage control' exercise. The most salient characteristic of

Greek academic writing on international relations, which has profound repercussions on Greek diplomacy, is the almost uncritical reproduction of controversial neo-liberal positions regarding the role of trade, economic interdependence, institutions and democracy in the modern world.<sup>54</sup>

#### Neo-Liberal Institutionalists or Internationalism with Two Gears

As seen earlier, mainstream foreign policy assumptions of economic liberalism<sup>55</sup>, suggest that, international stability is mainly a function of international economic considerations, the existence of regulatory institutions, the advent of democracy<sup>56</sup> and other processes at the world level which promote, interdependence, integration<sup>57</sup> and institutional structures. For many neo-liberals, states are not the main actors in world politics. Some accept the centrality of the state as an objective reality<sup>58</sup> and take the normative position that this must change. Industrialization and democracy, the argument continues, increasingly create welfare states which are less oriented to power and prestige and more oriented towards economic growth and social security. "In a world of multiple issues, [it is further suggested, imperfectly linked,] in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is greatly increased."<sup>59</sup> Detached from the ethical dimension of the issue and other questions mentioned earlier regarding functionality, neo-liberals stationed in big states, have no hesitation to point out that hegemonic power may be necessary to establish cooperation among states in conditions under which states pursue this cooperation 'in their own interests'.<sup>60</sup> Of course, it is added that, "when we think about cooperation after hegemony, we need to think about institutions"<sup>61</sup>, that is, about institutions which will survive after the decline of the power of the hegemonic power.

Needless to say, while national leaders of big states, leaders such as de Gaulle, Nixon, Reagan, Thatcher and Mitterrand design their countries' strategies in an ideological environment of divine attachment to national interests, national purposes, national independence and national strategic interests, smaller states are lectured about globalization, regional cooperation, confidence-building measures, the need for institutions and about the 'anachronism of state sovereignty'. Careful retracing in academic writings reveals that this political and ideological discourse is often called another name in sophisticated neoliberal academic writings which attack sovereignty without providing a non-hegemonic and credible alternative.

At this point, a distinction could be made between internationalist neo-liberal views spelled out in a hegemonic state and internationalist neoliberal views pronounced by intellectuals or political leaders in small states. The first category, neoliberal internationalism flowing from a hegemonic

state, consciously or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, facilitates this state's power factors to penetrate smaller or weaker sovereignties. The weaker the sovereignty of a small state, the easier its penetration by spies or multinationals and the fewer the chances of the small state's achieving symmetrical interactions in the context of interstate parity and balanced patron-client relations. The second category of cosmopolitan neoliberal views in small states is by all means less straightforward. Experience in Greece<sup>62</sup> shows that, the 'spokesmen' of this sort of internationalism could very well be some politicians, but also, some professors serving other scientific fields and not aware of the neoliberal/realist debate in IR theory. In some other cases, they might be professors of economics in small states who did not have the time to study and work out in their minds the differences between economic liberalism in any given country and internationalist liberalism, which is in fact an ideology of dominant capitalist countries, and the concepts of which are analyzed in many books of political economy of international relations. (See the writings of authors such as Robert Gilpin and Immanuel Wallerstein.). Another category of cosmopolitan neoliberalism in a small state may be traced in the writings of some ideologically confused intellectuals, adherents to a 'missionary - Wilsonian' sort of diplomacy. The latter group either has little knowledge of the theoretical debate or is brainwashed and trained during their studies to think in these terms in hegemonic states by being out-talked or out-persuaded by former professors. Furthermore, given the keen interest of the agents of hegemonic powers to spread neoliberal ideas in small dependent states, one could also refer to the well known phenomenon of 'locals' seeking personal fulfillment or "touchable interests" by serving the objectives of strong external actors and their agents.<sup>63</sup> I borrow the term 'touchable interests' from Panayotis Kondylis<sup>64</sup>, a clear, articulate and distinguished scholar based in Germany. In the same article, seemingly addressed to the audiences in small countries, Kondylis points out that, 'propagandists' of globalization pay little or no attention to the prerequisites and to the internal logic of the processes which, supposedly, would induce international peace through the abrogation of the nation state. On another occasion, challenging the conventional wisdom of internationalist concepts, Kondylis notes that, the only sure thing about universalist/ecumenical views is not international peace but the transformation of all international conflicts into civil wars.<sup>65</sup>

### **The Greek (Neoliberal) Version of a 'New World Order'**

It is probably time to refer to some characteristic cases of underlying trends in Greek foreign policy analysis. One example is Nikos Mouzelis, a London-based professor well-known to the Greek public and a prolific columnist in the realm of Greek internationalist thinking. Referring to the

