# Imperialism, Ethics and the Popularization of Medical Theory in Later Fifth-Century Athens: *Airs, Waters, Places*[*]

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## Introduction

This article engages with the theoretical and intellectualizing approaches to medicine in the fifth century BC represented by certain of the so-called Hippocratic texts. The perspective that it takes might, however, be called popular. I intend to examine the utility of one Hippocratic text, *Airs, Waters, Places*, not in terms of its contribution to the development of medical science, but rather in the context of the popular politics and ideology of Athens' democracy and her empire.[1]

My approach is perhaps contentious in that it involves viewing both a canonical text of the Hippocratic corpus and fifth-century Athens from a more critical, and indeed cynical, perspective than is customary in existing scholarship. An overall aim is to get away from a teleological perspective in which a text such as *Airs* and intellectual thought in this period are seen only in terms of the 'progress' they seem to represent as they move towards a scientific approach to the natural world and disease. Instead, I interrogate the narrative in which the search for rational causes and the move from 'religious' to 'natural' explanations are interpreted—from our perspective—as a step in the right direction, even when the 'medical science' professed in certain of these texts is flawed, and therefore not useful from a strictly biomedical point of view.

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[1] For an introduction to all aspects of the work see the introduction to the Budé edition of Jouanna 1996, which is the text used in this article. Heinimann 1945, 170-209 provides the most detailed discussion of the text's date, placing it at the end of Periclean era, a little before 430 BC. For the purposes of this article, the second half of the fifth century is sufficiently precise, although I agree with Heinimann. Jouanna 1996 would place the text in the next decade.

And to that end, I examine one example of such material, doing so in a broad synchronic frame and considering it from the point of view of its consumers and the utility they found in it. I do not make here a comprehensive statement about all the texts of the 'Hippocratic' Corpus—given their diversity none is possible—but rather about one text, *Airs, Waters, Places*.[2] Since this text offers readers little in the way of practical assistance in the treatment of disease, and—I would suggest—was perhaps never intended to do so, its popularity and the decision by some to embrace its account of the causes of illness and of physical constitutions in place of those more customary (and indeed often religious) warrant scrutiny.[3] This article will attempt to show that among the predominant factors contributing to the popularity of the 'scientific' account offered by this treatise are those associated with Athens' empire and its policies, both towards its Delian allies as they were reduced to subjects of its *arche* and towards others whom the Athenians perceived as threatening its 'growth'. In the political arena, medical theory, medical discourse, and its purveyors offered Athenians convenient and persuasive, because seemingly authoritative, 'rational', indeed 'scientific', bases for the ideologies and policies deployed in the exercise of *arche*, and at times also the means to attempt to evade the moral censure belonging to more customary understandings of the causes of disease.[4]

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[2] The reading below is compatible with a growing awareness of the need for a 'dismemberment of the Corpus', and a consideration of each text on its own terms: see most recently Craik 2015, 'Introduction' (esp. xx-xxiv), and van der Eijk 2016 (whose phrase this is), along with the other papers collected in Dean-Jones and Rosen 2016.

[3] Demand 1999 has addressed the subject of whether the 'Greeks' believed in the efficacy of Hippocratic therapies, and though her discussion deals with texts that offer therapeutic treatments (and therefore crucially different than *Airs*), her comments about a wider sense of 'efficacy', 'conceptional satisfaction' and 'shared world-view[s]' (142-148) are not irrelevant to the discussion below. That said, her categories ('Greeks', 'Hippocratic') are rather too broad to be useful here.

[4] Here the constraints of space will not permit me to develop the latter argument, but I intend elsewhere to examine the 'rational', 'natural', that is, 'non-religious', approaches to disease such as represented by *Airs, Waters, Places* and *On the Sacred Disease*, arguing that their appeal to some, not least the Athenians during the 'plague', arose from the opportunity that they furnished to evade what I would call the 'culturally agreed upon moment of ethical self-scrutiny' that traditionally attended the onset of disease, particularly when it afflicted an entire community (e.g. Hesiod, *WD* 240-243); for a useful preliminary discussion along these lines see Marshall 1990. On the shared religiosity of these Hippocratic texts see van der Eijk 1991, and below n. 26.

**Preliminaries: The Invitation – Herodotus' *Histories*, Book 3**

By way of introduction to this approach, and for some readers a necessary justification of it, I look at an author who contains what might well be the earliest extant evidence for the reception of the ideas represented in *Airs, Waters, Places,* namely, Herodotus. I will not, however, be rehearsing those passages that have been regularly adduced as Herodotus' allusion to the Hippocratics as these have been well documented.[5] Rather, it is Herodotus' treatment of doctors that is of interest here, suggesting as it does the need to consider at least some medical texts and professionals more critically from the point of view of their popularity and their association with imperialism.

Herodotus chooses to frame Book 3 of his *Histories*, with the stories of two doctors, both of whom serve as physicians to Persian kings and in this position are able to exploit the imperialist *ethos* of those figures in order to achieve their own personal ends. I pass over the story of the Egyptian oculist—although relevant—who ultimately leads Cambyses to conquer his native Egypt in order to take revenge upon the Egyptian king responsible for his posting to the Persian court.[6] I note only that his is the very first story of Book 3, and as such proves a fitting introduction to a book chock-full of allusions to themes and material that are found in contemporary medical writers.[7] Instead, I focus upon the Greek doc-

[5] The most thorough recent treatment of the subject and its bibliography is Thomas 2000; cf. Demont 2018.

[6] On this doctor see Irwin 2017b, 97-108 (esp. 99-104).

[7] See, for instance, the diagnosis of Cambyses' madness as possibly epilepsy (3.33), that is, owing to a congenital illness (*kata genos*) rather than caused by divine anger, the famed longevity of the Ethiopians attributed provisionally to the wondrous waters of their fountain (3.23.2-3), so lacking in density and smelling of violets, or the skulls of the Egyptians which he claimed he was still able to see long after the battle in which they died (3.12), thicker than those of their Persian conquerors owing to their *nomos* of shaving their heads from childhood and leaving them bare to be hardened by the sun. Scholars have been quick to identify similarities between these passages and texts within the Hippocratic corpus, and, of course, also debate how direct the allusions should be deemed to be (see e.g. Lateiner 1986, and more recently Thomas 2000 and Jouanna 2005, 6-13, and cf. Demont 2009). As important, however, is the implicit testimony to the *popularity* of such theories that resides in Herodotus' choice to invoke them in the course of his own work, the recognition of which allows one to begin to inquire into Herodotus' agenda behind his choice to adopt this register so conspicuously each of the times that he does: on which see Irwin 2014 (on the Ethiopian *logos*) and 2017b

tor Democedes, whose story figures towards the very end of Book 3.[8]

Democedes is a figure who chose to court power: moving from Aegina, to Athens, and finally to Samos (3.131), he became physician to the aspiring thalassocrat and tyrant Polycrates (3.39) whose ambitions to hold sway over ever wider dominion led ultimately to his demise (3.120-125). At the subjugation of Samos, circumstances render the doctor a valued servant to the Persian king Darius through 'an offer he could not refuse'.[9] Showered with wealth at the Persian court, but deprived of his freedom to leave as he wishes, Democedes devises a ploy to return to his native Italy, the success of which is predicated on the expansionist drive of the Persian king. Taking advantage of the Queen's gratitude for curing her affliction, Democedes requests her assistance in leading Darius towards a campaign in the west, one for which he, as a native of Croton, would be the natural choice to serve as guide and which would provide him with an opportunity to escape. The text juxtaposes Democedes' 'healing' of Atossa (ἰώμενος ὑγιέα ἀπέδεξε, 3.134.1) with the 'education' he gives her on how to persuade her husband to set his imperial designs westwards: 'Democedes healed and rendered Atossa healthy, and thereupon she, taught by Democedes (διδαχθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ Δημοκήδεος, 3.134.1), was applying (προσέφερε) such an argument to Darius as what follows…'[10] Encouraging Darius to embark on a new conquest, Atossa's arguments culminate in the medical:

> You should show some industry now, while you are still young: for sense grows with the growing body, but grows old too with the aging body and loses its edge for all purposes (αὐξομένῳ γὰρ τῷ σώματι συναύξονται καὶ αἱ φρένες, γηράσκοντι δὲ συγγηράσκουσι καὶ ἐς τὰ πρήγματα πάντα ἀπαμβλύνονται).

As an imperialist, Darius' biological clock is ticking, so Democedes instructed Atossa (ἐκ διδαχῆς, 3.134.4) would be a persuasive argument to bring to bear on a disposition that might otherwise be resistant.

(on the bones of Pelusium and Papremis). On the subject of medicine in Herodotus see also Brandenburg 1976, Althoff 1993, Thomas 2000, esp. ch. 2, and now Demont 2018.

[8] 3.129-37. For discussion of this figure see Griffiths 1987, and more recently Davies 2010 and Irwin 2011, 438-444.

[9] This is embodied in the gift of golden shackles that he receives from Darius for having healed him (3.130.4) and stated in 3.135.1.

[10] For a common medical sense of προσέφερε, see LSJ *s.v.* A.1 (e.g. Pl. *Sym.* 189a, cf. 187e; Hp. *Ulc.* 24; D.C. 55.17, and widespread in the medical writers).

