The Theory of Foreign Policy In Pericles' "Funeral Oration"

Yannis Philippoussis*

RÉSUMÉ

On considère souvent l'Oraison funèbre prononcée par Périclès comme le texte par excellence sur l'idéal démocratique. Cependant, on ne l'a jamais considéré comme étant un texte qui prononce une théorie de politique extérieure et des relations internationales. Pourtant, Périclès a été impliqué dans la politique d'Athènes pendant une grande partie du IVème siècle av. J-C, et surtout pendant cette période importante de l'histoire athénienne qui couvre son hégémonie et son âge d'or mais qui, encore plus, s'avère une période décisive entre les deux grandes guerres. S'il est toujours important de connaître les politiques domestiques ou etrangères d'un politicien, il est encore plus fondamental de savoir les principes théoriques qu'il a employés et appliqués afin de mieux comprende la raison du dirigisme de sa politique concrète. Or, Périclès semble avoir donné précisément ces principes dans ce discours, même s'il l'a fait d'une facon épigrammatique et cryptique. En outre, il essaie de défendre la valeur et la pertinence de ces principes en les opposant non seulement aux principes des Spartiates, ce qui est d'ailleurs évident, mais aussi à ceux des Sophistes dont les principes allaient prédominer après sa mort.

Le discours de Périclès, en faisant partie intégrale du texte de Thucydide et, mis en rapport avec le commencement de la guerre du Péloponnèse, acquiert une valeur exceptionnelle.

ABSTRACT

The Periclean *Epitaphios* has long been considered as one of the most important texts in defense of the ideal of Democracy and Freedom; it has never been considered, however, as a document in which Pericles's theory of foreign policy is given. If Pericles had been in office for a large part of the 4th c. BC (during the Athenian hegemony and the Golden age and especially as it relates to the period of the "cold war" between the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars), it is important to know not only his domestic and foreign policies but also the principles which guided him in his public relations and his foreign accords. It seems that the *Funeral Oration* gives a good account of his guiding principles. In his epigrammatic style, Pericles seems to have intended to give a clear indication of these principles and, in his cryptic way, he tries to defend their value and relevance by juxtaposing them to both the obvious Spartan principles and the not so obvious Sophistic ones which, as he had seen, would guide the Athenian domestic and foreign affairs after his death.

Integral part of Thucydides's text, and indeed an extremely significant one as it relates to the beginnings of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles's speech becomes today as relevant as the historian's chronicles.

*Dawson College (Canada)

1. As an Athenian politician in office for more than 30 years, besides having been involved in trade dealings and treaty negotiations with non-Greek nations (e.g. the Persian) as well as with other Greek City-States within or without the Athenian Confederation and Alliance (e.g. the Aegean Islands and the Corcyrean or the Spartan)(cf. I, 31 ff), Pericles had also been, more specifically, instrumental in both the preparation and expansion of the Peloponnesian War. It is rather inconceivable that Pericles, in his long tenure in government, did not meet the Spartan or other ambassadorial emissaries and declare, in his *Realpolitik*, his government's decisions. As a *stratêgos*, both in its military and in its political sense (as well as in the implied decision-making powers), he must have been often implicated in strategic decisions in the diplomatic sense as well. One can find, in Thucydides' accounts, Pericles' military expertise and strategies and can notice his political skills and policies; one can confirm and document, that is, his military and political brinkmanship which contributed in his continuous re-election to office. The question arises, therefore, as to which were his theoretical principles in his foreign as well as in his domestic policies and in his diplomatic strategies in regard to interstate and international relations.

Since, at least according to Plutarch, Pericles has not left any text[1], all our judgment on the question of his politics and his policies has to rely on external sources and, in this particular case, on Thucydides' meticulous chronicles. As to whether we can find in Pericles' speeches, as the strict historiographer recounts them, any explicit and clear answer to the question of Pericles' foreign policies and international relations, answer which would satisfy today's research for empirical evidence and documented corroboration, may prove to be a difficult and insatiable task. It seems, however, that, in a textual hermeneutical analysis of the "Funeral Oration", we may find some hints of the Periclean guiding principles and diplomatic strategies relating to his foreign policies and relations. These guiding principles are not only those on which he, as a long-lasting and active politician, apparently based his own policies, but also are those which he seems to propose, as an old and experienced statesman, to others. Since it is obvious that there are no policies without politics and no politics without polity and politeiological principles -the understanding of which is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the scientific study of specific state policies and relations- the purpose of this article is, precisely, an attempt to exude Pericles' principles on which he based

-in his *Machtpolitik*- his politics and policies as far as his domestic and foreign affairs are concerned and his strategies in interstate and international relations. These principles may be extracted from the defense of his socio-political philosophy as he juxtaposes and contrasts it to both the Spartan type of society and the Sophistic kind of democracy.

2. As it is known, Pericles's *Epitaphios* ("Funeral Oration") has survived as part of Thucydides' detailed historical account of the Peloponnesian War.[2] Pericles, as Thucydides claims, delivered his "Funeral Oration" in 429 BC as a *eulogy*, according to the "annual custom"[3], for the Fallen Soldiers in the first years of the War (432-429). In his speech, besides praising the soldiers, Pericles praises, obviously, the Athenian Democracy and Freedom for which the soldiers gave their lives. As it is a "praise" (*enkômion*) for Democracy and Freedom, the *Epitaphios* is also, however, their "funeral eulogy" (*epikêdios*) since, with the Sophists -at least in Pericles's perspective the Solonian democracy would turn into an anarchic ochlocracy (mob-rule) and freedom into a lawless liberality (permissiveness). This had also been Socrates' and, later, Plato's philosophical position -as well as their critique and lamentation- in the *Republic*. This Sophistic "democracy", along with the *political*system altogether, ended finally in 317 BC. It is interesting to notice, however, that, as part of his praise of the Athenian democratic society[4], Pericles raises the question of inter-state and international as well as inter-citizen and inter-personal relations, relations which Thucydides discusses also, as part of his own interest on the subject, in the rest of his voluminous work[5].