conclusions of two prominent and influential Greek professors, who, in 1994, predicted some sort of harmony and perpetual peace in the post cold war era<sup>66</sup>, devoted two full pages in the influential Sunday newspaper "ToVima"<sup>67</sup>, calling for a new foreign policy which would repeat the 'successful' agreements between Palestinians and Israelis, as well as the agreements in Ireland.<sup>68</sup> The political message was clear: in the new world order, regardless of a Turkish threat, Greece had the luxury to appease Ankara. The logic is simple: In the 'new world order', Palestinians are appeased. Why not Greeks? However, Nikos Mouzelis goes even further. Not only Greece should appease Turkey, but Greece should also volunteer diplomatic and strategic support to its adversary by promoting Ankara's European objectives.<sup>69</sup> In the new international context, he concludes, Greece should even play a leading role for the development of the closest possible links between Europe and Turkey.<sup>70</sup> Recessives and flexibility, he went on, are not only possible but also in Greece's interests.<sup>71</sup> Another leading analyst and a distinguished professor of sociology is Kostantinos Tsoukalas. As a columnist and a professor very close to the highest political echelons<sup>72</sup>, Tsoukalas is known to prefer analysis not only of philosophical questions but also of issues relevant to international relations. Analyzing the issue of globalization, the well-known leftist professor of the 'utopian era' (May 1968), reaches conclusions which could not be closer to the neo-liberal assumptions about the irreversible globalizing forces. In rather axiomatic terms, he comes to the conclusion that, through economic development, the world's capitalist system already homogenized world structures limiting national exclusiveness in the spheres of symbols, language, art and entertainment.<sup>73</sup> The reproduction of an ecumenical ruling system, based on the fragmentation of the impoverished political and the predominance of supranational capital, may be able to carry the day.<sup>74</sup> Without determining the exact nature of the emerging international rule, he goes on to observe that "...no society is able to determine its own perception for its global future. .... compulsory adherence to national traditions, therefore, functions as an ecumenical alibi which rejects the already preponderant homogenizing processes".<sup>75</sup> On another occasion, Tsoukalas became more specific when he endorsed the emergence of an utopic new European political consciousness, which could, as he argues, prove of historic significance for Europe and the world at large.<sup>76</sup>

Evidently leading analysts, whose views are by all means the dominant strand of thinking in Greece, regard with fetishism the 'new world order' and international political integration, phenomena which take place in the context of the post-cold war era. In all the writings of Greek intellectuals, hegemony, an esoteric element of all collective endeavors, is overlooked, forgotten or underestimated. In this prospective international system, even

for specialists, that is, even for IR academics and political philosophers, questions referring to values, morality, justice, violence, authority, rule and governance at the world level, are all disregarded, degraded or taken for granted. The philosophers state the obvious (globalization, interdependence, transgression of sovereignty), without, however, examining the many questions of political philosophy which such a process poses with regard to existential matters, e.g., the associations between the specific and general, between the real and fictitious. What, after all, does this mean for a small state like Greece? Ariadne's clue as threaded through the political thinking of some Greek intellectuals, is left no doubt. At the outset, intellectual unrest is caused by deeply rooted philosophical reservations about the 'appropriateness' of the nation state as the principal unit in international relations.<sup>77</sup> The same reservations are also evident with regard to national consciousness, national identity and national culture as appropriate concepts in the 'modern world'. The least they could concede to the nation-state and to the national cultures is that they are unavoidable evils to be washed away eventually by the irresistible forces of internationalism, integration and interdependence.<sup>78</sup> Interests, culture and moral values, it is supported, are articulated and aggregated at the global level, inevitably making the nation-state an anachronism and national identities a danger for peace, stability and world order.

Among Greek intellectuals, fetishist expectations for a classless international system, or, alternatively, a neo-liberal cosmopolitan peaceful 'world of trading citizens', lead to a process of perpetual questioning of the nation-state, of national consciousness, of national identity and of national interest. Furthermore, in the context of these imaginary emerging 'new world orders', whose democratic deficit escapes the attention of most Greek analysts, Greece's chances of survival rest in resignation and submission to the dictates of those - never clearly identified - commanding the 'globalizing processes'. It is only natural that, in such a context, analysis does not explain how the government of a small state claims and wins its vital interests. What is more urgent for a small state's foreign policy, according to Greek conventional wisdom, is to explain what is the best 'damage limitation exercise'.<sup>79</sup> Similarly, small nation-states are either by definition constrained to follow the dictates of the dominant powers or are expendable for the cause of imaginary homogenized worlds.

With regard to the political implications of globalization, a recent book written by Panayiotis Yennimatas<sup>80</sup>, Vice-President of the European Investment Bank, produces a genuine argument suitable for a penetrated and dependent small state. Essentially, Yennimatas exemplifies the widespread but not always spelt out view that the Greek nation-state has no chance of acting autonomously and independently. In an approach charac-



teristic of contemporary foreign analysis in Greece, the focus is on limits and limitations rather than on capabilities and possibilities. "In international society, the margins of free ethnocentric options are relative. ... The structure of contemporary international community, international law, the complex interrelations of power, internationalization of economics, institutionalized alliance commitments or other commitments of a small state, impose objective commitments and limitations on the exercise of national policy, to the extent that, in the end, national strategy is impossible, it loses the character of autonomous national action and acquires the character of passive adaptation to the structural predicaments of the environment".<sup>81</sup> Further on, the author argues that "the concept of nation-state as the subject of international relations and the concept of national power as a full expression of national interest is an empty and obsolete formalism, if no reference is made to the specific social configuration the nation-state is integrating".<sup>82</sup> Making these arguments more specific, he goes on to suggest something inconceivable in big states where the neoliberal ideas originated. As it is written, "the concept of limited autonomy in the decision making process when political and strategic objectives are formulated, ... does not mean setting these objectives externally. Precisely, it means the political 'internalization' of the limits, limitations and barriers imposed by the international system in the decision making process".<sup>83</sup> The implications are more than obvious. These arguments were supported by former minister of Foreign Affairs Papakostantinou who presented the book at its launching, when he said that they should become 'Greece's national anthem'. This line of argumentation is actually proposing the commitment of an act of self-abnegation/self-deprecation leading to 'Finlandization' for a forthcoming imaginary international order in the context of which nation-states are expendable. Even more importantly, it is supported that, not only small states could not resist this inescapable reality, but also that, they should internalize the constraints imposed by this reality. In other words, the organic structure of small states should be adapted to the prevailing structure of the balance of power at the world level, be it military power, financial power or trading capabilities of big governmental or non governmental actors. The ideological underpinnings of these views, by and large dominant in Greece, become more than obvious when the author compares the — basically involuntary and forced through threats — limited autonomy/sovereignty of Finland with neoliberal arguments as regards an interdependent and increasingly integrated world. As he put it, "an extreme example of committed national action has always been the case of formally sovereign Finland (the term 'Finlandization' is essentially synonymous to limited sovereignty)".<sup>84</sup> In other words, subordination and submission to power is envisaged by Greek intellectuals as the inevitable fate of small states in the face of