On this front, however, no persuasion was necessary: Darius announces that a new campaign was exactly his intention. And yet since it is aimed in the wrong direction—against Scythia—Atossa must carry on with the doctor's persuasive script: she has heard an account of Greek girls, Spartan, Argive, Attic and Corinthian, and wants them as her servants (ἐπιθυμέω γὰρ λόγῳ πυνθανομένη Λακαίνας τέ μοι γενέσθαι θεραπαίνας καὶ Ἀργείας καὶ Ἀττικὰς καὶ Κορινθίας, 3.134.5). As a result of the doctor's deft instruction, Atossa convinces Darius to turn his attention westwards, and, just as the doctor foresaw, Democedes is chosen as scout and thereby enabled to effect his escape. This he does, however, not before allowing the Persians to assemble a certain body of information about Greece (ἔπλεον ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα…τὰ παραθαλάσσια ἐθηεῦντο καὶ ἀπεγράφοντο…τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῆς καὶ ὀνομαστὰ θεησάμενοι, 3.136.1)—his freedom is won, but at the cost of jeopardizing that of Hellas should Darius continue on the course that the doctor has prescribed for him.

I draw attention to Democedes' story for its depiction of a physician's 'instruction', how he taught his clientele to deploy medical arguments for aims other than those strictly medical, in this case to fuel an expansionist agenda that would in turn serve his own personal agenda—a course of action suited to the patient's character and beneficial to himself. Atossa's first argument about the 'naturalness' of Darius taking such action at such an age presupposes some notion of the 'nature of man': the 'growth of the mind' is claimed to be coextensive with the 'growth of the body' in order to imply that a certain period in a man's life is the 'natural' or 'appropriate' time for other types of *auxesis*—in this case that of the king's empire.[11] The argument that Atossa makes resonates with those made among Herodotus' contemporaries in their own expansionist ventures: according to Thucydides, when the Athenians deliberated over undertaking the conquest of Sicily, among the medical arguments that Alcibiades brought to bear on the Athenians was that he was at his *acme*—that is, in perfect condition to accomplish such a feat.[12] 'Growth'

[11] Asheri 2007, 514.

[12] 'Alcibiades', Thucydides 6.17.1: 'And do not be afraid of my youth now, but while I am still in its flower (ἀλλ᾽ ἕως ἐγώ τε ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ᾽ αὐτῆς), and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves of the 'benefit' of us both (ἀποχρήσασθε τῇ ἑκατέρου ἡμῶν ὠφελίᾳ).' And see Alcibiades' further elaboration at 6.18.6 with de Romilly 1976 (cf. Hornblower 2008, 352-353). For the use of medical discourse and metaphor throughout the debate, see Jouanna 2012b (ch. 2), with bibliography, and Jouanna 2005, 19, who contributes the parallel between Alcibiades' warning against change

is, moreover, also a key metaphor: the conceptualization of aggressive expansion as 'growth' rendering 'natural' and therefore beyond judgment what otherwise described would be open to moral censure—the product of an unjust greed and/or lust for power over others—is one of which Thucydides' narrative makes good use in attempting to absolve Athenian *arche* of charges of wrong-doing.[13] Not everyone, however, was prepared to dismiss ethics from evaluating wars undertaken for expansionist aims, and to accept that such 'growth' is 'natural', so Herodotus attests—also in Book 3—in the message that the Ethiopian king sends to the unjust Persian king, and this is further evident in the 'just war theory' implicit in Andocides' *On the Peace*.[14]

The doctor seems also to have provided Atossa with her second line-of-attack.[15] When she rejects the idea of a Scythian campaign, she invokes a *logos* that she claims to have heard and that has led her to prefer to acquire certain peoples as servants—in this case European Greeks—over others—here Scythians. Readers are, of course, not explicitly told what that *logos* was—there was no need for elaboration given Darius' willingness to comply. There is, though, certainly enough in the ethno-

(6.16.7) and *On Regimen in Acute Diseases* 36. Relevant for the wider project behind this article is Thucydides' depiction of medical discourse being mobilized—by both sides—in the assembly in order to persuade: see Nicias at 6.14 who requests the Prytanis behave like a good doctor, possibly an indirect reminder of the *nosos* from which Athens had, according to Nicias (6.12.1), only just recovered. One should note, however, that Nicias' allusions to medicine remain at the level of simile, instructing others to be like a good doctor, whereas Alcibiades' use of medical argumentation is more pervasive and blurs the boundary between the medical and the political, casting himself as a physician.

[13] On the 'organic metaphor' of 'growth' in Book 1, see 1.2.6, 1.12.1, 1.16.1, 1.17.1, 1.69.4, 1.89.1, etc. with Hornblower 1991, 134. See also the defense from 'nature' that Pericles is portrayed as having made in response to the negative progress of the war (Thuc. 2.64.3): ἦν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδῶμέν ποτε (πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι)…

[14] Herodotus 3.21.2: οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἀνὴρ δίκαιος. εἰ γὰρ ἦν δίκαιος, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπεθύμησε χώρης ἄλλης ἢ τῆς ἑωυτοῦ, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐς δουλοσύνην ἀνθρώπους ἦγε ὑπ᾽ ὧν μηδὲν ἠδίκηται ('…nor is that man just; for were he just, he would not have coveted a land other than his own, nor would he try to lead into slavery men by whom he has not been injured'). Andocides 3.13: οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁμολογῆσαι διὰ τάδε δεῖν πολεμεῖν, ἢ ἀδικουμένους ἢ βοηθοῦντας ἀδικουμένοις ('Everyone would agree, I think, that war is justified only so long as one is either suffering a wrong oneself or supporting the cause of another who has been wronged').

[15] The doctor as the source explains Asheri's difficulty here (2007, 514): 'Herodotus seems to ignore that, before the exploratory expedition, Atossa could not have had such a great knowledge of Greek women.'

graphic material of Herodotus' day to provide suggestions. Perhaps the *logos* she claims to have heard pertained to the *nomoi* of the Greeks, or perhaps to their *physis*. But perhaps the *logos* was more sophisticated, one based on the characters and constitutions of each people arising from the different lands that they each inhabited, that is, something like the thesis maintained by the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places*, a text that famously contrasts European Greeks and Scythians.[16] The superior constitution and character of European Greeks praised by that text, in contrast to the Scythians whom it depicts most unattractively, would no doubt have made them seem more desirable. Other sources corroborate this portrayal and suggest that these Greeks, deemed more intelligent by some, may have seemed more 'useful', given that the Scythians are widely portrayed as neither intelligent nor able to be domesticated.[17] On that basis, however, Herodotus would allow another construal of her preference, and one less flattering to Greek readers invested in stereotypes: perhaps Scythians were not too uncultivated, but too 'free' to become good slaves (for Herodotus, for instance, they are the freest peoples—4.46—and definitely not slavish, cf. 4.142). Speculation aside, whatever basis Atossa may have found in the *logos* that she claims induced her to prefer these Greeks over Scythians, Herodotus' story contains some polemic for those readers of his day who had much invested in a contrast between 'free' Europeans and 'slavish' Asiatics—the dichotomy found in a text like *Airs, Waters, Places,* as we will see below. These readers might well be taken aback by the preference of this Asiatic queen for Greek servants, and not Asiatic Greeks, but rather those of Europe.

I cite Herodotus' story for the purpose of foregrounding the existence in the late fifth century of a more critical and indeed cynical view of what doctors could 'teach' and why. Herodotus portrays a doctor deploying his 'knowledge', medical authority, and the discourse of medicine for aims other than bodily health, whether done for the physician's own personal benefit (even at the expense of his own country), as with Democedes, or when borrowed by a power intent on its own 'growth'. It is with Herodotus' 'instruction' on how to approach both the practitioners of medicine and the use to which their instruction might be put that I turn to my main discussion.

[16] *AWP* 17-22 J. On Scythia in Greek ethnography, see Thomas 2000, 42-68.

[17] For negative portrayals of the Scythians' intelligence see for instance Thuc. 2.97.6, or the Scythian policeman of Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousae.*

### *Airs, Waters, Places:* Medicine and Athenian Ideology

*Airs, Waters, Places* is a treatise that purports to teach its implied readership—identified in the first line as would-be doctors—the things necessary for practicing medicine well. Particular emphasis is placed on the necessity of taking environmental factors into consideration in the practice of medicine—the winds, the waters, the quality of the soil, the seasons of the year, and to a lesser extent some reference is also made to the *diaita* of a people (1-2 J)—a theory that has been called 'environmental determinism'.[18] As the text continues, the impression is that its intended audience, at least ostensibly, is a special subset of doctors, those whose practice will be itinerant, and therefore in special need of this information if they are to be successful in prognosis.[19]

The text falls into two parts. The first, chs 1-11, is more abstract in its discussion of how differences in each of several environmental factors will impact on health, while ch. 12 marks an abrupt shift from the generic to the specific,[20] announcing that it will now turn to the differing constitutions of peoples inhabiting different continents:

> So much for the changes of the seasons. Now I intend to compare Asia and Europe, and to show how they differ in every respect, and how the nations of the one differ entirely in physique from those of the other (11.2 – 12.1 J).[21]

As promised, the second part does devote considerable time to arguing for the 'natural', 'environmentally determined' superiority of Europeans over Asiatics, albeit with quirky, and sometimes lengthy, digressions about such liminal curiosities as the so-called 'Macrocephaloi' (14 J), the people of the river Phasis (15 J), and the Scythians (17-22 J). Towards the conclusion of the treatise, however, its argument is extend-

[18] On this concept, see Thomas 2000, 76 and esp. 86-98 on its use in *Airs*. Craik 2015, 9 uses instead the term 'medical climatology'.

