

Turkey's 'Road Map' to the European Union

Implications for Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Issue

Dimitris P. Droutsas and Panayotis J. Tsakonas*

RÉSUMÉ

Suite à un bref historique de l'évolution des relations turbulentes entre l'Union européenne et la Turquie, à partir de l'accord d'association d'Ankara (1963) jusqu'au Conseil d'Europe à Helsinki, cet article traite des relations de la période allant de la guerre froide jusqu'à la question chypriote. L'article met l'accent sur deux dimensions des relations entre l'UE et le pays candidat, notamment le Partenariat et le Programme national pour l'adoption de l'acquis (NPAA). Les auteurs évaluent l'impact des relations européennes sur les relations turco-grecques et la question chypriote et en tire des conclusions pertinentes.

ABSTRACT

The article begins with a historical overview of the evolution of turbulent relations between the EU and Turkey, from the Ankara Agreement of Association (1963) up to the Helsinki summit of the European Council. The authors focus on how post-Cold War Greek-Turkish relations have evolved by tracing developments and events, especially the Cyprus question. Particular emphasis is paid to two key areas of Turkey's relations with the EU, namely the Accession Partnership and Turkey's National Program for the Adoption of the Aquis (NPAA). The article concludes with an assessment of the impact of the EU-Turkey relationship on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue.

The European Council's Summit Meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 was a turning point in Turkey's path to the European Union. The Helsinki Meeting managed to eliminate the 'phantom of exclusion' by granting Turkey a formal status of Candidate State for acces-

* Dr. Dimitris P. Droutsas is Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Dr. Panayotis J. Tsakonas is Scientific Advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece. The views expressed in this article are personal and not to be attributed to the institution represented by the authors.

sion to the EU, while it also eased the turbulent relations with the EU, dating back to the early 1960's. The granting of candidate status has also entailed Turkey's entrance into a pre-accession strategy which, in turn, asked that certain political conditions be fulfilled in order for accession negotiations to commence. More importantly, Turkey's eligibility after the Helsinki European Council is conditional on the resolution of two issues, namely its 'border conflict' with an EU-Member State; i.e., Greece, and the Cyprus issue.

In Helsinki, Greece, by insisting on a real – instead of a virtual or *sui generis* – candidacy for Turkey, aimed at the engagement of Turkey in an 'Accession Partnership' with the EU – a "road map" to Europe. This partnership would put Turkey under the constant screening and monitoring process of certain EU mechanisms and procedures allowing for certain structural changes to take place in Turkey, in order that the *acquis communautaire* be fully endorsed. This "Europeanisation" of Turkish politics and society is expected – by Greek decision-makers – to eventually lead to the abandonment by the Turkish élite of its current rusty aggressive behaviour and to the adoption of policies based less on geopolitical instruments of statecraft and more on international law and agreements.

EU-Turkey Relations: From Association to Candidacy

Turkey's relations with the EU date back to 1963, when it became the second Mediterranean country after Greece¹ to sign an Association Agreement – the so-called "Ankara Agreement" – with the European Community.² These agreements were based on Article 238 of the EEC-Treaty, of unlimited duration and stipulating eventual – though not automatic – membership to the Community.³ Of course, both the Community and Turkey were aware at the time that the road opened by the "Ankara Agreement" would be rising and long.⁴

The Athens and Ankara Agreements, signed when Europe was in the midst of the Cold War, were considered desirable as a means of strengthening economic and social conditions of two key NATO

members occupying a pivotal role in the southern flank of the Alliance and at the head of the Dardanelles. The agreements were also a means by which the Community could find some form of equilibrium between Greece and Turkey and also assert its international personality, mainly its ability to conclude international agreements as a bloc with third countries.⁵ It was, therefore, in the Mediterranean that the Community was able to affirm its international character initially and thus gain recognition as a new entity in the international system.

The end of the Cold War diminished Turkey's traditional importance for the West, though strong arguments can still be made about its strategic value *vis-à-vis* the turbulent Middle East and Central Asia – not to mention the importance of supporting and upholding the Turkish secular state as a model for the newly independent Moslem states of Central Asia.

Turkey launched its application for membership to the Community on 14 April 1987; the *Commission's* – rejecting – *Opinion* on Turkey's application came out at the end of 1989.⁶ The reasons which the EU put forward for refusing Turkey's application were routinely linked to Turkey's low level of economic development, its rapidly growing population (with the added consideration that, were it to become a member of the Union, Turkey could before too long become one of its most populous countries) and the impact that such a large underdeveloped, mainly agrarian country, would have on the Community's structural funds, agricultural policy and budget – not to mention internal migration.⁷

The treatment of Turkey by the EU is symptomatic of its changing international priorities, not least of which are those in the Mediterranean region. Since the late sixties and early seventies, the Community had regarded the Mediterranean as a zone of instability whose problems could spill over into Europe itself. While military threats and overall strategic balance in the region might have been countered by the presence of the American Sixth Fleet, the Community was using economic statecraft, especially discriminatory trading preferences, under the aegis of its Global Mediterranean

Policy,⁸ to enhance stability in the region, essentially by trying to alleviate the non-military threats.’ The accession of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) to the Community consolidated the new democratic process that had begun in each of these countries. In the late eighties, at the time of Turkey’s application, no such prerogatives existed which would have motivated the Community to include Turkey in its fold. Moreover, the focus of the EU had shifted markedly to internal consolidation, while externally it became preoccupied with two main issues: the successful consolidation of Western European integration by linking the EFTA countries with the Union through the European Economic Area (EEA) and events in Central and Eastern Europe. Then came the negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the start of European Economic and Monetary Union followed by accession negotiations with the EFTA group and the conclusion of ‘Europe Agreements’ with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These events also negatively affected the applications for accession to the EU of Cyprus and Malta.

