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THE CHRONOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC AND ITS RELATION TO THE *CORPUS DEMOSTHENICUM*

The problem of the chronology of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is connected with other problems, such as the lack of any specific dates concerning the beginning and/or the completion of some of his works, especially those on rhetoric, and the controversy about the third book of the *Rhetoric*. The latter was caused mainly by its many inconsistencies compared with the other two books, and by Aristotle's own ambiguous references to the art of Isocrates' former pupil, Theodectes. One must also consider all evidence related to the rivalry between the Academy and the school of Isocrates, which appeared for some time as a personal antagonism between Aristotle and Isocrates. Finally, Plato's influence upon the formation of Aristotle's rhetorical theory cannot be overlooked. Irrespective of any other means of determining the chronology of the *Rhetoric*, a later or earlier date of composition can be deduced from the relative conformism of Aristotle's rhetorical theory to that of his master's.

According to Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle had written several other treatises on the same subject as the extant *Rhetoric*[1]. The *περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἢ Γρύλλος α'* is a lost dialogue named after the son of Xenophon Gryllus, whose death in the battle of Mantinea (363) was widely commemorated[2]. This first work of Aristotle on rhetoric is regarded as being a polemic against current rhetorical tendencies. There are reasons to believe that this polemic was focused on the epideictic oratory and its main exponent

1. For a detailed examination and discussion of the catalogue of Aristotle's works see P. Moraux, *Listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain (1951); for Hesychius' catalogue (*Vita Menegiana*) see also I. Düring, *Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition*, Göteborg (1957), pp. 80-93; from a total of nine books included in the list of Diog. Laert. V 22-25, only three, namely the *περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἢ Γρύλλος α'*, *Τέχνης ῥητορικῆς α'*, *β'*, and *Τεχνῶν συναγωγὴ α'*, *β'*, can be assigned with any certainty to Aristotle. Cf. P. Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Ethik, Politik, Rhetorik, *SB*, *Wien*, vol. 223, fasc. 2 (1944), 111-114.

2. Hermippus apud Diog. Laert. II 55: *φησὶ δὲ 'Αριστοτέλης ὅτι ἐγκώμια καὶ ἐπιτάφιον Γρύλλου μυρίοι ὅσοι συνέγραψαν, τὸ μέρος καὶ τῷ πατρὶ χαριζόμενοι.*

Isocrates. Quintilian says that Aristotle's overcritical attitude in *Gryllus* was modified afterwards in his *Rhetoric*[1]. This reminds us of Plato's approach to the subject which had changed between *Gorgias*, reflected in *Gryllus*, and *Phaedrus*.This did not mean that he stopped ridiculing rhetoric and recognized it as an «art»; but in *Phaedrus* he suggested through an idealistic approach to the subject that, under certain circumstances, rhetoric could acquire the characteristics of a true art[2]. The ideal of the Platonic *ψυχαγωγία*, as it has been set out in *Phaedrus*, was certainly an incentive for Aristotle in attempting to classify human emotions in a way which would suit an art[3].It seems, therefore, that *Gryllus*, with its vigorous attack against the use of *affectus* by the sophistic rhetoric, forms the basis for the first stage in Aristotle's attitude towards rhetoric. So, if we use Aristotle's treatment of the techniques of emotional appeal as a basis of distinction, the first part of the *Rhetoric*, Bk. A. 1, must be the oldest, corresponding to the period of *Gryllus*, around 360[4]. The incompatibility between this first part of the *Rhetoric* — where Aristotle accuses his predecessors of neglecting the discussion of the main issues of a case, by means of rhetorical syllogism (A1. 1354a 11-24; 1354b 6-11; 1354b 16; 1354b 27; and 1355a 19) — and the rest of the work is one of the main implicit items of evidence, which lead us to believe that the treatise as a composition bears the marks of various periods and conflicting theories.

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1. Quint. II 17.14: *Aristoteles, ut solet, quaerendi gratia quaedam subtilitatis suae argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo; sed idem et de arte rhetorica tris libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur sed ei particulam civilitatis sicut dialectices adsignat*; see Fr. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik, *Neue Philolog. Untersuchungen*, 4, Berlin (1929), pp. 197, 204. On *χαριζόμενοι* he remarks that because of the particularly bad meaning of the term in the Academy, we can infer that *Gryllus* was mainly an attack on the abuse of appeals to feelings, a characteristic of sophistic rhetoric (*ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασία*), in contrast to the *λόγος* and *ἀρετὴ* pursued by the Academy.

2. See *Phaedr.* 269dff., especially 271e-272b. See E. L. Hunt, Plato and Aristotle on rhetoric and rhetoricians, *Hist. Studies on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians*, ed. R. Howes, Ithaca - New York (1961).

3. *Phaedr.* 271d: *ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει.* Cf. Solmsen, *op. cit.*, p. 227f.

4. It is natural to suppose that Aristotle wrote the *Gryllus* shortly or immediately after the battle of Mantinea (362). On the other hand we could possibly extend the date of the work up to 355/353, just before the *Antidosis*. See P. Moraux, *op. cit.*, p. 34, n. 38. Cf. also Solmsen, *op. cit.*, p. 207 and *passim*.

