The Security Dilemma in Greek-Turkish Relations: Theory and Practice

Panayotis J. Tsakonas*

It is usually said that a dilemma is worse than a problem, because it necessitates a choice between two equal, mostly equally undesirable, alternatives. The notion of the security dilemma in world politics seems to be one of the most significant and pervasive features of relations between states seeking the transcendent value in international politics and governments' first and foremost obligation, namely security.

Theorists agree that a security dilemma exists when the military preparations as well as the foreign policy behaviour of one state create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another state as to whether those preparations and/or behaviour are for 'defensive' purposes only — in order to enhance its security in an uncertain world — or whether they are for offensive purposes; i.e., to change the *status quo* to its advantage.[1] Indeed, whatever the actual intentions of a state engaging in military preparations or joining particular alliances, it is the *irresolvable uncertainty* in the mind of the other state about the meaning of the first state's intentions and capabilities which creates the dilemma. Precisely because it is impossible for the other to see inside one's mind it can never be certain as to one's intentions.

The idea of the security dilemma holds, in essence, that one nation will feel insecure if it makes no effort to protect its security, while any effort to do so will threaten the security of one or more nations. As a consequence, the first nation faces a dilemma: it will be insecure if it does not act as well as if it does.[2] Thus, at one horn of the security dilemma is a self-defeating quest for security while at the opposite horn are the risks attendant upon not responding to the perceived threat. In the words of Booth and Wheeler, this genuine dilemma

* University of the Aegean (Greece)
** The theme of this special issue will be complemented by other articles published in the spring 2002 issue of Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies.

takes the following form: "should the other's military preparations be matched and so risk an arms race and the further build-up of mistrust, danger, and cost, or should a wait-and-see policy be adopted thereby risking exposure to coercion or attack as a result of relative weakness?"[3]

This is actually the 'tragedy' of the security dilemma and the reason –according to neo-realism– that it cannot be either solved or abolished, but only ameliorated.[4] In an anarchic international system when a state decides to increase its security by, for instance arming itself, the security of other states decreases automatically. Thus, one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others. This is merely due to the fact that although it is difficult to draw inferences about a state's intentions from its military posture and capabilities, states do draw such inferences, even when they are unwarranted. Thus, as a prominent 'security dilemma' theorist suggested "governments believe that other governments see them as they see themselves, i.e., they find it difficult to see themselves as a threat."[5]

The Evolution of the Concept

The notion of the security dilemma is as old as human history. In his book on the Peloponnesian war, the Greek historian Thucydides, claimed that "what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused to Sparta".[6] His phrase lies at the heart of the security dilemma. The Greek philosopher Xenophon has also pointed to the concept when describing a scenario in which two people can go to war despite neither wanting such an outcome.[7]

Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth century English philosopher is the one most associated with the idea of politics being a struggle for security in a hostile environment. In such a 'Hobbesian state of nature — where life is 'nasty, brutish and short'— the drive for security becomes the dominant preoccupation. Although from different philosophical starting points, Rousseau, the French philosopher, highlighted the notion of the security dilemma by pointing out the central role of trust in international relations by introducing the parable of the stag

hunt.[8] In the example of the stag hunt, Rousseau has shown how fear, mistrust and mainly uncertainty about others, real intentions (the key-notion of the security dilemma) in relations between states destroy the prospects for cooperation and increase the pressures for confrontational conflict. Indeed, often the behaviour of some states resemble Rousseau's Stag Hunt in that each side would prefer mutual cooperation, but is driven to defect solely by the fear that the other side has or will develop a different preference.

However, the term 'security dilemma' was first coined by John Herz and the concept started gaining widespread usage in the 1950s through the writings of Herbert Butterfield. Undoubtedly, the bipolarity of the Cold War gave the security dilemma its utmost poignancy. Butterfield's notion of the 'irreducible dilemma', which counts for all past and present conflicts was at the root of all the tensions of the present day. In addition, Butterfield considered the inability to 'enter onto the other man's counter fear' as the central feature of the security dilemma. His phrase 'Hobbesian fear' became a useful shorthand for the dynamic driving security dilemmas. He has eloquently described the situation he called 'Hobbesian fear' by writing: "…you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot see inside your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have. As this operates on both sides the Chinese puzzle is complete in all its interlockings –and neither party sees the nature of the predicament it is in, for each only imagines that the other party is being hostile and unreasonable."[9]

Working along similar lines, John Herz argued that the security dilemma is the natural product of an anarchic international system and it always existed in a situation where there was interaction between men and groups in the absence of a higher political authority. For Herz, the quest for more and more power –in order to escape the impact of the power of others– renders in turn the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst.[10] Thus, both Herz and Butterfield believed that the search for security through military power tends to provoke insecurity in others.