Moreover, the emerging problems and priorities in the Mediterranean region, to which the EU was admittedly rather slow to react – population growth, migratory pressures on Europe, terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism – lessened Turkey’s attractiveness. The perception being that Turkey could possibly aggravate rather than diminish some, if not all of these pressures. Turkish intransigence regarding Cyprus and its dismal human rights record¹⁰ did not help either. Lurking under the surface was the cultural question; namely, although Turkey has Western institutions of government and a legal system established by Kemal Atatürk, it is an Islamic country.¹¹ Ironically, when in the seventies the international environment was potentially favourable towards Turkey, the latter was rather lukewarm to the idea of membership,¹² while Greece successfully pressed for membership.

The application for membership to the Community submitted by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on 3 July 1990 made the Community’s stance over Turkey’s application more demanding. At the 1990 Dublin European Council the Community declared that

future relations with Turkey would depend on Ankara adopting a more cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue. Not until 6 March 1995 did it become possible for the EU to complete negotiations for a Customs Union Agreement¹³ with Turkey. It was at this point that the General Affairs Council of the EU – under persistent pressure from the Greek government – ‘bartered’ the lifting of the Greek veto against a commitment to start accession negotiations with Cyprus (and Malta) six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.¹⁴

Although the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 “*confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union*”, it did not grant Turkey the status of Candidate State for accession to the EU and did not include Turkey in the pre-accession strategy developed for Candidate States, thus allowing ten former communist states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) to move ahead of Turkey in line. Instead, the European Council, in order to justify the fact that Turkey’s application was treated separately, called on the Commission to develop a ‘European Strategy for Turkey’ with the aim of assisting it with further reforms, and invited Turkey to the ‘European Conference’¹⁵. To make things worse, the eleventh officially recognized Candidate State was the Republic of Cyprus, which – along with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia – was to begin actual accession negotiations.

The effects of the decisions made in Luxembourg not only upset longstanding expectations in Turkey; but they also created a psychological barrier between the EU and that country, which took the form of a genuinely angry response by the latter, namely the suspension of all of its political relations with the EU (except from the Customs Union).¹⁶ The one-to-one meetings, which followed between Turkey and the Commission, focused primarily on the payment of EU-funds and the financial compensation due to Turkey as part of the 1995 Customs Union Agreement.¹⁷

Finally, the Cardiff European Council in June 1998 was considered an attempt on the part of the EU to bring Turkey closer to meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Cardiff thus managed to pave the way for the EU's approach to Turkey's candidacy to be readdressed by adopting the position that the Commission's "Progress Report on Turkey" was in effect a document on preparation for Turkish accession.¹⁸ Furthermore, the need to carry forward the "European strategy for Turkey" was stressed, including the tabling of any proposals necessary for its effective implementation.

The Helsinki European Council of 10 and 11 December 1999 has managed to eliminate the phantom of exclusion by stating that "*Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate countries*".¹⁹ However, the granting of formal status of Candidate State for accession to the EU has also entailed Turkey's entrance into a pre-accession strategy²⁰ to stimulate and support its reforms, which in turn asks for certain political conditions to be fulfilled *in order for accession negotiations to start*²¹ (our emphasis).

The various joint EU-Turkey institutions started re-functioning after the Helsinki decisions.²² The most important of these institutions is the EC-Turkey Association Council, which met on 11 April 2000 for the first time in three years and was chaired by Turkey. It adopted two important political decisions, one on the establishment of eight sub-committees of the Association Committee and the other on the opening of negotiations for an agreement aiming at the liberalization of services and the mutual opening of procurement markets between the EU and Turkey. The sub-committees of the Association Committee fulfilled a two-fold task: "*prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis*", as requested by the Helsinki European Council, with a view to intensifying the harmonization of Turkey's legislation with the Community's rules and regulations and monitor the implementation of the Accession Partnership priorities.

The Evolution of Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Issue

During the post-Cold War era, relations between Greece and Turkey remained tense while the two NATO allies maintained an extremely high level of defense expenditures compared to other NATO members. The 1990s witnessed a number of bilateral crises:

- 1) the declaration of the Joint Defense Doctrine between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus;
- 2) the October 1994 declaration of a *casus belli* over the possible extension of Greek territorial waters by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, which then became official policy through a Resolution of the Turkish National Assembly;
- 3) the Imia crisis which brought the two countries to the brink of war. Scarcely a month after the signing of the Madrid Agreement in July 1997, which at first seemed to constitute a major positive development in the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations, Greece observed a “negative list” of Turkish responses. The responses included Prime Minister Yilmaz’s statement that the principles of international law cannot be applied to the Aegean Sea, the “Joining” or “Integration Agreement” concluded between Turkey and the occupied areas of Cyprus, and the challenge to Greek sovereignty over more than one hundred islands and islets in the Aegean Sea, including the island of Gavdos, south of Crete.

On the other hand, Turkey remained very anxious because of Cyprus’ purchase and planned deployment of the Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile system. Decisions taken in the Luxembourg and Cardiff European Councils, held in January and June 1998 respectively, further burdened the already tense and fragile Greek-Turkish security agenda, as the postponement of Turkey’s accession negotiations remained linked to Greece’s deliberate policy of keeping the doors of the EU closed. The picture further deteriorated with the capture of the leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, at the Nairobi airport in February 1999, after a brief stay in

the Greek ambassadorial residence in Kenya. For most high officials and analysts in Turkey, the Greek involvement in the Ocalan issue was a clear indication, if not proof, of Greece's plans for Turkey's dismemberment (in the general context of the so-called "Sevres Syndrome", which allegedly is haunting some Turkish policy-makers).

