

Turkey's Democratic Process and International Stability after Helsinki: A Research Agenda

Panayotis J. Tsakonas*

Dimitri C. Conostas**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article vise à dresser un tableau permettant de bien cibler les questions principales découlant des décisions prises au sommet d'Helsinki et qui risquent de dominer aux mois et aux années à venir les politiques de sécurité grecque et turque ainsi que les relations politiques entre la Turquie et l'UE. Dans ce but, cet article met l'accent sur l'influence qu'aura le « processus de démocratisation » en matière décisionnelle sur la politique étrangère turque. L'auteur de cet article avance l'hypothèse selon laquelle les développements et les changements sur la scène intérieure auront énormément d'influence sur la politique étrangère turque et son orientation soit conflictuelle soit de coopération envers la Grèce. C'est pourquoi il faudrait analyser ces éléments dans le présent turbulent « processus de démocratisation ». C'est aussi à ce niveau que se situe l'importance de conscientiser tous les acteurs extérieurs qui s'intéressent ou interviennent dans ce projet en cours entre la Turquie et l'UE de risques qui en découlent pendant cette période turbulente de transition après le sommet d'Helsinki.

ABSTRACT

An effort will be made in this article to set up a research agenda, with the aim of highlighting the key issues which, due to decisions made at the Helsinki Summit, are expected to dominate both the Greek-Turkish security agenda as well as the EU-Turkey political agenda in the coming months and even years. To this end, the article will discuss the effects of the democratization process on foreign policy decision-making of an anocratic (a mixture of democratic and autocratic characteristics) régime, namely Turkey. It is the thesis of this article that the developments and changes in Turkey's domestic arena are those which will most seriously influence Turkey's foreign policy decisions towards cooperation or conflict with neighbouring Greece and are thus those which deserve analysis in the current turbulent 'democratization process'. Herein also lies the policy relevance of this project, namely to make all external actors either interested or involved in the EU-Turkish project aware of the risks involved in the turbulent transition period ushered in by the Helsinki Summit.

* Dr. Panayotis J. Tsakonas of the Institute of International Relations - Pancreion University is the main author of this article.

** Professor D. Conostas, Director of the Institute of International Relations, offered advice as regards the paper's structure and the formulation of hypotheses.

Certain academic and policy-making analyses – heavily influenced by the ‘democratic peace’ argument¹ – argue that international peace will be invariably strengthened by the process of democratization. In fact, in line with Huntington’s reasoning that “the spread of democracy in the world means the expansion of the zone of peace”,² the rationale behind Greece’s concession to granting Turkey the status of an EU candidate country at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, was largely based on the assumption that strengthening Turkey’s European orientation would engage the country in a medium and long-term process that will allow certain structural changes, namely democratization. As a result, the European *acquis* could be fully endorsed. This process which will eventually lead the Turkish élite to abandon its rusty aggressive behaviour towards Greece, and to adopt policies based less on geopolitical instruments of statecraft and more on international law and agreements.

However, most recent findings on the under-researched yet rather critical relationship between democratizing nations and their international behaviour towards cooperation or conflict demonstrate that whether democratization exerts a pacifying influence or whether it inhibits international cooperation and promotes conflict ultimately depends on the success of the transitional process itself. In particular, during ‘problematic democratization’, when basic democratic institutions and procedures are implemented and function more or less effectively in an unconsolidated form, while élite and societal preferences remain illiberal or become radicalized during the turbulent process of transition, international security is seriously threatened.³

Structure and Methodological Elucidations

An effort will be made herein to set up a research agenda, with the aim of highlighting the key issues which, due to decisions made at the Helsinki Summit, are expected to dominate both the Greek-Turkish security agenda as well as the EU-Turkey political agenda in the coming months and even years. To this end, the article will discuss the

effects of the democratization process on foreign policy decision-making of an anocratic (a mixture of democratic and autocratic characteristics) régime, namely Turkey.⁴ The opening of the Turkish 'black box' will allow for the exploration of the effects of the on-going fragile and turbulent 'Europeanization process'⁵ on Turkey's domestic politics. Although a complete connection between foreign policy and domestic politics is not possible, and undoubtedly certain exogenous factors and processes will affect the outcome of the domestic struggle, reinforced after Helsinki, it is the thesis of this article that developments and changes in Turkey's domestic arena will most seriously influence Turkey's foreign policy decisions towards cooperation or conflict with neighbouring Greece. By implication, these developments and changes deserve analysis in the current turbulent 'democratization process'. Herein also lies the relevance of this project to policymaking, namely making all external actors, either interested or involved in the EU-Turkish project, aware of the risks involved in the turbulent transition period ushered in by the Helsinki Summit.

Four methodological elucidations are necessary at this point. First, the article's main concern is not about the relationship between consolidated democracies and international peace but rather about *the relationship between democratizing nations and their international behaviour towards cooperation or conflict*. To this end, the distinction between democracy as an outcome and democratization as a process is essential for determining the content of a transitional state of affairs that can last for more than a generation and whose success is not assured. Thus, democracy should be considered as the end-state (the Ithaca) while democratization is a process that does not always follow the principles of democracy. In fact, many times it may prove itself to be an impediment to arriving at democracy.

During the democratization process, domestic reforms and an unconsolidated 'procedural democracy'⁶ will be promoted so that a régime will become democratic and be consolidated as such. For Turkey, democratization involves a series of domestic reforms which will eventually lead to the establishment of 'EU member-state type democracy'. In such a consolidated or 'substantive' democracy not

only political but also societal changes are allowed to take place (e.g., the norms of tolerance, cooperation and trust sink deep and lasting roots and a high level of 'civic culture'⁷ exists) while democratic norms and procedures are deeply embodied in the whole society. Also the 'democratization process' is expected to mean that the military is placed under civilian control and that the democratic processes and benefits are enjoyed by a state's members as a whole. Moreover, it is expected that 'democratization' will accelerate the process of 'élite circulation'. It will redefine most, if not all, state institutions, thus forcing a new state élite to start searching for the new 'reason of the state' and for new definitions of 'national interest'. To be sure, this *reconceptualization* of 'the national interest' is inevitably linked to the outcomes of domestic political debates and struggles. Nevertheless reconceptualizing constitutes a typical phenomenon in countries which undergo the turbulent process of democratization.

Second, given that this research program is about democratization as a process and not democracy as an outcome, our analysis will rely on the characteristics of the Turkish political system as well as on the attributes of the Turkish society.⁸ The examination of both Turkish polity and society is necessary because although democratization is a process that primarily involves changes in a political system, the societal changes have an impact on the democratization process itself. Thus, in order for a more complete understanding of the relationship between democratizing states and international security to be gained, our analysis combines the study of actions taken by political élites with the examination of societal structures.

Finally, two additional points of a methodological nature need particular reference. First, this article will not assess the effects of the democratization process on Turkey's external behaviour at all fronts but it will be limited to the effects of Turkey's democratization process on its behaviour *vis-à-vis* a neighbour and EU-member state, namely Greece. Second, the various studies to examine and test hypotheses on the relationship between democratization and international stability were so far based on *ex post facto* analyses of particular cases. However, contrary to past efforts, this research project lacks such a luxury since

the case under examination has just entered the long, painstaking, fragile and most probably risky process of democratization. This fact sets, by implication, the limits of the argument of this project, allowing only for findings of a *probabilistic* rather than of a deterministic character.

EU–Turkey Relations: from the Ankara Agreement to Helsinki

Turkey's turbulent relations with the EU began in 1963 with the signing of the Ankara Agreement (or Association), which provided Turkey with associate membership with the European Community (EC). Of course, both the EC and Turkey were aware at the time that the road opened by the Ankara Agreement would be long and rising. In the following years, Turkey's European path has travelled rather turbulent phases of setbacks and problems. Turkey was excluded from all EC/EU enlargements that took place in 1973, 1981, 1986 and 1995. Submitted by the government of President Turgut Özal in 1987, its application for full membership was rejected on grounds related mainly to Turkish internal conditions (human rights' violations, weak civic and political tradition and culture) plus the Cyprus issue. The application of the internationally recognized Government of the Cyprus Republic for EU membership in 1990 made the EC's stance over Turkey's application more demanding. At its 1990 Dublin Summit, the Community declared that future relations with Turkey would depend on Ankara's adopting a more cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue.⁹ Not until 1995 would the EU be able to negotiate a customs union with Turkey, which came into effect on January 1, 1996.

