

Recensions / Book Reviews

Christos P. Ioannides: *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*. Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991

This book describes Northern Cyprus which Turkey invaded in 1974 and still occupies. It describes how Turkey has illegally changed the cultural and demographic character of the northern part of Cyprus by transforming into a Turkish province.

The book is divided into 11 chapters. Chapter One deals with the issue of Anatolia settlers brought to the Northern part of Cyprus by Turkey to change the ethnodemography of Cyprus. On November 15, 1983, under the umbrella of the Turkish Army, the Turkish-Cypriot «legislative assembly» declared it a Turkish state with Rauf Denktaş as its president. The occupied part of Cyprus covers 1,350 square miles (size of Rhode Island) along with the Turkish occupied army of approximately 35,000 Turkish troops, and a Turkish-Cypriot population of about 98,000. «The Ethno-demography of Cyprus» is discussed in Chapter Two.

Despite the lack of reliable census material on the ethnic composition of Cyprus, the author looks at available records starting with the British census of 1881 and 1960. In both cases the author found that the overwhelming majority of the Cyprus was Greek Orthodox. The Turkish Cypriot arguments of Turkish emigration to Cyprus are refuted from the evidence. The author makes the following conclusions: 1) both Greek and Turkish Cypriot emigration patterns paralleled the population ratio between the two communities, 2) both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have emigrated for economic reasons and, 3) no mass Turkish-Cypriot emigration to Turkey occurred, therefore there should not be any massive Turkish-Cypriot return from Turkey after 1974 (p. 22).

In Chapter Three, the author outlines the parallel methods of conquest and colonization of the Ottomans in 1571 and the Turkish invasion, occupation and colonization of Cyprus in 1974. In both cases colonization was carried out as a systematic policy of the Turkish government (p. 27). Since 1974 the author estimates that about 74,000 Turkish settlers have colonized Cyprus, including peasants, civil servants, soldiers, laborers and tourist industry personnel, and retired officers. Through this colonization policy, many Bulgarian Muslims and Kurds are also allowed to settle in the Turkish occupied Northern Cyprus. About 174,700 Greek Cypriots fled from their homes in Northern Cyprus as the Turkish army

advanced in the double invasion of 1974. It is estimated that most of the Turks settlers settled in villages and a few in towns and cities. About 60% of them have settled in the Famagusta district. The majority of these settlers live separate from Turkish Cypriots.

In Chapter Four, the author examines two basic issues: «The Enosis Movement» and «The Pan-Turkish Ideology» in Cyprus. Regarding the «Enosis Movement», or the union of Cyprus with Greece, an intense political mobilization began in the mid-1950s led by General George Grivas known as «Digenis» for the liberation of Cyprus from British rule and the union with Greece. Archbishop Makarios was the political leader of Cyprus who enjoyed overwhelming popular support. The Turkish Cypriots were not mobilized until later. Greece and Greek Cypriots fought side by side with the British during World War II and hoped England after the War (as Churchill had promised) would cede Cyprus to Greece. The struggle for selfdetermination began with the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots were used by the British against the Greek Cypriots. The EOKA movement was against the British colonists and not against the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot leadership did everything to help the colonial government in its military campaign against EOKA. An Anglo-Turkish policy force was formed to fight the EOKA and the Greek Cypriots. The author believes the failure of Greek Cypriot leadership and Greece to anticipate the Anglo-Turkish alliance had disastrous consequences for the Greek Cypriots.

