

Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974: Theory and Praxis

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RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude juxtapose deux écoles de pensée, en théorie et en pratique, soit les écoles "multilatérales" et "unilatérales". Les multilatéraux tendent à être Eurocentriques tandis que les unilatéraux sont plus à l'aise avec l'ethnocentrisme. De plus les multilatéraux mettent l'emphase aussi bien sur les variables économiques et politiques que militaires, alors que les unilatéraux recommandent une confiance au seul pouvoir militaire. L'auteur conclut que le paradigme multilatéraliste est devenu dominant durant les dernières années mais il estime qu'il s'est opéré une synthèse des aspects principaux des deux écoles de pensée.

D'autre part, les socialistes ont tenu une position pro-UE et pro-OTAN alors que l'opposition conservatrice fut et continue d'être de manière enthousiaste résolument pro-occidentale. Ainsi, l'auteur conclut que le pronostic pour le profil occidental de la Grèce est solide et en sécurité. Malheureusement, la situation en Turquie est moins fluide et peu amène à supporter un gouvernement fort, ayant les appuis nécessaires pour mener de manière décisive une politique authentique de réconciliation.

ABSTRACT

This paper juxtaposes two schools of thought, in theory and practice, entitled respectively "multilateralist" and "unilateralist". The "multilateralists" orientation tends to be Eurocentric whereas the unilateralists feel more comfortable with ethnocentricity. The former emphasize economic and political variables in addition to military ones. The latter recommend reliance on power - military - alone. The author concludes that the multilateralist paradigm has become dominant in recent years but he feels that there has been a useful synthesis of aspects of both schools of thought.

The author also concludes that the prognosis for Greece's Western profile is solid and secure given that the Greek socialists have unequivocally adopted a pro-EU and pro-NATO policy while the Conservative opposition's stance has been and continues to be enthusiastically pro-Western. Unfortunately, the situation in neighboring Turkey appears much more fluid and less likely to sustain a strong government that will have the necessary backing to move decisively toward a policy of genuine reconciliation with Greece.

The study of international relations in Greece had not developed independently of international law and diplomatic history until the early 1980s.¹ Stephanos Constantinides has carefully reviewed and classified a

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representative sample of foreign policy-oriented literature that has appeared mostly in the last decade (1986-96). He rightly concludes that "... the theoretical contribution of Greek scholars to [the study of] international relations is very limited and poor."²

This is not the place where we can attempt an in-depth explanation as to the reasons accounting for the pessimistic but accurate conclusion that Constantinides has reached. If one were to adopt a comparative perspective, one would probably find that countries classified in the category of small, economically less developed, internally divided and strategically located (hence externally dependent and/or penetrated) also tend to exhibit a similar lack of scholarly productivity in the fields of foreign policy analysis and international relations. The author was rudely awakened to this fact in the mid-1960s after he finished delivering a lecture at the American University in Washington DC on the subject of Greek foreign policy. During the question-answer period which followed, an experienced and somewhat cynical gentleman in the audience made the following observation: "You did not need 45 minutes to discuss Greek foreign policy. You could have summarized it with two words: *Yes, Sir!*"

It was not until the years following the restoration of democracy in 1974 that the field of international relations began its gradual development in Greece. Greek society, after the traumatic experiences of two major schisms in the twentieth century, irrevocably entered a course of reintegration and reconciliation. Extra-parliamentary institutions, such as the Armed forces and the Throne, which had functioned as vehicles of foreign interference in politics³ were democratically reoriented. Of course the Throne as institution was eliminated by vote. (See the December 8, 1974 plebiscite on the question of the monarchy.)

After 1974, the Greek Armed Forces assumed a most vital external deterrence/defense mission vis-à-vis Turkey, abandoning the communist counter-insurgency role that had been assigned to them by NATO during the Cold War years.⁴ The defeated side of the Civil War was finally permitted to re-enter politics through the legalization of the Greek Communist parties and the establishment of PASOK by Andreas Papandreou whose third-world style, anti-dependency and anti-American rhetoric struck several sentimental chords in the psyche of the Greek public. These developments clearly served to reintegrate the badly divided Greek society. Most importantly, the Greek economy had made quick developmental strides in the 1950s and 1960s, having crossed the threshold of relative abundance. Symbolic as well as substantive affirmation of the Greek metamorphosis⁵ was Greece's hotly debated, but ultimately overwhelmingly accepted, accession to the European Community (European Union today) in 1981.

