The Impact of Thucydides on Postwar Realist Thinking and Its Critique

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It will be enough for me however, if these words of mine are judged useful words by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last forever.[1]

Thucydides, I.22

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article traite de l'influence qu'a exercée la vision de la guerre et des relations inter-étatiques de Thucydide sur les théoriciens de l'École de pensée réaliste. Bien que Thucydide fut un réaliste dans l'acceptation moderne du terme, le catégoriser dans l'une ou l'autre des sous-écoles du Réalisme s'avèrerait simpliste et trompeur. En effet, une étude poussée des ses analyses met à jour une approche réaliste complexe qui ne fait qu'ajouter à l'héritage que nous a légué ce grand historien et théoricien.

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how Thucydides' understanding of war and interstate relations has infuenced the theorists of the Realist school of thought. It argues that although Thucydides was a Realist himself in the modern use of the term, it seems quite simplistic and therefore misleading to seek to classify the great historian's thinking in one or the other variant of Realism. Instead, a more thorough reading of his analysis reveals a rather complicated Realistic approach which only adds to his legacy as a historian and a theorist who can offer time-less insights into contemporary power politics.

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Introduction

Very few would doubt that time has rewarded Thucydides in ful-filling his ambitious purpose of producing a classic work. Indeed, his *History of the Peloponnesian War* has long occupied a promi-nent position among scholars and statesmen who invoke its unconditional and timeless relevance to successive periods of world history. Especially during the Cold War, international rela-tions theorists and, in particular, the realists went so far as to iden-tify Thucydides as the "Founding Father of Realism", claiming that one could glean numerous insights from *The Peloponnesian War* which could prove valuable in the understanding of contemporary interstate politics. Indeed, Robert Gilpin, a prominent representa-tive of the Realist school of thought, characteristically notes that "one must inquire whether or not twentieth-century students of international relations know anything that Thucydides and his fifth-century BC compatriots did not know about the behavior of states... Ultimately, international politics can be still characterized as it was by Thucydides."[2]

Whether this view is correct or not may be argued; however, Thucydides' tremendous impact on postwar Realist thinking remains undisputed.

The aim of this study is to examine the major themes and theo-ries developed by the Realists which in their view were first tackled in *The Peloponnesian War.* These themes will be approached not exclusively from the Realists' point of view but also from that of scholars -both contemporary IR theorists and classicists- who are neither self-identified nor identifiable as belonging to the Realist school of thought. This article highlights the most controversial points in the debate on so-called "Thucydidean Realism" and explores (a) how much of a Realist Thucydides was and what he has to offer contemporary interna-tional relations; (b) what this discussion and the variety of approaches to Thucydides' perspective tell us about the risks that every scholar aspiring to appeal to Thucydides' thinking must face in order to establish his or her own theories and prove that their applicability may be traced back twenty-four centuries.

I. Hegemonic Wars and Thucydides' "Great War"

One of the most fervent supporters of the classical character of Thucydides' work is Gilpin, who has based his theory almost entirely on Thucydides. In fact, Gilpin has credited Thucydides as

the first to introduce the theory of hegemonic war,[3] epitomized in the concept that "the dynamic of international relations is provided by the asymmetrical growth among states".[4]

According to Thucydides' theory, at an initial stage the international system is relatively stable due to the hierarchical ordering of the states as defined by the distribution of power among them. Yet since human beings are driven by three fundamental passions: *interest, pride* and *fear*, they always aim to advance their own interests and increase their power and wealth. As a consequence, it is highly possible for a minor state to increase its power disproportionately and seek to challenge the supremacy of the dominant state. This process leads to a severe disequilibrium in the international system.[5] If the hegemonic power, in turn, fails to preserve the existing distribution of capabilities in the system, it is most likely that the crisis will precipitate a hegemonic war. The outcome of such a war will be the redistribution of power among the political actors and the creation of a new international order in which the victorious power will extend its new hegemony.[6]

Thucydides' contribution to the contemporary analysis of war, according to Gilpin, lies in his attempt to demonstrate that "great wars were recurrent phenomena with characteristic manifestations. A great or hegemonic war, like a disease, displays discernible symptoms and follows an inevitable course."[7] Symptoms of a hegemonic war could be synopsized as follows:

•involves an open conflict between the leading power(s) of an international system, the rising challenger(s), other major states and most minor states

•is caused by substantial changes in the political, strategic and economic sphere and certainly threatens to transform the *status quo* of the existing international structure (the basic issues at stake: What will be the nature of the international system? and Who will govern the new system?)

•because of the vast scope of the actors involved, it is an unlimited conflict, in terms of the eventual means used, its intensity and duration.[8]

Does the Peloponnesian War really fit into this theoretical model? Undoubtedly, the Peloponnesian War was a great war in the sense that -as Thucydides notes- it "was the greatest disturbance in the history of the Hellenes, affecting also a large part of

the non-Hellenic world, and indeed, the whole of mankind".[9] More importantly, the aim of this war was not limited. Thucydides claims it was about "hegemony over Hellas."[10] Indeed, when the war broke out between Athens and Sparta, in 431 BC, it soon took the form of a struggle for leadership of the new structure which would emerge in the international system of the Greek world. Sparta was the uncontested hegemonic power until the end of the Persian Wars (480 B.C). However, in the fifty years which followed the defeat of the Persian Empire, Athens increased its power and gradually built up its own empire which threatened to change the existing hierarchy of power. Each of the two rivals sought to reorder other city-states to its own alliance system, thus polarizing the Greek world between two opposing blocs: the Delian League (led by Athens) and the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta).[11] Hence, the whole of Hellas became entangled in a war, whose conclusion would determine the new hegemon and the new hierarchy of power in the system.

