

The Cyprus Problem since the December 1999 EU Decisions at Helsinki

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article met l'accent sur l'évolution du problème chypriote depuis les décisions du sommet d'Helsinki que les membres de l'Union européenne ont prises en décembre 1999. Ces décisions ont affecté l'orientation européenne de la Turquie et confirmé le cheminement de Chypre vers l'adhésion à l'UE.

Alors que ces développements étaient en cours, les États-Unis, appuyés par le Royaume-Uni, ont entrepris des initiatives diplomatiques importantes sous l'égide de l'ONU pour résoudre le problème de Chypre. Malheureusement ces initiatives ont miné la crédibilité de l'ONU et l'application de l'acquis européen dans le cas de Chypre. Par conséquent, le problème se trouve à l'heure actuelle dans son état le plus critique depuis l'invasion turque de 1974.

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on developments in the Cyprus problem since the December 1999 European Union Helsinki decisions which affected Turkey's European orientation and confirmed Cyprus' path to membership. While these positive developments were taking place, the United States, supported by the United Kingdom, also undertook major diplomatic initiatives under the mantle of the United Nations in order to resolve the Cyprus problem. However, these initiatives undermined both the credibility of the United Nations and the application of the *acquis* in the case of Cyprus. Hence the Cyprus problem has now come to its most critical point since the 1974 Turkish invasion of the island republic.

Settlement Initiatives: The Last Decade

The last decade of the twentieth century brought significant changes in the international dimension of the Cyprus problem. The end of the Cold War left the United States as the dominant power in the international system. The collapse of the former Soviet Union reduced even further Russia's limited influence in this dispute. The ensuing

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collapse of Yugoslavia restored legitimacy to partition and ethnic cleansing as solutions to ethnic problems, creating a bad precedent for Cyprus. Finally, an invigorated European Union set a new framework for expansion in post-Cold War Europe.

Cyprus concluded an association agreement with the European Community in 1972. In 1990, the government of Cyprus applied formally for membership in the European Community, and in the fall of 1993 the Council of Ministers of the European Union accepted the Cypriot application, despite concerns expressed by the Commission over the lack of a political settlement. Integration talks with Cyprus commenced on schedule in March 1998. By the mid-1990s membership in the EU became a Cypriot foreign policy priority. The European Union recognized the continuity of the Republic of Cyprus and its government, and this was reflected in actions of European courts and other EU organizations. The prospect of membership and the application of the *acquis communautaire* offered new options for resolving intractable issues such as those of human rights, borders, and security. The United States, until the Clinton administration, had not looked favourably upon the involvement of the EU in the Cyprus problem. The change in American policy served a number of objectives. It provided a new source of pressure on the Cypriot government to resolve the problem. Working in cooperation with Britain, Germany and other EU members, Washington promoted the idea of a solution prior to the entry of Cyprus to the EU. This was done despite public statements at the highest level of the EU that even though a political settlement was desirable prior to membership the lack of a settlement would not stop the integration of Cyprus. Washington's advocacy of a solution prior to entry gave Turkey an indirect veto over the membership of Cyprus, a power that Turkey did not formally have. Further, a solution prior to integration would legitimize derogations from recognized human rights¹ that normally would be protected under the *acquis* and other European legislation. Washington's policy change also served another objective. By pressing the Europeans to grant candidate status to Turkey,² Washington gained political credit in Ankara by being Turkey's sole promoter among the reluctant Europeans.

The diplomatic activism of the 1990s was carried into the new millennium. UN Security Council resolutions on Cyprus called on the Secretary-General to utilize his 'good offices' in the peacemaking process. He was therefore primarily responsible for maintaining the dialogue between the government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots. In this task the Secretary-General has been assisted by his own special representatives, in addition to the special representatives of the United States, Great Britain and other foreign countries, initiatives by Secretaries of State and Foreign Secretaries, and the usual embassy level contacts. The involvement of so many foreign diplomats under the guise of supporting the Secretary-General raised questions about the coordination of their efforts, their commitment to a substantive process, their knowledge of the issues and of the players involved in these talks.³ There were also questions about the aims and the tactics employed by these negotiators.