integration, interdependence and complex governmental or non-governmental interactions.<sup>85</sup> No neoliberal analyst has pushed the argument to its logical conclusion as Panayiotis Yennimatas does, or, at least, not as explicitly. The fact that it is so explicitly stated in Greece and that the former foreign minister this argument as 'Greece's national anthem', is a strong indication of the state of IR analysis in Greece.

This intellectual unrest, preponderant in modern Greek politics, could only influence the political discourse. Kostas Simitis, for example, the professor and PASOK leader who succeeded Andreas Papandreou as Greek prime minister in 1996, did not elaborate on such crucial issues as social and political control. However in a 1995 interview he observed that, "the socialists, in order to fulfill their political objectives, are obliged to shape policies of supranational character. The historic challenge for the left is to revert to internationalism".<sup>86</sup> Later on in the interview, Simitis supported the construction of a supranational structure in Europe, a kind of integration whose ideological roots may be traced to the writings of some radical political idealist of the 1940s and 1950s. Namely, he supported that "history, culture, political systems, language, are all elements which separate the people of Europe." The construction of political Europe<sup>87</sup> tramples on the history of the nation-state, entails the transfer of authorities, explicit and touchable, to a supranational centre. This move would directly concern the perceptions, values and habits, and political culture of the peoples of Europe.<sup>88</sup> In other words, the nation-state and its culture are expendable in the name of internationalist experiments in Europe. Certainly such a course has long since been abandoned. Few or none outside Greece would ever make such a daring statement, that is, that European integration should 'trample on' the cultures and history of the participating member states. Indicative of the preponderant internationalist ideological trends in Greece is the fact that they are explicitly stated at the highest political echelons.

### **Some Concluding Remarks**

If the above sample of ideological and analytical trends in Greece were widespread, the policy relevant conclusions could be many. In the first place, the nature of the international system leaves no doubt: the only base for interstate interaction is national interest.<sup>89</sup> Still, as already mentioned, the Greek attachment to national interest is considered 'ultranationalism'. Both liberal and Marxist internationalist attitudes, predominant in the country's political life, are considered by Greek conventional wisdom as 'peace loving' attitudes, 'progressive' ideology and 'proper' behavior in international relations. Such attitudes, according to these dominant views, are in harmony with global trends. Greece, therefore, should swiftly adapt

and pass by short term losses. The endorsement of this logic basically calls for the partial abandonment of national interests, encompasses vital interest and even Greece's survival interest; in other words, territory and sovereignty, part of which - contrary to international law and Treaties - are claimed by countries such as Turkey and FYROM. Certainly, a non-revisionist state such as Greece has strong interest to plea for the implementation of existing international law. However, international law is neither all-encompassing nor automatic in its application.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, while some positive results may be expected on straightforward cases, when other states' interest differ from Greece's, as past experience shows<sup>91</sup>, such institutions will either turn a blind eye or give arbitrary interpretations which serve their countries' national interest. Illusions for the existence of an internationalist new order, in the context of which, solidarity is forthcoming in case of danger may prove extremely dangerous for the security of any one state. Of course for Greece, the threat posed by a militarily powerful revisionist state encompasses the survival interest as well.

This is not the place to suggest strategies<sup>92</sup> for a small state such as Greece which faces a military threat. Nonetheless, it could be pointed out that, when faced with an external threat, a nation may resort to a number of auxiliary approaches which may or may not strengthen deterrence against the aggressor. However, attention should be focused on external and internal balancing. Such a policy encompasses the following:

- 1) a prohibitive military deterrence against military threats;
- 2) a persistent diplomatic cost;
- 3) psychological cost through manipulation of deterring threats;
- 4) the development, beyond traditional Greek alliances, of robust alliances or other arrangements with the 'enemies of the enemy';
- 5) secret operations which weaken the enemy and provide valuable information about his capabilities and weaknesses, and
- 6) resistance to pressures to legitimize - politically or otherwise - claims against Greek territory.

Last but not least, any strategy should be founded on robust and infallible national morale, an inflexible refusal to negotiate on matters of sovereignty, and extreme caution to neoliberal or other internationalist intellectual exercises about the anachronism of nation-states, structures, cultures and national interests. Whatever happens in the long run, in the foreseeable and ongoing perennial process between the strong and the weak, between the deterred and the deterrees, between the one in favor of the *status quo* and the revisionist state, sovereignty would be the basic instrument to safeguard one's interests. In other words, there is no conceivable cause or reason establishing a rational which may consider the nation-state and its interests dispensable or expendable.

Though a difficult task, this article has hopefully provided enough evidence to show that this is not the preponderant view in Greece. In case of different opinions about the crucial issues briefly examined above, any query or comment will be promptly answered with further evidence and detailed analysis on views and trends.<sup>93</sup> As in any other country, the predominant political philosophy of international relations determines the life and soul of Greece's foreign policy. We should, therefore, have a clear mind as to which philosophy dominates Greek thinking and what is at stake.