Although it seems that during the second half of the fifth century the necessary conditions for the outbreak of a hegemonic war in Hellas came into existence, not all contemporary theorists subscribe with the view that Thucydides' "Great War" should be classified as a hegemonic war. Donald Kagan, for instance, argues that the great Peloponnesian War was not the type of war that, for all its costs, creates a new order that permits general peace for a generation or more. Indeed, the peace treaty of 404 BC, which marked the conclusion of the war, reflected only temporarily the dominant position of Sparta. The Spartans failed to maintain their hegemonic position in the international system, since they eventually proved inadequate and inferior to the requirements of their new imperial position.[12] In the same vein, Mark Kauppi stresses that not only Sparta's dominance was short but even during that period, Sparta showed no willingness to behave as the hegemonic power over the rest of the Greek world. Its major concern was rather how to "thumb down the helots than expand its empire."[13] Also Gilpin himself questions Thucydides' perception that Sparta was the hegemon of the time and Athens the emerging power which challenged the former's supremacy.[14] In his view, when the war started, Athens was no longer just a rising power, but it had already taken over the hegemonic position from Sparta.[15]

Nevertheless and despite any objections to the association of the Peloponnesian War with the model of the "War for Hegemony",

several scholars seem to recognize that the Neorealists -including Gilpin- use the term "hegemony" in an identical way with that of Thucydides. Even this approach, however, is not without its critics. Daniel Garst, for instance, believes that this is a superficial resemblance. Although he admits that both Neorealists and Thucydides understand the term "hegemony" as leadership, he stresses that in Neorealism the concept of hegemony lacks the moral dimension which played a central role in Thucydides' analysis. In Garst's view, the greatest mistake the Neorealists make in their analysis of the great historian's thinking, is that they try to approach his understanding about hegemony and hegemonic war *out of historical context*, since they link these concepts with systemic imperatives which regulate the behavior of states. By contrast, Garst notes, "Thucydides reminds us that power and hegemony are above all bound to the existence of political and social structures and the inter-subjective conventions associated with them." [16]. This argument, although not strong enough to make by itself the case that the structuralist approach of Thucydides' reading is not sufficient, touches at the core of the problem that most contemporary theorists faced in their attempt to give an objective account of Thucydides' analysis. In fact, as it will be demonstrated clearer further below Thucydides was too complicated to be strictly classified in one or the other variant of Realism.

II. Causal Explanation of Wars and Power Transition Theories

While Robert Gilpin has explicitly applied his theory on Hegemonic War to The Peloponnesian War, other contemporary Realists focusing on the causal explanation of wars and power transition theories have equally claimed to trace their intellectual lineage to Thucydides.

a. Causes of War

Thucydides is credited as the first to make the distinction between underlying and immediate causes. Indeed, although students of *The Peloponnesian War* invariably quote Thucydides' famous explanation at 1.23, that the war was spurred by the growth of the Athenian power and the fear this caused to Sparta, a more thorough insight of his work indicates that the Greek historian was very careful in distinguishing between grounds for complaints (*αιτίαι και διαφοραί*), accusations (*εγκλήματα*), precipitants (*προφάσεις*) and the truest precipitant of war (*η αληθέστατη*

πρόφασις).[17]

In his discussion on the origins of the "Great War", Thucydides proceeds to an analysis -very familiar to the Realist approach- of the factors which prompted the shift of the distribution of power among the Greek city-states and eventually led to the outbreak of the war.[18] Thus, he traces three important determinants which -in his view- explained the transformation of Athens into an imperial power: First, it was its geographic position, demographic pressure and poor economic resources which prompted Athens to turn to commerce. Second, it was the Athenian superiority of naval power which offered great opportunities for the expansion of commerce and subsequently the establishment of the whole Hellas as the hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, there were significant technical innovations of naval power as well as other "technological" developments -such as fortification tech-niques- which favored the growth of the Athenian power. Third, it was the Persian Wars and the new strategic environment their conclusion created, as Athens emerged victorious, while Sparta adopted a rather isolationist policy. This factor coupled with the coming into power in Athens of a wealthy commercial class, eager to expand its economic interests, gave a further boost to the growth of Athens.[19]

The synthesis of all the above parameters caused a shift in the balance of power between the two powerful countries and the forging of two rival camps: These factors, according to Thucydides, are the *underlying* causes of the war, as opposed to the *immediate* causes, such as the dispute over Epidamnus, Corcyra and Potidea.[20] Still, none of them can be convincingly credited as the cause which made the war inevitable. For sure, on the eve of the outbreak of the hostilities, although both sides seemed fully aware of the potential disastrous implications of the imminent war, they appeared equally determined of waging it.[21] Was it out of patriotism or overreaction? Thucydides believes that the reason which eventually made the war inevitable was *fear*. The Athenians feared that if they allowed Corinth -Sparta's ally- to take control of Corcyra's navy, they would weaken their position in the Greek system. The Spartans, in turn, feared that the Athenians would tip the balance of power against Sparta. In short, both political actors were caught in -what the Realists term- a characteristic case of a *security dilemma*.[22] The lack of hierarchy of authority among the city-states had created lack of mutual trust

which, in turn, had forced each actor to function in a *self-help* system for its own security. The security dilemma in this case is that although the two sides may have not initially wished war, the self-help system -which encourages independent actions- made states to be suspicious of each other and therefore to presume the worst intentions for the other.[23] In this framework, as Thucydides puts it: "when tremendous dangers are involved, no one can be blamed for looking at his own interest,"[24] and of course the option of war becomes more than likely.

In any case, the fact that the Greek historian in his approach of the Peloponnesian War focuses on the anarchic conditions prevailing in the international system of the time and the reactions of states to potential changes of the existing balance of power, leaves no doubt that Thucydides in his analysis acts as an original Realist by proceeding to what in the IR terminology is called a "system-level explanation".[25]

Yet, without trying to undermine the value of this view, I suggest that this is only one aspect -although very important- of Thucydide's perspective. His explanation of the causes of the Peloponnesian War would remain incomplete if we ignored the equally great emphasis the Greek historian placed on the function of "second image" factors operating at the domestic level, and more specifically, the nature or character of the society. Indeed, as Kauppi rightly points out, Thucydides in his narrative illustrates how the democratic regime and the experience of the Persian Wars transformed the Athenians into a daring and outward-looking society, which in turn functioned as a driving force in the forging of an imperialist foreign policy. This unique character exhibited by the Athenians which made them restless and more ambitious in ever expanding their borders and acquiring power, further exacerbated the threat perceptions of Athens' neighbors and rivals.[26] Thus, on the one hand, there was Athens, a *polis* with a democratic regime and a free, daring, and cosmopolitan behavior, while on the other hand, there was Sparta which was oligarchic, conservative, isolationist and primarily interested in preserving its domestic *status quo*.[27]

b. Power Transition Theories and the Peloponnesian War

According to Thucydides, the element of "fear-of-Athens" did not exist in Sparta throughout the whole period of the rising of

the Athenian power. Indeed, the Spartans remained inactive as long as they perceived that the Athenian growth did not constitute a threat to their national interests. It was only when the "Athenian strength attained a peak plain for all to see and the Athenians began to encroach upon Sparta's allies... that Sparta felt the position to be no longer tolerable", and decided to go to war.[28]

