

The Theory and Praxis of War and Peace in the Thucydidian Era: 450-400 BC*

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article présente les idées et les actions exopolitiques grecques de la seconde moitié du Vème siècle av.JC. Pour être en mesure d'obtenir la perspective nécessaire à cet effet, l'auteur juxtapose les théories aux pratiques impliquées avec les évènements cruciaux ayant ébranlé le centre du monde ancien.

À cette époque, les relations inter-cité se sont traduites principalement par la guerre du Péloponnèse dont l'Histoire monumentale nous est livrée par Thucydide. L'oeuvre de Thucydide, qui s'insère dans un ensemble brillant formé des ouvrages des plus grands penseurs de l'âge d'or, se penche sur le dilemme entre patriotisme et nationalisme, entre idéalisme et réalisme. L'hypothèse de travail de cet article s'articule autour du fait que ces dilemmes peuvent être débattus et résolus de manière dialectique, de sorte que la synthèse résultante explique bien des contradictions anciennes ou actuelles de la macropolitique.

ABSTRACT

This articles presents the salient exopolitical ideas and acts of the Greeks in their Golden Age at the latter half of the fifth century. In order to put this particular place and time in its proper general perspective, this study juxtaposes the relevant theories and practices involved in the great events which shook the epicenter of the ancient world.

At that time, the defining activity of inter-city-state relations was the Peloponnesian War as recorded in the monumental History of Thucydides. This work, together with those of other great thinkers of that fateful era give us an idea of the perrenial dilemma between patriotism and nationalism, as well as idealism and realism. The working hypothesis here is that these issues may be discussed and resolved dialectically, so that their resulting synthesis explains many classic and current contradictions in macropolitics.

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Introduction

Describing the conduct of macropolitics or international relations and prescribing foreign affairs or exopolitics has been going on for a couple of millennia by diplomats and academics alike. Consequently, there is no dearth of histories and theories which try to explain the phenomenal complexity of world events by simplifying them to their fundamentals.

In spite of their plethora, macropolitical theories can be and are classified into two dominant schools, Moralism and Materialism. According to contemporary nomenclature, materialists are also called "Realists" who believe in national interests and descriptive power politics, whereas moralists or "Idealists" prefer legal influences and prescriptive social ethics as the primary factors of foreign policy and interstate activity.

Of course, this classic dichotomy began with the ancient Greeks by confronting the polemic history of Thucydides with the pacific theory of Plato. After two thousand years of intellectual debate on the subject, the issue between competition and cooperation or war and peace, has not yet been resolved and perhaps never will.

Nevertheless, we will attempt to do so here by showing that this old antagonism may be transcended in the dialectical synthesis of true Realism, as the closest approach to "reality". Accordingly, it is not so much that force reflects the real world any more accurately than law, but that both are really present in various degrees at different times and places. In that sense, it is our thesis that the Greeks tried to resolve these contradictions by aspiring for relatively idealistic policies inside Greece, while resigning themselves to brutally realistic ones outside.

In the case of classical Greece during the fifth and fourth centuries BC, conditions conspired to highlight the materialist-idealist dichotomy and intersect it with the city-patriotism and country-nationalism dilemma. The city-states were faced with great opportunity to unite in a national polity, but were held back by their exaggerated love of political independence. The question is which of these options was more realistic or idealistic. How did the Greek intellectuals evoke their situation and evaluate their options, while the statesmen explained their policy and executed

their diplomacy.

We try to answer these questions in full recognition of many taxonomic, anachronic, methodologic and ideologic biases or discrepancies. As we shall note throughout this article, the pros and cons of these positions were skillfully presented and defended by different people. So, with these salient points in mind, we proceed to see how classical theory developed and interacted with Greek reality; keeping in mind that similar comparisons hold in all cultures and for all times.

The Golden Age

After the Persian Wars, the Greek world presented a very bright picture indeed. The general prosperity which followed its military triumph, increased its population to about three million people, of which a third were male citizens, another third females, and the final third foreigners or slaves.

Having overcome their common crisis, the Greek *poleis* were drawn together by a strong spirit of brotherhood. The external threat seemed to have built up their internal cohesion and the danger of foreign domination increased their sense of collective defense. Thus, the centrifugal tendencies of the city-states were temporarily submerged in a fit of national exhilaration.

No *polis* was affected so much by the general euphoria as Athens. Its citizens idealized their contribution to the common effort and claimed to be the saviors of western civilization. Believing themselves as the purest and brightest of all Greeks, they took it upon themselves to become the guardians of the Hellenic world and the trustees of its culture.¹

By the middle of the fifth century then, Athens reached its Golden Age and became the unofficial capital of Greece. It would be superfluous here to recount the artistic, literary, scientific, social, economic and political creations of Athens which established the reputation of that city throughout the *ecoumene*.

Our concern here is to focus on the development of exopolitical thought, so we follow the theory and praxis of foreign policy and conflict resolution which attempted to establish peace in Greece and project its strength abroad. In this, as in other endeavors, Athens led the country and tried to impose its policies upon a

reluctant and recalcitrant political system.

Imperialism

The rise of Athens was more a matter of historical chance than of state policy or political theory. The road from the Corinthian League of 480, via the Delian Confederacy of 475, to the Athenian Empire of 450, may well be said to have been traveled "in a fit of absent mindedness." Ultimately, the *Pax Atheniensis* caught the Athenians, just as everyone else, by surprise.²

Within a few decades, as the fear of a Persian threat decreased appreciably and the pride of Greek strength increased tremendously, Athens developed from a pastoral and agrarian society into an urban manufacturing and trading center, thus attracting people from far and wide. Along with its own rural emigrants, great numbers of slaves and foreigners precipitated into the city, changing its demography from a small homogeneous community into a large multinational cosmopolis.

This transformation of Athens, as of any society, may be explained by a proper juxtaposition of time and place, as well as a combination of social, economic and political power factors. The social aspects involved the quantity and quality of its demographic resources. The population of that megalopolis at its acme has been estimated at almost 300,000, a good part of which was concentrated around its urban center and the rest spread out in the Attic countryside (T,ii.14; AA,1256a; AP,1305a). Of these, the adult male citizens hardly numbered 50,000, their wives and children another 150,000; the rest being at least 75,000 slaves and 25,000 metics from all over the Mediterranean and Black seas.