The Americans in particular expressed their frustration with the inconclusive negotiations, attributing the lack of progress to the two parties and their 'lack of political will' to make necessary concessions. However, Washington did not question its assumptions about Turkey and its foreign policy, and its unwillingness to support the implementation of UN resolutions on Cyprus. Instead, Washington focused its pressures on the victim of aggression so as to bring the Cypriot positions closer to the confederation ideas demanded by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Working under the mantle of the UN American negotiators, like Richard Holbrooke, engaged selectively in the talks. Failure to resolve this perpetuated problem could then be assigned to the parties or to the Secretary-General's office without risking their own personal reputation or their political/diplomatic ambitions.

The American approach appeared to be 'keep them talking', even though the gap separating the two sides was widening each year with new Turkish/Turkish Cypriot demands. The negotiating initiatives fluctuated between attempts at a comprehensive solution through a framework agreement arrived at high level meetings, to limited confidence building measures that could open the way to a comprehensive solution. Some of these meetings involved face to face negotiations

between the president of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash,⁴ proximity talks,⁵ or even informal exploratory talks among foreign representatives and representatives of the two sides.⁶

These meetings often produced documents such as the 1992 Boutros Ghali 'set of ideas'. This text reflected commonalities in the positions of the two sides and identified areas in need of further negotiation. There were also the 1993/94 proposals for confidence-building measures. These documents could not break the deadlock because the Turkish Cypriots used them as stepping stones to promote their separatist policies. The fate of the 1993 package of confidence building measures (CBMs), which had been accepted by the government of Cyprus, is a classic example of the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot and American collusion. In secret talks in Vienna in the spring of 1994, that excluded the Cypriot government, 'clarifications' were added to the 1993 CBM package to bring it closer to Turkish Cypriot positions which compromised the unity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. As Turkish Cypriot positions kept shifting closer to a confederation of two separate sovereign states, the Secretary-General was forced to issue critical statements about the Turkish Cypriot negotiating behavior in reports and statements to the Security Council both in 1993 and 1994. This, however, had no effect on American, Turkish or Turkish Cypriot policies. On August 29, 1994, the so-called Turkish Cypriot 'Assembly' endorsed Denktash's negotiating position dropping federation as the aim of the comprehensive settlement in favor of a confederation. Needless to say that the formal shift violated the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements and the UN resolution that endorsed the principle of a bizonal-bicommunal federation. While the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey continued with their unilateral actions,⁷ the government of Cyprus negotiated along lines agreed upon since 1977. Successive Cypriot governments never had the political courage to force the negotiations back to a zero base to counter Turkish Cypriot unilateral actions. By proving that they negotiated in good faith, the Greek Cypriots were forced into continuous concessions in order to keep the negotiations alive without any reciprocity from the other side.

In a series of 'non-papers' the Secretary-General's representatives in the 1997 face-to-face talks in Troutbeck, New York, and in Glion, Switzerland, attempted to bridge the gap in the position of the two sides by attempting to force the Cyprus government closer to the idea of confederation and of an acceptance of Turkish Cypriot sovereignty. The government of Cyprus, however, did take some bold initiatives in an attempt to break the deadlock on security issues by presenting on December 17, 1993, a detailed demilitarization proposal. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected this proposal and insisted on continued Turkish military presence and intervention rights. The United States in turn has used this proposal to push for Greek Cypriot demilitarization, while maintaining a smaller Turkish military presence in the occupied areas with limited intervention rights in a reconstituted international force preferably under NATO command.

By the end of the Clinton administration, the Cyprus problem was treated not as a problem of invasion and occupation but as an inter-communal dispute. The break-up of Yugoslavia had given new legitimacy to confederation schemes and to ethnic separation. Turkey maintained that the Cyprus problem had been solved in 1974, and that the purpose of any negotiations was to legitimize the condition created since 1974, while clarifying issues of borders and property compensation. Its long-term strategy on Cyprus was finally paying off. Aware of American attitudes on the importance of Turkey, Ankara considered that the de-facto recognition of the political entity in the occupied areas was a mere matter of time, and that international mediators would eventually force the Cyprus government to acknowledge that reality.