This concept of Thucydides that significant changes in the distribution of capabilities among the Greek city-states were directly related to the increase of the possibility of war, made the Realists to consider him as the first " power transition theorist". According to power transition theorists, when a radical change of the distribution of capabilities occurs in the international system, hegemonic powers seek to preserve their own position, even if they need to resort to war. In other words, any rising power which challenges the supremacy of the dominant power is bound to face a rigid opposition.[29]

Yet, not all power transition theorists approach the same way the conditions leading to a change of the system. One could at least identify two major variants: The first variant focuses on the rise and the fall of the states in economic, political and military terms[30] and the second, on the relationship between change in power capabilities and the initiation of war.[31] Between the two approaches, the latter seems to be closer to Thucydides' perception of ancient Greek system. This approach is also shared by A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler who argue that the more the power of a state grows, the greater the probability of war is.[32] In other words, war is most likely when the power capabilities of the rising state approach those of the hegemonic state. At that point, the weaker state decides to go to war in order to change the *status quo* of the system in its favor.[33]

Charles Doran and Wes Parsons advance another argument maintaining that states trace a power transition cycle which starts with their rise and closes with their fall. What is innovative in their theory is the assumption that a state might initiate a war -apart from the top- at three other points of the cycle: the ascendance, the maturation and the decline. This is because at these four points a dramatic change occurs in the balance of power among the states of the system, although it is believed that the possibility of war is greater when the state is at its ascendance or at its decline.[34] Kauppi, by contrast, holds that the Peloponnesian War

represents one of the most characteristic examples of war which erupted when the dominant power was on the top of its power cycle, that is, when it realized that it was already loosing out its power.[35] At this point, the declining power -which has still the military superiority- opts to launch a *preventive war* in order to destroy the challenging power. This was the case with Sparta. When its statesmen faced the dilemma "to decline or to fight" they chose the latter.[36] A different explanation regarding the timing of the initiation of the Peloponnesian War comes from Doran who believes that the Peloponnesian War belongs to the cases in which the eruption of a war is the result of the existing tension between the hegemonic power and its challengers. In such cases, because of the tense atmosphere, the possibility for over-reaction and miscalculation is great.[37]

Yet, as it happens with most attempts made by contemporary IR theorists to draw analogies from Thucydides' work, the applicability of power transition theories to *The Peloponnesian War* does not go unchallenged. Lebow, for instance, points to the fact that there is no agreement among power transition theorists either about the causes prompting such dramatic changes in the system, or about the timing of the onset of war.[38] Also, according to power transition theorists, it is presumed that war starts when a state approaches or threatens to surpass the power of the hegemon. Although the outbreak of war does not always coincide with the timing of the power change, it is expected that the gap between these two elements is as narrow as possible. Yet the war between Athens and Sparta broke out much later than the period in which the Athenian power saw its decline or when it was in its ascendance again.[39]

Doran points to another "flaw" in the case of the Peloponnesian War: According to power transition theorists, statesmen are assumed to have a good understanding of potential changes in the distribution of capabilities and react accordingly. Yet, the Greek example points to the contrary. Although Athens had already become a hegemonic power of the Greek world some forty years before the start of the "Great War", Sparta did nothing to prevent it or to change its new position. Moreover, when the war eventually erupted, it became apparent that neither the Spartans had a good understanding of the relative power between the two rival blocs when they proclaimed war, nor the Athenians had a good grasp of the military power of Sicily, when they decided the expedition in 413 B.C.[40]

III. The Peloponnesian War and the Cold War: A Recurrent Story?

a. Similarities and Differences

For several theorists belonging to the Realist school of thought, Thucydides' work has also been the source of inspiration in their understanding of the Cold War system, as they claim to discern numerous similarities in the hegemonic rivalry between Sparta and Athens, on the one hand, and the United States and the former Soviet Union, on the other. Between the two cases, the Realists identify a recurrent pattern: there are two allies who defeat a common enemy in a devastating war. In the fifth century B.C, Sparta and Athens fought together against Persian imperialism. In the twentieth century, the United States allied with the Soviet Union during World War II to halt German aggression. With the end of these great wars, the former allies turn against each other. When Athens and Sparta did not feel threatened anymore by Persia, they both started suspecting one another as the potential power to take the leadership of the rest of Hellas.[41] By the same token, George Kennan -the influential American policymaker during the Cold War- in his famous "X" article, in 1947, urged the United States to adopt a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union, so as to prevent the latter from taking under control the industrial and military resources of the defeated Germany.[42]

In geopolitical terms, it could be argued that the leading powers had adopted a hegemonic attitude towards the other states of the system. Athens became the dominant power of an empire (*αρχή*) whose member-states experienced an indiscriminate interference from the part of Athens with their domestic and foreign affairs. On the other hand, Sparta became the leader of a hegemonic alliance (*συμμαχία*) which was rather loose, thus leaving enough autonomy to its members.[43] Similarly, in the aftermath of World War II, as the US and the Soviet Union emerged as the sole dominant powers of the international system, they formed two antagonistic alliances thus dividing the system into two camps.

Another common characteristic between the two dyads is that very often crises, which emerged in the periphery of the two

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alliances, functioned as another territory of indirect confrontation between the two leading powers, thus bringing them very close to a direct military encounter. This was the case -for instance- in Epidamnus, Corcyra and Potidea in ancient Hellas, and in Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan during the Cold War. Also, it is interesting to note how the alliance leaders of both periods in question, failed -in most cases- to tackle efficiently sub-regional crises when they decided to intervene militarily, as it occurred with the Athenian expedition to Sicily, the American intervention in Vietnam or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[44] Finally, in political and ideological terms, there is the proclivity to associate Athens with the US as the sea powers with liberal and democratic regimes, and Sparta with the USSR as the land powers with oligarchic and authoritarian regimes.[45]

If, however, contemporary IR scholars can trace these similarities between the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War, the *dis*similarities appear much more striking and perhaps more significant. Joseph Nye dismisses categorically all these "patently shallow historical analogies" which tend to present USA in the place of ancient Athens and the Soviet Union in that of Sparta. He points to the fact that it was not only Sparta or its equivalent Soviet Union which were "slave states", but also classical Athens was a slave-holding state torn by domestic upheavals. Furthermore -contrary to the Cold War- it was "oligarchic" Sparta which eventually won and not "democratic" Athens.[46]