The issue of Pan-Turkism is an extreme form of Turkish nationalism which promoted Turkish irredentism. It has its origins in the 19th century and in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. The author argues that the major objective of Pan-Turkism was to bring all outside Turks under the umbrella of Turkish State. It glorified the ancient symbols of Turkish conquest the mythical grey wolf (bozkurt) of the Asian Steppes which according to Turkish legend, led the early Turkish tribes in their march of conquest, (p. 60). The bozkurt became the symbol of PanTurkism in the 20th century. Pan-Turkism competes with the ideology of Kemal Atatuk whose political ideology was in favor of a homogeneous and secular state and against irredentism. According to the author, since 1960, Pan-Turkism has been the mainstream of Turkish politics (p. 63). The Pan-Turkist ideology reflects the attitudes toward Cyprus and Greece. In general, PanTurkism advances various racial and demographic theories to prove that the Greeks are not the descendants of ancient Greece and Cyprus are more Turkish than Greek.

In Chapter Five, the author examines more closely the activities of Pan-Turkism in the 1950s. In 1946, the establishment of the Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association, as a mouthpiece of Pan-Turkism in Cyprus, was founded in Istanbul. The stated purpose of this Pan-Turkist association was to advance Turkey's irredentist nationalism (p. 77). The Pan-Turkists were active and advanced the idea that Cyprus is Turkish. Furthermore, a number of Turkish newspapers along with this Pan-Turkist cultural organization advocated that the nationalist movement in Cyprus, the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church and EOKA were controlled by communists and an enosis of Cyprus with Greece will jeopardize Turkey's vital interests. The author shows that the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir on September 6, 1955, were organized by this Pan-Turkish group. Both the Menderes government and the leadership of *Kıbrıs Türkler* (Cyprus is Turkish) were behind the riots against the Greeks in Turkey. Both the government of Menderes, who was convicted and hanged later, and the opposition were implicated in the riots and the support of Pan-Turkist ideology. Three of the most influential members of the organization's central executive committee were Hikmet Bil, Kamil Onal, and Ahmed Emin (p. 84), who were actively involved in anti-Greek Cypriot activities. The Turkish press also had close ties with this organization.

Chapter Six deals more specifically with the «Cyprus Question and the Anti-Greek Riots of September 1955». The riots against the Greek minority in Constantinople and Izmir reached such catastrophic proportions that the Greek community and its institutions were destroyed almost completely. The Turkish government was responsible for these riots which almost obliterated the Greek community from about 100,000 prior to September 1955 to about 3,000 today (p. 97). The Menderes government was found guilty of masterminding the riots. Greece and the armed forces downplayed the extent of destruction because their main concern was their anti-communism hysteria of the 1950s.

In Cyprus proper, EOKA had started its military campaign in April 1955 by attacking British military and police installations. Despite EOKA's assurances that their campaign was not against the Turkish Cypriots but against the British, the Turkish Cypriots sided with the British and adopted the view that Cyprus is Turkish. The British policy in Cyprus was close to that of Turkey. Through rumors and innuendos the Turks accused the EOKA as preparing an all-out attack on the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish newspapers helped in spreading false rumors. In the meantime a conference was convened by prime minister Anthony Eden in which he invited Turkey and Greece for talks in London.

Makarios and the Greek Cypriots were against this conference known as the tripartite London Conference. It was this conference along with Zurich that gave Turkey a legitimacy to Cyprus. The rumors of imminent Greek Cypriot massacre against the Turkish Cypriots proved to be a fabrication by the «Kibris Turktur» movement «Cyprus is Turkish» (p. 110). The anti-Greek riots in Turkey were organized and instigated by the Cyprus Turkish Society (Kibris Turktur) and supported by the Turkish government. In their proclamation the Kibris Turktur society made it clear it was the same society that set up the bomb in Ataturk Kemal's home in Thessaloniki in order to justify the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir.