Students of international relations in Greece adopted by and large a historical-sociological approach,⁶ avoided the luxurious temptation to indulge in behavioral/quantitative searches, and moved within what one would call a traditionalist/realist paradigm. With Greek-Turkish relations and the question of Cyprus dominating the foreign policy agenda, Greek scholars at home and the diaspora focused on these issues almost exclusively. Simultaneously a second strand of research, which was progressively gaining in importance, focused on the institutional aspects of the EC/EU with special attention to Greece's integrative fortunes in the steadily evolving European unification process. Few Greek scholars escaped the hellenocentric orientation in their research and publications, with notable exceptions among scholars such as Poulantzas, Mouzelis, Tsoukalis, Heraclides and Papadopoulos, who have entered the mainstream literature in their respective fields.⁷

Indeed, we should pause here and ponder the handicaps facing European scholars (especially those functioning in non mainstream countries) in their attempts to penetrate the narrow circles of North American research communities that have all but dominated the field of international relations. With the continuing process of European integration, as well as the globalization and enlargement of the communities of research through internet, e-mail and related technologies, one could safely predict the progressive involvement of Greek IR specialists in the mainstream of theoretical discourses.

Standing at the threshold of the 21st Century, Greece may be classified as a country which is democratic, internationalist, developed, free-trading, interdependent, and status-quo— in one word, Western. It is a member state of nearly all important international organizations (most notably the European Union, the Western European Union and NATO) having linked its fate with a "club" of advanced economies and consolidated democracies. It is the thesis of this paper that despite two "not so great" debates that have been conducted among scholars, journalists and politicians since 1974, the substance of Greek foreign policy has followed a steady course oriented toward European unification (the positive challenge) and deterrence of Turkey based on an adequate balance of forces (the negative challenge).

The first debate divided scholars and politicians in the 1970s into either **pro-** or **anti-**accession camps on the question of seeking membership in the European Community. Strongly favoring accession in the mid-1970s were New Democracy, the Center Union and the Greek Communist Party of the Interior. Vocally opposed to accession were PASOK and the Greek Communist Party (KKE). The debate could have been summarized as

"Karamanlis versus Papandreou." Karamanlis's famous slogan was "Greece belongs to the West", to which Papandreou would retort "Greece belongs to the Greeks." The pro-EC camp viewed an integrating Western Europe as a greenhouse of democracies that would contribute to Greece's economic advancement and to the consolidation of post-1974 democratic institutions. The anti-EC forces declared that the EC was no more than an appendage of American capitalism contributing to and feeding on dependency relationships of the Center-Periphery variety. For the anti-Europe camp the answer was to search for a "third road" toward socialism that would place Greece firmly in the camp of neutral and nonaligned countries of the European or Third World variety.⁸

The pro-EC forces commanded enough votes in parliament to ratify Greece's accession agreement which had been signed in Athens in May of 1979. Following ratifications by all member States, Greece entered the Community as its tenth member on January 1, 1981. Ironically, PASOK won an overwhelming victory at the polls in October of the same year and took over the reins of government. The first great debate quickly and predictably subsided as Andreas Papandreou (under the shadow of the then powerful president, Constantinos Karamanlis) opted to remain in the EC declaring that objective conditions had changed and that the cost of withdrawal would have been much greater than the cost of active and assertive participation. The conclusive cessation of the debate was confirmed following the resignation of Karamanlis from the presidency early in 1985, the second victory of PASOK in the June 1985 elections, and the revision of the Greek Constitution to reduce the powers of the head of state to ceremonial levels early in 1986. Andreas Papandreou, having emerged in total control of the situation, made a further move to the "right" by appearing in his second term as an ardent supporter of Eurofederalism. The inflow of billions of ECUs in structural funds as well as the apparent deterrent impact of EC membership on Turkish revisionism convinced Greece's most flexible politician to completely abandon the anti-european rhetoric of the late 1970s.⁹