The *Τεχνῶν συναγωγὴ α′, β′* (no. 77 apud DL) is another lost work of Aristotle[1]; as the title shows, it was a history of rhetoric based on a collection and classification of the existent *technae*. Aristotle probably before composing his own art of rhetoric, and in accordance with his highly systematic way with which he treated every scientific subject, made a collection of every previous rhetorical system and device. The *Synagoge Technon*, as it is said, «*tantum praestitit inventoribus ipsis suavitate et brevitate dicendi ...ut nemo illorum praecepta ex ipsorum libris cognoscat*[2]. In the fragment preserved in Dion. Hal. (*Isocr.* 18: *ὅτι δέσμας πάνυ πολλὰς δικανικῶν λόγων Ἰσοκρατείων περιφέρεσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν βυβλιοπωλῶν Ἀριστοτέλης*) we have another indication that, in this second work also, Aristotle criticizes Isocrates[3]. His criticism here, as in *Rhetoric* 1355a19, is concentrated on the forensic kind of rhetoric. This work — for whatever reason it may have been composed — must have given Aristotle a general view of the pre-existing rhetorical systems with their practical basis.

Diogenes Laertius is one of the sources which refer to the course of Aristotle's lectures on rhetoric in the Academy as a result of a mutual antagonism with Isocrates[4]. There is no doubt that the success of Isocrates' school in preparing future statesmen had forced the Academy to introduce a course on rhetoric during the afternoon sessions. The true basis of the rivalry lay in education (aims and method), and subsequent influence upon public affairs. There is no doubt also that Aristotle's early animosity against Isocrates reflects the Platonic and in general terms the Academic opinions of the period[5]. Isocrates and his school

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1. Cic. *Inv.* II 2, 6; Cic. *de Or.* II.38,160; *Brut.* 12, 46; Quint. III 1.8-13; Diog. Laert. II 104; Arist. fr. 136 Rose.

2. Cic. *Inv.* II.2.

3. His criticism here applies to the forensic kind of rhetoric on the basis that it provides more opportunities for emotional appeal. Cf. also *Rhet.* I 1, 1354b 25-35; See Solmsen, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

4. Diog. Laert. V. 3: *ἐπειδὴ δὲ πλείους ἐγένοντο ἤδη, καὶ ἐκάθισεν εἰπών· αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ξενοκράτην δ' ἐᾶν λέγειν. καὶ πρὸς θέσιν συνεγύμναζε τοὺς μαθητάς, ἅμα καὶ ῥητορικῶς ἐπασκῶν* (Diogenes probably confused the name of Isocrates with that of Xenocrates. Aristotle must have used the original from Euripides fr. 796 N[8]; see Düring, *op. cit.*, p. 58f.); Cic. *de orat.* III 35, 141; Quint. III 1, 14 ;Philod. *Rhetor.* vol. II 36, 3-5, p. 50 Sudh.

5. That is 360-347 B.C.; see I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, Göteborg (1961), pp. 20-21, R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship*, Oxford (1969) p. 49 n. 6; cf. W. Jaeger, *Paedeia III*, tr. by G. Highet, Oxford (1945), p. 184, but see 146f. In the second period (335-322) both Plato and Isocrates were dead. There was no practical

was the immediate successor of the sophistic tradition—he was a pupil of Gorgias. It appears that in his polemic against philosophy he introduces a rhetorical philosophy. On the other hand, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, despite its practical aim, exposes the philosophical rhetorical theory of its author. Aristotle started lecturing most probably around 355 B.C.[1]. The two schools seem to have exchanged not only verbal abuses but whole books of abuse.

According to our sources, Cephisodorus, a pupil of Isocrates, wrote in four books[2] a polemic against Aristotle around 360 B.C. As it has been argued, Cephisodorus would not have composed four books if there had not been enough material in Aristotle's teaching at the time to justify this attack[3]. Isocrates own polemic was expressed in the *Antidosis* (353 B.C.), to which Aristotle answered with the *Protrepticus*, a lost dialogue, which was written most probably around 350 B.C.[4] However, the *Rhetoric* does not prove that Aristotle had a low opinion of Isocrates; in fact, as it has been proved from numerous citations in the *Rhetoric*, the rivalry between them at the early stage of Aristotle's involvement with rhetoric, did not prevent him from afterwards accepting Isocrates' autho-

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reason for this antagonism any more. For Aristotle's rivalry with Isocrates see also Moraux, *op. cit.*, p. 337; C.M. Mulvany, Notes on the legend of Aristotle, *CQ*, 20 (1926), p. 160; J. Atkins, *Literary criticism in Antiquity*, I, London (1952), p. 133; see below p. 5, n. 6.

1. See Fr. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, II, Leipzig (1892), 64-65.

2. Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* XIV 6.9: *ὃς δὴ ὁ Κηφισόδωρος, ἐπειδὴ ἠνίκ' Ἀριστοτέλους βαλλόμενον ἑαυτῷ τὸν διδάσκαλον Ἰσοκράτην ἑώρα, αὐτοῦ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ὢν ἀμαθὴς καὶ ἄπειρος ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ καθορᾶν ἔνδοξα τὰ Πλάτωνος ὑπάρχοντα, οἰηθεὶς Πλάτωνα τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπολέμει μὲν Ἀριστοτέλει ἔβαλλε δὲ Πλάτωνα.* See also Dion. Hal. *Isocr.* 18; Athen. II 60b, III 122b; for Cephisodorus see *RE* XI c. 227.