In the second term of the Clinton administration, the resolution of the Cyprus problem and the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations became a higher priority in American foreign policy. Greek-Turkish relations entered a new phase of instability in the aftermath of the January 1996 crisis over the Imia islets. Since 1974, Cyprus has burdened Greek-Turkish relations, even though it was not implicitly a Greco-Turkish issue. A resolution of the Cyprus problem was expected to have a positive effect on Greek-Turkish relations, while an

improvement in Greek-Turkish relations would create a more positive climate for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute.

In addition to the movement in the relations of Cyprus with the EU, there were three other developments that directly impacted the negotiations on Cyprus. First, the European Court of Human Rights ruling on the *Loizidou* case on December 18, 1996, which upheld not only the continuity of the Republic of Cyprus but once more held Turkey accountable for its control of the occupied areas and the consequent loss of *Loizidou's* enjoyment of her property rights.⁸ This ruling directly affected the American and Turkish attempt to resolve property issues through compensation and effectively limited the rights of settlement and property ownership in the occupied areas by Greek Cypriots. The second development related to the cold-blood killing of unarmed Greek Cypriot demonstrators along the dividing line near *Dehrynia* in October 1996 by Turkish Cypriot security forces and members of Turkey's right wing terrorist group, the *Grey Wolves*.

Faced with Turkey's military threat both from the occupied areas and from bases on the southern coast of Turkey,⁹ the last government of *Andreas Papandreou*, in cooperation with the government of Cyprus, proclaimed a 'unified defense dogma' (EAX)¹⁰ which incorporated Cyprus in the Greek defense space. Even though doubts were expressed early on about Greece's ability and willingness to meet such a commitment, especially in view of other defense priorities in the Balkans, in Thrace and the Aegean, Greece and Cyprus proceeded with plans for common defense planning, coordination of military procurement, military training, etc. Towards the end of 1996, Cyprus, with advice from Greece, ordered the *S-300* anti-aircraft missile system from Russia. This decision was exploited for domestic purposes in Greece and Cyprus. It was condemned by the United States as a destabilizing action, while Turkey threatened to destroy these anti-aircraft missiles if they were deployed on the island. Washington remained remarkably silent in view of Turkey's threats, and it was not until the fall of 1998 that it issued lukewarm warnings about the use of force in the region. Washington, however, did not allow the sale of

American defensive weapons to Cyprus, while supplying Turkey with massive amounts of sophisticated weapons¹¹ that posed a clear and present danger to both Cyprus and Greece's Aegean islands. The Turkish threat against Cyprus was not surprising, but the American response was as it confirmed that Washington considered Turkey as a hegemonial regional power.¹² The Clinton administration focused its pressures on both Nicosia and Athens. In December 1998, the government of Cyprus announced that the S-300s would not be deployed in Cyprus but, instead, they would be sent to Greece for deployment on the island of Crete. This decision effectively destroyed the myth of the unified defense dogma between Greece and Cyprus. Turkey had threatened the use of force, and Greece and Cyprus blinked. For Turkey, this was a significant victory as it proved that its diplomats could rely on their country's military strength to achieve their objectives.

Greek-Turkish relations reached a low point with the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya in the spring of 1999.¹³ The Öcalan affair caused a shake-up in the Greek Foreign Ministry. George Papandreou, son of the late Prime Minister of Greece Andreas Papandreou, assumed command of Greek foreign policy. The impact of the Öcalan affair and a summer of devastating earthquakes in Turkey and Greece gave Papandreou the opportunity to take bold initiatives *vis-à-vis* Turkey. These initiatives, and especially the support Greece extended at the Helsinki EU meeting to Turkey's EU candidacy in December 1999,¹⁴ improved the image of Greek foreign policy in Europe and in the US. The conditions imposed at Helsinki on Turkey's candidacy placed the ball squarely in Turkey's court and in the court of the EU, as the lack of progress in Turkey's European vocation up until then had been conveniently blamed on Greece. The improvement in Greek-Turkish relations in the last year of the twentieth century has not had a positive effect on Cyprus negotiations as the next section will show.