Based on assumptions of flawed human nature and the sin of humanity, Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out that although security is so much desired, it can never be achieved. Security cannot be achieved, because although so strongly desired it is power that is sought to guarantee it. But the more it is sought the greater the problems of maintaining whatever levels of power or security are desired.

By distancing himself from analyses based on the sin of humanity Kenneth Waltz has introduced to students of international politics an influential analysis arguing that the security dilemma is the inevitable consequence of the structure of the international system. More specifically, Waltz described the security dilemma as "a condition in which states, unsure of one another's intentions, arm for the sake of security, and in doing so set a vicious circle in motion. Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to anyone's security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by arming".[11] In Waltzian logic, anarchy was seen as inevitably creating a sense of insecurity of governments.

Game theory, through the influential work of Thomas Schelling, has also helped to clarify the dynamics of insecurity. By discussing the dynamics of mutual distrust, the 'compounding of each person's fear of what the other fears',[12] Schelling has developed a 'nervousness model' to argue that by the dynamics of mutual distrust, rational decisions (rational calculation of probabilities or a rational choice of strategy) can produce irrational outcomes (mutual destruction).

The Contemporary Problematique

What is of catalytic importance in the contemporary security dilemma literature is the -not always clear- differentiation between '*inadvertent*', '*structural*' or '*system-induced security dilemma*' on the one hand and '*deliberate*' or '*state-induced security dilemma*' on the other.

Inadvertent

In an 'inadvertent', or 'system-induced'[13] security dilemma, two states are engaged in a struggle over security, yet their security is not under threat since both have benign intent; their conflict is based upon a false, illusory incompatibility.[14] In this case the security dilemma is the *unintended* product or the "tragic consequence" of the anarchic nature of the international system since "the unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive constitutes the security dilemma".[15] It could be thus argued that the dilemma is created in the one of the two governments' mind by the other's failure to act carefully on security matters, by the other's forwarding of unintended signals and/or by the other's insensitivity to the security needs of the other state. Indeed, "…statesmen …rarely…consider seriously the possibility that such a policy will increase the danger of war instead of lessening it".[16]

This is in fact the classic version of the security dilemma at work and a representation of Robert Jervis' –by far the most prolific writer of the security dilemma and the first who examined the interplay between the pressures [constraints] created by the structure of the system and the behavior of the units in the interstate system– 'spiral model'.[17] Jack Snyder also refers to this aspect of the security dilemma as a 'structural' security dilemma and argues that because states perceive each other as a threat, a war can occur: 'a status quo state may choose to attack another *status quo* state, though both would prefer a stable compromise to war".[18]

To give an example, in the case of 'inadvertent security dilemma', the Greek-Turkish arms race would be the result of inadvertent actions of either the Greek or the Turkish government whose defensive military preparations to enhance its security in an uncertain world (but with no intention to overthrow the military *status quo*) have increased the sense of insecurity felt by the other. This stems from the fact that no matter what the real intentions are, the fundamental problem is that governments can never fully know the minds of others.[19] So if either Greece or Turkey perceives the 'defensive' preparations of the

other as potentially threatening and offensive, then an inadvertent security dilemma arises.

In this classic version of the security dilemma neither state is able to exhibit the 'defensiveness' needed, namely determine each other's intent accurately or provide for their own defense without creating fear in each other. It is worth noting that the reaction of one state to another state's deployment could be affected by the 'defensiveness' of the forces and by the uncertainty of the states on whether offense or defense hold an advantage as a means of waging war. The security dilemma is thus intensified by the states' inability to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons and mainly by their uncertainty about whether offense or defense has the advantage. When offense has the advantage over defense in military technology, the spiral is tightened and the incentive to launch pre-emptive attack increases because states see a preventive advantage in fighting now, rather than later. In such a case, "*status-quo* powers must then act like aggressors; the fact that they would gladly agree to forego the opportunity for expansion in return for guarantees for their security has no implications for their behavior".[20] To make things worse, especially if a state comes to believe that the other state is such a menace that the former can be secure only if the latter is crippled, if not destroyed, then conflict and deadlock appear the best or the only route to the former state's security. Thus, if a level of mistrust is at such a level, and the offense is so dominant, a state may even decide to pre-empt what is interpreted as an inevitable attack by the other. This fear of surprise attack is the most potent and most dangerous driver of the spiral.[21]

Deliberate

The security dilemma may also be the product of an *intended state policy* rooted in the ideological beliefs and goals of man and the state and their orientation towards the international political and territorial *status quo*. Therefore, unlike the case of 'inadvertent security dilemma', where it is the anarchic system that induces conflict between states who have benign intentions, in the case of 'deliberate security

dilemma', conflict between the states is a result of one of the two states' desire to expand. Still the ultimate goal of the state's desire to expand is security, achieved through either expansionism or military superiority.

