

Greek Foreign Policy and the Community of International Relations Scholars

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RÉSUMÉ

Entre 1974 et 1996, les acteurs domestiques ont joué un rôle important dans la formulation de la politique étrangère grecque. La communauté des spécialistes des relations internationales, a cependant échoué à s'établir comme une force respectée et autonome capable d'influencer la politique extérieure, en raison de lacunes théoriques, de l'emphase accordée aux analyses superficielles et à court terme et de la fragmentation du domaine. En conséquence, malgré quelques exceptions notables, les spécialistes grecs des relations internationales ont endossé des thèmes reflétant des divisions idéologiques et politiques dans la société grecque ou des intérêts professionnels étroits. De plus, les spécialistes n'ont pas cherché à introduire une perspective indépendante fondée sur la richesse de la connaissance accumulée dans le travail académique de la communauté des relations internationales.

Les concepteurs de la politique de la Grèce et la communauté des spécialistes des relations internationales doivent unir leurs forces afin de faire face au principal débat-dilemme de la politique étrangère du pays : dans quelle mesure le détournement des rares ressources qui permettraient d'atteindre le niveau de développement économique nécessaire à l'intégration européenne causera-t-il un dommage irréparable à la sécurité du pays dans la perspective de la très réelle menace turque?

Les spécialistes des relations internationales peuvent relever ce défi en mettant de côté les catégorisations artificielles, telles "Européanistes" et "Nationalistes" et en rétablissant de nouveau la confiance dans les relations internationales en tant que domaine d'étude scientifique. Autrement, elle court un réel danger de marginalisation, au détriment autant de ses membres que du pays.

ABSTRACT

In the period from 1974 to 1996 domestic sources have played an important role in the formulation of Greek foreign policy. The community of International Relations scholars, however, has failed to become a respected, autonomous factor in influencing foreign policy due to the neglect of theory, emphasis on superficial, short-term, policy-related analyses and its fragmentation. Consequently, some notable exceptions notwithstanding, Greek I.R. scholars, rather than introducing an independent perspective based on the wealth of knowledge accumulated in the scholarly work of the International Relations community, endorsed views reflecting ideological and political divisions in Greek society or narrow professional interests.

Greek policy-makers and the community of I.R. scholars must join forces in addressing the country's central foreign policy dilemma: how the diversion of scarce resources to the attainment of a level of economic development that will

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bring Greece to the path of European integration will not cause irreparable damage to the country's security in view of the very real Turkish threat.

The community of I.R. scholars can only meet this challenge by putting aside artificial categorizations into "Europeanists" and "Nationalists" and reestablish confidence in International Relations as a scientific field of study. Otherwise it runs a real risk of marginalization to the detriment of its members and of the country as a whole.

Introductory Remarks

Writing a chapter on Greek foreign policy and International Relations in Greece after 1974 and the influence exercised by the academic community on the course of the country's foreign policy, presents me with some quite unique dilemmas and challenges. Since 1979, when I started teaching an "International Relations" course at Panteion University (then Panteion Graduate School of Political Sciences) - the only course on the subject available at that time in Greek University curricula, I have been an active participant in the debates and academic politics that have determined the course and present status of the field. Detached analysis and objective assessment of facts require therefore an exceptional effort which, even if successful, will not be easily convincing to others.

To the outsider, even to the most intelligent student of Greece's foreign policy who is not a member of the Greek academic establishment, the intensity of the domestic foreign policy debate or the monologues that often substitute as debate, represent both a paradox and a challenge. A constructive reaction is to approach the problem with the analytical tools of International Relations. A recent article in this journal represents a good example of a response of an academic to a clash among other academics over issues related to their discipline. The author, a distinguished Greek-Canadian scholar, takes for granted the primacy of academic dictates over ideology, politics and professional interests and argues that the differences of view among Greek academics result from their adherence to established but conflicting Schools of Thought: "Realist", "Interdependence", "Marxist-Dependency".¹ It is my thankless task, in this chapter, to sustain a different line of argument. The current state of academic debate on Greek foreign policy reflects the primacy of political ideology and professional interests over academic discipline requirements.

2. The Evaluation of the Fields of International Relations in Greece: a Synopsis

Prior to the dictatorship (1967-1974), the social sciences in Greece were both marginalized and underdeveloped, with the possible exception of economics. Among the various explanations put forward by students of

post-WWII Greek history, the one associating the status of the social sciences with the degree of academic freedom and social criticism tolerable within the political system of the victors of the Civil War, appears the most credible. Scientific analysis and interpretation of official state preferences concerning the regulation of social, economic and political interaction dominated University curricula until the late 1970's including that of the Panteion School of Political Sciences, the sole institution of its kind in Greece, which had just one chair in the field of specialization, i.e. political science. Although the school offered no law degrees, it covered thoroughly all fields of law including criminal and civil jurisprudence.

The study of state interaction was the prerogative of Professors holding chairs of international law at the Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki as well as at Panteion. International organizations, including the United Nations, fell within the competence of such chairs, for example, diplomatic history was taught either separately or in conjunction with legal subjects.