In the decade that followed their victory, the Athenians managed by a series of brilliant diplomatic and military maneuvers to consolidate their lead over their confederates. At its zenith, their Delian League combined with the Delphic Amphictiony became an interstate organization of over 250 city-states around the Aegean. Like modern Inter-Governmental Organizations, each member state had one vote in a General Assembly; but Athens, of course, was the *primus inter pares*, being its prime mover, main treasurer and ultimate hegemon.³

Within a few years, the League became increasingly centralized, with a common democratic ideology and a single administrative, fiscal and judicial apparatus. With the collective strength of its League and foreign alliances, Athens preempted a third Asian

invasion of Europe by engaging Persia in its own territory. In 460, the League launched its only international aggression by sending an enormous 200 ship armada from Cyprus to support Egypt in its war of independence against Persia. The outcome of this five year war was such a disaster that it ended any further thoughts of foreign adventures. Nevertheless, by mid-century the League was able to contain Persia by the Peace of Kallias in which the Ionian colonies of Asia Minor were guaranteed their freedom for the next forty years.⁴

It was about then that plans for a permanent peace and unity were conceived in the minds of some Athenians who wanted to take advantage of the favorable political situation. Foremost among them was Pericles, whose "Grand Design" was meant to transform the Athenian Empire to a Greek Confederation. To that end, he called a Panhellenic Congress in 448 to negotiate a common peace -*koine eirene*- as the first step towards a national union (Plutarch, Pericles, 17-30; H, ix, 106).

Unfortunately, this great dream was not realized. Resentment against Athenian power and suspicion of Pericles' motives made most Greeks reject his plan. Some people however, like the rival politician Cleon, complained that the failure was due to Athens' lenient treatment of its allies. A democracy, they concluded, was unable to govern an empire, let alone unite Greece (T, iii.37)

Undaunted by the failure of his grandiose scheme, Pericles proposed a lesser but more concrete plan to build Thurii, a Pan-hellenic *polis* in Magna Graecia, to replace the infamous Sybaris which had been destroyed some time before. This was to be a practical experiment in polyethnic living -*synoecism*- to prove that the Greeks of many clans could live together within a single state.⁵

Established in 443, Thurii was made up of many Greek tribes who were supposed to start anew in perfect equality. It was the first state to have specific legislation safeguarding minorities and a distinct government department to enforce human rights. Yet, in spite of the efforts of its illustrious godfathers, Thurii only lasted a few years. Its Dorian population soon expelled the Ionians and took over the whole state. So, like the Pythagorean attempt to form a "United States" of Croton, Sybaris, Pandosia and Temesa, in the previous generation, the Thurian model also soon unraveled.⁶

If anything, the abortive experiment proved that the people of Greece could not live together politically. The only way that its

various ethnic groups would unite was if one of them was strong enough to enforce its will upon the rest. Without such preponderance of power wielded ruthlessly by someone, every supra-political attempt sooner or later deteriorated into its separate components.

This is precisely what happened in the case of the Delian League which by mid-century was transformed into the Athenian Empire of 150 tribute-paying satellites. It is ironic that Pericles, the champion of democracy at home, was now preaching the fatal doctrine of imperialism abroad. The widening gap between the domestic liberalism of Athens and its foreign hegemonism, made a mockery of its policies and ideals.

On the one hand, Athens claimed to be the bastion of freedom, the defender of the weak, the protector of the persecuted and the scourge of tyrants. On the other hand, Athenians treated their allies with contempt, their subjects with severity, and increasingly acted with the arrogance of power. Their imperial exploitation was not only economic and financial, but legal and political. Interstate disputes had to be adjudicated only in Athenian courts and foreign or defense policy was the exclusive prerogative of Athens.⁷

Yet, unlike the multinational Persian or Roman imperialism, the Athenian Empire was merely national, because it contained generally Greek and particularly Ionian poleis, with only few Hellenized Karian principalities. Nevertheless, Athenian imperialism also included colonialism, as the metropolis sent out settlers with allotment holdings -*Cleruchies*- in the lands of its satellites (T.iii.50).

At least half a dozen such colonies were established, involving over ten thousand emigrants. These *Cleruchies* not only eased Athenian overpopulation, but also served as strategic outposts, guarding imperial trade routes and preventing or punishing local uprisings; thereby becoming another point of friction between Athens and its putative allies.

Many writers of the period reflected on this discrepancy between the liberal ideals and the imperial actions of Athens. Some accepted the benefits of empire in high status, pride and honor, as privileged entitlements stemming from the extraordinary Athenian services to Greece, but others were more skeptical and critical (T, ii.63; vi. 82).

Among the latter was Pindar who expressed his anti-Athenian and anti-war sentiments in his famous poems. The Theban aristo-

crat criticized Athens as the embodiment of hubris and predicted its ultimate ruin. Like him, even patriotic Athenians voiced their concerns with the moral issues of power and the corrupting influence it had upon those who abuse it.

Undoubtedly, for most citizens patriotism was unequivocal and their belief in the cause of Athens unshakable. The city's playwrights were quite hostile to their state's rivals, and their laudatory epithets for the metropolis indicate where they stood. For Aeschylus, Athens was a beautiful and prosperous *polis*, while for Euripides she was illustrious and shining; the land of the free and the home of the brave.

It should be kept in mind that although Athens was indeed all that, its citizens could not publicly criticize official foreign policy with impunity. Athenian authorities would not have allowed and its audiences could not have applauded openly unpatriotic expressions.

In this light, we should appreciate that it must have taken a lot of courage for a few critics to voice their political opposition as Aeschylus did in the *Oresteia* when he said that the Athenians committed hubris by their imperial pride or *folie de grandeur*. They of all people should have learned the lesson of how the mighty inevitably fall when they overreach themselves, as the Persian defeat clearly demonstrated. More diplomatically, Sophocles praised the Athenians for their daring, but advised prudence and self-control in their outreach (*Helen*, 40).

In the *Suppliants* (490, 745, 950), Euripides castigated the shortsightedness and overconfidence of states who dream of empire, without counting the power of their opponents. While he admired those who sacrifice their lives to defend their country (*Phoenicians*, 1000), he considered the duty of every wise man to avoid violence and only engage in it as a last resort; warning that as one sows, so he shall reap (*Trojans*, 95, 400). Consequently, the dramatist counseled his countrymen to return to the proven and prudent tradition of humility and moderation, thus giving up the fleeting illusion of imperial glory (*Orestes*, 920; *Electra*, 390).

In a lighter vein than the older tragedians, the younger comedian Aristophanes ridiculed politics as he did everything else. In the *Babylonians*, he criticized Athenian foreign policy as exploitative and its democratic leaders as vainglorious fools. In the *Birds*, he made fun of the Syracusan expedition and in the *Knights*, he mocked the flattery of demagogues when they declared the

Demos was good and wise enough to command over all Greeks.

