

Greed and the mixed constitution in Xenophon's *Anabasis**

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THE STORY of Xenophon's *Anabasis* is well known: the famous Ten Thousand Greek mercenaries (actually, there were close to 13,000) travelled to what is now Iraq with Cyrus the Younger, who wanted to wrest the throne of the vast and wealthy Persian empire from his elder brother Artaxerxes II. I shall be focusing more on the retreat from Iraq – the *katabasis*, if you like – as the Greeks fought Persian armies, wild mountain tribes, and savage weather to get back 'home'¹ – to get back to the sea, in this case the Black Sea, where they knew they would find Greek settlements.

My aims in this paper are modest: I shall subject the text to a little analysis, with the purpose of revealing three underlying themes: leadership, panhellenism, and the destructive power of greed. All three themes are relatively clear within the text, but the ways in which Xenophon develops them differ, as do the uses to which they are put. In particular, I detect faint traces of a constitutionally framed answer to the question *how* greed's destructive energies work. The different uses to which the themes are put reveal something of Xenophon's working methods.

All writers inform their texts with such underlying ideas and viewpoints, and Xenophon is notorious for deliberately doing so even when he seems to be writing factual history. This is why he is commonly labelled a 'moralistic' or 'exemplary' historian: he includes or

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1 For the scare quotes see Bradley 2001, 539-549, Ma 2004, and Waterfield 2006, 125-130.

omits episodes, or skews his account, for largely moralistic purposes: to give his readers examples to follow or avoid.² Uncovering such underlying ideas is therefore particularly important in Xenophon's case (over and above the familiar advantages of analysing or deconstructing a text). In an earlier paper,³ I argued that his philosophical works were informed by Socratic values to a greater degree than is commonly recognized. The present project on *Anabasis* is related: to reveal the ideas (not, as it happens, especially Socratic ones) that were, it seems to me, in Xenophon's mind as he wrote certain stretches of the work.

Anabasis on Leadership: A Sketch

It will help to have before us an example of the kind of practice I am talking about, where we can see that Xenophon has structured his narrative with some underlying theory. Because the topic has been well studied,⁴ it is easiest to start with leadership, and permissible to deliver no more than a sketch. Throughout *Anabasis*, we see Xenophon and other commanders in action. Occasionally, especially on the occasion of a leader's death, Xenophon pauses for explicit comment,⁵ but more usually we just see them in action. Now, as the story unfolds, we learn quite a lot about Xenophon's views on leadership: that a good commander knows how to recognize and work for the common good; he is imaginative and flexible enough to devise various means of attaining the common good, and strong enough to resist wrongdoing. Such a leader is automatically attractive to his subjects, who, as a result, respect him and willingly obey him. Willing obedience is best, but in emergencies it may also be generated by compulsion or a sense of shame or duty. However it comes about,

2 See especially Gray 1989 and Dillery 1995.

3 Waterfield 2004.

4 See Gray 2007, 3-13, and 2011, esp. 7-51, 179-245; Hutchinson 2000; Nussbaum 1967, 96-146; Wood 1964, esp. 51-54.

5 Obituary of Cyrus: 1.9.1-31; of Clearchus: 2.6.1-15 (see also 2.3.10-13); of Proxenus: 2.6.16-20; of Meno: 2.6.21-29; of Agias and Socrates: 2.6.30. See Gray 2011, 71-79.

the vertical virtue of obedience is chiefly the commander's means of instilling in his subordinates discipline, the horizontal virtue of being able to work with others.⁶

This is all familiar material, but my point is this: in *Anabasis* very little of it is learnt by the reader as a result of explicit comment. Since the obituaries, in which Xenophon can pass judgement in his own name, occur relatively early in the book, he had the opportunity of sowing ideas early which would then have guided readers as to how to think about leaders' actions later. In fact, however, the obituaries are as much character analyses as comments on leadership qualities. We learn much more about Xenophon's ideal of leadership through the action of the book than we do by explicit comment.⁷ Since nothing that we learn from the action of *Anabasis* clashes with Xenophon's views on leadership as expressed in other works,⁸ we see that *Anabasis* is a layered text: the *action* may at times be informed by an underlying layer of *theory*. This is not to say that the action did not happen, or did not happen in that way; it is just that Xenophon has chosen to structure his narrative in a certain fashion.

The Shadow Side of Anabasis

The theme on which I shall be focusing is that of greed and its destructive effects. But even raising the idea that destructiveness is one of Xenophon's topics in *Anabasis* might strike some readers as strange. Such readers might be naive, reading the book just as an adventure story, or they might be sophisticated, urging a plain reading of a Xenophontic text as the correct way for scholars to approach Xenophontic studies. In either case, they incline towards a straightforward reading of *Anabasis*, in which Xenophon tells an unnuanced story of heroic Greeks overcoming awesome odds, a kind of *Boy's Own* adventure story, with no sign of dark hues anywhere, except for the obvious baddies of the book (Dexippus, Meno, Boïscus, etc.).

6 On obedience and discipline in *Anabasis*, see Nussbaum 1967, 18-27, 69-95.

7 Anderson 1974, 120-133, well brings out the qualities of Xenophon's own leadership as they emerge from the action of the text.

8 See the secondary literature cited in n. 4.

The fundamental problem is that Xenophon is a quiet and modest writer. He rarely trumpets his views, preferring to let his readers pick them up in less direct ways. Nevertheless, I believe, along with many others, that Xenophon is frequently more subtle, both as a thinker and as a literary artist; and I also believe, along with a smaller number of scholars, that even *Anabasis* should be read with a sensitive eye out for its undercurrents and nuances.⁹ So I should first establish that this is not in itself implausible, and that *Anabasis* is the kind of text that might contain some darker shadows.

Let us take panhellenism. Superficially, Xenophon seems to support a panhellenic agenda. The Greeks marched all the way to Babylonia unopposed; they were (apparently)¹⁰ victorious in battle. At one point (1.5.9), Xenophon reflects: ‘It was obvious to anyone who thought about it that, although the size and populousness of the king’s empire gave it strength, the length of the journeys involved and the fact that its forces were scattered made it weak and vulnerable to a sudden offensive.’ ‘For all our small numbers,’ he says at another point (2.4.4), ‘we made the king a laughing stock.’ Later (6.1.13), the Greeks jokingly tell some visitors that the Persians could have been defeated by the women in the army’s train. Moreover, in Xenophon’s own lifetime the expedition was put to panhellenic use by politicians: Isocrates read it as evidence of Persian weakness (*Panegyricus* 145-149; *To Philip* 90-92); both Agesilaus of Sparta and Jason of Pherae were reputedly inspired by it (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.4.2; 6.1.12).