This dark picture started changing during the Kosovo conflict, when the two governments reached an understanding that an improvement of relations was necessary. Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, and his Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem, prepared the ground for an official *rapprochement* that was greatly facilitated by two unexpected events: the catastrophic earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August and September 1999, respectively. The swift Greek reaction to the Turkish tragedy changed the mood spectacularly and led to a similar Turkish reaction after the Athens earthquake. Both countries, either through official channels or through private initiative, rallied to the side of each other dispatching medical supplies, equipment and rescue teams to alleviate the plight of earthquake-torn Greeks and Turks. A *rapprochement* between the two countries followed in the summer of 1999, which led to a number of bilateral agreements on issues characterized as 'low politics'. In January and February 2000, Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Cem visited each other's capitals and signed a total of nine bilateral agreements on 'low politics' or 'low confrontation' issues. These agreements concerned tourism, culture, the environment, trade and commerce, multilateral cooperation (especially with regard to the Black Sea and Southeast Europe regions), organized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Those low-politics agreements are perceived by both countries as a very positive development and constitute a good basis for building a solid bilateral relationship.

However, progress on the more substantive issues touching the core of bilateral problems (high-politics) will be neither automatic nor easy. Although both sides, with the encouragement of the EU, NATO and the USA, have appeared willing to discuss, in principle at least, various Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and conflict resolution proposals, there is strong "inertial" opposition, especially in Ankara.

Given that the Helsinki European Council set a particular timetable, within which both the Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue should be addressed, both countries agreed to create the necessary conditions for successfully addressing more sensitive 'high politics' issues at a later stage. With the aim of creating the necessary conditions, the two countries decided to work together towards the advancement of a 'limited' or 'transparent' security regime²³ that could form the basis for a stable and less dangerous relationship. This régime would aim at the regularization of the two states' action with regard to a specific 'issue area'. In this case, the area is arms control, which may concern the agreement between the opponents on the adoption of specific measures that would eliminate the possibility of 'surprise attack' and promote stability (crisis stability) through the prevention of war caused inadvertently by miscalculations and/or accidents (accidental war).

By introducing a dialogue on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) the two countries laid the foundations for the establishment of such a 'limited' or 'transparent' security régime in the area of arms control. The Greek-Turkish CBM process dates back to January 2000, when the Turkish side submitted a set of exclusively military CBMs that could be concluded and implemented by the two countries. The Greek side responded favourably to some of the Turkish proposals, while it insisted that the agenda – in line with the broader definition of security in the post-Cold War era – should not be limited to certain military CBMs, but could include certain environmental CBMs. Indeed, after three official meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Greece and Turkey have managed to agree on three particular categories of CBMs to be discussed in the months to come. More specifically, the two countries have agreed to discuss a series of measures included in the following three categories: (a) Confidence-Building Measures within the framework of the Papoulias-Yilmaz Memorandum of Understanding (Athens, 27 May 1988), (b) Measures of Tension Reduction, and (c) Measures of Good Neighbourliness.²⁴ The measures included in the first category were agreed to be discussed within the framework of NATO²⁵ by the two states' Permanent Representatives in Brussels, while measures included

in the other two categories are being discussed by the Political Directors of the two states' Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

The de-coupling of the Aegean and Cyprus issues might be possible, at least to a certain extent and in terms of implementing agreed CBMs, although the situation in the Aegean has a direct impact on the situation in Cyprus, and vice-versa. It is thus unlikely that fundamental progress towards a comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement will be achieved without a just and mutually acceptable solution of the prickly Cyprus problem. To this end, a 'European' solution for the two communities on the island would probably be the optimal solution.²⁶

It is also worth noting that the two meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey on January 19-22 and on February 5-6 2000, in Ankara and Athens respectively, have given further impetus to bilateral relations, by producing ideas that have resulted in successful cooperation between the two countries. One of those initiatives was the setting up of a joint Task Force entrusted with the study and realisation of Greek-Turkish cooperation on matters pertaining to the *acquis communautaire*. The Task Force has met six times so far.²⁷ After an initial stage of exploratory nature that helped define the main areas of potential cooperation, the Task Force has focused its activity on paving the way for seminars of technical assistance regarding the transfer of know-how on various issues of interest concerning the *acquis communautaire* to the Turkish side.²⁸ These seminars are not based on the 'teacher and pupil scheme', but are intended to bring the two sides together, in studying each other's practices and sharing Greece's experience in dealing with the various aspects of the *acquis*. The results the Task Force has achieved so far contribute to the positive development of relations between the two countries, as they are tangible and irreversible, thereby enhancing considerably mutual understanding and trust between the two administrations.

With regard to the Cyprus issue, the most recent development has been the launching of proximity talks. Following the statement of the G-8 meeting on 20 June 1999²⁹ calling for comprehensive negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1250/99 (29 June 1999). The Resolution

requested that the Secretary-General, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions, invite the leaders of the two sides to comprehensive negotiations under the auspices of the UN. These negotiations should be conducted in respect of the following principles: (a) no preconditions, (b) all issues on the table, (c) commitment to continue to negotiate in good faith until a settlement is reached, and (d) full consideration of relevant UN Resolutions and Treaties.³⁰ On November 13, 1999, Kofi Anan, announced that his invitation for proximity talks to start on 3 December 1999 in New York had been accepted by President Glafkos Clerides and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş. The date chosen for the start of the proximity talks certainly contributed to the positive climate in view of the important decisions to be taken on Turkey's status as Candidate State for accession to the EU at the Helsinki European Council a few days later.