The second "not so great" debate in Greece was the product of the momentous changes surrounding the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the attendant restructuring of Cold War bipolarity and the nuclear balance of terror. The centerpiece of the exchange had to do with the "reading" of the emerging contours of the international system and the derivation of conclusions and recommendations that would safeguard Greek national interests in the emerging global order/disorder of things. As in the case of the late 1970s, there was much more smoke than fire to the whole enterprise. At the academic level, according to Constantinides, scholars were divided into two ideologically

distinct schools of thought which he dubbed "ethno-realists" and "trans-nationalists-idealists" respectively.¹⁰ He concluded that the "...result of this confrontation is a certain confusion because discussion deteriorates rapidly from the academic-theoretical point to a political one if not to partisan politics and personal disputes. Besides, these discussions lead to a simplification of the reality and finally to a Manichean bipolarism."¹¹ We take, however, a somewhat different perspective. The debate was not one between realists and idealists but one juxtaposing the arguments of two alternative strands of realism which we could call "unilateralist" and "multilateralist." The unilateralists tend to define security in a narrow and traditionalist fashion as denoting "territorial integrity and regime maintenance." Consequently, they emphasize the decisive role of military force in international politics. For the multilateralists,¹² security is a wider concept which includes, in addition to territorial integrity and regime maintenance, economic variables (free trade, free markets) as well as political freedoms and the protection of human rights (democracy). Hence, the multilateralists believe that economic, political and alliance variables provide practical and effective levers of exerting influence in addition to the military capabilities of a given State.

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by momentous events such as the reunification of Germany, the relatively peaceful fragmentation of the former Soviet Union, the collapse of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and one party socialism, and the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. There followed also what appeared to have been "peace breakthroughs" in the Middle East, South Africa and Northern Ireland. The international community greeted these events with a sense of relief and George Bush characterized the post-Cold War system as a "new world order" while Francis Fukuyama pronounced "the end of history."¹³

Unfortunately the euphoria was not destined to last long. The death of communism led a number of new and recycled politicians in post-communist countries to substitute Marxism-Leninism with new "isms," in this case nationalism and ethnic autonomism of the expansionist, revanchist or irredentist varieties, in order to attract attention and votes among the dizzy and disoriented masses that were plunged into processes of multiparty elections without sufficient preparation. As a number of crises logically erupted in regions of the former Soviet bloc (the wars in Yugoslavia and the butchery in Bosnia taking center stage), as well as in Africa and South and Southeast Asia, the initial euphoria gave way to unqualified pessimism and the Western media were inundated by catastrophic scenarios positing a "new world disorder", the "return and revenge of history," "from Sarajevo to Sarajevo" and so forth.¹⁴

Greek students of international relations, reflecting these wider streams of thought, divided themselves into two distinct groups projecting pessimistic unilateralism and quasi-optimistic multilateralism respectively.¹⁵ The multilateralists over-emphasized good prospects for the building of a new global order that would be the product of the convergence of ideologies and the mutuality of interests of major powers (such as the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and Japan). In their view, the United Nations would gain new strength and would be in a position to legitimize international interventions against aggressive nations and leaders (such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq). They also predicted that, as a minimum, collective humanitarian assistance would be made available in nightmarish situations such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, etc. The multilateralists, accordingly, recommended to the Greek government the adoption of a policy that would exploit the leverage provided by political-diplomatic-economic factors while integrating/harmonizing its objectives with those of multilateral institutions such as the EU, NATO, and the WEU. The unilateralists, on the contrary, predicted that the planet was returning to a Hobbesian state of nature characterized by international anarchy (rather than a concert of powers), multi-fragmentation, and escalating regional conflicts in which the strong "do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Consequently they counseled policy-makers to reinforce military capabilities, employ the craft of frequent and shifting alliances, and take advantage of tactical opportunities to reverse past losses.