But this is too superficial a way of reading the text.¹¹ The Greek mercenaries may have successfully invaded the Persian empire, but they were not alone and unaided: they were accompanied by at least the same number of Asiatic troops. And the book certainly is not a record of a triumph: they endured horrific hardship and lost almost

9 Those who read *Anabasis* as a nuanced text include Rood 2005 and 2010; Waterfield 2006; essays in Section V of Gray (ed.) 2010; essays in Lane Fox (ed.) 2004.

10 For an alternative view of the battle of Cunaxa, see Waterfield 2006, 14-19.

11 In qualifying Xenophon’s panhellenism, I part company from e.g. Cawkwell (2004, 65-67), Dillery (1995, 59-63), and Perlman (1977, 247-248), and side with Rood 2004.

half their force; they quarrelled among themselves and by their thuggery made themselves unwelcome to the Greek settlers of the southern Black Sea coastline; Xenophon himself became disillusioned and more than once wanted to leave the army (6.2.15; 7.1.38-39), which finally broke down into separate bands (*Anabasis* 7; Diodorus Siculus 14.31.5). If the scene on Mount Theches, with Greeks of all ranks and all ethnicities embracing (4.7.25), is meant to be a panhellenic moment,¹² our impression of the scene is also meant to be coloured by the disintegration of the army over the next few weeks. The superficial reading of the text is undermined by closer attention to its undercurrents.¹³

So one of the ways in which we can see that Xenophon is more graceful and subtle than he is often given credit for is to attend to the undercurrents of *Anabasis*. In short, *Anabasis* is not as simple as it seems. The text contains subtleties, some of which may be dark-hued, and Xenophon means us to pick up some of these aspects of the text – not necessarily to acquire an articulated theoretical understanding, but at least to gain an impression, even if subliminally. Invariably, Xenophon's touch is light. The reader gains some of his impressions by reading between the lines of the action, or by being open to the rhythms of the narrative.

The Army as a Polis

So, I intend to focus on the theme of greed and its destructive effects. This is not an unrecognized feature of the book,¹⁴ but I think it has not been appreciated quite how central it is, and how Xenophon has worked on it. The best way to see this is to consider the politics of the text. This is not an abstruse or hidden aspect of the text: everyone recognizes that it has a political layer. *Anabasis* is political in the very direct sense that, in the course of the book, Xenophon

12 As Dillery (1995, 76-77) suggests.

13 Since I doubt that Xenophon was a panhellenist, I am bound to doubt Carrier's ingenious 1978 thesis that *Cyropaedia* as a whole is intended to be propaganda for the conquest of Persia.

14 Dillery 1995, 79-83; Rood 2004.

unmistakably describes the mercenary army as a *polis* on the move,¹⁵ or perhaps more exactly as a colonizing expedition in search of a place to make a *polis*.¹⁶ Consider, most plainly, 5.6.15-18:

Meanwhile, Xenophon had been looking at how many Greeks there were there ... There they were on the coast of the Black Sea, where it would have taken a great deal of money to organize such a large army. As a result of these reflections, it occurred to him that it would be a fine achievement to found a city and acquire extra land and resources for Greece. It would be a sizeable city, he thought, when their numbers were added to the local inhabitants of the Black Sea coast.

Apart from clues such as this, the chief way in which Xenophon impresses upon us that the army acted like a mobile *polis* is that he constantly pauses to describe its internal organization and its decision-making and judicial procedures. These procedures depend on the interaction between generals, officers, and men, who then start to appear as the three social classes of the mobile *polis*.¹⁷

It is easy to see the army's internal organization. The generals naturally formed themselves into a kind of deliberative board with the power to reach decisions by a majority vote (6.1.18), issue commands on their own, entertain ambassadors from cities or other

15 For Hornblower 2004, 244, it is axiomatic that the army was a kind of mobile *polis*.

16 Dalby 1992.

17 So Nussbaum 1967, ignoring, with Xenophon, all the thousands of camp followers. Thucydides 7.77.7 is perhaps the *fons et origo* of the idea of an expeditionary army as a *polis*. Dillery 1995, ch. 3, thinks that the description applies only to the third phase of the expedition, on the Black Sea, when all the political structures began to be used. But actually they were in place earlier; as we shall see, it is just that circumstances brought the army assembly into greater prominence in the third phase. On the phases of the expedition, see Nussbaum 1967, 147-152; Dillery 1995, 64-95. Hirsch 1985, 21-38, traces the development of the concepts of trust and deceit through a four-stage journey.

armies and present them to the men (2.3.17; 5.4.4; 5.5.7 (presumably); 5.6.1; 6.1.3; 6.1.14), draw up the agenda for general assemblies, convene them, and advise them. Sometimes the ten or so generals met on their own (2.1.1; 2.3.17; 3.3.3; 3.5.14; 4.3.14; 4.4.19; 4.8.9; 5.5.2); sometimes they also included the 120 or so *lokhagoi*, captains (1.7.2; 2.2.3; 2.2.8; 2.3.28; 2.5.25; 3.1.33; 3.5.7; 4.1.12; 4.5.35; 4.6.7; 7.1.13; 7.2.13). This larger or smaller board of officers was in fact the norm in the army, meeting on a daily basis. In typical army fashion, the élite met, decided what to do, and told the men to get on with it.

However – and this is surely odd for an army¹⁸ – there were also plenty of times when they relied on democratic structures. A few times in the earlier stages of the journey (1.4.12; 2.5.27; 3.2.1),¹⁹ and then commonly once the army reached the Black Sea (5.1.1; 5.4.19; 5.5.7; 5.6.1; 5.6.22; 5.7.3; 6.1.14; 6.1.25; 6.2.4; 6.3.11; 6.4.10; 6.4.17; 6.4.20; 6.6.11; 6.6.29; 7.1.24; 7.3.2; 7.3.10; 7.6.7), we hear of general assemblies at which the whole army was consulted (to a greater or lesser extent) by the officers, or, in the latter stages of the journey, by Xenophon alone as supreme commander of what was left of the army.²⁰ On two of these occasions (6.1.25; 6.2.4), the men even assembled of their own accord; on two others, they took on the power of telling their officers what to do, rather than the other way

18 Hornblower 2004 comes up with some parallels from earlier and later campaigns, which serve as a useful corrective to the idea that the Ten Thousand were unique, but their behaviour was still unusual. Hornblower's examples seem to me to show armies reacting to extreme situations, in ways that are therefore by definition not normal. A closer analogy might be the Macedonian army assembly in the time of Alexander and his Successors – but its role is hotly debated, and I, for one, do not believe it had a constitutional function (Waterfield 2011, 158). It seems that within the Achaean League in the late third and early second centuries (and the same may go for the Aetolian League too), the general assembly was only summoned for crises (Larsen 1968, 224-225).