Chapter Seven deals with the role of Turkish officers and a new organization known as Volkan to counter EOKA. It appeared in September 1955, the day of the anniversary of the Greek defeat and evacuation of Smyrna in 1922. The Volkan organization adopted as its symbol the grey wolf. This nationalist Turkish organization was trained and guided by Turkish officers. It urged all Turkish Cypriots to disengage from any cooperation with the Greek Cypriots. The TMT (Turkish Resistance Org.) or Volkan's main objective was to promote separation between the two communities. The TMT was not dissolved even after Cyprus gained its independence. Prior to the invasion the Turkish Cypriots lived in enclaves and had a self-proclaimed administration. The segregation was the prelude to partition following the invasion of 1974. A number of Turkish officers served in Cyprus with TMT between 1955-1974. During the period of 1964-68 Denktash was in Turkey. He returned to Cyprus in 1968 and became the undisputed leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.

In Chapter Eight, the author examines the role of Pan-Turkish and Turkish Islamic groups in Cyprus during the 1960's and 1970's. According to the author, «[T]he Turkish government treated the Cyprus issue as both a nationalist and an Islamic issue» (p. 159). The irredentist goals of Pan-Turkism have been pursued in Cyprus all along. All successive Turkish governments have treated Cyprus as part of Pan-Turkist policy since World War II, the author argues (p. 160). In the last two chapters (Nine and Ten) the author expounds on the politics of the self-proclaimed Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus and TRNC and the turning of the TRNC into a Turkish province by changing the hellenic character of the occupied part of Northern Cyprus. A systematic cultural and administrative Turkification of Cyprus has been going on since even before the Turkish invasion in 1974. Greek villages, and streets have changed into Turkish names. The Greek Orthodox churches have been converted into mosques.

In conclusion, the author believes that Turkey has embarked on an imperial path of possession of territories by altering the actual demographic composition of Cyprus since the Turkish invasion in 1974. In carrying out the demographic alteration of Cyprus, Turkey has followed a policy of systematic colonization of the Northern part of the occupied Cyprus. Indeed, the author documents the transfer of about 74,000 Anatolian settlers to occupied Cyprus. The ideological justification for Turkey's new imperialism is through its ideology of Pan-Turkism and the belief that Cyprus is Turkish. Islam is used by Turkey to win support for Turkey's Cyprus policy in the Arab and Islamic countries and diffuse domestic pressure from Islamic groups (p. 192).

According to the author, by using its military might Turkey follows a policy of coercive diplomacy with regard to Cyprus and Greece. The author believes that the plight of Cyprus is due primarily to the combined blunders of Nicosia and Athens that have contributed to the present situation. On the contrary Turkey's overall policy toward Cyprus is consistent since the 1950s. The most important blunders include: the London Tripartite Conference in 1955; the lack of a determined response by Greece to the anti-Greek riots of 1955 in Turkey; the Zurich-London agreements of 1959; the untimely proposals by Cypriot President Makarios to amend the constitution of Cyprus in November 1963; the lack of a Greek response to the Turkish bombing of northwest Cyprus in August 1964; the withdrawal of the Greek military division from Cyprus in December 1967; and above all, the military coup staged by the Greek junta against Makarios in July 1974, p. 193.

Ioannides believes that the self-proclaimed «Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus» has been by any standards totally dependent and absorbed culturally, militarily, politically, diplomatically, and economically into Turkey. The TRNC, the author argues, has become the 68th Turkish province (p. 194). The incorporation of TRNC into a Turkish province has undermined the concept of «intercommunal» talks under the UN auspices (p. 195). The author ends his book with a rather pessimistic view of Cyprus by believing that Cyprus may very well be swallowed by Turkey if a federal arrangement is agreed upon and Turkey will continue to exert an imperial vision in eastern Mediterranean and its policies toward Greece and Cyprus will continue to be aggressive. In addition, the author has provided two useful appendices of documents, an extensive bibliography, and an index that make his book highly documented (a total of 50 pages).

Ioannides has written a highly readable, fully researched and well argued book. His main conclusion: Cyprus has been transformed into a Turkish province. Although I tend to agree with his basic analysis and conclusions, it seems to me the author has not taken into serious consideration the international factor as one of the most important factors in the Cyprus issue. I recommend this book to all those interested in the Cyprus conflict.