Not having been a philosophical thinker by profession, Pericles, as a practicing politician of long standing, simply describes, in one simple and brief paragraph on democracy, an already existing societal reality and political state; and he describes them both, not unexpectedly, in the manner he perceived them existing in the Athens of his time as well as in the way he would have like them to be in the future. The society and the state he describes are those which had been in existence since Solon first prescribed them in his philosophical *hypothêkas* and *elegeia*, then founded them in his constitutional *politeia* and finally established them in his political *nomothesia*, more than150 years earlier, in 585 BC.[6] In this brief paragraph (II, 40) of the Oration, Pericles succeeds in giving, in a synoptic but clear way , all the Solonian principles of

the "communitarian" Democratic Ideal and, at the same time, in opposing them to both the existing Spartan society under the "communistic" principles of Lycurgus's legalistic codification and the upcoming Athenian society under the "communal" principles of the Sophists' libertarian philosophy.[8] It is interesting to notice that, diplomatic for the spirits of the times or, perhaps, respectful of the sacredness of the occasion, Pericles not only does not mention the Sophists by name, his political adversaries in Athens, but not even the Spartans, their common military enemies. Yet, both are clearly implied in the context of the text which is taken, by the expert statesman, as a pretext to present his military and diplomatic theory as well as his social, political and economic philosophy.[9]

3. In the last part of this paragraph (ll. 5-12, p.276), the Thucydidean Pericles declares that:

> Και τα ες αρετήν ενηντιώμεθα τοις πολλοίς ου γαρ πάσχοντες ευ, αλλά δρώντες κτώμεθα τους φίλους. Βεβαιότερος δε ο δράσας την χάριν, ώστε οφειλομένην δι΄ευνοίας ω δέδωκε σώζειν ο δ΄άντοφείλων αμβλύτερος, ειδώς ουκ ες χάριν, άλλ΄ές οφείλημα την αρετήν αποδώσων. Και μόνοι ου του ξυμφέροντος μάλλον λογισμώ η της ελευθερίας τω πιστώ αδεώς τινα ωφελούμεν.
>
> Again, in what concerns questions of excellence there is a great contrast between us and most other people. We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving good from them. This makes our friendship all the more reliable, since we want to keep alive the gratitude of those who are in our debt by showing continued good will to them; whereas the feelings of one who owes us something lack the same enthusiasm, since he knows that, when he repays our kindness, it will be more like paying back a debt than giving something with gratitude. We are unique in this. When we do kindness to others, we do not do them out of any calculations of profit or loss: we do them without afterthought, but in the confidence of our freedom.

What is the meaning of this text and which are its implications and their alternatives? Although a dense and cryptic text, Pericles seems to be, in the choice of his words, quite clear as far as his intentions, his references and his goals are concerned.

This speech is certainly a Funeral Oration and not, of course, a Policy Statement. Yet when Pericles raises -and this, especially, in the middle of a Funeral Oration- the question of "friends" and the way of making "friends", one may wonder about the meaning and the significance of this term *philous* and the implication of its discussion in this particular funeral speech, in case one considers that it had been delivered and that, even more, was meant only for a domestic consumption. The term *philous* and the manner by which, as he claims, the Athenians of his time make friends are, therefore, revealing: he tries apparently to set the principles on the basis of which good relations are established and that these friendly relations are not only established within the City limits among the citizens themselves but also beyond the City limits with other states and nations. And they are revealing at least two things: his statesman's concern for the substantiality and the reliability of a foreign policy and the importance and the authenticity of the guiding principles of this foreign policy.

4. After having presented, in his conception of *philosophy* and *philocally* at the beginning of the paragraph, the Athenian position on the question of truth and beauty[10], the question Pericles raises now, at the end of the same paragraph, is that of goodness in a rather obvious reference to *philanthropy*.[11] The *praxis*, along with the *theôria* and the *poiêsis*, is, in Pericles' description -and, consequently, philosophical perspective quintessential for his good society. The logical, the aesthetical and the ethical sides of being -the prism of the traditional Greek "excellence" (*aretê*) through which everything had to be considered and examined- are, thus, all present in Pericles' text. The *sophon* (or *orthon or alêthes*) *kai kalokagathon* (that is to say Science, Fine Arts and Politics which had been considered that far, at least since Solon's time, the cornerstone of the Athenian society) is, evidently, the central point of the entire paragraph. Whether it is presented, in this paragraph, only as a defensive attempt of his educational and ornamental policies -of which he has often been accused for having spent in vain, as a superfluous megalomaniac, the economic blood of the Athenians and of the Athenian allied or client states- it may be argued *ad infinitum*; yet Science, Fine Arts and Politics had been precisely the three that Pericles had entertained and honored in Athens during his tenure, since the 450s, and for which history has bestowed on this period a lasting glorious golden classical wreath.

Thus, on the basis of this prism, if the immediately preceding part of the paragraph (ll.8, p. 275 to5, p.276) deals with the importance of the "words" and their relation to the proper and true democratic discussion, this last cited part on *aretê* (ll.5-12, p.276) is on the importance of "deeds" and their relation to the proper and true communitarian activity. Words and deeds, discussion and action, according to Pericles, are bound together: "we Athenians, he says, in our own persons take our decisions on policy and submit them to proper discussions, for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and deeds"[12]. This statement is, obviously, in clear reference and opposition both to the Sophistic rhetorical "words" which had been debated without any concern for their content nor for their consequences[13] and to the Spartan military "deeds" which had been performed without any previous public examination and discussion.[14] Thus, Pericles, in order to make this point clearer, continues with emphasis: "the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences [and, of course, this implies the causes as well] have been properly discussed".[15] The Athenians, in Pericles' view, not only know what they do, but they do it only after knowing well why they do it; so he reinforces this by adding that "the man who can most truly be accounted brave is he who knows best the meaning of what is sweet in life and of what is terrible, -and then goes out undeterred to meet what is to come" which seems to be a clear reference to the present war and the praised soldiers: that is to say, the Athenians are conscious of both the meaning and the reason why they fight in this war, so "they go out undeterred to meet what is to come", to meet even death as the Fallen Soldiers have proven. These soldiers did not fight simply because they had been commanded by their "kings" as the Spartan ones do, nor because they are flattered by their "politicians" as the Sophist ones do. True bravery, strength and power, individual and societal[16], are the result of knowledge (*gignôskontes*, in a rather direct reference to the Spartans), but also the result of a solid knowledge (*saphestata*, in a possible reference to the Sophists[17]). This is clearly in juxtaposition to the alternative possibilities, on the one hand, of relying only on words in "rhetorical empty discussions" of individual opinions based on flattery and self-appraisal, a fact which creates a political correctness; or, on the other hand, of relying only on deeds in "fearful sluggish bravery" of authoritarian commands based on collective ignorance, a fact which creates a state of blind obedience. The words (in a clear reference to the

Sophists) must be followed by deeds and the deeds (in an obvious reference to the Spartans) must be the result of thoughtful discussion: the words are supposed to be actually ("factually") *supported* and the deeds must be freely ("reelly")[18] *thought*. A community (and a truly democratic one, for that matter) is, for Pericles as it had been for Solon before him and for Socrates during his own time and Plato after him, the consequence of proper communication amongst its members which proper communication itself finds its aetiology only in the true communion of thought of the members, essential elements of a communitarian society.