The EU Summit in Luxembourg in December 1997, although it "confirmed Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union", placed Turkey in a special category by inviting it to the 'European conference' of applicant countries. Turkey was not included in the pre-accession strategy developed for the so-called 'slow track' countries. Ten former communist states thus moved ahead of it in line, namely Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria,

Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Instead, the EU Council, in order to justify the fact that Turkey's application process would be treated separately, called on the European Commission to develop a 'European strategy for Turkey' with the aim of assisting the country in further reforms. To make matters worse, the eleventh officially recognized country was Cyprus, which, along with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia could begin actual accession negotiations.

The decisions made in Luxembourg not only upset longstanding expectations in Turkey, but they also created a psychological barrier between the EU and Turkey, that took the form of a genuinely angry response by the latter, namely the suspension of all of its political relations with the EU (except from the customs union).¹⁰ The one-to-one meetings, which followed between Turkey and the Commission focused on the payment of EU funds and financial compensation due to Turkey as part of the 1995 Customs Union agreement.¹¹ Finally, the EU's Summit in Cardiff in June 1998 was considered as an attempt by the EU to bring Turkey closer to meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Cardiff thus managed to pave the way for the EU's approach to Turkey's candidacy. It would be readdressed by adopting the position that Commission Progress Report on Turkey was in effect a document on preparation for Turkish accession.¹² Turkey was thus defined as one of the twelve acceding states while the need for a more detailed working timetable for the 'European strategy for Turkey' was stressed.

The EU Summit in Helsinki: a Renewed European Perspective with Conditions

Although the prospects for Turkey's full membership remain rather remote, the European Summit held in Helsinki managed to eliminate the 'phantom of exclusion' by granting Turkey a formal candidacy status. This status would in turn allow the country to take part in all Council of Ministers and European Summits, thus benefiting from all

the rights and obligations associated with membership.¹³ However, the granting of candidacy status has also entailed Turkey's entrance into a pre-accession strategy, which in turn asks for certain political conditions to be fulfilled before accession negotiations start. It is worth noting that not until the fall of 1999 would the European Commission decide to make fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria¹⁴ a precondition for starting negotiations. Until then candidates had to have made significant progress towards meeting political and economic conditions).¹⁵

The set of preconditions imposed by the EU has highlighted the interventionist character of the European project since Turkey was shown in no uncertain terms that the exclusive club it wants to join is a supranational authority able both to constrain and empower states in a multiplicity of ways, and thus the Turkish ruling élites as well as the public opinion need to accept that one cannot have the latter without the former.¹⁶ As Buzan and Diez stress,

“The EU is, by its entire logic, ‘post Westphalian’: that is, it represents a model of relations between states that goes significantly beyond the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Part of the price to be paid even for partial association with an international organization such as the EU is tolerance of a high level of *mutual interference in domestic affairs, aimed at harmonizing a wide range of legal, moral and institutional practices.*”¹⁷ (our emphasis)

In addition, as many EU members made explicit on many occasions, the set of political preconditions imposed on Turkey by the EU are not additional preconditions for formal candidacy, as Turkey argued in many instances, but simply conditions fulfilled by other applicants in the past, therefore constituting *a conditio sine qua non* for eligibility and not membership.

It is worth pointing out that the decisions made in Helsinki took place when the debate in EU capitals as well as in Turkey about the exact content and definition of ‘Europeaness’ (how Europe is defined?

by geographical, historical, cultural, religious criteria or a combination of these criteria?) was –and still is– open. As Meltem Muftuler-Bac argues, “...if Europe is redefined along notions of liberal democracy, then one can argue either for Turkey’s exclusion or for Turkey’s *conditional inclusion with the requirements that Turkey must reform its political system.*” (our emphasis).¹⁸

Obviously during the transition process when the prospects for Turkey’s fulfilling membership conditions are still remote, some of the questions related both to ‘Europeanness’ and to Turkey’s domestic struggle will not only remain open but will probably become more acute. In other words the basic question remains: Is it possible to view Western liberal democracy and Islam as compatible notions in tomorrow’s EU?

However, although negotiations are not scheduled to start between the EU and Turkey before certain preconditions are fulfilled, Turkey was urged to support a series of reforms that are integral parts of a pre-accession strategy. The latter involves a particular ‘accession partnership’ that was drawn up on the basis of the previous European Council Resolutions. According to the ‘accession partnership’, released by the European Commission on November 8, 2000, Turkey is expected to adopt, before the end of the year a National Program for the adoption of the European acquis. The purpose of the ‘accession partnership’ is to set out in a single framework the specific short-term and medium-term priorities and intermediate objectives¹⁹ for political, economic and legal/ administrative reforms, which touch upon Turkey’s ‘internal’ as well as ‘external’ front.²⁰

Internally, Turkey is asked to proceed to the transformation of its anocratic régime into a full-fledged Western democracy. As noted earlier, Europe’s interventionist character entails that it cannot draw a line at ‘internal affairs’ of either its member-states or those willing to become members. Therefore, Turkey’s eventual membership in the EU involves at a minimum the ‘conscious surrender’ of parts of state sovereignty to a supranational organization, if not the complete rethinking of the state’s role and the re-conceptualization of the

‘national interest’. It must be stressed at this point that Helsinki, especially the conditions set by the ‘accession partnership’ document, has made evident that democratization is a prerequisite for membership. This clashed with the dominant perception in Turkish politics in the 1990s, namely that the EU will first incorporate Turkey as a full member and will then help foster democratization.

The reforms that Turkey is asked to promote are related to three broad areas, namely the Kurdish issue thus by implication human rights issues, the role of the military in Turkish politics, plus certain economic and administrative adjustments for harmonizing state’s internal structures to certain European standards. Needless to say, all these reforms are either directly or indirectly related to the main issue of Turkey’s internal restructuring, namely the democratization of Turkish politics and the transformation of the state from a republic to a democracy.

The Kurdish issue is undoubtedly at the top of the EU-Turkey relations list. The European Union wants Turkey to deal with the Kurdish issue, which has claimed over 37,000 lives since 1984, when the military struggle started. The EU wants Turkey to deal with this issue in terms of human rights, minority rights and freedom of expression grounds and for the issue to be conceived as part of an overall project of consolidating and strengthening Turkish democracy. Thus, for the European Union there can be no doubt, the Kurds are an ethnic minority that deserves protection of its distinct identity.

Contrary to the Turkish élite and public which seem united over the argument that the only solution to the conflict is ‘to stop terrorism’,²¹ the European Union – strengthened by a series of resolutions issued by the European Parliament – calls on Turkish authorities

- 1) to cease imprisoning people who are sympathetic to Kurdish nationalism;
- 2) to extend cultural rights to Kurdish people (e.g., allowing Kurdish-language newspapers, broadcasting and schools);

- 3) to open the political discourse with regard to the various 'pro-Kurdish' parties which are being closed down while their members in parliament are being expelled from the legislature and arrested and to engage in direct talks with the Kurdish people's representative organizations with a view to turning the Kurdish issue from one of armed conflict to a process of negotiation, conciliation and finally one of a peaceful political solution.

Although the EU deliberately avoided politically sensitive references to minorities, for example, the words Kurd and Kurdish are omitted in the 'accession partnership', a series of strict conditions regarding both the Kurdish issue as well as individual and human rights issues are expected to be met in the short and medium-term.²²

The arrest of the PKK's (Kurdish Workers' Party) leader Abdullah Öcalan and the death sentence appealed before the Turkish Supreme Court in November 1999 pushed forward another long-lasting problem between the EU and Turkey, namely the issue of the death penalty, which the EU would like to see removed from the Turkish penal code.²³ Indeed, Ecevit's decision to put the execution on hold as well as to put the Öcalan case before the European Court of Human rights in Strasbourg was a smart, yet temporary, move.²⁴ Nevertheless, Turkey's European aspirations will be seriously hindered unless Turkey can find a way to integrate the Kurds into the Turkish political community and to continue the process on issues related to human rights violations, such as the revised penal code, the enhanced independence of the judiciary as well as other issues that are included in both the short and medium-term priorities of the 'accession strategy'.