19 Note also that at 1.3 Clearchus calls a general assembly of his contingent; Meno does the same at 1.4.13. The instance I have cited at 2.5.27 is not explicitly described as a general assembly, but since we see Clearchus reporting back to officers and men at once, it surely was (Nussbaum (1967, 51, n. 6) is more tentative). 1.10.17 may also assume a hastily assembled general meeting.

20 More general assemblies are adumbrated: see Nussbaum 1967, 50, n. 5.

around (5.7.34; 5.8.1); on at least one occasion (5.1.14), they rejected the advice of their officers. This is quite remarkable, of course, and presumably due to a combination of the thuggery of the Ten Thousand and extraordinary circumstances. Normally, if an army assembles (any army, ancient or modern), it is only to be addressed or harangued by their officers. In *Anabasis*, the rank-and-file soldiers actually have a say in what goes on, and Xenophon has gone out of his way to draw this aspect of the army to our attention.

It is clear, then, that throughout the book Xenophon describes the army as a *polis* with its administrative functions. The next thing we need to see is why there are so many more general assemblies in Books 5-7 than earlier. An analysis of these assemblies shows immediately and beyond the shadow of a doubt that almost all of them were crisis meetings.

1.3.2	Near mutiny: the men suspect they are going against Artaxerxes
1.4.12	Final confirmation that they <i>are</i> going against Artaxerxes; near mutiny
2.5.27	Clearchus reports back on his critical meeting with Tissaphernes
3.2.1	Following the capture of the senior officers
5.1.1	Having reached the Black Sea, ‘home’, what to do next?
5.4.19	To boost morale following their first serious defeat
5.5.7	Assembled to hear the critical Sinopean delegation
5.6.1	How to proceed (possible splitting of the army)?
5.6.22	Possible splitting of the army: to stay in Asia or return home
5.7.3	Near mutiny
5.8.1	Trial of the generals

6.1.14	Presentation of foreign dignitaries
6.1.25	Mutiny: men want to elect a single leader
6.2.4	As 5.1.1 and 5.6.1: how to proceed?
6.3.11	To abandon safety and risk rescuing the Arcadian–Achaean division
6.4.10	The solemn reunification of the army
6.4.17	Provisions running low: should they stay at Calpe?
6.4.20	Provisions critically low
6.6.11	Cleander threatens the hostility of the Spartans
6.6.29	A follow-up to the previous meeting
7.1.24	Mutiny, and the near sacking of Byzantium
7.3.2	To work for Seuthes or head for home?
7.3.10	To settle the terms of working for Seuthes
7.6.7	Official sanctioning of the Cyreans by the Spartans

Except for the formality of the presentation of foreign dignitaries (Sinopeans at 5.5.7; Paphlagonians at 6.1.14), these assemblies typically occurred at critical moments: when the generals needed the troops' acquiescence in their plans; when the soldiers were in danger of mutinying, or of splintering into factions, or of committing some crime, or of losing confidence. They occurred when there was a real danger of the normal system, where the officers are the executive, being rejected by the troops, for instance when the officers were contemplating such a risky action that it made sense to try to gain the troops' agreement before carrying on. The increased frequency of such meetings after they reached the Black Sea was due to the fact that the army was beginning to fall apart, emergencies were more frequent, and the need for officers to consult and placate the men more urgent.

The Destructive Power of Greed

But why were there so many emergencies on the Black Sea? Why did the administration of the army change so dramatically from a normally functioning army to one where the common soldiers were unruly and required such conciliatory gestures? Xenophon makes it plain that the answer is greed.

Books 3 and 4 display the army working perfectly. At the beginning of Book 3 there is an army assembly (3.2.1), at which Xenophon, along with the rest of the newly appointed generals and other officers, obtain the troops' go-ahead for their plans. These plans are then executed with complete success for the entirety of Books 3 and 4. There is no need for any further assemblies, the army meshes and behaves with exemplary flexibility in overcoming obstacles,²¹ individuals display heroic bravery, and Xenophon and Cheirisophus are everywhere prominent as good and effective commanders. The men and the officers are united by their sole concern, which is survival. We see that a correctly functioning army makes possible the proper fulfilment of everyone's roles. It is the commander's job to rule wisely and well, and it is the people's job to provide the muscle to support the ruler's objectives. In order to do this, any social unit needs discipline, which is in Xenophon's view the foundation not just of collective cohesion, but also of individual morality.²² A correctly functioning army or *polis* fosters not just the common good, but every individual's good, and so the troops make it safely through to the Black Sea, with their worst enemies proving the terrain and the weather.

By the time the reader has reached the end of Book 4, he is bound to think that Xenophon's intention was to write a *Boy's Own* adventure story. The fourth book, in particular, contains a series of

²¹ See Whitby 2004.

²² In a number of places, Xenophon assumes an equivalence between all forms of social organization – an army, a household, a *polis*, whatever – such that leadership qualities are the same in all of them, and their good or bad functioning can be described in similar terms. See *Oeconomicus* 13.5 and 20-21; *Memorabilia* 1.2.48, 3.4.7-12, 4.1.2, 4.2.11; *Cyropaedia* 1.6.21.

upbeat set pieces which stress the unity of the army. I shall mention just three: the brilliant defeat of the Armenians, requiring close cooperation between all units of the army and sufficient flexibility to adopt unusual formations (4.3), the Mount Theches episode, of course (4.7.21-26), and the athletic games with which the book closes (4.8.25-8). Xenophon creates a potent mood of optimism: working together, the Greeks are unstoppable, on a roll, happy, in favour with the gods.

At the end of Book 4, the army reaches the Black Sea. Even though hostile or potentially hostile tribes occupied much of the coastline and interior, there were also Greek settlements on the coastline, and so the Ten Thousand expected to be safe. Their motives changed, therefore. No longer concerned solely with safety, they began to think about getting back home richer than they left. They turned greedy, then, and this is where the problems start. Ironically, the change of motive from safety to greed would prove to be the very thing that jeopardized their safety. In fact, the trouble begins right at the start of Book 5, with Dexippus' desertion (5.1.15) heralding the break-up of the army and the breakdown of discipline. The mood changes almost from one page to the next.