Vahakn N. Dadrian: *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity*, Blue Crane Books, 1996.

Vahakn N. Dadrian, an internationally well-known scholar on the Armenian genocide wrote an exceedingly important and scholarly book, not directly related to the issue of his life-long interest, the Armenian Genocide, but on the *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide*. This book is a review of the historical evidence of German complicity in the Armenian genocide. Indeed, as Hitler contemplated the Jewish extermination he once asked: «Who remembers the Armenians?» The focus of the present study is an examination of the role that German officials (both military and civilian) played in the Armenian genocide by Turkey, then an ally of Germany during World War I.

Using an avalanche of historical sources, both primary and secondary (drawn from diplomatic history, international law, political science, and official German documents), the author has written a book indicting not only Germany but also the Western world—an affront against humanity. In his words, the author «attempts to dissect and expose the lethal role performance of these officials who, for reasons of their own, allowed themselves to be coopted by the Turk Ittihadist leaders to aid the executioners of the Armenian people» (p.94). The author believes, «the study is also an invitation to consider the entire matter as a challenge to historical truth and, therefore, ultimately treat it as a moral issue» (p. 94). Dadrian argues the Armenian genocide is not due to memory amnesia, nor is it a «forgotten genocide,» but it was sacrificed at the altar of political expediency and economic rapaciousness by the victorious Entente powers. Seen in this light, it is more about the distribution of power relations in national and international politics rather than historical truth. In a diabolical sense, the Turkish denial of Armenian genocide served as a shield to Nazi Germany. Despite the overwhelming historical evidence, the author states that the Turks continue to deny the occurrence. In his words, «Turkey has engaged in all forms of public relations and

co-optation, cajoling, and intimidation to influence the western media» (introduction). According to him, there is a systematic effort by modern Turkey to conceal its crime by changing the archives and deleting sentences in a sort of cover-up. The book was written primarily for German audiences and relies a great deal on German State archives and documents. The author also makes clear that German complicity in the Armenian genocide does not in any way exonerate the crime committed by Turkey, which is second only to the holocaust in the 20th century. In his introduction, Dadrian states that «German minor officials and consuls stationed in Turkey had documented the Armenian genocide, sometimes in defiance of their superiors or in secrecy. Most of these reports were classified information and were marked as confidential secret or top secret» (p. 11).

Using a variety of informal and secret methods such as stealth, conspiracy, and clandestine transactions, Turkey bribed German and Austrian newspapers and agents to suppress any trace of Armenian massacres. Turkey also used spies overseas to spy on Armenian nationalists. The author examines the legal and international ramifications of the Armenian genocide. He documents the fact that a number of German (mostly) minor officials risked their lives by objecting to the Armenian carnage in the interior of Turkey. The author strongly believes that the failure to address this international crime against humanity later led to the Jewish Holocaust. Dadrian thinks that the Armenian genocide is also an issue of international law which the West has failed to address. The author found overwhelming evidence of a mass execution of an Armenian labor battalion ordered by the German General Bronsart von Schellendorf, who worked with the Ottoman general staff. The rationale of the mass execution of the Armenians was justified for security reasons. Both civilian and military personnel confirmed as eye witnesses that this crime took place and it was reported in many documents.

A commission on these atrocities, which issued its final report on March 29, 1919, accused Turkey and its allies (the Germans) of using barbarous and illegitimate methods against the Armenian citizens. Again, a committee of jurists in 1920, commissioned by the Council of the League of Nations, concluded that the official order to deport the Armenians en masse «was a violation in international law» (p. 19). Two German generals, Bronsart (on July 25, 1915) and Boettrich (on October 3, 1915), who served as members of the military mission in Turkey, are said to be responsible for ordering the Armenian deportation.