A major issue that has hindered Turkey's European ambitions is the omnipresent role of the military in Turkish politics.²⁵ For the EU the absence of real civilian control over the military is an anomaly and gives cause for serious concern. The military has intervened in Turkish politics three times in the past in 1960, 1971, and 1980 while in February 1997, the military put an end to the coalition government headed by an Islamist, Necmettin Erbakan, through a 'soft' or a 'post-modern coup'. Most important, the 1982 constitution itself – drawn

up by the military, which seized power two years earlier – grants the military a degree of autonomy that no democratic state would tolerate.²⁶ Furthermore, the military's role in Turkish political affairs has been structurally integrated through particular institutions, namely the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Security Courts (SSC). The military-biased synthesis of the NSC allows for the military to decide over the most sensitive issues (i.e., internal and external security) while by the SSC's the military's role is extended into the educational and judiciary system, making Turkey 'the only example in Europe in which civilians can be tried at least in part by military judge'.²⁷ The EU has thus asked for certain reforms that touch upon all -more or less- the anomalies related to the increased role of the military in Turkish politics. Most importantly, with the 'accession partnership', the EU calls on Turkey to align the constitutional *role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU member states.* (our emphasis) In fact clear reference was made to the medium-term priorities, e.g. work should begin, even if not completed, during 2001.

Last, but not least, certain economic and legal conditions are also integral parts of the pre-accession strategy. With regard to the economic criteria, the EU asks primarily from the Turkish economy to ensure in the short-run the implementation of the current dis-inflation and structural reform program as well as the agricultural reforms agreed with the IMF and the World Bank, and to proceed with the privatization of state owned entities. In order for Turkey to become a functioning market economy and to acquire the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union, the latter expects from Turkey to complete the process of privatization and the reform of the agricultural and financial sector and to ensure the sustainability of the pension and the social security system in the medium-run.

The legal criteria, on the other hand, refer mainly to the long process of the harmonization of the country's legislation and practice with the *acquis communautaire*. The most important of the short-term conditions refer to the acceleration of the country's modernization of

public administration, including strengthening of the relevant administrative institutions; and the improvement of operation of the judicial system as well as the further promotion of the judiciary training in Community law and its application. In the medium-run the EU calls on Turkey to further develop and strengthen Justice and Home Affairs institutions with a view to ensuring the accountability of the police and the independence of the judiciary and to lift the geographical reservation to the 1951 Geneva Convention in the field of asylum and develop accommodation facilities and social support for refugees. Needless to say, that the most difficult phase for the fulfillment of the aforementioned economic and legal criteria lies in Turkey's capacity to transform, especially in the short and medium-run, internal apparatuses and, most important, cultural traits and practices in a way that will allow for a productive collaboration with the EU norms and mechanisms.

Externally, Turkey's eligibility after Helsinki is conditional on the resolution of two issues; namely its 'border conflict' with an EU member-state, (Greece) and the Cyprus issue. It is beyond the scope of this article to exercise the various (especially legal) interpretations used in the domestic political debate in both Greece and Turkey after the Helsinki Summit to draft the list of Turkey's obligations which are conditional upon resolution of tensions on the Greek-Turkish front. For the purposes of this article, we will instead stick to the implications stemming from EU's political message to Turkey with regard to both Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue.

With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, Helsinki made it clear to Turkey that it has four years to seek ways to resolve its "outstanding border disputes and other related issues" with Greece before the rather critical review that would assess whether to start accession negotiations takes place. With regard to the Cyprus problem, Helsinki reiterated that although a political settlement of the Cyprus problem would facilitate Cyprus accession, this very settlement "would not be a precondition for accession". At the same time, Helsinki had ambiguously stressed that all relevant factors would be taken into account for the final decision on accession. Nevertheless, the Summit has also sent

a clear message to Turkey that the division of Cyprus must be ended by 2004. After that date, even a divided Cyprus will become a member of the European Union, meaning that only the southern part of the island, governed by the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government will enter the EU. In that sense, Turkey, which illegally occupies the northern part of the island, can no longer block Cyprus' EU-membership.

Helsinki, by reaffirming preconditions for starting negotiations which go beyond the Copenhagen criteria for membership, thus constitutes both an alert and an incentive for Turkey, that there is a light at the end of the tunnel and Turkey must therefore successfully address current issues that cause instability into a particular part of the European Union. However, it should be stressed at this point that the 'accession partnership' –in a last minute change- refers to the decision taken at Helsinki to set a deadline for Turkey to solve its differences with Greece 'through the International Court of Justice at The Hague by the end of 2004 at the latest'. However, the clause is in the preamble and not among the short and mid-term criteria which Ankara has to meet. This leaves Turkey much greater room to maneuver. On the Cyprus issue, however, things are much clearer. Thus, the text of paragraph 9 of the Helsinki decision has been included among the short-term priorities Turkey has to meet. This calls on Ankara to support strongly within the framework of political dialogue UN Secretary General's mediation aiming at solving the Cyprus issue.

The Impact on Turkey's Domestic Politics

The democratization process intensified by decisions made at the European Summit in Helsinki and elaborated on a short- and medium-term basis in the 'accession partnership' that followed will seriously affect Turkish domestic politics in many ways and to a great extent. Specifically, democratization is expected to be the driving force for the appearance of a certain amount of turbulence in Turkey's domestic politics, which is highly likely to undermine the country's

democratization project and affect its external behaviour. This turbulence in Turkish domestic politics will mainly regard the eruption of a set of domestic shocks at the state and society level, being portrayed as (i) 'élite turbulence', (ii) 'societal turbulence' and (iii) 'economic turbulence'.

(i) 'élite Turbulence'

The Kemalist modernization project has been replete with tensions since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, due mainly to the strict and narrow conception of Turkish nationalism ('Turkishness') that excluded the existence of a multiethnic and multicultural Turkish entity. Specifically, the civil and military élite envisioned and tried to impose – rather than debate with the public- a homogeneous Turkish identity by following a 'Turkification' process which aimed to limit both the Islamic and ethnic influences within the confines of étatism and in full accordance with the statist vision of the new Turkey.²⁹

The result was the emergence of a 'state Islam' which was constructed from above and which should have been integrated into the construction of the Kemalist notion of Turkish nationalism, based on what has been called the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis'.³⁰ However, contrary to the expectations of an élite which was indifferent to the development of an inclusive idea of the state, the existing multiple identities that characterize republican Turkey were reinforced and radicalized. Indeed, political and economic liberalization of the mid-1980s allowed popular Islamic groups to become active 'outside state control' and to bring themselves at the epicenter of political life. The alarmed and threatened civil-military élite responded immediately by strict anti-Islamist measures under the orders of the Turkish military and by the reintroduction of the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis'. Increasing pressure has the opposite results from the ones the state (civil-military establishment) was expecting, since popular Islam found a voice in the Welfare Party, which managed to win the 1995 general elections. The civil, and especially the military élite, 'had no choice' but to respond actively by attacking the 'Islamic fundamentalism' of a democratically elected government and to force it to resign, under the threat of a military coup!

From the establishment of the Republic up to the present, the civil-military élite, agonizing to preserve its ailing ideological character, has decisively contributed to the erosion of the Turkish state, which loses authority, consent and loyalty while tolerance among the various social groups is turning down. Indeed, the civil-military stance has so far barricaded the public sphere, inhibited any communicative action between the state and the public, and thus widened the gap between the state and society as well as excluded, from the debate on Turkey's collective identity, critical elements of the Turkish society.

How the EU political conditions, especially the ones that are included in the short and medium-term priorities of the 'accession partnership' and regard the country's democratization and the alignment of the military's role with the EU democratic standards, will affect state's élite position and role? It is most likely that EU pressure will reinforce certain conflicting – and often competing – visions expressed from within the civil-military establishment.³¹ Moreover, the schism – which is already apparent – among the Kemalist élite will further deepen due to the new EU demands.³² Although one can hardly refer to two distinct groups with coherent and clear-cut views and positions, it seems that the Turkish civil-military élite is divided into mainly two groups, namely the Conservative Kemalists and the Reformers.