5. Thus, after he elaborated on the notion and the conditions of the *truly* democratic verbal discussion, Pericles elaborates, then, on the ethical relational action. Having elaborated already on the notion and the conditions of true Democracy (i.e. the consciousness of one's self and the responsibility for one's affairs), he discusses, right after, the notion and the conditions of Freedom, the two principles for which the fallen soldiers gave their life. In this last part of the paragraph, he discusses the relationships and the relations of the Athenians both with one another and with other states and nations. On the basis and the fulfilment of those conditions he insisted already as necessary for these relations: with one another as conscious and responsible persons as well as participating and active citizens; with other states and nations as a free and open community as well as a sovereign and friendly state. The public ethical relations expand, then, from the inner-City-State of Athens (on the infra-national level) to the inter-City-States of the Greek world (on the national level) and, by implied extension, to the inter-Nation-States of the World (on the international level).

In his "*tois pollois*" and "*philous*", Pericles seems to imply the rest of mankind as well. On the one hand, with "*tois pollois*" (i.e. not few), he does not seem, in any way, intentionally or not, to delimit the range. That he refers primarily to the Spartans and to the Sophists is rather clear, but in dealing with "others", with whom one wants to establish good friendship and trade, the conditions Pericles poses are evidently the same whoever these "others" may be. Yet, on the other hand, the use of the term "*tois pollois*" (i.e. not all) shows, also, that Pericles does not want to exclude any other peoples from the rest of mankind who may

have the same notion or the same principles of "friendship"; he sees that it is possible that there be others who would feel the same way as his own Athenians do. The term "*tois pollois*" may refer, therefore, to the "crowds" ("*hoi polloi*") of a Sophistic society (cf. the notion of "ochlocracy", as opposed to true "democracy", in Plato's critique of *tois pollois*, *ochlos* and *plêthos* in the *Republic*); it may refer to the other Greek City-States (including, certainly, the Spartans); it may refer as well to all the non-Greek peoples and cultures. It is rather obvious, from the terms he uses (i.e. *tois pollois* and *philous*) and their context, that Pericles refers to both the Sophists and the Spartans and, apparently, to the World as well. So, in this regard, Pericles states that, when it comes to the question of "excellence" (*aretê*)[19], "there is a great contrast between the [present] Athenians and most other people" (*enêntiômetha tois pollois*).

6. What, then, is this difference in regard to "excellence" that Pericles refers to? The Athenian "excellence", as it is presented in the text, relies, at first, on the fact that the people of Pericles' contemporary Athens are, indeed, personally active and participant "citizens" rather than passive and re-presented "residents". Hence, the emphasis on *drasis* (a repeated term in *drôntes* and *drasas*) is not of secondary significance, since it seems that it not only refers to the dramatic aspect of the ethical agent but also to the existential drama of the free person, both references being the antithesis to the Sophistic passive individual anonymity and political multitudinous representation[20] as they are, obviously, the antithesis to the Spartan passivity in the individual evaporation and political massive assimilation.[21] And the fundamental aspect of this is that, in Pericles' view, it is in this active and dramatic way that the Athenians acquire friends. So, in this way, one may understand Pericles' juxtaposition and contrast, first, of friendship to calculation and, second, of freedom to obligation, the first with an explicit reference to the Sophists and an implicit one to the Spartans and the second with an overt reference to the Spartans and a covert one to the Sophists.

In his contrast of friendship to calculation, Pericles' conception of friendship is rather clear since his list of its essential characteristics is self-revealing: the contrast of kindness to profit, of giving to receiving, of conferring to taking, of gratitude to debt, of good will to bad feeling, of charity to self-interest, of generosity to

afterthought, of benevolence to gain[22], the list reveals a society whose characteristics go against the Sophistic egocentric atomism and hedonistic utilitarianism: in Pericles' view, true friendship is without ulterior motives, either of political gain or of economic return; it is not based on self-love and self-interest.[23] Friendship is not, therefore, individualistic selfishness, but personalistic selflessness; it is not ego-centric, but allo-centric; it is a kindness out of the civic-mindedness of the actively participant citizens in the *polis* as a interpersonal human entity which is the opposite of a circumstantial individualistic residential cohabitation of consumers in an *asty* as a geographical territorial entity. True friendship is not a narcissistic and *idio*-syncratic self-love in the unidentifiable "sameness" and "contiguousness" of corporeal atoms of the Sophistic hedonistic materialism, but brotherly-love in the identifiable "equality" and "neighbourliness" of real friends. The term *philous* (*philia*) is implying here ethical and cultural polish and politeness of the "political"agent (*politês*) as member of the *polis*. Thus, "friends", in this Periclean conception, are not the erotic "lovers" of Sophistic hedonism, but the aretetic "lovers" implied in the "lovers" of Wisdom, Beauty and Goodness, i.e. in the logical, aesthetical and ethical dimensions of the human being, dimensions which become the three fundamental "values" as evaluative criteria in his axiology of that which leads finally to that axiocratic society he tries to describe. So the principle which guides both the actions and the relations of the Athenian people, as Pericles at least sees it, is that outward friendship which is the foundation of the "fellowship" necessary for a true community of people, community such that characterizes Pericles' Athenian community which, naturally, goes beyond both the singular "communal" living of inward self-centered individuals and the simple "communistic" living of an inward holistic social entity.[24] The essential characteristics of friendship and the conditions of its possibility are, therefore, denoting that the kind of society Pericles describes is neither the collectivistic and corporative Spartan society nor the upcoming individualistic and capitalist one of the Sophists. To the view that competition or confrontation produces excellence in every sphere of human activity, Pericles seems to propose (as Solon did before him and Socrates and Plato after) the alternative that the source and cause of excellence is the cooperative community spirit.

7. It is also and equally important to notice here that, according to Pericles, if the Athenians do good, this is done not only in a friendly way, but also in a free disposition. This friendship, which is without ulterior motives of profit and calculations, is also without any superior force of commandment or obligation; it is a friendship developed and contracted intentionally and voluntarily based on freedom. In this case, neither the force of a utilitarian profit-in-mind nor the force of a totalitarian master-mind dictate true friendship and, in this sense, friendship is the manifestation of freedom since true friends are free. Is this freedom taken here in the social or societal sense? One may notice that this freedom is not juxtaposed and opposed primarily -or only- to a social "slavery", but, instead, to the lack of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. The notion of Freedom in this Periclean conception is, mainly then, a personal and existential freedom. Civil "liberties", which refer to an individual's access to political enfranchisements and societal permissions were, of course, absent in the Spartan politically authoritarian society; but civic "liberalities" (*eleutheriotês*), on the other hand, which give a licence to anarchic actions and ethical permissiveness, was characteristic of the Sophistic gnoseologically doxastic and ethically relativistic philosophy.

Thucydides' own observations, to this effect, are revelatory (II, 52-55, esp. 53): "Athens owed to the plague the beginnings of a state of lawlessness...and pleasure...". This confirms both the strength of Sophism at this time and Pericles' perspicacity in this speech. Of course, the plague was the occasion, but the cause of this societal and social radical change was the Sophistic philosophy. This occasion made the Athenians accept Sophism readily and, consequently, Pericles was blamed for everything, not only for the war, but also for the plague (cf. II, 59). Pericles' open reaction to the Sophistic principles did not take long to come (cf. II, 60).