I have emphasized this because it seems to me to be an underappreciated aspect of Xenophon's literary style that he is conscious of the effect of the rhythms of his work.²³ Here in Books 3 and 4 the rhythm is one of joy and success, with Xenophon and Cheirisophus acting as equals and even allowing themselves some banter.²⁴ It is the same technique film-makers use when they include a light-hearted scene of peace and quiet humour before one of horror, for the sake of the contrast. So Xenophon shows us the army *polis* functioning well, and then shows it falling apart, and he makes it plain why it begins to fall apart:²⁵ largely greed, but also neglect of divine

23 Not discussed, for instance, by Gray 2011, or by Higgins 1977.

24 4.6.14-16, with the nice overtone of a Spartan and Athenian treating each other as equals so soon after the end of the Peloponnesian War. Equality is also the assumption of their military interactions (e.g. 3.4.38-42) and even of their row (4.1.19-22).

25 On the narrative of the breakdown of the army, see also Nussbaum 1967, 170-193.

will (6.3.18; 6.4.23-24). Greed first threatened to split the army back into its original ethnic units (5.6.34;²⁶ Xenophon intervened with a speech to defuse the threat) and finally did so (6.2.9-16); via unauthorized marauding, it caused on more than one occasion the greatest losses of life the mercenaries endured throughout the whole journey (5.4.16; 6.3.2-9; 6.4.24); it almost made them attack a friendly people (5.5.2-3), but the gods intervened; it made the men frequently unruly and even mutinous, leading to ugly incidents (5.7.13-33; 6.6.5-28; 7.1.7-21, allayed by another speech by Xenophon). Xenophon characterizes as greed the mercenaries' natural desire to return home wealthier than they left,²⁷ and the reason he characterizes it in this way is because of its destructive effect on the *eutaxia* of the army. The army often comes perilously close to mob rule.

It is worth lingering a little over the beginning of Book 6, where Xenophon gives us a sequence of events motivated by greed. First, at 6.1.17-18, greed destroys the unity of the board of generals: the men, anxious to enrich themselves, think they would be better off with a single commander than with a board, and select Xenophon as their preferred commander-in-chief. Xenophon intervenes with a diplomatic speech, and Cheirisophus the Spartan is chosen instead. But the army was still unruly, and only a couple of days later, a little further along the coast, we find it being effectively controlled by *lokhangoi* rather than *strategoi* (6.2.4-8).²⁸ Flexing their muscles, these independent *lokhangoi* then bring about the splitting of the army along ethnic lines (6.2.9-16). The army is eventually reunited, again thanks to a speech by Xenophon (6.3.12-14), but only until 7.2.2, where the

26 See 5.6.18 for Silanus' motives, and 5.7.1-2 for his effect. On the original ethnic units: Parke 1933, 31; Roy 1967, 292; Dillery 1995, 66; Lee 2007, 48-52.

27 See Perlman 1977, 254-258 on the economic motives of the mercenaries, and Roy 2004 for an excellent general discussion of their 'ambitions'.

28 Another occasion when the captains form a delegation without any generals is 5.6.14, but the two occasions are not equivalent. In 6.2.4-8, the generals chosen for the delegation refuse to go, making this clearly a case of the captains acting in the generals' place; in 5.6.14, the delegation has the generals' blessing. Similarly, at 5.7.34 the captains are authorized to form a jury by themselves, to try all miscreants, including the generals!

generals are in open conflict, *stasis* (cf. 7.3.7). The destructive power of greed is highlighted for page after page, and we can be in no doubt about Xenophon's motives: he presents his readers with a vivid portrait of degeneration, so that they can learn just how dangerous greed could be.²⁹ Once again, we see that the action of the narrative contains an educational message. Actually, in this case, Xenophon scarcely leaves the message implicit. In case we might fail to realize that the situation he is describing is imperfect, even desperate, he twice informs us that he personally had had enough and wanted to leave the army (6.2.15; 7.1.38-39). This invites us to find a pessimistic message in the text, and it is hard to see why Gray 2011 and others might want us *not* to read between the lines of a Xenophontic text.

Constitutional Theory

Greed, then, has the power to destroy a *polis*. I want to suggest next that Xenophon toyed with a view about *how* greed destroys a well-functioning *polis*, and that his thinking on this score was coloured by constitutional theory. What I am trying to do here, as stated above, is trace a thought-pattern that seems to have been in Xenophon's mind as he wrote – to read *Anabasis* as bearing traces or echoes of such ideas, that he allowed to structure his narrative.

By definition a *polis* has a *politeia*, a constitution, just as a table has tableness or a leader leadership qualities. It is therefore worth asking what constitution Xenophon thought the strange mobile *polis* of the mercenaries had. Some try to restrict it – to say, in particular, that the army acted like an Athenian-style democracy.³⁰ There are certainly similarities, but the first difficulty with this is that the men came from all over the Greek world, not just Athens. Leaving aside

29 In my view (Waterfield 2006, 191-195), Xenophon means to issue a warning to his immediate contemporary audience; he saw greed as a destructive factor for *poleis* in his own time. Notice also that greed is highlighted as a negative factor in the famous and famously pessimistic asides that end *Cyropaedia* and *The Spartan Constitution* (*Cyropaedia* 8.8; *The Spartan Constitution* 14).

30 Brownson 1922, xii-xiii: the mercenaries constitute 'a marching democracy ... an epitome of Athens set adrift in the center of Asia'. Nussbaum (1967, 9) seems briefly attracted by a Spartan model.

the peltasts, who came from marginal places like Thrace, about half the hoplites came from the Peloponnese, but the other half hailed from central and northern Greece, from Crete and some of the Aegean islands, from Sicily, and from all over Asia Minor. When so few came from Athens – only 8 out of the 66 individuals whose origins we are told about, and all officers³¹ – why would the Athenian constitutional model have been adopted? We find similarities, then, only because the Athenian is the system we know best. Very likely, the functions that the Athenian Council and Assembly performed were found equally in other cities for which we simply lack evidence. So we cannot restrict the constitution of the mercenaries' *polis* in this way, but nevertheless, as I said, a *polis* must have some kind of *politeia*. Can we describe the mercenaries' *politeia* more precisely?