The author names specific German generals and civilian officials who knew of the destruction of the Armenians, such as Marshal Sanders, the Prussian officer Captain Rudolf Nadolny, German Regimental Commander Colonel Stange, Lieutenant Scheubner Richter, Hauptmann Schwarz, Louis Mosel, Oswald von Schmidt and others. He also mentions Turkish generals and leaders of the Special Organization East led by Dr. B. Sakir, Alihsan Sabis, Omer Naci, Yakub Cemil, Deli Halit, Cerkez Ahmed, and Topal Osman (p. 55). In addition, the author documents the ideological complicity and zealotry of the Baron Oppenheim against the Armenians in order to please the German emperor. The author details Oppenheim's conspiratorial consort in plotting the destruction of the Armenians (p. 77).

Finally, the author examines the issue of legal liability by reviewing the record made by the Allies and issued as a joint declaration on May 24, 1915. This record condemned the Ottoman massacres of the Armenians and those responsible for assisting in the genocide (pp. 89-94).

The book is divided into two major parts. Part One comprises pages 7 to 105 including notes while Part Two covers pages 107 to 198. Each part contains extensive notes and annotations from various primary and secondary sources. In addition, there are four appendices (A, B, C, D, pp. 199-271), and a number of photographs and names of the major architects (both German and Turkish generals) of the Armenian genocide mentioned in the text (pp. 273-281). Pages 283 to 291 include a general bibliography of primary sources of state and national archives and official documents including materials from Austria, Germany, France, Great Britain, Turkey (both Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic), United Nations, United States, and Armenian sources. Also the author includes an extensive list of works on genocide and genocide-related topics (pp. 293-296). Dadrian himself has published extensively on the issue of genocide including 5 books, 3 monographs, 34 articles, and the translation of a book.

The first part deals with Germany's readiness to embrace Turkey's anti-Armenian posture. Germany's relationship with Turkey harkens to Bismark (1878), the German nationalist who was instrumental in the unification of Germany. According to the author, Germany was interested in reorganizing the Ottoman Turkish military and Bismark played the broker at the Congress of Berlin. Within four years following that Congress, the first German military mission arrived in Turkey with the aim of reorganizing the Ottoman Turkish Army. A number of military missions and economic elites arrived, including emperor William II. Germany was the first country to be given the Bagdad Railway Construction Project in 1888 during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamit.

The Bagdad Railway Construction Project was facilitated by the emperor's two trips to Turkey in 1889 and 1898. At the same time, Prussian military officers continued to instruct, train, and rebuild the Ottoman Turkish Army (p. 8). It must be noted that while these events were taking place, the Armenian genocide already had started in the closing decade of the 19th century. The German-Turkish military and economic alliance made the Germans indifferent to ongoing Armenian genocide. Not only did the official German government not protest, but emperor William II visited Turkey for the second time and was welcomed with red carpet treatment by the Sultan himself during the Armenian massacres of November 1896. It was obvious that in the name of German national interests Germany did not raise the issue of Armenian genocide, despite the fact that both Bismark and the emperor William II were dismayed by Turkish barbarities. Yet, despite his knowledge of the Armenian genocide, the German emperor praised Abdul Hamit as a model for other countries to emulate. Moreover, the German emperor was against the young Turk revolution of 1908 which deposed the Sultan. It was this revolution that ended the Ottoman empire in the Balkans.

General Bronsart, in particular, knew in advance about the real purpose of the mass Armenian deportation and did nothing to prevent the mass execution. Not only did he refuse the request to intervene on behalf of the Armenians, but he scolded the German vice-consul for wanting to help them. The name of the consul was Dr. Max Erwin Von Schenbner Richter (p. 23). In his report, the vice-consul stressed the pitiful and painful condition of Armenian women and children slated for deportation. He also arranged for the distribution of bread to deportees. General Bronsart objected against even this humanitarian help and urged that the bread be sent to the Turkish Army (p. 23). Indeed, the vice-consul risked his life, not only threatened by General Bronsart, but also by General Mahmud Kamil, the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman 3rd Army.