In the final analysis, we could argue that the multilateralists could be described with epithets such as internationalists and functionalists who are deeply influenced by the thought processes of Mitrany and Monnet.¹⁶ Alternatively, the unilateralists could be described as ethnocentrists who follow the power-political premises of Karl von Clausewitz.¹⁷ The following point should be made clear. In a progressively globalized world economy, in an era of transnational interdependence, it would be at best confining to leave realism within the anachronistic confines of late 19th century geopolitics. In short, it can be argued that Monnet is as much a realist as is Morgenthau.¹⁸

As we are approaching the end of the 1990s and new realities unfold before us, one could propose that, paradoxically, the "truth" lies somewhere between the projections of the unilateralists and the multilateralists. Specifically, every effort to characterize the international system (as a totality) as either stable/orderly or as anarchic/disorderly is risky indeed. For, simply, one part of the planet is currently stable while another (the larger part) is in a state of transition leading to either stability and peace or, more likely, to instability and war. A new "bipolarity" seems to be in the

works dividing the world along a North-South rather than an East-West axis. The North comprises States with industrial and post-industrial economies and consolidated democracies located in North America and West Europe, and includes Japan and other advanced OECD-member states. The premises of Jean Monnet and geoeconomic interdependence best fit into the patterns of relations of this world island of relative stability and peace. The South groups the developing States of what we used to call the Third World as well as certain sections of the former Soviet Union and Southeastern Europe. Here the norm appears to be political instability, economic scarcity, explosive population growth and frequent internal (ethnic/tribal) and regional (interstate) conflicts.

If we accept the above problematics, we should expect that the conflicts of the 21st century will continue surfacing in the global South but will also spill over (especially in the sensitive areas of refugee movements and illegal immigration) into the vulnerable and porous North. It would make sense for the major powers (including Russia and China) of the stable pole to address in concert the challenges of the South with collectively authorized preventive measures (peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian and developmental assistance). Unfortunately, the task of North-South economic convergence appears at best herculean and at worst quixotic, especially if we take into consideration that the gap between the privileged of the North and the suffering of the South is growing with every day that goes by.¹⁹ The most likely response of the major powers of the North (with the agreement or acquiescence of Russia and China) is that they will adopt a damage-control strategy for the South. This strategy is designed to serve their national interests and in some cases (e.g. the 1990 Gulf War) their collective benefit.

Future flash points in the unstable South will be likely divided into three categories in classic triage fashion: The first category will involve zones of vital interests, such as the Persian Gulf and the oil-rich Middle East, where one should continue to expect collective military intervention and other types of sanctions applied by so-called coalitions of the willing. The second category refers to zones of mid-level interest, such as Bosnia, where the most probable collective responses will employ peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations authorized by the UN Security Council and implemented by NATO (with its new out of area missions), the WEU, the OSCE and other institutions in the proliferating alphabet soup of international organizations. In the third category, in the zones of low or no interest (we could also call them zones of indifference and benign neglect), such as Sudan, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Burundi, the former Zaire and elsewhere, one should expect non-involvement or at most humanitarian assistance — the latter mainly in cases noticed and dramatized by CNN, BBC *et al.*

As both multilateralists and unilateralists in Greece are digesting this hybrid state of affairs, their thinking is beginning to converge. For the multilateralists Greece belongs to the pole of stability but it borders on zones of instability and intermittent conflict. The greatest error that policy makers could make, according to multilateralist reasoning, would be to permit the country to become entangled in nationalist/irredentist problems in its immediate neighborhood. The unilateralists are less sanguine about Greece's ability to insulate itself from regional conflicts and their answer is: armaments, armaments, armaments!

In terms of praxis, it appears that the multilateralists have carried the day in the years since 1974 and especially since 1981. With the exception of a short interval of flirtation with unilateralist thinking (1991-94), Greek governments have kept themselves on a steady course in what we will describe below as the dominant paradigm of Greek foreign policy.²⁰

The dominant (multilateralist) paradigm relies upon conservation through a synthesis of adequate military preparation, European integration and prudence. The revisionist/unilateralist approach, on the contrary, emphasizes the concepts of survival and growth in a world where conflicts and dangers are normal conditions. For the unilateralists, the so-called dominant school reflects a synthesis of well-meaning utopianism, steadily retreating appeasement, preemptive defeatism, as well as heavy dosages of wishful thinking. We will be returning to their views in some detail below.