The *Conservative Kemalists* (also known as *Jacobins*) adhere to a strict interpretation of Kemalism and reject any deviation from secularism and uni-culturalism.³³ Advocates are to be found mostly in the center-left, the military and in the top levels of bureaucracy. Conservatives tend to interpret Turkey's national interest in narrow security terms and have a difficulty in recognizing any need for reforms that will express the new societal demands. The Reformers, on the other hand, recognize the limits of Kemalism and the need for giving a new content to certain pillars of the Kemalist ideology, especially secularism and reformism. *Reformers* are to be found in the center-right, the Left and among cosmopolitan business élites of Istanbul. They are in favour of reducing the role of the military and reform the constitution and today's patriarchic and clientelistic party system. By implication, Turkey's national interest is not defined in narrow bal-

ance-of-power terms and reformers are in favour of Turkey's European orientation, which is seen as a "window of opportunity" for abandoning Kemalist inwardness and following a liberal and self-confident policy abroad.³⁴

The most vivid example of the internal dispute between prominent members of the Kemalist élite is the crisis that erupted in relations between the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and the Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, due to the refusal of the latter to sign a bill which would have given the government the right to dismiss public servants it believes have connections with Islamists (!). Sezer, a strong supporter of human and religious rights, has seen in the passage of the decree a move against individual freedoms that would inhibit Turkey's chances for membership.³⁵

However, regardless of this kind of disagreement between the aforementioned state élites, they both share a traditional and elitist view not that distant from the normative and value structures of the Ottoman élite. Indeed, both consider the state as their property and themselves as the custodians of an institution handed over to them by the founder of the republic as well as of distinguished groups staying above the rest of Turkey's society. This elitist and undemocratic habit is reflected on the Turkish party politics (Turkish parties are widespread patron-client systems)³⁶ as well as on the Turkish media, which although relatively free and competitive, are also supporting the Turkish model of top-down modernization by the civil-military élite. Thus, while the mind-set of Turkish journalists is characterized by the perception of being 'the guardians of the public interest' they at the same time show a strong tendency of self-censorship concerning religious issues, the cult around Ataturk's legacy, the army, and the Kurdish or Armenian questions.³⁷

Indeed, both conservative and reformers Kemalists' behaviour is characterized by an authoritarian and elitist habit linking, to a certain extent, modern Turkey with its traditional Ottoman background. This military-bureaucratic élite, fully legitimized by the Kemalist ideology, controls the resources of the modern sectors of the Turkish society and

refuse to reflect on its role in the modernization of Turkey's society, thus constituting the major obstacle to Turkey's efforts to meet the modern standards required by the EU. These facts do not auger well for Turkey's European orientation when coupled with the military's paramount power and ability to define the internal and external threats to the state.

Thus, it is obvious to assume that the military, as the dominant actor in the civil-military establishment,³⁸ will most probably be reluctant to give up the state's mechanisms of social control and the army's prerogatives in favour of an elusive and distant European future. Seeing itself as the guardian of the Kemalist legacy and the protector of democracy from internal threats the military will thus keep setting the domestic agenda towards more radical directions that will be based on or derived by a military-security framework. Moreover, the military – protected by a battery of constitutional and legal provisions and enjoying the forbearance of the Turkish political parties, parliament, government and media – can easily lead the régime to adopt policies that are limited to options not in conformity with the democratic rules of the game (predatory and outside the practice and spirit of democracy) and along the political habit of the military, according to which the use of force is considered as legitimate.

(ii) 'Societal Turbulence'

As stressed earlier, the civil-military establishment's efforts to impose the Kemalist modernization project from above inhibited any communicative action between the state and the public, while it prolonged the distance between the former and critical elements of the Turkish society. The manipulation of the Turkish society by both explicit propaganda, e.g. the media and more covert indoctrination, e.g. political socialization, by the Kemalist civil-military élite has allowed little room for social pluralism.

The result has been that the basic characteristics of the exogenously formed societal preferences were lack of tolerance, cooperation and trust. Moreover, the growth of civil associations was inhibited by a society, which governed more by force and less by consent and which

was prevented from learning and internalizing the norms and values of 'civic culture'. Thus, resort to legitimate violence in order for dissent to be contained became an integral part of the society's cultural legacy. By implication, the use of force (or at least the threat of its use), rather than mediation and compromise, became the dominant norm for tackling difficult situations and solving both domestic and international problems.³⁹

The renewed European perspective introduced by Helsinki seemed appealing to a plethora of actors who have saluted Turkey's inclusion in the group of candidate countries, each one for its own distinct reasons. Indeed, this perspective seems appealing to Western-oriented Kemalists and to a materialistic middle-class as well as to those on the margins of the Turkish society and politics, such as the Islamists and Kurds who see in Europe the possibility of more tolerance and freedom of action for their own views.⁴⁰ More specifically, the particular short-term and medium-term political conditions included in the 'accession partnership' have put the issues of human rights and religious freedoms at the top of Turkey's agenda of priorities while they encourage the development of a civil society. In fact, what the EU asks for is a redefinition of certain pillars of the Kemalist ideology, especially notions of nationalism and populism.

However, with regard to the Kemalist notion of populism, it is hard to imagine how parties and other associations could develop and moreover flourish, as the prohibited bases for groups constitute their major *raison d'être* in other democracies.⁴¹ Specific appeals on these bases are also prohibited, as they cause discord and undermine social unity.⁴² In addition, with regard to the Kemalist notion of nationalism, the EU asks for a workable compromise on the two types of 'challenges' to the Turkish state, namely Islam and the Kurdish issue. One might thus wonder how religious movements that threaten the state can be integrated into the state because the latter has to democratize. Indeed, the incorporation of Islam⁴³ into mainstream politics seem a must for the sake of the liberal democracy while the authoritarian nature of political Islam threatens -according to the Turkish perception- Turkish democracy.⁴⁴ Finally, with regard to the Kurdish issue,

it is debatable how a workable compromise can be achieved between EU's position that the Kurds are an ethnic minority that deserves protection of its distinct identity and the dominant view both at the élite and society levels that the only solution to the problem is to stop terrorism.⁴⁵ At least implicitly, there is a fear among the Turkish élite and society that such a reform will have a spillover effect on other policies which hold the Turkish state together. By implication, the Kurdish issue is far more threatening for the Turkish people than outsiders might guess because it is closely associated with Turkey's 'identity crisis'.⁴⁶

In the EU logic, success in the aforementioned redefinition of certain pillars of the Kemalist ideology is measured in terms of social pluralization and the emergence of a vibrant, diversified, complicated and sophisticated civil society outside the reach of the official state. Especially for Turkey, democratization would mean overcoming the fundamental internal contradictions of Kemalism and its top-down modernization program for Turkey and its transformation from an élite-driven, top-down, authoritarian movement of officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals to a popular ideology that commands the support of the Turkish masses and the middle classes in particular.

However, the inherent weaknesses and antinomies of the Turkish society do not auger well either for its emancipation or for the emergence of independent social agents, for example, powerful business élites⁴⁷ that will become the prime actors for redefining Kemalist's ideology main pillars and for promoting a popular sovereignty that will allow the Turkish society to become the author of the rules of the democratic game. To make things worse, the existing institutional framework -functioning in an unconsolidated form- cannot play the role of the buffer when force-based solutions to both internal and external threats and problems, rather than mediation, consent and compromise are the options offered by the exogenously formed preferences of the Turkish society.