It is worth noting at this point the difficulty to equate *security* with the *preservation of the status quo*.[22] It seems that only few states in the world are completely satisfied with the *status quo* and will not take any measure to improve their position, especially when the risks attendant upon this action are minimal. Moreover, motivated by the dictum 'that which stops growing begins to rot', some states have to expand in order to feel secure.[23] If we consider change as inevitable, the maintenance of *status quo* by the opponent is seen as source of conflict. As Jervis has put it: "If each side can feel secure only when it has a larger army than the other, an abstract agreement on a willingness to forgo advantages so that both sides can gain security will be illusory".[24] In such a case states will be forced to compete even if their primary goal is security.

By extension, it is also difficult to contrast *expansionism* with *security-seeking*, in the sense that the expansionism may in fact be pursued as a route to security-seeking and thus a state's 'expansionist' behaviour can be 'defensive' in nature. Of course sometimes such beliefs are but rationalizations for more purely predatory drives; at other times they are not, and is extremely difficult for later analysts, let alone contemporary observers, to tell which is which. However, even of the motives are defensive the pursuit of superiority is itself bound to perpetuate a security dilemma.

A deliberate security dilemma therefore exists where one state believes *it can only be secure if others are insecure*.[25] In that case the dilemma is created in a government's mind *as a result of the deliberate actions of another state*. In Booth and Wheeler's reasoning these deliberate actions may be of two kinds, though.

Firstly, they may be from a *militarily status quo state* which adopts deliberately 'offensive' strategies in order to deter another, because it

sees itself in an adversarial relationship with it. In this case, the second state may be thrown into a dilemma as a result of the apparent contradiction between the first declared defensive intentions and its (threatening) military capabilities.

Secondly, they may be from a *revisionist* or revolutionary state, which wishes to change the *status quo* and which adopts a posture designed to lull the other state into a false sense of security. In that case, the other state may be thrown into a dilemma as a result of the apparent contradiction between the revisionist's state declared policy (reassuring) and its actual military capability (over-arming) and behaviour (threatening).[26]

Alternatives to 'security dilemma'

Given that a security dilemma situation exists *only when behaviour can be explained in security terms*, the most obvious alternative to a security dilemma is a situation in which one state seeks to expand **in order to achieve non-security goals**, meaning that this state is *inherently expansionistic*. As an alternative to the security dilemma, this situation is close to John Herz's description of policies motivated by interests *that go beyond security proper* (our emphasis). By referring to policies motivated by such interests Herz meant that all states pursue security, yet some pursue security *plus ambition*. Hitler's behaviour in the 1930s is the most vivid example of this type of behaviour. With regard to Hitler's behavior Herz has put it bluntly: "it can hardly be maintained that it was a German security dilemma which lay at the heart of that conflict, *but rather one man's, or one regime's ambition to master the world*"[27] (our emphasis).

Benign intent becomes a rather crucial criterion in tracking down alternatives to the security dilemma. For example, if a predatory state, motivated by non-security expansion and absolute gains, exists there is no security dilemma. Such a situation resembles to Jack Snyder's 'imperialist dilemma'. By that Snyder refers to an aggressor state, which seeks a goal that would require the target state to forfeit a valu-

able asset, e.g., territory, sovereignty. "In order to achieve its expansive …goals, the aspiring imperialist state develops offensive military forces for the purpose of conquest or intimidation. [the imperialist dilemma] is thus a by-product of the *competition over non-security issues.*"[28] (our emphasis). In Snyder's model the imperialist state does believe that the other state intends to do it harm and, therefore, it arms not only to acquire its original role, but also to protect itself. However, although the states in Snyder's imperialist dilemma may be in a dilemma, the situation *is not* a security dilemma since one of the states, or even both, actually intend harm to the other. Needless to say that in such a situation any attempt by the other state to accept reasonable settlements of key issues (e.g. arms control) and greater conciliation would have been useless and might have even invited pressure by the other side.