The United States - The G-8 Formula - and the 2000 Round of Proximity Talks

Washington, capitalizing on the euphoria of the improved climate in Greco-Turkish relations, embarked on a campaign to make the governments of Greece and Cyprus more responsive to Turkey's regional concerns. It also lobbied for Turkey's EU candidacy, without linking Turkish compliance to any of the established conditions expected of EU members and candidates. At the United Nations, Washington attempted to quietly upgrade the status of the regime in the occupied areas of Cyprus during the discussions on the renewal of the UN peacekeeping force.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in a letter to the president of the UN Security Council dated April 20, 1998, concluded that Turkey defined its Cyprus policy in the context of 'two states and three problems'. This included the recognition of Turkish Cypriot statehood as the prerequisite for a solution. In turn, the three problems in need of resolution were those of security, settlement of property claims, and the delineation of borders. Further, they demanded acknowledgment of the legitimacy of Denktash's government and its political procedures; lifting of the economic embargo; continuation of Turkey's military guarantee, and acknowledgment of the political equality of the two sides in all aspects of the negotiations. Mr. Denktash also demanded the withdrawal of the Cypriot application to the EU, and that the UN and all external mediators accept this new political reality. The Secretary-General described these points as Denktash's 'new positions' as a result of which the Turkish Cypriots rejected the intercommunal framework of all previous rounds of negotiations. Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials blatantly argued that the Cyprus problem had been solved with Turkey's 1974 intervention and with the 'population exchange' that followed. Turkey, in order to facilitate its EU aspirations agreed, late in 1999, to re-open talks on Cyprus and to seek a peaceful resolution of its differences with Greece. However, having attained candidacy status at Helsinki, it became clear that Turkey sought the de-facto recognition of the occupied areas and the formation of a confederation of two, independent, sovereign and rec-

ognized states on Cyprus. It was in this context that they were willing to address issues of property compensation, security and limited border adjustments.

Turkey was fully aware of Washington's progressive support of most of these ideas, especially because Richard Holbrooke promoted the idea of an 'acknowledgment' of the Turkish Cypriot political entity by the Greek Cypriots during his mission to Nicosia in May 1998. That acknowledgment included the legitimacy of the laws and institutions established there since 1974, and the fact that the Cyprus government did not speak on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community. Instead, Turkish Cypriots were represented by leaders elected through legitimate procedures. Sir David Hannay, the British representative on Cyprus, shared similar views. Both argued that such an 'acknowledgment' would provide the needed momentum in a new round of talks, as they both expected the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sides to negotiate in good faith. This, of course, had been the history of the Cyprus negotiations since 1974.

Washington once more took steps to undermine the United Nations by bringing the Cyprus problem to the meeting of the G-8 in Cologne, Germany, on June 20, 1999. The attempt to minimize the role of the United Nations has been a constant element of American policy since the 1950s. The G-8 adopted the following formula¹⁵ on Cyprus, which was later endorsed by UN Security Council resolutions 1250 and 1251 of 1999. The two sides were called to a new round of talks based on the following four principles: talks without preconditions; discussion of all issues; sustained talks in good faith and until a solution is found, and full consideration of relevant UN resolutions and treaties.

The G-8 formula contained both good and bad news. The reference to the UN resolutions implied an endorsement of a bizonal-bicomunal federation, with single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship. Further, earlier resolutions condemned the pseudo-state created by the Turkish army in the occupied areas, and called for its non-recognition. The 'bad news', however, were that 'the parties'

could put on the table all issues without preconditions. This meant that Mr. Denktash could present himself as president of a sovereign and independent state, and that he could present his proposal for a confederation of two sovereign states. The reference to the other international agreements implied discussion of the Treaty of Guarantee and Turkey's intervention rights, in addition to the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report to the Security Council on June 22, 1999, closely reflected the American and British ideas by noting that the political status of the Turkish Cypriots needed to be addressed. He attempted to do that in an addendum on the status of UNFICYP in December of 1999, but his attempt to do the same in June 2000 failed after repeated warnings by the Cyprus government. This was the reality facing the Cyprus government as it entered inconclusive rounds of UN sponsored proximity talks with the Turkish Cypriots in the spring and summer of 2000. The proximity talks were also attended by American and British negotiators.