[19] On the ostensible audience of the text as itinerant physicians, see Jouanna 2012d, 155; Craik 2015, 9. See also Dean-Jones 2003, 116-117, who however thinks that doctors who practice true itinerancy were a rarity. For suggestion of itinerant doctors see Hp. *Law* 4.

[20] The transition is so abrupt that some have challenged the unity of the work, but see the cogent defence of Grensemann 1979, and see also Jouanna 1996, 16-19 and 21 n. 38 on verbal repetition across the two parts; cf. Craik 2015, 8-9.

[21] Translations are those of Jones 1923, at times slightly modified, while the numeration (J) is that of Jouanna 1996.

ed beyond the contrast between Europeans and Asiatics, and those inhabiting the lands near this continental divide, to distinctions among the more mainstream inhabitants of Europe (23 J), also owing to their differing locales. In short, non-varying and easy climates, coupled with rich lands such as one finds in Asia, and in some parts of Europe, will generate more docile people, though admittedly, the text concedes, institutions, *nomoi*, will also play no small role in determining the character and physical constitution of a people (16.14-39 = 16.3-5 J). This admission is significant as one that 'unfortunately for the author…seems to undermine much of the rest of his thesis'.[22]

In the course of the second part, the text's alleged purpose of instructing doctors, itinerant or otherwise, is all but forgotten until the parting assurance of the author: 'Take these observations as a standard when drawing all other conclusions, and you will make no mistake (ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τεκμαιρόμενος τὰ λοιπὰ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσῃ, 24.9 J).'[23] But in the end, it does not seem to matter much: it is hard to fathom what practical use either part of the text could offer its supposed doctor-readers. Even if the correlations between those environmental factors and the physical conditions purported to arise from them were accurate, readers would need to go elsewhere for instruction or draw upon their own experience in order to treat patients since the text provides little in the way of therapeutics.[24] In fact, since the medical conditions alleged to have arisen from environmental factors would have been for the most part identifiable upon examination of a patient, one might say that the 'causal' account that the text offers is in fact functionally useless, based as it is on factors within the natural world that are almost entirely out of the

[22] Thomas 2000, 93 and see also 96-7 on the contradictory agenda of the work, arising from the claims that climate, continent, and *nomoi* are each 'crucial'.

[23] *AWP* 24.65-67 = 24.10 J. The similarity of the phraseology with Thucydides 1.21.1 is striking.

[24] This absence causes Dean-Jones 2003, 116 to infer that the text is aimed at readers with 'considerable medical expertise', but it is equally appropriate for those to whom therapy is of no interest, those who have no medical expertise and no intention of practicing. For Jouanna 2012 the 'nosological' aim of the text accounts for the diminished presence of the therapeutic, but his staggered disclosure of the degree to which the therapeutic has been eclipsed suggests some embarrassment: 'more nosological than therapeutic' (157); 'therapeutic contexts…occupy a relatively minor place in the treatise' (169); 'the therapeutic aspect…is barely present' (172). For further discussion of therapeutics in the 'Hippocratic' Corpus see van der Eijk 2005, ch. 3.

control of local inhabitants to alter. The only foreseeable benefit that the text offers its physician readers would seem to lie, as claimed at the outset, in the credibility the doctor may garner for himself by anticipating what diseases are likely to befall a population based on seasonal variations.[25] The text says as much in its defense at the end of its proem (2.2 J):

> As time and the year passes he will be able to tell what epidemic diseases will attack the city either in summer or in winter, as well as those peculiar to the individual which are likely to occur through change in mode of life. For knowing the changes of the seasons, and the risings and settings of the stars, with the circumstances of each of these phenomena, he will know beforehand the nature of the year that is coming. Through these considerations and by learning the times beforehand, he will have full knowledge of each particular case, will succeed best in securing health, and will achieve the greatest triumphs in the practice of his art.

This prognostic function of the text finds elaboration in chs 10-11, which begin: 'As to the seasons a consideration of the following points will make it possible to decide whether a year will prove unhealthy or healthy…'. These chapters on the seasons are rather different from the others in that their predictions of the diseases frequently transcend the specificity of locale, describing instead seasonal variations that can happen in a variety of places and the diseases that they will precipitate, and therefore—if true—their content would be of use also to doctors whose practice was not itinerant, as well as non-physician readers, in conveying closer to the surface the treatise's general subtext that the source of disease is 'natural', as in something that an expert can account for in 'rationalistic' terms.[26]

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[25] For 'retrospective prognosis' along these lines of explanation, see Diod. Sic. 12.58.3-5, perhaps based on Ephorus, explaining the severity of the Athenian plague in 426 BC, and seemingly with an agenda of discrediting or diminishing the idea of divine causation.

[26] On this view see *AWP* 22.2 and 22.12 J (cf. 4.3 J), complemented by *On the Sacred Disease* 18.1 J, where the very environmental factors of *Airs* are what makes diseases 'divine':

> And the disease called the Sacred arises from causes as the others, namely, those things which enter and quit the body, such as cold, the sun, and the winds, which are ever changing and are never at rest. And these things are divine, so that there is no necessity for making a distinction, and holding this disease to be more divine than the others but all are divine, and all human. Each has a nature and power of its own none is hopeless or incapable of treatment.

So for all its display of 'knowledge', in terms of medical treatment, there is little of practical benefit in this text: the author offers a panoply of causes but no therapy. And yet, despite its limited utility, a teleologizing scholarship nevertheless tends to congratulate the text for what it is presumed to represent, the nascent quest for scientific explanation, albeit contradictory in its claims and erroneous in its results: one might call this the 'at-least-they-tried' school of interpretation.[27] But there are problems with taking this text so straightforwardly as the author's earnest attempt to present medical knowledge to his intended audience, or with the implicit assumption that there were not contemporaries who would have received the text critically. First and foremost, the fact that the text's audience was clearly greater—and meant to be greater—than the narrow audience it presents itself as addressing, that is, those doctors intending to embark on an itinerant practice, renders a discrepancy between the text's explicit self-presentation and what it actually is. This variance between the pretense of its audience and its actual audience becomes, moreover, all the more acute if *Airs* was written for public performance.[28] Second, the 'knowledge' that the author claims to purvey and the basis for his claim are somewhat problematic. Leaving aside questions about the accuracy of his claims, the experience presumed by the range of territory covered by the text presumes a degree of itinerancy that would itself have rendered the authors' credentials suspect in the eyes of some within the profession: the Hippocratic *Decorum* (2) seems to imply that such moving from city to city is what characterizes frauds.[29]

Moreover, the scope and geographical distances encompassed within the text grants enormous license to the author insofar as he knows that the purported 'information' he imparts will remain by and large unverifiable to the majority of those who encounter his text. Placed in a sim-

For the shared theology of the two texts see Heinimann 1945, 170-209 and, more recently, van der Eijk 1991.

[27] See e.g. Jouanna 2005, 4, citing *Airs* and *On the Sacred Disease* as examples: 'Of course, it is still a far cry from the Hippocratic Corpus to the technical terminology of causation as we find it later in Galen under the influence of Aristotelian or Stoic philosophy, but the Hippocratic doctors' reflections on causation are remarkable for their time.' Cf. Jouanna 2012d, 155: 'We can say without hesitation that it constitutes the most fundamental text for the study of the different categories of water and their relationship with health and disease in the history of western medicine.'

[28] On the text as a performed piece see Jouanna 2012c, 42-43; see also Craik 2015, 10 for the verbs of speech throughout the text.

[29] Dean-Jones 2003, 117.

ilar position to most consumers of ethnography, they would have been unable to verify for themselves much, if not all, of what they read, and therefore would have been granting or withholding their trust based on features of the *epideixis* that had more to do with rhetoric than medicine, influenced not only by how well the author presents the arguments pertaining to his subject, but also by how well he has matched his words to the character and needs of his listeners.[30] Taking seriously the implicit warning in Plato's *Gorgias* about how easy it is for a master of rhetoric to present himself as a doctor before a crowd of people,[31] we should ask ourselves whether modern readers may have been as easily swayed as an Athenian assembly into mistaking a *rhetor* for a real doctor, and have failed to realize that the thesis of this text may have been received more critically by discerning contemporaries, among whom I would count Herodotus,[32] who could well see agenda in the text other than the imparting of medical 'knowledge'. When what the author claims to be observable is as suspect as the explanations that he offers and in light of the lack of specific medical benefit offered by the text's instruction, one might choose instead to ask what would have accounted for the

[30] For recognition of this ability as the expertise of rhetoric, see Plato, *Phaedr.* 273d-e. Lying outside the more limited scope of this discussion, the *Phaedrus* is nevertheless relevant to a larger discussion of medicine and popular politics given the associations it makes between rhetoric and medicine, alluding even to the method of Hippocrates in this context, and its attribution of Pericles' superior powers of persuasion to the natural science of Anaxagoras (269e6-270d). On understanding the allusion to Hippocrates in this text, see Mansfeld 1980 and Gill 2002-3. I would suggest that what Demand 1999, 145-146 sees as the 'importance of cognitive satisfaction to the healing process recognized in Classical Greece' (as witnessed in Plato's *Laws* 720b-e, describing the extensive discussions of the practitioner with patient and family as the means whereby he wins their trust and persuades them to comply) may be a part of Hippocrates' method alluded to in the *Phaedrus*.