Yet, in the way he brings up, in the Funeral Oration, the possibility of friendship as the result of "freedom" (*eleutheria*: "not by calculation of profit, but by trust in our freedom", he states)[25], Pericles obviously refers to one's own "self-mastery" since, he continues, "each single one of our citizens, in the manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person"[26] (is it not significant, one may ask, that he does not say "the rightful lord and owner" either "of another person" or "of other people"?); and emphatically adding, in this regard, that each single one is able to "do this, moreover, with exceptional

grace and exceptional versatility", i.e. gracefully accepting, if need be, even defeat or death in the war as did those soldiers he praises now (and this notion of "grace" is also revelatory since it is thrice repeated here).[27] Pericles' notion of freedom implies, then, a self-mastery based on self-consciousness and self-knowledge (*autognôsia*)[28] and, as such, it reveals the dignity and the integrity[29] as well as the discipline and the respect of the truly free person for both his own and the other's self. Freedom, therefore, as self-mastery, is self-responsibility in one's own personal "ability to respond critically" for his own actions which are the result of human interactions, a point which Pericles clarifies later in the same speech.[30] The action (*drasis*) brings, of course, a reaction (*antidrasis*) as the result of human interaction; but, in this Periclean view, *drasis* is clearly the opposite of both *apodrasis* (escape) and *adraneia* (inaction), in reference, again, to the two respective alternative World Views he rejects, *apodrasis* and *adraneia* in view especially of both the present military operations and the possible diplomatic relations. Free, therefore, are those who know who they are and what they do and, thus, they know the reason and the cause of why they act; free are those who, because of their self-mastery, are not slaves -primarily and fundamentally- to themselves and to their whims, a fact which -secondly and consequentially- enables and empowers them so that they be not slaves, socially and politically, to their leaders and to others.

The slavery to oneself and to one's own whims can easily be referred, in Pericles' perspective, to the Sophists' gnoseologically subjectivistic "opinion" (*doxa*) which includes the individual preconceptions and prejudices (a result of narrow-mindedness instead of civic-mindedness) as well as to their politically relativistic "persuasion" (*peithô*) which includes the crowd's self-righteousness and self-rectitude (a result of rhetorical flattery instead of critical reasoning). The slavery to leaders and to others, in a further analysis, presupposes the absence of self-consciousness and self-identity which absence often reduces or eliminates any resistence which brings, finally, political impotence and submission to tyranny. Solon had already raised this point and Plato would say, in his *Republic*, that the first eventually leads to the latter.[31] It does not matter whether the leaders and the others are political or military leaders or, even, landowners; whether they are generals or commanders or, simply, work superiors; whether they are an impersonal and anonymous aggregative "crowd" or a congregative "mass" or, still, another political state. The master-slave

relation (whether dominion or domination and, thus, submission or subjugation) is, in this Periclean sense (as it is also in Plato's *Republic*), primarily and fundamentally, a question of consciousness and it becomes, consequentially, a social and political relation.[32]

What Pericles seems to say, therefore, is that friends are free and close to each other while enemies are slavish and closed to each other. That is the reason why only friends can freely and openly discuss with one another in a truly democratic way in the *Bouleuterion* or the *Agora* and they are, as a consequence, "gracefully and flexibly" open, within the same principle, to one another's views and relations; enemies only fight since they are closed to each other's views and relations, either in their individual ego-centric or in their collective ethno-centric shelledselves.[33] For Pericles, an open society is a society which is personalistic and communitarian. An individualistic society, like that which the Sophists proposed -and were soon- to establish in Athens, is indeed a closed society since the individual, by fact and by definition as self-centered and self-interested, is closed unto his own selfish shell.[34] For a society composed of egocentric individuals not even a trade treaty is easily possible (because of the mercantile competition), let alone a peace treaty[35] (because of the military self-righteousness): in its aggressive competitiveness, such a society is a closed society just as much as a collectivistic society, like that of the Spartans. What Pericles seems to say, therefore, is that treaties (whether peace or trade treaties) must be ratified and signed by the "consenting people" (the true *demos*) who are supposed to be both self-conscious and well-informed -otherwise these treaties simply remain "paper treaties"- and moderation must be not only in words but also in deeds. The true leader leads the people without either herding them as an impulsive crowd or dictating to them as an unthoughtful mass.[36]

8. If this interpretation of Pericles' terms and text is correct and if this is indeed his meaning, then the implications -and their alternatives- are rather clearly exuded: first that Pericles' society is an ethical one and, second, it is an open one. On this basis, Pericles' proposed principles to resolve conflicts (whether military or diplomatic) or to establish relations (whether interpersonal or international) become more or less transparent.

First, in Pericles' description, one may notice an implied striking distinction between the ethical aspect of his society and the moralistic society of the Spartans as well as the amoralistic one of the Sophists. As all the Periclean Athenians -"each and every one", he says, (*kath'hekaston*)- think critically, discuss publicly and decide responsibly before they consensually accept a code of ethics or enact a societal law as the "lawmakers" themselves, then they are not like the Spartans whose "edicts and decrees" come from far and above as traditional *mores* (moral) since the remote legislation of the ancestral "Lawgiver" Lycurgus; nor are they like the upcoming Sophists whose "acceptances and agreements" are circumstantial egoistic concurrences (amoral) of individual subjective opinions. The Athenian Solon was not a Lawgiver (like Lycurgus or Moses), but a lawmaker. Even his *Politeia* (the constitutional social contract) had been constantly and openly reviewed and revised (cf. Cleisthenes etc.) and his *Nomothesia* had been changed often and radically until 429 BC as the Athenians were enacting new legislation they considered appropriate according to their historical situations and circumstances (cf. Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*). Unlike moral and amoral ones, ethical decisions are the result of truly human reason and philosophical deliberation which form and mold the *ethos* of the personal character: moral decisions are the result of collective divinatory tradition and obedience while the amoral ones are the result of individual persuasive opinion and credulity; moral decisions are monarchic or oligarchic and amoral ones are polyarchic or anarchic while ethical decisions are supposed, at least, to be truly demarchic.