What advice did Washington offer the two sides as they entered this latest phase of proximity talks?

1. Look to the future and not to the past.
2. Do not debate whether the events of 1974 were an invasion or an intervention.
3. Do not debate abstract notions of federation/confederation, or the nature of sovereignty. Arrive at a constitutional solution first, and name it later.
4. Leave humanitarian issues out of the negotiations. These issues, in addition to the missing, included the 90,000+ Turkish settlers.
5. The government of Cyprus should commit to confidence building measures including the gradual lifting of sanctions against the so-called TRNC.

6. President Clerides and Mr. Denktash were urged to show political courage and imagination so as to close their careers with an agreement, because they have the moral authority over their respective publics, and can unburden their successors from politically costly choices.

The irony and cynicism of American policy is that while publicly American officials endorse a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation, privately they have given their full support to a confederation of two independent, sovereign states. American officials promote the 'land for constitutional concessions' principle. The greater the territorial compromise, the looser the confederation becomes. In 1992, the United States had presented some 92 map variations which were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots. These territorial concessions ranged from 25%+ to almost 32% of the territory for the Turkish Cypriot 'state'. Alternative scenaria have also been prepared on the structure of the executive branch, while selective provision from the Swiss, German, Belgian and the Canadian constitutions have provided justifications as to how sovereignty can be divided in a two-state confederation, despite the UN resolutions calling for a state with a single sovereignty.

The following ten points offer insights as to how Washington has attempted to address the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot demand for recognition of the so-called TRNC as a pre-condition for substantive talks.

1. The US will not support recognition as a precondition for the talks, but will assist the Turkish Cypriots to attain recognition as an outcome of the talks.
2. The US is interested in having continuous negotiations between the two parties to keep the momentum created by American initiatives and by the recent improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.
3. Meaningful talks require that the Greek Cypriots need to come to terms with the reality that has been created since

1974, and to be sensitive to Turkish Cypriot needs and concerns. For Washington the problem is one of intercommunal power sharing and not one of invasion and occupation.

4. It is up to the parties to decide what relationship they will have. They need to show flexibility, realism, and political courage. The US will offer constructive suggestions and alternative scenarios to guide the talks.
5. Even though federation may be desirable, it must be wanted by both sides. The reality, however, is that the new constitutional arrangement requires an acceptance of elements of legitimized partition reflecting the conditions existing since 1974. A stable partition will be better than the current unstable *status quo*.
6. The two sides need to negotiate the core issues, and not to debate issues like federation or confederation, invasion or occupation. The core issues involve: boundaries, property exchanges, resettlement of displaced persons, three freedoms, and compensation. Therefore, in these talks, it is the substance that counts, not the form! Once a settlement is reached, then, constitutional experts and politicians can name it whatever they may!
7. Raouf Denktash and the Turks are realists and will come to the talks with something less than the *de jure* recognition of the 'TRNC' as an independent and sovereign state. Raouf Denktash will accept an 'acknowledgment' by the government of Cyprus that he and his administration represent the Turkish Cypriots and speak on their behalf. Once granted such an acknowledgment he will negotiate in good faith. The American State Department, Britain, and Australia, suggest that the September 1993 exchange of letters between the government of Israel and the Palestinians be used as a precedent.

8. An 'acknowledgment' by the government of Cyprus does not have to be disclosed publicly until negotiations have reached a satisfactory stage.
9. Even though acknowledgment amounts to recognition of the Denktash administration as the *de facto* government of the territory under its control, it will not have other legal consequences. Assurances will be offered to the Greek Cypriots that the international community, with the exception of Turkey, will not recognize *de jure* a Turkish Cypriot state. And,
10. When a full agreement has been reached, the international community will allow a brief moment of sovereignty to the Turkish Cypriots, so that both sides can form a new partnership on Cyprus based on the political equality of the two constituent states.