3. See I. Düring, *op. cit.*, pp. 389-390. He argues against Jaeger's opinion (*Hermes* 64, 1929, p. 22) that Cephisodorus' four books were an answer to *Protrepticus* (thus after 353).

4. The aim of *Protrepticus* was to defend a type of life based on philosophy; cf. Iambl. *Protr.* 6 (fr. 4 Rose): *φιλοσοφητέον ἄρα ἡμῖν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὀρθῶς πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον διάξειν ὠφελίμως.* In a curious way Aristotle appears to defend philosophy against Isocrates' accusations using Isocrates' own method. This type of *protrepticos logos* is said to have been introduced by Isocrates. Cf. Isocr. *Πρὸς Δημόνικον*. See also his criticism in *Antid.* 84-85: ... *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην προσποιουμένων προτρέπειν ἡμεῖς ἂν ἀληθέστεροι καὶ χρησιμώτεροι φανεῖεν.* For *Protrepticus* see I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, p. 428; W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: fundamentals of the history of his development*, tr. R. Robinson, Oxford (1934), p. 54ff.

rity on matters connected with style[1]. This, as Cope remarks, «may also incline us to adopt the later date of the *Rhetoric*, during his (sc. Aristotle's) second residence in Athens»[2].

Theodectes, a pupil of Isocrates, might have played a considerable role in this change of Aristotle's attitude towards the sophistic rhetoric, which can be seen in the third book[3]. The opinions concerning the authorship of the work which bears his name (*Τέχνης τῆς Θεοδέκτου συναγωγὴ α'*, no 82 apud DL) are varied. Ancient authors do not seem to ascribe the work with much certainty either to Aristotle or to Theodectes[4]. Aristotle himself refers to it in a way which has caused conflicting interpretations. In *Rhet.* II 19. 1410b39, *αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηριθμηνται* could mean that he refers to a work of his own or to a work of Theodectes. It could also mean a work of his own dedicated to his friend[5]. Solmsen suggested that Aristotle had made his own *synagoge* using the work of Theodectes, after the latter's death; and that Theodectes' own theories were important enough to make Aristotle discuss them in the third book of his *Rhetoric* (ch. 13-19). Solmsen believed that in the part referred to as *περὶ τάξεως* (ch. 13-19), Aristotle was influenced by an Isocratean *techne*, which according to his opinion was that of Theodectes[6]. H. Diels proposed that Theodecteia was originally an Aristotelian composition, and that when Aristotle came back in 335 found his own text enlarged by Theodectes' teaching. This material

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1. Especially in the third book. See below p. 6 n. 1.

2. E. M. Cope, *An introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, London and Cambridge (1867), p. 42.

3. Athen. X 451e: *Θεοδέκτην δὲ τὸν Φασηλίτην, φησὶν Ἕρμιππος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν Ἰσοκράτους μαθητῶν, ἱκανώτατον γεγονέναι.* Cf. Dion. Hal. *Isae.* 19; Fr. Solmsen, Drei Rekonstruktionen zur antiken Rhetorik und Poetik, *Hermes* 67 (1932), pp. 133-154.

4. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1421b 1-3; Quint. II 15, 10; IV 2, 31; Dion. Hal. *de compositione verborum* 2; see below p. 13, n. 1; Val. Max. XIII 14, 3: *Aristoteles Theodecti discipulo oratoriae artis libros quos edere donaverat, molesteque postea ferens titulum eorum sic alii cessisse, proprio volumine quibusdam rebus insistens planius sibi de his in Theodectis libris dictum esse adjecit.*

5. Cope, *op. cit.*, p. 57ff. concluded that the work must belong to Aristotle as «his practice is... never to quote another's work as an authority»; he added though that there might have been another art by Theodectes himself.

6. For Isocrates' *Techne* see K.Barwick, Das Problem der isokrateischen *Techne*, *Philologus*, 107 (1963), pp. 42-60; idem, Rhet. *Τέχνη* und Horaz ad Pis., *Hermes*, 57 (1922), pp. 24ff.; S. Usher, The style of Isocrates, *BICS*, 20 (1973), p. 40 and n. 16; Solmsen, *Drei Rekonstruktionen*, p. 148ff.; Cic. *Brut.* XII 48; Quint. II 15, 4; III 1, 53; *Vit. X Or.* 838e-f; Arist. fr. 141 Rose.

improved and revised was at the end published as the extant *Rhetoric*[1]. Despite the differences in those assumptions, there is a common point; that of the completion of the *Rhetoric* after Theodectes' death (around 330), and in the third period of Aristotle's residence in Athens.

According to modern interpretations, books A and B also show different elements of composition, besides book Γ. 23[2]. A. Kandelhardt supported the view that the *Rhet.* 1354a11 - 1355b23 was the oldest part of the composition, dating back to the first draft, which W. Jaeger called «Urrhetorik»[3]. Solmsen accepted Kandelhardt's thesis and added *Rhet.* 1354a 1-11 to the first stage of composition[4]. I. Düring assumed that *Rhet.* I-II, with the exclusion of II 23-24, was written between 360-355. «This would explain», he added, «why Aristotle did not comment on any passages from Demosthenes' speeches. His first appearance in the courts was at the trial of Leptines»[5].