More seriously, Aristophanes decried Athenian imperialism because it maltreated and exploited its allies (*Wasps*, 707). Lack of measure and control eventually lead empires to ruin, so a democracy should avoid entangling alliances and concentrate in improving its domestic situation. Thus he showed that in spite of all the criticism, he loved Athens, and later on in the *Frogs* he made up for his past ridicule by comforting and consoling his defeated *polis*.

The famous pamphlet of the *Old Oligarch* also emphasized the correlation between populism and imperialism, because rule by a lumpen-proletariat inevitably led to a government dominated by the navy and thereby leading to a policy of adventurist expansionism, against the conservative interests of the rural landed gentry. This thesis became so well-established by the aristocratic critics of democracy that it was taken for granted by political theorists, including Plato and Aristotle.

Pericles, of course, realized the credibility gap between his domestic and foreign policies. He had to admit, somewhat apologetically, that the Athenian empire was indeed a tyranny. But he insisted that the realities of power politics necessitated such regrettable conduct. "If you intend to rule," he told his fellow citizens, "you must carry out what your interest requires however immoral it might seem, or else give up your empire and cultivate honesty with impunity." (T, i.76; ii.63). However, as Isocrates later concluded, imperialism was not only immediately immoral but ultimately unprofitable (*Eirene*, 69-74).

The Athenians living in the *Pentekontaetia* of their Golden Age between 480 and 430 had neither the time nor inclination to construct detailed theories of imperialism; leaving this task to the philosophers of the next century. The only social thinker of that period who tried to generalize on the subject of power politics was, of course, Thucydides. It is in his *History* where one finds some of the most penetrating insights on human nature as they apply to international affairs.

Thucydides was not only a great historian but the first theorist of the strategy and sociology of power. Influenced by Hippocrates, he combined natural and cultural factors in his explanations of exopolitics; coming close to proposing a progressive evolution of power in world affairs from nature to culture. His classical theory

thus combines both physics and ethics in a grand synthesis of power politics.

Accordingly, natural necessity *-phuseos anagkaias-* dictates that the strong dominate the weak. Right as the world goes, is only a question between equals. Actually, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must; since by their very nature, both men and gods, strive to dominate their environment (T. v.89,105).

At the root of this drive to power is a natural predisposition of men to action and ambition, coupled with cultural pressures to loyalty and glory. In all cases, the crucial factors are to be found in political institutions and policies, as well as natural conditions and resources.

Moreover, power begets power: because to keep power, one is forced to increase it. States involve themselves in imperial ventures imperceptibly, so by the time they become aware of their involvement it is too late to retreat. Once a state commits itself to play a world role it can never reverse its thrust without loss of face. Unfortunately, people condemn those who give up and respect only those who stand up. So the worst faults of an empire are pity, sentiment and indulgence. To hold unto what it acquires, a state must then adopt the principle of Alcibiades and keep on expanding until checked by a superior force.⁸

In spite of all that, Thucydides recognized that sooner or later too much power spells its own doom. What was a religious hubris in Herodotos became political hubris in Thucydides. It is not only the Gods who envy powerful men, but all those who have to submit to them. Fear, hostility and hatred follow the powerful, who eventually make enemies even of their friends.

Indeed, that is precisely what happened in Greece. As the power of Athens increased, its reputation decreased and from being the most respected city of Greece, it soon became its most despised. Gradually, this hate was translated to action, and Athens was defeated amidst general rejoicing.⁹

This lesson seems to have been well taken, because from Thucydides to Polybios, ambition and greed *-philotimia kai pleonexia-* were said to lead into conflict and revolt *-philonikia kai stasis-*. All historians realized that it is harder to hold power than to get it. In order to keep it, they advised against corrupting the virtuous habits *-ethe-* that make for real power: i.e. clemency, generosity, gratitude, kindness, goodness, humility, moderation, trust

-epieikia, philanthropia, eugnomosune, metrioteta, praoteta, kalokagathia, prothumia, euergesia, megalopsychia, pisti.

Although the drive for empire *-arche-* is fear, honor and interest; a state can dominate others by either force and fear or trust and goodwill (T.i.75.3). Lasting victory then depends not merely on heavy weapons and much money, but in proper training and intelligent strategy: both of which stem from a strong political constitution. The ultimate factors of state power thus are: *epitedeusis, politeia, ethos, tropoi, nomoi*: all of them social, rather than military virtues. Since losing power is due to moral corruption first and foremost, retaining power takes courage, wisdom and control, which are cultural rather than natural virtues, promoted by *ethos kai paideia*.

As Demosthenes put it later: by natural inertia, men and states alike, tend to take the path of least resistance, thus compromising virtue for quick and easy gains. So in order to do better, we need culture to educate people to moral conduct (*Chersonnesos*, 712).

It is difficult to know to what extent this sophisticated theory of *realpolitik* was understood, accepted and practiced by the Greeks. Some states may have been content to exchange liberty with security, so they supported the Athenian Empire, because the benefits of peace and prosperity were worth the sacrifice of local sovereignty. But to most it was anathema, to be opposed at all costs.

Imperial policy, no matter how high its domestic ideals, could not offer to foreigners what they desired most: political participation in decision-making. The furthest a hegemonic system of representation went was to give a low voice in decision-making to the small allied states, but not to matters of vital interest (T, ii,8; 63.2; iii,37.2).

To go beyond that and give aliens a greater say in public policy would have destroyed political exclusivity; something unthinkable to most Greeks. Athenian dominance then was opposed, not so much because it was so oppressive, but because it was inconsistent with its own principles. Since Pericles could not apply throughout the empire the ideals he so eloquently expressed in the "*Epitaphios*" (T, 38-43), his supra-political plans were built on shifting sand and doomed to failure.

Interstate Bipolarity

Leading the opposition against Athens, by trying to undermine its

policies and counterbalance its power, was Sparta. This other great city-state of Greece became the obvious antagonist of Athenian expansionism for many reasons: sociohistorical, geopolitical, and ideological. The diametric opposition of Athens and Sparta on all these areas, created a bipolarity of power in the Greek interstate system which compounded the difficulties for national conciliation and integration.

First of all, Spartans and Athenians led the two main Hellenic tribes, Dorian and Ionian, who were distinguished by dialect, custom, religion, physiology and psychology (H, i. 56). The Dorians were considered as backward, slow, cautious, introverted, simple-minded, dull-witted and grave (Euthydemus, 302). Whereas, the Ionians were innovating, swift, adventurous, extroverted, versatile, sophisticated and irreverent (T, i. 70).