The key assumption of the dominant paradigm (shared incidentally by the gamut of political parties including those politicians, journalists and scholars who consider themselves unilateralists) is that Greece faces a continuous revisionist challenge from its eastern neighbor, Turkey. This, in turn, requires vigilance as well as the maintenance of an adequate balance of forces to attain and maintain the value of deterrence. The use of force by Turkey in Cyprus in 1974 and the continued occupation of the northern third of the island's territory, reminds the Greeks that Turkey would again be ready to employ force in the Aegean and in Thrace at the expense of Greece's territorial integrity should a new opportunity be offered to it.

According to the dominant paradigm Greece is firmly placed in the space of politically and economically advanced states that have over the decades developed strong bonds of political and economic interdependence embodying the principles of pluralist democracy and market economy. Greece's membership in the European Union is at the heart of a strategy of integration with a cluster of advanced democracies that have since World War II abandoned past practices that had equated national interests with territorial claims, opportunistic and temporary alliances, spheres of

influence, competitive colonialism and unbridled ethnocentrism. The –strategy of European integration has been designed to accomplish the twin objectives of sustainable political and economic development as well as add a powerful diplomatic weight to deterrence vis-à-vis Turkey.

Following a central tenet of the multilateralist strategy, Greek policy makers have systematically sought to avoid the creation of additional diplomatic fronts, given the severity and immediacy of the Turkish challenge. Accordingly, even during the Cold War years, starting with the mid-1960s, Greece had sought to promote detente and cooperation in the Balkan region. This prudent policy was nearly abandoned, however, in the 1991-94 period.

All in all, Greece has emerged after 1974 as an economically privileged state with every reason to maintain political stability and the territorial *status quo* in its region. This means that it will not advance territorial claims against its neighbors but will be, simultaneously, ready to go to war, if necessary, in order to defend its territorial integrity against foreign aggression. Furthermore, it has become apparent that the best way to protect the human rights and to promote the well-being of the Greek minority in southern Albania is to adopt a strategy of contributing (with Greece's allies and partners) to the rapid and effective transition to democracy and economic growth in Albania, the poorest state on the European continent.

The revisionist/unilateralist school of thought has grown at an accelerated pace in the last seven years, coinciding with the end of the Cold War. Unilateralist proponents define themselves and their policy recommendations as activist, energetic, counteroffensive, pre-emptive, ethnocentric and patriotic in orientation. They also claim an exclusive hold on the values and practices of "realism." They dismiss the so-called dominant strategy as reactive, passive, idealist, spasmodic and appeasing in nature, and they warn of grave dangers if the multilateralist recipes are followed. For them, Greece faces dangers from all directions and appeasement only serves to wet the appetite of the country's enemies. The threat from Turkey is clearly territorial, the dangers from the North (especially from FYROM) are irredentist, while the challenge from the West is cultural (threatening Greece with the loss of linguistic, religious and traditional identity).

The unilateralists call for a rude awakening of modern Greeks from the slumber of consumerism, hedonism, cynicism and corruption. They long for a heroic mobilization of the disoriented masses in order to give battle and save a small and "brotherless" nation.²¹ They perceive the global system as anarchic, dangerous, conflictful, amoral as well as unjust: an arena in which the strong survive and the weak disappear.

Some unilateralists recommend what they call the "Israelization" of Greece.²² They fear that the alternative would be Greece's "Finlandization." They admire Israel for its military prowess, its special relationship with the United States, its ability to employ force preemptively, and to negotiate only from a position of strength. Here the unilateralists not only disregard the very different circumstances informing Greece and Israel, but also miss the point that the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians (despite serious setbacks) is founded on assumptions of mutual restraint and mutual interest leading to a much desired historic reconciliation. In the view of this author, the unilateralist analogy of Greece fits much more the Israel of 1967 rather than that of today.