## NOTES

1. The two most important security issues, by and large unchanged despite the termination of the cold war, are, first, the Turkish threat and second, instability as well as revisionism in the Balkans. From another perspective, Greek-American relations have always been crucial for Greek security. For an analysis of Greek perceptions of the Turkish threat, see Athanasios Platias, "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence", in D. Conostas / Ath. Platias, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s* (Macmillan, London, 1991). For an excellent analysis of the legal questions see Christos Rozakis, "An Analysis of the Legal Problems in Greek-Turkish Relations 1973 - 1988", *Yearbook* 1989 (Eliamep, Athens, 1990). For analysis of both the Turkish threat as well as Balkan balances in the context of the post-cold war era, see D. Conostas, "Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters", in D. Conostas / Th. Stavrou (eds) *Greece Prepares for the Twenty First Century* (The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Wash. DC, 1995). Athanasios Platias, convincingly argues that the perception that Turkey follows a revisionist strategy cuts across party lines (pp 92 - 95). Dimitris Conostas concludes that "the difficult, potentially contradictory tasks, set by new conditions in Western Europe and the Balkans, require a clear cognition of the challenges involved and the political determination necessary to meet them effectively" (p. 93).
2. For introductory analysis on the issue of the Greek deterrence strategy see (in Greek) Pan. Ifestos / Ath. Platias, *Greece's Deterrence Strategy* (Elliniki Apotreptiki Stratiyiki) (Papazisis, Athina, 1992). (Also Ath. Platias, "Greek Deterrence Strategy" in *Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies*, vol. 4, no 2 (1996) pp. 33-54).
3. By this I refer to the question of "anarchy" in the international system.
4. This is the dominant view in the political comments of some influential Sunday newspapers. In the context of the "new international order", it is often supported, emphasis should not be on deterrence but on appeasement and disarmament. This stand, implicitly or explicitly, relates to attitudes which underestimate or deny the existence of a Turkish threat.
5. For example, General De Gaulle, despite strong domestic and external opposition accelerated the French nuclear program. The General correctly sensed that, in the years ahead, nuclear power was crucial in its endeavor for international status,

national independence and national security.

Similarly, President Mitterrand surprised many of his followers when he gave the strongest possible support to the double track decision of 1979 to install the euromissiles. His decision was based on the correct assumption that the correlation of forces played distributive role in international power relations. Stronger forces between France and the adversary, supported, was a strengthening element in France's quest for national independence and diplomatic autonomy. Power disequilibrium, for Mitterrand, like for many other western leaders at the time, was the prelude for political disequilibrium and surrender to the political will of the adversary.

6. The existence of these three traditions are well known by anyone living in Greece. No scholarly analysis was found which specifically examines the influence of these internationalist ideas on Greek diplomacy since independence.

7. For corresponding traditions at the world level analyzed from the perspective of culture and international political economy, see Wallerstein Immanuel, *Geopolitics and Geoculture, Essays on the Changing World System* (Cambridge University press, 1991), esp. pp 1-15. Wallerstein refers to three leading ideologies at the world level: conservatism, liberalism and socialism, emanating from Wilsonian and Leninist eschatologies.

8. Scholarly analysis on the ideological component of Greek foreign policy is scarce. For some elements of traditional trends see (in Greek) Dimitris Conostas, "The Objectives of Greek Foreign Policy": 1974 - 1986, in D. Conostas/Ch. Tsardanidis (eds), *Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy* (Sakkoulas, Athens, 1988).

9. See below.

10. The period during which Eleptherios Venizelos governed Greece is possibly an exception to the rule. It should be also noted, of course, that, both with regard to foreign strategy and domestic policies, Venizelos changed attitudes and orientation during his last tenure of office.

11. Pax Romana prevailed over many centuries, Pax Sovietica for almost eighty years and Hitler's "new order" for only some years.

12. Turning the "principle" into a "rule of law" at the international level means 1) no revisionism, 2) respect of other states' territorial integrity, 3) respect of the right of every independent society to exercise self-determination and definition of the form and character of its normative structures.

13. As it was noted by Immanuel Wallerstein, "in the two parallel contradictions - tendency to one world vs. tendency to distinctive nation-states and tendency to one nation state vs. tendency to distinctive ethnic groups within each state - it has been the states which have had the upper hand in both contradictions". He also notes that, "the history of the world has been the very opposite of a trend towards cultural homogenization; it has rather been a trend towards cultural differentiation". See Immanuel Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, pp 189 & 192.

14. The term "normative structures", basically, refers to the norms, values and institutions. Professor Alfred Rubin of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,

considers the following as important "normative orders": Divine law, natural law, customary law, values/morality, legal orders based on positive law and comity. See his paper, "Conflict Resolution", presented to the summer educational seminar of the Institute of International Relations of Panteion University, in Corfu, Greece (August 1997). See also Alfred Rubin, *Ethics and Authority in International Law* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997). If I may add a comment regarding the two just quoted texts, unlike some other authors originated in big states, I appreciated the objectiveness and concrete approach of Alfred Rubin in analyzing the complex political, moral and legal questions involved in "international intervention" and in other acts over and above state sovereignty.

15. Carr H. Edward, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919 - 1939, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, London, 1940), p. 28.

16. For important works analyzing these phenomena, see Keohane Robert and Nye Joseph (ed.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge Ma., 1973). Keohane Robert and Nye Joseph, *Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition* (Little Brown, Boston, 1977). Keohane Robert, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1984). Rosenau James, *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (The Free Press, NY, 1969). Rosenau James, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (Frances Pinter, Nichols, London & New York, 1980)

17. It is obvious that in the latter case, it is more appropriate to speak not of interdependence or penetration but of dependence, infiltration and corrosion.