By extension, a second – logical – alternative to the security dilemma, that is consistent with classical views of human nature viewing humans as harbouring original sin and being driven by the will to dominate, would depict *both sides as seeking to alter the status quo,* obviously with the aim *of achieving non-security goals.* Such a view would be likely to result in a portrayal of *both sides as aggressive or evil.*

A Research Agenda

In the field of international relations and security studies, the security dilemma has proved to be a fruitful diagnostic tool to analyse relations and to explain conflict emerging between states operating in an anarchic international system – especially with regard to the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War.[29]

However, the most critical conflict in the Mediterranean basin, namely the Greek-Turkish dispute, acquired much less theoretical attention. Indeed, although this enduring conflict makes headlines for the last twenty-five years in both states' media – and all over the world – its examination by using the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma has been totally overlooked by both the Greek and Turkish interna-

tional relations scholars. As a matter of fact, the decision made by **Hellenic Studies** to publish a special issue on the Greek-Turkish security dilemma is the first attempt for Greek-Turkish relations to be analysed and for the Greco-Turkish conflict to be explained in terms of the security dilemma.[30]

In the present special issue of **Hellenic Studies/Etudes helléniques** an attempt is made by a group of Greek and Turkish international relations experts and security analysts to examine particular case studies, which fall into the three basic manifestations of the Greek-Turkish, or the Turkish-Greek, conflict in the post-Cold War era. As theory and practice suggest, the security dilemma manifests itself (a) in *arms-race* {as the core of the action-reaction phenomenon characterizing the armaments dynamics}; (b) in crisis scenarios {in a low degree of *crisis stability* evidenced in vicious circles of "reciprocal fears and surprise attack"}, and (c) in *competitive alliance formation* {i.e., a tendency toward a continous struggle for "preemptive alignment"}.

Pairs of Greek and Turkish scholars examine a variety of cases that stem from the history of the Greek-Turkish conflict with reference to the three aforementioned thematic areas and reflect upon certain instances of the Greek-Turkish conflict since the end of the Cold War. Needless to say that in analyzing the Greek-Turkish conflict, country representation is considered as necessary. Assessments are often formed or influenced by the Greek and Turkish perceptions of the cases under examination. Indeed, behaviour underlying the security dilemma is shaped not simply by the strategic situation or the circumstances that constitute the security dilemma; i.e., anarchy and offensive advantages, but also by the *participants' perceptions* of that situation and their expectations of each others' like behaviour in that situation. Indeed, cognitive dynamics impact on the security dilemma in crucial ways. In examining a particular case study, contributors may try to capture the way cognitive dynamics can intensify the security dilemma.[31]

The first thematic area, devoted to arms races, is analyzed by the contributions of Christos Kollias and Gunlay-Gunluk Senesen. Given

that even during the post-bipolar period – at a time when other NATO members have been trimming their defence spending– Greek and Turkish military expenditures have continued to grow in real terms, Kollias addresses some methodological issues, which hinder the empirical examination of the Greek-Turkish armaments race with the aim of identifying whether the issue of an action-reaction régime between Greek and Turkish military spending can be established and a systematic Greek-Turkish arms race can be empirically verified. Along the same line of reasoning, Senesen attempts to identify whether Turkish defense expenditures during 1983-2000 (the choice of the period is based on availability of detailed data on Turkish defense expenditures) and relations with Greece in the same period have a common pattern. It seems that recent empirical literature on a long-run arms race between Turkey and Greece is inconclusive and Senesen attempts to find out to what extent the continuum of perceived threats upon which Turkish defense decisions react are attributable to threats emanating from neighboring Greece.

A particular crisis scenario, namely the Imia (Kardak for Turkey) incident of 1996 is the focus of the analyses provided by Kostas Ifantis and Gulden Ayman. Structural factors along with the revisionist, predatory (non-security) goals of Turkey are highlighted by Ifantis as the major causes of the Greek-Turkish conflict while the Turkish conduct in the Imia incident is explored with the aim the above mentioned premise to be empirically verified. In her contribution Ayman explores various crisis models to show how crises lead to conflict and even war. Models are contrasted with the example of the Kardak crisis. Factors such as history, policy, strategy, social pressures, and diplomacy are considered while the impact of the particular crisis on Turkish-Greek relations is also discussed.

The tendency of the states leaving under the security dilemma toward a continous struggle for the formation of "preemptive alignment" is another thematic area under consideration. Antonia Dimou and Marios Evriviadis explore Turkey's search for pre-emptive alignments and a hegemonic role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East, as it reflected on the Turkish-Israeli alliance. The

alliance's background, its modern version and the motives behind its formation are thus analysed while the Greek and Cypriot concerns – and responses – to this partnership are also discussed.

Making Assessments that the Security Dilemma is at Work

Before discussing the criteria that should be used for making assessments that in an adversarial relationship the security dilemma is or it is not at work, one should refer to a series of difficulties and ambiguities inherent in such a discussion.