(iii) 'Economic Turbulence'

The customs union between the European Union and Turkey came

into effect on January 1, 1996, thereby implying fundamental changes in the Turkish trade, competition legislation and economic policies. Turkey did indeed apply the majority of these changes. However the funds, which were agreed in return, have never been granted. Special aid for the customs union, of 375 million euros, and a special EIB loan, of 750 million euros, were twice blocked as they failed to achieve unanimity in the European Council and EIB's Board of governors, respectively.⁴⁸ This discrimination caused a lack of political dialogue between the parties and it resulted for the customs union to "fell short of acting as a tool for further integration".⁴⁹

In the Helsinki European Council, the EU decided to give Turkey the principal motive for democratization and European integration towards third parties, that of "candidate status". As a result, Turkey rejoiced with Helsinki, access to Community funds, which has already reached the sum of '15 million Euros for three years',⁵⁰ so as to prepare Turkey for accession. The motivation of 'clear membership' can greatly assist in Turkey's economic harmonization efforts that will facilitate to eliminate obstacles in political integration as well as increasing the economic integration by attracting foreign investment. The political circumstances can also lead towards the same direction, as Turkey can now claim the "most stable" and progressive "government for a decade".⁵¹ What can nevertheless be said, is that any harmonization effort, demands an acceleration of the progress of a customs union, which results in an increase of Turkish commitments towards European economic integration. Such an advance can, in the short-term, negatively affect the Turkish economy.

To start with, the failure of all seventeen previous IMF programs⁵² proves that the Turkish economy has a profound weakness to adapt to international organizations' economic reforms. Still, this time it is not the IMF that can provoke turbulence, but the new exchange-rate mechanism adopted by the Turkish government. The promise of a rapid reduction in inflation that the new exchange-rate policy holds out, "increases the risk of a growing external imbalance, which if not funded by adequate foreign capital inflows could trigger currency speculation and a sharp devaluation".⁵³ A possible sharp devaluation

will result in tensions between the government's economic policies and public sentiment, as well as to an anti-European climate due to the relation between the expectancy for these policies to work in return of the severe tax régimes which are demanded by Brussels. And if the Turkish government tries to subsidize the foreign capital by augmenting the already vast bill⁵⁴ for privatization, then it risks upsetting, yet again, the masses that relate their national public companies with their national pride.

Finally, Turkey will eventually have to suffer another cost, regardless of the conditions set out in the 'accession partnership'. This cost has to do with the fact that one of the most important consequences of the customs union during the period 1995-1999, was the disorientation of Turkish imports away from third countries, towards the EU.⁵⁵ Furthermore the Helsinki decision implies an even deeper economic cooperation, hence it is reasonable to argue that the orientation towards the EU would grow. On the other hand there are countries outside the EU frame which promise an economic expansion in the near future and with whom Turkey could have gain more in a bilateral basis rather than within EU.

To be sure, Turkey faces a dilemma, which risks being overstretched in the case of excessive EU demands on the one side and the economic explosion of third-countries on the other. In practice, in the case of a global economic crisis, Turkey will feel safer under the umbrella of the EU economic bloc. Alternatively whether the claim that 'the emerging-markets crash of the late 1990s will soon be regarded as a mere blip in the ongoing "Asian miracle"⁵⁶ becomes true, then Turkey will have a tendency to orientate its economic policies outside the EU towards other markets. This could be done through the reductions concerning sensitive products "stipulated by the Association Council Decision No:2/95" which had already "faced certain problems as regards automotive products, because of incentives given to some Far East-based investment." ⁵⁷

Turkey was thus obliged to start the process of European economic integration, being treated unfairly due to the blockade of funds to

which it had the right to have access. However, the Helsinki European Council restored the balance by offering candidate status to Turkey. A candidacy, which still alarms Turkey, because of the eventuality of the country being judged on a different base than other candidates. Initially the Turkish population seems to have responded positively to Helsinki. However, in the short-term, there are dangers in the European-led economic policy of Turkey, which risks upsetting the Turkish population against the economic reforms and the spirit of European integration. Supposing that the dilemma of Turkey's market orientation over-stretches during the same period of the internal popular upset, then the efforts of economic integration in the area, would suffer a considerable blow.

To sum up, a certain degree of socio-economic stabilization constitutes the necessary prerequisites for the successful completion of the process of democratization. It seems that in the case of Turkey, both elements are lacking. Indeed, severe economic setbacks or the derailing of economic reforms, that intensify social conflict and enhance the popularity of remedies, have always been one of the most serious threats to the process of democratic consolidation. Moreover, socio-economic instability serves to undermine societal preferences for tolerance and constitutes a rather fertile ground for radical nationalist appeals.⁵⁸

The International Impact of Turkey's 'Problematic Democratization' on Its Foreign Policy vis-à-vis Greece

It is evident from the above analysis that Turkey has entered a rather fragile and painstaking transition process in which almost all prerequisites needed for successful democratization are lacking. However, if democratization in Turkey is not *en route* to successful completion it is also unlikely that societal and élite preferences will be formed in a moderate fashion. Moreover, "problematic democratization" seems to be the case in the turbulent transition period Turkey has entered after Helsinki. During this period, élite and societal preferences are likely to

become radicalized -typical to a nation that experiences 'problematic democratization'- and military adventures are likely to be perceived by traditionally conservative groups, such as the military, as a useful means to regain their political power and prestige⁵⁹ or legitimizing the rule (ascent to power) of élites that are unable to solve domestic problems.

During the turbulent process of transition, certain political élites are not hesitant to embark on adventurous (read: more conflictive) foreign policies to defend the 'national interest' or even resort to war in order to distract popular attention away from the internal social and economic turbulence while consolidating their own domestic political support. In other words, certain élite statesmen resort to a policy of foreign conflict in order to defend themselves against 'domestic enemies' (enemies arising from the inequities created by the process of rapid social change). Moreover, the turbulent nature of the democratic transition often provides fertile ground for the rise of militant radicalism that can manifest itself in many different forms such as nationalism, fascism, or religious fundamentalism, thus forcing the emerging structures of democratic representation to magnify and transmit these illiberal policy preferences.

In Turkey, the civil-military élite, and especially its military component, appear as the primary "securitizing actors".⁶⁰ In other words, these are the ones able to define internal and external threats to the state and militarize the political process. The EU conditions imposed on Turkey, being perceived by the Turkish élite as threatening to the ideological and identity foundations of the state -with which the élite identifies, will most probably lead to a militant radicalism by the élite's component that enjoys full control of the state's institutions and whose decisions take priority over those of the cabinet, namely the military. Given that militarization entails a procedural dimension where the use of coercion and force is considered legitimate it is highly likely that the 'proposed' responses, by the military, to external 'existential' threats -which would have been identified solely by the military- will be based on a military-security framework and be directed towards radical positions. Hawkish domestic preferences will thus be

allowed by the emerging -and therefore unconsolidated- democratic principles to shape the foreign policy of the transitional régime, making it more assertive, if not aggressive.

In addition, as some analysts argue, only the long-term prospect opened by Helsinki serves as a counterweight to the growth of nationalist sentiment in Turkey. In the short-run however, Turkey's *basic nationalist dilemma became more profound* with Turkey's EU candidacy.⁶¹ This is mainly due to the interventionist character of the 'post-Westphalian' European project. Indeed, as Lesser has eloquently stressed "even candidacy implies that significant sovereignty constraints (i.e., greater scrutiny, convergence and compromise) will be posed by the EU from the most mundane (e.g., food regulations) to high politics (human rights, foreign and security policy), a closer relationship with formal EU structures will threaten Turkish sovereignty at many levels".⁶²

A reactivation of the 'Sevres Syndrome' will most probably appear as a result of the conditions imposed on Turkey in order that ties with the EU be strengthened. However, nowadays the content of the 'Sevres syndrome', or the fear of containment and dismemberment, is not along the lines envisioned by the Western powers after World War I. Indeed, this major threat is not posed by foreign powers with territorial ambitions, as was the case at Sevres. Instead, it is caused by the consequences of the EU's 'imposed' modernization project on an anachronistic Kemalist élite and a fragmented society. Thus, many good reasons are there already in order for a more assertive policy, based on a sovereignty-conscious approach in key-areas, to appear more and more appealing.