The unilateralists frequently argue that Greek membership in the EU has been overestimated, fearing that it cultivates illusions of security among the people and creates pressures for unilateral disarmament. Further they are dubious about the effectiveness of policies seeking to link Turkey's behavior in Cyprus and the Aegean to that country's aspiration to join the European Union. They, instead, recommend "realistic" tactics calling for "understandings" with Turkey's "enemies" east of its borders (Armenia, Iran, Syria) as well as supporting the Kurdish population's aspirations for a place in the geopolitical sun. They strongly criticize the passive and accommodationist Greek policies on Cyprus, the Aegean, Thrace, Northern Epirus and Skopje for lacking nerve and direction and relying on toothless campaigns regarding the "righteousness" of Greece's case. Finally, they support assertive and unyielding policies in all directions (considering dialogue and diplomatic exchange as signs of weakness) and give little thought to the dangerous implications of Greece becoming entangled in a conflict with two or more of its neighbors.

Despite the serious risks that unilateralist thinking entails, the dialogue that is continuing between the two schools of thought and action is useful and even profitable. In a democracy, foreign policy (and politics in general) needs to be the product of open and serious debate. It is more than apparent that both schools advance some arguments and offer criticisms that can serve the purposes of open-minded and well-meaning political elites, whether in the government or in the opposition.

Given Greece's foreign policy profile presented above, the country can be described today as a satisfied, *status quo*, strategically located, medium-sized power whose main objective is to engage heavily in institutionalized multilateral arrangements such as the EU, NATO and the WEU that help to consolidate a structure of cooperation and peace in its troubled neighborhood.

NATO, throughout the years of the Cold War, tended to be equated in Greece with the political and strategic will of the United States and was viewed as being the primary instrument for Soviet containment. Although strategists in Greece were concerned with the country's inadequate conventional capability that was facing more powerful Warsaw Pact conventional forces stationed in Bulgaria, they accepted a front-line-state status (similar to Germany's) which afforded security on the basis of strategic deterrence and the balance of nuclear terror. There were two additional dimensions, however, which were specific to Greece: the first dimension had to do with the after-effects of the Greek Civil War which called for a counter-insurgency mission for the Greek armed forces against a potential attempt of Greek Communists to take over the country. The second dimension, which remains of special concern to the present day, is related to a highly troubled partnership with neighboring Turkey over the issue of Cyprus (1955 to present) and over a number of highly disturbing Turkish claims in the Aegean region (1974 to present).

The momentous changes surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact called for an appropriate reexamination of NATO's post-Cold War future. The Greek reading of the situation -not unlike that of other European partners- views NATO today as a gradually expanding alliance providing the values of collective defense and (increasingly) collective security to its member states. The Soviet threat has been replaced by a whole new set of high level risks which include the spread of nuclear and biological weapons as well as missile launchers. The "risk list" includes international terrorism, narcotics cartels, and a variety of forms of internal and regional conflicts stemming from a sudden resurgence of nationalism, ethnic autonomism and religious fundamentalism.

Expectations in Greece are that the United States will perpetuate its useful strategic presence in Central Europe. However it is assumed that the American presence there will be progressively reduced to symbolic levels. On the contrary, the Greeks project that the United States will raise its profile (in and out of NATO) in the most strategic central and eastern Mediterranean regions and that the new risk calculus of post-Cold War NATO will focus on a North-South rather than an East-West axis. In this respect, Greek policies have been adjusting toward preparing the country to capitalize on strategic assets such as the island of Crete (especially Suda Bay) and other important Aegean and Dodecanese islands.

Given that Greece's main security concern has been emanating from Turkey, Greek policymakers have sought to solidify a strategy of adequate deterrence founded on factors of hard as well as soft power. Thus Greece

has been spending around 6% of its GDP for defense purposes over a number of years and has sought to maintain sufficiency in land, air and naval power vis-à-vis Turkey. In terms of soft power, Greek policy has sought to deepen multilateral ties in the European Union, NATO and the WEU, the premise being that Turkish policy-makers would think twice before attacking a country that is highly integrated into the Western family of nations.