Right from the beginning, it was made clear that the proximity talks were to be seen as the start of an extended process. So far, the two sides have witnessed five rounds of proximity talks.³¹ The procedure chosen by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Alvaro De Soto, was designed to avoid the transfer of positions and proposals from the one side to the other, and present orally his own ideas for discussion and comment and separately, to both sides. His objective was always to draft a comprehensive paper for negotiation. Ideas were put on the table on the four core issues: territory, property, security and constitution. The talks were characterized by time-consuming mediation efforts to keep them alive, rather than by real and substantial progress. Two incidents overshadowed the talks. First, lengthy discussions on a controversial "Addendum" to the Secretary General's Report on the occasion of the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period, which referred to the position of the "Turkish-Cypriot authorities" for the first time. The "Addendum" was finally withdrawn. In reaction to the withdrawal of this Addendum, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership imposed measures against UNFICYP. These measures include limitations to the movement of UNFICYP across the buffer zone. Further, the UN is now obliged to insure all its vehicles with

Turkish-Cypriot insurance companies and to allow the Turkish-Cypriots to collect fees for the water, electricity and other services consumed by UN camps in the occupied areas. Second, Turkish troops advanced 300 meters at one point in the buffer zone, where a village, named Strovilia, with a small number of Greek-Cypriot families as well as a UN entry post were located and are now enclosed by Turkish military forces. Both actions have given rise to a series of protests, including protests from the UN Secretary General who demanded that the *status quo* be reinstated.

At the conclusion of the fifth – and so far last – round of the proximity talks, the UN Secretary General put forward a series of ‘oral remarks’, outlining his views on the continuation of the process as well as on the issues under negotiation. A new element can be identified in the considerations on the settlement of the Cyprus issue: the compatibility of the comprehensive solution to be found with the *acquis communautaire* and the opportunity of Cypriot accession to the EU. Finally, on 24 November 2000, while discussions reached their peak on the references on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue in Turkey’s Accession Partnership, Denktash declared that he did not intend to continue proximity talks, returning to the position he had previously held that recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot entity as an independent state was a precondition to be fulfilled before entering into talks.

Implications of Turkey’s ‘Road Map’ on Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Issue

The “Accession Partnership” is undoubtedly the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy.³² More specifically, Turkey’s Accession Partnership³³ sets out, in a single framework, the priority areas, as defined in the analysis of the situation in Turkey, on which preparations for accession must concentrate in view of the political and economic criteria and the obligations incumbent upon a EU-Member State as defined by the European Council. It also indicates

the financial resources for assisting Turkey to implement the priorities identified during the pre-accession period.³⁴ The priorities and intermediate objectives for political, economic and legal/administrative reforms within Turkey's accession preparations are divided into two groups, namely short-term and medium-term,³⁵ and touch upon Turkey's 'internal' as well as 'external' front.

Internally, Turkey is asked to proceed to the democratization of Turkish politics and the transformation of its 'anocratic' régime into a fully-fledged western democracy. Turkey's, as all candidate states', eventual EU-membership involves at a minimum the 'conscious surrender' of parts of state sovereignty to a supranational organization, if not the complete rethinking of the state's role and the re-conceptualization of the 'national interest'. The reforms that Turkey is asked to promote are mainly related to three broad areas, namely the Kurdish issue – and by implication human rights issues – the role of the military in Turkish politics and certain economic and administrative adjustments for harmonizing the state's internal structures to certain European standards.³⁶ It can well be argued that such reforms in Turkey's 'internal front' constitute a small revolution.

Externally, Turkey's eligibility after the Helsinki European Council is conditional on the resolution of two issues, namely its border conflict with an EU-member state, specifically Greece³⁷ and the Cyprus issue. It is beyond the scope of this article to exercise the various – especially legal – interpretations, used in the domestic political debate in both Greece and Turkey the day-after the Helsinki European Council for defining Turkey's obligations that are conditional upon resolution of tensions on the Greek-Turkish front. For the purposes of this article, we stick instead to the implications stemming from the much clearer political message of the EU to Turkey concerning Greek-Turkish relations as well as the Cyprus issue.

With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, Helsinki made clear to Turkey that the country has four years – until 2004 – at its disposal for a resolution of the conflict with neighbouring Greece to be achieved before the rather critical review that would assess Turkey's

path towards the EU takes place.³⁸ After welcoming the launch of the proximity talks on the Cyprus issue under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, the Helsinki European Council reiterated that a political settlement of the Cyprus problem would facilitate Cyprus' accession to the EU, but would not be a precondition for accession. At the same time, the European Council stressed ambiguously that all relevant factors would be taken into account for the final decision on accession.³⁹ Nevertheless, the Heads of States and Governments of the EU-15 have sent a clear message to Turkey that the division of Cyprus must be ended by the date of the next EU-enlargement at the latest. After that date, even a divided Cyprus will become member of the Union. In that sense, Turkey, which illegally occupies the northern part of the island, can no longer 'block' the accession of Cyprus to the EU.

Thus, the Helsinki European Council constitutes both an alert and an incentive for Turkey that there is a light at the end of the tunnel and Turkey must, therefore, successfully address current issues, which cause instability into a particular part of the Union.

The decisions taken at the Helsinki European Council concerning Turkey's so-called external front have been included in Turkey's Accession Partnership – Turkey's actual road map to Europe. The formulations finally drafted were the result of strong diplomatic efforts by both sides and may be considered characteristic of what could be termed this new era in Greek-Turkish relations introduced by rapprochement between the two countries.

From the outset, the Greek government made clear to its EU-partners that it expected both issues of special Greek interest (Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue) to be included in Turkey's Accession Partnership.⁴⁰ Once the assenting opinion of the EU-15 on this principle was assured, the remaining non-linguistic question was not *whether*, but *where* to put these provisions in Turkey's Accession Partnership document.