Last, but not least, it would have been wrong for outsiders to take Turkish interest in Europe for granted. The acceptance of the Helsinki decisions by Turkey was seemingly based on the assumption that Turkey does no longer have to deal with a great dilemma; i.e., between a European and a non-European orientation, and that its European profile has almost been cemented. Unfortunately, the dilemma still exists (!) Indeed, besides the fact that some Turks find Europe intru-

sive and threatening, certain conservative members of the Kemalist civil-military establishment suspect the EU of neo-colonialism and racism. Certain events, especially in the past (e.g., the EU decisions in Luxembourg in 1997), made even the most Western-oriented Turkish élites feel disillusioned about Europe, and increasingly receptive to the idea of a more sovereignty-conscious and independent Turkey (with regional hegemonic ambitions). In fact, this is a feeling that transcends the whole political spectrum, from the military and most of the business community, to the religious and secular right wing, and also on the left. It is worth noting that this tendency was reinforced internally after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a series of new Turkic states due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The will of the Kemalist élite to develop an active role in Turkey's western and northern frontiers, has led to the fading of the dividing line between nationalist Kemalists and those in favour of Pan-Turkism.

To make things worse, conservative Kemalists (especially the military) continue to think that a "special relationship" with the US and Israel is a good alternative to Euro-membership. In fact, the Turkish-Israeli axis or 'strategic alliance', reemerging dreams of Turanism, Turkish military operations in Iraq, the threat of force against Greece and Cyprus in case of deployment of the S-300 missiles on the latter's soil as well as against Syria over the PKK's leader are only some of the recent, yet clear, examples of Turkey's 'regional activism'.⁶³

Moreover, it remains to be seen whether Turkey will fully join the European family if the cost of following the European pace exceeds the benefits, short or/and long-term. It remains to be seen whether or not it will gain by becoming a regional super-power or if the regional role become more appealing. Such a role, fully endorsed by all Turkish governments so far, might prove incompatible with the country's European orientation and, most importantly, with the restraints that might be posed to Turkey's hegemonic ambitions due to demands for compliance with the European principles and standards.⁶⁴

Needless to say, that which is to be chosen depends on the opportunities available in the international system as well as on the "will-

ingness” of the civil-military élite to engage in foreign policy adventures. Indeed, the enlarged opportunity can often result in the increased willingness to engage in certain types of international behaviour, while minimized opportunities can inhibit willingness. National leaders often act as power-maximizers, but the relative weight of international and domestic influences on foreign policy will ultimately depend on their respective degree of intensity with which they are perceived by decision-makers. Turkey’s Premier Bulent Ecevit has repeatedly emphasized a ‘regionally based’ foreign policy in which Ankara seeks to play a more active role in defense of its interests in adjoining areas. Indeed, in practice this has meant a more assertive policy towards Syria, Iran, Northern Iraq, and a strong stance on the Aegean, and Cyprus issues.⁶⁵

Especially, Cyprus is the nationalist issue *par excellence* for the Turkish civil-military élite and touches on rather deep nationalist sensitivities.⁶⁶ So far, a strengthened nationalism on the one hand and Turkey’s strategic importance for the West on the other resulted in the rigid Turkish stance on Cyprus. Over the years, Cyprus also became the only ‘reason of pride’ for the Turkish Kemalist élite (especially the military), which promoted a modernization project that has failed in many respects. Thus, Cyprus appeared as the only ‘success story’ in the state’s long list of failures in its efforts for internal reform and modernization. Some argue that Cyprus is in fact the most vivid proof of Turkey’s role as a regional power and the testing ground indicating what, how and how much Turkey can do for Turks living outside Turkey’s borders.⁶⁷ Moreover, the Cyprus issue has given content to the ideology of ‘pan-turkism’, which thus managed –although on the fringe of Turkish politics in the 1960s– to become the dominant ideology in the 1990s. Indeed, a consensus –if not a rigid front– was achieved around the Cyprus issue among the conservative and the modernizing members of the civil-military élite,⁶⁸ while nationalism on the Cyprus issue was also used for legitimacy purposes. This in turn has not only negated any ‘rational approach’ to the Cyprus problem on Turkey’s part but it moreover led to the adoption of a more intransigent stance.

Those placing Cyprus in a category of disputes different from the bilateral ones between Greece and Turkey downplay the former's significance especially the 1974 invasion, as a turning point in the hardening and proliferation of differences over the Aegean region. As long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, it is likely that Turkey will opt for politics of containment and lessening of tension over the Aegean (especially in periods when the future of its EU relationship is at stake) but it will not deviate substantially from its traditional stance on these issues. One should wonder whether mere reference in the Preamble of the Helsinki decisions to bilateral problems with Greece and their eventual settlement by the International Court of Justice could become an actual factor in the resolution of these issues. The experience of the eleven months since Helsinki supports this rather pessimistic assessment. At the same time, the Turkish minority in Greek Thrace could become an additional irritant to the bilateral relationship, given traditional Ankara tactics of resorting to accusations against Greece over the fate of this minority each time European institutions attempt to scrutinize minority and human rights within Turkey.

Given the conditions of 'accession partnership' and their impact on domestic politics, Turkey after Helsinki will experience a problematic process of democratic transition, during which basic procedural requirements for democracy will be implemented, and yet societal pre-conditions for democratic consolidation will be missing. Most probably, this will, in turn, lead to foreign policy outcomes that will be much more hawkish than those of the successfully consolidating democracy. Such a tendency makes an explosive mix when coupled with the findings of empirical research which suggests that it is most likely that a failing nascent democracy will direct its aggressiveness against its regional neighbours, simply because the opportunity for conflict with neighbouring states is usually much larger than the potential for confrontation with distant nations. A finding, which puts Greece at the top of the agenda of prominent candidates to be called to deal with Turkey's assertive foreign policy in the years to come.

One might wonder whether democratization is worth the effort as a means of expanding the zone of peace if the risks to international security posed by failing nascent democracies can be high. In other words, why should Greece keep trying to make Turkey succeed in such an endeavour if the risks involved in the transition period –between the current process of democratization and Turkey becoming a consolidated democracy- would or could pose a serious threat to Greece’s security? We are convinced that Europe can still be the answer regarding Turkey’s behaviour *vis-à-vis* its neighbour, Greece. Moreover, it is in Greece’s interest to take all necessary steps, alongside the international community, so that Turkey enters, as did Greece in the past, a ‘virtuous circle’ of democratization and not a ‘vicious circle’, in which the floundering process of democratization and its negative foreign-policy consequences will widen the perceived political, socio-economic and cultural gap between Turkey and the community of well-established democracies. However, Greece should also be aware of the risks involved in this fragile transitional period and elaborate strategies that will successfully tackle Turkey’s internal pressures and incentives towards diversionary policies *vis-à-vis* Greece.

It seems that the Helsinki Summit has managed to throw the ball of Turkey’s behaviour towards Greece into Turkey’s court. However, although in Helsinki the EU managed to build the ‘other half’ of the bridge which was initially built by Greece in order to draw Turkey closer to Europe, it remains to be seen whether the fragile and painstaking internal struggle that has been initiated or reinforced by the Helsinki Summit will strengthen the existing bridge rather than let it collapse.

NOTES

1. According to the 'democratic peace argument', democracies never (or rarely) fight each other. On the 'democratic peace' literature see-inter alia- Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", **American Political Science Review** (Vol. 80, no. 4, 1986), pp. 1151-69; Bruce Russett, **Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold World** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1993); David Lake, "Powerful Pacificists: Democratic States and War", **American Political Science Review** (Vol. 86, no. 1, March 1992), pp. 24-37 and John Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace", **International Security** (Vol. 19, no. 2, Autumn 1994), pp. 87-125. For a comprehensive critical review of the 'democratic peace' argument, see Miriam Fendium Elman (ed.), **Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the Answer?** (CSIA Studies in International Security, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997).
2. Samuel Huntington, **The Third Wave** (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London, 1991), p. 29.
3. See Thomas Carothers, "The Democracy Nostrum", **World Policy Journal** (Vol. 11, no. 3, Autumn 1994), pp. 47-53. For a systematic and thorough effort to fill the current theoretical and empirical gap, see the excellent work of Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, **Expanding the Zone of Peace? Democratization and International Security** (St. Martin Press, New York, 1998).
4. Certain Turkish analysts attribute to Turkey's political system some of the reasons that account for Turkey being regarded as a puzzling sight by many Western observers, namely that "Turkey is not an authoritarian country, on the other hand, it would be far-fetched to claim that it is an established democracy". See Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics", **East European Quarterly** (Vol. XXXIV, no. 2, Summer 2000), p. 159. See also Tursan, who stresses that "the Turkish political system is far from being democratic", in Huri Tursan, "Erzatz Democracy: Turkey in the 1990s" in Richard Gillespie (ed.), **Mediterranean Politics** (London, 1996, vol. II), p. 216.
5. As Kubicek notes, the term "Europeanization", which is often used interchangeably with the word "Westernization", refers to the quest to become like and a part of Europe, traditionally seen in Turkey as the center for "Western" civilization. See Paul Kubicek, "Turkish-European Relations at a New Crossroads", **Middle East Policy** (Vol. VI, no. 4, June 1999, Ref. 1), p. 171.
6. The term 'procedural' serves mainly to emphasize democratic procedures and institutions –in other words, the 'democratic method' –rather than cultural or socioeconomic characteristics typically associated with a democratic régime.
7. Yet it remains unclear whether it is democracy that promotes 'civic culture' (i.e., a product of consolidated democracy) or whether things work the other way round, namely that 'civic culture' is the producer of democracy.