Undoubtedly, the difficulty in assessing accurately the other side intentions always appears as the most difficult enterprise, and the essence of the security dilemma situation. It is also possible that a government, which objectively faces an inadvertent security dilemma, may misperceive it, and as a result it may deal with the other state as facing a deliberate security dilemma, thus choosing to emphasize a 'deterrent' response. The latter might include offensive weapons and doctrine. In this case the result might be to exacerbate tension further. This misperception, however, can hardly be doubted –and thus corrected—because it is simply rather hard to doubt the *reasonableness* of decision-makers. Moreover, the reasonableness of decision-makers, who are, by definition, committed to defend the national interest, can be hardly criticized. There are many times decision-makers are wrong about the other's side intentions, yet they prefer to take a friend for an enemy rather than pay the costs of mistaking an enemy for a friend. Who could really blame them for doing so, given the ambiguous nature of the evidence available and mainly the (probably unbearable) costs their country has to pay because they incorrectly believed that the other side was not hostile.

In addition, one may also observe ambiguities as far as the basic concept of security is concerned. Thus when it remains unclear what is the object of security (e.g. the state, the individual, the régime) one can hardly doubt the relativity of the content of the terms that are commonly used to characterize states and their behavior: e.g. "*expan-*

sionist", "status-quo", "security-seeking", "opportunity-driven" etc. While discussing the content of the 'deliberate security dilemma' we noted - and further explained - the difficulty to equate *security* with *the preservation of the status quo* as well as the difficulty to contrast *expansionism* with *security seeking*. Difficulties also appear when one is called upon to distinguish between *revisionism* and *aggressiveness*. There are states, which may regard the *status quo* as unacceptable and they are also willing to pay a high price to change it. In both cases, one may refer to revisionist states, yet it is the second case that can be regarded as being aggressive. Thus, **aggressive** behavior should not be regarded as entailing only a desire to expand, but *a willingness to undertake high risks and dangerous efforts - even risk the state's survival - to change the status quo.*[32] (our emphasis) This is a rather important criterion. Actually, to the extent that the empirical findings of the case studies indicate that either Greece or Turkey was willing to pay a high price to gain superiority in order to coerce the other into changing the *status quo* the security dilemma analysis will be misleading.

Most importantly, the empirical research and examination of the particular case studies should also make some logically sound inferences about a series of issues:

(a) What do empirical findings suggest about Greece and Turkey? Are they 'status-quo states', 'security-seekers', 'power-maximizers', 'opportunity-driven states', 'aggressive states'?

Although all the above terms are problematic and it is difficult to say which state fits into each category, they give a usable, if rough, distinction. As a result, what does empirical research suggest about Greece's dictum that Turkey is 'inherently expansionistic' or/and 'inherently aggressive'? Are there clear indications – if not proofs – that Turkey has been willing to undertake high risks and dangerous efforts – even risk the state's survival – to change the *status quo* in the Aegean or elsewhere?

The Cold War analogy makes an interesting point here. A recent explanation of the US/Soviet rivalry through the use of the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma suggests that Soviet leaders were *not*

willing to risk what they had achieved in order to get more, yet they did *want*, *expect*, and *seek more*. However, the American belief that the Soviet Union was inherently expansionistic ruled out cooperation, precluded the adoption of a purely defensive posture by the US and led to the conclusion that demonstrations of resolve were crucial while the only way to underscore US resolve was by prevailing in crises.[33]

(b) Is the Greek-Turkish conflict a security dilemma (or a security problem)? If it is a security dilemma what is actually the type of this dilemma? Inadvertent or Deliberate? Were there instances or periods when *both types* of the security dilemma were at work?

In refining the criteria that should be met for a security dilemma to be at work, one should have in mind that each side will not be willing to pay a high price to gain superiority in order to coerce the other into changing the status quo. More specifically, in a deliberate security dilemma situation one of the two states could be either 'expansionistic' (e.g., Greece by desiring to expand its territorial waters in the Aegean) or 'security seeker' (e.g., Turkey, although the value of security may be seen as achieved by either hegemony, expansionism or the existence of asymmetry in military might) because it is driven by nightmares of inferiority (not by hopes for gain).

The Greek-Turkish state of affairs cannot be classified as simply a 'security problem', but indeed as a security dilemma only after verifying that the threat posed by one state to another, be it inadvertent or deliberate, *has not been* accurately perceived by the potential or actual target state. The empirical findings of the particular case-studies should also demonstrate that the Greek-Turkish security dilemma is comprised by both *dilemmas of interpretation* (i.e., are the other's policies defensive or offensive?) and then *dilemmas of response* (i.e., should these policies be matched and so risk an arms race, counter-alliances or/and crisis escalation or should a wait-and-see policy be adopted thereby risking exposure to coercion or even attack as a result of relative weakness).