These characteristics stemmed partly from the geographical regions the two peoples occupied. The Dorians had settled inland thus becoming a land-locked, isolated, parochial and rural folk; whereas the Ionians filled the coasts and islands, thus developing into seafarers, traders, travelers and urbane cosmopolites. Consequently, the Spartan army rose to be the dominant power on the mainland, while the Athenian navy ruled the waves of the Aegean.

Related to these differences was also the opposite development of their political systems, both of which diverged significantly from the mainline traditional Greek culture. Whereas Sparta created a militaristic oligarchy, Athens evolved into a civic democracy. By the middle of the fifth century the latter was the most egalitarian, progressive and open society in Greece; while the former remained essentially closed and frozen for two centuries.¹⁰

Sparta is the perfect example of how legislation and education can effect radical social change. Until 750, that city was evolving like every other. It welcomed and even granted citizenship to foreigners who contributed to its development (AP, 1270a). But then, its development was stunted by conquering its Messinian neighbors. In order to keep a population ten times their own subjugated, the Lacaedemonians became a garrison state in chronic alert.

Finally, the Lycourgian constitution around 600 froze Sparta into a militaristic regime in permanent mobilization, in a three-tier system of *homoioi*, *perioikoi* and *helotes*. Thus the Spartan curse was to dominate the Peloponnese and spend its destiny as goaler of the surrounding serfs. Its narrow foreign policy even forced its

allies far and wide to tow a strict line of common friends and enemies.

The transition from archaic to classic Sparta is reflected in the change from the melic poetry of Alkman to the elegiac poetry of Tyrtaios. In his *Doric Partheneion*, Alkman gave a pleasant, peaceful and romantic view of Spartan life (Frg. 4). A contemporary of Homer, Alkman may not even be Greek, since he was born in the capital of Lydia, Sardis, and brought to Sparta as a slave, so his poetry has a decidedly unspartan flavor.

Unlike him, by mid-seventh century, the most famous native Spartan poet Tyrtaios represents the new revolutionary ideals of his country, thus becoming the official voice of its resulting warrior ethic and military creed. In his Eunomian elegy, he summarized the legal basis of his city-state, around the principles of uniformity, simplicity, austerity and solidarity. Combining these Spartan virtues in the *Exhortations*, he sang what a fine thing it was for a man to fight and die for his country (Frg.10).

This poetic Sparta served as an ideal model for philosophers from Socrates to Diogenes who praised and promoted it in their political discourses. Its legendary self-sufficiency, exclusivity, stability, authority, uniformity, community and simplicity appealed to all moralists. Being able to maintain its way of life without change for centuries, Sparta exuded an air of utopian perfection so dear to conservative ideologues.

By contrast, the Athenian experience left them cold. Very few poets sang the praises of democracy. One exception was Archilochos of Paros, a contemporary of Tyrtaios, who unlike the Spartan, lauded the ideal of synoecism which made Athens share Attica with its neighbors in peaceful coexistence rather than subjugation. These differing point of view then set the two standard opposing political paradigms from then on.

After 600, unlike Lycurgos, the Athenian law-giver Solon reformed the ancient Draconian regime by the principle of eunomia, thus preventing violence and improving social justice throughout Attica. The poems of the great nomothetes show his horror for civil war and love for his country. In his Fourth Elegy, he gives a graphic description of the plight of cities under strife and exhorts his fellow citizens to civic unity and harmony.

Within a century, the democratic reforms of Kleisthenes not only gave more power to the people or demos through *isegoria* and *isonomia*, but distributed it throughout Attica by dividing the ten

Athenian tribes into *demes* of regional *trittyes*, with proportional representation in a Council of 500.

These internal reforms eventually spilled over to external relations. As Herodotos noted (H. v.77): when ruled by tyrants, the Athenians were no better than their neighbors, but when they were freed, they became far superior. The addition of a radical ideology to its foreign policy, soon made Athens a net exporter of political revolutions throughout the Greek world and eventually set it on its road to glory.

Based on their diverging developments, the foreign policies of Athens and Sparta were bound to clash. Sparta's was isolationist, conservative, xenophobic, militaristic. Athens' was interventionist, revisionist, expansionist, commercialist. Athenian activism propagated the new radical democratic ideology to all people and had its greatest appeal in the lower class masses to whom it promised a better life. As such, it was inflammatory and subversive to the established order; it incited revolutions everywhere and instigated discontent.

It is easy to see how the aristocratic and *status quo* regimes would naturally oppose Athens and how the dissatisfied or oppressed would support her. In the second half of the fifth century these two sides crystallized into rigid military blocks bent upon each other's destruction. The vested interests throughout Greece, under the leadership of Sparta, were committed to contain and reverse the disturbing influence of Athens and its allies. Interstate relations, thus became increasingly a struggle between the two camps; with the conflict gradually escalating from cold to total war.¹¹

Worse still was that the conflict inevitably spread outside Greece to involve the Persian Empire. Ever since their defeat in Ionia, various factions within each Greek *polis* tried to secure Persian support to defeat their internal or external enemies. Usually the Persian monarchy sided with conservative or aristocratic parties against radical or democratic governments. It was therefore rather expected that Sparta eventually invited the Asian colossus to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica in order to distract the Athenians from their Egyptian expedition against Persia (T,i.109). Even if that particular gesture was not very effective, it did set the pattern for the permanent financial involvement of

Persia as the key holder of the balance of power in Greek affairs from then on.

Although the conflict between Athens and Sparta was waged on many fronts, the one that concerns us most is the propaganda used by both sides to win people's hearts and minds. The psychological war raged between the imperialists, as Cleon of Athens or Lysander of Sparta, on the one hand and the sovereignists, as Pagondas of Boeotia or the representatives of Metylene, Platea, Melos, on the other; with the more moderate position of Diodotos of Athens or Brasidas of Sparta, somewhere between.

Ideologically, Athens had the advantage of a popular and dynamic movement which promised social justice and equality. As we have seen however, the practical application of these rousing slogans in the Athenian imperial policy clashed directly with political loyalties and local patriotism. This weakness of Athenian foreign policy eventually outweighed its strength. The ideological advantages of liberalism were more than canceled out by the practical disadvantages of imperialism.

On the other hand, the doctrinal disadvantages of oligarchy, were more than compensated by its emphasis on political independence. By making capital of the sacred ideal and soft spot of all Greeks, the oligarchs were able to overcome the attractions of democracy. The innate love of the Greeks for "*eleutheria kai autonomia poleos*," was in the final analysis stronger than the new class siren song of *democratia*.¹²

Although the Thirty Year Peace with Sparta in 445, succeeded in establishing the bipolar balance of power in Greece for a few years, with Athens as the ruler of the sea and Sparta of the land; it proved too fragile to last more than fifteen years. While everyone paid lip service to the sacred principles of non-intervention and self-determination, both sides practiced gross and open interference in the domestic affairs of smaller states, as well as meddling in each other's sphere of influence.