It must be stressed that Turkish war propaganda had accused the Armenians as being against the Turkish war effort. The Turkish high command used this lie as a pretext for the Armenian annihilation. In fact, according to the author, the Turks created an artificial rebellion by Armenians in order to justify the mass deportation (pp. 25-30). In addition, Dadrian documents the critical role that Lt. Colonel Felix Guse (who held the post of Chief of Staff at the headquarters of the Ottoman 3rd Army) played in the extermination of the Armenians concentrated in six Turkish provinces (p. 29). In fact, Lt. Guse's model was General Bronsart.

Pages 35 to 43 summarize the key support role that the German Chief of Staff (the 3rd Army high command) played in the initiation of the Armenian genocide. On pages 44 to 54, the author examines the decisive role the Special Organization East played in the liquidation of the Armenians of Eastern Turkish provinces. Dr. Sakir was the legitimate chief of the Special Organization East who played a pivotal role in organizing and implementing the Armenian genocide (p. 43). The Armenians were viewed as enemies of Turkey, not only because they were heavily concentrated in Eastern provinces, but because they were geographically interposed between Turkey and the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus region (pp. 44-49). Even today this continues to be the case following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of an Armenian independent nation. The German connection to the Special Organization via German secret service agents and surveillance are also discussed. The use of 6 Islamic masses against the Christian populations, especially the Armenians, were used by Dr. Nazim who was one of the principal architects of the Armenian genocide. These special Muslim bands were used by the Special Organization to massacre Armenians. One of the major characteristics of the Armenian genocide was the forced conversion of Armenian women, children, and girls to Islam (pp. 49-54). Step by step, the author documents the collaboration of Turkish-German joint military campaigns against the Ottoman Armenians. The Germans knew too well of the Turkish intention to annihilate the Ottoman Armenians in the Caucasus Trabzon region. Indeed, the Germans accommodated their allies, the Turks, to carry out the Armenian genocide.

In Part Two (pp. 107-198), the author documents the political and ideological determinants for the involvement of the German military in the Armenian genocide. More specifically the author discusses a number of issues including the following:

(1) The revival of the Armenian question and the new Turko-German partnership in the period interposed between the first Balkan War and World War I. Germany was the official ally of Turkey, and emperor William II of Germany had cultivated a new and invigorated partnership with the young Turk regime. This German partnership with Turkey culminated on August 2, 1914 with the secret Turko-German military alliance.

(2) The creation of the German military mission and the inroads into Turkey led by veteran Prussian officers. The purpose was to reform and reorganize the Turkish army. The German-Turkish military relationship dated back to 1882 when then major van der Goltz was commissioned by Sultan Abdul Hamit to reorganize the Turkish army and train its officers corps.

(3) The bearings of the German ideological perspectives, and especially emperor William II, who came to identify with the Turkish/Islamic theocracy and regarded Turkey as the Prussia of the Orient. He compared the Islamic attributes of self-denial to his notions of Prussian puritanism (p. 113).

(4) Dadrian documents the complicity of the military, the order for the deportations, and the roles that high ranking German officers played in the Armenian genocide, especially the roles of General Major Bronsart von Schellendorf, Von Der Goltz, Feldmann, Boettrich, Guido von Usedom, Wilhelm Souchon, Seeckt, and Count Eberhard Wolffskeel von Reichenberg (pp. 116-136).

(5) The political indicators of complicity are discussed in pages 137-186. The author examines various indicators of the German complicity in the Armenian genocide including: the role of the emperor William II, the high ranking German officers, ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim whom American ambassador Morgenthau described as «the perfect embodiment of the Prussian system» (p. 141), and Lt. Commander of the Navy and Marine Attache Hans Humann.

(6) While Turkey denied any German involvement in the liquidation of the Armenians before the war, in the aftermath a number of Turks came forward to implicate Germany, especially the Turkish Interior Minister Grand Vizier Tolat, Turkish publicists, a former Turkish foreign minister, two Turkish deputies, 8 and a Turkish historian.