(c) What inferences can be drawn by the case-studies with regard to the primary concerns and fears of the two states in conflict? Are they driven by 'absolute' or 'relative gains' concerns?

As realism suggests, the states' concern is often not that the other side is currently aggressive or that the current situation is threatening, but that it may become so in the future as others change their capabilities and intentions. The fact that others or their successors can change, are at the heart of the security dilemma. Thus it is not correct to argue that security concerns and the security dilemma will disappear if states could be certain of others' benign intentions. Indeed, the fact that the opponent may change its intentions, compel states to always seek to compare their absolute gains with those of other states. In these circumstances, unilateral gains from defection may lead to the accumulation of relative advantages, which serve as a hedge against future defection by the opponent.[34] As a consequence, even if none of the states starts with predatory motives, the desire to protect one's future position under conditions of the security dilemma can transform a situation from the Stag Hunt into the Prisoners' Dilemma, in which exploiting the other side is preferred to mutual cooperation.[35]

It is worth noting that recent empirical findings on the two superpowers rivalry suggest that in US/Soviet relations there have been instances (mostly related to the Third World) where the security dilemma was at work because the Soviet Union was merely taking advantage of opportunities - rather than creating them - *with the aim of weakening the US influence and position.*[36] (our emphasis). Thus, in many cases cooperation is inhibited both by fears that the other side will cheat and by hopes to gain a better distribution of the values in dispute.

(d) Were there instances in post-Cold War Greek-Turkish relations when a *deep security dilemma* was at work?

Robert Jervis has described the situation of a 'deep security dilemma' as a state of affairs where, unlike one based on mistrust that could be overcome, there are no missed opportunities for radically improving relations. In such a situation, both sides may be willing

to give up the chance of expansion if they can be made secure, but a number of other factors – the fear that the other's relative power is dangerously increasing, technology, events outside their control, and their subjective security requirements – put such a solution out of reach.[17]

(e) To what extent the Greek-Turkish conflict resembles the US-Soviet competition during the Cold War? Are there analogies in Greece/US, Turkey/US behavior?

With regard to the US/Soviet Union rivalry, it is worth-noted that in the beginning of the Cold War, the United States wanted to freeze the *status quo*. At any point in the Cold War – with the significant exception of its final years when victory was in sight – the United States would have been happy to sacrifice the possibility of further gains in return for a high degree of security. At the start of the Cold War, the image of the Soviet Union was as uremittingly hostile (if cautious). It can be argued that although the US was a security seeker and did not want to run major risks to roll back the Soviet influence, it was not hesitant to exploit opportunities to weaken US influence. Most interesting is the fact that these efforts were indistinguishable in their effect from expansionism, and very much resemble to what is called "deep" security dilemma, in the sense that although the US primarily sought security the unintended effect was to preclude mutually acceptable arrangements.[18]

Undoubtedly, credible answers on whether a security dilemma is at work can better be provided if both the Greek and the Turkish archives could be examined. However, contrary to other conflicts – such as the one between the superpowers in the Cold War era that have been possible to be examined through archival research – the Greek-Turkish one is still in progress while access to both Greek and Turkish archives of the post-1974 period with regard to the two states foreign relations is not allowed.

The basic aim of the project is, after empirically analysing certain aspects of the Greek-Turkish conflict, to sound out whether a security dilemma has been or still is at work. Of course, state behaviour

alone cannot say whether a security dilemma exists. A hostile attitude can be the product of the hope for gain or the fear of loss, of offensive drives as well as of defensive responses. Moreover, as it has already been stressed complexity and ambivalence are also present when one asks whether Greece and Turkey are driven primarily by fear rather than the hope for gain, as security dilemma analysis expects. It is not thus expected that the empirical evidence, whatever this may be, will yield *an unambiguous conclusion.* As a matter of fact, if the academic community still cannot decide whether World War I was the result of the security dilemma, it would be surprising that this special issue to come up with some unambiguous conclusions about the actual type of a conflict, which is still in progress.

Yet, the diagnosis of the existence of elements or/and particular types of the security dilemma in the Greek-Turkish conflict is politically attractive and useful. This is actually where the policy-relevance of this project lies, namely to identify the ways for the amelioration of the Greek-Turkish conflict and provide a good basis for a credible and mainly viable conciliation. Most importantly, the theoretical conclusions and policy implications of this project can in fact go beyond an interpretation of the conflict by creating a solid basis for the next step in the debate between Greek and Turkish 'epistemic communities', namely a *critical definition of the security dilemma.* Such a definition will reflect the contested nature of a politically contingent reality and recognize that Greece and Turkey are not actors that pursue a particular view of rationality.