By the end of July 2000 the gap separating the two sides was growing and this created a serious dilemma for the government of Cyprus. Abandoning the talks would have serious political consequences, especially on the progress of the talks with the EU. Remaining in the talks exposed the government of Cyprus to American, British, and UN pressures for an acknowledgment of the Turkish Cypriot state and for the formation of a confederation of two independent, recognized and sovereign states. Aware of these conditions, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots held fast to their position on confederation as shown in the paper submitted by Mr. Denktash to Mr. Alvaro De Soto, the representative of the Secretary-General in Geneva during the July phase of the talks.¹⁶ What was even more insidious was that De Soto's 'non-paper' was dictated to the parties. This non-paper, to which the parties were asked to respond, altered the terminology that had been included in UN Security Council resolutions on Cyprus. It was one more attempt to undermine the moral authority of the UN. This non-paper adopted positions advocated by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. It included references to the common state instead of the federal state on Cyprus, spoke of the component states joining in a

50/50 partnership, terms used by Mr. Denktash. It abandoned the concepts of a 'just and viable' solution in favor of an 'equitable' solution and addressed the two sides instead of the two communities, thus moving away from the principle of intercommunal talks; it provided for freedom of movement, but called for 'equity' in property compensation, effectively overruling the Loizidou ruling of the European Court of human rights; and called for a significant reduction in the number of Turkish troops on Cyprus and their presence in a new international force. Two other critical points were also addressed by De Soto. The new state would have three constitutions with distinct definitions on citizenship. While earlier UN resolutions spoke of a sovereign Cyprus Republic with a single citizenship and international personality, De Soto proposed the distinction between separate internal citizenship and nationality. Finally, De Soto extended an indirect veto to the Turkish Cypriots on the issue of the EU, something denied to them by the EU, by indicating that EU integration must account for the 'legitimate concerns of both sides'.

These negative developments in the Cyprus talks were accompanied by other discouraging political developments. During the summer of 2000, the occupied areas entered a new phase of economic and political instability opening the way to more direct rule from Ankara. Moreover, in total disregard of the United Nations, the occupation forces violated the neutral zone and brought under their control the hamlet of Strovilia causing only the verbal expression of concern by the United States, Britain, and the Secretary-General. Meanwhile, Ankara continued its campaign against Greece by formally repeating its known positions on Thrace, the Aegean, and the Greek islands of the Aegean. These actions indicated that what had changed since the summer of 1999 was the tone, not the substance or the objectives of Turkish policy.¹⁷

At the September phase of the U. N. talks on Cyprus, the trends described in the preceding pages were fully articulated in the opening statement of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. On September 13, 2000, in New York, the Secretary-General stated:

The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot parties have been participating, since December 1999, in proximity talks to prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement. I believe the time has come to move ahead.

In the course of these talks, I have ascertained that the parties share a common desire to bring about, through negotiations in which each represents its side and no one else as the political equal of the other, a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership on which to build a better future in peace, security, and prosperity on a united island.

In this spirit, and with the purpose of expediting negotiations in good faith and without preconditions on all issues before them, I have concluded that the equal status of the parties must and should be recognized explicitly in the comprehensive settlement which will embody the results of the detailed negotiations required to translate this concept into clear and practical provisions.¹⁸

For the first time, the Secretary-General formally and unequivocally spoke of the two parties rather than two communities; defined that each party represents itself and no one else, and spoke of a new partnership, i.e., a new state as demanded by the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots. This opening statement fully complied with the positions advocated by the US and by the UK. This is an important point because, up until September 13, statements and/or leaks as to the positions advanced by the UN mediators were dismissed as rumors or as independent initiatives by UN 'technocrats'.¹⁹ The shock of the UN Secretary-General's opening statement brought the talks to a near collapse before they began. The United States scrambled to save the talks by suggesting that nothing had changed in its policy or that of the United Nations and that the Secretary-General's statement did not imply the recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state. These vague verbal assurances could not hide the reality of what occurred in New York. The United States, all along, promoted positions on Cyprus acceptable to Turkey. Now, the United States had used the Secretary-General to promote the same goals. In the process, the UN's chief executive officer had taken steps that contradicted the unanimous UN

Security Council resolutions on Cyprus and undermined the integrity of the organization he represented.