The need that the political, social and economic analysis of international society take its proper place, next to international law, in a "new program" of study of social sciences was first recognized and put into practice by the Panteion School faculty in the immediate post-dictatorship period; i.e., from 1974 to 1978. Most of these faculty members were prominent social scientists or jurists conscious of the limits of their discipline. Most had lost their faculty positions during the dictatorship and were either detained in Greece or forced to work in European universities. They now were given incentives to test a fresh approach to their field. In general, the significance of teaching the social-sciences in consolidating democratic institutions and modernizing Greek society was repeatedly noted. George Tenekides, a prominent international lawyer and professor at Panteion, played an instrumental role in placing "International Relations" as a separate course in the "new program" of study and then elevating it to "compulsory course" status for senior year students (1978).

Since then, the growth of international studies in Greece has been spectacular indeed. Six Universities have either separate Departments of International Studies: (Economics University of Athens, University of Macedonia and, since September 1997, Panteion University); or Sections of International Studies within Departments of Political Science or Law (University of Athens, University of Thessaloniki and University of Thrace). When, in 1993, graduate studies were officially institutionalized in Greece, four of the above Universities (University of Athens, University of Thessaloniki, Economics University and Panteion) included international and/or European studies, or international and European economics in their graduate programs, while one of them (University of Athens)

offers two different programs one through its Department of Law and the other through the Department of Political Science and Administrative Studies. A total of 138 faculty members and 47 visiting professors and assistants (39 Professors, 22 Associate Professors, 49 Assistant Professors and 28 Lecturers) serve in these Departments and sections. Although only a segment are international law/international relations specialists, the growth from a total of approximately 10-12 in the late 1970s to the present figure is very impressive indeed.

Among the reasons that could be cited to explain this development, two seem particularly pertinent. First, and foremost, was a new law (1982) that abolished the old system of chairs and introduced a university organization similar to the North American one, especially as regards the establishment of departments as basic academic units. Within the course of a few years, the law multiplied the available programs of study in all fields and created hundreds of new faculty positions. It should also be kept in mind that during the 1980s the number of Universities in Greece also multiplied with the upgrading of independent schools (agriculture, economics and commercial studies, political sciences) to the status of independent Universities (Agricultural University, Economics University of Athens, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, University of Piraeus, University of Macedonia) and the creation of new Universities in different parts of Greece: Epirus, Thrace, Thessaly, Aegean, etc.

A second reason, exclusive to the growth of international studies, is the renewed interest in international society and state foreign policy resulting from the new phase that Greek-Turkish relations entered after the 1974 Cyprus crisis and, equally important, the Greek accession to the European Economic Community that materialized in 1981. Universities rushed to cover the existing gap in European Studies and a whole new generation of graduates sought post-graduate education abroad in the same field in anticipation of jobs in Universities, Greek public administration and the European Community itself. Over the course of time, Greek membership in the Union introduced revolutionary changes in the Greek IR community to the extent that research programs and related opportunities became available to scholars individually and not through the traditional university hierarchies and structures. University position and assessment of each researcher's academic competence became secondary to connections, particularly in Brussels. Research centers, either in the form of small entities set up to compete for a particular program or large institutions with a much broader scope and range of activities became veritable power-houses competing successfully with the Greek university establishment. Among the most notable such institutions are three which were all established in the course of a two-year period (1988-89): The Hellenic

Center for European Studies (EKEM) founded in 1988, closely supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Hellenic Foundation for European (originally Defense) and Foreign Policy (1988) (ELIAMEP) founded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense and, finally, the Institute of International Relations or I.I.R. (1989) formally affiliated with Panteion University.

3. The Greek International Relations Community⁹

Those impressed by the number of scholars actively involved in international studies in Greece should withhold final judgment as to the effect of such figures on IR research and theory or on political praxis until several additional factors are drawn into the picture. The first factor is that the overwhelming majority of scholars involved are international or European Union law and institutions specialists, while another significant group comprises historians and economists. Indeed, a review of both graduate and undergraduate courses offered in Greek Universities will establish that political science/international relations courses represent about 20% of the total.

Should one scratch a little deeper and look into the academic background of those teaching IR courses, one would conclude that those who have studied the field and retain a theoretical orientation in their work represent a much smaller figure. It is somehow paradoxical that while all major textbooks used in Greek universities as an introduction to the field of international relations² emphasize theoretical orientation as a *sine qua non* to the scientific study of foreign policy the authors of such text books often show no particular zeal in reconfirming those commitments while evaluating the work of candidates for university positions including the rank of full professor.

A second related factor is that the majority of the few political science scholars deal with current issues of Greek foreign policy and, by and large, with topics suitable to policy-oriented analysis and practical recommendations to decision-makers. Very rarely do such works contain any citations to general theoretical works in international relations, or, attempt to correlate their findings with the *problématique* of established IR paradigms. It was uncommon in the past for the government and the public to turn to "experts" for answers to complicated international problems. Primarily the international lawyers, deemed eligible for such consultation, commanded an established discipline³, but by the middle 1980s a number of factors reversed the situation. Among these was the rapid expansion of the IR academic community as a result of the new university law⁴, the influx of private radio and television that resulted in a wave of aggressive reporters willing to interview anyone who appeared able to speak with authority on

⁹The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Heleni Androulaki, Research Assistant at the Institute of International Relations in documenting parts of this section.

any subject that would attract an audience and last, but not least, a long and growing list of problems in Greece's external relations with Turkey as well as with the European Community and the United States. The circumstances were fitting for an innovative response and this came with the establishment in 1988 of the "Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy" with the initiative provided by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The foundation was to operate as a private law institution but it would be endowed with public funding. The initial nine-member governing council was appointed by the two Ministries. According to the foundation's by-laws, members of the governing council were to be selected from the ranks of the military, the diplomatic corps, journalists and academia. In a revision of its by-laws, effected in 1993, the number of governing council members rose to 13 while it was stipulated that the membership be selected, "in a representative way", from the academic, diplomatic, military, mass media and business communities.⁵

Institutes of international politics or foreign policy, bringing together retired diplomats, foreign policy decision-makers, journalists, businessmen and academics, play a useful role in establishing contacts with similar institutes in other countries, by holding conferences and seminars on current issues of foreign policy and debating sensitive issues without officially involving their governments. Yet in most countries with a tradition in the field of IR such "think-tanks" coexist with academic research institutes that conduct other than policy-oriented research.