From the moment the Greeks began to theorize about political systems, they came up with a common framework that divided constitutions into three: monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. The division is clearly based in the first instance on what proportion of the citizen body hold political power: only one man, a limited number of wealthy men, or all full citizens. This, for instance, is how it is introduced by Plato, at *Statesman* 291d. But as well as being a linear division, ranging from the rule of one man to the rule of all male citizens, the threefold division was also seen as two radical extremes – monarchy and democracy – with some kind of compromise or balance in the middle. And so some form of oligarchy was often touted as an ideal 'mixed' or 'balanced' constitution, with advantages for every social class.³²

31 Roy 1967; Parke 1933, 28.

32 A diachronic sample of texts: Thucydides 8.97.2; Plato, *Laws* 691c-692a; Aristotle, *Politics* 1298b5-11; Dicaearchus fr. 71 Wehrli; Polybius 6.3-10, 6.18.1; Cicero, *De Re Publica* 2.57, 59; ps.-Archytas, *De Legibus* (Thesleff, 33-6); Hippodamus, *Republic* 97.16-102.20 (Thesleff, 97-102). The latest trace dates from the sixth century CE, the fragments of the anonymous Neoplatonic dialogue *On Political Science* (see O'Meara 2003, 171-184). For discussion of the theory in antiquity, see Aalders 1968, Bleicken 1979, and Nippel 1980. The first ancient texts are: Pindar, *Pythian Odes* 2.86-8 and Herodotus 3.80-83 (the 'Constitutional Debate'). Raaflaub 1989 is a good study of the earliest manifestations in the fifth

This pattern of thought was not restricted to theorists and philosophers: it was an ordinary, everyday distinction, arising from people's perception of the administrations operative in their own *poleis*. The Athenians, for instance, could (and did)³³ look back on a kind of historical progression from monarchy to oligarchy and finally to democracy. The threefold distinction could be, and was, played around with by the philosophers, but in origin it was a commonsensical distinction, familiar to all at a moment's thought.

The concept of 'mixture' was variously applied by various ancient Greek political theorists to this basic threefold structure. For Aristotle, for instance, the ideal constitution mixes both oligarchic and democratic elements (*Politics* 3-4; see especially e.g. 1298b5-11). In the second century BCE, Polybius went further, and described the Roman *politeia* (and to a lesser extent the Spartan *politeia*)³⁴ as a thorough mixture of *all three* constitutions (6.11-18). It is this latter form of mixing, where a constitution is created out of a blend of all three of the basic constitutions, with which I am chiefly concerned. 'Its precise source is unknown,' says Hahm, rightly, and he goes on to outline scholarly speculation that the theory of the blended constitution originated 'in the shadow of the Academy,' before being transmitted to Polybius.³⁵ In fact, however, I believe that there is a trace of it in Xenophon's *Anabasis*. I doubt that Xenophon was the original author of the idea: so far from being presented as an original discovery, it is not even *presented* at all. But, if I am right, this is certainly the first trace of it in extant literature.³⁶

century.

33 e.g. in the lost beginning of ps.-Aristotle's *The Constitution of the Athenians*. Though lost, a good summary is possible: Rhodes 1981, 78-79.

34 See also Plato, *Laws* 712d-e.

35 Hahm 2000, 465. The view of Delatte 1922 and others that the theory originated with Archytas of Tarentum is currently unsafe: see Huffman 2005, 599-606, who adds 'although the evidence is almost equally divided'. But note that, if I am right in finding a trace of the mixed constitution in *Anabasis*, the theory has been pushed back to the middle of the fourth century, and Archytas (c.425-c.350) becomes a better fit as the originator.

36 I am not here committing myself to any absolute date for the composition of

By Xenophon's time, the simple threefold division was undergoing some elaboration, especially by Plato. Plato divided the three into three pairs of twins: the rule of one man into dictatorship and kingship, the rule of the few into oligarchy and aristocracy, and the rule of the people into ochlocracy (mob rule) and democracy.³⁷ We can be sure that Xenophon was up to date with this constitutional theory, because at *Memorabilia* 4.6.12, we find a fivefold division attributed to Socrates, with democracy remaining (tactfully?) undivided, but autocracy divided into kingship and tyranny (depending on whether or not the ruler rules over compliant subjects), and oligarchy divided into aristocracy and plutocracy (depending on whether the administration is in the hands of the best men or just wealthy men).

The Anomalous Distribution of the Generals

Now, it is no stretch to describe the army (as I already have done) as becoming perilously close, in Books 5 and 6, to mob rule. At 5.7.26-28 Xenophon uses politically loaded language to persuade the men not to turn into a mob: they would lose their democratic rights to declaring war and making peace, and to listening to the presentations of ambassadors from abroad; there would be no point to democratic elections. It is no stretch, either, to think of the renegade *lokhagoi* of Book 6 as members of the army's oligarchic élite gone to the bad.³⁸ We need next to see that Xenophon has, not untypically, skewed his account. The skewing seems to me to be very obvious and striking, and therefore to demand an explanation. The skewing I mean has affected Xenophon's account of the generals in the *katabasis* section of the work. For comparative purposes, I shall start with the distribution of the generals in the *anabasis* section.

Anabasis other than 'some time in the 360s or early 350s'.

37 The basic division occurs at *Statesman* 291d-e, but Plato then elaborates his own take on it until 303d. For further constitutional divisions in Plato, see *Republic* 544a-576a and *Laws* 676a-702a. In his *Politics* Aristotle fundamentally retained Plato's sixfold structure in his discussion of constitutions, ideal and real.

38 Xenophon draws attention to the higher social status of the generals and officers at 3.1.36-37.

In Books 1 and 2 there are essentially seven Greek generals, as follows:³⁹ Agias of Arcadia, Cheirisophus of Sparta, Clearchus of Sparta, Meno of Thessaly, Proxenus of Thebes, Socrates of Achaea, and Sophaenetus of Stymphalus.⁴⁰ The seven generals are not equally prominent in Xenophon's narrative: Agias, and Socrates receive, on average, only one or two mentions per book before being killed.⁴¹ Sophaenetus was not one of the generals arrested by Tissaphernes; he too receives roughly one mention per book: 1.1.3; 1.2.3; 2.5.37; 4.4.19; 5.3.1; 5.8.1; 6.5.13. He then drops out of the text, and it is very likely that he was replaced by Phryniscus of Achaea,⁴² who is first mentioned as a general at 7.2.1, so that Phryniscus' trajectory continues that of Sophaenetus. He is mentioned at 7.2.1, 7.2.29, 7.5.4, and 7.5.10, so he brings the average up a little.