18. This is so because it provides criteria on the basis of which interactions take place. It also makes it possible to anticipate the evolution of bilateral or multi-lateral relations thus facilitating planning and the search for cooperative approaches. Regarding the latter aspect, needless to state the obvious, that is, the fact that national interests are not always incompatible and conflictual. For classical analysis upholding the argument that the national is the correct basis for international interaction, see Morgenthau Hans, *In Defence of National Interest* (A. Knopf, NY, 1951). Morgenthau wrote this book in the 1940s in order to support the view that the new interventionist strategies of the United States should refer to national interest and not to vague internationalist values. Half a century later, we could hardly find a single interventionist policy (Vietnam, the Gulf, Haiti, Bosnia), not justified in terms of "America's strategic interests".

19. As regards the latter aspect, see the classical argument in the analysis of Waltz Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison - Wesley, 1979).

20. For analysis of this point, see (in Greek) Athanasios Platias, *To Neo Diethnes Perivallon* (Papazisis, Athina, 1996), ch. 2, esp. note 47, p. 51.

21. This may refer not just to states as actors but also to other factors directly or indirectly linked to the states.

22. Such relationships involve not only hierarchical dominance and superior/subordinate interactions but also unequal cost/benefit equations among the parties involved. For discussion of this issues and varying views, see R. Keohane & J. Nye,

Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1977), esp. ch. 3. Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences", *International Organization*, vol. 36, no 2, 1982. R. W. Cox, "Labor and Hegemony: A reply", *International Organization*, vol. 34, no 1, 1980. Philip Acton, "Regimes and Hegemony", *Paradigms*, vol. 3, no 1.

23. Cosmopolitanism as I use it, refers to various proposals or ideas which propose regulation of the system in ways which overcome state sovereignty and individual societal particularities.

24. I suggest the following books: Carr E. H., *The Twenty Years Crisis*, *op. cit.* Carr E.H. *International Relations Between the Two World Wars 1919 - 1939* (The Macmillan Press LTD, London, 1947). Osgood Robert, *Ideals and Self - Interest in Americas Foreign Policy* (Univ. of Chicago press, Chicago, 1953). Lafeber Walter, *The American Age* (W. W. Norton & co, NY, 1989). See also my book (in Greek) *American Foreign Policy, From "Idealist Innocence" to "National Destiny"*(Odysseas, Athens, 1994), vol. I.

25. Carr E. H., *The Twenty Year Crisis*, *op. cit.*, p.109

26. *Ibid*, p. 110.

27. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Penguin books, NY, 1982)

28. Keohane Robert, *Hobbes Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society* (Harvard University, working paper series, paper no 93 - 3, pp. 3, 4, 27. Citation from p. 27)

29. Answering this question is probably the most crucial question for the diplomacy of all states, especially when facing military threat. This is so because, depending on the answer, the governments measure the "proportions" of the "components" of national strategy: Resort to international organizations? Military deterrence? Threats? External balancing? Internal balancing?, or, what mixture of these factors?

30. Much less so of a binding normative structure, given the absence of a societal corpus at the world level.

31. Seyom Brown remarks that, "there is no centralized international mechanism for the enforcement of state - to state treaty obligations". See *International Relations in a Changing Global System*, *opus cite*, p. 19. See also E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Year Crisis*, ch. 11.

32. See the excellent book of Martin Wight (introduction by Hedley Bull), *International Theory, the Three Traditions* (Leicester University Press, Leicester, London, 1991).

33. This aspect is overlooked even by integration theory. Societal integration received little scholarly attention. For a good approach of this issue see Smith Anthony, "National Identity and the idea of European Unity", *International Affairs*, vol. 68, no 1, 1992. We could also refer to Bull Hedley, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, no 1-2, September/December 1982.

34. It is ironic that, though many writings supported ambitious schemes for

supranational structures, the single most important issue related to existing international law, that is, the question as to how the United Nations could become more effective and less hegemonic, received little, if any attention.

35. To my view, the debate reached its climax in the writings of some "younger" IR specialists during the first half of the 1990s. A part of this debate can be found in the "Merasheimer versus Keohane, Kupchan, Merle, et. al.", in **International Security** from 1989 to 1997. See also, Krasner Stephen, "Compromising Westphalia", **International Security**, vol. 20, no 3, Winter 1995 - 96.

36. I need not go into details to explain that, as already remarked, many proposals are a far cry of idealistic schemes. In the writings of such prominent authors as Keohane, Kupchan and others, the rational is based on "power relations", "concerts of power", etc. See especially Kupchan Charles & Kupchan Clifford, **Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe**, cit. Ruggie j. Gerald, "The False Promise of Realism", **International Security**, vol. 20, no 1, Summer 1995. Keohane Robert, **The Promise of Institutional Theory**, *op. cit.*

37. 1) Nothing guarantees the perpetual absence of conflict of interest among the dominant powers. 2) Concerts of hegemonic powers may have operated relatively smoothly in earlier times but it is not certain it could be repeated in a world of 200 states striving for autonomy and independence. 3) Mass communications and domestic opinion in hegemonic states (as Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia and Tchetchenia have shown) do not allow sustainable interventions against other societies. 4) Given its slim moral grounds, its viability and sustainability would be always in question.

38. See the classical analysis of Bull Hedley, **The Anarchical Society** (Columbia Univ. Press, NY, 1977), p. 85.

39. Bull Hedley, *op. cit.*, p. 85 & 86.

40. E. Carr, **The Twenty year Crisis**, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

41. *Ibid*, p. 109.