The creation in the same year of EKEM, whose purpose was to specialize in European Community affairs and whose officers are appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the year after of the IIR, whose Executive Council and Director are elected every three years by the faculty and student representatives of the Department of Political Science and International Studies of Panteion University, did not shift the balance from policy to academic research and could not prevent the erosion of the status of I.R. as an academic field of study. This, despite the fact that both EKEM and IIR have tried to keep a balance between policy-oriented and non-policy oriented research.⁶

A third and final factor is the fragmentation of the community of I.R. scholars with the main division line that of the Political Science Departments of the Universities of Athens and Panteion and the Institutes associated with them (ELIAMEP informally and I.I.R. formally). Perhaps, the saddest effect of this fragmentation was that on the Hellenic Society of International Law and International Relations the professional association of virtually all members of the I.R. Community. Since the early 1990s all ELIAMEP - associated members of the Society - with the notable excep-

tions of Professors Christos Rozakis and Argiris Fatouros - including its former President, Th. Couloumbis, have abstained from all activities of the Society, including a round-table discussion on the state of the field in Greece and the problem of the IR community fragmentation organized in June 1995.⁷

The virtual paralysis of the Hellenic Society, especially with regard to non-legal foreign policy questions, had a prominent victim: the Society's Yearbook of International Law and International Politics (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis Publishers) ceased publication with evident consequences on informed communication among members of the community. Younger scholars were faced with the dilemma either to be associated with ELIAMEP activities and be given the opportunity to publish in the foundation's Yearbook (until 1996 the only such publication in Greece) or try their luck in foreign-refereed journals. A related effect of this situation was that newspapers, especially the Sunday editions, emerged as the sole opportunity an IR expert had to communicate his or her views to a wider audience and answer criticisms addressed through the same medium. An uglier consequence was the systematic attempt to gain "monopoly" positions in the widely read Sunday papers.

4. The Current Foreign Policy Debate

Obviously under the above mediatic conditions, it is an exaggeration to treat conflicting views on Greek foreign policy as a genuine scholarly conflict. The latter presupposes fundamental agreement on who qualifies as a member of the community of scholars, a basic familiarity of all those involved with the essentials of the literature - something that is hard to apply to the readers of Sunday papers - and a consensus on methodology. Such conditions being absent, arguments had to be presented in a concise form with convenient categorizations, and ideological overtones.

A review, therefore, of the debate concerning the principal orientation of Greek foreign policy should focus not so much on the theoretical frameworks of the IR community of scholars as on the ideology of the political elites. This is particularly true with regards to the aspect of the debate that has attracted most attention: the clash between "nationalists" and "euro-peanists"⁸ whose evolution in the post 1974 period could be summarized along the following lines.

A singular development of the political ideology of the period after the dictatorship was the erosion of the role of the conservative "Right" as the principal guarantor of the country's national interests. The involvement of the three main bastions of the pre-1967 political order (i.e.:the army), the monarchy and the "foreign protector" (i.e.:the U.S.) in a mix that led to a

“national disaster” (i.e.: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus), motivated the forces of modernization within the Greek conservative political establishment to adopt an increasingly pro-European political agenda that culminated with the country’s accession to the EEC in 1981.

On the other hand, the traditionally internationalist Greek left, for tactical reasons, espoused themes that could pave the way to a new version of Greek nationalism.⁹

The emphasis on serving Greek interests as the essential precondition for continued membership in main institutions of the Western/Capitalist bloc became a major policy line for PASOK, in its transformation from a small party to the first post-WWII Greek government representing the forces that were defeated in the civil war. At the same time, the perception of a Turkish threat against Greek territorial integrity and the need for policies that would effectively deter Turkey emerged as an additional goal shared by leftist political forces. Differences of opinion concerning the kind of policies that would serve this goal were secondary to the unifying perception that Turkish imperialism, despite a certain degree of autonomous motivation, was in effect, an expression of American imperialist designs.

The segment of the left that would somewhat distance itself from such interpretations of the historical process was the Eurocommunist party later transformed into the “Coalition of the Left”. Although sharing the perception of the Turkish threat, Greek Eurocommunism, by elevating the European Community to the level of the most significant battle ground for the promotion of the socialist cause and the realization of a “Europe of the Working People”, retained a highly internationalist profile. It is well known to students of contemporary Greek history that this rather small party had a political weight far superior to its electoral strength in the sense that it represented the vast majority of the Greek intelligentsia that during the years of the dictatorship was exposed, in heavy doses, to leftist western variations of “progressive ideas”. However paradoxical it might appear, for almost the entire 1974-1989 period, the core of Greek europeanists comprised modernist conservatives and heretic Communists.