As its wealth and welfare depended on foreign trade and investment, Athens found it increasingly necessary to build a large navy to protect its sea lanes, as well as to use force to sustain its markets and subversion to expand its power. Spartan policy, motivated by fear, jealousy, honor and interest, could not allow another state to dominate Greece. So when all other means failed to contain the Athenian challenge, the Spartan coalition felt compelled to resort to war. Although both sides saw their actions as a defensive strug-

gle for survival, the ultimate issue was whether Greece would continue to be a politically pluralistic geographical expression or become a united country under Athenian leadership.¹²

The Peloponnesian War

The long anticipated conflict came in an atmosphere of popular enthusiasm and optimistic expectations of speedy victory. Public opinion seems to have favored the Spartan side who was hailed as the liberator of Greece from Athenian expansionism.¹³

Soon however it became evident that neither side could gain a decisive advantage, so the fight deteriorated into a war of attrition to exhaust rather than defeat the enemy. As it dragged on, the conflict grew both in scope and intensity. The participants lost sight of their higher objectives and military victory became an end in itself.

The war soon escalated into a multifacet conflict: involving ideological, economic, cultural, social, political and military aspects. Although it began as a Greek dispute, it gradually engulfed the whole Mediterranean world. From a regional fight, it thus escalated into a world war which marked the beginning of the end of a great civilization.¹⁴

Thanks to Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War remains to this day a model in miniature of all great conflicts. Whereas Herodotos acclaimed his international war as an epic struggle between civilization and barbarism, Thucydides performed a scientific anatomy of interstate war in all its clinical details. His account is thus a classic not only of the history but the theory of interstate violence.¹⁵

An Athenian aristocrat by birth, well educated and travelled, Thucydides was thirty when the war began. As befitted his station, he was made admiral of an Athenian fleet operating in Thrace. Unfortunately, he failed to prevent Amphipolis from falling into the hands of the enemy. As a result, he was disgraced and spent the rest of his life as a historian in exile, where he died without completing his *magnum opus*.

Much has already been written on the great historian, so we will not go into a detailed analysis of his ideas. Suffice to reiterate that the importance of Thucydides lies both in his generalizations and impressions. The significance of his comments for our purpose is

that they represent a vocal segment of public opinion on the causes of war and the search for peace, as well as theoretical insights on macroeconomics and exopolitics.

According to Thucydides, violence has a tendency to feed on itself and become all-consuming. As in a primeval collective frenzy, restraints break down, laws are trampled, distinctions disappear and morality is forgotten. The Amphictionic laws designed to limit war were consistently violated by both sides. Everything belonged to the victor and to be taken a slave was considered an act of clemency. The many aspects of war: revolts, secessions, interventions, counter-revolutions, treachery, bitterness, denunciations and reprisals, raged on all fronts and became normal behavior in these terrible times.¹⁶

It is as if after a while people lose sight of events and become slaves to the monster they have created. While all men pay lip service to peace and condemn war, they continue perpetrating acts of violence. Civilized persons turn into barbarians, brutal passions and naked force rule the day. All reason is lost and basic instincts reign supreme. Destruction is rampant and wanton, so the whole situation gets out of control and stretches beyond comprehension (T, i, 78-82).

Although Thucydides denounced these syndromes of collective pathos, he did not consider war intolerable or unnatural. This dramatic transition of a culture from cosmos to chaos indicates a breakdown of *nomos*, not *physis*. Since human nature is animalistic, it is only artificially kept in check by custom and law. Under normal circumstances individuals and states can afford to behave in proper civility. But in times of crisis and confusion, instinctive human nature gets a chance to brake out of its civilizing restraints and shows itself at its naked or baser underside. Desperate people cannot afford the luxury of high ideals, so they are forced to let their lower needs rise to the surface and dominate their actions (T, iii, 82-4).

As protracted conflict deteriorates and degrades men and states, it reduces their character down to the level of their fortunes and enervates all those involved to impotence. Thus Thucydides concluded, war was the ruin of Hellenism, it undid the work of centuries and left Greece in shame and despair. The reestablishment and maintenance of peace therefore became everyone's most vital task ahead.¹⁷

The ruinous effects of war were also recognized by many other writers of that period. Ever since Hesiod (*Theogony*, 901), war had

fallen from its epic pedestal and was regarded as the scourge of mankind.¹⁸ Thus, from Herodotos to the Old Oligarch, fifth century writers registered their opposition to war and praised the advantages of peace.¹⁹

Herodotos considered war to be monstrous and advised people, who spoke the same language at least, to settle their disputes by diplomatic negotiation and arbitration, rather than by violent means (H. vii.9). Moreover, interclass conflict was much worse than interstate war. As Herodotos put it, *stasis* was to *polemos*, as *polemos* was to *eirene* (viii, 3). The Larisan pamphleteer, Herodes Atticos echoed this comparison by repeating it later on, and Iamblichos went further to blame war as the cause of disaster and slavery, attributing these evils to anomia. (Frg. 89, 7, 32-5).

In his odes, Pindar of Boeotia sang the praises of peace along with justice and equity as the offsprings of right (*Olympian*, xiii.6), because he recognized that only under peaceful conditions did cities flourish (*Pythian*, viii.1). His contemporary Bacchylides of Ceos concurred that peace was indispensable for prosperity (*Paeans*, vii.46). Finally, Prodikos, another Ceosian and the reputed teacher of Socrates, advised young men to serve their *polis* honorably, but at the same time benefit all Greece peacefully. Only then would they be admired for their virtue -*arete*- by everybody (XM, 2.1.27).

The criticism of internecine war was nowhere more evident than in Athens, the cultural and intellectual center of Greece. Athenian thinkers and writers were the most outspoken in their opposition to war and in their demands for peace. Yet, whereas civil war among Greeks was particularly sad and strongly condemned, international war against the barbarians was accepted with equanimity (*Gorgias*, Frg. 5b, 8a). This distinction between intra, inter and extra-state war, created significant gradations which were supposed to improve the former by worsening the latter.

Especially effective in influencing public opinion towards peace were the popular playwrights of Athens, among whom Sophocles and Euripides were the most vocal. Sophocles described war as the most shameful activity of men. His compassion for its victims made him the advocate of the common man and the foe of the powerful warlords.