Within these notions of friendship and freedom, the Athenians, according to Pericles, were not, therefore, indifferent towards their fellow-human-beings; they were neither collectively pathetic nor individualy apathetic: they were, instead, sympathetic in sharing and caring.[37] This seems to be, or to indicate, a meaning of philadelphic and philanthropic characteristics to his conception of "excellence" (*aretê*), an aretology which differs fundamentally from both alternative societies, the sophomoric hedonism and the moralistic conformism. Certainly, according to Pericles, this philanthropic aretetic *ethos* which characterizes his Athenians should not be taken to imply nor to denote political, military or diplomatic weakness. He stated at the beginning of the paragraph that to devote oneself to education and the pure sciences (*philosophoumen*) does not imply softness; nor to develop cre-

ativity and the fine arts (*philokaloumen*) implies extravagance. At the end of the same paragraph he adds that to be sympathetic to, and care for, others should not, therefore, be taken as a sign of political, military or diplomatic impotence. Yet, what distinguishes the *ethos* of the human character is indicative of one's relations towards others; and the Periclean *ethos* is indicative of his Athenians and their human relations. Instead of the competitive attitude of the sophistically influenced Athenians and the confrontational attitude of the Spartans, Pericles proposes a compassionate attitude which leads to negotiations rather than military operations in conflict resolutions.

If Pericles' juxtaposition of his Athenians with the Spartans is obvious, his emphasis nevertheless of the difference between *his* Athenians of the "Funeral Oration" (before the plague) and the Athenians of his "Plague Speech" (during and after the plague) is, in this case -as Pericles points out in the later speech- striking and relevant in understanding his policy position in the earlier speech. On this point, one may only refer to II, 61, and especially when he makes the remark, towards the end, on the "arrogant" and "those who, through lack of ethical fibre, fail to live up to the reputation which is *theirs already*" in which remark one may notice his observation that the Solonian democracy had changed to an amoral expediency and an anarchic ochlocracy.

The Peloponnesian War has always been considered as a war between the warring parties of Athens and Sparta. Yet the fundamental point which must be taken into account when considering this war is that Athens had not been one and the same in its 25-year duration. While the Spartan guiding principles remained the same throughout the length of the war, the Athenian ones did not and so did not their relations and their policies. The change after Pericles' death is not, therefore, only a simple change of government, but, instead, a radical change in philosophical principles and, consequently, in societal and state relational attitudes and policies. Thus, this fundamental change can be noticed, after Pericles' death, not only in Athenian societal attitudes as the previous case shows (II, 61), but also in Athenian state behavior and policy. One significant and characteristic example -which would suffice- is the "Melian Dialogue" in 416 BC (V, 84-116) with "the massacre of the male population". To some objections regarding historical accuracy, one may point out that it is not so much whether this event took place in the way Thucydides records it or not; or whether it is Thucydides' own

reflections, views and words or not.[38] What is important to notice, in this case, is the predominance of the principles which, this time, are those of "self-interest" and "profit", of "expediency" and "efficiency",[39] those principles precisely which Pericles seems to have rejected in his *Funeral Oration*. One may only compare the Athenian attitude in the emissaries imposing their will and compelling submission[40] with the Melian replies on the principles of moderation and friendship.[41]

This Periclean ethical friendship as "love-of-other", benevolent and giving as it must be, implies, in its freedom and justice, an openness and fairness to all "others" without any distinctions or restrictions. The friendship, if indeed true, implicitly extends, then, not only to one's fellow citizens within his own society but also to other societies outside it. In using constantly and consistently the verbal plural (first person plural), Pericles implies that this free friendship is not practiced only within their own City-State limits in an inter-personal level, but also out of their own City-State. The implication of Inter-City-State relations (inter-political, with the Spartans in this particular instance) and Inter-Nation-State relations (inter-ethnic, which may easily be taken to include, in this case, the Persians, for example)[42] is rather clear. The Athenian *philia* and *euergesia* to which Pericles refers cannot be open only to "allied" or "client" states, as it may be easily assumed. In the manner and the terminology of the presentation of his conception of friendship, by referring to the egocentric and utilitarian Sophists, Pericles raises the question of inter-personal and inter-citizen relations and he stresses the guiding principles of openness and civic-mindedness which must be present; by referring to the ethnocentric and militaristic Spartans, he raises the question of inter-state and inter-national relations and he stresses again the principles of openness and good-neighborliness. Of course, the fact that, in his speech, Pericles addresses the Athenians and talks to them about friendship (and its essential characteristics) implies that he describes the existence of -and proposes the possibilities and conditions for- inter-personal and inter-citizen relations; the fact that he refers to the Spartans implies inter-state and even inter-national relations. Thus, Pericles describes both the way Athenians act, react and interact amongst themselves as persons and as citizens as well as how they act, react and interact, as a community and as a state, with other states and nations in their political treaties and economic trades. These relations extend, obviously in this case, to trade treaties, cultural treaties and -why not- peace treaties.

That Athens lost the war was, no doubt, because, as Thucydides says, she abandoned Pericles's policy and strategy. Yet a further, and more fundamental, question is why did Athens abandon this Periclean policy and strategy, an answer which Thucydides does not explicitly provide. Yet, stating it at the moment and in the way he does, in that crucial paragraph 65 of Bk II, and in his contrast of the private profit and the flattering politicians who succeeded Pericles and the crowds who were leading, Thucydides gives implicitly the answer himself. The answer may be found, then, in her abandonment of his foundational political principles with the acceptance -and subsequent predominance- of the Sophistic individualistic utilitarian philosophy. The shift of polity was due to the ideological differences. The resulting political infighting divided the Athenians, brought social anarchy and consequently weakened their military position. The Plague, as an unpredictable natural disaster which could not have been easily under human control, certainly contributed to the ultimate Athenian defeat by its great economic as well as human losses; but the ideological differences appear to have been the fundamental aetiological factor. The Sicilian expedition, almost fifteen years later, would suffice as an example (VI, 1 ff). It is certain that there are questions of policy, strategy and military operation regarding this expedition. Yet, even if they had been victorious, the question still remains as to why did the Athenians of that time undertake this expedition in the first place: would the Athenians of the earlier period have undertaken it under the leadership of Pericles? And if not, would it have been solely on the basis of a specific circumstantial strategic decision on the possibility of success? Would the "calculative" principle have come into consideration? That this expedition was viewing the conquest not only of the Sicilian and Italic Greek City-states but also of Carthage and the Carthagenians (VI, 90) is a rather clear indication that the expansionist policy of the politicians of that time was guided, first, by the antagonistic and confrontational politics of the power of the stronger ("might is right" as Callicles and Thrasymachus would defend later in the Platonic *Gorgias* and *Republic*) rather than the Periclean conciliatory politics; and, second, by the "panhellenic" and "cosmopolitical" policies of the Sophists (introduced by the rhetoricians who, as migrants, had arrived in Athens after the 450s, especially from Sicily) rather than the "political"(i.e. of the "*polis*") policies which Pericles describes in his speech.