42. *Ibid*, p. 111.

43. *op. cit.*

44. *op. cit.*, esp. ch. 4.

45. See Kennan George, **American Diplomacy, 1900 - 1950** (The University Of Chicago Press, 1951), esp. pp 95 - 96.

46. Who could confidently determine "wrong" and "right" as regards Palestinian and Israeli land disputes or the differences among Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo?

47. The best example of this fact, and probably the best case for students of international relations, is the Cyprus conflict and the "mediation" of the UN since the invasion of Turkey in 1974. Contrary to the Chapter of the United Nations, and even the early decisions of the Security Council, successive General Secretaries summit proposals leading headfastly to the adaptation of the weak side to the faits accomplis of the use of force.



48. As noted earlier, even University professors claim that national interests and national issues are an anachronism and a “caprice” to be observed only in Greece. It is remarkable that such views could be spelled or written publicly without, as regards their factual and theoretical base, being checked by other professors or intellectuals. For the underlying reasons of this fact see my views in *I meleti ton Diethnon Skeseon stin Ellada kai i Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki, Epetirida Institutoutou Diethnon Skeseon tou Panteio Panepistimiou* (Sideris, Athina, 1996). Also, Dimitris Conostas (in Greek), *Exoteriki Politiki kai Diethnes Dikaio. To Vima*, 28.8.1995. Dimitris Conostas, pointing at the legalistic approach preponderant among Greek IR specialists, observes that, it is inconclusive and counterproductive if, as it happens in Greece, one overlooks state power and its priorities and upgrades institutional and environmental factors as the quintessence of international relations.

49. This is evident in almost every single statement of political leaders across Greece’s political spectrum. The references made in this spirit, occasionally, give the impression of a divine attachment to the “international law” and “international legality” as if they are positive law differing little from the corresponding laws of the intrastate order.

They are also extremely skeptical about the role of the nation-state in the supposedly integrated “world system”. See, for example, the statements of the Greek Prime Minister after the Imia crisis between Greece and Turkey in January 1996, when he referred to the “unbeatable/invincible legal weapons of Greece” (“aitita nomika opla tis Elladas”).

50. The few lines which follow tentatively refer to indicative and commonly known ideological trends in Greek intellectual and political discourse. The fact that a detail scholarly study on the role of ideology on Greek diplomacy is not available is both an anomaly and a challenge for further study on the role of intellectuals and the predominant political philosophy of international relations among Greek politicians.

51. Similar views to the ones to be quoted below, dominate the discussion on international relations in Greek media.

52. See “I analysi ton Diethnon Skeseon stin Ellada”, *op. cit.*

53. As already noted, scholarly analysis as regards the impact of ideology on Greek diplomacy is rare or inexistent. For general analysis from which one may draw some conclusions, see (in Greek), Michalis Charalampidis, *Prolethenta, Koinonia-Kyvernisi-Aristera* (Gordios, Athina, 1994), esp. ch. 3 - 9 which refer to ideological issues relevant to foreign policy. Also, Meleti Meletopoulou, *H Ideologia tou Dexiou Kratous* (Papazisi, Athina, 1993). Also, Yiorgou Karampelia, *Sta Monopatia tis Outopias* (Nea Synora - Livanh). Also, Michalis Charalampidis, *Ethnika Zitimata* (Irodotos, Athina, 1990).

54. It should be noted that some confusion is not excluded. Politicians and intellectuals such as Stephanos Manos, appear publicly to adopt “liberal” positions as regards the management of Greece’s national economy. However, it seems as if the corresponding positions concerning international relations may escape their attention. This is not the case of Andreas Andrianopoulos who attributes globalizing “forces” a dimension of fetishism unrelated to actual interstate practice. See his

book (in Greek), *Dimokratikos Kapitalismos kai Koinonia tis Gnosis* (Libro, Athens, 1997). The "confusion" is also apparent in everyday political intercourse. During the pre-election campaign of 1996, for example, the leader of the conservative party Miltiadis Evert reproached Kostas Simitis that he is "neoliberal". As regards foreign policy, this argument seems to be accurate (see below).

55. For further positions of neoliberals see the analysis of part II above, esp. Keohane and Kupchan / Kupchan. For an outline of the neoliberal argument and critical analysis, see Grieco Joseph, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization*, vol. 42, no 3, summer 1988, esp. pp 489 - 492. Also, Mearsheimer John, "Back to the Future", *International Security*, vol 15, no 1 Summer 1990, esp. pp 42 - 51.

56. One need not to mention that, in the political discourse in hegemonic states, when these arguments are borrowed, we could observe tactics of double standards and abuse of concepts and "universal ideals". The term democracy, for example, is defined by the dominant power, irrespective of particularities, cultures and other "local" factors and with different applications when it refers to an ally or to an adversary.

57. Supranationalism, the only really touchable phenomenon underpinning neoliberal theories, is a far reaching endeavor whose success in Europe is not confirmed. As Haas defined integration, it is "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national setting are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones". Haas Ernst, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford Un. Press, 1958), p.16.

58. See, for example, Axelrod Robert, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic books, NY, 1984). Also, Keohane, *After Hegemony*, cit., esp. p. 9 & 26, & 245 - 6, where he acknowledges the validity of the realist insights on the role of power and the effects of hegemony.