As the official *rapprochement,* initiated by the two states' Foreign Ministers and greatly facilitated in 1999 by the catastrophic earthquakes that shook Turkey and Greece, has aptly demonstrated, groups within both states disagreed – and still disagree – on the desirability and possibility of cooperation. Indeed, particular groups argued – and still argue – that cooperation is impossible, conciliatory gestures naïve and a strong defense posture necessary. Some other groups, however, have seen greater possibilities of cooperation and advocate policies designed to facilitate cooperation. Dealing with the security dilemma in a critical way, namely as a political dispute over what constitutes the

state's (either Greece or Turkey) interests and how best to pursue those interests, reveals the possibility that uncertainty can be transcended and that the Greek-Turkish security dilemma can be ameliorated.

With the exception of the most doctrinaire realists, there is a widespread belief – especially among more sophisticated neorealists – that humans do have some choice on the matter of the security dilemma and as a consequence the impact of the security dilemma can be mitigated through "improved anarchies"[3,30] and by the development of a mature society of states. The crucial question as to the Greek-Turkish conflict remains whether reassurance can be possible as well as whether mutual security is a goal that can be attained and under what particular circumstances. To that end, the analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict with the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma can offer valuable insights as to the policies that need to be developed in order for arms competition to be reversed; crisis stability, increased and arms reduction, encouraged between Greece and Turkey.

NOTES

1. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler "The Security Dilemma" in John Baylis and N.J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas in World Politics. International Issues in a Changing World* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), p. 30.

2. Richard Smoke "A Theory of Mutual Security" in Richard Smoke and Andrei Kortunov (eds.), *Mutual Security: A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations* (London, 1991), p. 76.

3. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 31.

4. See Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", *International Organization* (Vol. 36, no. 2, 1982), p. 178 and Idem, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics* (Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1978), pp. 167-213.

5. John Foster Dulles used to believe that the Soviet Union it "does not need to be convinced of our good intentions. Khrushchev knows we are not aggressors and do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union". As quoted in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976), p. 68.

6. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, (trans. Rex Warner, London, 1970), p. 25.

7. Xenophon wrote "I know of cases that have occurred in the past when people, sometimes as the result of slanderous information and sometimes merely on the strength of suspicion, have become frightened of each other and then, in their anxiety to strike first before anything is done to them, have done irreparable harm to those who neither intended nor even wanted to do them any harm". As quoted in Gideon Akavia, "Defensive Defense and the Nature of Armed Conflict", *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (Vol. 14, No. 1, 1991), p. 29.

8. Rousseau describes five hungry men cooperating to hunt for a stag. The hunger of each would be satisfied by the fifth portion of a stag, but the hunger of one would be satisfied by a hare. When one of the men spies a hare within reach he leaves the group to grab it, so allowing the stag to escape. His own hunger is satisfied, but his defection and the collapse of cooperation this causes leaves his fellows hungry. The fundamental problem in such a self-help situation is that none of the hunters knows whether the others will defect and chase the hare. Because of this uncertainty and lack of trust, it is understandable that each hunter will assume the worst and pursue his 'apparent' interest at the expense of his 'real' interest.

9. Herbert Butterfield considered the inability 'to enter into the other man's counter fear' as the central feature of the security dilemma. See Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (Collins, London, 1951), p. 51.

10. John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", *World Politics* (Vol. 2, No. 2, 1950), p. 157.

11. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1972), p. 187.

12. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 2078.

13. The terms are coined to Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler.

14. To most theorists of the security dilemma, it is the 'benign intent' that lies at the core of the security dilemma. See, among others, Alan Collins, *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (Keele University Press, New York, 1995), p. 10-11.

15. See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, op. cit., p. 66.

16. See Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes*, op. cit., p. 360.

17. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, op. cit., pp. 62-7.

18. See Jack Snyder "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914" in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Psychology and Deterrence* (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985), p. 160.

19. As Lord Grey, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain at the eve of the First World War, so eloquently put it "The distinction between preparations made with the intention of going to war and preparations against attack is a true distinction, clear and definite in the minds of those who build up armaments. But it is a distinction **that is not obvious or certain to others** (our emphasis). Each government, therefore, while resenting any suggestion that its own measures are anything more than for defense, regards similar measures of another Government as preparation to attack". As quoted in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, op. cit., p. 69.

20. See Robert Jervis, *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma*, op. cit., p. 169. The structural security dilemma emphasizes how a belief in the advantage of the offensive can exacerbate the fear of attack and create - not only intensify - a security dilemma.