Also, according to Gilpin, one of the most glaring differences between the two wars is that while the Athens-Sparta rivalry represented a clearly bipolar structure, the American-Soviet confrontation appeared in the last decade of the Cold War to have been replaced by a rising multipolar system.[47] In addition to this, it should be reminded that the Cold War ended without being ever fought, while the Peloponnesian War was a real long-lasted and disastrous war. This is attributed to the fact that the American-Soviet antagonism was primarily based on nuclear deterrence, a factor which eventually prevented the two rivals from any direct confrontation.[48] On the contrary, in the fifth-century Greek system, there was no such powerful weapon to function as an efficient deterrent of war. As Carlo Santoro rightly points out referring to the ancient Greek case, "war was always a feasible choice because the values at stake were not the physical survival of the society, but only the distribution of power and

wealth".[49]

Moreover, because of the irretrievable character that the use of nuclear weapons could have had on the international system, the two Cold War superpowers adopted an attitude entirely opposite to that of Athens and Sparta: that is, they refrained from inter- fering with the sphere of influence of each other. With scant exceptions, they avoided any form of direct offensive action and, instead, they chose to comply with the *status quo* as agreed in Yalta, in 1945. Moreover, they refrained from exerting pressure on neutral states in order to compel them to side with one or the other bloc. Weaker states also -contrary to the example of ancient Corinth which incited the Peloponnesian War- avoided to provoke a superpower confrontation.[50]

b. Democracies *vs* Authoritarian Regimes

Similar analogies between the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War have been also drawn *vis-à-vis* the role of the ideology and the nature of the regime of the protagonists of the two historical periods. This time the comparison regards the "democratic" dyad of Athens-US *versus* the "authoritarian" one of Sparta-USSR. Against this argument, Philip Sabin warns that despite the strate- gic similarities between the two periods, one can discern "impor- tant ideological and constitutional differences" between the type of the Athenian democracy and that of the American. More specifically, ancient Athens was a rather radical democracy, since - due to the small size of the city- it was feasible for the citizens to vote directly, whereas nowadays people can only be represented by parliamentary systems.[51] In the same vein, Matthew Evangelista notes that not only Athens, but also Sparta should be considered democratic, given that both city-states applied the same practice in their decision-making process: there was a real debate held in an assembly and followed by public vote.[52]

Again, it appears that this very element of democracy sometimes functioned at the expense of the national interest of the states and although external factors did exert a restrictive role on the policy-makers of each state, they did not always determine their decisions.[53] Thucydides, in his narrative, has repeatedly noted how precarious and sometimes unforseeable was the outcome of open debates -which were the blueprint of their democratic regime- since competent public speakers and politicians could eas-

ily shift or even manipulate public opinion.[54] It is precisely this important remark that makes some scholars to assert that Thucydides very often moves from the "second-image" analysis based on state character, to a "first-image" explanation based on human nature, whereby the individuals and especially the elite personalities at the time are considered as the prime initiators of certain collective actions with implications to world politics. This phenomenon is particularly evident in democratic Athens, where the spiritedness and individualism of its citizens give free rein to an imprudent pursuit of power with often disastrous effects for the city-state itself, culminating on the eventual fall of Athens after the Sicilian expedition.[55]

In autocratic states, by contrast, argues Evangelista, decision-making was much a rather straight forward process, since the authoritarian character of the regime tended to stifle the debate and consequently limit the range of options and initiatives.[56]

There is also the argument -favored by the theorists of the Liberal school of thought- that states with a democratic regime are inclined to adopt a more peaceful policy among themselves than authoritarian states.[57] Yet, as the Realists have rightly pointed out, the classical Athens case demonstrates rather the opposite. In fact, not only it did not show a pacific tendency towards the other *poleis*-states, but it still represents a good illustration of how belligerent and aggressive democracies can be. In a number of instances, one can deduce the Athenian assertiveness and expansionism of its empire starting with the Megarian Decree[58] and culminating with the expedition to Sicily in 413 B.C. Needless to say that Athens used the same "non-democratic" methods by treating its allies in the Delian League rather as subject peoples, than as equal members of an alliance.[59] As Pericles himself reminds to the Athenian public:

> Do not imagine that what we are fighting for is simply the question of freedom or slavery: there is also involved the loss of our empire and the danger arising from the hatred which we have incurred in administering it...

> Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.[60]

These words are illustrative of Thucydides' thesis that not only democratic societies do not necessarily have pacifying effects on the international system, but -to the contrary- they demonstrate a

peculiar dynamism which finds expression in the nurture of expansionist and imperialistic aspirations. In this context, Thucydides deserves to be credited as the first theorist to note the imperialist as opposed to the pacifist character of democratic regimes.[61]

In the same vein, John Lewis Gaddis comparing the democratic US and the oligarchic Soviet Union, suggested that the democratic structure of domestic politics of the US, in essence, prevented the country from pursuing a more conciliatory policy towards the Soviets; whereas the autocratic nature of the Soviet regime -due to lack of pluralism- could have moved more freely into appeasing the tension, if it had wished so.[62]

IV. Alliances and Balance of Power: In Search for Stability

The Peloponnesian War and the international relations system of the time also served contemporary Realists as a point of reference for another debate on the nature of the balance of power and the role of the alliances in retaining the stability in the system. The basic assumption of this debate is that due to the absence of a central and overriding authority, states tend to join their capabilities by forming alliances in order to better protect them- selves against the threat of another power. Alliances, in turn, aim at preventing the ascendance of a hegemonic power and thus preserving the balance of power in the system.[63] At this point, the debate focuses on two issues: (a) Do *all* states resort to the formation of alliances in order to cope with the threat of a rising hegemon? (b) Which of the types of balance of power is more likely to lead to war, bipolarism or multipolarism?