59. Keohane Robert and Nye Joseph, *Power and interdependence*, (Little Brown, Boston, 1977), p. 35.

60. Keohane R., *After Hegemony*, p. 246. This apostrophe, that is, "in their own interests", could be easily translated into a political attitude of hegemonic powers outwardly dictating other nations as to what their interest is about. In the context of the Greek-Turkish conflict, there is abundance of evidence for such attitudes. In Cyprus, Western diplomats, anxious to secure stability in Turkey, put enormous pressure on the Greek side to accept solutions which serve this purpose (for hegemonic stability). Moreover, in the context of the same logic, American and Western leaders exert tremendous pressure on the Greek political leadership to have a dialogue with Turkey and help Ankara's European objectives, because this is also, as they - arbitrarily define it - "in the interest of Greece". In Greece, this logic, finds many, who, consciously or unknowingly, without any substantial argument go along this "external definition" of Greece's national interests". Michalis Moronis, a leading columnist in *Eleftherotypia* most of ten writes in favor of a rapprochement with Turkey. The logic of this rapprochement, is explained in

terms of the supposedly irresistible strategic purpose of the United States which Greece could not but follow in a damage limitation approach which demands leaving off tactics aiming at Turkey's isolation (which counter western strategies to upgrade Turkey's regional role). As he put it, "the dilemma for Greece is apparent. What to do? To follow the strong allies and partners, by accepting an arrangement as regards the Greek-Turkish issue and the Cyprus problem". See his article in *Eleftherotypia*, 11.3.1997. In another occasion and in the same logic, Moronis wrote that Greeks should accept (and even promote), *inter alia*, the establishment of two states in Cyprus (this is precisely the objective of Ankara's strategy for over many decades). In another article, in much revealing apostrophe showing the underlying philosophy, he argues, that the only chance to survive in Greece if "do not follow policies which counter the established opinions, perceptions and dominant thinking ... we must prove our ability to act in a spirit of appeasement and stability" (*Eleftherotypia*, 16.10.1995). The same or similar views are also very often expressed by journalists who dominate Greek media such as Richardos Someritis, G. Pretenteris, diplomats such as Theodoropoulos / Lagacos / Papoulias / Tsounis (see their small book *Skepseis kai Provlimatismoi*, Sideris, Athina, 1995, p.81) and academics such as D. K. Psychogios and Nicos Mouzelis (see below).

61. Keohane R., *ibid.*

62. This is an issue which could not be analyzed here. It deserves another study, probably a content analysis of speeches and writings of Greek intellectuals and Greek politicians. Such an analysis not only could provide evidence that neoliberalism is massively reproduced in Greece, but also that this is done in an exaggerated manner which causes distortions of the original - admittedly subtly defined - concepts.

63. Vindication of this point would be easier if an official report by the Department of State and other services inform us on the money spent by USA officials and other agents during the last seven years in order to promote contacts of intellectuals, bilateral meetings of business people, seminars, concerts, confidence building measures and other related activities of "rapprochement" between Greece and Turkey. The expediency for such activities is self-evident in terms of American strategy (though this may fluctuate or be severely questioned domestically in Washington) but this is not the case as regards Greece's national interest. Notwithstanding the Turkish threat, most Greeks consider these activities as attempts to hide the substance of the Greek - Turkish conflict behind procedural or insignificant matters until the next phase of Turkish aggression takes place. Suffice to mention that resistance to confidence building measures on these grounds have been rejected by all political parties and governments the last quarter of a century. Nonetheless, American agents (diplomats, as well as other "agents") in Athens, never ceased to attempt recruitment of Greek intellectuals in this line of thought and action. The writer of this paper received tenths of invitations in his capacity of professor (all rejected) and I have personal knowledge of tenths of others who accepted this American -basically neoliberal- approach.

64. "Globalism as an Ideological Construction", *To Vima* 15.3.1997 (in Greek).

65. See (in Greek) "Oikoumenismos - Sxetikismos: Proypotheseis tis Anoxis stin

Maziki Dimokratia”, I *Kathemirini*, 14.7.1996.

66. See (in Greek), Thanos Veremis - Th. Couloumbis, *Greek Foreign Policy Prospects and Questions (Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki Prooptikes kai Provlmatismoi)* (Sideris, Athens, 1994).

67. To *Vima*, 26.2.1995. Reportedly, Nicos Mouzelis is a close political friend and occasional adviser to Prime Minister Costas Simitis, the internationalist minded politician who took office in January 1996 as Andreas Papandreou's successor.

68. Irrespective to other reservations relating to the different character of these conflicts if compared to the Greek - Turkish conflict and the Cyprus question, we all know that these agreements proved to be a total failure. For a critique of this view see (in Greek) P. Ifestos, "Greeks: "Idiots and Isolated?""", *Eleftherotypia*, 16.3.1997.

69. See my earlier made observation regarding American pressures to accept Turkey's hegemonic role in the region.

70. This extraordinary argument is fully in line with neoliberal views in IR theory. The crux of neoliberal argumentation as regards the prospective structure of the international system is that 1) the "market" (political and economic) will regulate the system and the international institutions should reflect this reality, 2) hegemony may flourish but it should be tolerated because it could be "temporary", and 3) at both the world and the regional/subregional levels, arrangements which are beneficial for the national interests of one country at the expense of the national interests of another could be imposed by "concerts of power" for the sake of stability (i.e. hegemonic stability). If the above profoundly neoliberal views of Nicos Mouzelis, written in 1995, are compared with the views of the same author in 1997 (*To Vima*, 2.11.1997), the storm in the brain of Greek internationalists is fully displayed. Namely, portraying a "progressist" image to the Greek public, the author, who I presume is not aware of the relevant debate in IR theory, *inter alia*, attacks neoliberalism. The profound contradiction lies in the fact that, whilst the only effective means to resist the erosion, corruption and hegemonism caused by unregulated "globalization" is to reinforce the nation-state, its sovereignty and interstate parity, the most salient characteristic of Greek internationalist intellectual take up is to challenge the logic of the nation-state's relevance in the "age of modernity".