The draft was prepared by the Commission and took into consideration Turkey's interests. A reference both to Greek-Turkish relations

and to the Cyprus issue, based on the wording used in the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, was put only in the chapter regarding the “Principles” of the Accession Partnership. From a legal point of view this chapter does not bear the same binding nature as the chapter containing the “Priorities and Intermediate Objectives” does, thus leaving Turkey much greater room for manoeuvre. Greece’s demand was that provisions on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue be included in the short- and medium-term priorities of the Accession Partnership.⁴¹ This demand was partially fulfilled at the meeting of the Commission’s College adopting the draft proposal of Turkey’s Accession Partnership, November 8, 2000. Besides the reference to Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue in the above-mentioned chapter, the Cyprus issue was also included in the “Short-Term Priorities” which Turkey had been called upon to meet.

Greece’s insistence that the Council⁴² for Greek-Turkish relations be included in the “Medium-Term Priorities” of Turkey’s Accession Partnership led to intense Turkish reactions and the visit of high-ranking Turkish officials to the capitals of the EU-Member States which Turkey considered key players in the Accession Partnership decision-making process.⁴³ A compromise solution at the political level was finally agreed upon at the General Affairs Council of December 4, 2000 – the last Council meeting before the Nice European Council. This compromise foresaw the inclusion of both the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations in the “Short-Term” and “Medium-Term Priorities” respectively, but under the heading “Enhanced Political Dialogue and Political Criteria”.⁴⁴ In this manner, the Greek demand of including both issues in the “Priorities” of Turkey’s Accession Partnership was met, while Turkey’s sensitivities were assuaged by giving continuation to the ‘constructive ambiguity’ of the wording chosen at the Helsinki European Council.

Community assistance for financing projects through the pre-accession instruments for Turkey is conditional on respect by Turkey of its commitments under the Association Agreement, Customs Union and related decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council. Thus, further steps towards satisfying the so-called Copenhagen criteria and, in par-

ticular, progress in meeting the specific priorities of the Accession Partnership in the year 2001 need to be taken. Most important, Turkey's failure to respect these general conditions could lead to a decision by the Council on the suspension of financial assistance.⁴⁵

Finally, the implementation of the Accession Partnership is monitored within the framework of the Association Agreement; i.e., in the appropriate sub-committee of the Association Committee, and through the competent Council bodies, to which the Commission must report regularly.

In order to prepare for membership, the Accession Partnership calls upon Turkey to prepare on the basis of the Accession Partnership a National Program for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA). Although this program must be compatible with the priorities established in the Accession Partnership setting out a timetable for achieving them, it is not an integral part of the Accession Partnership.

With considerable delay, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey finally adopted the NPAA on 19 March 2001.⁴⁶ Turkey's NPAA is aimed at the objectives of "*further strengthening Turkey's pluralistic, participatory and democratic structure on human rights and rule of law, which are principles that have already been adopted by Turkey*", moreover of "*a more efficient implementation of Turkey's economic program which will enable Turkey to adapt rapidly to the Copenhagen economic criteria*", and finally of "*Turkey's rapid adaptation to the criteria achieved by the EU member states in every field*".⁴⁷ Turkey's National Program foresees reform-oriented political, economic, social and institutional changes. With its political characteristics as well as its economic, social and institutional contents, the NPAA "*provides for a very intensive adaptation and legislation process*." Expressing its desire "*to put into effect the necessary measures and laws rapidly*" the Turkish government expects, by completing this transformation process, both to "*achieve its aim to be a member of the European Union and acquire a stronger and more active position in the international arena*."⁴⁸ The reaction of the EU to the content of Turkey's NPAA, however, was far more cautious.⁴⁹

Concerning the issues which are related to Turkey's external front, namely Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, Turkey's NPAA refers to them solely in its "Introduction", and by using quite vague language. More specifically, by stressing that Turkey will continue to develop its relations with neighbouring countries on the basis of a peace-seeking foreign policy, it is also stated that Turkey "*will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue; supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General, in the context of his good-offices mission aiming at a mutually acceptable settlement with a view to establishing a new partnership in Cyprus based on the sovereign equality of the two parties and the realities on the island*". It could be argued that a certain amount of consistency is lacking, if Turkey's NPAA is to be compared with the priorities set in Turkey's Accession Partnership. However, it should be remembered that the parameters of EU-Turkey relations were laid down by a commonly accepted document, namely Turkey's Accession Partnership, and that Turkey's progress will be evaluated on the basis of Turkey's implementation of all the priorities and the fulfilment of the criteria set in this document.

One may convincingly argue that the Helsinki European Council did not manage to produce tangible results with regard to the resolution of either the Greek-Turkish conflict or the Cyprus problem. It should be stressed, however, that attainment of tangible results was not on the Helsinki agenda. The latter, by renewing Turkey's European, should be viewed and assessed as a long-term enterprise that aims at making Turkey entering, like Greece did in the past, a 'virtuous circle' of democratization as well as the community of well-established democracies.

However, the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy for Turkey initiated by the Helsinki European Council, namely the Accession Partnership, has instead managed to 'Europeanize' both Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue. Indeed, Turkey's Accession Partnership, by calling on the fulfilment of certain short-term and medium-term priorities, has set a particular timetable within which both the Aegean and Cyprus issues should be addressed and

dealt with. The key element of Turkey's path to the EU has thus enmeshed both the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations within the context of the Union, where Greece enjoys a comparative advantage *vis-à-vis* an aspiring EU-member state (Turkey), while both issues are closely linked to Turkey's European accession path.