On the other hand, the “patriotic PASOK” along with the die-hard Communist Party (KKE) put major emphasis on the preservation of national sovereignty within the bipolar international order. Each player had different reasons, emanating either from political expediency or lessons of Marxist-Leninist and contemporary “Dependency” doctrines.

In the post-1989 period a number of developments caused significant changes in the array of “Europeanist” and “Nationalist” forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc shrank the influence of

the Greek Communist party which could no longer present a credible challenge to PASOK. For the latter, the counterbalancing of domestic and foreign policy goals became a much less politically expedient exercise. At the same time, Andreas Papandreou himself, fighting a tough legal battle with his political opponents over the "Koskotas affair" and in fragile health, was no longer the man likely to resort to the familiar - and politically successful - moves of the past. Actually, with the "Soviet Block" alternative eliminated, any talk about an "independent" Greek path in foreign policy sounded meaningless. European integration appealed more and more to PASOK's leadership but also to the rank and file as a sensible foreign policy course.

On the conservative side, the "Macedonian" question, i.e. the struggle to prevent the tiny independent state that emerged in Greece's northern frontier after the collapse of Tito's Yugoslavia, from assuming the name "Republic of Macedonia", became a catalyst for internal changes. There were other provocations to Greek sensitivity stemming from an overnationalistic political debate in other neighboring countries like Albania and to a lesser extent Bulgaria. But the issue of the name of "Macedonia" was soon elevated to number one foreign policy concern of the Greek public with grave consequences on Greek domestic policies as well. The weak, one-seat majority, Mitsotakis government that somehow survived three years of strife between the hard-liner Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras and the Prime Minister, collapsed in 1993 after having introduced another division line along the Europeanists versus nationalists dichotomy inside and outside the New Democracy Party. This time the focus had been on the rather "shallow" Macedonian issue. Greece's uphill fight over the "Macedonian cause" confused and disturbed international public opinion especially that of Western partners, whose patience had been repeatedly tested in the past over Andreas Papandreou's "heretic" policies and Greece's policy of transferring issues arising from Greek-Turkish disputes to Western organizations.

World television coverage of massive rallies condemning the "Republic of Macedonia" featuring priests in black robes hoisting the Greek flag was seen as inexplicable nationalist hysteria. However embarrassing this sight might have been for the Greek intelligentsia, the effect was negligible compared to their feeling of alienation in view of grass-roots support of Bosnian-Serbs, by then the "villains" of Western media. Greeks appeared as a backward Balkan nation placing religious affinities above humanitarian and anti-racial preoccupations as well as questions of international justice - as understood by major media networks. For some time, a real gap seemed to have emerged between the perceptions of the average citizen and those of the intellectual élites.

It was evident that there would soon be a backlash with PASOK's kiss to power, following the overthrow of Mitsotaki's government by Samaras and his supporters. Uncompromising policies toward FYROM continued, but heretic views within the party would find their way to the media with an increased frequency. As the deadlock over the name of FYROM dragged on, the parties of the left originally the Communist party alone followed after a while by the Coalition of the Left - took more and more outspoken positions against the country's "intransigent" attitude on the issue. It should be reminded at this point that while the two large parties had both important electoral constituencies in Northern Greece and faced strong resistance from deputies elected there, the parties of the left were much less concerned over the regional electoral cost of a more conciliatory policy concerning the name of FYROM. On the other hand, "New Democracy's" official party line remained the same but real enthusiasm for the "Macedonian case", by now a *raison d'être* for its principal contender for the conservative vote: Samaras' "Political Spring" had all but vanished. Editorials and contributions by prominent intellectuals in some of the country's most influential newspapers reflected a more and more outspoken opposition to the nationalist agenda.

The New York Agreement lifted the Greek embargo against FYROM and by leaving the question of FYROM's name to be settled through negotiations under UN auspices, allowed the normalization of that Republic's relations with Greece. The agreement was a turning point as regards the Macedonian - related nationalist vs. Europeanist clash to the effect that it removed the issue from its prominent position in the Greek foreign policy agenda. Attention was once more diverted to the traditional preoccupations of Greek foreign policy, i.e. Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations. In the upcoming battle within PASOK over the succession of Papandreu, whose health was declining rapidly, Gerassimos Arsenis and Akis Tsohatzopoulos would represent the traditional "patriotic line" of the party with a prominent item in their agenda the doctrine of a "Unified Defense Space"¹⁰ between Greece and Cyprus, while Kostas Simitis would give priority to the political and socio-economic prerequisites that would allow Greece to remain a Union partner in the forthcoming advanced stages of European integration. The latter's victory in securing the PASOK leadership transformed the party's foreign policy profile into pre-eminent-ly Europeanist with very few, if any, distinct differences from that of the Coalition of the Left.

It was the 1996 Imia crisis that revitalized the foreign policy debate in Greece and presented on its own merits the most credible challenge to the "Europeanist" vision. However appealing, the European orientation could not by itself provide a credible immediate solution to Greece's security

concerns. In the Imia crisis Turkey demonstrated to all skeptics that, under a favorable balance of forces, it would not hesitate to advance its claims against Greece for fear of making Europeans unhappy for a while. The provocation proved an embarrassing yet valuable lesson for the Simitis government which since then has paid sufficient attention to the upgrading of the country's armed forces, in order to restore the balance of power between the two countries. On the other hand, the effort by New Democracy under the leadership of Miltiadis Evert, to build a case of general governmental inadequacy out of the handling of the Imia crisis and upgrade it to the number one item of his party's electoral platform for the September 1996 elections, failed to convince voters. The revival of nationalist sentiment that the crisis caused was short-lived and the subsequent debate failed to address convincingly the country's long-lasting foreign policy dilemmas.