Again, Thucydides' *History* of the "Great War" seems to offer valuable responses in the analysis of states' behavior. As a first remark it could be argued that the vast majority of alliance for- mation cases in Classical Greece were originated from the need of certain *poleis* to balance against some other *polis* seeking hege- mony. In 432 B.C., for instance, Corcyra sought to align with Athens in order to protect itself against the threatening power of Corinth.[64] For similar motives, in 420 B.C., the Argives sought to balance against Sparta, by forging an alliance with Athens.[65]

Yet "balancing" against a potential aggressor was not the sole mode of action for the *poleis*. In some cases, the *poleis*-states

demonstrated a preference of "bandwagoning" instead of "balancing". According to the bandwagoning theory, states may choose to "climb on the bandwagon" of a rising challenger, thus enforcing the latter's already increasing power at the expense of the existing balance of power.[66] This phenomenon is particularly characteristic in small weak states, which -given their vulnerability to external threats- are more inclined to align with a rising power in the hope that major actors will act as a security umbrella for them.[67] A good illustration of "bandwagoning" in fifth-century Greece, is when in the aftermath of the Sicilian disaster, several *poleis* -and particularly those which until then had adopted a neutral stance toward the War- rushed to join the revolt which had broken up amongst the Delian League allies against Athens. For those states -given that Athens' defeat was imminent- to climb on the rebels' "bandwagon" meant that the end of the Great War would find them on the side of the winners.[68]

Overall, although IR theorists admit that states have no standard preference towards the one or the other system, it is agreed that in the majority of cases -including the Peloponnesian War era- states tend to "balance" rather than "bandwagon".[69] Surprisingly -and much to the disappointment of those scholars who emphasize on the striking similarities between the two historical periods- during the Cold War, American policy-makers appeared to be rather concerned with the "bandwagoning" phenomenon than with "balancing". This particularity is primarily attributed to structural reasons and to a lesser extent to cultural ones: The nuclear deterrent which made the war less probable, coupled with the "treaty obligations" which bounded the U.S. in its conduct of foreign policy, made the American policy-makers to place much more emphasis on the psychological factor of negotiation and credibility, than on the actual use of force as the Ancient Greeks did. These structural and cultural constraints however which allayed the possibility of the use of force, put more strain on the American leaders as they feared that if the U.S. lost its credibility as the leading power of the Western bloc, their allies might defect by climbing on the communist "wagon".[70]

An equally important issue which has long been debated amongst the IR scholars relates to the question of the grade of stability and security that bipolar and multipolar systems can bring about. Here again, the Realists suggest that by comparing the two

characteristic examples of hegemonic rivalry (Athens *vs* Sparta and US *vs* USSR), one can gain a better insight on this particular theme. The opinions, however, are not converging as to whether a bipolar or a multipolar political structure preserves the stability of the international system better.[71]

Kenneth Waltz is among those scholars who argue in favor of bipolarism. According to his theory, the less the number of the poles is, the less likely it is for the actors to miscalculate and go to war. This is because in a bipolar system, the dominant position of the two superpowers functions as a deterrent against offensive actions and allows a strict control over their respective subsystems.[72] In contrast to this conception is that of David Singer and Karl Deutsch who contend that multipolar power systems are more conducive to international stability. This thesis is based on the argument that the more the poles are (a) the less the share of the attention is that any state can devote to any other and (b) the more complex the interaction among the states is. Moreover, because of the high level of uncertainty in a multipolar system, decision makers tend to be more cautious and therefore, the possibility for an accentuation of tensions becomes less likely.[73]

How do these theories fit into the two historical models? In order to proceed to the examination of the applicability of the above theories, Realists have put into scrutiny a very basic assumption: Was the fifth century B.C. Greece a bipolar system divided into two blocs? If yes, then what conclusions could be drawn about the relation between bipolarity and war-proneness? Undoubtedly, the ancient Greek world was partitioned into two spheres of influence whose major opponents were the leading powers of two respective alliances: The Lacedaemonian League, on the one hand, which functioned as a loose web of bilateral alliances between *poleis* and it was led by Sparta and the Delian League, on the other hand, which was structured rather as "an imperial confederation" whose metropolis (Athens) constituted the supreme economic, military and political power in the alliance.[74]

The apparent similarities between this bipolar structure of the ancient Greek system and that of the Cold War era led several scholars to the logical question: If bipolarism was the system which dragged the two rivals into the Peloponnesian War, then why did the same system have a deterrent effect during the Cold War era, thus preventing the two superpowers from going to war? As Santoro explains, a bipolar system is an inherently unsta-

ble system to the extent that the outbreak of war becomes inevitable. Nevertheless, as it was mentioned earlier on, the factor which made the difference between the two historical cases, is that the Cold War central actors possessed the nuclear weapon. Given that the destructive power of this weapon could not guarantee the victory to either of the two rivals, it was used as an effective tool for deterring the outbreak of a global war. By contrast, the deterrent value of the conventional force which ancient Greece possessed, was very limited since the use of such a force would only lead to the redistribution of capabilities. Consequently, the concept of war in those cases was not just a realistic option but often the preferred one in order for each state to either maintain or change the existing balance of power so as to achieve a more favorable distribution of capabilities.[75]

Yet, this picture of fifth century B.C. Greece as a clearly bipolar structure is not fully shared by all theorists. In fact, it is argued that although Thucydides himself in the beginning of his narrative presents the whole Greece as being divided into two camps, he later explains that the ancient Greek world was rather multipolar, as several sizeable city-states -such as Thebes and Corcyra- pre-ferred to move between the two alliances, depending on their interests, rather than play with the rules of bipolarism.[76]

In the same vein, Frank Wyman uses the historic period at the onset of the Peloponnesian War as a characteristic example of his theory on power multipolarity. More specifically, he contends that in a system which is power multipolar, warfare is of higher magnitude, if it occurs, compared with a power bipolar system. This is because in a multipolar system, the big powers are not self-reliant; therefore, any member of their coalition which creates a serious crisis could drag the big power and consequently the whole alliance into a war. That was the case, in Wyman's view, when, in the dispute between Corcyra and Corinth, Athens felt compelled to defend the former and Sparta the latter.[77]

Finally, a more conciliatory and perhaps more convincing approach in the definition of the structure of the ancient Greek world comes from some scholars who talk about a "bi-multipolar" or a "quasi-bipolar" system which was characterized by the dominance of the two relatively stronger powers, but there were also other minor actors who could influence the interaction among the states. Underlying this argument there is a very simple syllogism: If one accepts that classical Greece was a bipolar system,

one would expect that both Athens and Sparta would not be affected by the defection of their allies. But that was not the case, since none of the two rivals was powerful enough to afford defections. On the other hand, if one accepts the option of the multipolar system, one would expect a continuous shift of alliances in order to adjust to changes in relative power. Again that was not the case, as both protagonists were too powerful to be balanced by any peripheral changes in alliances. What eventually happened in the Greek example is a good illustration - according to Doyle- of how quasi-bipolar systems function by combining the flaws of both systems: On the one hand, the fear which was caused in Athens and Sparta by the prospect of defection of Corinth and Corcyra undoubtedly worked as a precipitant in bringing the two superpowers into war. On the other hand, both cities were not powerful enough to tilt the balance of the two major actors in the system.[78]

V. Instead of Conclusion: Understanding Thucydidean Realism

It is certainly not an easy task to understand and interpret the work and the thinking of a historian and theorist who lived almost two and a half millennia ago. But it is much more difficult and ambitious an endeavor to demonstrate how and to which extent Thucydides' work offers "timeless insights into the contemporary international politics" as the Realists claim.