By implication, Turkey's Accession Partnership has also managed to enmesh Turkey in the European integration system, where the European norms of behavior and certain European-style rules of the game must be followed by Turkey. That was, in fact, the rationale behind Greece's concession to granting Turkey the status of Candidate State for accession to the EU. By pushing Turkey deeper into the European integration process, Greece aimed to link Turkey's state; i.e., its elite's interests, to certain international (read *European*) ways of behaving. 'Socialization' from this realist perspective is the process of reconciling the individual aspirations of states' – especially revolutionary states' – to generally accepted standards.⁵⁰

It should be stressed, however, that Turkey's entering into European integration is expected to exert a certain amount of pressure, especially on that country's domestic front. Indeed, by strengthening the democratization process, pressure will be put on Turkey's civil-military establishment for more rational allocation of the country's economic resources. Additionally, the democratization process would mean that the military falls under civilian control and that democratic processes and benefits are enjoyed by the members of the state as a whole. The deepening of the democratization process and the ability of a broader political participation of an electorate, currently more or less indifferent and/or incapable of reacting to the commands of the military bureaucracy, would intensify the pressure exerted on the Turkish foreign policy élite to redefine the strategic priorities of the country towards a more rational distribution of the country's assets. It seems that this fragile and painstaking 'democratization process' can become the driving force for the appearance of a certain amount of turbulence in Turkey's domestic politics. 'Problematic democratization' is highly likely to provide, in turn, a rather fertile ground for the rise of militant radicalism, the reactivation of Turkey's Sevres Syndrome and the

adoption of a more regionally based role by Turkey. Such developments could affect Turkey's foreign policy behavior by leading to the adoption of diversionary, if not aggressive, strategies *vis-à-vis* its neighboring Greece and on the Cyprus issue.⁵¹

Given that both the Aegean and Cyprus issues have been enmeshed within the context of the European Union while both issues are closely linked to Turkey's European accession path, it seems that Turkey's choices are now limited to the following: 1) Turkey will either take a sincere – although painstaking – effort to abandon its intransigent position on both the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations and contribute productively to their resolution 2) or Turkey will instead adopt a policy aiming at the reversal of certain European-style rules of the game which are now being imposed by its Accession Partnership and should be followed by Turkey.

Greece should be aware of the risks involved in this fragile transitional period and the elaborate strategies, which, along with the European Union, will successfully tackle Turkey's domestic as well as 'European' pressures. Turkey should also be aware that its decision to adopt a positive and productive stance to the resolution of both the Cyprus issue and bilateral relations with Greece will undoubtedly be backed by Greece's positive – if not enthusiastic – support of its path towards Europe. The fact that it was Greece which expressed concern about Turkey's 'exclusion'⁵² during last December's Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union in Nice is but a clear case in point.

NOTES

1. Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Greece (signed on 9 July 1961 in Athens), OJ No. 26, 18 February 1963, p. 294.
2. Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (signed on 12 September 1963 in Ankara), OJ No. 217, 29 December 1964, pp. 3685 and 3705.

3. Article 28 of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement specified that: “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.”

4. For background to EU-Turkey relations, see Selim Ilkin, “A History of Turkey’s Association with the European Community” in Ahmet Geoffrey Evin and Denton (eds.), **Turkey and the European Community** (Leske and Budrich, Opladen, 1990).

5. Roderick Pace, “The Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: From the Treaties to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” in Peter Xuereb and Roderick Pace (eds.), **Economic and Legal Reform in Malta** (Malta University Press, Malta, 1995), p. 398.

6. Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, SEC(89) 2290 final/2, 20 December 1989.

7. Ibid (point 8).

8. For background to the Mediterranean Policy of the EU, see Dimitri P. Droutsas, “The EU and the Mediterranean: The Cypriot Application for Full Membership in the Regional Context” in Heinz-Jürgen Axt and Hansjörg Brey (eds.), **Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?**, (Südosteuropa Aktuell 23, Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, München, 1997), pp. 100-124.

9. Of course, it remains a moot point as to how relevant the Mediterranean Policy of the EU has been in maintaining regional stability, compare Roderick Pace, “The Domestic and International Politics of the Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Union”, **The European Union Review** (Vol. 3, No. 1, 1998), pp. 80-84.

10. Human rights have always played an important role in the Union’s dealings with the Mediterranean associates. The Association

Agreement with Greece had been frozen after the colonels' coup in 1967, while Spain's request for an Association Agreement was rebuffed pending substantial progress in democratization. Human rights were a frequent bone of contention between the EU and Turkey following the intervention of the Turkish military in the political affairs of the country. Besides, the respect for human rights is now a binding feature of the "Europe Agreements" and the new "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreements".

Given this emphasis, when the European Parliament's statutory approval was sought for the EC-Turkey Customs Union Agreement and the Financial Protocol in December 1995, Turkey's human rights record came under attack, with the leader of the Socialist group stating most emphatically that the majority of her group were voting in favor of ratification "in sorrow, with heavy hearts and without enthusiasm", compare Pauline Green (European Socialists), Debates of the European Parliament, OJ Annex No. 4-472, 13 December 1995, p. 144.

11. John Redmont, **The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta?**, (Dartmouth, 1993), p. 45.

12. The disenchantment with the whole relationship was clear, when the Turkish Foreign Minister said in 1974 that his country did not share Greece's urgency in joining the Community. Relations with the Community were worsened by the 1974 invasion of Cyprus. Further difficulties in this relationship were introduced by the intervention of the Turkish military in domestic politics and the general deterioration in the human rights situation.

13. Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union, OJ L 35, 13 February 1996, p. 1. The Customs Union entered into its final phase on 31 December 1995.

14. The statement of the General Affairs Council can be found in the Bulletin of the European Union 3/1995, p. 80. This commitment was

reaffirmed by the Cannes European Council in June 1995 (point A/I/1) and by the Madrid European Council in December 1995 (point A/III/A): “The European Council reiterates that the accession negotiations with Malta and Cyprus will commence, on the basis of the Commission proposals, six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, and will take its results into account.”

15. “The European Council decided to set up a European Conference which will bring together the Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring to accede to it and share its values and internal and external objectives.”, Luxembourg European Council Conclusions (paragraph 4).