Düring's speculation as to the early time of composition stands against Dionysius of Halicarnassus' belief that the *Rhetoric* was a work of the post-Academic period, when Demosthenes had already composed his main speeches[6]. In this case Aristotle's rhetorical theory might have profited from Demosthenes' practice rather than the opposite. Dionysius' main effort is concentrated in proving that despite certain accusations, made by a Peripatetic philosopher, Demosthenes' genius owed

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1. H. Diels, Über das dritte Buch der aristotelischen Rhetorik, *Abhandl. d. Kön. Akad. d. Wissensch. zu Berlin. Philos. Hist. Kl. IV*, Berlin (1886), 11-16. Diels proposed that the *Theodecteia* is an Aristotelian composition; that when Theodectes took the lectureship in rhetoric after the departure of Aristotle from Athens in 347, he used for his lectures the original material Aristotle had composed. When Aristotle came back in 335 he found his own text enlarged by Theodectes' teaching. This material improved and revised was at the end published as the extant *Rhetoric*; cf. P. Maroux, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-101; G. Kennedy, *The art of persuasion in Greece*, Princeton (1963), pp. 103ff..

2. For a detailed discussion of varying opinions see K. Barwick, *op. cit.*, G. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, pp. 88ff.

3. *De Aristotelis Rhetoricis*, Göttingen, 1911.

4. *Op. cit.* p. 208.

5. *Op. cit.*, pp. 256ff. The assumption that Aristotle ignored Demosthenes for political reasons has not gained enough support generally. Aristotle's references in the *Rhetoric* show that on the whole he would not be prevented by personal or ideological reasons from using illustrations from an opponent's work.

6. Dion. Hal. *ad. Amm.* I, c. 3.

nothing to Aristotle's authority[1]. In his letter to his friend Ammaeus[2], Dionysius wrote that he undertook to compose it not only out of regard for the truth (*τῆς τε ἀληθείας προνοούμενος*) but .. *καὶ τῆς ἁπάντων τῶν περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ἐσπουδακότων χάριτος*. He tried to make the point that not everything achieved in rhetoric was included in the Peripatetic philosophy. Dionysius argues on the basis of chronological and other implicit evidence. So, the reference to the Olynthian War (*Rhet.* III 10, 1411a 1-8) was sufficient evidence for him that the *Rhetoric* was written after Plato's death and therefore the first group of the twelve public speeches of Demosthenes, written between 355-349, antedates the *Rhetoric*[3]. In addition to this, a reference in Bk. II (23, 1398a 1) alludes to the alliance between Athens and Philip in 339. To support his argument Dionysius compared the quoted passage with excerpts taken from Philochorus and from the speech *On the Crown*[4]. Dionysius then concluded that the Rhetoric's completion followed the second group of Demosthenic speeches delivered between 348—the end of the Olynthian War—and 339, when Philip sent ambassadors to Thebes. At the end he tried to prove that the *Rhetoric* was in fact completed even after the speech *On the Crown* (330), which was delivered after the battle of Chaeronea. He argued that in *Rhet.* II 23, 1398a 1, Aristotle alluded to the trial of

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1. Dion. Hal., *op. cit.*, c. 1: ... *ὅτι τῶν φιλοσόφων τις τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου πάντα χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος Ἀριστοτέλει τῷ κτίσαντι ταύτην τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ τοῦτο ὑπέσχετο ποιήσειν φανερόν, ὅτι Δημοσθένης τὰς ῥητορικὰς τέχνας παρ' ἐκείνου μαθὼν εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους μετήνεγκε λόγους καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνα κοσμούμενος τὰ παραγγέλματα πάντων ἐγένετο τῶν ῥητόρων κράτιστος*. Cf. I. Düring, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

2. *Op. cit.*, c.2. Dionysius gives a list of seven names of orators and some names of rhetoricians such as Thrasymachus, Theodorus, Alcidamas. He believes that in proving false the assertions made by certain peripatetics he was contributing to the truth in such an important matter. See Dion. Hal. *ad Amm.*, ed. R. Roberts, Cambridge (1901), p. 40.

3. Dion. provided a parallel chronological account of the lives of Demosthenes and Aristotle based mostly on historical tradition. As his only purpose was to prove that Demosthenes' speeches were anterior to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, he used from the historical sources only the necessary information to support his thesis. Cf. *ad Amm.* c. 12. On Dionysius as historian see R. Roberts' comments (*ibid.*, p. 25): «In the Dinarcho we see Dion. at his best as a literary historian, a role which ... fits him far better than that of the general historian».

4. See Philoch. Fr. 135 *FGrHist.* 328; Dem. *On the Crown* 311, 313 (cf. Aesch. *ag. Ctes.* 151); see Cope and J. E. Sandys The *Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 3, Cambridge, Engl. (1877) *ad loc.*

Aeschines against Ctesiphon[1]. So, he concludes that since Demosthenes had completed all his speeches before the *Rhetoric,* the assertion that *τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους ἐζηλωκέναι τέχνας τὸν Δημοσθένη* is false. On the contrary: *τὰ Δημοσθένους καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρων ἔργα παραθέμενος Ἀριστοτέλης ταύτας ἔγραψε τὰς τέχνας.*

Dionysius' *First Letter ad Ammaeum* is very important as an intermediate historical source regarding the chronology of literary achievements and of events in Aristotle's and Demosthenes' life. On the other hand, Dionysius' use of historical events was not always contributory to his literary aims[2]. Düring remarks that: «He (scil. Dionysius) had available a copy of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Andronicus' edition, i.e the same work as we possess today, including the *περὶ λέξεως α, β.* He could not know that this work is an amalgam of different treatises, written at different periods of Aristotle's life. From this point of view his conclusions were justified»[3].