Cheirisophus is everywhere prominent. He is mentioned four times in the first two books (1.4.3; 2.1.5; 2.2.1; 2.5.37), and at least a dozen times in the next two books; and then, even though he is absent from the army for most of Book 5, he receives another half dozen mentions in Books 5 and 6 (5.1.3; 5.3.1; 5.6.36; 6.1.15; 6.1.32), including his death at 6.4.11. During his absence, and after his death, his contingent is taken over by Neon, who accordingly comes to prominence in the final three books and shares a trajectory with Cheirisophus (as Phryniscus does with Sophaenetus): 5.3.4; 5.6.36; 5.7.1; 6.2.13; 6.4.11; 6.4.23; 6.5.4; 7.1.40-7.3.7.

Clearchus is even more prominent – so much so that precise statistics are not necessary. Though challenged by Meno, he was the

39 They were primarily those who had been ultimately responsible for the recruitment of troops from their ethnic areas: 1.1.9-11.

40 Pasion of Megara and Xenias of Parrhasia are also generals, but they have deserted by 1.4, so they do not count. There is also an aberration: Sosis of Syracuse is mentioned at 1.2.9, apparently as a general, but since he is never mentioned again, and since he brought only 300 troops, maybe he was not a general in the first place.

41 The statistics for Agias and Socrates are as follows. Agias: 1.2.9 (where Köchly's emendation of 'Agias' for 'Sophaenetus' is certain); 2.5.31; 2.6.30. Socrates: 1.1.11; 1.2.3; 2.5.31; 2.6.28.

42 See Roy 1967, 289-290.

lead commander during the march up country, and as such features on most pages of Books 1 and 2. The same can be said of Meno, though he is not quite so prominent as Clearchus. Both Clearchus and Meno were captured by Tissaphernes and receive their obituaries at the end of Book 2. Proxenus, Xenophon's friend, is another such case: he receives a good dozen mentions in the first two books, ending with his obituary.

In the first two books, then, even the non-prominent generals receive an average of one or two mentions per book, and there are no significantly long stretches during which any of them are not mentioned at all. After the capture of the generals at the end of Book 2, a new batch is elected. In Books 3-7 there are again seven generals, as follows: Cheirisophus/Neon, Cleanor of Orchomenus,⁴³ Philesius of Achaea, Sopaenetus/Phryniscus, Timasion of Dardanus, Xanthicles of Achaea, and of course Xenophon of Athens.

Again, these seven generals are not equally prominent; in fact, the disparity is even more striking. At one extreme, we have Xanthicles, who receives only two mentions after his election at 3.1.47: 5.8.1 and 7.2.1. Philesius receives only six mentions, averaging about one per book (3.1.47; 5.3.1; 5.6.27; 5.8.1; 7.1.32; 7.2.1). Sopaenetus/Phryniscus receive only eleven mentions, roughly evenly spaced throughout the whole book (see above). Cleanor receives nine mentions as general (3.1.47; 4.6.9; 4.8.18; 6.4.22; 7.1.40; 7.2.2; 7.3.46; 7.5.4; 7.5.10). Timasion receives seventeen mentions: 3.1.47; 3.2.37; 5.6.19; 5.6.21-24; 5.6.35; 5.6.37; 6.1.32; 6.3.14; 6.3.22; 6.5.27; 7.1.40; 7.2.1; 7.3.18; 7.3.27; 7.3.46; 7.5.4; 7.5.10. Cheirisophus/Neon are as prominent as already mentioned, and it goes without saying that Xenophon features on almost every page.

Now, what is significant about the figures for the second batch of generals is that they display significant clumping. Specifically, after

⁴³ Along with the others, he is elected general at 3.1.47, to replace Agias, but he was called a general already at 2.5.37. I take this earlier passage to be a proleptic mistake of Xenophon's.

their election at the beginning of Book 3, most of the generals almost entirely disappear for the entirety of Books 3 and 4. Xanthicles is not mentioned at all in Books 3 and 4, but then he is hardly mentioned anyway. Philesius is not mentioned at all in Books 3 and 4, where he could have received another five or so mentions, in keeping with his average. Sophaenetus/Phryniscus receive only one mention in Book 4. Cleanor receives only two. Of the new generals, the most remarkable case is that of Timasion. At 3.1.47 he is elected general; at 3.2.37 we are told that he was to share the command of the rearguard with Xenophon – but he then disappears until 5.6.19, despite the fact that he was presumably just as busy as Xenophon throughout the action of Books 3 and 4, and his busy-ness is properly reflected after the end of Books 3 and 4, when he receives a well-above-average number of mentions.

The effect of this vanishing of most of the generals in Books 3 and 4 is to highlight those that remain, and they are Cheirisophus and Xenophon. For page after page of these two books, their names recur (or, if not, we are probably in the middle of one of Xenophon's longer speeches); all the action is instigated and seen to its successful conclusion by them. By having the other generals disappear, Xenophon allows us to see these two as individuals, and since each of them is basically in charge of separate divisions of the army (the vanguard under Cheirisophus, the rear under Xenophon), it is not far-fetched to suggest that we see them constantly acting within their own domains as monarchs.⁴⁴ In fact, if they did but know it, they were acting like two Roman consuls out in the field – who were of course Polybius' choice for the monarchic function in his blended constitution.⁴⁵ The vanishing of the generals shows that this narrative is not entirely historical, but has been skewed; we look for some reason for this, and we find Xenophon displaying his qualities as a sole leader – a 'monarch', in Greek constitutional terms.

44 As also does Xenophon for much of Book 7.

45 Polybius 6.12.9.

The Destructive Power of Greed (Continued)

If I am right, Books 3 and 4 are meant to portray, *inter alia*, the advantages of sole rule. It seems to me that the story of the army on the Black Sea reveals traces of continuing reflection on the sixfold constitutional division. Book 5 begins with the raid on the Drilae (5.2), as a case study of the army functioning properly (as established in 5.1), and consequently gaining the provisions it needed despite the extreme hazardousness of the raid. But after a pause of only one chapter, it all goes wrong: the Greeks lose large numbers of men, because the men go out for plunder as a greedy mob without the generals' authorization (5.4.16). We see again Xenophon's use of contrast to heighten the dramatic effect of an episode. Just when things were going well, they all began to fall apart.