5. The Greek Foreign Policy Debate and the IR Community: 1990-1996

The Greek IR community contributed in three different ways to the post-1990 debate concerning fundamental orientations and basic options of Greek foreign policy. The first kind of involvement is the direct participation of academic members of the IR community in policy-planning bodies within the Foreign Ministry or other Ministries whose functions have a direct effect on foreign policy. In the pre-1990 period such participation was very rare since governments resorted to scientists already serving in existing bureaucracies, like the Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry or the body of experts that supported the work of diplomats. A notable exception was the Programming Committee of the Information Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Deputy and later Alternate Foreign Minister Yannis Kapsis.¹¹ The Committee operated for approximately three years: 1985-1987. Although its assignment was limited to support "Athena" a monthly news magazine presenting a semi-official Greek view of current, domestic and international developments, this first cooperation of representatives of the I.R. community prior to its fragmentation has had some positive results. Limited financial assistance was secured for projects with a combined academic and policy interest and the invitation to Greece of important scholars and influential public figures was facilitated.

In the post-1990 period the first major case of I.R. community collective involvement in official policy making mechanisms was the establishment of a Policy-Planning Committee under Deputy General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador E. Megalokonomos. The Committee¹² whose membership at some point exceeded 40 persons, comprised all the academics associated with ELIAMEP and several retired

diplomats. The Committee, began its work in early 1991 and ceased to exist a few months prior to Samaras' decision to resign the post of Foreign Minister (June 1992). About six months after the commencement of its work, a representative of IIR (P. Ifestos) and a representative of the now defunct Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies were invited to join the Committee. In the period of approximately 18 months that the Committee functioned regularly, it accomplished relatively little in terms of concrete policy-input. On the other hand, the involvement of the great majority of IR scholars in a Policy-Planning Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a time when a hard-line policy vis-à-vis FYROM was implemented and nationalist sentiment in Greece had reached a climax is significant in itself. Certainly, membership in the Committee does not imply complicity in the actual policies followed. On the other hand, involvement in the policy-making procedure appears to have had a restraining effect on published criticism and prevented the debate from focusing on the essential question: "Are national security threats, emanating from the consolidation of FYROM in Greece's northern frontiers and the possibility to pursue revisionist claims against Greece's territorial integrity, serious enough to justify the undermining of the dominant "ethnic group" in that state and, consequently, to justify the backing of Albanian and Bulgarian objectives for its partition and/or annexation to a Greater Albania or Greater Bulgaria?"¹³

The case of this Committee is significant for an additional, more general reason, since it demonstrates a risk inherent in any case of participation of scholars in similar bodies: identification with official decisions and neutralization of their independent role. There was no follow-up to the Policy-Planning Committee experiment until April 1996 when the Simitis Government decided to establish a Scientific Council in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The council, endowed with broad jurisdiction, has since then become a major advisory body primarily due to the academic reputation of its members.¹⁴ One should note, however, that the fragmentation of the I.R. community and the undermining of its scientific credibility have had a noticeable effect on the membership of the council: all are professors of either international or constitutional law, not a single member is a political scientist with specialization in International Relations or Foreign Policy Analysis.¹⁵

Recently two more ministries have set up committees with the participation of members of the IR community. In February 1997, the Ministry of the Press and Mass Media established a Scientific Council on International Public Opinion,¹⁶ while recently, the Ministry of Defense has announced the creation of a new body of as yet unspecified membership and purpose.

Besides official involvement in institutionalized consultative processes, there is the possibility to exercise effective influence through informal means. An illustration of the potential of this first type of interaction is the close contact of Gerassimos Arsenis, at a time when PASOK was an opposition party, with P. Ifestos, Ath. Platias and Chr. Yallourides.¹⁷ The three scholars contributed to the formulation of the “Unified Defense Space” doctrine between Greece and Cyprus and influenced G. Arsenis’ thinking in strategic affairs, before and after he became Minister of Defense, while their writings facilitated public understanding of the doctrine.

A second method of directly influencing official thinking on foreign policy issues is through the preparation of special studies commissioned either by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense. All major Institutes have prepared such studies, some of which, under contractual constraints, remained confidential while others were later published. It is evident that data concerning unpublished studies are not easily accessible, especially given the lack of communication among Greek IR institutes. Among the major studies undertaken by IIR itself in the past, one should mention those prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁸, the General Secretariat for the Greeks Abroad¹⁹ and the Ministry of Defense.²⁰ In so far as non-confidential studies are concerned, EKEM has recently published a study it had undertaken for the restructuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²¹

Effective utilization of special studies undertaken by IR “think-tanks” presupposes the existence of an adequate “analysis and planning mechanism” within the public authority that commissions the study. This is crucial both for providing appropriate specifications for the work undertaken as well as for the optimum use of the findings. Often, specifications are too broad, leading to voluminous studies that are difficult to absorb and run the risk of being outdated by the time of their completion. Equally important, a competent policy-planning division is a *sine qua non* condition for a mutually beneficial cooperation between IR Institutes and government instrumentalities. Despite difficulties, the commissioning of studies is a much preferable policy²² to that of offering grants. Recently, both the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense have shifted from providing grants to allotting funds for studies, in an effort to set the relations with research institutes on a new, more equitable and useful basis.