9. The very fact that -and especially the way in which- Pericles talks about friendship and openness of his society and his state (in his respective terms "Athenians" and "Athens") by addressing the Athenians and, of course, by referring to the Spartans, at this early moment in the history of the war, would easily allow a not too far-fetched interpretation that, in his terminology and its usage, he extends hands for peace and friendly relations with the military enemy. Does Pericles invite the Spartans to a Peace treaty from a standpoint of weakness? Would that invitation be because Athens had been already, in the summer of that same year, under siege by the Spartans? This conclusion is reasonable and possible, but since the War was, at this time, only in its first years, it is also reasonable to consider that the Athenians would have had confidently thought that they had a good chance of winning it; indeed, on the basis of the Athenian naval strength Pericles seems to be here rather certain of the favourable outcome. Obviously Pericles, at this time, did not know the length of the war nor its outcome 25 years later nor, of course, the upcoming devastating plague of which he himself would be a victim.

The question of "weakness" may, secondly, be considered from the point of internal -and ally- opposition: one may be tempted to compare, for example, Pericles' situation with that of the Spartan king Pleistoanax and his eventual exile (II, 21) because, in his case, the Acharnians and many others, within the Athenian state, were, as Thucydides relates, "furious with Pericles and paid no attention at all to the advice which he had given them previously"(II, 21), despite the fact that "Pericles was convinced of the righteousness of his own views about not going out to battle" (II, 22); and, furthermore, the Sophists' official political opposition and their strong following in the Athenian society, following which became clear during the plague and after Pericles' death.[43] This conclusion also seems to be reasonable and possible, but, if during the summer Athens was under siege, in autumn things changed considerably, as Thucydides says, and "Athens was then at the height of her power and had not yet suffered from the plague" (II, 31). Indeed, it is "[i]n the same winter" that Pericles, because of his strength, "was chosen to make the speech" (II, 34). When he delivered his *Funeral Oration*, Pericles spoke, therefore, rather from a position of strength.

A peaceful society, as Pericles describes his to have been, should not even, by implication as well as by principle, look for a simple truce.[44] That he had advised the Athenians to go to war against the Spartans is true and Pericles seems to readily admit it with the justification, however, that this advice was given, as he says,

because of the Spartan "ultimatum" (e.g. I, 139 ff) and because the war "was forced upon" them. Thus, the Athenians, he adds, must "resist those who started it" (I, 144): the Athenians, in Pericles' consideration, should "not give in"(I, 140) and should not show they are "the weaker party" (I, 141).[45] His proposal that the Athenians should not be the ones "to start a war"(I, 144) is, therefore, a clear confirmation of his principles; and his insistence on "arbitration"and "peaceful negotiations" (which the Spartans, apparently, never wanted, cf. I, 140) as well as on his "willing to reach a settlement through a treaty"(I, 145) is an even stronger confirmation.

Of course, Pericles insisted, at the beginning of this paragraph, that being involved in the Sciences and Arts does not make the Athenians soft and lax, implying apparently both a reference to the innuendo of "softness"in the battlefield and a warning to a possibly anticipated abandonment of military undertakings out of weakness.[46] In the same vein and sense, again, at the end of the paragraph, he makes the point that being friendly and open to people does not make the Athenians gullible and lenient in the diplomatic field either. Yet, having set the ethical and political principles for individual and social public relations and having implied the principles of economic and ambassadorial relations, the Periclean strategy and diplomacy indicates, in this way, a major and significantly different approach to inter-state and international relations and opens, also, to new and momentous philadelphic and philanthropic horizons.[47]

One may easily suspect, of course, whether it is here a question of "honest friendship" or, possibly, a question of "ulterior motives", especially if the Athenian relations with their allies be questioned within the purported "imperialistic" Athenian hegemony.[48] The question is whether Pericles is indeed critical or rather hypocritical. Yet, if one suspects this question, one may also suspect Pericles' possible answer which would, perhaps, be that if the others are friends in word and deed, not only would they seek the honesty of friendship in one's conscious deeds but they would also show it in their own conscious deeds: if it be true that what count are the responded deeds and that one be accountable in "doing and doing good to others", then Pericles' answer would be that it is only in the reciprocation of consented deeds that one would see the end-result. In Pericles' own "conclusion"[49], this democratic freedom and this diplomatic disposition are the essence of the educational "lesson" (*paideusin*) (II,41) that the Athenians can give to the rest of the Greeks and, by extension again, to the rest of mankind.[50]

10. The purpose of this article is a textual exegesis and its hermeneutical analysis in order to exude its meaning and its implications. The question of the historical accuracy of the speech and the historical application of its content during the Periclean tenure in office (and the purported Athenian imperialistic hegemony) are beyond the scope of this article. Hence, whether this Oration was indeed historically delivered by Pericles himself at the time Thucydides claims it to have been or whether it was literally delivered in those very same words as the historiographer records it or, furthermore, whether it was simply attributed to him by Thucydides himself, is not the essential point here. Pursuing this objection even further, it is also secondary as to whether this Oration was written and delivered personally by Pericles or was it instead (as the Platonic Socrates would ironically have it in the *Menexenus*), by Aspasia or, for that matter, by any other rhetorician or logographer.

Even if one objects, moreover, that this speech does not give us an accurate historical account of the Athenian society or the Athenian democracy or the Athenian relations with their Greek or non-Greek neighbours (whether friends and allies or enemies and rivals) still this is a matter of historical interpretation (and very controversial indeed) which is not directly relevant to the purpose of this article. The Periclean "Golden Age" has had its critics, both affirmative and negative, with powerful arguments on both sides. One may, however, be tempted to contrast this period to -and compare it with- the Victorian Era of a strong British Empire and the predominance of its puritan morality and customs; and yet one may recall the slavery and the child labour of last century in the British industries and factories. Another may be tempted to juxtapose it -and oppose it- to the strong American Empire and its insistence on the defence of human liberty and rights; yet one may be reminded of the slavery and the black labour not only after the emancipation in the 1860s and '70s, but also after the recent 1960s and '70s. The question may be asked as to whether there are any societies or civilizations, including the Biblical, which can claim innocence in political actions or immunity from any social imperfections, and especially in regard to military operations and diplomatic relations. A synchronic comparison as well as a diachronic may be, in this regard, revelatory.

The fact still remains that the content of the speech leaves a specific and clear picture of the political and social context and situation of the Athenian society as Pericles, at least, saw it in that

historical period and, at the same time, sends a specific message of intent that the expressive literary art of the text communicates succinctly as well as beautifully. There is no question, it seems, that, as a rhetorical and a literary work, the *Epitaphios* is a work of art and a masterpiece; that, as a philosophical and political message, it is a message which may, very well, be heeded and may, courageously, be tested and applied in our own troubled times. Presenting alternative principles of political, social and economic philosophy to that of the Spartans and the Sophists, and the implied philosophical principles of diplomatic, strategic and public relations, Pericles sends to posterity a concrete message of fundamental importance. Today, theories of international conflict resolutions and of international public relations abound and proliferate; within his philosophical principles of the Democratic Ideal, Pericles offers his own theory. Can any one of our contemporary theories resolve the existing and long-lasting international conflicts (of which there are many crucial ones around the world) and prepare for more effectively peaceful international relations? As Thucydides's text in general becomes, lately, more and more relevant documentation on military and diplomatic information, the Periclean conflict theory may also be possibly one to consider. For Thucydides, it seems, both this text and its message must have made a lot of historical and philosophical sense, otherwise he would certainly have referred to it, in his own critical historiographical methodology (cf. I, 20-21 ff), in a completely different way; and, especially if Thucydides, as Plutarch says, was not that favourable to Pericles, he might have only mentioned this speech in a footnote or, at the most, *in passim*.[51]

NOTES

1. **Bioi, Periklês,** 8,7.