Faced with the breakdown of normal army structures, Xenophon finds himself tempted by autocracy.⁴⁶ First, at 5.6.15-18, he contemplates founding a colony with himself as founding hero (see also 6.4.1-7, 6.4.14, 6.6.4). Then, at 6.1.25, when the troops want to make him their sole leader, he confesses himself tempted (by the honour that would accrue to him, he says), but declines in favour of Cheiriosophus. Finally, at 7.1.21 the troops offer him the chance to make himself the ruler of Byzantium, but again he declines and calms the troops' anger. Two refusals really bring the matter to our attention – sole leadership here is presented only in a negative light – and we are bound to ask ourselves the reasons (apart from the fact that it shows him firmly rejecting the demands of greed). In both cases, he would have been promoted to sole leadership by the troops themselves, acting as an unruly mob. Though Xenophon does not say so, he would expect his readers to know that, in Greek constitutional terms, that method of elevation would make him a tyrant, not a monarch.⁴⁷

46 Affording us, perhaps, an insight into his character. Notice how his men thought that he 'lorded it over them' (*hybrizein*): *Anabasis* 5.8.1. I thank *Ariadne's* anonymous referee for the reference.

47 Lewis 2004 has shown that Xenophon was working (in practice) with a broader concept of tyranny than his philosophical contemporaries; but the feature of

It seems to me that the best way to make sense of the narrative and portraits Xenophon offers us is to think that he was bearing Greek constitutional theory lightly in mind as he wrote these pages: above all, the idea that the three basic constitutions have evil twins.⁴⁸ The properly functioning democratic element gives way on the Black Sea to mob rule; many of the officers, both generals and captains, began to allow themselves to be controlled by the troops, rather than controlling them (e.g. Lycon at 6.2.4; Neon at 6.4.23), and so show themselves *not* to be 'aristocrats', the right people for the job, but oligarchs in the pejorative sense; and the autocratic element would appear, under the influence of greed, as tyranny not monarchy.⁴⁹ If Xenophon had been allowed to found his colony at Calpe Harbour, he might have been a true monarch, but circumstances guaranteed that his only option was tyranny. And each time it was greed that turned a good constitutional element into its bad or perverted twin. This, then, is how greed destroys a *polis*.⁵⁰ Scholars (especially Nussbaum 1967) have detailed the structures of the mercenaries' mobile *polis*, but they have not asked why Xenophon chose to stress these constitutional structures; this very act of defamiliarization – of portraying the army as a *polis* – requires some explanation. It seems to me that it helped him display the effects of greed.

The Failure of an Ideal?

Throughout *Anabasis* Xenophon stresses the importance of flexibility. The Ten Thousand constantly came across conditions that

tyranny that Xenophon stresses on every occasion (and he is our major source on fourth-century tyranny) is that the tyrant is raised to power by the unconstitutional use of military force.

48 It may seem that these passages are too slight to bear the baggage I am imposing on them, but they are no slighter, perhaps, than many of the passages in Athenian tragedies that have been found to have political implications (on which see the remarks of Goldhill 1997, 343-346).

49 See especially the description of Clearetus and his ilk at 5.7.26-33, which tars them as tyrants: they have their own bodyguard (implausibly), they are wild beasts, they set up on their own; they eschew formal legal processes.

50 The power of greed to destroy a *polis* is a *topos* from Solon (fr. 3.5-8 Diehl) to Polybius (6.48, 6.51, 6.56), and beyond.

were totally unsuited to hoplite warfare, and their survival depended on adapting traditional Greek military practices, and even on trial and error.⁵¹ Their survival on the Black Sea coast likewise depended upon political flexibility, especially the generals' allowing the troops an unusual degree of complicity in decision-making. If such flexibility is a virtue in *Anabasis*, perhaps Xenophon means us to see his description of the army *polis* at work as some kind of ideal: by the flexible use of democratic, or oligarchic, or autocratic systems, as required – by adopting an overall blend of the three constitutions, a vague forerunner of Polybius' blended constitution – the army survived.⁵²

If Xenophon was attracted by this ideal, it should appear in Books 3-4, where the army is functioning properly and well. It is easy to find democracy there (in a suitably limited form), because the books begin with a general assembly at 3.2, at which the troops vote, by a show of hands, to accept Xenophon's advice for the immediate future; it is easy to find oligarchy, because Xenophon's first aim, on taking command, is to see that the board of generals and captains is reconstituted (3.1.38; it then functions as usual for the rest of these two books); and we have found hints of autocracy too. In Books 3-4, then, we find autocrats acting efficiently for the good of their subjects,⁵³ oligarchs in control of administrative functions, and *hoi polloi* there to be consulted in an emergency. It is not implausible to suggest that, in Xenophon's view, an army functions well with such a

51 e.g. the adoption and then rejection of the hollow square at 3.2-4.

52 Xenophon was aware, of course, of the fragility of constitutions: at the very beginning of *Cyropaedia*, he remarks how all three types of constitution are overthrown by political coups (1.1.1; see also *Agesilaus* 1.4). How to avoid this? How to achieve stability? Perhaps the answer is hinted at in Books 3 and 4 of *Anabasis*, with his portrait of a perfectly functioning, flexible, blended system.

53 Echoing Herodotus' Darius (*Histories* 3.82), at 6.1.18 the troops want a sole commander because a board of generals is inefficient. The efficiency of the autocrat was a *topos*: see e.g. Demosthenes, *Olynthiac* 1.4, and *On the Situation in the Chersonese* 8.11. It is still a *topos* in contemporary political theory, especially since the efficiency of democracy obviously decreases in a two-party set-up.

blended constitution. But we need to remind ourselves again of the darker tones of *Anabasis*. If this is Xenophon's political ideal, it is not one that he expected to be realized. Faced on the Black Sea with the harsh realities of human nature, he became tempted by monarchy.