[31] Plato, *Gorg.* 456b, on which see Dean-Jones 2003, 119 and Jouanna 2012c, 51: 'And I further declare that, if a rhetorician and a doctor were to enter any city you please, and there had to contend in speech before the Assembly or some other meeting as to which of the two should be appointed physician, you would find the physician was nowhere, while the master of speech would be appointed if he wished' (Loeb trans., Lamb). The comment of Dean-Jones 2003, 119 is certainly correct (see also Jouanna 2012c, 51): 'Plato obviously intends his readers to be surprised and perturbed at the possibility that somebody with only Gorgias' knowledge of medicine could win the post of public physician over a true doctor.' See also Lloyd 1991, 252-253. Diodorus' account at 12.58 is suggestive of what Gorgias adopting medical explanations might have been saying in the Athenian assembly during his first visit to Athens beginning in 427 BC.

[32] See Thomas 2000 on Herodotus' critical relationship to the thesis of *AWP*.

currency the text seems to have enjoyed: just what benefit (ὠφελία) did the text offer its readers? Although the text is of limited use in terms of accounting for the actual and direct impact of physical environments on human bodies, the utility may be seen to lie, as will be shown, in its potential to substantiate or buttress a certain ideological 'reality' for a particular audience.[33]

Before turning to that particular audience, one might entertain more general reasons for the text's currency. There is of course any intellectual pleasure it affords the reader: although presented as a piece of 'technical' writing, there is much here of intrinsic interest to non-physician readers. Those who might have found themselves skeptical of the overall thesis might nevertheless have found their imaginations captivated by its exposition of a kind of thought experiment about the influence of the physical world on human bodies and characters, and on the human collectivities, that inhabit it. Moreover, such digressions as those on the practices of the Scythians and the Macrocephaloi obviously have a voyeuristic appeal; certainly they account for no small part of modern scholarship's interest in the text.[34]

That said, the utility I wish to examine is rather more practical, something other than that to be derived at the level of reading pleasure. The first half of the treatise, its description of which geographical elements are optimal for human health and which not, could almost suggest a handbook for the aspirant colonist as much as the budding physician, providing as it does criteria upon which one might choose the location of a new settlement in order to enhance the physical constitution and character of those who would inhabit it.[35] It would, however, be a foolish colonial venture that intentionally sought to settle less than optimal new lands even if they were committed to the belief in their salutary effects: the Athenians, for instance, certainly did not set out for Sicily looking for lands as 'hard' as their own.[36] Moreover, such a future-oriented ob-

[33] Cf. the discussion of 'efficacy' in Demand 1999, 142-148.

[34] See, for instance, Sassi 2001, 105-111, whose discussion of *Airs* focuses almost entirely on these marginal peoples. Jouanna 2012d, 156 admits that the lengthy technical section on water is not 'the most attractive for the reader who explores *Airs, Waters, Places* for the first time'. For more on this Scythian material in *Airs*, see West 1999.

[35] As, for instance, this sort of material is deployed by the 'Athenian stranger' at Plato, *Laws* 747d; see also Aristotle, *Pol.* 1330a39-b18.

[36] For the fertility and prosperity of Sicily see Diodorus Siculus 12.54, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ πάλαι μὲν ἦσαν ἐπιθυμηταὶ τῆς Σικελίας διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς χώρας, and the opening of [Plato's] *Eryxias*.

jective is at odds with the text's dedication to describing and explaining the *status quo*: those ethnic characters and constitutions currently found to exist that are alleged to have resulted from the particular environments inhabited by each people. Whatever utility this text offered those readers whom it persuaded, or simply pleased, would have belonged primarily to their present-day.

In order to identify the text's utility and, the attendant issue, the text's target audience—just who will find the 'instruction' provided by the text useful—it is pertinent first to examine the rhetoric of the text, its exposition and modes of persuasion.[37] The text adopts the voice of the expert, convincingly to judge from modern scholarship,[38] promising its readers that the 'knowledge' the speaker is about to impart will be efficacious in their practice of medicine. The demonstration of that knowledge which ensues in the first 11 chapters constitutes a kind of blinding with science:[39] a detailed account renders readers acutely aware—to a degree that presumably they had not previously been—of the multiple variables in the physical world and their alleged consequences on the physical and psychic constitutions of peoples, even going out of its way to deride common knowledge pertaining to the subject.[40] This bewildering display of the author's 'knowledge' serves a specific purpose: it is precisely that which garners authority (and provides the basis) for the claims about national character that are to follow in the treatise's second half. And yet, the two parts of the treatise work together rather circularly to support each other's assertions: the later material about the

[37] On rhetoric in the natural sciences, see Lloyd 1979, 85-98, and Jouanna 2012c (ch. 3).

[38] E.g. Jouanna 2012d, 157 ('the author (who is, above all, a doctor)…'); Craik 2015, 9 ('That the writer is himself a doctor, writing for doctors…is evident from the entire tenor of the work'). Contrast Lloyd 1991, 251 who acknowledges that the author of a Hippocratic text may have been 'no practitioner himself'. See also his comments (p. 249) on the 'recurrent preoccupation' in certain of the Hippocratic texts 'with how the doctor is to be distinguished from the layman, and again how from imposters, charlatans, or doctors in name alone.' Aristophanes' *Clouds* is relevant here in putting the ἰατροτέχναι prominent among the sophists whom the Clouds nourish (331-332, with Sommerstein 1982 *ad* 332), and it is suggestive that the scholiast accounts for their presence by singling out one text by name, Hippocrates' *Airs, Waters, Places* (cf. Dover 1968 *ad* 332), an association presumably Aristophanes' audience would also have made.

[39] On the author's technical language see Craik 2015, 9-10, who inadvertently demonstrates its convincing effect.

[40] E.g. *AWP* 7.13 J: 'In fact, men are mistaken about saline waters through inexperience, that they are considered to be laxatives. They are the most opposite of a laxative.'

character of different peoples will seem to instantiate the claims of the beginning chapters, at least for those of its readers who agree with the overall characterizations of the peoples it contains. At the same time, however, it is this first half of the treatise that gives a 'scientific' basis for justifying common views about different peoples for those readers who already hold them. Technically, however, from the point of view of the text's ostensible purpose, the second part of the treatise is otiose: if one presumes the accuracy of the first part, it follows that having received the general principles it alleges to impart, doctor-readers ought not to need the second part at all.

One is entitled to explore the ends served by the inclusion of this second part and its argument for the superiority of the constitutions of Europeans over Asiatics, and some Europeans over others, arising from the physical environments in which they live. For the text patently does not assert Greek superiority over the barbarian—indeed, unexpectedly these dichotomies are used only a single time—but rather it maintains the superiority of Europeans over Asiatics based on a continental divide.[41] And yet, that focus on the continents as a basis for difference is itself problematic. Quite apart from the contradictions that arise from the lack of uniformity in the climates and terrains within Europe and Asia, the choice to base a thesis of 'national' superiority on geography is a far less obvious one than opting for more customary—and plausible—explanations lying at the poles of the *physis* – *nomos* debate, which at one end would hold birth, that is, *genos*, of paramount importance, or alternatively customs (some of which often of course influenced by environmental factors). In our text, however, the former receives no real attention, while the latter enjoys only occasional and rather awkward—for us, at least—acknowledgement as a factor, subordinated, at least in duration of exposition, to physical environment, but with implications that are devastating for the work's entire thesis.[42] Scholarship tends to regard contradictions in the text, perhaps most conspicuous at the end of ch. 16, as a flaw in the medical science and/or logic of the author, but it can equally well be understood as an indication of the rhetorical abil-

[41] *APW* 16.5 J. See Thomas 2000, 91 (cf. 94-97): 'The categories at issue are continental. We are meeting neither the language of the Greek–barbarian opposition, not that of Greeks and non-Greeks, except only at ch. 16.' See also Schubert 1997, 141 n. 59.

[42] There is a tension in the text: given environmental factors take up the lion's share of the text, they ought to be most important, and yet *nomoi*, despite the brevity of the admission, arguably trump them in the strength of their influence.

ities of our author who has convinced readers of his medical credentials when the ability to persuade in defiance of logic—that is, with a sophistic argument—better attests to the work of a sophist.[43]

If this, broadly speaking, is how the mechanics of persuasion work, it remains to consider those who would have found the claims of the text persuasive. The text is potentially accessible to all readers of Greek, and betrays little that is explicit in the way of identifying any privileged audience. Nevertheless, it does speak most clearly to one group of readers. These readers are not just Europeans whom it presents as superior, but more specifically those whom it elevates above the dictates of environment, namely, those who possess a certain political constitution. Twice, at chs 16 J and 23.4 J, the text refers to the detrimental role of autocratic rule on a population, and the benefits of autonomy. I quote the culmination of each iteration of the argument:

> ὁκόσοι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ Ἕλληνες ἢ βάρβαροι μὴ δεσπόζονται, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτόνομοί εἰσι καὶ ἐωυτοῖσι ταλαιπωρεῦσιν, οὗτοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσι πάντων. τοὺς γὰρ κινδύνους ἐωυτῶν πέρι κινδυνεύουσι, καὶ τῆς ἀνδρείης αὐτοὶ τὰ ἆθλα φέρονται καὶ τῆς δειλίης τὴν ζημίην ὡσαύτως.