(7) Incidents of concealment and disclosure, such as, deletions of foreign office documents for financial reasons, injunctions of German military and civilian missions in Turkey not to intervene in the process of extermination of the Armenians (p. 157), the removal by the Germans of Ottoman General Staff of files, a German document of May 4, 1916 indicating the annihilation of the Armenians was ordered by the Germans (p. 160-163) and the disclosure of two veteran Austrian consuls are also examined.

(8) The anti-Russian ideology in the Turko-German partnership and its anti Armenian repercussions are also discussed. A chief exponent of pangermanism and panturkism was Tekin Alp, who argued that the Slavs were the historical common enemy of both the Turks and the Germans, and therefore an alliance between the two nations was «a geographical and historical necessity» (p. 167).

(9) The German political economists were rather tacitly supportive of the Armenian genocide.

(10) The view of German experts in criminal and international law that German complicity was a by-product of militarism is also discussed.

(11) The testimony from a German newspaper editor, who investigated the massacres of the Armenians by going to Turkey (pp. 175-182), is also discussed.

The analysis will not be complete unless a few words are said about the appendixes.

The book includes four appendixes A, B, C, D (pp. 199-271). Each appendix deals with a specific issue and includes its own notes.

Appendix A, examines the transition of prominent German officials from service in Turkey to service in Nazi Germany later. The author mentions by name three such prominent officials who served both the Turkish Army and Nazi Germany. One official was Franz von Papen, who was the Chief of General Staff of the IV Turkish Army in World War I, and served as Hitler's Vice Chancellor and President of Prussia (1933-1934). Later he became Special Ambassador to Austria and helped with the annexation of Austria to the Nazi Reich. Other prominent German officials were: Kanstantin Freiherr von Neurath who served as foreign minister in Papen's cabinet. During World War I he served as Councillor at the German Embassy in Constantinople (1915-1916) and was instructed by Chancellor Hollweg to monitor the operations against the Armenians (p. 199). Others who served both in Turkey during the Armenian genocide and in Nazi Germany were: Count F. W. Von der Schulenburg, Privy State Councillor Frederic Hans von Rosenberg, Wilhelm Solf, Albert Ballin, and Lt. General Hans von Seeckt (one of the top Prussian generals who served as Chief of Staff at Ottoman General Headquarters, and who returning to Germany after WWI, laid the foundation for the emergence of the Wehrmacht). In addition, two other prominent German generals who also served in both the Turkish army and Nazi German military were Major General Otto von Lossow and Major General Kress von Kressenstein (p. 201).

Appendix B deals with the indignity of decorating the arch-perpetrators of the Armenian genocide. Both in Berlin and Istanbul, a host of Turkish military and civilian officials in wartime Turkey were decorated with a variety of Prussian and German medals, awards, and honors (p. 205). Some of these honorees who were instrumental in the liquidation of the Armenians were: Huseyin Azmi, Atif, Hacı Adil (Arda), Mustafa Abdulhalik (Renda), Ahmed Muammer, Mehmed Memduh, Tahir Cevdet, and also eight more high ranking Turkish military officers received German decorations. The German decorations reached its apogee of indignity by extending its honors to Dr. Behaeddin Sakir and Ittihad party boss, interior minister and Grand Vizier, Talat Paşa, who by all accounts, were the two architects of Armenian genocide (p. 216).