In spite of his personal divided loyalties and professional conflict of interests,²⁰ Sophocles emphasized the great grief caused by war

and cursed whoever first taught men to arm and fight (*Ajax*, 1185-1210). Finally, he reminded his audiences that war never slays the evil and guilty; only the good and innocent perish in it (*Philoctetes*, 435).

Euripides, the last of the three great tragedians, went even further in his hate for war and filled his plays with the suffering and grief of this great evil. In the *Trojan Women*, he dramatized the injustices and horrors of war which were sent by the gods to punish human hubris. For that reason, Greeks must have sinned much, since they were paying such a heavy price.²¹

Beyond divine retribution, however, Euripides blamed human vanity and history, as the direct causes of social conflict (*Helen*, 40; *Andromache*, 700). "Foolish states" he lamented in the *Suppliants*, "you have the choice of settling your differences by negotiation, yet you prefer to do so by killing." And concluded by wishing "If you could only settle your differences by logic rather than force, then perhaps you will put the common good of all Hellas above your own particular interests."²²

Using comedy, rather than tragedy, as his weapon, Aristophanes made his opposition to war quite plain. His vitriolic attack on demagogues was especially directed at Pericles and his party, whom he held responsible for the war. As a result, he applauded another playwright, Eupolis, who went so far as to suggest that Pericles should be tried as a "war criminal." (*Poleis*)

From his first play in 425, Aristophanes ridiculed the war-mongers and insisted that the war should never have started in the first place. Now that it had, it ought to be ended pronto, because it has unforeseen consequences and brings out the worst in men. For the failure to achieve peace, he blamed the machinations of demagogues who fooled the masses to support their mistakes.

In desperation, he had Attic farmers conclude private peace treaties with their enemy neighbors in defiance of official Athenian policy; thus pointing out that the local transborder interests of the simple rustics united them against the complex interstate quarrels of their sophisticated urban governments (*Acharnians*, 510-20, 860).

Reflecting widespread public opinion, Aristophanes accused wealthy arm dealers of war profiteering, while poor people everywhere suffered. The great comedian was equally critical towards

both Spartans and Athenians for treating each other like barbarians. So in support of the Peace of Nikias in 420, he wrote *Peace* to applaud the end to war and hail the Atheno-Spartan treaty as the prelude to national reconciliation and renaissance.²³

Unfortunately, that peace hardly lasted a year and war resumed worst than ever for another decade. Once again poverty and misery accompanied it, culminating in the Sicilian disaster of 414. Soon thereafter, Aristophanes took up his pen once again to write his most antiwar play, *Lysistrata*, where he gave up on men altogether and turned to women for a more rational policy. Therein, women chide men for forgetting their common nature and culture by their internecine fighting and incite them to revert to their pacific Panhellenic ideals (1130).

It is often said that the peace movement was an intellectual exercise of Athenian elites and did not reflect public opinion. From the fact that the war not only continued in spite of all this peace propaganda, but spread outside Greece, it would seem that it must have had the support of many people. On the other hand, it could be that, as Thucydides noted, the war went on by its own momentum. Men and states were consumed within it, not knowing how to extricate themselves from the holocaust.

In vain Xenophon (H, vi, 3.15) proposed that industry and commerce, rather than militarism and imperialism, were the way to peace and prosperity; or Alciphron (3.16) advised young men to go back to work in the farm rather than fight in the army. However true, these proposals were a luxury that most states could ill afford. So each *polis* chose a much faster but a lot riskier road to wealth by beggaring its neighbors through fratricidal conflict. It seems that the brutal "natural law" of Alcibiades "punish or perish" allowed no option other than dominate or be damned (T, vi.18), so it proved stronger than the calls to calm, work and trade.

The final blow for Athens came when Sparta allied with Persia. Thereby, following an absence of seventy years after its ignominious defeat, Persia entered Greek politics once again. Henceforth, Persian policy practiced and perfected the principle of "*divide et impera*" (T, x.51; xi.6). By shifting its weight from one side to the other, the "Evil Empire" became the holder of the balance of power in Greece, thus preventing either Athens, Sparta, or anybody else, from doing to Greece what Rome was destined to do for Italy.

Even after the war ended with the utter defeat of Athens, its legacy haunted Greece forever. A generation of conflict left the country exhausted, never to recover from its grave losses. War destroyed the Greek economy, agriculture, population and ecosystem, since scorched earth became the norm of invaders and defenders alike. The great law of interdependence which involves all aspects of a complex system in a chain reaction, meant that when one link went down, so did all the others eventually.

The destruction was not only physical but moral. Old values broke down and disappeared. The foundations of the social system were loosened beyond repair. Egoism and factionalism helped by sophism and militarism broke up old traditions. Men became mainly motivated by selfish biological impulses, thus force and fraud replaced law and order.

As the Persian War was the beginning of the flowering of Greece, the Peloponnesian War was the beginning of its wilting. At the end of the fifth century, Greece entered its period of decline and by the fourth century the whole country was bent on self-destruction.

But, while traditional values were on the way out, new ones had not yet come in to replace them. In this moral anomie and cultural vacuum, conflict was the outlet of the contradictions between the old and the new. Hellenic society descended into a state of violent flux and spasm. Thus, the system had become dysfunctional as a result of the deep shock, never to regain its normal equilibrium.

Political Reforms

The upheaval in which Greece found itself around the turn of the century gave rise to a lot of soul-searching among its intelligentsia. Serious doubts arose about the efficacy of the political system and grave warnings were sounded on the future of Hellenism. The literati, as we saw, were the first to engage in social criticism and their scathing attacks on the political institutions of the city-state were unsurpassed for a long time.

A major criticism was the growing influx and influence of foreigners and mercenaries in Greece. Various commentators condemned this sad state of affairs by saying that the *polis* would be better off when citizens alone serve in its army, rather than

together with barbarians like Lydians, Phrygians and Syrians; just because these foreigners had become residents (X, Poroï, 2.3; T,ii.13.6; 31.2).

The deteriorating situation however demanded more than military criticism. Some thought that the Greek malaise went deeper than political institutions and thus required more drastic measures for a complete cure. It was from these men, of whom first and foremost was Socrates, that political philosophy *per se* was born.

Much has been said about Socrates, the wise old man *par excellence*. Among other things, he embodies the "model citizen" of Periclean democracy and the "political animal" of Aristotelian philosophy. His life and death summarizes the highest point which classical theory and praxis could reach. For that reason it is necessary to point out the views of Socrates on interstate affairs and then see how they influenced classical thinking after him.