A third, more traditional, method for scholars to influence the foreign policy debate, has been through the publication of their works. Occasionally this kind of debate has taken the form of direct juxtaposition of opposite views concerning either an evolving major international crisis

or the formulation of new policies on pending foreign policy questions. Perhaps, the most typical exchange of views of the first variety were the five short articles, three by this author and two by Th. Coulombis, on the effects of the Cold War on the emerging post-cold war international system and the Greek interests involved.²³ Although the texts contained here and there some abrasive remarks, this remains the only published scholarly exchange of views, where both writers made explicit reference to theory in support of their arguments.

Debates have also taken the form of conflicting arguments supporting existing policies or advocating their revision in specific ways. An example of this kind of debate, conducted primarily through the publication of books rather than short articles, was that between Panayiotis Kazakos arguing in a 1989 ELIAMEP publication that a Cyprus application for membership to the European Community would be ill-advised and premature and Panayiotis Ifestos arguing exactly the opposite.²⁴ Another case in this category stems from the controversial proposal put forward in an article in *Kathimerini*, by the Director of ELIAMEP, Yannis Valinakis that, under certain conditions, the Republic of Cyprus could extend recognition to the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". There was an immediate response by Yannis Kranidiotes²⁵ in the same newspaper and a meeting to discuss Valinakis' ideas, sponsored by the Hellenic Society of International Law and International Relations. These ideas, which at that time caused an uproar both in Greece and Cyprus,²⁶ were repeated six years later, again in an ELIAMEP publication, co-authored by four former Greek Ambassadors but caused little noticeable public reaction.²⁷

Much more common is the publication of articles in which authors express their views or respond to those of others without citing specific sources. This variety of debate, by far the most popular form of communication through newspapers and magazines, has attracted some prominent IR scholars of the younger generation. Proponents of the realist school have popularized their ideas concerning the primacy of states, their quest for power either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends, the concept of balance of power and the "neo-realist" emphasis on the structure of international systems and their effects on state behavior.²⁸ Panayiotis Ifestos and Athanassios Platias, prominent representatives of this school in Greece, with a solid educational background and contribution to I.R. literature, attempted to apply realist theory to specific issues of Greek foreign policy. Their writings appeared in Greece at a time when the fragmentation of the IR community had eliminated traditional channels of scholarly communication and had upgraded newspaper columns into the most appropriate means. Under the circumstances, the introduction in Greece of political realism, one of the most popular schools of IR theory,

proved a formidable task. Limited space and readers, evidently uninterested in citations to theories, forced the authors to focus directly on policies and policy-recommendations emanating from their theoretical persuasion. In the mass media, where the foreign policy debate was dominated by the nationalist - europeanist clash, "realist" analysis²⁹ was conveniently classified as "nationalist" with all the heavy political overtones that it carries due to the Greek civil war and post-civil war troubled political history. The two authors were consequently subjected to attacks, by writers that referred to them not by name, but through the use of imaginative variations of the term "nationalist".

A writer with a solid academic background but a different theoretical persuasion is Alexis Heraclides, whose preoccupation with transnational aspects of international life, especially human rights, ethnic minorities and the right to secede from multiethnic states led him to argue occasionally that the solution advocated by the British colonial rulers and partition-policies of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot leadership corresponded to international legal rules and practices.³⁰ Rather than draw attention to the real division line between scientific and non-scientific work in international relations, Th. Coulombis, a senior member of the community, has shown impressive creativity in dividing scholars in, always two, categories whose particular names change: pro-"Achilles", vs. Pro-"Ulysses"³¹ "optimists" vs. "pessimists",³² "status quo" vs. "revisionists"³³, "realists" vs. "pragmatists"³⁴ etc... The implication is that on one side stand the prudent, pro-Europeanists, eager to advise peaceful cooperation with neighbors while on the other side are the "isolationists" and the "adventurists", "ready to create faits accomplis against Balkan states"(!)³⁵

6. Concluding Remarks

Neglect of IR theory, dominance of policy-oriented institutions and research and fragmentation of the community of scholars have adversely affected the growth of the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis in Greece. This is a reality that should not be concealed either by the proliferation of conferences and seminars on current foreign affairs issues or by the increase of University programs of study. In terms of the scholarly contribution to Greek foreign policy, there have been instances of positive influence exercised by individual scholars or groups of scholars to particular government echelons or individual policy makers. On the other hand, the very fact that the I.R. community of scholars shares with everybody else the same media (newspaper and magazine columns, radio programs, TV talk shows etc), either to exchange views or communicate views to the public, affects the content of the analysis and equates its quality to that of a professional commentator of current affairs. It is, there-

fore, only natural that after a brief interval, international institutional and legal analysis has made an impressive comeback both in average citizen perceptions as to what a true "scientific discipline" is as well as to policy-makers utilitarian needs.