In **Appendix C** the author deals with the issue of differential treatment of the Greeks and the Jews *vis-à-vis* the background of the Armenian genocide. In the case of the Greeks, the author argues that despite the fact the Turks hated the Greeks even more than the Armenians, the Turks did not use large scale extermination massacres in the deportation of the

Greeks. One of the main reasons was that unlike the Armenians, the Greeks had a government. Moreover, Greek premier Venizelos warned the Turks that in the case of widespread massacres against any Asia Minor Greeks, the Greek government will retaliate against the Turkish subjects of Greece. The Greeks also urged the German and Austrian Ambassadors to warn Turkey. Another reason mentioned was the fact that King Constantine I of Greece was married to Sophia of Prussia, the sister of German emperor William II. In the end, over 1.5 million Greeks were also eliminated or expelled from Anatolia in the GrecoTurkish war of 1922.

In the case of Jews, the Turks did not seriously persecute them. This case contrasts sharply with the Armenian genocide and the expulsion and destruction of Asia Minor Greeks. The author argues that unlike the ongoing conflicts between Turks, and Armenians and the Greeks, the Turks had no ongoing conflict with the Jews. On the contrary, for centuries Turkish-Jewish relations were harmonious. The Jews found Turkey a refuge during the expulsion from England in 1290, France 1329, Portugal 1497, and of course, Spain during the Inquisition.. Other factors mentioned in the differential treatment of the Jews *vis-à-vis* the Armenians and Greeks were the rise of Zionism, the sympathy for the Young Turks Revolution of 1908 by the Jews of Thessaloniki, and the Turkish orientation toward favourable public opinion in the USA.

Appendix D has to do with the appeal of German writer Arwin T. Wegner, an eyewitness to the Armenian genocide and to President Wilson in 1919. The text is in the German original and in English translation and tells of what he experienced as an eyewitness to the horrors inflicted upon the Armenians in Turkey (pp. 273-281). There are also a number of photographs of the major protagonists and architects of the Armenian genocide mentioned in the text. Also included is a bibliography (pp. 283-296) divided into primary and secondary sources.

In his final commentary on the issue of German responsibility, the Dadrian concludes that there is an overwhelming amount of evidence both direct and indirect of German complicity in the Armenian genocide. The author believes «what stands out in that evidence is a central feature of German complicity, namely, the willingness of a number of German officials, civilian and military, to aid and abet the Turks in their drive to liquidate the Armenians» (p.186). The author continues: «They thus qualify to be regarded as coperpetrators and 'accessories to the crime'» (p. 186). He concludes, «perhaps the historians and perhaps even the statesmen of Germany will find it pertinent and seemly to reconsider the central issue raised here. In the final analysis what is at stake here is the triumph of the forces of civilization over a legacy of barbarism that almost succeeded in bringing about the expiration of an ancient nation» (p. 186).

Dadrian's book on the *German Responsibility on the Armenian Genocide* is one of the most researched and documented books I have seen about Armenian genocide. The author has done a superb job of disclosing one of the major crimes in the 20th century, not only against the Armenian people, but against humanity. The purpose of the book was to expose the German officials and the role they played in the Armenian genocide at the turn of the century. It is ironic that after a century, Turkey has denied the occurrence of this crime against the Armenian nation despite overwhelming evidence. Political expediency has taken precedence to this crime which preceded the Jewish holocaust. Dadrian has written his *opus*, and this alone, makes him the pre-eminent scholar who made us all aware of such an enormous crime in the 20th century. This book should be read by all Germans, and should be on all reading lists dealing with Germany and genocide studies. It is not only an indictment of Nazi Germany, but it serves to remind us of the moral responsibility of any civilized nation and the world. For, as the author argues, the full disclosure and knowledge of this heinous crime could have perhaps prevented the Jewish holocaust of World War II.

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Livres reçus / Books Received

"Oil on fire", Text books, Ethnic stereotypes and violence in South-Eastern Europe., Hanovre, december 1996, Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung

Cet ouvrage collectif qui comprend une dizaine de contributions rédigées en allemand ou en anglais s'attache à l'étude de la violence en Europe du sud-ouest. On doit citer en particulier l'article d'Irène Lagani, spécialiste des Balkans, auteur d'une étude sur la "La présentation des guerres dans les livres d'histoire".