8. Recent empirical research suggests that, especially in the region of Southeast Europe where both Turkey and Greece are located, violence was –and to a certain extent still is– triggered by the deliberate actions taken by political élites. See –inter alia– V. P. Cagnon, Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia”, **International Security** (Vol. 19, no.3, Winter 1994-95), pp. 130-166.
9. For a background on EC-Turkey relations, see Selim Ilkin, “A History of Turkey’s Association with the European Community” in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (eds.), **Turkey and the European Community** (Leske and Budrich, Opladen, 1990).
10. The Luxembourg decision not only reinforced Turkey’s ‘syndrome of exclusion’ but it also questioned the country’s European orientation. See Pia Christina Wood, “Europe and Turkey; A Relationship Under Fire”, **Mediterranean Quarterly** (Vol. 12, no. 1, 1999), p. 110.
11. See Gulnur Aybet, “Turkey and European Institutions”, **The International Spectator** (Vol. XXXIV, no. 1, January-March 1999), pp. 107-108.
12. Bill Park, “Turkey’s European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara?” (Paper presented at the 41st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, CA, March 14-18, 2000), p. 4.
13. In Helsinki the EU leaders had also made Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Malta official candidates. These states will join Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus, with which formal entry talks opened in 1998.
14. The EU Council which was held in Copenhagen in 1993 adopted the following criteria for the evaluation of candidate countries for membership in the EU: (a) political conditions, i.e., the state of democracy and the respect for human rights, (b) economic conditions, i. e., macroeconomic stability, ability to deal with competitive pressure; and (c) the ability to adopt the *acquis communautaire*. The Copenhagen EU Council stated that “membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities”. See **Presidency Conclusions**, The Council of the European Union, Copenhagen, 1993.
15. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Europe’s Tainted Mirror. Reflections on Turkey’s Candidacy Status after Helsinki” in Dimitris Keridis and Lenore Martin (eds.), **The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy** (MIT Press, Cambridge, forthcoming).
16. Idem.
17. See Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey”, **Survival** (IISS, Vol. 4, no.1, Spring 1999), pp. 50-51.

18. Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics", **East European Quarterly** (Vol. XXXIV, no. 2, Summer 2000), p. 160.
19. *Short-term* priorities have been selected on the basis that it is realistic to expect that Turkey can complete or take them substantially forward by the end of 2001. The priorities listed under the *medium-term* are expected to take more than one year to complete although work should, wherever possible, also begin on them during 2001.
20. Apparently, the political, economic and legal issues that were cited by the EU in Helsinki are the ones that legitimized Turkey's traumatic experience of exclusion in the EU Summit in Luxembourg in 1997. Indeed, in its 1997 decision, the EU cited several issues that must be resolved, namely the on-going Kurdish conflict and attendant human rights problems, shortcomings in Turkish democracy, and failure to resolve the Cyprus dispute.
21. See Paul Kubicek, **Turkish European Relations**, op. cit., p. 172
22. In the *short-term*, (2001) these conditions include the strengthening of legal and constitutional guarantees for the right of freedom of expression (in line with article 10 of the European convention of Human Rights) and of the freedom of association and peaceful assembly; the encouragement of the development of civil society; the reinforcement of fight against torture practices and alignment of legal procedures concerning pretrial detention in accordance with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights; the strengthening of opportunities for legal redress against all violations of human rights; the maintenance of de facto moratorium on capital punishment, the removal of any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting and the development of a comprehensive approach to reduce regional disparities and the improvement of the situation in the Southeast, with a view to enhancing economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens.

In the *medium-term*, they include guarantees for full enjoyment by all individuals –without any discrimination– of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; the review of the Turkish constitution and other relevant legislation in order to guarantee the rights and freedoms of all the Turkish citizens; the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the lifting of the remaining state of emergency in the South-East; and the guarantee of cultural diversity and cultural rights for all citizens by abolishing any legal provisions preventing the enjoyment of these rights.

23. See Chris Morris and Tony Paterson, "EU Warns Turkey to Spare öcalan", **The Guardian**, November 26, 1999. In the 'accession partnership' document a medium-term condition that should be met by Turkey regards the abolition of the death penalty and the signing and ratification by the Turkish government of the Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

24. Given that -regardless of the European Court's verdict- Turkey might reconsider the execution for domestic reasons. See "Turkey Bites the Bullet" (Review and Outlook), **Wall Street Journal**, 15 January 2000, p. 10.
25. On the role of the military in Turkish politics see -among others- Semih Vaner, "The Army" in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.), **Turkey in Transition; New Perspectives** (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987), pp. 236-265; Ahmad Feroz, **The Making of Modern Turkey** (Routledge, London and New York, 1993) and William Hale, **Turkish Politics and the Military** ((Routledge, London and New York, 1994). Greece should probably ask itself why -although none of the numerous Greek-Turkish crises of the last forty years occurred while Turkey was under military rule- is the heavy-handedness of the Turkish military detrimental to Greek-Turkish relations?
26. See Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", **Comparative Politics** (Vol. 29, no. 2, January 1997) and Jeremy Salt, "Turkey's Military Democracy", **Current History** (Vol. 98, no. 625, February 1999). On the internal structure of the Turkish Armed Forces, see Mehmet Ali Birand, **Shirts of Steel. An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces** (Tauris, London and New York, 1991).
27. The European Commission's Progress Report on Turkey, 1998, p. 13. It is also worth-noting that in 1998, the European Court of Human Rights declared that the State Security Courts violate the European Convention of Human Rights.
28. According to the Helsinki declaration "... the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlements of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004". See **Declaration of the European Union Council in Helsinki**, 11-12 December 1999.
29. For an excellent analysis on this line of reasoning see Philippos Savvides, "Legitimation Crisis and Securitization in Modern Turkey", **Critique** (No. 16, Spring 2000), pp. 55-73.
30. See -among others- Serif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey" in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun Eds.), **Ataturk: Founder of a Modern State** (Hurtsn, London, 1997, 2nd ed.), pp. 191-219 and Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey", **Comparative Politics** (Vol. 30, no. 1, October 1997), pp. 63-82