2. **Peloponnesian War,** Book II, ##34-46. The original Greek (and the references to it) comes from I. Bekker's edition, 1821 (with some modifications in the punctuation): **Epitaphios,** pp 267-286. If not otherwise indicated, the translation is that of Rex Warner (1954) in the Penguin Edition (with some modifications at times), Penguin Books, London, 1972, pp. 143-151.

3. *Ibid.* #34. An annual and ancient "custom" for the Athenians which has been revived in our own times (since 1918) as a commemorative annual affair (Remembrance Day, November 11).

4. Cf. #37, ll. 4-5: *dia to mê es oligous all'es pleionas oikein, dêmokratia keklêtai.* "Political", as it is implied in this speech and used in this article, is in the sense of a system based on the size and the level of the *Polis*, within the Greek Infra-Nation State system, a system which was replaced by Alexander's "Nation-State", the *Panhellênion*, uniting all the Greeks as a nation in the 330s BC, and the subsequent Supra-Nation-State system, the *Pancosmion* or *Cosmopolis*, uniting many Asiatic and African nations in the 320s BC. Implied in this speech is also the Spartan view of the completely homogeneous Nation-State ("ethno-political") and the Sophistic fully heterogeneous Intra-Nation-State ("cosmo-political") (cf. below). One may raise, at this point, the question of the Athenian Hegemonic "Imperialism" of the Periclean "Golden Era", but it can be argued that this was neither ethno-centric nor cosmo-centric in the above sense, but a Confederacy.

5. On Thucydides' views on these Relations, cf. the articles in this issue of **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies**, and more specifically P. Arnopoulos' "Theory and Praxis of War and Peace in Thucydides's Era (450-400)".

6. Cf. Plutarch, **Solon**, 3; Aristotle, **Athenian Constitution**, 7,1.

7. "Laconically" one may be tempted to say, despite the fact that he is a *de facto* committed Attic Greek in the content of his speech as well as in his Attic background. Both philosophically and tribally as well as geographically, the Attic philosophy during the Socratic period merges and transcends, on the central mainland, the endmost Ionian and Dorian lines of philosophic thought of the Pre-Socratic period which includes the Sophistic Philosophy; i.e. merges and transcends the empiricistic, materialistic and atomistic philosophy of Asia Minor (Milesian and Ephesian; cf. Sophistic here) and the rationalistic, formalistic and holistic philosophy of South Italy (Pythagorean and Eleatic; cf. Spartan here).

8. The detailed analysis and interpretation of the textual passages and the textual proof of these aspects are not within the scope of this limited article; they need their own elaborate analytic discussion.

9. He mentions, of course, the Spartans in # 39, ll.13 ff (p.273), and, losing his patience perhaps, he directly attacks the Sophistic attitude of the Athenians in his Speech during the plague in #60 (telling them in #61: "you changed", i.e. principles, "not me"). Thucydides himself elaborates on their newly acquired hedonistic principles in #53. Both S. and S. are present, therefore, in his mind and in his speech.

10. A defence, certainly, of the Athenian intellectual and artistic concern and economic expense. Pericles' instrumentality, in the 30 years he had been in governmental office, for the advancement of both Pure Sciences and Fine Arts, for the pursuit of both scientific research and artistic beautification, had been under critique by the Sophists of his time.

11. *Ibid.* Pericles litteraly and explicitly uses the terms "philosophy" and "philocally" in *philosophoumen* and *philokaloumen*; he does not, however, use any of the terms "philanthropy" or "philagathy", *agathoergia* or *agathopoiia*. Yet it is obviously implied - as the spirit of the text shows- in the specific terminology he uses to express the ethical aspect of his contemporary Athenian society.

12. On the relation of words and action, cf. also I, 144.

13. Obviously because of their philosophy. On this point, besides Plato's many **Dialogues**, cf. also Aristophanes' **Clouds**.

14. "Discussion" rather than "debate". A "debate" is based on the Sophistic *logomachia*, while a "discussion" is based on the Solonian and Socratic *autognôsia*. Even the term "debate" corresponds to the Greek *logomachia* and denotes the "battle" of "words" (de -beat, battle; cf. the French *battre*). The term "discussion", on the other hand, implies conscious and knowledgeable reasoning and argumentation by "shaking" the evidence "through" the intervention of the interlocutors (dis -quash; cf. the Latin *quatere*). Cf. Pericles' sterms: *krinomen... orthôs ta pragmata... an... dikaiôs kritheien... saphestata gignôskontes*, a clear reference to both the Sophistic "debate" (in staying only on the level of words) and the Spartan complete absence of discussion.

15. Cf. Pericles's Speech in I, 140-144 always "giving reasons" for any of his proposals (e.g. 144: "I could give you many other reasons why you should..."). Cf. Socrates's dictum: "An unexamined life is not worth living" (implied human life in a human way : *anthrôpô* (**Apology** 38a: *o de anexetastos bios ou biôtos anthrôpô*).

16. *Kratistoi d' an tên psychên* may very well refer to both the individual bravery (cf. the notions of *tolman* and *thrasos* before in relation to the *psychê*) and to the societal power (cf. the notion of *kratos* implicit in the *kratistoi*). Cf. *amathia*.

17. Cf. earlier the *politikôn epimeleia* and the *ta politika mê endeôs gnônai*.

18. This is not only playing with the words and the letters. Any act is a fact as "done"; and any fact is an act with the human intervention (with obvious ethical implications) (e.g the splitting of the atom and the splitting of the cell in the natural state and the human action; or miscarriage and abortion). In the same way, any free decision (and choice) is an existentially mental "reeling" (human ability to think and to respond); and this existential freedom precedes (and founds) the civil liberties. This is, perhaps, what Pericles tries to emphasize in this relation of words and deeds. On freedom, cf. below.