Whereof I can give a clear proof. All the inhabitants of Asia, whether Greek or non-Greek, who are not ruled by despots, but are independent, toiling for their own advantage, are the most warlike of all men. For it is for their own sakes that they run their risks, and in their own persons do they receive the prizes of their valour as likewise the penalty of their cowardice. (16.5 J)

> ὅκου γὰρ βασιλεύονται, ἐκεῖ ἀνάγκη δειλοτάτους εἶναι. εἴρηται δέ μοι καὶ πρότερον. αἱ γὰρ ψυχαὶ δεδούλωνται καὶ οὐ βούλονται παρακινδυνεύειν ἑκόντες εἰκῇ ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίης δυνάμιος. ὅσοι δὲ αὐτόνομοι—ὑπὲρ ἐωυτῶν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους αἱρεῦνται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων—προθυμεῦνται ἑκόντες καὶ ἐς τὸ δεινὸν ἔρχονται. τὰ γὰρ ἀριστεῖα τῆς νίκης αὐτοὶ φέρονται.

For, as I said above, where there are kings, there must be the greatest cowards. For men's souls are enslaved, and refuse to run risks readily and recklessly to increase the power of somebody else. But independent

[43] A sophist would be proud of having induced a gifted scholar to make this defense of one of his contradictions: 'How can we reconcile these two statements? This is probably one of those questions one is not supposed to ask, and which the author himself did not ask. His logic is both rigorous and flexible' (Jouanna 2012d, 166).

> people, taking risks on their own behalf and not on behalf of others, are willing and eager to go into danger, for they themselves enjoy the prize of victory. (23.4 J)

The passages reveal the criterion for distinguishing peoples as superior not to be their ethnicity, nor where they dwell, but rather their possession of certain *nomoi*. The passage seems generic enough, and yet the terms of this description are rather too uncannily evocative of Herodotus' account of democracy's effect on the 'growth' of the Athenians (Hdt. 5.78):[44]

> Ἀθηναῖοι μέν νυν ηὔξηντο. δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἓν μοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἔστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι.
>
> So the Athenians grew in power and proved, not in one respect only but in all, that equality is a serious affair. Evidence for this is the fact that while they were under tyrannical rulers, the Athenians were no better in war than any of their neighbors, yet once they got rid of their tyrants, they were by far the best of all. This, then, shows that while they were oppressed, they were, as men working for a master (ὡς δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι), cowardly, but when they were freed, each one was eager to achieve for himself.

The similarity of Herodotus' description of democracy in relation to Athens with what is praised by *Airs*, *Waters, Places* begins to suggest one target audience of the text, the Athenians. Moreover, the fact that *Airs* goes out of its way twice to make a point that argues for *nomos* over environment, *despite* the contradiction this generates in relation to the text's central thesis, suggests an audience who either did not notice or found unproblematic the logical contradiction between these claims, and the reason for this would be because their ideology was well served by both arguments. On such a reading, the contradiction that scholars find in the text need not be something of which the author—'primitive' doctor as he must needs have been—was unaware; his *epideixis* may

[44] The comparison is already in Stein 1882 and recognized by Macan 1895 and Nenci 1994 (oddly overlooked by Hornblower 2013) *ad loc*. On the comparison see Ubsdell 1983, 186-187 and Schubert 1997, 140-142.

consciously have been catering to a particular consumer group who benefited from both theses being deployed as they are.

That said, for the argument of this article it is not necessary for this text to have been written specifically for Athenians, though Athens was certainly recognized by contemporaries as a good market for purveyors of a wide array of such intellectual wares.[45] My discussion will, however, go on to show that there are further reasons to see this text as a proponent of Athenian political ideology.[46] For the moment, one may pose the question more broadly, asking what use Athenians in particular would have make of the premises of the text. What did this text offer its Athenian consumers?

To begin, one might first identity the Asiatics that the text portrays as less warlike and 'tamer' than Europeans, owing to the uniformity of their seasons and the absence of the violent changes and extremes maintained as necessary to rouse the temper. Among these Asiatics would be counted foremost the Greeks of Ionia. As often noted, this passage in ch. 16 bears great affinity to descriptions of the temperate climate possessed by the Ionians such as one finds, for instance, in Herodotus (1.142.1-2):[47]

> Now these Ionians possessed the Panionion, and of all men whom we know, they happened to found their cities in places with the loveliest of climate and seasons. For neither to the north of them nor to the south does the land effect the same thing as in Ionia [nor to the east nor to the west], affected here by the cold and wet, there by the heat and drought.

The fact that the text consistently opts to speak of an Asiatic/European divide, rather than a Greek/barbarian one would suggest that such categories were chosen with the aim of distinguishing between Greeks, that is, separating Asiatic Greeks from those of Europe, and of rooting in 'natural', 'scientific', 'objective' terms a basis for differentiation between them that one find elsewhere independent of an environmental explanation. Moreover, it is one that is ultimately unflattering to those Eastern Greeks, among whom are counted especially the Ionians.

[45] As, for instance, dramatized in Plato's *Protagoras* and embodied in the figure of Callias, the consumer *par excellence*: see Plato, *Crat.* 391b7-c5 and [Pl.] *Axiochus*. On the intellectual climate in Athens, see the magisterial study of de Romilly 1992.

[46] Indeed, it is the 'Athenian Stranger' who presents *Airs, Water, Places*-style material to his Dorian interlocutors (Plato, *Laws* 747d).

[47] See Nestle 1938, 25-28 and Thomas 2000, 90-91, 105-106.

There are several ways in which such a portrayal of these 'Asiatics' would suit well the needs of the dominant Athenian ideology, in particular the ideology of their *arche*. In terms of justifying Athenian rule, the assertion that environmental determinants render these Asiatics 'more gentle' but also 'more tame' (ἡμερώτεροι) renders 'nature' responsible for their political status as subjects. That their character has been dictated by factors in their physical world would then serve to diminish the responsibility of those who have chosen to control them: they are themselves to blame for their status, owing to their own passive nature, or to blame is nature itself. When in turn such a character is coupled with a 'natural law' popularly cited among Athenians, that some—the stronger—rule while others—the weaker—submit to being ruled, then the rulers can bear no moral responsibility for the power they exert over other peoples.[48] Such an assertion is, of course, convenient for those who choosing to rule over others wish nevertheless to quell pangs of conscience arising from their own moral sensibilities or to evade the censure of others. The argument is compelling, but fallacious: even if this 'subject status' were to be 'natural' for these Asiatics, it need not render those who have chosen to rule them any less culpable for stepping into that role, nor for how they behave towards them while occupying it.

Here other arguments from medicine come into play. On the eve of the Ten Years' war when the Peloponnesians found fault with the ethics of Athens' behavior towards its subjects, the Athenians are said to have justified their actions as follows (Thuc. 1.76.2-3):

> It follows that it was nothing wondrous (θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν), or contrary to the common practice of mankind (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου), if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up…And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been a thing established that the weaker should be subject to the stronger…But praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature (τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει) as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do.[49]

Here the Athenians are presented as having argued that their decision to take up the mantel of empire was entirely in accord with human *tro-*

[48] For this 'natural law' (or *physis anagkeia*) the *locus classicus* is Thucydides' *History*: see 1.76.2 (quoted immediately below) and especially the Melian Dialogue (5.105.2; cf. 5.89); see Connor 1984, 14.

[49] Translations of Thucydides are those of Crawley 1910.

*pos*. Therefore, if the act should be deemed wrong, blame belongs to a characteristic of mankind, a human tendency, not to the Athenians *per se*: this is a case of the mobilization of theory regarding 'human nature' to evade accountability for the choices made by individuals and the collectivities to which they belong. Here we have another use of the 'medical', the 'nature' of man, in the service of empire. And for those who saw (or would see, that is, future students of the past) through this justification, Thucydides will present the Athenians as having offered a further defense: it is not only that they are not to blame, acting as they have in accord with human *tropos*, but *praise* is actually *due* to them for their 'unnatural' restraint in abiding by justice more than 'natural law' (i.e. their greater power) would require.[50]

Another justification for Athenian *arche* lurks in ch. 16 (quoted above), and resides there in the claim that *nomoi* have the strength to overcome the influence of environmental determinants on a character. Given its affinity to the description of Athenian democracy elsewhere (as seen above), the claim is capable of furnishing (not so) veiled praise of the Athenian *nomos* of its constitution. When, however, those praised as 'the most warlike' are those Asiatics who are 'autonomous' and 'toil for themselves' (16.5 J), there is embedded a further political argument. In so far as the Athenians imposed the *nomos* of democracy upon many of the Asiatic Greeks of their *arche*,[51] the passage provides an implicit defense of Athenian *arche* as good for the ruled, enabling the Asiatics to be better than the dictates of their environment would otherwise prescribe. The argument is useful: what to some seemed an unacceptable infringement upon the rights of political self-determination can with this argument be presented as the means whereby Asiatics, 'environmentally challenged' as they were, could elevate themselves to be better than the constraints of their geography would have allowed. Athenian *arche* offered the opportunity for Ionians to better themselves through *nomos*,[52] and thereby transcend the derogatory characterization of them

[50] The more extensive study of this topic must needs contain analysis of Thucydides' use of medicine in his historical analysis, as well as in speeches, but unfortunately such an undertaking, with its extensive scholarship, must lie outside the more limited scope of this article. Swain 1993 (with bibliography) is a useful starting point.