Another point which should be discussed here is Dionysius' statement regarding the chronological relation between the *Rhetoric* and other Aristotelian works[4]. Dionysius argues also that since Aristotle referred to his other works in the *Rhetoric,* namely the *Topics, Analytics* and *Poetics,* it was natural to put the composition of the *Rhetoric* at a later date after the former works[5]. Aristotle indeed was not a beginner in teaching when he started his lectures on rhetoric in the Academy. Cicero clearly alluded to a change in Aristotle's curriculum (*mutavit repente totam formam*

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1. *Rhet.* II 23, 1397b 7: *καὶ ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων Νικάνορα*; modern research tends to prove that Dionysius' argument was wrong. Cf. Cope-Sandys, *ad loc.*

2. Cf. *supra* p. 7, n. 3. For a complete list of archons' names, Olympiads, and historical events see the chronological table in R. Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 162ff. For the chronology of the *corpus Demosthenicum* generally, see the tables provided by A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, III, Leipzig (1887) 430-452, and F. Blass, *op. cit.*, p. 54ff. It seems that Dionysius also failed to see the importance of another citation in the *Rhet.* II 23, 1399b 11f., which, as L. Spengel *(Comment. in Arist. Rhetoric*, Munich (1839), p. 39) pointed out, was an allusion to the alliance concluded between Alexander and the Greeks excluding Lacedaemonians at Corinth in 336 B.C.; see Cope, *Introduction*, p. 38 and Commentary *ad loc.*

3. *Op. cit.*, p. 256 and 258. On Andronicus of Rhodes, the Roman editor of Aristotle's works, see I. Düring, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-421; cf. also C. F. Grayeff, The problem of the genesis of Aristotle's text, *Phronesis* 1 (1956); J. P. Lynch, *Aristotle's School*, Univ. of California Press, (1972), pp. 192-194 and *passim.*

4. See I. Düring, *op. cit.*, 1, p. 258.

5. Dion. Hal. *ad. Amm.* c. 6, 7.

prope disciplinae suae), after the latter saw the success of Isocrates' school[1]. Philodemus' attack implied that Aristotle was already a teacher of philosophy, a subject which he had deserted in order to undertake lecturing in rhetoric[2]. In the *Rhetoric* (1356a 7) Aristotle pointed out that rhetoric is closely connected with politics as an offshoot of dialectics and ethics which may fairly be called politics[3]. Eloquence was the main tool for politics and the sciences of legislation and governing. The centre of gravity for both rhetoric and politics lies in how to address a large untrained audience in the assembly or the courts and in choosing what means of persuasion to adopt. Aristotle regarded as the most important function of the orator the demonstration, which is a form of dialectic[4]. He treated rhetoric as a counterpart of dialectics, to which the former is equal and not subordinate[5]. Dialectics in the Aristotelian sense was a method of logical syllogism as he developed it in his *Topics* and *Prior Analytics*. In his rhetorical theory he used the enthymeme, that is the rhetorical argument, and the example, in analogy to both scientific reasoning and syllogism[6]. Thus enthymemes, arguments on probabilities, form together with the emotions (*πάθη*) and the character of the speaker (*ἤθη*), the system of proofs which is regarded as the «core» of the Aristotelian rhetorical theory[7]. It seems, therefore, that Aristotle may well have started his lectures on rhetoric as an auxiliary course to that of politics. Aristotle in *Rhet.* 1356a 7 talked of those who confounded

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1. Cic. *de orat.* III 35, 141; see *supra* p. 3, n. 4.

2. See Düring's comments (*op. cit.*, pp. 299-311) on Philodemus' criticism.

3. *Rhet.* 1356a25: *ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν*. In fact, as rhetoric deals with human actions, characters and emotions, it follows that the individual and his morals are the subject of political science. See E. L. Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 20f. He remarks that «teaching Ethics as an abstract knowledge would seem as futile as the teaching of an abstract rhetoric». On the connexion of politics with ethics see also E.Zeller, *Aristotle and the earlier peripatetics*, II, London(1897), c.12, 13.

4. See Arist. *Top.* A 1; *Rhet.* I 2, 1357a7ff.

5. *Rhet.* I 1, 1354a1: *ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ*. See Cope-Sandys, *Commentary, ad loc.*; cf. R. Kassel, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, Berlin - New York, ed. 1976, *ad loc.*

6. *Rhet.* I 1, 1356b1: *τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ συλλογισμός,.... ἔστιν γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός*.

7. *Rhet.* I 1, 1356a-1-5; 1356a 20-25; see Fr. Solmsen, The Aristotelian tradition in ancient rhetoric, *AJP* 62 (1941), p. 38.

rhetoric with politics and assumed that they demonstrated political acumen by using rhetorical devices. Spengel had pointed out that Aristotle attacked Isocrates mainly for his legislative proposals[1]. Mulvany also made the assumption that Aristotle may not have attacked him so crudely had he not already been an expert in that art, and that at that time « at least a course of *Ethics* has been delivered and a collection of *politics* was ready»[2]. C. Ryle remarked that Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* «frequently talks as if his rhetoric students are quite familiar with the terminology and the practice of dialectic, i.e. as if they are learning both «arts» together»[3].