The first conclusion drawn from this essay, is that despite any differentiations or criticisms coming from various scholars, I think most of them would agree that Thucydides *was* a Realist, in the sense that he embraced -at least- four fundamental assumptions of political Realism: First, that the state is the principal actor in the international system representing the key unit of analysis, regardless of whether the use of the term refers to the *poleis*-states of the ancient Greek world system or the modern type of states. Second, that the state acts as an integrated unitary actor with one policy. Third, that the state behaves in a rational way, and therefore understandable for any external observer. Fourth, that national security is the most important factor in world politics and therefore the state always aims at acquiring power.

What is also inarguable is that Thucydides had a huge impact on policy-makers and theorists of Realism especially during the Cold

War era, given that the structure of the international world of that period hinted in many aspects at the way the ancient Greek interstate relations functioned. However, as the comparison between the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War clearly demonstrates, students of Thucydides' *opus*, very often caught by the axiom of "Thucydides' relevance" did not avoid the trap of selectively quoting his judgements, in order to apply theories or practices deriving from a different historical context to the reality of their time and *viceversa*.[79] Thus, the favourite method of various scholars of introducing "historical relativism", instead of illuminating their analysis, often led them to serious misperceptions based on the presumably "striking similarities" between the two historical periods.[80]

This mistake of "selective reading" has also tempted several theorists to classify the Greek historian in one or the other variant of Realism. This is particularly characteristic in the case of Neorealists who -by using Thucydides' famous explanation of the "truest cause"- claim that Thucydides proceeds to a purely structuralist analysis. Yet, as it was discussed in this paper, a more careful reading of his *History*, proves that Thucydides, apart from his direct method of explaining the various developments, also tried indirectly to look into events by placing them in multiple levels of analysis -the international system, the domestic factors, and the role of the individual. Having this in mind, Doyle rightly notes that "paternity suits tend to be messy, for each version of Realism can identify its views in Thucydides' *History*".[81]

This remark leads us to the core issue in the study of the Greek historian's work: What type of a Realist was Thucydides? Does his approach constitute a special variant in Realism? To be sure, Thucydides believed, just as the Realists do, that *poleis*-states because of the anarchic nature of the international system are in a constant state of war in their attempt to improve their security and increase their relative power. Yet, although he placed special emphasis on the analysis of the predominance of the poleis-states as the key units in the ancient Greek world system, he did not think that states were the only actors in it. On the other hand, his explanation that human beings are driven by three fundamental passions -interest, pride and fear- made quite clear that state behavior -in his view- was not always determined by structural factors. Indeed, Thucydides dedicated a significant part in his narrative to explain how human nature and individuals -especially the leading personalities- affected the conduct of international

affairs. Of course he never went as far as to suggest that the individual alone could independently shape the international system and the existing balance of power. Finally, Thucydides gave similar credence to the national character of the state and domestic considerations, as a factor which could influence a state's proclivity to war or peace. Democratic and imperialistic Athens *vs* the oligarchic and hegemonic Sparta was the perfect dyad for Thucydides to analyze the shaping of states' foreign policy.

Having set the framework of the complexity of Thucydides theory, it becomes quite obvious that, despite the admittedly prominent position of the structural level of the Greek historians' analysis, every single approach which tends to overemphasize this type of analysis by entirely ignoring or diminishing the importance of the other factors -examined above- is bound to remain incomplete and perhaps misleading, as none of them could stand alone - according to "Thucydidean Realism"- to adequately explain international relations.

Concluding, it appears that Thucydides has inarguably valuable insights to offer on the concept of war and the pursuit of power, the origins of hegemonic war, the forming of alliances and the political behavior of democracies *vs* authoritarian states. To this end, the Peloponnesian War can be most rewarding in the understanding of the Cold War era as well as on whether bipolarism or multipolarism is the system which can better preserve peace and stability. Finally, it is fascinating to realize how Thucydides understood and explained the implications of the shift in power capabilities in the international system, the balance of power system and the conditions under which the various transitions of power took place in the fifth-century B.C. Greek world. More importantly, however, it is most intriguing to discover at the same time, how relevant these theories of his are in contemporary world politics.

In this framework, IR specialists have an important contribution to make by understanding Thucydides, as there are numerous lessons to be drawn that could assist in understanding international relations. But on two conditions: it is important to bear in mind that Thucydides' ideas and interpretations reflected the values, inclinations and theories of his own time which are, understandably, different from those of nowadays. Therefore, students of *The Peloponnesian War* should beware of "reading" Thucydides within the context of his political culture and historical circumstances. On the other hand, it should be noted that his

approach of international politics could only be understood if it was read as a whole, whereby all three Waltzian images -as ana-lyzed in his treatise- would be taken into account. This is perhaps the only way to rightly appreciate and benefit from what Martin Wight called "one of the supreme books" ever written on power politics.[82]

NOTES

1. Thucydides, **The History of the Peloponnesian War**, trans-lated by Rex Warner, introduction by M.I Finley, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954, I.22, p. 48.

2. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change in World Politics**, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 227-228.

3. The term "hegemonic war" or "war of hegemony" was coined by Raymond Aron in order to describe the great wars of the twen-tieth century. See: Raymond Aron, "War and Industrial Society", in Leon Branson and George W. Goethals (eds.), **War - Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology**, N.Y., London: BasicBooks, Inc.,1964, p. 359.

4. Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", **Journal of Interdisciplinary History**, XVIII:4, (Spring 1988), "The Theory of Hegemonic War", p. 591.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 601.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 595 and Mark V. Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory and the Peloponnesian War" in Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss (eds.) **Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age**, Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 101-124. See also Aron, "War and Industrial Society", *ibid.*, p. 359.

7. Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", *ibid.*, pp. 594-595.

8. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change**, p.199. An important element to be added is that all major powers of the system and the majority of the minor ones tend to eventually join with one or another of the conflicting camps. Some characteristic examples of this type of war, are -apart from the Peloponnesian War- the Second Punic War, the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the wars of Louis XIV (1667-1713), the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic (1792-1814), and finally World War I and II. See Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid.*,

p.108

9. Thucydides, *ibid.*, I.1, p.35.

10. Robert Gilpin, **War and Change**, *ibid.*, p. 198. Gilpin believes that Thucydides considered the total of the Greek city-states as a relatively autonomous system and the stakes at war very high. See, for example, Pericles' speech to the Athenians before the outbreak of the war: "Let none of you think that we should be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megarian decree; (...) but if we do go to war , let there be no kind of suspicion in your hearts that the war was over a small matter...", (Thucydides, I.140, p. 119).

11. Gilpin, **War and Change**, *ibid.*, p. 199.

12. Donald Kagan, **The Fall of the Athenian Empire**, Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univerity Press, 1987, pp. 284-285.

13. Mark. V. Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid.*, pp.109-110.

14. Thucydides, I.23, p. 49. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War and Cold War", in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*

15. As it will be discussed further below, this is because, while Athens continued to grow following the end of the Persian Wars, Sparta fearing on one hand a domestic revolt by the subjugated helots, and on the other of being landlocked, failed to take advantage of the new opportunities for wealth and power and fell behind. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War and Cold War", in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, p.34.

16. See Daniel Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism", **International Studies Quarterly**, 33, 1989, pp. 22-25.

17. Thucydides, I.23. Also see Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and Causes of War", in Lebow and Strauss, (eds.) **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 125-165.

18. Gilpin, "Theory of Hegemonic War", *ibid.*, p. 597.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 597-599.

20. These disputes between minor city-states are considered by Thucydides only as the precipitants of the war but certainly not the substantial and true causes. See, Thucydides, I, 24-65, pp. 49-72.

21. Thudydides, I.78, pp. 81-82.

22. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., **Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History**, New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993, pp. 8-16.

23. See also Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, **International Relations Theory**, NY: MacMillan Publ., 1993., pp. 47-50.

24. Thucydides, I.75, pp. 79-80.

25. Viotti and Kauppi, **International Relations**, *ibid.*, p. 49. A characteristic example of this approach is the passage which shows how Spartans felt insecure about the Athenian decision to rebuild their own fortifications following the end of the Persian Wars: "When the Spartans heard what was going on, they sent an embassy to Athens. This was partly because they themselves did not like the idea of Athens or any other city being fortified, but chiefly because they were urged on by their allies who were alarmed both by the sudden growth of Athenian sea-power and by the daring which the Athenians had shown in the war against the Persians." See Thucydides, I.89-90, pp. 87-89.

26. Mark V. Kauppi, "Thucydides: Character and Capabilities", in Benjamin Franckel (ed.), **Roots of Realism**, London: Frank Cass & Co., 1996, pp. 142-143.

27. Throughout his narrative, Thucydides takes the opportunity to highlight these differences often by appraising the uniqueness and superiority of the Athenians compared to the Spartans. See for instance, the speech by the Corinthians (I.70-71) and Pericles' *Funeral Oration* (II.35-46). The latter, in fact constitutes a eulogy of the institutions of Athenian society, such as: equality before the law, commerce, individual freedom in the way of living and edu-cation and finally the democratic policy-making processes. See: William T. Bluhm, "Causal Theory in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War", **Political Studies**, Vol. X, No.1, 1962, pp.15-35. Also, Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid.*, pp.103-105, and Gilpin, "Theory of Hegemonic War", *ibid.*, pp. 599.

28. Thucydides, I.118, p. 103.

29. George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", **Compartive Studies of Society and History**, 20, April 1978, pp. 214-235 and Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power", **The American Political**

Science Review, 74, December 1960, pp. 947-965.

30. In the first group Kauppi lists: G. Modelski, W. Thompson, I. Wallerstein,C. Chase-Dunn, etc. See Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid*, p. 105.

31. In the second group are included: Robert Gilpin, A.F.K. Organski and Charles F. Doran. See again Kauppi, *ibid.*

32. A.F.K. Organski, **World Politics**, New York: Knopf, 1967, 2nd ed., pp. 202-203.; A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler, **The War Ledger**, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980, Ch. 1 and 3.

33. *Ibid*, see also pp. 21-23. Lebow is skeptical about this view. He argues that there is also the possibility that the weaker state might either choose to wait until it becomes stronger than the dominant power, or it will attempt to change the *status quo* by peaceful means. See: Lebow, "Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and Causes of War", in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, pp. 135-137.

34. Doran and Parsons, "War and the Cycle", *ibid.*, pp. 949-952.

35. Kauppi, *ibid.*, pp. 106-107.

36. Gilpin, **War and Change**, *ibid.*, p.191.

37. Doran, "War and Power Dynamics: Economic Underpinnings", **International Studies Quarterly**, 27, December 1983, pp. 419-443.

38. Lebow, "Thucydides, Power Transition Theory, and Causes of War", *ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

39. Lebow, *ibid.*, pp.139-140.

40. *Ibid*, pp. 139-141. These remarks, however, are conflicting with Thucydides' view that people were essentially rational beings and could therefore learn from their mistakes and avoid ill-fated decisions in the future. Although he himself could not deny, as Kauppi notes, "that there were cognitive limitations on rational decision-making and the problem of translating intentions into desired outcomes." See Kauppi, "Contemporary International Relations Theory", *ibid.*, pp.112-119.

41. Robert Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War", *ibid.*, pp. 31-50. See John Lewis Gaddis, "Introduction: The Evolution of Containment", in John Lewis Gaddis and Terry L. Deibel, **Containing the Soviet Union**, London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, p. 1.

42. George Kennan (X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", **Foreign**

Affairs, 25 July 1947, pp. 566-582.

43. Donald Kagan, **The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War**, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969.