I do take seriously the idea that Xenophon was tempted by monarchy. He believed in the possibility of wise leadership, and his self-portrait in *Anabasis* is designed to make us believe that he had what it takes to be a wise leader.⁵⁴ All attempts to pinpoint Xenophon's political position depend on scant evidence, and most tend to argue that he was likely an oligarch in the Athenian mould – a laconophile, and strongly opposed to the extremes of the Athenian democracy.⁵⁵ This may very well be the case. All I am saying is that at the height of his disillusionment, Xenophon was tempted by monarchy – for himself, but more generally as necessary under extreme circumstances.⁵⁶ Xenophon was contributing to the flourishing debate about kingship which began in the fourth century and continued for centuries.⁵⁷

Again, we find that *Anabasis* is underpinned by more theory than appears at first sight, and that this theory is impressed upon us largely by the action rather than by explicit comment. Each of the three constitutions is awarded good and bad points. Autocracy is theorized as being suitable for one kind of crisis, when rapid and efficient action is required; and democracy is theorized as being suitable for

54 Hence, perhaps, his ambivalent attitude towards tyranny, noted by Lewis 2004.

55 e.g. Anderson 1974, 40-45. Gray 2000, however, also finds him in favour of 'enlightened monarchy' (150); see also Luccioni 1947 and Azoulay 2004. On the face of it (ignoring *its* undercurrents, on which see e.g. Gera 1993), *Cyropaedia* is of course strong evidence of a preference for monarchy.

56 An interesting sidelight onto this is afforded by the elevation, at 2.2.5 (immediately after the capture of the generals), of Clearchus to sole command – to monarchy. Notice the way Xenophon describes it, by stressing that this happened not as a result of an election, but organically, with the army dimly perceiving the need and doing the right thing to assure its safety. Again, under extreme circumstances, monarchy might be just the thing.

57 See Rowe/Schofield 2000, index s.v. 'kingship'. It is hardly surprising to find such a contribution in *Anabasis*, when Xenophon can also use a supposedly economical treatise for the same purpose (see *Oeconomicus* 13.5 and 20-21).

another kind of crisis, when the common people need to be placated. Oligarchy, not theorized in itself, is theorized by contrast with democracy and oligarchy. That is to say, Xenophon belongs to the camp of those who saw oligarchy, for a normally functioning society, as a balanced constitution between two extremes.⁵⁸

To conclude, then. Xenophon found himself writing about leaders, so he structured his narrative with his current thinking about leadership. When he found himself writing about the mercenary army acting as a kind of *polis*, he did the same: he structured his narrative with some current constitutional thinking, particularly because it helped him to explain or understand the destructive power of greed on *poleis*: it turns a good constitutional element into its evil twin.

But the two cases are not exactly the same, and the difference is illuminating. The case of leadership shows Xenophon structuring his account of the action in accordance with theory, in such a way that his readers are expected to learn the theory. The case of the mixed constitution shows him structuring his account of the action in accordance with theory, but as a way for him to make sense of things for himself, not as a way to educate others. That is why the allusions are so faint; he can hardly have expected them to be consciously picked up by his readers.

So we find three slightly different kinds of traces of Xenophon's working methods in *Anabasis*. In addressing panhellenism, he develops a position – a position of doubt – entirely by nuance. In addressing leadership, he develops a position by a mixture of direct and indirect statement, and expects his readers to be educated. In addressing the effect of greed on a *polis*, he develops a position primarily for his own purposes as a writer, to structure the text and see if the theory helps him to understand his experiences on the Black Sea. We can

⁵⁸ This needs qualification, but the qualification does not occur in *Anabasis*. In his Socratic works, however, Xenophon attributes to his mentor, with obvious approval, a distinctive kind of Socratic oligarchy, on which see Waterfield 2009, 173-190.

almost see Xenophon in his study in Scillous, with his slave amanuensis by his side, pondering and dictating his text.

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Η απληστία και η μικτή πολιτεία
στην *Ανάβαση* του Ξενοφώντα

Περίληψη

ΣΤΗΝ προκείμενη εργασία εξετάζω την *Ανάβαση* του Ξενοφώντα, προκειμένου να φέρω στο φως κάποιες ιδέες που φαίνεται να υπόκεινται στη βάση της αφήγησης. Εστιάζω σε τρία τέτοια θέματα: στο ζήτημα της ηγεσίας, στο ζήτημα του πανελληνισμού και στην καταστροφική δύναμη της απληστίας. Τα δύο πρώτα ζητήματα είναι οικεία στους μελετητές και γι' αυτό είμαι σύντομος στην πραγμάτευσή τους. Τεκμηριώνω την παρουσία του τρίτου θέματος (της καταστροφικής δύναμης της απληστίας) καταδεικνύοντας ότι ο Ξενοφώντας (παράδοξα ίσως) στην αφήγησή του αντιμετωπίζει το μισθοφορικό στρατό ως πόλη εν κινήσει και δείχνει συστηματικά πώς μία πόλη διαλύεται από την απληστία. Στο κείμενο εντοπίζω ίχνη της ακόλουθης αντίληψης: η απληστία καταστρέφει μία πόλη εκτρέποντας καθένα από τα πολιτειακά στοιχεία (μοναρχία, αριστοκρατία, δημοκρατία) στις αρνητικές τους εκδοχές (δεσποτισμό, ολιγαρχία, οχλοκρατία). Μέσα από τις ίδιες ενδείξεις στο κείμενο φαίνεται να υπάρχουν ίχνη και της εξής σκέψεως: μία πόλη λειτουργεί σωστά, όταν όλα τα στοιχεία του πολιτεύματός της λειτουργούν αρμονικά. Υποστηρίζω, ως εκ τούτου, ότι ο Ξενοφώντας προοικονομεί την περίφημη 'μικτή πολιτεία' του Πολυβίου (και αυτό ίσως αποτελεί κάποιο έρεισμα για να υποστηρίξουμε ότι η θεωρία για τα

έξι πολιτειακά στοιχεία, τρία θετικά και τρία αρνητικά, ανάγεται στον Αρχύτα από τον Τάραντα). Υποστηρίζω, επίσης, ότι η πολιτική πραγματικότητα ανάγκασε τον ιστορικό να αντιληφθεί ότι το ιδεώδες της μικτής πολιτείας δεν ήταν πρακτικά εφαρμόσιμο. Στην αφήγησή του ο Ξενοφώντας φαίνεται να μεταχειρίζεται διαφορετικά τα τρία αυτά βασικά θέματα και η διαπίστωση αυτή ανοίγει ένα 'παράθυρο' στις αναλυτικές μεθόδους που εφαρμόζει: άλλα θέματα μένουν στο επίπεδο της υποδήλωσης (πανελληνισμός), άλλα επιβάλλονται στον αναγνώστη (ηγεσία) και άλλα ίσως εξυπηρετούν στο να διαρθρώσουν το κείμενο για τους σκοπούς του ίδιου του Ξενοφώντα ως συγγραφέα (απληστία).