[51] The *locus classicus* for this practice is [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.10-11. For the Athenian imposition of democracies, with some nuancing of the motivations, see Brock 2009.

[52] And this argument seems to have been presented as *a fortiori* the case for the metics living in Athens—the subject of wonder (*thauma*)—as seen in the exhortation

found so often in contemporary sources.[53] It also implicitly answers those who, pointing out the inferior character of the Greeks that the Athenians ruled,[54] derided what Athens seems to have regarded as its greatest achievement—*arche* over Greeks.[55] In summary, the environ-

given to Nicias by Thucydides (7.63.3): ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, οἳ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ἡμῶν τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα… ('Bear in mind how well worth preserving is the pleasure felt by those of you who through your knowledge of our language and imitation of our manners were always considered Athenians, even though not so in reality, and as such were honored throughout Hellas…').

[53] See e.g. Plato, *Sym.* 182 b-c for the extent to which such characterizations are taken for granted in contemporary Athenian discourse: τῆς δὲ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται, ὅσοι ὑπὸ βαρβάροις οἰκοῦσιν. τοῖς γὰρ βαρβάροις διὰ τὰς τυραννίδας αἰσχρὸν τοῦτό γε καὶ ἥ γε φιλοσοφία καὶ ἡ φιλογυμναστία· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι συμφέρει τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲ φιλίας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ κοινωνίας, ὃ δὴ μάλιστα φιλεῖ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν ('But in Ionia and many other regions where they live under barbarians, it is counted a disgrace. Foreigners hold this thing, and all training in philosophy and sports, to be disgraceful, because of their despotic government; since, I presume, it is not to the interest of their rulers to have lofty notions engendered in their subjects, or any strong friendships and communions; all of which Love is pre-eminently apt to create'). See also Herodotus' presentation of what 'Scythians' say about Ionians (Hdt. 4.142): 'On the one hand, inasmuch as Ionians are free, the Scythians judge them to be the most cowardly and least manly of all mankind, but, conversely, when they speak about (τὸν λόγον ποιεύμενοι) Ionians as slaves (ὡς δούλων ἐόντων) they say they are captives most loving their masters (φιλοδέσποτοι) and least likely to run away.' On contemporary views of the Ionians, see the sources assembled in Alty 1982; see also Irwin and Greenwood 2007a, 19-25.

[54] See, for instance, the portrayal of the Ionians in the failed Ionian Revolt as owing to their unwillingness to exert themselves (Herodotus 6.11-12) with Thomas 2000, 105-106. Or see Thucydides' account of the Ionians who first revolted from the Delian League in response to the obligatory military service, whom he describes as those 'not accustomed and not willing to exert themselves (ταλαιπωρεῖν, 1.99.1)'. ταλαιπωρεῖν, ταλαιπωρία and other words of this stem are buzzword in *Airs* (e.g. 12.6 J, 16.4 J,16.5 J, 19.4 J (2x), 23.3 J (2x), 24.2 J, 24.3 J, 24.8 J): over 10% of all appearances in the Corpus are in this text; cf. Jouanna 1996, 21 n. 38. For more on the contemporary resonances of the word see below.

[55] See the words attributed to Pericles (Thuc. 2.64.3): μνήμη καταλελείψεται, Ἑλλήνων τε ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστων δὴ ἤρξαμεν. Against this, compare the disdain in Hermocrates' exhortation (Thuc. 6.77.1), '…resolutely show them that here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, who change continually, but always serve a master, sometimes the Mede and sometimes some other, but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese, dwelling in Sicily.' Cf. Herodotus' pun (5.97) about the ships the Athenians send

mental determinism of *Airs, Waters, Places* uses 'science' implicitly to explain both how it is natural for these Asiatics to be ruled and how *nomos*—one derived from Athens—benefits them by countering the effect of their environment on their character, thereby improving them and in turn elevating the quality of the *arche* (Athens') to which they belong.

The text goes further, however: what matters is not only the arguments that the text champions, based on environment and to a lesser extent *nomos*, but also the one that it excludes, namely, the 'genetic': that is, differences *kata genos*. In the context of the ideology of Athenian *arche* this choice has practical utility, performing as it does a critical separation in 'national' character between European Greeks, to whom Athenians of course belonged, and those Greeks of Asia whom their *arche* ruled, one alleged to lie in 'science' as the 'natural' consequence of their differing geographies. This separation was, of course, essential for Athenians since the Ionians whom they ruled were alleged to be of Athenian descent. If these Asiatics should have been considered biologically—*kata genos*—soft and unwarlike, naturally disposed to be ruled by others, this would have had some unflattering implications for their Athenian progenitors. Instead, the environmental determinism offered by the text enables them to be 'naturally' inferior in a sense other than genetic, owing to the natural factors belonging to a different environment rather than the factor of a *physis* which to some extent was still shared with the Athenians. This is important since from some vantage points the Athenians were seen as nothing other than trumped up Ionians.[56] Moreover, the disparaging depictions of Asiatics here, those one might find applied to Ionian Greeks by Athenians, were in fact things that were said of Athens *qua* Ionians elsewhere. Compare Thucydides' Corinthians who, exhorting their Peloponnesian allies to lift the Athenian siege of Potidaea, point out the travesty of a Dorian city being besieged by *Ionians* (Thuc. 1.124.1): 'Delay not, therefore, to bring aid to the Potidaeans, Dorians who are besieged by Ionians, which is quite a

to aid the Ionian revolt as the *ἀρχὴ κακῶν*, the 'beginning of evils' that becomes the *arche* made up of *kakoi*: see Irwin and Greenwood 2007b, 'Index', s.v. *arche kakon*.

[56] See the stele at the Isthmus recording towards the east, 'This is not the Peloponnese, but Ionia', and toward the west, 'This is the Peloponnese, not Ionia': Strab. 3.5.5, 9.1.6; cf. Plut. *Thes.* 25, where its erection is ascribed to Theseus. See further Solon 4a for Athens as 'the oldest land of Ionia' and the kinship denoted by the Ionian names of the pre-Cleisthenic tribes (Hdt. 5.66.2, 69.1), said to have been changed because of Cleisthenes' disdain for Ionians.

reversal of the order of things.'[57]

Distinctions among Greeks, some of whom are European, takes us to the final chapter of the text (24 J), where in conclusion the text's thesis is recapitulated, 'For in general you will find assimilated to the nature of the land both the physique and the characteristics of the inhabitants (εὑρήσεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς χώρης τῇ φύσει ἀκολουθέοντα καὶ τὰ εἴδεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς τρόπους, 24.7 J; and again at 24.9): 'harder', more inhospitable, lands, so the text maintains, produce stronger, more intelligent and more warlike peoples. The difference is that as the thesis is now applied, distinctions are rendered among Europeans, and consequently among the Greeks who live there. In terms of presentation, the argument of ch. 24 seems rather unemphatic, striking its readers as just a further reflection—an unproblematic corollary—of the text's central thesis (24.1 J; cf. 23.1 J):

> In Europe too there are tribes (φῦλα) differing one from another in stature, in shape and in courage. The differences are due to the same causes as I mentioned above, which I will now describe more clearly.

And yet, despite this casual veneer (facilitated by the gentle introduction in ch. 23), standing as it does in final position the argument must be recognized as occupying a weighty position. I would argue that the passage is united with the rest of the text in the degree to which it partakes of Athenian ideology. In this case, however, the contrast is not between Athenians and their Ionian kin who have been weakened by climate and geography, but rather the 'scientifically-based' superiority of the Athenians over their enemies, that is, over those European Greeks who were known to possess better lands than the Athenians.

Thucydides helps us realize that they are here the text's target. The very first argument of Thucydides' *Histories*, in his proem (the so-called 'Archaeology') foregrounds the weakness of Attica's land—its 'thinness of soil', *to leptogeon*—[58] against the 'excellence' (*arete*) of Thessaly, Boeotia, and most of the Peloponnese, using it as an explanation for early Athens' greater 'growth' (1.2.3-6):

> The richest soils (μάλιστα δὲ τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη) were always most subject to this change of masters; such as the district

[57] On the Dorians' view of Ionian inferiority, see e.g. Thucydides 5.9.1, 6.77.1, 7.5.4. See Munson 2007, 147 n. 6 and 149, and Alty 1982, 3-4. See Alty (pp. 7-11) also on the Athenians' desire to distance themselves from such aspects of their Ionianism.

[58] Cf. the description of Attica, past and present, in Plat. *Critias* 110e-111d.

> now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese, Arcadia excepted, and the most fertile parts (ὅσα ἦν κράτιστα) of the rest of Hellas. The excellence of the land (διὰ γὰρ ἀρετὴν γῆς) favoured the aggrandizement of particular individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its soil (διὰ τὸ λεπτόγεον) enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion, that the migrations were the cause of there being no correspondent growth in other parts (διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι). The most powerful (οἱ δυνατώτατοι) victims of war or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalized, swelled the already large population of the city to such a height that Attica became at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out colonies to Ionia (ὥστε καὶ ἐς Ἰωνίαν ὕστερον ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῆς οὔσης τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψαν).