31. Democratization serves to expose the foreign policy decision-making process to the variety of 'horizontal' pressures, such as those coming from elected officials, high-level bureaucrats, and institutional interests. It is also worth-noting that the élite 'continuity' between the Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic, in the sense that the members of state-élites were derived out of the military-bureaucratic stratum of society, has given its position to a new Turkish élite that shows much more diversification. According to Walter Weiker, 85 per cent of the bureaucrats and 93 per cent of the officers in the early Turkish Republic have already acquired their positions in the late Ottoman Empire. See Walter Weiker, **The Modernization of Turkey. From Atatürk to the Present Day** (New York and London, 1981), p. 21.
32. It is an irony that it is the EU today, which imposes the norms of modernity in a civil-military establishment that in the past has been the modernizing actor that imposed the Kemalist 'modernization project' on the 19th century Turkey.
33. The conservative Kemalist body politic is best suited into a Kemalist tradition that, in Ernst Gellner's words, "... contains a deep commitment to Westernization, but Westernization in 19th century terms". See Ernst Gellner, **Encounters With Nationalism** (Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), p. 82.
34. For this argumentation see Dimitris Keridis, **Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization** (NATO Research Fellowship Final Report, 1999), pp. 26-27.
35. Premier Ecevit resubmitted the controversial decree and it seems that President Sezer has no other option but submit disputed decrees to the Constitutional Court (which was led by Sezer before he becomes President). Now it looks the struggle will be between the military and Ecevit's far right coalition partner on the one side and the media, the civil administration, most of the parliament and the EU on the other side. See **Struggle Unfolds in Ankara** (STRATFOR, Global Intelligence Update, 18 August 2000) in « <http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu2000/081800.asp> ». See also "L'Armée d'Ankara Contre les Islamistes", **Le Figaro**, Septembre 3, 2000.
36. As Nimet Beriker notes "it is evident that politics in general has been reduced to a game of capturing public resources and then redistributing them through legal and illegal means. There is almost complete absence of meaningful debate among the political élite". See Nimet Beriker, "The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects", **Security Dialogue** (Vo. 28, no. 4, 1997), p. 449.
37. For these remarks see Shahin Alpay, "Journalist: Cautious Democrats" in Metin Heper, **Ayshe Oncu and Heinz Kramer** (eds.), **Turkey and the West. Changing Political and Cultural Identities** (Tauris, London and New York, 1993), pp. 70-78, 83.

38. See Eric Rouleau, "La République "Des Pashas". Ce Pouvoir si Pesant des Militaires Turcs", **Le Monde Diplomatique**, Septembre 8, 2000. See also Ali Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts" in John Chipman (ed.), **NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges** (Routledge, New York, 1988), p. 311-312.
39. For this argument, see the views of former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Professor Christos Rozakis as they appeared in "Ellada, Tourkia kai o Dromos Pros tin Eirinefsi" (Greece, Turkey and the path to peace), speech delivered to the Association for Thinking on the Modernization of Greek Society, 13 March 1997.
40. See Ian Lesser, "Changes on the Turkish Domestic Scene and Their Foreign Policy Implications" in Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee, **The Future of Turkish-Western Relations. Towards a Strategic Plan**, (RAND, 2000), p. 8.
41. In Turkey, by constitutional provisions, parties and interest groups on the basis of class, region, ethnic group and religion cannot be formed.
42. Paul Kubicek, **Turkish European Relations**, op. cit., p. 166.
43. On the debate about the status and role of Islam in Turkish politics, see –among others- Binnaz Toprak, **Islam and Political Development in Turkey** (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1981); Feride Acar, "Islam in Turkey" in Canan Balkir and Alan M. Williams (eds.), **Turkey and Europe** (Pinter, London and New York, 1993), pp. 219-238.
44. Meltem Muftuler-Bac, **The Impact of the European Union on Turkish Politics**, op. cit., p. 170.
45. Turkish daily **Milliyet** has published in February 27, 1993 a survey. According to the 15,683 Instabilities polled in this survey over 66 percent favoured the fight against terrorism as a solution while ambitious political reforms such as federalism or autonomy for Kurdish areas were unequivocally rejected. Published in Paul Kubicek, **Turkish European Relations**, op. cit., p. 172 (ref. no. 37).
46. See Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West Since World War II" in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, **Turkey Between East and West** (Westview Press, Boulder, 1996), p. 64.
47. Undoubtedly, the emergence of a dynamic private sector is a positive sign. Certain private sector associations, such as the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) seem frustrated by the tendency of the Turkish democracy and administration to lag behind. See Stephen Kinzer, "Business Pressing a Reluctant Turkey on Democracy Issues", **New York Times**, March 23, 1997. According to John O'Neal, Frances O'Neal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett: "political and economic freedoms allow individuals to form

transnational associations and to influence policy in light of the resulting interests, inhibiting their governments *from acting violently toward one another*" (our emphasis). See John O'Neal, Frances O'Neal, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950-1985", **Journal of Peace Research** (Vol. 33, no. 1, 1996), p. 13. It is worth noting, however, that this argument might have an application on consolidated and stable democracies only.

48. See <http://www.eureptr.org.tr/english/ei-prehelsinki.html>
49. EU Report: **The Effects of the Customs Union to the Turkish Economy**, 25/11/99, p. 29.
50. Restricted EU Report on **Turkey Preparing for EU Membership**, July 2000, p. 2.
51. Leyla Boulton, "Early Signs Are Encouraging", **Financial Times**, 12 June 2000.
52. <http://www.turkeyupdate.com/imf.htm>
53. Robert O'Daly, The Economist Intelligence Unit, **Country Report, Turkey**, 1st quarter 2000.
54. The current year the privatisation bill was estimated around the unprecedented sum of \$7,6 billion, see Gazi Ercel, **Macroeconomic Features and Prospects of the Turkish Economy**, September 26, 2000.
55. Commission's Proposal for Council Decision on Modification of the Decision 2000/24/EK, 26 July 2000. p. 3.
56. "Rosy Prospects, Forgotten Dangers", **The Economist**, April 13, 2000.
57. EU Report: **The Effects of the Customs Union to the Turkish Economy**, 25/11/99, p. 79.
58. Many historians attribute Hitler's rise in the late Weimar Republic in the causal relationship between the growth in unemployment and economic uncertainty and the radicalization of public attitudes towards politics. See –inter alia- A. J. Nicholls, **Weimar and the Rise of Hitler** (Macmillan, London, 1968), p. 147.
59. See Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War", **International Security** (Vol. 20, no. 1, Summer 1995), pp. 5-38 and Jack Snyder, **Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition** (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 32-35, 49-52.
60. See Philippos Savvides, **Legitimation Crisis and Securitization in Modern Turkey**, op. cit., p. 69.
61. See Ian Lesser, **Changes on the Turkish Domestic Scene and Their Foreign Policy Implications**, op. cit., p. 8.

62. *Idem.*
63. See -among others- Shireen Hunter, "Bridge or Frontier? Turkey's Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture", **International Spectator** (Vol. XXXIV, no. 1, January-March 1999), pp. 63-78 and Ziya Onis, "Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity", **The Middle East Journal** (Vol. 49, no 1, Winter 1995), pp. 48-68.
64. See Panayotis Tsakonias, "Riding Two Horses at the Same Time", **TO VIMA** (Greek Daily), December 22, 1999 and Panayotis J. Tsakonias and Thanos P. Dokos, "Greek-Turkish Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty First Century. A View from Athens" in Lenore Martin et al (eds.), **The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy** (CSIA Studies in International Security, MIT Press, Cambridge, forthcoming). Certain analysts, although admit that Turkey's decision to follow a more independent power role (e. g., in the Middle East) will further reduce the likelihood of gaining membership in the EU, do not necessarily see a contradiction between that role and continued close security links between the EU and Turkey. For this argumentation see Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, *The European Union and Turkey*, op. cit., pp. 51-55.
65. See Ian Lesser, *Changes on the Turkish Domestic Scene and Their Foreign Policy Implications*, op. cit., p. 12.
66. On the position of the Cyprus issue in Turkish national psyche and political culture, one will find rather enlightening the address of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem at the 55th session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 16, 2000. See Hansjorg Brey, "Turkey and the Cyprus Question", **The International Spectator** (Vol. XXXIV, no. 1, January - March 1999, pp. 111-121. Brey pinpoints that Turkish politicians have never before expressed their determination to defend the Turkish presence in Cyprus more vigorously than during the past two years (i.e., 1997-1999).
67. See Niazi Kizilyurek, *Kypros. To Adixodo ton Dyo Etnikismon* [Cyprus: The Impasse of Two Nationalisms] (Athens, 1999) (in Greek).
68. President's Sezer full alignment with the Government's stance on the Cyprus issue is characteristic of the consensus the issue enjoys internally. Note that Sezer was not hesitant to openly confront government's decisions over issues of human and individual rights violations, respect of religious freedoms and, in general, Turkey's adjustment to certain EU standards.
69. See Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War", 1816-1965, **Journal of Conflict Resolution** (Vol. 36, no. 2, 1992), pp. 309-341.