It is on *Antidosis* (258)[4] that Ryle has based his assumption that «dialectic had been a part of the curriculum for young men in the Academy for at least a little while before 354/3. From this we can infer that Aristotle started teaching rhetoric when he had already trained his students in the art of question and answer on certain theses and counter-theses». The *Topics* provided the «ready-made» commonplaces to be employed as arguments. Subsequently it has been suggested that the *Topics* was a subject of Aristotle's teaching in quite an early period in the Academy[5]. It has also been suggested[6] that in addition to the *Topics*, probably the *Prior Analytics* were completed, although the same could not be said of the *Analytics Posterior*. One may conclude, therefore, that the reference of other works of Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* does not necessarily prove that the completion of all these works preceded it chronologically.

It could also mean that Aristotle was lecturing on two or three different series of subjects with clearly distinguished premises, but over-

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1. L. Spengel, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

2. *Op. cit.*, *supra* n. 11, p. 53.

3. G. Ryle, Dialectic in the Academy, *Third Aristot. Symposium*, ed. G.E.L. Owen, Clarendon Press (1968), p. 69.

4. *Antid.* 258: *καὶ τί δεῖ τούτου θαυμάζειν, ὅπου καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας σπουδαζόντων ἔνιοί τινες ὁμοίως βλασφημοῦσι περὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὥσπερ οἱ φαυλότατον τῶν ἀνθρώπων*; with *ἔνιοι* Isocrates meant Aristotle and his course on dialectic which he called *eristics*.

5. See J. de Vogel, Aristotle's attitude to Plato and the theory of ideas according to the Topics, *Third Aristot. Sympos.* (1968), pp. 91-102.

6. I. Düring, *Aristotle and Plato in mid-fourth century*, Göteborg (1960), p.53ff., remarks that «the *Topics*, *Rhetoric* I-II, and considerable parts of *Analytics* and the *Categories* were, according to our best evidence, written and publicized in the form of lectures before *Protrepticus*».

lapping and contributing to a certain curriculum, for instance the training of a statesman, and that parts of the *Topics* or *Politics* had already been published when parts of the *Rhetoric* were written but not yet published[1]. G. Kennedy made the assumption that the extant *Rhetoric* was «the result of three further steps, though their order is uncertain»[2]. He accepted an early Academic stage and a final one during Aristotle's second period in Athens (perhaps around 330); he presumed that most probably «the better part of the ground work» on the *Rhetoric* was done in Macedonia (342-335), during the third period of Aristotle's life (347-335). If this assumption is correct he says this could explain the frequency with which passages from Isocrates are quoted and the striking absence of any quotation from Demosthenes.

There is no generally accepted answer to the questions which have arisen in this study. However, one could endeavour to clarify certain points, so that certain conclusions can be reached which would be based on the available evidence and on the comparison of various points of view.

A. It seems that the specific evidence which is available for Aristotle's involvement with rhetoric, refers only to the first period of his life in the Academy (367-347). We could attempt to further divide, with reservation, this period, only with respect to rhetoric, into an early Academic period (360-353/350), and a late Academic period (350-347). In the early period the influence of Plato is predominant, as can be seen from his (scil. Aristot.) polemic exposed in *Gryllus* (*supra*, p. 2). The inconsistency in Aristotle's attitude as expressed in Bk. A 1 (regarding the use of *affectus*) and the rest of the work is very significant for the development of his rhetorical theory. At the late Academic period, or even immediately after *Gryllus*, Aristotle must have gone through a second stage of formulating his own rhetorical theory. The main factors which influenced Aristotle's theory must have been: (1) Plato's attitude towards rhetoric and relevant studies pursued within the Academy; (2) the old traditional rhetorical systems via *Synagoge Technon*); (3) contemporary rhetorical theory esp. Isocratean, via Theodectes.

The result of this late Academic period, no matter when it was actually written, is illustrated in Bk I (except part 1), mainly Bk. II

1. See Cope, *Introduction*, p. 48f.
2. *Op. cit.*, 22, p. 84 n. 73.

and Bk. III[1]. The main points of the Aristotelian rhetorical theory are actually expressed in the first two books,which is a combination of dialectics, ethics and politics on a philosophical basis. His main contribution, however, to rhetorical theory was a classification of emotions based on reasoning, and it was a challenge to his master, on the very ground on which Plato denied that rhetoric was an «art» (Platonic «logos»). So it appears that, what started as a rejection in *Gryllus*, has ended as an acceptance in Bk. II 1-12.

For the second period of his life, while he was away from Athens (347-335), and for the third period in Lyceum (335-323) there is no information at hand with respect to the *Rhetoric*. G. Kennedy (*supra*, p. 11) asserts that the «better part of the ground work» was carried out in Macedonia. It is very unlikely that Aristotle brought his notes from his lectures on rhetoric to Macedonia, even in order to tutor the young Alexander[2].