Of the little that we know of Socrates' opinions on Hellenic affairs, we can be sure that he was a good Athenian and considered patriotism as the highest virtue of man. He took his citizenship so seriously that he preferred to die than give it up. His sense of honor and pride -*philotimia* - for being an Athenian has been reported so often as to be beyond dispute.²⁴

For Socrates, the *polis* was the highest and most enduring of human works; so urban life was the only civilized way for man. Although his knowledge ranged far and wide, Socrates' interests were circumscribed within his city and its citizens.²⁵

It is thus ironic that he was accused of being an agent of a foreign conspiracy to subvert the Athenian regime. Because he mixed easily with foreigners and citizens alike, he was looked upon suspiciously. The young followers of Socrates came not only from the best families of Athens but from all parts of Greece. He, therefore, had connections everywhere and it would have been an easy matter for him to go and live wherever he liked.²⁶

But Athens was the epicenter of his existence, so he spent all his life within its walls and only went out to fight its wars. His attachment to the city was so strong that he repeatedly refused many invitations, such as from Archelaos in Macedonia, Scopas in Cranon, and Eurylochos in Larissa to visit them there. He would not hear of living in some semi-barbarian country where apolitical disorder and lawlessness prevailed.²⁷

Nevertheless, the charge of impiety against Socrates was hiding the suspicion that he was a member of an international secret cult of

Pythagoreans: the aristocratic elitist *hetairia* of which the Athenian democrats were so fearful. Moreover, his friendship with notorious Spartan sympathizers, like Alcibiades, Critias and Charmides, made his a classic case of guilt by association.²⁸

Yet, Socratic opposition of Athenian foreign policy was constructive and reformist. So, in spite of his dismay for the decline and fall of Athens, he never lost faith in the *polis* as the ultimate form of politics.²⁹ He thus differed sharply from the sophistic internationalism which scorned civic life.³⁰ His criticism and individualism were those of a free citizen: always predicated within a strong and healthy *polis*. For Socrates, loyal political citizenship was the yardstick for assessing human action and the premise governing moral behavior, so high treason would be unthinkable.

Socratic attachment to the *polis* was so influential that it dominated political philosophy for a long time. As developed and perfected by Plato, the theory of the *polis* reigned supreme throughout the fourth century. Socrates' introspective philosophy thus nipped at the bud any nascent trends for naturalism and internationalism which arose at that time. The Socratic cure for the ills of Greece was simply the reeducation of individual citizens within the *polis*.

The complex personality and seminal ideas of Socrates however could be interpreted in various ways. Thus in addition to the direct line represented by Plato and Aristotle, the Socratic influence can be found in such diverse thinkers and schools as the Panhellenists and the Cynics. Each school, led by a different student of his, focused on a particular aspect of Socrates which was then turned into a separate and distinct philosophy.

In the following century three most significant developments branched out of the original Socratic circle: panhellenic nationalism of Isocrates; political patriotism of Plato or Aristotle; and cosmopolitan individualism of Antisthenes. Each one of these movements tried to give an answer to the Greek predicament by proposing some changes on the Hellenic political system. Of these only the last succeeded somewhat, not in saving Hellenic politics, but in easing its transition to the Hellenistic world.

Conclusion

Returning to our original quest for a dialectic resolution of the Idealist-Materialist thesis-antithesis dilemma, we can now reaffirm

our Realistic synthesis. Because of this ontologic and semantic complexity, only a proper mixture of different options can best explain human behavior and expose foreign policy in its historical and geographical context.

Accordingly, the real realist realizes the complexity of things and the limitations of human understanding to comprehend, let alone influence it intentionally; while the ideal idealist implies the simplicity of a dominant factor, be it power or principle, which human intelligence can discern and public policy control. In that sense, classical realism recognizes and respects limits to both means and ends of human thought or action, instead of idealizing and magnifying either cultural liberty or natural necessity.

In the final analysis, a good political theory should eventually result in a successful social praxis, so it must be judged on both its theoretical explanations and policy applications. In this respect, classical exopolitics had something to say about state sovereignty, power politics and legal order, as well as foreign policy, strategy and diplomacy. The official application of ideological positions first in interstate and then in international relations was widely accepted. That is why classical thinkers were also policy consultants as well as practicing diplomats.

The primordial foreign policy decision that any sovereign state has to make or accept is whether to have any foreign relations at all. Although a purely isolationist policy is rare; most philosophical utopias make it the cornerstone of their foreign policy, thus indicating a definite preference for maximizing internal and minimizing external affairs.

This philosophical bias stems from the conviction that an ideal *polis* must be static, exclusive and sovereign. Splendid isolationism is thus the best way to attain and maintain a necessary independence for both self-sufficiency -*autarkeia*- and self-government -*autarchia*. Accepting this line of thought, even when practical considerations did not permit strong isolationism; ideal foreign policy leaned towards passivity: external affairs were controlled, entangling alliances avoided, and foreign relations eschewed.

With this minimalist attitude towards exopolitics, classical theory took an explicit stand in its abhorrence of economic, cultural, and political interdependence among states or nations. Only as the necessary lesser evil did philosophers accept interstate law and organization as the means to attain a semblance of peace and

order in the global system.

In fact, the actual Greek historical record does not follow its predominant ideal. City-state foreign policies range between passive and active, isolationist and interventionist, defensive and offensive, allied and neutral, dogmatic and pragmatic. Even if most people preferred a minimalist foreign policy, events beyond their control forced them to act differently.

Moreover, the Greek love for local autonomy did not preclude various confederate arrangements. Both political independence and Pan-Hellenic interdependence then were to some extent facts as well as ideals. Thus, in spite of the predominant theory, actual policy had to recognize and compromise them in different degrees at different times and places.

All these deployments and developments however were too little and too late. As a shame-honor society, no man or state could appear to submit to others without loss of face or virtue. If only the Greeks could recognize that compromise and cooperation rather than domination or subjugation was the way to honor -*time*- and virtue -*arete*- history might have turned out differently. As it was, their self-defeating ideas and acts simply continued for another century, going from bad to worse, until their whole system was snuffed out.

NOTES

N.B. Classical works are abbreviated as follows: AA=Aristotle *Atheneon Politea*; AP=Aristotle *Politics*; H=Herodotos; T=Thucydides; X=Xenophon.

1. An Athenian foreign policy slogan was "Protect the weak and punish the wrongdoer." X, **Hellenika**, vi, 5.45; Isocrates, **Panegeric**. 52; Euripides, **Suppliants**, 310-1; H,iii, 144; ix, 7; Plato, **Menexenos**, 240-5; **Laws**, 692-8.