19. The translation of the Classical Greek term *aretê* with the term "virtue" is completely wrong. The Classical Greek sense is in relation to the Ancient Greek ethics of "excellence": an attempt to become what one is capable of being, as opposed to the *hamartia* (in the ancient Greek sense of not doing anything to excel) and to *hubris* (in the sense of exceeding one's own limits; cf. *mêden agan*). The term "virtue" has nothing to do with this Greek meaning since it refers either (originally) to the Roman morality of "manliness" and "virility" for which the Greeks had the term *andreia* (i.e. *versus* "cowardice" or "pusillanimity") or (later) to the Christian morality of "righteousness" and "rectitude" which implies a disobedience to a preordained divine commandment (i.e. *versus* "sin" or "contumaciousness").

20. It is only a "multitude" (in the sense of "crowd or mob") of individuals who can be "represented" since they are impersonal and anonymous and, consequently, can be replaceable.

21. In the "mass" (in the sense of "flock or herd") there is a complete assimilation and the individuality is lost.

22. Compare also the terms in B. Jowett's translation in Claredon Press, Oxford, 1900, pp 126-135. Cf. *aretên legei nun tên philian kai euergesian* - Scholiast.

23. Cf. Pericles' terms *drôntes*, *charin*, *eunoias*, *eleutherias*; and *paschontes*, *opheilêma*, *xympherontos*, *logismô*, etc. Compare here the view of Adam Smith, **An Inquiry Into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations**, 1776, especially Bk I, ch. II "Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour".

24. Pericles' notion of *polis* is not that of a "state" in the Hegelian sense (despite the misleading translations) (cf. Note 36 below), but that of a people with the sense of community manifested in the civic-mindedness.

25. Warner's translation of *eleutheria* here (p. 147) as "free liberality" is not only confusing and misleading but completely wrong.

26. Cf. also #63 on "freedom and slavery" and, in a careful reading, the same implication.

27. Cf. "*...o drasas tên charin....ouk es charin...., meta charitôn...*"

28. Cf. the Solonian *gnôthi seauton* and the Socratic clarification of it by the addition of *en oida oti ouden oida*.

29. On Pericles' dignity and integrity, cf. II, 65 (cf. the contrast, in the same passage, to his Sophist successors: private ambition, private profit, flattery etc) and compare it with II, 13 (on his property so that there are no suspicions). Cf. Pericles's view in I, 143 that human beings come first and then houses and land which are "the fruit of their labour".

30. Cf. #43, ll. 12 ff p.281: *eudaimon to eleutheron . to de eleutheron to eupsuchon krinantes...* The notions of *eudaimon* and of *krinantes* here are important in the understanding of what is *eleutheron* and *eupsuchon*.

31. **Rep.** 555b-576b.

32. Because of apparent semantic and, perhaps, ennoiological similarities, it may be remarked that this notion of "master-slave relation" should not be taken in the Hegelian sense, nor the notions of "state" (cf., for instance, Warner's translation of *polis* and *politika*, especially in # 60 as well as in # 40) (cf. Note 25 above). Pericles' philosophy (or Socrates' and Plato's, for that matter) has nothing to do with that of Hegel's which is Eleatic with Stoic and Neoplatonic elements. On Hegel's notion, cf. his **The Phenomenology of the Spirit**, B, IV, A and B, i.e. B: "Self-Consciousness", IV: "The Truth of the Certitude of Oneself", A: "Independence and dependence of Self-Consciousness; Dominion and Servitude" and B: "Freedom of Self-Consciousness; Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness" (cf. English. Translation of J.B. Baillie, **Phenomenology of Mind**, Harcourt Publications, New York, 1967, pp.241-267). Cf. also Hegel's **Philosophical Propaedeutics**, Course II: "Phenomenology of the Spirit and Logic" , ## 22-39: "Self-Consciousness", and especially ## 29-37: "Mastery and Servitude".

33. Karl Popper's Society (**The Open Society And Its Enemies**, 2 vol., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1945), as an individualistic and libertarian one, despite his own claim, is necessarily, therefore, a closed society.

34. For Karl Popper to claim the possibility of an Open society on an individualistic and libertarian foundation (*ibid.*) not only is a contradiction in terms, but even more is an indication of Popper's understanding of the reality of " individual sovereignty" and "libertarian openness" .

35. This may be one of the possible reasons for the length of the war after Pericles' death, the intransigence of the warring parties. Obviously one objection may rightly be that it was during Pericles' tenure that the war started. Yet, without any intention to defend Pericles, one may, nevertheless, see that the reasons for the starting of a war may very well be out of one society's -or its leader's- hands and control, in the case of a direct attack or of an involuntary defensive involvement. On this point, our contemporary WWII may be used, as one example, on the side of the Allies; besides, the Persian Wars for the Ancient Greeks may be another example.

36. One may refer, as examples, to the recent Middle-East and Northern Irish Peace attempts and their final ratification; one may also wonder about the final European Union etc. We may recall, as a case in point, the Ferrara-Florence Union of Christian Churches in 1439 which remained *de facto* a "paper union".

37. Cf. the II.1-4, p.275, on "wealth" and "poverty". See # 51 on the caring of one another during the plague and compare it with # 52 ff and # 61("you have changed [i.e principles]... Yet you must remember that you are citizens of a great city..., condemned are those who, through lack of moral fibre, fail to live up to the reputation which has been theirs already"[principles]). On political apathy, cf. his critique in II, 63.

38. Cf., for instance, Penguin ed., *op.cit.*, appendix 3, pp.614-616.

39. One may easily find numerous strikingly similar examples today of democratic superpowers guided, in their foreign affairs and relations, by the same principles and attitude.

40. Cf. V, 87, 89, 93, 95, 105, 107.

41. Cf. V, 90, 94, 98,106.

42. Cf. II, 65 and 67 on Persia and the Spartan attempts to establish an alliance against the Athenians.

43. Cf. his "Plague Speech" and Thucydides' observations; cf. notes 26 and 39-40 above.

44. And this vision of the lasting peace is despite the fact that -it must be noted again with the risk of repetition- the war is only in its first year and that Pericles could not foresee, nor did he live to see, how long and devastating one it would be for all.

45. Cf. the reference to the parallel of the Persian invasion. One may compare the position of, and its justification by, the Allies during WWII.

46. Cf. the importance of knowing the reasons why one fights, which is the characteristic of Pericles's Athenians.

47. Compare the Spartan ambassadorial belligerent attitudes and dispositions (intransigent and confrontational) in, e.g., I, 139 ff.

48. To be noticed in II, 39 that Pericles claims: "the Athenians fight their own battles by themselves", as opposed to the Lacedaimonians who "bring also their allies".

49. *xunelôn te legô* (#41, II.13, p. 276 and ff).

50. An interesting question one may ask is whether mankind, especially today, has retained, in its constitutions and institutions, the Solonian-Periclean (and, in this case, Socratic-Platonic) theories and practices of Democracy and Freedom (and, consequently, of Diplomacy and Policies) or rather the Sophistic ones.

51. Cf. **Bioi**, 8,5; 9,1; 14,1-3 etc.