Greece's recently announced defense doctrine (involving modernization and reorganization procedures) calls for a sum of \$14 billion to be expended in the next ten years (over and above the \$3 billion per year for military expenditures). The new doctrine retains military conscription but strongly reinforces the category of 5-year enlisted professionals and reorganizes the Army reducing the number of Divisions and increasing that of Brigades relying on flexible, mechanized and highly mobile smaller units designed to fit needs for multinational peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations under NATO auspices.

In its new weapons procurement program, Greece continues to rely primarily on US supplied sophisticated equipment with Germany and France running a distant second and third in the suppliers list. "Bargain-basement offers" from post-Cold War Russia, in the spirit of PfP and the special NATO-Russia relationship, are logically to be added to the future list of important suppliers.

Finally, we should stress here that the welcome improvement in Greek-Turkish relations which took place last July during the Madrid NATO Council meeting can open -if prudently pursued- avenues toward a Greek-Turkish reconciliation over the issues of Cyprus and the Aegean. Such -reconciliation would dramatically facilitate NATO's stabilizing role in regions such as the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.

In conclusion, we can propose that Greece, as is the case with most of its Western partners, has gravitated toward a widely shared consensus regarding important questions of foreign policy strategy with occasional debate and disagreement on matters of tactics and policy implementation.

Following the death of Andreas Papandreou (June 1996) and the rise to undisputed power (after the September 1996 election) of Constantinos Simitis (a moderate, a technocrat and multilateralist in political philosophy) the pendulum has decisively swung in the direction of the multilateralist paradigm. This process has been further strengthened by the election of Costas Karamanlis (in March 1997) as the leader of the loyal opposition party, New Democracy. This 42-year-old holder of a doctorat from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy promises to provide effective and substantive opposition that avoids the populist excesses in foreign policy of his immediate predecessor.

In short, the prognosis for Greece's Western profile is solid for the foreseeable future since Greek socialists have unequivocally adopted a pro-EU and pro-NATO policy while the Conservative opposition's stance has been and continues to be enthusiastically pro-Western. Unfortunately, the situation in neighboring Turkey appears much more fluid and less likely to sustain a strong government that will have the necessary backing to move decisively toward a policy of genuine reconciliation with Greece. A Greek-Turkish rapprochement will permit Turkey to concentrate on the multiplicity of problems in its eastern fronts be they with Syria, Iran and Iraq, not to mention the simmering Kurdish question. It will be necessary, therefore, to continue the efforts toward building confidence and reducing tension. The result could eventually permit strong leaders in both countries to emulate the courage of Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Atatürk who had crafted a long lasting period of Greek-Turkish friendship in the early 1930s.

NOTES

1. Stephanos Constantinides, "Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis", *Hellenic Studies / Études helléniques*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1996, pp. 43-62. The literature on Greece's political, economic, social, cultural and diplomatic profile in the English language is quite rich and steadily growing. For an inclusive, up-to-date, annotated bibliographical guide see Mark Dragoumis and Thanos Veremis, *Greece, The World Bibliographical Series* (Oxford: Clio Press, 1998), Forthcoming.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
3. T. A. Coulombis, J. A. Petropoulos, H. J. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics*, New York: Pella, 1976.
4. Thanos Veremis, "Greek Security: Issues and Politics", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 179, London, the IISS, 1982.
5. For an excellent and challenging study of the subject of metamorphosis, see William Hardy McNeill, *The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War II*, Chicago, 1978.
6. See the classic work on this subject by Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, New York: Doubleday, 1966.
7. Nikos Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America*, (London: MacMillan, 1986); Nikos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece and Spain* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities, 1976); Loukas Tsoukalis, *The New European Economy Revisited* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Alexis Heraclides, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics*

(London: Frank Cass, 1991); and Yannis Papadopoulos, *Complexité sociale et politiques publiques*, (Paris: Montchrestien, 1995).

8. For this author's views on the gradual transition of PASOK from non-alignment to a Western orientation, see Theodore A. Coulombis, "PASOK's Foreign Policies, 1981-89: Continuity or Change?" in Richard Clogg, ed., *Greece 1981-89: The Populist Decade*, London: MacMillan, 1993, pp. 113-30.