Most of the well supported hypotheses, which have been made with respect to this topic, refer to the period in Lyceum, as the most logical period for the final revision and publication of the *Rhetoric*. It is in this period that Aristotle classified, completed, and published most of his works. The chronology of the composition of the *Rhetoric*, therefore, cannot be assigned with much certainty to one period, since it was a drawn out work, completed over a long period of time and a process which followed the development of Aristotle's thought.

B. Regarding the second part of the present study which refers to the possible influence of Aristotle on Demosthenes or *vice versa*, the following can be concluded:

Dionysius in his attempt to prove that Demosthenes did not learn anything from Aristotle's rhetorical theory, follows an oversimplified method. In other words, he presents mainly a series of chronological evidence, which prove, according to his opinion, that the *Rhetoric* is a re-

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1. See my *Techniques of emotional appeal in Demosthenes and their relation to pre-Aristotelian and Aristotelian rhetorical theory*, Univ. of London, 1980, p.62 (unpublished thesis).

2. Cope, *Introduction*, p. 37, believes that the chronological and other internal evidence in the *Rhetoric* show a very close relation of the work to the Athenian life and history; this could be a reason to eliminate the two periods of Aristotle's life in Athens as the possible time of the composition of the *Rhetoric*. Yet, there was always the possibility of a revision of the work in Macedonia, but not of an original composition.

sult of Aristotle's maturity and therefore, it was composed at a time later than the *corpus Demosthenicum* as a whole. As it has been pointed before (*supra*, p. 6) in the light of present research, certain of his points lack persuasive evidence. This, however, does not mean that his original point of view was not correct. In fact we accept that Dionysius was right to believe that «it was his obligation to defend Demosthenes and together with him a whole generation of orators and rhetoricians against the ignorance and the unfair criticism of those who pretended to know everything»[1].

It is the writer's belief that to prove whether Demosthenes was or was not influenced by Aristotle is not a simple matter of presenting chronological evidence as to when the *Rhetoric* and the *corpus Demosthenicum* appeared. After all, is it logical to expect without doubt the existence of a mutual influence?

Let us suppose then that the largest part of the *Rhetoric* (Bk. I, II), had been completed before Demosthenes became famous as an orator, around 355 B.C. This, as it has been argued, could account for the lack of any comments from Demosthenes' orations in these books with the exclusion of Bk. II 23-24[2]. The same argument, however, cannot be applied to Bk. III, which also completely lacks references to Demosthenes. Assuming that Demosthenes was already well known during the first phase of the write-up of the *Rhetoric* (around 350 B.C.), had Aristotle any need to use him as reference? In fact, it seems improbable that Aristotle would have sought sources of reference from his contemporary orators.After all his target was the sophistic rhetoric and more specifically Isocrates and his school. What he mainly wanted to prove, as it is shown from his first two books, was that rhetoric, which was developed out of practice (*ἐμπειρία*), could become an art (*τέχνη*) when reduced to a scientific method. The basis of this systematization was a tripartite system of proofs, logical, ethical and emotional[3].

Now we come to the controversial Bk. III in which he deals with matters of style and the arrangement (*dispositio*) of the rhetorical material (*λέξις-τάξις*). This examination leads inevitably to the parts of a speech and their contents. Such subject matter represents the core of

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1. See *supra* p. 7, n. 2 cf. Dion. Hal. *De compositione verborum*, ed. R. Roberts (*On literary composition*, London 1910, p. 262).

2. See Düring, *op. cit.*, p. 259. Bk. II 23-24 was probably a later addition.

3. See Solmsen, *supra* p. 9, n. 7.

the sophistic rhetoric and all the systems of traditional rhetoric[1]. Aristotle could not exclude it from his system. He faced this problem by doing two things a) formalizing and elevating the *pathê* from an instictual to a cognitive level, and b) exerting a continuous criticism, which indicates a progressive compromise. This recurring criticism of the techniques of the sophistic rhetoric is, more or less, the pattern of Aristotle's presentation of rhetorical material in this part of the *Rhetoric*[2].

From the significance of these subjects for any rhetorical theory we are obliged to conclude that this book, as it now exists, is a critical presentation of earlier material. In other words this material must have been in existence in the first Academic period (360-350)[3]. If, however, as it seems probable, the final revision was made during the last period (around 330), the question remains: was Aristotle in need of Demosthenic practice?

Aristotle's references in the *Rhetoric* indicate that he did not have to refer to Demosthenes while illustrating his theory. In fact, these references show that Aristotle never referred to his contemporary orators and Demosthenes apparently was not an exception to the rule[4]. A simple examination of the references indicate that Aristotle's most significant sources were: a) Homer, and the tragic poetry[5], and b) sophists and rhetoricians.With regard to orators, Aristotle makes more extensive references to Isocrates and very limited ones to Lysias[6]. He actually refers to Demosthenes only once[7]; an indirect reference to Demades' point of view regarding the former's policy. In fact, it seems that both Isocrates and / or Lysias fitted very nicely Aristotle's rule.

Isocrates was a philosopher, a writer, and mainly a teacher. His orations were mainly political pamphlets or epideictic speechs, which

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1. The third book devoted to style proves that Aristotle was obviously using a textbook bearing many similarities to the Isocratean style. Especially the last chapters (13-19) seem to be a quotation of the *partes orationis*, an infallible sign of Isocrates' theory and the tendencies of his school (cf. Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 16); cf. *supra* p. 6, n. 1, cf. also Solmsen, *Drei Rekonstruktionen*, p. 145f.