Particularly devastating for the scholarly reputation of the field is the division of scholars into "nationalists" and "europeanists". It is well understood by Greeks and knowledgeable foreigners, that Greece is not a typical European Union country in the field of security. The dilemma that Greek policy-makers are facing is, and will continue for a long-time to be, whether the diversion of the country's energies and resources to attain advanced levels of European integration could make-up for the growing imbalance of forces between Greece and Turkey in favor of the latter. Greece needs its "nationalists" i.e. the political realists specializing in strategic studies in order to maximize the return of its diminishing investment in defense and explore other long-term external and internal balancing strategies. But it needs as much its European orientation and all those who advocate it, in order to maximize the political and economic advantages of membership as well as to motivate various institutions and social groups in the modernization of Greece's domestic structures. However, portraying the European Union as a panacea to all of Greece's problems is a simple-minded and dangerous illusion.

The Greek government and Greek political parties have a vested interest in a competent IR community able to carry out a task where it definitely enjoys a comparative advantage over international law specialists or professional journalists: the long-term planning of Greek foreign policy in a period where the international system is in a process of transition. They should, therefore, place their confidence in academic research and take the various foundations and Institutes of foreign policy for what they really are: means of supplementing and supporting diplomatic work and engaging in public exchanges with similar Institutes in other countries. But the ultimate task for mending bridges and bringing together the IR community in Greece should be carried out by its own members, who are under serious risk of becoming collectively marginalized.

NOTES

1. S. Constantinides "Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis", *Etudes helléniques / Hellenic Studies*, (Vol.4, No1, 1996, p. 43-61) See also Varvarousis, "The Scientific Field of International Relations in Greece: Evolution and Prospects" *International Law and International Relations* (1993), pp. 325-352 (in Greek).
2. The author of the first textbook was the late George Tenekides: **Subjects of Sociology of International Relations** (Athens: Papazisis, 1976). The Greek translation of the American original edition of Th. Couloumbis and J.F. Wolfe **Introduction to International Relations - Power and Justice** (Athens: Papazisis, 1981) followed. The same year another shorter introduction, the work of P. Varvarousis, a lecturer of the University of Athens: **Introduction to International Relations** (Athens: A. Sakkoulas, 1981). Two years later, another introduction, written by the author of this article, became available to Greek students and younger scholars: D. Conostas: **Theory and Methodology of International Relations** (Athens: A. Sakkoulas, 1983). The book familiarized for the first time the Greek community of I.R. scholars with the debate on Paradigms in International Relations. A little later Th. Couloumbis and D. Conostas co-authored a two-volume work under the title: **International Relations: A Global Approach** (Athens: Papazisis, 1985) which became the basic textbook in the field in Greece. Recently the two authors followed separate paths each publishing a separate introduction: D. Conostas in collaboration with K. Arvanitopoulos: **International Relations: Continuity and Change** (Athens: Library of the Institute of International Relations, I. Sideris Publishers 1997) and Th. Couloumbis **Introduction to International Relations** (Athens: Papazisis, 1995).
3. D. Conostas "Foreign Policy and International Law" *To Vima*, August 27, 1995.
4. See *supra* #2.
5. Of the three academics in the first nine-member council, the author resigned shortly, Chr. Rozakis remained for some years, while Th. Couloumbis, joined by Th. Veremis and Y. Valinakis - all three associated with the Department of Political Science of the University of Athens - have filled over the years the main executive posts in ELIAMEP's governing body.
6. I.I.R. in particular, despite its meager financial means, has tried to retain links with the scientific community of I.R. in the United States and elsewhere. See e.g. *Cosmos Yearbook 1995*: "International Relations Theory at the Crossroads" with contributions from Joseph Grieco, Stephen Krasner, Seyom Brown, Robert Cuttler, Mathew Evangelista etc. Karl Holsti and James Rosenau have contributed to D. Conostas and Ath. Platias (eds.) **Modern Diasporas in World Politics** (London: Macmillan, 1993), while Georgi Arbatov, Shlomo Avineri, Godfried Kinderman, Bruce Russett and many others have taken part in the annual Corfu Seminar on Conflict Resolution. Robert Keohane and other prominent I.R. scholars have lectured under the auspices of the Institute in Athens.