9. It would be fascinating to conduct a systematic content analysis on the writings of scholars that had adopted a strongly anti-accession stance in the 1970s and to establish whether, when and how quickly they turned necessity (or inevitability) into a virtue.

10. See Stephanos Constantinides, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

11. *Ibid.*

12. For a detached presentation and discussion of the views of unilateralist scholars such as Athanasios Platias and Panayiotis Ifestos.

13. Constantinides, *op. cit.*, classifies Thanos Veremis, Nikos Mouzelis and the author of this article, among others, as fitting the category of "transnationalists-idealists" which we have renamed "multilateralists" for the purposes of this discussion.

14. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992.

15. Representative of this genre of thinking are Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996; John J. Mearshimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994-5, pp. 5-49; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century*, New York: Scribner, 1993.

16. For a sampling of the views of scholars T. Veremis, T. Coulombis, D. Conostas, E. Chela, Ch. Chardanidis, A. Platias, P. Kazakos, P. Ifestos, Ch. Rozakis, Th. Christodoulides, and S. Dalis see the selection by A.A. Fatouros, "O Polemos ston Kolpo kai oi Ellines Diethnologoi," in *Diethnes Dikaio kai Diethnis Politiki*, Thessaloniki, Vol. 21-22 (undated), pp. 221-92.

17. One of the early and most influential proponents of functionalism was David Mitrany. See his seminal essay, *A Working Peace System*, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966. The best known and celebrated practitioner of functionalism was the European statesman Jean Monnet.

18. See Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, New York: Modern Library, 1943.

19. Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the major proponents of post-World War II realism, concluded that the debate between idealists and realists was not one of morality versus cynicism, but one of alternate conceptions of collective morality. It is worth quoting him at some length here: "The contest between utopianism [idealism] and realism is not tantamount to a contest between principle and expediency, morality and immorality, although some spokesmen for utopianism would like to

have it that way. The contest is rather between one type of political morality and another type of political morality, one taking as its standard universal moral principles abstractly formulated, the other weighing these principles against the moral requirements of concrete political action, their relative merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political consequences to which they are likely to lead." See his *Dilemmas of Politics*, University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 86.

20. The tragic distances separating the privileged from the underprivileged of our planet are recorded in full in *Human Development Report, United Nations Development Program*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

21. In this category one could list scholars such as Alexis Heraclides, John O. Iatrides, P.C. Ioakimidis, Panos Kazakos, Nicos Mouzelis, Harry Psomiades, Christos Rozakis, Loukas Tsoukalis and the author of this essay among others; diplomats (retired) such as Georgios Papoulias, Byron Theodoropoulos and Costas Zepos among others; journalists such as Costas Iordanides, Yannis Kartalis, Alexis Papahelas, A.D. Papayannides, Yannis Pretenderis and Richardos Someritis among others; and politicians such as Andreas Andrianopoulos, Leonidas Kyrkos, Michalis Papaconstantinou and Michalis Papayannakis among others.

22. The introduction of this term in the Greek political vocabulary has been attributed to a former President of the Republic — Christos Sartzetakis — who has recently emerged as a vocal proponent of unyielding and patriotic causes.

23. See Stelios Papatthemelis, "Finlandopoiisi I Israilinopoiisi (Finlandization or Israelization)", Athens, *To Vima* (March 17, 1997).

24. In this category one could list scholars such as Marios Evriviades, Charalambos Giallourides, Panagiotis Ifestos and Athanassios Platias among others; diplomats such as Michalis Dountas and Themis Stophoropoulos among others; journalists such as Giorgos Harvalias, Liana Kanelli, Chrysanthos Lazarides and Panos Panagiotopoulos among others and politicians such as Panagiotis Kammenos, Yannis Kapsis, Giorgios Karatzaferis, Stelios Papatthemelis, Sakis Peponis and Christos Vyzovites among others.

25. The multi-front war scenario, that has proven so disastrous (even for great powers whenever they have engaged in it) does not seem to concern unilateralist politicians, journalists and scholars.