2. E. g. *Rhet.* 1415b4; b18; b22; b33.

3. Cf. *supra* p. 2, n. 1.

4. By which «rule» I mean Aristotle's lack of references to the actual text of a contemporary orator.

5. References were also made to representatives of other kinds of poetry.

6. The references to Antiphon are to the tragic poet and not to the orator.

7. Cf. *supra* p. 8, n. 1. Even if we accept that the three references to Demosthenes (1399b 12; 1401b 32; 1407a7) are actually references to our orator, this does not change the fact that there is no actual reference to Demosthenes' text.

means that he was anything but an orator active in the courts or the assembly. Regarding Lysias it is known that he lived for some time in Sicily, and that he became a student of Tisias, the Sicilian rhetorician. He is said to have written *Technas* and demegories, eulogies and among other things a defence of Socrates[1]. Plato and Aristotle seem to have accepted his rhetorical ability.He was older than Isocrates (*ibid.*, 836b-c.). He became a professional logographos out of necessity and never (except once) did he appear in the assembly or in courts[2].

It appears then that even if we accept the idea that changes and additions were made to the *Rhetoric* to bring it up-to-date (e.g. Bk. II 23-24), in its final state it preserved the original material of its synthesis during the first Academic period. Furthermore, Aristotle despite his compromises regarding stylistic matters and rhetorical devices, remained faithful to his original aim, which was to create a system of rhetorical theory with a philosophical foundation. In other words the extent of the applicability of the teaching of the *Rhetoric* at the Academy or at the Lyceum was limited and did not encompass Aristotle's contemporary orators and their practice. One has the feeling that even his reference to Isocrates represents an excuse in order to level a criticism against theories (aesthetic, rhetorical, psychological) which appeared much earlier than the middle of the fourth century. It is interesting to note that more references were made to Theodectes as a tragic poet than to Theodectes as a rhetorician. However, the topic of references found in the

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1. *Vit. X or.* 836B; see S. Usher, Lysias and his clients, *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 17 (1976) p. 32f.

2. See *Vit. X or.* 835F - 836A: *καὶ οὕτως ἀπελαθεὶς τῆς πολιτείας τὸν λοιπὸν ᾤκησε χρόνον ἰσοτελὴς ὤν.* Lysias therefore, may have failed to become a citizen but he remained a metic. This would mean that he could speak in a law court and that he may have actually appeared in the court more than once. This, however, does not change the fact that most of his speeches were written for his clients (*ibid.*,836B); Cicero (*Brutus* 48), most probably quoting Aristotle's *Synagoge Technon*, says: *nam Lysiam primo profiteri solitum artem esse dicendi deinde, quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus autem ieiunior, orationes eum scribere aliis coepisse, artem removisse;* cf. K. Barwick, *Hermes* 57(1922),p. 49. On Lysias' technique as a professional speechwriter see the interesting remarks of S. Usher (*op. cit.* p. 39). «the quotation of the actual words alleged to have been used in a conversation, argument or harangue, is rare in Lysias, and this is one of the characteristics which makes him less of a 'natural' orator, than for example, Andocides and Aeschines. More interesting, however, is the fact that when live speech is used by Lysias, it tends to have a certain stiff formality».

Rhetoric and of the comparison that could be made between rhetoric and tragic poetry is beyond the purpose of the study at hand.

With Demosthenes, the greatest orator of antiquity, we come to oratorical practice. Demosthenic oratory, exercised at exactly the same period as the development of Aristotle's rhetorical theory, proves in the best possible way that in the area of oratory (during the fourth century at least) Aristotle's theory did not play any role[1]. Demosthenes' oratory derives from and follows traditional rhetorical methods, which were expanded and perfected by his ingenuity. That means that the accumulation of rhetorical and stylistic knowledge, made by generations of sophists and rhetoricians, was available for anyone to use; Demosthenes, therefore, did not need to consult Aristotle's authority in matters where the rhetorical tradition could supply him with many practical solutions.We may assume therefore, that a speech was precisely the combination of pre-existent theory using traditional practice and the orator's personal contribution brought in his case.

Aristotle's rhetorical theory runs in successive parallel stages to the contemporary oratorical practice, a great part of which he ignores or despises. On the question of mutual influence it seems certain that he adopted some, at least, of the precepts of pre-Aristotelian theory.

Minor rhetoricians had not followed the Aristotelian tradition, though they had adopted some of its theoretical precepts. They followed the traditional rhetorical practice and theory. The bulk of quotations from Demosthenes[2] proves the importance of his contribution to the history of rhetorical theory. It also proves the undisputable superiority of practice, as represented by Demosthenes' speeches, over Aristotle's rhetorical system.

Pre-Aristotelian rhetoricians, or any other of the τεχνολογοῦντες, did not consider it necessary to describe in detail the variety of emotions and to define them in the scientific manner employed by Aristotle. Since the main outlines of the art of rhetoric were already drawn, the way every day speech was written was, more or less, a variation of well known principles which derived from everyday experience.

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1. See my thesis (*supra* p. 12 n. 1), pp. 128ff.

2. See the indices in L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 3 vols., Leipzig (1854-1856), and H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, Lipsiae (1931).