16. The Luxembourg European Council not only reinforced Turkey’s “syndrome of exclusion”, but it also questioned the country’s European orientation, see Pia Christina Wood, “Europe and Turkey: A Relationship Under Fire”, **Mediterranean Quarterly** (Vol. 34, no. 1, January-March 1999), p. 110.

17. The Customs Union Agreement was accompanied by a financial aid package made up of ECU 375 million in budgetary aid and ECU 750 million in EIB loans. However, following the events of January 1996 around Imia island in the Aegean, this aid was blocked at the insistence of Greece. See Gulnur Aybet, “Turkey and European Institutions”, **The International Spectator** (Vol. 34, no. 1, January-March 1999), pp. 107-108.

18. “In the case of Turkey, [the Commission’s regular] reports will be based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council.”, Cardiff European Council Conclusions (paragraph 64), (see also footnote 3). Compare also Bill Park, “Turkey’s European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara?”, (Paper presented at the 41st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 14-18 March 2000), p. 4.

19. Helsinki European Council Conclusions (paragraph 12).

20. This pre-accession strategy contains the following elements:

- enhanced political dialogue with emphasis on progress towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession, in particular as regards human rights, border disputes and Cyprus;
- the preparation of the analytical examination of the *acquis communautaire*;
- the establishment by the Commission of a “Regular Report” covering the relevant chapters of the *acquis communautaire*;
- the adoption of a single framework for coordinating all sources of EU financial assistance for pre-accession, including a legal base for the Accession Partnership;
- the opening of Community programmes and agencies for Turkey;
- the extension of the EC-Turkey Customs Union in the fields of services and public procurement;
- the use of the technical assistance offered by TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office).

21. “Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.”, Helsinki European Council Conclusions (paragraph 4).

The Copenhagen criteria are the following: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (political criteria), existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (economic criteria).

22. For details on the meetings held of these joint institutions in the year 2000, see “2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”.

23. See Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, “Limited Collective Security,” **Foreign Policy** (Vol. 80, Fall 1990), pp. 77-96 and Condoleeza Rice, “SALT and the Search for a Security Regime,” in Alexander George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, (eds.), **U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons**

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 301-3. On limited security regimes between adversaries, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," **Journal of Social Issues** (Vol. 43, 1987), pp. 56-63.

24. More specifically, the first category entitled **Measures for Confidence Building within the framework of the Papoulias-Yilmaz Memorandum of Understanding (Athens, 27 May 1988)** included the following five measures: (1) The Turkish Armed Forces are prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, to reduce to the possible extent the number, size and scope of their exercises in the high seas of the Aegean; (2) All Turkish military aircraft flying in the international airspace of the Aegean will, on a reciprocal basis, operate their identification devices called IFF/SIF; (3) Interim Combined Air Operation Center (ICAOC) in Eskisehir will be operational and ready for communication and exchange of information with ICAOC in Larissa/Greece on a reciprocal basis on flights conducted by the parties in the international airspace of the Aegean; (4) Turkish and Greek military aircraft could fly unarmed over the Aegean; (5) Notification, in the framework of the Exercise Planning Conference of NATO, yet on a bilateral basis, of the time schedule of national exercises for the following year, to avoid possible overlapping. The second category, entitled **Tension Reduction Measures** included the following nine measures: (1) Turkish and Greek military forces could conduct a joint military exercise and/or a PfP exercise in the Aegean or in the Mediterranean Sea; (2) In addition to naval visits scheduled for NATO exercises, Turkish and Greek Navy vessels could pay mutual port visits; (3) Invitations could be extended by both sides to attend national exercises; (4) Observation trial flights could be conducted on a reciprocal basis in the context of the Open Skies Agreement; (5) Establishment of direct communication channels between the Turkish and Greek Coast Guard Commanders; (6) Establish regular contact between the two Chiefs of Joint Staffs; (7) Implementation/extension of Papoulias-Yilmaz Agreements (e.g. prolongation of the summer moratorium); (8) Transformation of the triangular communication line between Athens-Brussels-Ankara into a hotline between Athens

and Ankara at Foreign Ministers level and, eventually, between Prime Ministers; and (9) Participation of Greek and Turkish Armed Forces in peace operations in the Balkans, as well as further intensification of the Greek-Turkish co-operation in the framework of the existing Multinational Peace-keeping Force Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE). The third category entitled **Measures of Good Neighborliness** includes the following three measures: (1) Exchange of ratification instruments for four Protocols and an agreement concerning the border area of Evros, which were signed by Greece and Turkey between 1969 and 1971; (2) Implementation of the 1963 Protocol concerning hydraulic work on the basin of the river Evros; and (3) Cooperation on the prevention of pollution on river Evros (Maritsa) by establishing a regime of sustainable environmental development of river Evros. At a later stage, the Bulgarian side can be invited to participate in the project.

25. In the context of NATO's new command structure, two military exercises have already taken place in the Alliance's southern region with chief-participants Greece and Turkey. During the "Dynamic Mix" exercise, Turkish troops (wearing a NATO hat) landed on Greek soil, and the whole exercise was conducted very smoothly. NATO exercise "Destined Glory", which took place in Turkey a few months later, caused, instead, a mini-crisis in bilateral relations, when Turkish objections to the agreed scenario forced the Greek contingent to leave the exercise.

26. See Douglas Frantz, "Cyprus Limits Greece-Turkey Warming", **International Herald Tribune** (December 19, 2000).

27. The meetings took place on the following dates and places: 28 February 2000 in Ankara; 17 April 2000 in Athens; 2 June 2000 in Istanbul; 25 September 2000 in Athens; 18 December 2000 in Antalya; 6 April 2001 in Ankara.