71. I write these lines few months after the major diplomatic move made by Greece in spring 1997, when its government adopted proposals such as the ones suggested by the distinguished authors. The "Madrid declaration", is considered by many in Greece as a classical appeasement stand. However, not only Turkish attitudes did not shift to moderation, but threats of war increased. Moreover, following a meeting in the "spirit of Madrid" in New-York on September 26, 1997 between the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers, the climate seem to have changed dramatically. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that, one could not possibly discuss with "murderers, extorters and bandits". He also compared Turkey's policies with Hitler's expansionism. See the Greek press from 27 to 28 September, 1997. For the latter point see I *Kathimerini*, 28.9.1997.

72. In an interview before he took office, Prime Minister Costas Simitis, declared

that in critical moments, if he wishes to have an opinion from two or three persons, one of them is Kostantinos Tsoukalas.

73. To **Vima**, 23.10.1990.

74. **Ibid**. The last phrase in Greek reads as follows: "... themelionetai ston katakermatismo tou apodynamomenou politikou kai tin katischysi tou yperethnikou kefalaiou, prepei na mporei na dikaionetai".

75. **Ibid**

76. To **Vima**, 7.9.1997.

77. This is no surprise. Modern Greeks, of both marxist and liberal traditions grew up in an intellectual environment which either show dependency as fetish or international political integration as inevitable.

78. It goes without saying that underestimating the national dimension and the "local" cultural dimension after what happens on Eurasia, shows, *naïveté*, to say the least.

79. See the indicative references made above to some views of representative authors such as M. Moronis, D. Phychogios and N. Mouzelis, R. Someritis, and Y. Pretenteris. For some of these views, see above, esp. note 66.

80. **The Problem of National Strategy** (Ellinika Grammata, Athens, 1997). One may consider the comments which follow on Yennimatas book as critical. Upon reflection, however, this may not be so. One may disagree with the philosophical content of his views but no one could possibly deny, both the honesty with which they are formulated and their value in determining underlying intellectual trends in Greece. The author, frankly, honestly and with clarity, makes explicit what other Greek analysts are either not capable of doing or intentionally they hide behind half truths. That is, that, what they see as "emerging orders" renders the nation state expendable or dispensable for the cause of inescapable global integration. Furthermore, the view of Yennimatas to be quoted below supporting the "internalization" of constraints in small states' decision making structures, by all means a controversial as well as novel suggestion, is again what everyone else want to say but is either "shy" or unable to do so. Last but not least, the views of a distinguished economist are valuable in the sense that they reveal deeper thoughts and images of officials in financial and economic centers. The same or similar views are expressed if one interviews - as I did lately - individuals originating in small states and serving international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In this respect, it is highly interesting to note, first, that, there is almost total absence as regards the political and social control of such processes, and second, that, even for the European Union to which the author often refers, questions of morality, values, political control etc. (until Political Union is accomplished) are not part of the speculation as regards present and future implications.

81. **Ibid**, p. 29.

82. **Ibid**, p. 35.

83. **Ibid** p. 37.

84. **Ibid**, p. 29.

85. Successive conservative governments after the end of the civil war followed the "doctrine of dependency". The architect of this stand which influenced Greek diplomatic thinking was late Panayiotis Pipinellis, Foreign Minister of successive Greek governments. The culture generated by this thinking revived in the 1990s in many other political sectors. For the views of Panayiotis Pipinellis, see his book (in Greek) ... *Istoria tis Ellinikis Exoterikis Politikis tis Elladas 1923 - 1941* (Saliverou, Athina, 1948). It is maybe worth noting that, there is a qualitative difference between P. Pipinellis and analogous Greek attitudes at the dawn of 2000. The Foreign Minister, in the aftermath of world war two, basically called for submission and subordination in order to preserve and protect sovereignty and territorial integrity and not in order to lose it for ever. For analysis of the issue of "dependency attitudes", see (in Greek), P. Ifaistos, *I Exoelliniki Nootropia kai ta Aitia tis, To Zitima tou Diethnismou, Patriotismou, Ethnikismou kai i Ethniki Stratiyiki tis Elladas* (Poiotita, Athina, 1977).

86. *Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia*, 12 / 3 / 1995.

87. Here, precisely, we can observe a typical representative opinion of Greek internationalist to be found in almost nowhere else in Europe. Fifty years after the first steps in integration, everyone else in Europe sees the European venture as an opportunity to strengthen their language, their culture and all other national factors. In Greece, Europeanism is synonymous to gradual "dispersion" of the Greek nation into an imaginary internationalist "guinea pig". No need to observe that, any attempt to resist these obsolete dogmas lead to accusations of anti-Europeanism and hypernationalism.

88. *Ibid.*

89. It is inconceivable that a political leader of any state, who gives oath to serve national interests, to think and act in internationalist terms. This is a contradiction in terms. Internationalism, in fact, is the opposite of national interest.

90. This paper did not touch upon another major issue, which is the legalistic approach on issues of major importance as regards national strategy. This question deserves another study.

91. See for example the shift of attitudes as regards the Macedonian question during the cold war and recent positions taken by the United States and other western states. The same applies to the Greek-Turkish conflict and the Cyprus problem.

92. The author has done so in other publications, some of them quoted above. See *Greek Deterrence Strategy*, *op. cit.*, part II. Also, P. Ifaistos, *I Exoelliniki Nootropia kai ta Aitia tis*, *op. cit.*