7. For the proceedings of the round-table discussion see: **Institute of International Relations Yearbook of the Institute of International Relations**, v. 1, pp. 52-119 (1996).
8. For a useful review of the historical origins of this debate, see *supra* #1.
9. For a discussion of the evolution of Foreign Policy objectives of Greece's major political parties see D. Conostas, "Greek Foreign Policy Objectives 1974-1986" in S. Vryonis Jr. (ed.), **Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK 1974-1986** (N. York: A.D. Caratzas Publishers, 1991) pp. 37-69.
10. On the "Unified Defense Space" see C. Arvanitopoulos, "The Extended Deterrence Doctrine and its Role in Promoting Cooperation", in Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. And D. Kerides (eds.) **Security in the South-Eastern Mediterranean - Europe and the United States - Greek Relations** (Virginia: 1997) 163-169; and Ath. Platias "Greek Deterrence Strategy" *Etudes helléniques*, v. 4, No 2, (1996) pp. 33-54.
11. Members of the Committee were Professors: D. Conostas, Th. Couloubmis, Chr. Rozakis and Th. Veremis; journalist V. Mathiopoulos, the late Nikos Kotzias, one of the most prominent writers of his generation; Ambassador Rodousakis and Mrs. F. Toma-Konstantopoulos.
12. The author of this Chapter, having reservations concerning the composition and the role of the Committee, declined the invitation to participate.
13. See D. Conostas "foreword" in M. Koppa, **A Fragile Democracy: FYROM Between the Past and the Future** (Athens: Papazisis Publishers, Library of the Institute of International Relations, 1994) pp. 9-19 at 13-14 (in Greek). On this author's criticism of the policies of Mitsotakis government on the "Macedonian question" see **Sunday Eleftherotypia**: November 11, 1992, p. 13 "...instead of capitalizing on our many advantages as the only European Community state in the region that understands Balkan problems we were trapped in uni-dimensional policy which upgraded the question of the name of Skopja into number one issue of Greek Foreign Policy". See also similar views in **Sunday Eleftherotypia**, February 20, 1994, pp. 26-27.
14. Professors A. Fatouros, K. Ioannou, Chr. Rozakis and G. Papademetriou. The latter is also Legal Advisor to the Prime Minister.
15. Two members of the Scientific Council: Professor Fatouros and Ioannou were appointed as Greek "negotiators" in the negotiation process of Greek-Turkish Disputes initiated by the Dutch Presidency of the European Union in early summer 1997.
16. The majority of the members of the Council are journalists. Professor Thanos Veremis and Assistant Professor Constantine Arvanitopoulos are the representatives of the I.R. community.
17. The first two scholars, now Associate Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies, were invited by G. Arsenis to discuss the concept of "extended deterrence" first analyzed in Greece in their joint publication: **Greek Deterrence**

Strategy (Athens, 1992): Chr. Yallourides, as an informal advisor to G. Arsenis, after he became Minister of Defense, played an instrumental role in establishing effective communication between the political leadership of the Republic of Cyprus and the Minister, eventually securing public acceptance of the "Unified Defense Space".

18. An anatomy of the Greek Balkan Reality (December 1992).

19. **The Greek Diaspora and its Role in the Promotion of National Issues** (1994).

20. Two volumes of studies were undertaken on behalf of the Ministry of Defense in the period 1994-1997 and were submitted under two different headings: **Defense Questions of the Balkan Peninsula-International & Regional Aspects and Greek Security Considerations** (v. I.); **Turkish Policies Towards Greece and Cyprus and the Security of the South-Eastern Mediterranean** (v. II.)

21. See E. Stoforopoulos and A. Makrodemetres, **The Greek Foreign Policy System: The Institutional Dimension**: (Athens: Hellenic Center for European Studies:1996, in Greek).

22. According to a recent ELIAMEP Memorandum to the Ministry of Defense the Foundation received in the period 1993-1995 99.000.000 Drs. from the Foreign Ministry and in the period 1993-1996 74.600.000 Drs. from the Ministry of Defense. During the same period IIR received 8.000.000 and 50.000.000 Drs. respectively in payment for studies commissioned. EKEM however continues to be financed almost entirely through the budget of the Foreign Ministry.

23. D. Conostas, "The Crisis", "the Critics" and the Policy: "Which Optimism?" **Sunday Eleftherotypia**, January 20, 1991; Th. Couloumbis "In the post-cold war world Greece identifies with "Europe of the Twelve" **Sunday Avghi**, January 27, 1991; D. Conostas, "The War in the Gulf. Time for Debate" **Sunday Avghi**, February 3, 1991 Th.Couloumbis "The War in the Gulf and The War of the International Relations Scholars - Time to conclude the Debate" **Sunday Avghi** February 10, 1991; D. Conostas, "The War and the International Relations Scholars: Time to talk seriously" **Sunday Avghi**, February 17, 1991. All five articles, were published in **International Law and International Relations** (1993) pp 227-242, so that all members of the Greek IR community could read and assess the merits of each author's views. Sadly this was the last issue of the only Greek scholarly I.R. journal.

24. See P. Kazakos, **The Accession of Cyprus to the European Communities** (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990); and P. Ifestos, **The Cyprus Application and the Enlargement of the European Communities** (1987-1992) (Athens: Papazisis, 1992). The two authors are Professors at the University of Athens and Panteion University respectively.

25. See Yannis Kranidiotes, **Kathimerini**, October 7, 1989, p. 7. The author is today Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece.

26. Condemnation was voiced from many directions including the Senate of the University of Athens and the Archbishop of Cyprus.

27. See my article "Return to Cyprus", *Kathimerini*, June 9, 1996.
28. See K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
29. See supra #2.
30. A. Heraklides: "Need for a Radical Change of Policy in Cyprus", *To Vima*, November 11, 1996.
31. Th. Couloumbis: "Greek Foreign Policy objectives in the Balkans" in D. Conostas and P. Tsakonas (eds.) *Greek Foreign Policy - Domestic and External Parameters* (Athens: Library of the Institute of International Relations, No7, 1994) pp. 87-95 in 93-94 (in Greek).
32. Th. Couloumbis, *Sunday Eleftherotypia*, July 9th, 1995.
33. Th. Couloumbis, *Sunday Eleftherotypia*, August 20, 1995.
34. Th. Couloumbis, *Sunday Eleftherotypia*, March 24, 1996, p. 13.
35. Supra notes 33-34. For a criticism of Th. Couloumbis practice to separate the members of the Greek I.R. community in arbitrarily drawn categories and the distortion of scholarly arguments to fit his categories see D. Conostas, *Sunday Eleftherotypia*, March 31, 1996, p. 16.