28. The seminars scheduled by the Task Force so far cover fields such as economy, customs, banking, electronic signature, agriculture, environment, justice and police cooperation, university cooperation, cooperation on youth projects.

29. U.N. document S/1999/711, annex.
30. UNSC Resolution 1250/99 (point 7).
31. The rounds took place on the following dates and places: 3-14 December 1999 in New York; 31 January-8 February 2000 in Geneva; 5-12 July and 24 July-4 August 2000 in Geneva; 12-26 September 2000 in New York; 1-10 November 2000 in Geneva.
32. Compare the Luxembourg European Council Conclusions (paragraphs 14-16).
33. Council Decision 2001/235/EC of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, OJ L 85, 24 March 2001, p. 13.
34. The Accession Partnership indicates the priority areas for Turkey's membership preparations. In its introductory part, the Accession Partnership clearly states that "Turkey will nevertheless have to address all issues identified in the Regular Report". Furthermore, it is also important that Turkey fulfills the commitments of legislative approximation and implementation of the *acquis communautaire* in accordance with the commitments made under the Association Agreement, Customs Union and related decisions of the EC-Turkey Association Council. Finally, it is recalled that incorporation of the *acquis communautaire* into legislation is not in itself sufficient, but it will also be necessary to ensure that it is actually applied to the same standards as those, which apply within the EU.
35. Short-term priorities have been selected on the basis that it is realistic to expect that Turkey can complete or take them substantially forward by the end of the year 2001. The priorities listed under the medium-term are expected to take more than one year to complete although work on them should, wherever possible, also begin during the year 2001.
36. For an analysis of the necessary reforms identified by the Accession Partnership in Turkey's internal front, see Panayotis Tsakonas and

Dimitri Conostas, "Turkey's Democratization and International Stability after Helsinki", **Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies** (Vol. 8, no. 2, Autumn 2000), pp. 153-188.

37. Greece's official position is that there is only one issue between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean that should be dealt with; i.e, the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean.

38. Paragraph 4 of the Helsinki European Council Conclusions states: "[...] the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004."

39. Paragraph 9a of the Helsinki European Council Conclusions reads as follows: "The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion."

Paragraph 9b of the Helsinki European Council Conclusions reads as follows: "The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors."

40. To this end, a 'tour des capitales' was undertaken by officials of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

41. For both issues, Greece could refer to precedent cases contained in the Accession Partnerships of other Candidate States. With regard to the Cyprus issue, the Accession Partnership of Cyprus includes a specific reference in the “Short-Term Priorities”: “Maximize efforts to support a settlement [of the Cyprus problem] under the auspices of the UN.” With regard to Greek-Turkish relations, an analog provision can be found in the “Medium-Term Priorities” of the Accession Partnership of Slovenia: “Continue efforts to resolve outstanding border issues with Croatia”.

42. In principle, the Council adopts the Accession Partnership acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. As a consequence, no Member State has alone the ability to block this decision. For being competent to adopt the very first Accession Partnership of a Candidate State, the Council needs a legal basis, which is provided by a Regulation requiring unanimity for its adoption (Council Regulation (EC) No. 390/2001 of 26 February 2001 on assistance to Turkey in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of an Accession Partnership, OJ L 58, 28 February 2001, p. 1). Without the consent of Greece to this Regulation, the Council could not proceed to the adoption of Turkey’s Accession Partnership. Any future amendments of Turkey’s Accession Partnership will be decided by the Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.

43. As a characteristic example of the “new era” in Greek-Turkish relations, one may refer to the fact that Athens was included in the Turkish “tour des capitales”. The visit paid by Turkey’s Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Faruk Logoglu, to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs on 30 November 2000.

44. The provision on the Cyprus issue in the “Short-Term Priorities” reads as follows: “In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, strongly support the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, as referred in the point 9(a) of the Helsinki conclusions.”

The provision on Greek-Turkish relations in the “Medium-Term Priorities” reads as follows: “In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, under the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues, as referred in the point 4 of the Helsinki conclusions.”

45. The Council will decide acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.

46. The Accession Partnership called upon Turkey to adopt the NPAA “before the end of the year [2000]”. Turkey referred to the delay of the EU in formally adopting the legal basis for the Accession Partnership – the Council had to wait for the (non-binding) Opinion of the European Parliament to be submitted. The economic crisis, which shook Turkey in the beginning of 2001, did not ease the intense discussions in the Turkish interior on the necessary reforms either.

47. Press statement of the (Turkish) Council of Ministers regarding the National Programme, Ankara 19 March 2001.

48. **Ibid.**

49. Günther Verheugen, the Commissioner responsible for enlargement, described the package of proposed reforms as “an important landmark in Turkey’s preparation for EU-membership and the first stage in a far reaching programme of political reform” and as “a starting point for the fundamental transformation of Turkey into a modern democracy”, **Financial Times**, 27 March 2001.

50. It is interesting that classical realists, such as Henry Kissinger, argue that the construction of stable international orders is dependent upon the successful linkage of state interests to international legitimising principles. See Henry Kissinger, **A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22** (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1957). In international relations literature, socialisation has been studied by realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist scholars. See – among others – Kenneth Waltz,

Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979), pp. 74-77, 127-128; John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis" in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), **Neorealism and Its Critics** (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 141-148; Henrik Spruyt, "Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order", **International Organization** (Vol. 48, no. 4, 1994), pp. 527-557; and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", **International Organization** (Vol. 46, no. 2, 1992), pp. 391-426.

51. For a detailed analysis of this argument, see Panayotis Tsakonas and Dimitri Consta, **Turkey's Democratization and International Stability after Helsinki**, op. cit., pp. 153-188.

52. The working hypothesis of the EU, when discussing the necessary institutional changes in view of enlargement, did not take into account Turkey's candidature for accession.