No less than *Airs, Waters, Places*, albeit on different grounds, Thucydides makes the weaker argument the stronger, rendering what might conventionally be held to be a weakness of a city—its poor soil—into in fact a source of strength for its people. The argument runs as follows: the inferior land of Athens did not give rise to the degree of stasis that arose over better quality lands, and therefore Athens was stable, and this stability in turn strengthened Athens by allowing it to become the haven for exiles from the stasis that had been generated in other cities over possession of those more fertile lands. Implicit also is another argument for Athenian superiority: this increase in migration to Athens forced those whom we infer to be the weakest of the Athenians to leave Athens and settle Ionia, and thus a latent distinction is drawn between the stock of the 'original', European Ionians, i.e. Athenians, and those who become the ancestors of the Asiatic ones. There were the ones who could hack the competition in Athens with the *stasiotai* arriving from elsewhere, and those who could not, and the present-day populations of Attica and Ionia are descended from each respectively.

Seen this way, Thucydides' account and *Airs, Waters, Places* are united in their attempt to assert a negative correlation between the quality of a land and the strength, stability and growth of its people, albeit employing

somewhat different approaches. Behind each must lie a common and more traditional idea that renders a different correlation between climate and constitution, namely, that a land possessing 'excellence', the term significantly *arete*, breeds men whose—to apply the words of *Airs* (24.7J) quoted above—'physiques (*eidea*) and characteristics (*tropous*) follow [its] nature'. The claim that the *arete* of the land leads to the *arete* of its people is certainly a less sophisticated position, but also less *sophistic* to the degree at least that it seems less counter-intuitive.[59] And if we ask whose land it was which it was so important to deny conferred *arete* on its inhabitants, the answer would of course be above all the Peloponnesians', and in particular the Spartans', its fine land was a *topos* of Athenian literature,[60] and the *arete* of its people—widely acknowledged, if sometimes begrudgingly—was something that required vigorous denial.[61]

Linguistically one can see that this distinction between Athens and her enemies, particular Sparta, is precisely what is at stake. The term given by Thucydides for the quality of Athens' soil—its *leptogeon*—is not carelessly chosen, but rather done so for its implications. *Lepta* is the word that describes the poor soil that *Airs, Waters, Places* asserts to be responsible for the positive characteristics of its men:

> ὁκόσοι δὲ λεπτά τε καὶ ἄνυδρα καὶ ψιλά, τῇσι μεταβολῇσι τῶν ὡρέων οὐκ εὔκρητα, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χώρῃ τὰ εἴδεα εἰκὸς σκληρά τε εἶναι καὶ ἔντονα καὶ ξανθότερα ἢ μελάντερα καὶ τὰ ἤθεα καὶ τὰς ὀργὰς αὐθάδεάς τε καὶ ἰδιογνώμονας.

As to those that dwell on thin (*lepta*), dry, and bare soil, and where the

[59] Thucydides' passage also gets away with sophistry, too, in that readers are induced to see Athens as somehow stronger than lands with *arete* for having received the *dunatotatoi* driven out from there, but of course these are the most powerful of the defeated, and those who retained control of those lands possessing *arete*, the winners of the stasis, would have been absolutely so: no amount of shipping the weakest of Athens' population to Ionia would change that, but a good amount of rhetoric can induce a reader not to notice. For an extended discussion of this passage see Biraschi 1984.

[60] See Eur. *IT* 399 (τὸν εὔυδρον δονακόχλοον | λιπόντες Εὐρώταν), but also *Helen* 209, 349, 493. On the quality of Sparta's land see also Herodotus 1.66.1. See also Euripides' *Temenidae* fr. 730 (ἅπασα Πελοπόννησος εὐτυχεῖ πόλις), and also fr. 727e (from *Temenidae* or *Temenus*: see Collard and Cropp 2008, 225-227), which might even contain an *Airs*-style aetiology for the subordination of the Messenians to the Spartans based on the former's better land. One might also compare Ephorus (*apud* Strab. 6.2.2) on colonizing Sicily, 'the nothingness of its people and the excellence of its soil (τήν τε οὐδένειαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς γῆς)'.

[61] See further below.

> changes of the seasons exhibit sharp contrasts, it is likely that in such country the people will be hard in physique and well-braced, fair rather than dark, stubborn and independent in character and in temper. (24.6 J)

By contrast, the possibility of being *leptoi* is that which is denied to men who possess fine soil:

> ὅκου μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ πίειρα καὶ μαλθακὴ καὶ ἔνυδρος, καὶ τὰ ὕδατα κάρτα μετέωρα, ὥστε θερμὰ εἶναι τοῦ θέρεος καὶ τοῦ χειμῶνος ψυχρά, καὶ τῶν ὡρέων καλῶς κεῖται, ἐνταῦθα καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι σαρκώδεις εἰσι καὶ ἄναρθροι καὶ ὑγροὶ καὶ ἀταλαίπωροι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. τό τε ῥᾴθυμον καὶ τὸ ὑπνηρὸν ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἰδεῖν· ἔς τε τὰς τέχνας παχέες καὶ οὐ λεπτοὶ οὐδ᾽ ὀξέες.
>
> For where the land is rich, soft, and well-watered, and the water is very near the surface, so as to be hot in summer and cold in winter, and if the situation be favourable as regards the seasons, there the inhabitants are fleshy, ill-articulated, moist, lazy, and generally cowardly in character. Slackness and sleepiness can be observed in them, and as far as the arts are concerned they are thick-witted, and neither subtle (*leptoi*) nor sharp. (24.8 J)

The implication is that lands which are *lepta*, as Thucydides claims Athens to be, produce men who are *leptoi*, and this is the substantiation of the claim that proceeds this final synopsis, namely that 'physiques and characteristics of men follow the nature of the land'. *Airs* studiously avoids using the word *arete* to describe the quality belonging to 'rich', 'soft', 'well-watered' lands, thereby avoiding the negative implications for Athenians whose land lacks it, lest it invite the contrary view that men more straightforwardly mirror the land that sustains them.

Another detail of ch. 24 that reveals the primary audience of the text is the author's concession regarding these 'soft' peoples, namely that, 'although bravery and endurance are not by nature part of their character, the imposition of law can produce them artificially' (24.3 J: τὸ δὲ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἐνείη, νόμος δὲ προσγενόμενος ἀπεργάζοιτ᾽ ἄν). The claim once again is conspicuous for acknowledging at the expense of the text's central thesis the importance of *nomos* as a determinant of character, *and* for echoing the argument so often mobilized by Athenians in their attempts to denigrate the renowned bravery of the Spartans: not arising from their nature, Spartan bravery is nothing other than a mindless reflex arising

from extensive training.[62] This is of course made famous in Pericles' funeral oration, in which he contrasts Spartan *nomos*-instilled courage with that arising effortlessly from the Athenians' *tropoi* (2.39.1 and 4):

> διαφέρομεν δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖσδε…πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὸ πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις ἢ τῷ ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχῳ· καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν…καίτοι εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλέον ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔν τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις.
>
> If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from antagonists… trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger… And yet if with habits not of labor but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of escaping the experience of hardships in anticipation and of facing them in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from them.

A giveaway, too, is the term used in *Airs*, *to talaiporon* ('toil, exertion'): its collocation in classical and classicizing sources with the Spartan/Dorian *ethos* is marked. Those of the Peloponnese are the people who are prepared to endure labours, *ponoi*.[63] See, for instance, the self-characterization of the Peloponnesian *ethos* attributed by Thucydides to the Corinthians (1.123.1)

> περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων τοῖς παροῦσι βοηθοῦντας χρὴ ἐπιταλαιπωρεῖν (πάτριον γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν πόνων τὰς ἀρετὰς κτᾶσθαι), καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἔθος.
>
> But concerning what shall be hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task in hand—for to win virtue by toils is our heritage—do not

[62] For sources for this argument and for refutations of it, see Irwin 2013a, 232-238.

[63] On *ponoi* as characteristic of the Spartans see e.g. Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 2.5.5, 3.2.2 with Lipka 2002, 18-19, 115, 124, 137. See also Irwin 2013b, 283-287.

change your ethos.[64]

Or compare the saying attributed to Alcibiades meant to undermine the Spartans' reputation for bravery (Ael. *VH* 13.38):

> Ἔλεγε δὲ μηδὲν παράδοξον ποιεῖν Λακεδαιμονίους ἀδεῶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀποθνήσκοντας· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ταλαιπωρίαν ἀποδιδράσκοντας[65] θάνατον ὑπὲρ τῶν πόνων ὧν ἔχουσι προθύμως ἀλλάττεσθαι.
>
> [Alcibiades] used to say that the Spartans who died fearlessly in war were not doing anything strange. There were escaping the ordeal imposed on them by their laws and eagerly accepted death in place of their labours.