21. *Ibid*, p. 189. On this line of reasoning see the 'recipe' of the "massive first-strike" provided by the Greek philosopher Panayotis Kondylis in order for the Hellenism's gradual shrinkage to be reversed. Kondylis proposed strategy is based on the false assumption – common to Greek philosophers who – inter alia- lack a deep knowledge of Turkey's domestic politics, yet they are not hesitant to write on Greek-Turkish relations 'on the side' – that a Greek-Turkish war would result in Greece's destruction while peace will soon or late turn Greece into a Turkey's satellite. Kondylis' proposed strategy vis-à-vis Turkey seems to fulfil George Kennan's dictum that 'those who live by the worst-case forecast may die by the worst-case forecast'. It must be stressed, however, that in Kondylis' logic Greek-Turkish relations are far from carrying even elements of the security dilemma. As a matter of fact, Greek-Turkish relations are close to what is described as an alternative to the security dilemma, namely that one of the two states in conflict (i.e., Turkey) is inherently expansionistic and aims to achieve non-security goals. In other words Turkey's behavior resembles Hitler's behavior in the 1930s. Thus, paraphrasing Herz, it can be argued that "it can hardly be maintained that it is a [Turkish] security dilemma, which lay at the heart of that conflict, but rather one man's, or one regime's ambition to ['Finlandize' Greece and turn it into a state of 'limited sovereignty']. See Panayotis Kondylis, *Theory of War* (Themelio, Athens, 1997, in Greek), especially "Geopolitical and Strategic Parameters of a Greek-Turkish War", pp. 381-411.

22. For a critique on neorealism's *status-quo* bias, see Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's *Status-Quo* Bias What Security Dilemma?", *Security Studies* (Vol. 5, No. 3, Spring 1996), pp. 90-121.

23. Recent studies indicate that there was a widespread belief among many Germans that the choice facing their country before World War I was between "world power or decline". See, inter alia, Fritz Fischer, *World Power or Decline* (Norton, New York, 1974).

24. See Robert Jervis "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?", *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Vol.3, No.1, Winter 2001), p.40.

25. See Jack Snyder, *Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914*, op. cit., pp. 153-79. This is in fact the line of reasoning of the traditional Russian belief, namely that 'fear bred respect'. According to Jervis, France's policy towards Germany in the inter-war period was also based on the premise that French security depended on German insecurity, since for France Germany could be neither conciliated nor reassured and therefore France's military superiority was necessary to deter German power. See Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes*, p. 177.

26. See Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma*, p. 31.

27. See John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1979) and Idem, *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, p. 157.

28. Jack Snyder, *The Imperialist Dilemma*, op. cit., pp. 165-6.

29. For recent explanation of the Cold War conflict between the two super powers through the use of the diagnostic tool of the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, *Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?*, pp. 36-60. Other attempts include Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (revised edition, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994); and Alan Collins, *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

30. An epistemic approach to Greek-Turkish relations would also be of particular importance in analyzing the interaction between domestic and international sources of state behavior as well as the role ideas play in shaping each state policy. However, it seems that so far the approach Greek and Turkish 'epistemic communities' (i.e., networks of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular domain) follow in order to analyze the Greek-Turkish conflict is, more or less, based on the same 'consensual knowledge', which is a shared set of beliefs about a particular cause-effect relationship. This relationship is most often overburden by a set of particular cognitive dynamics which force almost all members of the 'epistemic communities' on both sides to highlight the structural reasons that make states becoming power-maximizing rational egoists who define security in zero-sum terms. On the literature on epistemic and intellectual communities, see Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", *International* Organization (Vol. 46, 1992), pp. 1-35 and Emmanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Arms Control", International Organization (Vol. 46, 1992), pp. 101-146. On ideas defined as 'consensual knowledge', see J.T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change. Soviet/Russian Behaviour and the End of the Cold War* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997).

31. Cognitive dynamics may include - among others - ethnocentrism, 'doctrinal realism', ideological fundamentalism, strategic reductionism and zero-sum thinking.

32. Robert Jervis, *Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?*, op. cit., p. 39.

33. Ibid, pp. 58-60.

34. On relative gains argument see Joseph Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1990) and Robert Powell "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory", *American Political Science Review* (No. 85, December 1991), pp. 1303-20.

35. See Robert Jervis, *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma*, op. cit., pp. 167-213.

36. See Robert Jervis, *Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?*, op. cit., pp. 52-3.

37. *Ibid*, p.41.

38. *Ibid*, pp. 55-60.

39. In Buzan's words, such a 'mature anarchy' will be composed of "large, politically strong, relatively self-reliant, relatively tolerant, and relatively evenly powered units". See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Harvester and Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 208. See also Idem, "Is International Security Possible?" in Ken Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (Unwin Hyman, London, 1991), pp.31-53