44. Carlo M. Santoro, "Bipolarity and War: What makes the Difference?", in Lebow and Strauss, **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

45. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War", *ibid.*; also Philip G. Sabin, "Athens, the U.S, and Democratic Characteristics" in **Foreign Policy**, *ibid*, pp. 235-250, and Santoro, "Bipolarity and War" pp. 271-86, *ibid.*

46. Nye, **Understanding International Conflicts**, *ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

47. The Peloponnesian War escalated into a long and destructive war within the limited boundaries of the then perceived Hellenic territory, whereas the Cold War seemed to be spread out in a more global context and the military and economic power equally allocated in more than two rival powers. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War", *ibid.* As far as it concerns the debate over whether the two historical examples functioned as a bipolar or a multipolar system, it will be discussed at a later stage of this paper.

48. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is perhaps the most illustrative example of the restraining role nuclear weapons played between the two superpowers.

49. Santoro, "Bipolarity and War", *ibid.*

50. See Gilpin, "Peloponnesian War", *ibid.*, pp.46-48. Gilpin also suggests that the ideological factor may have played some positive role in the Cold War, as each side seemed convinced about the superiority and the correctness of its own ideology -capitalism and liberalism in the United States, communism and marxism in the Soviet Union- which made each superpower believe that it would eventually prevail over the other. Therefore, neither of the two protagonists really exerted any pressure towards open confrontation in order to claim victory. In the Peloponnesian War this was not the case, since ideology -in the sense it is used here- never really played a significant role.

51. Sabin, "Athens, the United States", *ibid.*, pp. 235-250.

52. Matthew Evangelista, "Democracies, Authoritarian States, and International Conflict", in Lebow and Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic**

Rivalry, *ibid.*, pp. 213-234.

53. Evangelista, "Democracies", *ibid.*, pp. 216-217.

54. See, for example, Thucydides' relevant passage on the dilemma Pericles faced when he decided not to send troops out to fight against Archidamus: "Pericles was convinced about the rightness of his own views about not going out to battle, but he saw that for the moment the Athenians were being led astray by their angry feelings. So he summoned no assembly or special meeting of the people, fearing that any general discussion would result in wrong decisions, made under the influence of anger rather than of reason", (Thucydides, II.22, pp. 138-139).

55. See, Ashley J. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scientific Theory", in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), **Roots of Realism**, *ibid.*, pp. 3-25.

56. An illustration of this argument could be the case of Stalin in the Soviet Union who muffled any form of open dialogue. See Evangelista, *ibid.* pp. 215-218.

57. This argument is based on the premise that the democratic ethos embedded in republican states prevents them from adopting an aggressive foreign policy. Consequently, the greater the number of republican regimes, the better the prospects for international peace.

58. G.E.M. de Ste.Croix, **The Origins of the Peloponnesian War**, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 225-289.

59. By the same token, a contemporary IR scholar would find it difficult to draw any parallels between the fifth century B.C. Athenian Confederacy and the Cold War North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). On the contrary, it is rather the Spartan alliance -with its looser structure and the independence its members enjoyed- that should be associated with NATO, and the Athenian Alliance with the Warsaw Pact, than the opposite. See Sabin, "Athens, the United States", *ibid.*, p. 237-241.

60. Thucydides, II.63, p. 161.

61. Kauppi, "Thucydides: Character and Capabilities", *ibid.*, pp. 142-143 and 161-168.

62. John Lewis Gaddis, **The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

63. Viotti and Kauppi, **International Relations Theory**, *ibid.*, pp.

35-83.

64. Thucydides, I.31

65. Thucydides, V.44.

66. Barry S. Strauss, "Of Balances, Bandwagons, and Ancient Greeks", in Lebow and Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 189-210.

67. On the formation of alliances and the bandwagoning theory see: Stephen M. Walt, **The Origins of Alliances**, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987. Also, by the same author: "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power", **International Security**, 9:4 (Spring 1985); Ropert L. Rothstein, **Alliances and Small Powers**, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968; Michael Handel, **Weak States in the International System**, London: Frank Kass, 1981; Robert Jervis, "Systems Theory and Diplomatic History", in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), **Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy**, New York: Free Press, 1979.

68. Thucydides, VIII.2

69. See Stephen M. Walt, **The Origins of Alliances**, *ibid*, p. 263. Also by the same author see: "Alliance Formation" *ibid.*, pp.3-43. Of course, there is a middle position which identifies both tendencies as a practice in contemporary interstate relations. See: Debora Welch Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?", in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds.), **Dominos and Bandwagons: Strategic Belief and Superpower Competition in the Eurasian Rimland**, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

70. George Kennan, one of the most influential American policy-makers during the Cold War, had characteristically warned that: "One of the vital facts to be borne in mind about the international communist movement in the parts of Europe which are not yet under Soviet military and police control is the pronounced "bandwagon" character which that movement bears....Those who hope to survive [...] in the coming days will be those who had the forsight to climb on the bandwagon when it was still the movement of the future." Cited in Strauss, "Of Balances", *ibid.*, p.189.

71. Santoro, "Bipolarity", *ibid.*, pp. 71-86.

72. Kenneth Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979; also, see Waltz, **Foreign Policy and**

Democratic Politics, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967.

73. F. Wyman, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Threat of War," in A.N. Sabrosky (ed.), **Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict**, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 116-117. See also K.W. Deutsch and J.D. Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", **World Politics**, 6, 1964, pp. 390-406.

74. Santoro, "Bipolarity", *ibid.*, pp. 76-77. See also Kagan, **The Outbreak**, *ibid.*, Doyle, **Empires**, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986 and W.R Connor, **Thucydides**, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

75. Santoro, *ibid*.

76. See Kagan "The Outbreak", *ibid.*, and Frank Wayman, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Threat of War", in Alan Ned Lebrosky (ed.), **Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict**,Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1985; W. R. Connor, "Polarization in Thucydides", in Lebow and Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 53-69

77. Wayman, "Bipolaity", *ibid*.

78. Michael W. Doyle, **Ways of War and Peace**, London, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, pp. 49-92. Also see Kauppi, "Contemporary" *ibid*. and Deutsch and Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems", *ibid*.

79. See Michael W. Doyle, "Thucydides: A Realist?", in Lebow & Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid*. pp. 169-188. An earlier version of this chapter is Michael W. Doyle, "Thucydidean Realism", **Review of International Studies**, No.16, July 1990, pp. 223-237.

80. See W.G. Forrest, "Theory and Practice", in Lebow and Strauss (eds.), **Hegemonic Rivalry**, *ibid.*, pp. 23-30.

81. Doyle, **Ways of War and Peace**, *ibid*, p. 91.

82. Martin Wight, **Power Politics**, London: RIIA and New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978, p. 24.