One also sees this *ethos* portrayed in Prodicus' famous 'Choice of Heracles', where the Dorian progenitor chooses the path belonging to *Arete* ('Virtue', 'Excellence'), one in which he will be subject to constant labours.[66]

That Sparta in particular is the target of the derogatory portrayal of those Europeans with fine lands may find further confirmation in another linguistic detail of the text. As discussed above and also made explicit in the text, ch. 24's allusion to the capacity of *nomos* to transcend the determinants of environment alludes to the argument made earlier about Asia in ch. 16. But there is a subtle shift in language that is made despite the authors' claim to be repeating his earlier words. While ch. 16.5 J describes the warlike nature of 'all the inhabitants of Asia, whether Greek or non-Greek, *who are not ruled by despots,* but are

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[64] Here one recalls the Corinthians will soon speak of the travesty of Ionians besieging Dorians at Potidaea (quoted above), a people famous for their unwillingness, for whatever the alleged reason, 'to toil' (ταλαιπωρεῖν): see *AWP* 16.4 J, Herodotus 6.11-12 (2x). See also Thucydides 2.70.2 where he explains that terms were made with the Potidaeans because the Athenian generals were aware of the *talaiporia* being experienced by their army in the cold weather. The use of the stem in Thucydides itself deserves a short article—an essential feature of the valence of the term is whether it is imposed upon one or something one has willingly chosen to undergo.

[65] The verb is not carelessly chosen: it renders the Spartans facing death bravely the equivalent of slaves fleeing a too severe master; cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.6.2 where Antiphon tells Socrates a 'slave' would flee the too austere lifestyle that Socrates calls— erroneously in his opinion—*eudaimonia*. See Irwin 2013b, 283-286 and Irwin 2017a, 11-16 for further sources and an interpretation of this nexus of ideas. For the conception of *nomos* as a *despotes* see Hdt. 7.104.4, and for the citizen as its slave, Pl. *Crito* 50e and 52d.

[66] On the labours required by *Arete* see Prodicus *apud* Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.34. See, by contrast, *Eudaimonia/Kakia*'s promise, 'Have no fear that I may lead you into carrying away these things through labouring (*ponoounta*) and toiling (*talaiporounta*) in body and soul.'

independent, toiling for their own advantage' (ὁκόσοι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίῃ Ἕλληνες ἢ βάρβαροι μὴ δεσπόζονται, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτόνομοί εἰσι καὶ ἑωυτοῖσι ταλαιπωρεῦσιν), in ch. 24 the author changes the term by which he describes those being ruled, no longer δεσπόζονται but βασιλεύονται:

> For, as I said above, where there are kings (ὅκου γὰρ βασιλεύονται), there must be the greatest cowards. For men's souls are enslaved, and refuse to run risks readily and recklessly to increase the power of somebody else. But independent people, taking risks on their own behalf (ὑπὲρ ἑωυτῶν) and not on behalf of others, are willing and eager (προθυμεῦνται ἑκόντες) to go into danger, for they themselves enjoy the prize of victory.

Easy to neglect as apparently minor, the shift has a point when it occurs in a context describing the involuntary facing of danger (οὐ βούλονται παρακινδυνεύειν ἑκόντες) among mainland Greeks: for βασιλεύονται appropriately describes those European Greeks who unusually still had kings (*basileis*), among whom prominently the Spartans, who possessed a constitutional diarchy and whose 'bravery' was frequently challenged as nothing more than a product of training and obedience, not one belonging to an individual's volition.[67]

More might be said of the ideology implicit in the details of *Airs, Waters, Places*, but I conclude with a summary: in its central argument *Airs, Waters, Places* provides a 'scientific' justification of an ideology that, in terms of positing a biological—if not genetic—superiority of some peoples, one might well call 'racist', and argues implicitly for the superiority of one people over others.[68] Although careful not to make ostensible reference to its privileged audience, no doubt to avoid compromising

[67] It is worth noting that elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus we find an equivalence of Ionia and the Peloponnese based on features of their physical situation: see *Diseases IV* 34.15 Littré which stresses their fine orientation towards the sun: ἡ γὰρ Ἰωνίη χώρη καὶ ἡ Πελοπόννησος τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ὡρέων οὐ κάκιστα κέεται, ὥστε δύνασθαι ἐξαρκέειν τοῖσι φυομένοισι τὸν ἥλιον… As in *Airs*, the author attempts to undercut the manifest advantages shared by these locations, in this case pointing out that, despite their fine orientation, Ionia and the Peloponnese nevertheless cannot grow the coveted silphium: unlike Libya their 'great' soil lacks the crucial *ikmas*. Unable *absolutely* to denigrate Ionia and the Peloponnese for the quality of their land, widely recognized as possessing *aretê*, the text reaches for a comparative frame—and one as extreme as Libya with its coveted silphium—that will in one respect at least make them seem inferior.

[68] On proto-racism in antiquity see the work of Isaac 2004, Gruen 2011, and McCoskey 2012.

its claim to objectivity, closer examination of the text demonstrates how the 'environmental determinism' it purveyed would have proved most serviceable to the ideology of Athenian *arche* that sought to elevate itself above both its subjects and enemies. Scholarship has tended to praise the text for the intellectual endeavor that its search for 'causes' seems to represent, taking it both as a straightforward indication of the best the times could do in terms of medical science and as sincere in its intellectual aims. This impulse ought, in my opinion, to be resisted. It rests upon the unwarranted assumption that this text is somehow representative of the best Greek views on the subject, and assumes that there were not contemporaries prepared to challenge—for perfectly rational reasons—the arguments that it advanced. Herodotus, I argue, suggests the case was otherwise. By disengaging from a teleological perspective, one becomes capable of seeing a text written very much for the needs of its consumers, and—more cynically—of recognizing that the pursuit of 'causes' in which some purveyors of this medical science engaged was for those that served certain political and ideological agenda. When viewed this way, it becomes difficult to distinguish *Airs* from other historical attempts to mobilize 'medical science' in the service of a supremacist ideology and its empire, or to see anything primitive or inadvertent in its contradictions and fallacies.[69]

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[69] Of course, I refer here above all to eugenics and the complicity of medical science with the scientific racism of the Third Reich, on which see Biddiss 1997, Weigmann 2001.

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# Ιμπεριαλισμός, δεοντολογία και εκλαΐκευση της ιατρικής θεωρίας στην Αθήνα του ύστερου 5ου αιώνα: *Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων καὶ τόπων*

**Elizabeth Irwin**

## *Περίληψη*

Η ΠΡΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΗ μελέτη αποτελεί το πρώτο μέρος μιας ευρύτερης έρευνας, η οποία έχει στο επίκεντρό της τις θεωρητικές και εκλογικευτικές προσεγγίσεις του 5ου π.Χ. αι. στην ιατρική επιστήμη (όπως αυτή εκπροσωπείται από τα λεγόμενα "Ιπποκρατικά" κείμενα αλλά και από προσωπικότητες όπως ο Αναξαγόρας), καθώς και την ευρύτερη διάχυση αυτών των θεωριών στην πολιτική και ηθική επιχειρηματολογία και συζήτηση της εποχής—αυτό που αποκαλώ (προς το παρόν) εκλαϊκευτική προοπτική του θέματος.

Στο πρώτο μέρος, που παρουσιάζεται εδώ, εξετάζεται η χρησιμότητα ενός Ιπποκρατικού κειμένου—του γνωστού *Περὶ ἀέρων, ὑδάτων καὶ τόπων*—όχι όσον αφορά τη συμβολή του στην ανάπτυξη της ιατρικής επιστήμης, αλλά στο πλαίσιο της εκλαϊκευτικής πολιτικής και ιδεολογίας της Αθηναϊκής Δημοκρατίας και της ηγεμονίας της. Το κείμενο αυτό δεν προσφέρει τόσο πολλά στον τομέα της πρακτικής αντιμετώπισης των ασθενειών και ίσως ποτέ να μη στόχευε σε κάτι τέτοιο (όπως θα υποστήριζα). Ακριβώς γι᾽ αυτό το λόγο η δημοφιλία του κειμένου αυτού, αλλά και η απόφαση ορισμένων να υιοθετήσουν την επιχειρηματολογία αυτού του κειμένου σχετικά με τα παθολογικά αίτια και τη φυσιολογία έναντι άλλων πιο παραδοσιακών (και συχνά θρησκευτικών) και συνήθων επιχειρημάτων επιβάλλουν τη συστηματικότερη εξέτασή του. Όπως επιχειρώ να δείξω εδώ, ένας από τους κύριους παράγοντες που φαίνεται να είχε επίπτωση στη δημοφιλία της "επιστημονικής" επιχειρηματολογίας που προσφέρει το κείμενο αυτό, είναι ο συσχετισμός της

με την Αθηναϊκή Ηγεμονία και την πολιτική της—πολιτική τόσο προς τα μέλη της Δηλιακής Συμμαχίας (που είχαν πλέον περιέλθει σε επίπεδο υποτελών) όσο και προς άλλους που αποτελούσαν δυνητικά απειλή για την "ανάπτυξή" της. Στον πολιτικό στίβο ο θεωρητικός λόγος και η επιστημονική επιχειρηματολογία της ιατρικής και των διακινητών της φαίνεται πως πρόσφεραν στους Αθηναίους βολικές και πειστικές (καθότι αυταρχικές), "ορθολογικές" και "επιστημονικές" βάσεις για την ιδεολογία και την πολιτική που εφάρμοζαν κατά την άσκηση της ηγεμονίας τους.