The September 2000 New York phase of the talks ended with the representative of UN Secretary-General, Alvaro de Soto, presenting the parties a series of new non-papers on constitutional, territorial, security, and property compensation issues so that they could be used as a basis for discussion when the 'parties' returned to Geneva in early November 2000. Earlier, the government of Cyprus had rejected constitutional proposals presented to them by Mr. de Soto as unworkable confederal schemes.

Keeping the talks alive, despite the setback suffered in New York by the government of Cyprus, offered an alibi to Turkey that the Cyprus problem should not be a condition in its November talks with the EU. It also provided a limited face saving for Greece's rapprochement policy with Turkey.

The second half of the year 2000 turned out to be a critical one for the survival of Cyprus as an independent and sovereign state. Despite the American inspired and directed UN machinations, the future of Cyprus is in Europe. If Washington is serious in its pledge to support a viable settlement in Cyprus in the context of a viable bizonal, bicomunal federation, then a solution based on the implementation of all Security Council resolutions and on the application of the *acquis* can help restore stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and serve the rights of the communities. Otherwise, Cyprus will remain the last divided and occupied country of Europe.

ENDNOTES

1. In particular, the implementation of the 'three freedoms'; i.e., movement, settlement and property ownership.
2. Candidate status was granted to Turkey at the Helsinki meeting of the E.U. in December 1999. Turkey was expected to meet a number of conditions by 2004 prior to the commencement of integration talks.

3. For example, President Clerides and Mr. Denktash have been involved in the Cyprus problem since its colonial days.
4. Such as those between President Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash in New York July and October 1992; the May 1993 meeting in New York between President Clerides and Mr. Denktash, and those of 1997 at Troutbeck, N. Y., Glion, Switzerland, and Nicosia.
5. Such as those in the current phase of negotiations in Geneva.
6. Informal talks held in London during the spring 1995.
7. The 1983 Turkish Cypriot U. D. I., the formal abandonment of federation in 1994, etc.
8. The Loizidou ruling, along with the U. S. Federal District Court ruling on the Kanakaria mosaics, had significant political and legal implications. The European Court of Human Rights ruling on the Loizidou case remains unimplemented at this time, despite calls by the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe for Turkey's compliance.
9. These bases were exempt from CFE limitations.
10. Arvanitopoulos, Constantine P., "Greek Defense Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence," in Theophanous, Andreas and Coufoudakis, Van (eds.) **Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean** (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1997) pp. 163-164.
11. These anti-aircraft missiles had a range of 150 miles. They were capable of shooting down aircraft flying out of bases in southern Turkey. Given the geographic location of Cyprus, Turkey elicited American and Israeli help on this issue by arguing that these missiles could also affect their security interests as well.
12. Gabelnick, Tamar, Hartung, William, Washburn, Jennifer, **Arming Repression: U.S. Arms Sales to Turkey During the Clinton Administration**, New York: World Policy Institute, 1999.
13. Abdullah Oçalan, the leader of the Kurdish rebellion against Turkey, had been evicted from Syria in October 1988 after Turkey threatened military action against Syria. In his quest for asylum Oçalan received clandestine support from members of the Greek government. He was arrested in Kenya in the spring of 1999 in a joint operation between the U. S. and Turkey.
14. Helsinki European Council, Presidency conclusion, 10 and 11 December 1999. Note in particular paragraphs 4, 9 (a) (b), and 12.
15. Press Release 20.06.99, "G-8 Statement on Regional Issues", p.3.
16. For an extensive accurate summary in English see **Cyprus Weekly**, July 14 - 20, p. 5.

17. **La Stampa**, August 2, 2000, article by Turkish Foreign Minister Cem.
18. U. N. Press Release, New York, Wednesday, July 13, 2000.
19. This was the U.S. explanation in May 2000 of the attempt to attach an 'addendum' to the Secretary-General's report on the operations of UNFICYP, implying the existence of a Turkish Cypriot 'state.'