2. The Delian League of 460 had about 300 members and Aristophanes spoke of the "thousand cities of the Athenian empire." **Wasps**, 707.

3. The transformation of the League into an Empire is reflected in Aristotle's writings when he used the term *hegemonia* to describe Athens until 453, and *arche* afterwards.

4. For comments on the League see: Agard, 84, 180; Baldry, 137; Bowra, 97-101; Caldwell, 51, 67, 81; Davis, 44, 68, 77; Dover, 84; Ehrenberg, 108; Grun, 13; Hettich, 29-35; Knorringa, 128, 290; Raubitschek, 16; Watson, 34; Zimmern, 170-93.

5. For that purpose Pericles engaged the best minds of the time: including Hippodamos of Miletos as its town-planner, Protagoras of Abdera its legislator, Empedocles of Acragas its educator and Herodotos of Halicarnasos as its historian, to plan this model city.

6. Old prejudices about each one, i.e. Thessalians were untrustworthy, Thebans cruel, Phaselites tricky, Dorians valiant and Ionians cowardly, proved insurmountable. Iamblichos, Pythagoras, 129, 249.

7. X. **Hellenika**, vi, 5.54; T, i, 2; xiii, 26; Isocrates, **Panegeric**, 62; Demosthenes, **Megalopolitans**, 14, **Rhodians**, 22; A. **Ethics**, 1123a. See also: Allendy, 16; Glotz, 193; Greenridge, 203; Philipson, 134; Webster, 22, 38.

8. So for a long time afterwards, Alcibiades' dream of a Mediterranean empire headed by Athens was considered the best example of hubris. T, iii, 37-40; iv, 18, 85, vi. 90.2.

9. Plato rejected Thucydides and Aristotle ignored him. **Rhetoric**, 1412b; **Politics**, 27.1; 23.2.; Isocrates, **Philippic**, 61; **Panegeric**, 119; **Peace**, 101. For commentary on these ideas see: Ferguson, 103; Romilly, 38-41, 69; Sabine, 24.

10. The Spartans were really a people without history, thus it was a historian Herodotos (i, 65), who among all the ancient writers called Sparta the worst governed state in Greece. See Botsford, 83-94; Bury, 123-7; Osborn, 177; Toynbee, 54.

11. For the causes of war see: H. v, 91; T. i, 67; ii, 39, 63; Aristophanes, **Peace**, 609; **Frogs**, 362; Demosthenes, xix, 286.

12. For the incidents that led to war and the final moves to avert it see: T. i. 75, 122; iii, 44; AA. 19.4. Also Jones, 68; McDonald, 43; Tenekides, 4.

13. Aristophanes, **Knights**, 576ff; Euripides, **Heraclides**, 199ff; T, ii, 8.

14. The Peloponnesian War has received renewed attention in recent years. Many theorists consider it analogous to the post-war East-West bipolar conflict. Cf. Fliess, passim; Halle, 262-5; Bury, 328.

15. It is interesting to note that when Thucydides was writing **The History of War in Greece**, his contemporary Sun Tzu was writing an equivalent classic, **The Art of War**, in China. Jaeger, 383; Jones, 67, 132; Kagan, 96; Halle, 261; Sinclair, 69, 106.
16. For more cynical views on power politics see: Plutarch, **Moralia**, 210b: **Lysias**, vii, 5; T. iii.82, vii,57; Plato, **Gorgias**, 483cd, 488c. Also, Casson, 98; Jarde, 258; Oliver, 134.
17. Thucydides' most pertinent thoughts on war and peace are to be found in the speeches of the Spartan plenipotentiaries to Athens in 427 (iv. 17-20), Hermocrates at the Sicilian Conference of Gela in 424 (iv.59-60), and last but not least, the infamous Melian Dialogue (v. 84-116).
18. Such comic epics as the **Batrachomomachia** (frog-mice war) satirized in stately mock hexameter the great old heroics. On the contrary, all major engagements of the thirty year war were fought massively either at sea or close to shore, thus diverging from the traditional hoplite pitched land battles (Hanson, 341).
19. Herodotos statement, "Who could be so foolish as to chose war over peace, since in war fathers bury their sons rather than the sons burying their fathers," (i, 87), conveys the pathos and unnatural condition of war.
20. Sophocles' father was an armaments manufacturer and he himself was an Athenian envoy charged to suppress the Samian revolt of 440. So, the playwright was an imperial treasurer, as well as a diplomat, a priest and a general. Anderson, 190.
21. "Ill-fated Hellas!" exclaimed Euripides, "She has the potential to become the best country on earth, but instead has become the laughing stock of the whole world." For more allusions on the evils of war see: **Hecuba**, **Troades**, **Andromache**.
22. Herodotos had Xerxes say "The trouble with Greeks is that instead of solving their problems by peaceful means, as people of the same race should, they chose to wage most reckless wars among themselves."
23. Aristophanes, **Peace**, 300, 530; **Knights**, 790ff; and Plutarch, Pericles, 28-30; Herodotos, iv,118.5, i,194, ii, 96.
24. Socrates probably fought as a hoplite in the battles of Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium where in spite of the Athenian debacle there in 424, he won fame for his gallantry even in retreat

and his humane treatment of the enemy. Although Socrates was not an unqualified pacifist, he only believed in defensive war. X, iii,13; vi,2; Plato, **Republic**, 334b; **Laws**, 944c; **Apology**, 28-9; 35-7.

25. "Who cares what is going on in far away lands," he said in the **Theatitos**, 143d, "What we should be concerned with is what happens here and now." **Apology**, 30a; **Phaedros**, 275b. Yet certain commentators (Arrian, Cicero and Diogenes Laertios) attribute to Socrates cosmopolitan and pacifist leanings (Zampaglione, 49).

26. Plato, **Crito**, 45c, 52b-54a; **Phaedo**, 99a.

27. D. L, ii, 5.24-5; Plato, **Charmides**, 153a; **Lachis**, 181b; **Meno**, 80b.

28. Athenian public opinion hostility or derision towards Socrates is caricatured by Aristophanes (**Clouds**, 140), where the master is conducting an international "think-tank" *-phrontisterion-* of arcane learning. See also, X. **Memorabilia**, ii. 60; iv, 15-6. Also Jaspers, 19; Popper, 184-7; Thompson, 175; Wolin, 69; Wright, 467.

29. "Our condition is by no means past remedy." (X. G, v, 18).

30. Socrates detested the sophistic amoral theory of power politics. On the contrary, obedience to the law and loyalty to the state is the greatest source of power and the best guarantee of peace. Santayana, 282.

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